

# SOUTH SUDAN

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021**  
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

## PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

	2017	2016
Problem understood	6	6
Target date for completion of mine clearance	2	3
Targeted clearance	7	7
Efficient clearance	7	7
National funding of programme	3	3
Timely clearance	6	6
Land-release system in place	7	7
National mine action standards	7	7
Reporting on progress	6	6
Improving performance	7	8
<b>PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>6.0</b>

## PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Release of mined areas plummeted in South Sudan in 2017, from nearly 20km<sup>2</sup> in 2016 to just over 3.7km<sup>2</sup> in 2017. This was largely due to security concerns from the ongoing conflict, which significantly impeded mine action operations during the year. As a result of the heightened insecurity, the programme shifted away from large area clearance to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks using smaller, more mobile teams. This greatly reduced the extent of demining.<sup>1</sup>

In 2018, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) stated that South Sudan was unlikely to meet its July 2021 Article 5 deadline. A new national mine action strategy was developed for 2018–22, but the conflict and associated insecurity means the deadline will be subject to further delays.<sup>2</sup> In June 2018, South Sudan's National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) informed states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) that it intended to submit an additional extension request for a period of five years beyond its July 2021 deadline.<sup>3</sup>

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- South Sudan should make every effort to minimise the risk to civilians from mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).
- South Sudan should complete re-survey of areas suspected to contain mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) with a view to more accurately determining the baseline of contamination.
- Continued efforts should be made to ensure accurate reporting by operators of mine action data and recording according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land release terminology.
- South Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.
- South Sudan should increase its financial support for mine action operations. Greater assistance from the government and international partners should be provided to the NMAA to strengthen its capacity to develop and implement effective policies to address explosive ordnance.
- The mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) should be changed to include support for the capacity development of government institutions and the national mine action programme.

## CONTAMINATION

South Sudan is heavily contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, as well as ERW, including cluster munition remnants (CMR). The weapons were used during nearly 50 years of Sudanese civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 led to the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Following two years of independence and relative peace in South Sudan, heavy fighting erupted in the capital city, Juba, in December 2013, initiating a new multi-dimensional armed conflict across the country.

According to UNMAS, as at the end of 2017, South Sudan had a combined total of 220 areas confirmed and suspected to contain anti-personnel mines covering a total area of almost 80km<sup>2</sup> (see Table 1).<sup>4</sup> At the end of 2016, 254 areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines covered an estimated 82km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>5</sup>

**Table 1: Mine and Explosive Remnants of War contamination (at end-2017)<sup>6</sup>**

Type of contamination	CHAs	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )	SHAs	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )
Anti-personnel mines	56	2,579,507	164	77,052,215
Anti-vehicle mines	15	132,548	55	1,378,273
CMR	60	2,758,274	83	1,775,408
Other UXO	27	1,867,572	224	1,540,351
<b>Totals</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>7,337,901</b>	<b>526</b>	<b>81,746,247</b>

CHAs = Confirmed hazardous areas SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas

Nine of South Sudan's (formerly ten) states contain suspected mined areas, with Central Equatoria the most heavily contaminated, followed by Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei, according to UNMAS (see Table 2).<sup>7</sup>

**Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination by former state (at end-2017)<sup>8</sup>**

State	CHAs	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )	SHAs	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )
Central Equatoria	34	1,576,262	89	1,941,472
Eastern Equatoria	14	846,226	30	3,322,477
Jonglei	3	106,604	23	29,056,642
Lakes	0	0	2	23,500
North Bahr El Ghazal	1	37,500	1	14,862
Upper Nile	1	1,427	5	39,171,872
Warrap	0	0	1	8,400
West Bahr El Ghazal	1	2,500	3	2,827,433
Western Equatoria	2	8,988	10	685,557
<b>Totals</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>2,579,507</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>77,052,215</b>

The full extent of South Sudan's ERW contamination remains unknown. SHAs continue to be identified, while the existing threat is being compounded by the renewed heavy fighting since December 2013, which continues to result in new UXO contamination, particularly in Greater Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. Ongoing and increasing insecurity persisted in greatly limiting access to many areas of the country, severely impeding efforts to confirm or address contamination, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region.<sup>9</sup>

In 2017, UNMAS reported that a review of the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database led to the conclusion that many existing hazards may have been over-reported in size. UNMAS consequently initiated a process of targeted re-survey during the year aimed at better defining the estimated size of SHAs. The results of the re-survey were not due to be finalised until the end of 2018, but UNMAS reported that ongoing survey in Upper Nile state, previously reported as the most heavily contaminated in terms of the size of area recorded, has revealed remarkably little contamination. Current projections of the number of minefields and cluster strikes remaining to be addressed are thought to be highly accurate, but markedly less reliable are estimates of their sizes as well as the type of contamination.

Mine Action Review is not aware of any confirmed new use of anti-personnel mines in the renewed conflict that erupted in 2013. Neither the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)<sup>10</sup> nor UNMAS<sup>11</sup> believes that anti-personnel mines have been used in the renewed fighting. Thus, while new areas of ERW contamination have resulted from the fighting, new minefields have not been recorded.<sup>12</sup>

In March 2015, however, a group of states monitoring the ceasefire in South Sudan reported that a government army officer "stated clearly that anti-personnel mines had been deployed in the area around Nassir", in Upper Nile state, by government forces.<sup>13</sup> In June 2018, South Sudan informed states parties to the APMBC that on 24 November 2017, a four-person investigation team travelled to Nassir to investigate the March 2015 allegation. The three-day investigation involved formal interviews with Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) officers and the police commissioner, along with a physical inspection of the ground around the SPLA barracks. The NMAA reported that the key finding was that there was no evidence of landmines being laid in the vicinity of Nassir, on or around the alleged date in 2015. It stated that a report had been sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation to the treaty's Standing Committee on Cooperative Compliance for consideration with a view to "closing the case on this matter".<sup>14</sup>

Mines, CMR, and other ERW in South Sudan continue to pose a physical threat to local populations, prevent the delivery of vital humanitarian aid, curtail freedom of movement, and significantly impede development.<sup>15</sup> In 2017, a total of 56 persons were reported as mine and ERW casualties (48 injured and 8 killed). In 2016, a total of 45 mine and ERW casualties were recorded (32 injured and 13 killed).<sup>16</sup> In Pochalla in Jonglei state, UNMAS reported that a camp for internally displaced persons was inadvertently sited on a previously unrecorded minefield. In 2017, after a woman reported seeing a mine, UNMAS found that the land, including a nearby primary school compound, was heavily contaminated with mines.<sup>17</sup>

## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) – since renamed the NMAA – was established by presidential decree in 2006 to act as the national agency for planning, coordination, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.<sup>18</sup>

In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening the capacity of the NMAA. UNMAS (with the NMAA) has been overseeing mine action across the country through its main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau. UNMAS is responsible for accrediting mine action organisations, drafting national mine action standards, establishing a quality management system, managing the national database, and tasking operators.<sup>19</sup> The NMAA takes the lead on victim assistance and risk education.<sup>20</sup>

While it is planned that the NMAA will ultimately assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, UNMAS has reported that the NMAA's continued serious financial and technical limitations prevented it from managing mine action operations effectively in 2017.<sup>21</sup>

UN Security Council Resolution 1996 authorised UNMISS to support mine action through assessed peacekeeping funds.<sup>22</sup> In May 2014, UN Security Council Resolution 2155, adopted in response to the conflict that broke out in December 2013, effectively ended the mission's mandate to support capacity development of government institutions. In 2018, UNMAS reported that reversing this change in the mission mandate to support the capacity building of government institutions would greatly enhance UNMAS' ability to support the NMAA.<sup>23</sup>

### Strategic Planning

In 2017, the NMAA, with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and funding from Japan, developed the South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2022.<sup>24</sup> According to UNMAS, the strategy has three goals and a number of associated targets:<sup>25</sup>

**Strategic Goal 1:** Advocacy and communication of South Sudan's mine/ERW problem continues through national and international awareness raising and adoption and implementation of international conventions to facilitate a mine-/ERW-free South Sudan.

**Strategic Goal 2:** The size of the mine/ERW contaminated area is clarified and confirmed and the problem is addressed through appropriate survey and clearance methods, ensuring safe land is handed back to affected communities for use.

**Strategic Goal 3:** Safe behaviour is promoted among women, girls, boys and men to reduce mine/ERW accidents and promote safe livelihoods activities.

The strategy includes a section on gender and diversity, focusing on how different gender and age groups are affected by mines and ERW and have specific and varying needs and priorities. Guidelines on mainstreaming gender considerations in mine action planning and operations in South Sudan were also incorporated in the strategy.<sup>26</sup>

### Legislation and Standards

According to UNMAS, the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for mine action in South Sudan are organic documents subject to constant review. In 2017, the medical and quality management chapters were revised.<sup>27</sup> The NTSGs are jointly monitored by UNMAS and the NMAA.<sup>28</sup>

### Quality Management

UNMAS reported that external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) operations were carried out throughout 2017 on all mine action operators in South Sudan, with all teams subject to external inspections by UNMAS and the NMAA.<sup>29</sup>

Due to constraints on the movement of UN staff due to increasing security concerns, at the end of 2016 UNMAS contracted a private company, Janus Global Operations, to conduct external QA/QC on behalf of UNMAS in South Sudan.<sup>30</sup> In 2017, external QA continued to be conducted by Janus as a subcontractor to UNMAS, though QA/QC procedures were updated towards the end of the year.<sup>31</sup> UNMAS stated that external quality management process was adjusted to focus more on mentoring field management.<sup>32</sup> Operators reported improvements in the QA system in 2017 and better collaboration between Janus/UNMAS and mine action operators.<sup>33</sup>

### Information Management

UNMAS reported no significant changes to the information management system or the IMSMA database in 2017.<sup>34</sup> Mines Advisory Group (MAG) reported improvements during the year, including that all demining agencies were now in possession of the IMSMA database on laptops, which provided up-to-date information on contamination throughout South Sudan.<sup>35</sup>

## Operators

Three international demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operated in South Sudan in 2017: DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), and MAG. Three international commercial companies also conducted demining: G4S Ordnance Management (G4S), Mechem, and The Development Initiative (TDI). No national demining organisations were involved in clearance in 2017.<sup>36</sup> As noted above, Janus was engaged in quality management for UNMAS.

According to UNMAS, almost 1,000 people were working in mine action operations in South Sudan in 2017. Mine action capacity deployed included two road assessment and clearance teams with four mine detection dogs (MDDs) each; five mechanical clearance teams with integrated manual deminer support; 16 eight-person multi-task teams (MTTs); eight nine-person quick reaction teams; four 15-person mine action teams; and 12 EOD/survey teams.<sup>37</sup>

UNMAS reported that conflict and ongoing insecurity in 2017 undermined the ability of all operators to conduct sustained clearance operations in many parts of the country. This restricted the deployment of mine clearance teams, leading to a reconfiguration of resources to field more mobile and smaller teams. Focus shifted to addressing EOD spot tasks rather than area clearance and to carrying out re-survey of previously suspected areas thought to have overestimated the size of contamination. UNMAS assigns mine action tasks to operators.<sup>38</sup>

## LAND RELEASE

In 2017, just over 3.7km<sup>2</sup> of mined area was released through survey and clearance: more than 1.7km<sup>2</sup> through clearance and a further 2km<sup>2</sup> through non-technical survey.<sup>39</sup> In total, nearly 12km<sup>2</sup> of hazardous area was released back to local communities, including 8.2km<sup>2</sup> released through battle area clearance, with the destruction of 734 anti-personnel mines, 42 anti-vehicle mines, and 34,600 items of UXO.<sup>40</sup>

This compared to 2016, when nearly 20km<sup>2</sup> of mined area was released through survey and clearance, including more than 2.6km<sup>2</sup> through clearance and technical survey, and a further 17.2km<sup>2</sup> through non-technical survey.<sup>41</sup> This was despite a resurgence of violence that resulted in mine action operations being suspended for much of the second half of 2016 and a dramatic reduction in areas across the country where operations could safely be carried out.<sup>42</sup>

UNMAS has said that the marked decrease in land release output in 2017 was due to the ongoing turmoil and security constraints, which reduced the systematic deployment of mine clearance teams and forced a reconfiguration of resources into more mobile, smaller teams. The teams were focused on spot tasks and re-survey of previously suspected areas.<sup>43</sup>

### Survey in 2017

As summarised in Table 3, in 2017, a total of 13 mined areas covering just over 2km<sup>2</sup> were cancelled through non-technical survey, while 8 areas with a size of just over 0.67km<sup>2</sup> were confirmed as contaminated with anti-personnel mines. No areas were reportedly reduced by technical survey, according to UNMAS records.<sup>44</sup>

This is a huge decrease from survey output in 2016, when a total of 18 mined areas covering just under 17.2km<sup>2</sup> were cancelled through non-technical survey, and almost 71,400m<sup>2</sup> was reduced by technical survey. In addition, 30 areas covering nearly 1.8km<sup>2</sup> were confirmed as mined.<sup>45</sup>

As reported above, UNMAS's belief that the IMSMA database contains many hazardous areas whose size has been significantly over-reported. The targeted re-survey that UNMAS initiated during the year should be finalised before the end of 2018.<sup>46</sup>

**Table 3: Mined area survey in 2017<sup>47</sup>**

Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m <sup>2</sup> )	SHAs confirmed as mined	Area confirmed (m <sup>2</sup> )	Area reduced by TS (m <sup>2</sup> )
DCA	0	0	2	164,982	0
G4S	7	1,123,342	5	480,879	0
MAG	0	0	1	24,149	0
MECHEM	3	813,795	0	0	0
TDI	3	106,069	0	0	0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>2,043,206</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>670,010</b>	<b>0</b>

TS = Technical survey

## Clearance in 2017

A total of 20 mined areas covering just over 1.7km<sup>2</sup> were released by clearance in 2017, with the destruction of 734 anti-personnel mines, 42 anti-vehicle mines, and 34,600 items of UXO (see Table 4).<sup>48</sup> In 2016, 74 mined areas covering nearly 2.6km<sup>2</sup> were released by clearance.<sup>49</sup>

Clearance of anti-personnel mine contamination has fallen steadily from nearly 5.1km<sup>2</sup> in 2015, the highest recorded total clearance output since the inception of humanitarian demining in South Sudan in 2004, to 2.6km<sup>2</sup> in 2016, and just over 1.7km<sup>2</sup> in 2017.<sup>50</sup>

**Table 4: Mine clearance in 2017<sup>51</sup>**

Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
MAG	4	322,201	383	5	1,567
MECHEM	2	15,034	1	2	1,565
DCA	2	39,924	10	2	1,799
DDG	0	0	1	3	396
G4S	11	867,562	285	26	24,138
TDI	1	467,368	54	4	5,135
<b>Totals</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>1,712,089</b>	<b>734</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>34,600</b>

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

## Deminer Safety

Mine action operators continued to face serious threats to the security of their operations and personnel due to the ongoing conflict. In 2017, there was an ambush on a demining contractor in which four personnel were seriously injured. In June 2018, UNMAS reported that an investigation into the incident found it to have been ethnically motivated. There were also several instances of criminality in which teams were robbed by armed groups during the year.<sup>52</sup>

## ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

In accordance with Article 5 of the APMBC, South Sudan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2021. South Sudan will not meet this deadline and has already announced it will be seeking a five-year extension.

UNMAS has highlighted the serious obstacles posed to mine action operations by ongoing fighting and insecurity, lack of access to contaminated areas, and new UXO contamination, along with the continuing and significant challenges from lack of infrastructure and access to vast areas of the country, as well as the unpredictable rainy seasons.<sup>53</sup> In 2018, UNMAS reported that South Sudan is unlikely to meet its July 2021 Article 5 deadline.<sup>54</sup>

According to a statement by the NMAA to APMBC states parties in June 2018, the Authority expected that by 2021, 100 open hazardous areas will be closed with a total area of over 35km<sup>2</sup> and 111 open hazardous areas with a size of over 43km<sup>2</sup> will remain to be addressed. It stated that this would require a further extension period of five years in order to fulfil its APMBC Article 5 obligations, although a formal proposal for an extension had yet to be submitted to the Government of South Sudan.<sup>55</sup>

**Table 5: Mine clearance in 2013–17**

Year	Area cleared (km <sup>2</sup> )
2017	1.71
2016	2.65
2015	5.10
2014	2.72
2013	4.33
<b>Total</b>	<b>16.51</b>

Due to the ongoing conflict, it is not possible to predict when South Sudan might complete clearance of anti-personnel mines on its territory, nor estimate the true extent of contamination.<sup>56</sup> For 2018, UNMAS has decided that the national mine action programme would prioritise re-survey of large SHAs remaining in the database, some of which were recorded as far back as 2003, especially where little evidence supports the original recording. It expects significant cancellation of area to occur as a result, though the effectiveness of the re-survey process is dependent on access.<sup>57</sup>

According to UNMAS, the Government of South Sudan is only able to provide minimal funding and support to all national institutions, including the NMAA. In 2017, all mine action activities were funded by the UN or international bilateral donors.<sup>58</sup> UNMAS thought reduced funding for mine action was likely in 2018, with a corresponding reduction in capacity and limitation on the timeliness of responses. It raised serious concerns over resource mobilisation in the face of overwhelming donor fatigue and frustration due to the ongoing conflict, which continues to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis. Mine action, which is a critical enabler for humanitarian assistance, is not prioritised by donors, who are increasingly unwilling to support Government institutions until a peace agreement is implemented.<sup>59</sup>

A surge in fighting in July 2016 had a significant impact on demining across the country throughout 2017. The security situation dominated all land release operations in 2017, greatly impeding the ability of clearance operators to deploy personnel and move heavy equipment across the country.<sup>60</sup> Security incidents on the majority of road networks severely curtailed transport while increasing support costs compared with previous years. Additionally, the political and ethnic elements of the conflict created a risk for the deployment of deminers based on their ethnicity in certain areas, further restricting areas of mine action operations.<sup>61</sup>

MAG reported that it was concentrating operations in 2018 in Central Equatoria state with the aim of completing survey of the entire state. Areas of confirmed anti-personnel mine contamination would be prioritised for survey and clearance wherever possible, it said.<sup>62</sup> DDG reported it would not seek large amounts of funding for its operations in 2018 due to the conflict, which has significantly reduced the areas in which it is able to operate.<sup>63</sup>

1	Emails from Tim Lardner, Chief, Mine Action, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 27 February and 1 March 2018.	27	Ibid.
2	Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018.	28	Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016; and responses to questionnaires by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015; and Augustino Seja, NPA, 11 May 2015.
3	Statement by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairman, South Sudan National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.	29	Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
4	Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018.	30	Emails from William Maina, Mine Action Operations Manager, DDG, 2 May 2017; and Bill Marsden, Regional Director East and Southern Africa, MAG, 10 May 2017.
5	Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; and Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 21 September 2017.	31	Emails from Katie Shaw, MAG, 10 May 2018; and William Maina, DDG, 6 February 2018.
6	Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018.	32	Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
7	According to UNMAS, the most heavily affected provinces are those with the highest number of SHAs, rather than those with the largest recorded total area size of contamination, as the size of contamination can change dramatically through the process of technical survey. Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018. In October 2015, South Sudan's previously established 10 states were redefined into 28 states by President Salva Kiir, which were then further subdivided by a presidential decree in January 2017 into 32 states.	33	Emails from Katie Shaw, MAG, 10 May 2018; and William Maina, DDG, 6 February 2018.
8	Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018.	34	Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
9	UNMAS, "2018 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan".	35	Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 10 May 2018.
10	See Landmine Monitor, "Country Profile: South Sudan, Mine Ban Policy", 30 October 2014, at: <a href="http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/south-sudan/mine-ban-policy.aspx">http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/south-sudan/mine-ban-policy.aspx</a> .	36	Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
11	Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018.	37	Ibid.
12	Ibid.	38	Ibid.; and email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 June 2018.
13	The monitoring group, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, consisting of seven East African states, reported that the officer made the statement on 12 March 2015, in a meeting between senior members of the government armed forces, UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) staff, and members of IGAD. See Intergovernmental Authority on Development Offices of the Special Envoys for South Sudan, "Summary of Latest Reports of Violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) Investigated and verified by the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in South Sudan from 1–16 March 2015", at: <a href="http://southsudan.igad.int/attachments/article/284/Violations_Summary_V32-35_ENG.pdf">http://southsudan.igad.int/attachments/article/284/Violations_Summary_V32-35_ENG.pdf</a> . See also ICBL-Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), "Concern at Reported Use of Antipersonnel Mines in South Sudan", Press release, Geneva, 31 March 2015, at: <a href="http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2015/concern-at-reported-use-of-antipersonnel-mines-in-south-sudan.aspx">http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2015/concern-at-reported-use-of-antipersonnel-mines-in-south-sudan.aspx</a> ; and I. Gridneff, "South Sudan Army's Landmine Use Escalates War, Monitors Say", Bloomberg Business, 30 March 2015, at: <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-30/south-sudan-army-s-use-of-land-mines-escalates-war-monitors-say">http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-30/south-sudan-army-s-use-of-land-mines-escalates-war-monitors-say</a> .	39	UNMAS email and UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2017".
14	Statement by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.	40	Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 5 September 2018; and UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2017".
15	Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.	41	Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017; and William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.
16	UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report", January 2018.	42	Ibid.
17	Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018; and UNMAS, "About South Sudan", updated March 2018, at: <a href="http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/southsudan">http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/southsudan</a> .	43	Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018.
18	"South Sudan De-Mining Authority", undated, at: <a href="http://www.goss-online.org/">http://www.goss-online.org/</a> .	44	Ibid.
19	South Sudan, "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016", Juba, 2012, p. iv.	45	Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017.
20	Response to questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 24 May 2013.	46	Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018.
21	Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.	47	Ibid; and Article 7 Report (for 2017), pp. 7 and 12.
22	UNMISS, "United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre [UNMACC]", undated, at: <a href="http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4313&amp;language=en-US">http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4313&amp;language=en-US</a> .	48	Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018; and Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 5 September 2018.
23	Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.	49	Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
24	Ibid.	50	UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2015"; email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016; Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C; and email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 5 September 2018.
25	Ibid.; and email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 June 2018.	51	Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018; Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 5 September 2018; and William Maina, DDG, 6 February 2018. According to UNMAS, the 396 UXO destroyed by DDG were destroyed in 376 spot tasks. DDG, however, reported higher figures of 478 UXO destroyed in 464 spot tasks. South Sudan's Article 7 Report for 2017 reports 9,850,679m <sup>2</sup> cleared in 2017 with the destruction of 734 anti-personnel mines, 42 anti-vehicle mines, and 34,600 items of UXO. Article 7 Report (for 2017), pp. 7 and 12.
26	Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.	52	Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 June 2018; and Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
		53	UNMAS, "About UNMAS in South Sudan", updated March 2015; and UNMAS "About UNMAS in South Sudan", updated May 2016.
		54	Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018.
		55	Statement by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.
		56	Ibid.; and response to questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.
		57	Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 June 2018; and Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
		58	Ibid.; and UNMAS, "2018 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan".
		59	Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
		60	Ibid.
		61	Email from William Maina, DDG, 6 February 2018.
		62	Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 10 May 2018.
		63	Email from William Maina, DDG, 6 February 2018.