

SOUTH SUDAN



ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE	For 2016	For 2015
Problem understood	6	5
Target date for completion of mine clearance	3	4
Targeted clearance	7	6
Efficient clearance	7	6
National funding of programme	3	3
Timely clearance	6	6
Land release system in place	7	6
National mine action standards	7	7
Reporting on progress	6	6
Improving performance	8	8
PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE	6.0	5.7

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

South Sudan's mine action programme continued to improve in 2016 despite the challenges posed by ongoing armed conflict and an escalation of violence in July, which led to many operators suspending their activities. While the amount of land released by clearance and technical survey fell by nearly half from the previous year due to restrictions on movement and increasing insecurity, the amount of land cancelled through non-technical survey increased nearly fourfold from the previous year, bringing the total amount of mined area released in 2016 to just under 20km², compared with 9.5km² in 2015.¹ However, despite increased clearance activities, new hazardous areas continued to be identified on a monthly basis.²

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- South Sudan should make every effort to minimise the risk to civilians from mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).
- South Sudan should increase its financial support for operational mine action. Greater support should also be provided to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) to build its capacity to develop effective mine action plans and policies.
- Continued efforts should be made to ensure accurate reporting by operators of mine action data and recording according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land release terminology.
- South Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.

CONTAMINATION

South Sudan is heavily contaminated by anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, and other explosive weapons that were employed during nearly 50 years of Sudanese civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 led to the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Following two years of independence and relative peace in South Sudan, heavy fighting erupted in the capital city, Juba, on 15 December 2013, commencing a new multi-dimensional conflict across the country.

According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), as at the end of 2016, South Sudan had a total of 254 areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, covering a total area of nearly 82.3km², as set out in Table 1.³

Table 1: Mine and Explosive Remnants of War contamination (as at end-2016)⁴

Type of contamination	SHAs	Area (m ²)
Anti-personnel mines	254	82,278,885
Anti-vehicle mines	74	1,539,818
Cluster munition remnants	142	4,584,943
Other UXO	247	3,535,684
Totals	717	91,939,329

SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas
UXO = Unexploded ordnance

Nine of South Sudan's (formerly ten) states contain suspected mined areas, with Central Equatoria the most heavily contaminated, followed by Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei, according to UNMAS (see Table 2).⁵

Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination by former state (as at end-2016)⁶

State	SHAs	Area (m ²)
Central Equatoria	135	3,765,919
Eastern Equatoria	58	4,978,522
Jonglei	32	30,724,553
Lakes	2	23,500
North Bahr El Ghazal	1	80,100
Upper Nile	8	39,173,413
Warrap	1	8,400
West Bahr El Ghazal	4	2,829,933
Western Equatoria	13	694,545
Totals	254	82,278,885

The full extent of South Sudan's explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination remains unknown. SHAs continue to be identified, while the existing threat is being compounded by the renewed heavy fighting since December 2013, which continues to result in new UXO contamination, particularly in Greater Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states.⁷ Ongoing and increasing insecurity persisted in greatly limiting access to many areas of the country, severely impeding efforts to confirm or address contamination, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region.⁸

Mine, cluster munition remnant, and ERW contamination in South Sudan continues to pose a physical threat to local populations, prevents the delivery of vital humanitarian aid, curtails freedom of movement, and significantly impedes the development of affected communities.⁹ In 2016, due to the escalating violence, internally displaced populations were particularly vulnerable to landmines and other munitions as they moved across unfamiliar territory, often lacking information about the pattern of conflict and contamination. Mine and ERW contamination continued to limit access to agricultural land and increased food insecurity, at a time when nearly four million South Sudanese were facing famine. During the year, UNMAS documented numerous examples of mines and other munitions preventing the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid.¹⁰

Despite the signature of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in August 2015, UNMAS reported that in 2016, armed conflict continued across the country and expanded into new areas, which it said "continues to litter vast swathes of land, roads and buildings" with munitions.¹¹ UNMAS reported that an average of 160 previously unknown hazardous areas were discovered each month in 2016.¹²

Mine Action Review is not aware of any confirmed reports of new use of anti-personnel mines in the renewed conflict, which began in 2013.¹³ In March 2015, however, a group of states monitoring the ceasefire in South Sudan reported that a government army officer "stated clearly that anti-personnel mines had been deployed in the area around Nassir", in Upper Nile state, by government forces.¹⁴ In response, South Sudan's army information director, Malaak Ayuen, denied that government forces had used mines.¹⁵

In December 2015, South Sudan informed states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) that it had not been feasible to carry out a verification mission to investigate the allegation due to lack of access from continuing armed conflict in the area. It stated that a committee would be established to investigate the allegation as soon as security conditions permitted and welcomed the participation of members of UNMAS and civil society on a verification mission.¹⁶ UNMAS confirmed in April 2017 that no further investigations had taken place.¹⁷

At the start of 2017, almost eight million people in South Sudan were living with the constant threat of the presence of mines and ERW, including more than 2.3 million South Sudanese who have been forced to become internally displaced since the outbreak of fighting in 2013. According to UNMAS, surveys of internally displaced persons identified a fear of ERW as among the most significant reasons for their inability to return home.¹⁸ UNMAS has claimed that the socio-economic cost of mines and ERW in South Sudan in terms of interrupted agricultural production, food insecurity, halted commerce, and the lack of freedom of movement is "incalculable".¹⁹

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) – now named the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) – was established in 2006 by presidential decree to act as the national agency for coordination, planning, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.²⁰

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011), UNMAS was given the responsibility to support South Sudan in demining while strengthening the capacity of the NMAA. Accordingly, UNMAS (with the NMAA) has been overseeing all mine action in South Sudan through its main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau.²¹ UNMAS is responsible for accrediting mine action organisations, developing national mine action standards, establishing a quality management system, managing the IMSMA database, and tasking operators.²²

While it is planned that eventually NMAA will assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, South Sudan's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016 notes that the government did "not have the financial and technical capacity to support its mine action program. UN agencies, development partners, and international organizations will need to support the program in providing technical and financial assistance".²³ UN Security Council Resolution 1996 authorised UNMISS to support mine action through assessed peacekeeping funds.²⁴

In May 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2155 in response to the conflict that broke out in December 2013. The resolution, which marked a significant change in mine action policy, effectively ended the mission's mandate to support capacity development of government institutions. The NMAA informed Mine Action Review in September 2017 that the transition from UN to national ownership was in limbo and progress towards achieving this goal had effectively stopped. The NMAA said it lacked the basic means to fulfil its functions.²⁵

Strategic Planning

Following the expiry of the 2012–16 National Mine Action Strategy, the NMAA, in close collaboration with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and with support from UNMAS, started developing South Sudan's new national mine action strategy in 2017. A first strategy stakeholder workshop was organised in Juba in August 2017 to agree on the mine action programme's vision, mission, goals, and objectives. The new national strategy will be finalised by 2018. There were no significant changes in 2016 to the existing strategic plan for 2012–16, which was developed by the NMAA with assistance from the GICHD and UNMAS.²⁶ The main objectives of the plan were to ensure that:

- South Sudan is in a position to comply with all international instruments related to mines and ERW and can conduct and manage the national mine action programme.
- The scope and location of the mine and ERW contamination are fully recorded, and all high-impact contaminated areas are identified, prioritised, cleared, and released.
- The national mine action programme contributes to poverty reduction and socio-economic development by being mainstreamed into development programmes.²⁷

Standards

While there were no changes to the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for mine action in South Sudan during 2016, according to UNMAS, revisions to the NTSGs that were implemented from October 2015 contributed to more efficient land release.²⁸ The NTSGs are jointly monitored by UNMAS and the NMAA.²⁹

Quality Management

UNMAS reported carrying out external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) operations throughout 2016 on all mine action operators in South Sudan. It stated that at the end of the year the QA/QC system was amended slightly, but QA/QC activities were set to continue with the same level of coverage for all operators in 2017.³⁰

Due to constraints on the movement of UN staff due to increasing security concerns, at the end of 2016, UNMAS contracted a private company, Janus Global Operations, to conduct external QA/QC on behalf of UNMAS in South Sudan.³¹

Operators

Four international demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operated in South Sudan in 2016: DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). Four commercial companies also conducted demining: G4S Ordnance Management (G4S), Mechem, Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML) (formerly MineTech International, MTI), and The Development Initiative (TDI). No national demining organisations were involved in clearance in 2016.³²

According to UNMAS, at its peak in 2016, mine action capacity in South Sudan included 62 technical teams, the bulk of which was in commercial companies, along with six mechanical assets, and one team supported by mine detection dogs (MDDs). However, this capacity lay idle in the second half of 2016, after conflict resurged in Juba and insecurity spread across the country. As at September 2017, survey and clearance capacity had not returned to the levels prior to the July 2016 crisis, and according to UNMAS, remained dependent on the re-establishment of secure operating conditions.³³

UNMAS assigns mine action tasks to operators. In 2016, MAG began deploying Multi-Task Teams (MTTs) with mechanical support from a PT-300D mine clearance machine, a MineWolf 330, and three Bozena machines which allowed for a sizeable increase in the scale of its operations on large-area clearance tasks. Its staff level rose to a total of 200, a significant increase in capacity from 2015. Two MTT teams and one MineWolf team under UN contracts were, however, demobilised after insecurity led to the cancellation of the contracts in September 2016.³⁴ In 2016, DDG changed its operational focus to responding to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs and did not engage in mine clearance operations.³⁵

NPA changed its operations to deploy smaller, more mobile teams focusing on non-technical and technical survey, with support from its MDDs, and for emergency EOD. Teams were re-accredited and a new operations base opened in Juba, although the teams could not be deployed because of the security situation.³⁶ Following an internal restructuring, NPA reassessed the viability of its programme in South Sudan and with no signs of improvement in security conditions took the decision to close the programme indefinitely in November 2016.³⁷

LAND RELEASE

In 2016, nearly 20km² of mined area was released through survey and clearance, including more than 2.6km² through clearance and technical survey, and a further 17.2km² through non-technical survey.³⁸ In total, nearly 27.8km² was released back to local communities, with the destruction of 585 anti-personnel mines, 200 anti-vehicle mines, and 20,190 items of UXO. In addition, 1,272km of roads were opened through route assessment and verification.³⁹ This was despite a resurgence of violence that resulted in mine action operations being suspended for much of the second half of 2016 and a dramatic reduction in areas across the country where operations could safely be carried out.⁴⁰

Overall land release in South Sudan doubled in 2016, from close to 14km² in 2015 to 28km² in 2016, due to a large increase in land cancelled through non-technical survey and an increase in battle area clearance. The amount of mined area reduced by technical survey and cleared, however, fell from 5.1km² in 2015 to 2.6km² in 2016, in large part due to a significant decrease in the amount of mechanical clearance and technical survey. This was a result of the deterioration of the security situation and greater restrictions on safe movement.⁴¹ There was a corresponding decrease in 2016 in the number of mines and UXO destroyed, down from the 1,715 anti-personnel mines, 473 anti-vehicle mines, and 27,395 items of UXO destroyed in 2015, and also a reduction in

the amount of roads opened through route assessment and verification, from that of just over 3,000km in 2015.⁴²

In total, UNMAS has also reported that, from 2004 to end-2016, more than 13,580 hazards have been addressed, over 1,175km² of land has been released (cancelled, reduced and cleared), and 27,573km of roads opened, with nearly 31,253 anti-personnel mines, 5,735 anti-vehicle mines, and 902,360 items of UXO destroyed.⁴³

Survey in 2016

As summarised in Table 3, in 2016, a total of 18 mined areas covering just under 17.2km² were cancelled through non-technical survey, and almost 71,400m² was reduced by technical survey. In addition, 30 areas covering nearly 1.8km² were confirmed as mined, according to UNMAS records.⁴⁴

As noted above, this is a significant increase in land cancelled through non-technical survey as compared with 2015, when 33 mined areas covering just under 4.4km² were cancelled. UNMAS reported that the nearly fourfold increase in area cancellation in 2016 was due to a greater emphasis on the role of community liaison officers in obtaining accurate survey data from informants.⁴⁵ At the same time, in combination with the reduction in clearance output, the amount of land reduced by technical survey fell by nearly half, compared to the reduction of nearly 145,000m² by technical survey in 2015. The amount of land confirmed as mined also decreased in 2016, from 145 areas comprising nearly 3.5km² the previous year.⁴⁶

Table 3: Mined area survey in 2016⁴⁷

Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m ²)	SHAs confirmed as mined	Area confirmed (m ²)	Area reduced by TS (m ²)
DCA	0	0	1	200,396	0
DDG	0	0	0	0	2,060
G4S	6	2,238,894	13	557,096	2,324
MECHEM	2	563,194	2	41,808	0
MAG	1	750,034	6	185,833	0
DML	7	279,292	2	51,528	67,015
TDI	1	13,257,399	6	796,941	0
UNMAS	1	77,489	0	0	0
Totals	18	17,166,302	30	1,833,602	71,399

TS = Technical survey

Clearance in 2016

A total of 74 mined areas covering nearly 2.6km² were released by clearance in 2016, with the destruction of 585 anti-personnel mines and 200 anti-vehicle mines (see Table 4).⁴⁸ This is nearly half of the amount cleared in 2015, which UNMAS had reported as the highest ever

total land reduced through technical survey and cleared since the inception of humanitarian mine clearance in South Sudan in 2004.⁴⁹ According to UNMAS, the reduction in mine clearance in 2016 was caused by the deteriorating security situation.⁵⁰

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2016⁵¹

Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
MAG	11	380,479	38	4	325
MECHEM	6	74,199	2	9	203
DCA	2	1,655	19	10	815
G4S	28	697,898	373	101	14,620
DDG	2	0	6	0	626
DML	18	924,602	127	52	139
TDI	7	495,711	13	24	416
NPA	0	1,179	7	0	1
Totals	74	2,575,723	585	200	17,145

AP = Anti-personnel

AV = Anti-vehicle

Deminer Safety

On 12 April 2016, two members of DDG's EOD team were killed by gunmen when their vehicle was ambushed as they travelled to the field from their base in Yei, Central Equatorial state, for a routine EOD call-out.⁵² The outbreak of violence across the Equatorial states in July 2016 affected many operators, including MAG, which

experienced an ambush during evacuation to Nimule, on the Ugandan border, resulting in the death of one national medic and gunshot wounds to three other staff. Two ambulances were set on fire and a large proportion of the team's equipment was lost.⁵³

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

In accordance with Article 5 of the APMBC, South Sudan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2021. South Sudan is not on track to meet this deadline.

UNMAS has highlighted the serious obstacles posed to mine action operations by ongoing fighting and insecurity, lack of access to contaminated areas, and new UXO contamination, along with continuing significant challenges from lack of infrastructure and access to vast areas of the country, and the unpredictable rainy seasons.⁵⁴ Given the current security situation, UNMAS stated in 2017 that it is not likely that South Sudan can meet its July 2021 Article 5 deadline.⁵⁵

Table 5: Mine clearance in 2012–16⁵⁶

Year	Area cleared or reduced (km ²)
2016	2.65
2015	5.10
2014	2.72
2013	4.33
2012	4.20
Total	19.00

While operators raised concerns over the lack of government funding for the NMAA and mine action activities in the country, according to UNMAS, the Transitional Government of National Unity in South Sudan paid the salaries of the staff of the NMAA in 2016.⁵⁷ In December 2016, at the APMBC Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, South Sudan requested support for the NMAA to enable it to undertake QA/QC and field visits, for training in areas of concern such as information management and operations, and for institutional capacity building and office hardware and supplies as well as transportation.⁵⁸

As reported above, the surge in conflict in July 2016 had a significant impact on demining activities across the country. Operations south of Juba were suspended due to security concerns for most of the second half of the year. Due to the spread and intensification of conflict in the Equatoria region, DDG was forced to shut down all clearance operations across Western, Central, and Eastern Equatoria April 2016, following the attack on its staff. It resumed operations in Unity and Upper Nile states two weeks later, but work remained suspended across Equatoria as at June 2017.⁵⁹

MAG suspended its operations on 8 July 2016 and all international staff left the country soon after. Due to the persistent conflict, operations could only be restarted in November 2016 in the small state of Terekeka, Central Equatoria, north of Juba, after the retraining of three MTTs.⁶⁰ After long periods of stand-down of operations due to a combination of restructuring issues, and constantly increasing security threats towards its staff with no sign of improvement, NPA closed its operations in South Sudan indefinitely in November 2016.⁶¹

In 2017, MAG was continuing to concentrate operations in Terekeka state, Central Equatoria due to ongoing nationwide insecurity, with the aim of declaring Terekeka free from the threat of ERW within five years. It expected that with additional donor funding, it would increase its non-technical survey capacity and deploy five community liaison and five technical teams during the year. MAG hoped to return to its earlier staff capacity by mid-2017, provided that it was successful in winning back the UN contracts that had been cancelled due to insecurity in 2016.⁶² DDG expected to continue to focus on EOD call-outs during the year.⁶³

1 Email from Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 18 April 2017; and UNMAS, "IMMSA Monthly Report – December 2016".
 2 Email Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; and UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan".
 3 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; and Tim Lardner, Programme Manager, UNMAS, 21 September 2017. UNMAS reported that discrepancies in the total figures for anti-personnel mine contamination as at end-2016, taking into account contamination released and confirmed during 2016, versus that which was reported at end-2015, were likely the result of a period of data reconciliation during the year.

4 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 and 21 September 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form C.
 5 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017; and Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form C. According to UNMAS, the most heavily affected provinces are those with the highest number of SHAs, rather than those with the largest recorded total area size of contamination, as the size of contamination can change dramatically through the process of technical survey.
 6 Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 18 September 2017.
 7 Ibid., 14 October 2016.

- 8 UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan".
- 9 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 10 Ibid.; and UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan".
- 11 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), there were no allegations of new anti-personnel mine use in the renewed fighting which began in 2013; in 2011, however, there were several incidents of apparent anti-personnel mine use. A fact-finding mission was sent to investigate the reports in Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile, and Western Bahr El Ghazal states in June–July 2013, during which civil authorities and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) commanders denied using anti-personnel mines, though SPLA officials affirmed that mines had been laid by rebel forces in Unity and Jonglei states. See Landmine Monitor, "Country Profile: South Sudan, Mine Ban Policy", 30 October 2014, at: <http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/south-sudan/mine-ban-policy.aspx>.
- 14 The monitoring group, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, consisting of seven East African states, reported that the officer made the statement on 12 March 2015, in a meeting between senior members of the government armed forces, UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) staff, and members of IGAD. See Intergovernmental Authority on Development Offices of the Special Envoys for South Sudan, "Summary of Latest Reports of Violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) Investigated and verified by the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in South Sudan from 1–16 March 2015", at: http://southsudan.igad.int/attachments/article/284/Violations_Summary_V32-35_ENG.pdf. See also ICBL-Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), "Concern at Reported Use of Antipersonnel Mines in South Sudan", Press release, Geneva, 31 March 2015, at: <http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2015/concern-at-reported-use-of-antipersonnel-mines-in-south-sudan.aspx>; and I. Gridneff, "South Sudan Army's Landmine Use Escalates War, Monitors Say", Bloomberg Business, 30 March 2015, at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-30/south-sudan-army-s-use-of-land-mines-escalates-war-monitors-say>.
- 15 Gridneff, "South Sudan Army's Landmine Use Escalates War, Monitors Say".
- 16 Statement of South Sudan, 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.
- 17 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan".
- 20 South Sudan, "South Sudan De-Mining Authority", undated, at: <http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/Independent-Commissions-and-Chambers/De-Mining-Authority.html#publications>.
- 21 Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 4 October 2017.
- 22 South Sudan, "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016", Juba, February 2012, p. iv, at: http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/nma-strat/NMAS-SouthSudan-2012-2016.pdf.
- 23 South Sudan, "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016", Juba, February 2012, p. iii.
- 24 UNMISS, "United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre [UNMACC]", undated, at: <http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4313&language=en-US>.
- 25 Interview with Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, in Geneva, 6 September 2017.
- 26 Information provided by Åsa Masselberg, Advisor, Strategic Management, GICHD, 21 September 2017.
- 27 South Sudan, "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016", Juba, 2012, p. v.
- 28 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Emails from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017; and Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017.
- 32 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017. MTI changed its name to DML on 3 August 2015. Dynasafe, "History of MineTech", at: <http://www.minetech.co.uk/who-we-are/history-of-minetech/>.
- 33 Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017.
- 34 Email from Bill Marsden, Regional Director East and Southern Africa, MAG, 11 May 2017.
- 35 Email from William Maina, Mine Action Operations Manager, DDG, 1 May 2017.
- 36 Emails from Frédéric Martin, Programme Manager, NPA, 5 April and 4 May 2017.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017; and William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.
- 39 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2016". This includes a total of nearly 8km² released through battle area clearance.
- 40 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017; and William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.
- 41 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2016".
- 42 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2015".
- 43 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2016".
- 44 Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2015"; and email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016.
- 47 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; and Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017. MAG reported cancelling two areas with a size of 64,000m². It did not report confirming any area as mined, nor reducing any area through technical survey. Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017.
- 48 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 49 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2015"; email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016; and Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
- 50 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 51 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; and Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017. MAG reported clearing a total of five areas with a size of 451,830m² and destroying 26 anti-personnel mines, 2 anti-vehicle mines, and 112 items of UXO. DDG reported clearing two areas with the destruction of six anti-personnel mines; it did not report figures for the size of the areas cleared or other munitions destroyed. NPA reported processing 54,773m² of land in 2016, however, it said no tasks were completed and no area was released for use. It reported finding and destroying nine anti-personnel mines, twelve submunitions, and two items of UXO. Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017; William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017; and Frédéric Martin, NPA, 5 April and 4 May 2017.
- 52 Email from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017; and Danish Refugee Council, "Two national employees have lost their lives in South Sudan", 12 April 2016, at: <http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/two-national-employees-have-lost-their-lives-south-sudan>.
- 53 Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017 and 21 October 2016.
- 54 UNMAS, "About UNMAS in South Sudan", updated March 2015; and UNMAS "About UNMAS in South Sudan," updated May 2016.
- 55 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 56 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2014"; and response to questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015; and emails, 14 October 2016 and 18 April 2017.
- 57 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017; Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017; and William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.
- 58 Statement of South Sudan, 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 30 November 2016.
- 59 Emails from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017 and 5 June 2017.
- 60 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017.
- 61 Email from Frédéric Martin, NPA, 4 May 2017.
- 62 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017.
- 63 Email from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.