

SENEGAL



ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE	For 2016	For 2015
Problem understood	4	4
Target date for completion of mine clearance	1	1
Targeted clearance	1	1
Efficient clearance	2	1
National funding of programme	5	4
Timely clearance	0	0
Land release system in place	6	6
National mine action standards	7	7
Reporting on progress	6	5
Improving performance	2	1
PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY POOR	3.4	3.0

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Senegal's mine action programme showed very limited signs of improvement in 2016, with the commencement of survey activities in areas previously inaccessible due to security concerns in north-west Casamance, and the clearance by Handicap International (HI) of two areas covering just over 29,000m² with the destruction of 20 anti-personnel mines. Senegal's timely submission of an updated Article 5 extension request workplan for 2016–21 is also an encouraging development. As at September 2017, however, HI was planning to end its demining operations.

However, overall progress remained slow for yet another year, as Senegal continued to fail to make significant progress in meeting its legal obligations to demine as soon as possible. This failure, combined with its unwillingness to clear mines around military bases, raises serious doubt as to Senegal's compliance with its core obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). It is unclear whether national political will exists to address its remaining mine contamination.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Senegal should complete non-technical survey as soon as possible and, where security allows, establish a more complete and accurate estimate of its remaining mine contamination. It should revise its Article 5 workplan and extension request milestones on the basis of results from survey activities as greater clarity is gained on the extent of remaining contamination.
- Senegal should ensure suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) are recorded on the basis of demonstrable evidence and with specific size estimates.
- It should prioritise clearance and technical survey in areas readily accessible that clearly evidence the existence of mines.
- The Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (Centre National d'Action Antimines, CNAMS) should continue to improve transparency and to facilitate dialogue between all actors concerned by land release operations, as well as to restore confidence among donors and international operators in its mine action programme.
- CNAMS should engage the Senegalese Armed Forces to participate in mine action activities and provide information on the location of mined areas and other resources to support clearance.
- Senegal should clarify the total extent of contamination remaining against the inconsistencies in its reporting on progress towards implementing its Article 5 obligations and its extension request targets.
- Senegal should provide regular updates on any changes to the security situation which might affect its ability to meet its extension request goals and report on efforts to facilitate dialogue with stakeholders on mine action activities in the ongoing peace talks.

CONTAMINATION

Senegal has still to establish an accurate assessment of the extent of its mine contamination, 18 years after becoming a state party to the APMBC. In 2016–17, it continued to report inconsistent figures for the amount of confirmed and suspected contaminated areas remaining, as it had in previous years.

According to CNAMS, as at 31 December 2016, a total of 81 areas of anti-personnel mine contamination remained to be addressed, of which 61 were confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) with a total size of 305,486m² and 20 were SHAs with an unknown size.¹ In addition, as in 2015, Senegal reported that 144 areas still remained to be surveyed, including 127 areas in Bignona department, 4 in Oussouye, and 13 in Ziguinchor.²

In April 2017, however, CNAMS also reported that 52 CHAs, of which 41 were CHAs covering a total of 529,027m² and 11 CHAs with an unknown size, remained to be addressed.³

Previously, at the end of 2015, Senegal had reported 83 areas of confirmed and suspected contamination with a size of nearly 1.6km². Of this, a total of 56 were CHAs with a total size of 465,127m² had been identified, and 27 were SHAs whose extent had not been defined, it said.⁴ However, in its 2017 Article 7 report, Senegal gave a different account, stating that at the end of 2015, a total of 47 CHAs with a total size of 233,840m² remained to be addressed, along with 20 SHAs with an unknown size.⁵

Four departments (Bignona, Goudomp, Oussouye and Ziguinchor) out of the total of forty-five in Senegal still contain confirmed or suspected mined areas. The affected departments are located in the Casamance region of Senegal, between Gambia to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by province (as at end-2016)⁶

Department	CHAs	Size (m ²)	SHAs	Size (m ²)
Bignona	19	34,690	11	N/K
Goudomp	25	162,994	0	N/K
Oussouye	13	77,240	4	N/K
Ziguinchor	04	30,562	5	N/K
Totals	61	305,486	20	N/K

N/K = Not known

In 2016, HI conducted non-technical survey for the first time in 80 localities near the north-western portion of the Senegal-Gambia border in the Casamance region, which had formerly been inaccessible for mine action operations due to security concerns. Five new SHAs were established as a result of the survey. A further 11 localities in Bignona in the north-west were tasked for non-technical survey in April 2016. The survey confirmed seven areas as mined, one in the district of Niaguis in Ziguinchor region, a second in the district of Nyassia in the department Ziguinchor, and a further five in the district of Niagha, in the department of Goudomp, in Sedhiou region.⁷

According to HI, given the historical evidence of frequent clashes and rebel bases in the area, the identification of SHAs in north-west Casamance suggests a high probability that other areas of contamination will be found as survey progresses further east, nearer to the northern border.⁸ The extent of contamination is better

known in the south of Casamance, where previous survey in the region has identified several SHAs, between the Guinea-Bissau border and the Casamance river to the north and Atlantic Ocean to the west.⁹

Mine contamination in Senegal is the result of more than 30 years of fighting between the armed forces and a non-state armed group, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC). Sporadic fighting with some factions of the MFDC has continued despite a ceasefire in place since 2004.

In 2016, mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination continued to pose a threat to local residents in the Casamance region, seriously hindered socio-economic development, prevented the return of displaced populations, and limited access to agricultural land and livelihood activities.¹⁰ As at the end of 2016, Senegal reported a cumulative total of 826 mine casualties, an increase of six from 2015.¹¹

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention serves as the national mine action authority for Senegal. Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by CNAMS. Regional mine action coordination committees have been established in Kolda, Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor departments.

Sporadic international technical assistance was provided to the programme by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2008–14, in particular through a technical or chief technical advisor.¹²

Strategic Planning

Senegal submitted an updated workplan in accordance with its Article 5 extension request in May 2017 for the remainder of its extension period, until 1 March 2021. The plan contains a list of all known or suspected contaminated areas and establishes annual targets for the amount of contamination to be addressed. However, there are inconsistencies and incompatibilities in its reporting on the total contamination remaining and the size of projected annual milestones for land release. Additionally, Senegal's extension request is until March 2021, but the plan does not contain details of work to be carried out after 2018.

According to the updated workplan, Senegal would address 17 CHAs with a total size of approximately 169,771m² in 2017; and 24 CHAs with a size of 343,856m² and 11 CHAs with an unknown size, along with non-technical survey of the remaining 144 areas, in 2018; and any areas confirmed as CHA by survey activities in 2019–20.¹³ This would appear to indicate that at least 513,626m² of CHA will be addressed; however, according to Senegal's most recent Article 7 transparency report, only about 305,000m² of CHA remained as of the end of 2016. Senegal has alternatively reported that a total of 41 CHAs with a combined size of 529,023m² would be addressed in 2017–18, along with 11 SHAs of unknown sizes; and that the 144 unsurveyed areas will be subjected to non-technical survey in 2019. It has estimated the remaining contaminated area to cover a total of 1.3km².¹⁴

The workplan does not include a detailed budget to accompany planned activities, nor does it include a resource mobilisation plan to account for how external funding will be secured.

Standards

There were no significant developments regarding Senegal's national mine action standards in 2016. According to HI, the standards have not been updated since 2013.¹⁵

Quality and Information Management

In 2016, HI reported that internal and external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) was carried out on its operations, and that 25% of land processed was subjected to QC using manual deminers, machines, or dogs. It stated that CNAMS QA officers conducted at least one visit per month to each site and that the areas of Boutoute and Diagon were sampled during the year.¹⁶

CNAMS reported there were no changes to the national quality or information management systems during 2016.¹⁷ According to HI, CNAMS's Information Management System for Mine Action database system was upgraded in 2015.¹⁸

Operators

With new funding from the United States (US), HI initiated a new 14-month project in July 2015 for non-technical survey of 80 localities and technical survey covering some 53,000m².¹⁹ In 2016, HI deployed a total of 15

deminers and 14 support personnel, two mine detection dogs (MDDs), and a mechanical excavator, which was introduced for the first time in 2016. HI stopped using the MDDs in December 2016 "due to lack of performance".²⁰ HI remained the only international mine action operator in Senegal in 2016 and as at September 2017 was preparing to end its demining operations in the country for lack of funding.²¹

HI was also sole international demining operator in Senegal until mid-2012, when new clearance capacities were added with the arrival of Mechem and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). In 2014, however, NPA withdrew from Senegal as a result of "government-imposed limitations on demining activities", which had prevented it from deploying demining resources where the necessary clearance could be done safely, and from undertaking non-technical survey in areas suspected to be contaminated but which had not been surveyed.²² The withdrawal was followed by loss of funding from the European Union (EU), Germany, and Norway.²³ In 2015, Mechem ended its operations in Senegal due to lack of funding.

LAND RELEASE

The total mined area reported released by HI in Senegal in 2016 was 147,650m²: just under 118,300m² through survey and 29,350m² by clearance, with the destruction of 20 anti-personnel mines. In comparison, HI released 911,000m² by survey in 2015, including just over 908,000m² through non-technical survey and a further 3,000m² by technical survey, but no anti-personnel mine clearance occurred.

CNAMS has reported that 21 CHAs with a size of just over 101,370m² were released by either clearance or technical survey between 2015 and 31 March 2017, with the destruction of 22 mines.²⁴ Prior to this, Senegal reported release of about 730,725m² and destruction of 383 mines in 2008–13. Most of these results were achieved between February 2012 and May 2013 with 548,137m² cleared, representing three-quarters of the total and 259 mines destroyed.²⁵

Survey in 2016

In 2016, HI reported confirming two mined areas with a combined size of 29,350m², including one area in Niaguis, Ziguinchor department with a size of 14,000m² (22,162m² were subsequently cleared) and one area in Goudomp, Sédhiou department with a size of 15,350m². It also cancelled seven SHAs with a total size of 62,235m² in Goudomp. A total of 56,061m² was reduced by technical survey.²⁶ CNAMS did not, however, report that any non-technical survey was carried out in 2016.²⁷

Previously, nearly 911,000m² of SHA was released by survey activities in 2015. HI, which began surveying in December 2015, reported that as at 31 December 2015, it had already cancelled 19 SHAs with a size of 908,000m² and reduced a further 3,043m² by technical survey.²⁸

Clearance in 2016

In 2016, HI cleared the two areas confirmed in Niaguis and Goudomp with a combined size of 29,350m², destroying 19 anti-personnel mines in Niaguis, and 1 anti-personnel mine and 2 anti-vehicle mines in Goudomp. HI attributed the increased clearance output in 2016, along with the significant increase in land released by technical survey, to its ability to carry out additional technical survey tasks with six-months of funding provided by a Government of Senegal grant, and the use of a mechanical excavator to support manual demining.²⁹

In its updated 2016–21 workplan, CNAMS reported that nine areas with a size of 58,414m² were cleared in 2016, and one anti-personnel mine destroyed.³⁰ However, it reported differing totals that 58,594m² was cleared in 2016, with the destruction of 19 anti-personnel mines, while also reporting separately that a total of 56,061m² was cleared with the destruction of 18 anti-personnel mines and one anti-vehicle mine.³¹

No anti-personnel mines were cleared in Senegal in 2015. CNAMS has given conflicting accounts that two areas with a size of 29,156m² were cleared in 2015, while also stating that a total of 3,043m² was cleared during the year; however no anti-personnel mines were reportedly found according to either claim.³²

Deminer safety

There were no accidents involving deminer safety in 2016. The last reported incident occurred in 2013, when a number of Mechem deminers working in the village of Kailou (Ziguinchor department) were kidnapped, some of whom were held for 90 days, although all were later safely released.³³

Inconsistency in Clearance Task Orders Since 2013

Senegal has been criticised for issuing task orders assigning clearance assets to areas not known to be affected by mines. It has also been accused of failing to clear considerable mine contamination in unmarked minefields around former and active Senegalese military bases, despite being readily accessible and under the control of the Senegalese Armed Forces.

In November 2013, Mechem, operating with funds administered by UNDP, was tasked to clear sections of National Road 6 (Route nationale 6, RN6) and a dozen laterite quarries used in a project to renovate the RN6, in areas not known to be affected by mines.³⁴ However, Senegal cited its politico-security situation to justify deployment of its clearance assets in areas where the safety of its demining teams could be guaranteed.³⁵

According to HI, when task orders were given in November 2013, only one polygon crossed by the RN6 in Sindone Lagoua (20km from Ziguinchor) was recorded as an SHA in the IMSMA database, and the quarries had never been recorded as suspected or confirmed mined areas.³⁶

Additionally, reports indicated that considerable mine contamination may lie in unmarked minefields around former and active Senegalese military bases.³⁷ But since the resumption of clearance operations and even though most of the military bases can be readily accessed – as they are under the control of the Senegalese Armed Forces – they have not been cleared nor even considered as a priority for demining operations. Some areas are

confirmed as contaminated: these include the village of Djirack, in which operations were planned to start in 2016 though this did not occur, reportedly for logistic and security reasons.³⁸ Others remain as either SHAs or as credible, if unrecorded and unconfirmed, reports of contamination by local populations, such as in Badème, Basséré, Kouring, and Santhiaba Mandjack.³⁹

Some clearance around military installations was carried out by HI in 2007–12 in Darsalam and Gonoum, during which 177 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in cooperation with the Senegalese armed forces, and by Mechem in 2013 in Mpack, during which 136 anti-personnel mines were destroyed (representing all the mines found that year).⁴⁰

In August 2016, CNAMS reported that in its criteria for prioritising tasks, emphasis was put on the level of security, the economic importance of the area, the desire of populations to return to areas, and the social cohesion of communities.⁴¹ It reported that “indeed, there is a significant amount of land demined in relation to the number of mines discovered”, while claiming that “it must be remembered that the main interest is to remove suspicion and to make accessible to local populations land which had formerly been abandoned”.⁴²

In 2017, HI reported that task criteria were developed according to the results of the non-technical survey carried out by HI in 2014, and updated information from further survey in 2016 and priorities reported by the local communities.⁴³ It reported, however, that more than 50% of areas cleared in 2016 had no evidence of anti-personnel mine contamination.⁴⁴

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2015), Senegal is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021.⁴⁵

In granting the second extension request in December 2015, states parties noted that Senegal “did not have clear knowledge of the size and location of areas that will warrant mine clearance” as well as its commitment “to undertake technical survey activities and to develop a cancellation procedure which may result in implementation proceeding much faster and in a more cost-effective manner”.⁴⁶

Senegal has claimed that the circumstances impeding compliance with its international legal obligations include general insecurity; MFDC reticence to agree to demining operations; the eight-month suspension of operations in 2013; ongoing concerns over deminer safety; and a decrease in technical and financial resources in recent years.⁴⁷ Senegal has also stated that security conditions and lack of funding could affect its ability to complete clearance in a timely manner.⁴⁸

In fact, since 2013, the apparent wilful lack of land release and concrete political will to address its mine problem, and as a consequence, the inadequate use of clearance capacities, have prevented Senegal from fulfilling its Article 5 obligations. This led to the withdrawal of a major operator and the loss of financial

support from key donors, explaining in part the sharp reduction in its clearance capacities. Indeed, while Senegal recorded a significant increase in clearance productivity in 2012–13, the way CNAMS has allocated tasks after the 2013 kidnapping has been criticised for directing resources and clearance assets to areas without credible risk of mine contamination, while requests from operators to conduct survey prior to deploying clearance assets were denied.⁴⁹

Senegal’s 2015 extension request foresees expenditure of some US\$11.5 million to support its mine action programme, of which \$6.4 million would be allocated to technical survey and clearance. Senegal has pledged to contribute to about 30% of the total to cover the running costs of its programme (approx. \$3.3 million).⁵⁰ Senegal’s updated workplan for 2016–21 does not, though, include a detailed budget for activities scheduled under its annual targets. It notes that Senegal’s own annual contribution in 2015–16 was nearly \$1.8 million and that external funding of \$781,478 was provided by the United States to HI.⁵¹

In its Article 7 report for 2016, Senegal claimed that FCFA 500 million (some US\$850,000) would be assigned for mine action from the national budget annually.⁵² According to CNAMS, its operating costs are included in the national budget, but reported that resources allocated for 2015 were not able to be mobilised until late 2016, due to complex procurement procedures. No national budget allocation for mine action operations had been recorded for 2017, it said.⁵³ Positively, however,

in April 2017, HI reported that following the release of a local call for tender by the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HI received a six-month grant for mine action of FCFA 122.6 million (approximately US\$200,000).⁵⁴

Senegal's submission of an updated workplan for 2016–21 in accordance with its Article 5 extension obligations is encouraging. However, serious questions remain about the likelihood of its implementation, which is highly dependent on security conditions. Senegal has regularly indicated that all demining operations would be conducted within the framework of the ongoing peace talks and would first be approved by MFDC in meetings with Senegalese officials.⁵⁵ At the same time, CNAMS has stated that talks with the MFDC are made by authorities in Dakar exclusively, and not by the mine action centre.⁵⁶ There is no explanation in the action plan presented in Senegal's second extension request of how peace negotiations conducted in Dakar by the Reflection Group on Peace in Casamance (Groupe de Réflexion sur la Paix en Casamance, GRPC) will include the issue of mine clearance.

In August 2017, CNAMS reiterated that the implementation of the revised workplan and the feasibility of the 2021 mine clearance deadline are based on the assumption that the GRPC obtains the MFDC's agreement on the inclusion of demining activities in the peace process, in order to allow for the rapid deployment of demining teams.⁵⁷ In the workplan, CNAMS stated that it was unable to provide detailed updates on the development of the peace process as it is not a member of the GRPC negotiation group. However, it reported that events in the Gambia had improved the security situation in the north of Casamance, particularly in the department of Bignona, allowing significant numbers of displaced persons to return. It expected that the continued evolution of the peace process would ensure better security conditions and improve access for mine clearance in planned locations.⁵⁸

Previously, in 2015, NPA criticised CNAMS for obstructing dialogue between operators and the armed forces in particular, which could provide the specific locations of mined areas. Other stakeholders echoed that CNAMS was preventing dialogue between parties, including the spokesperson of the MFDC, who stated that there was a complete lack of communication with members of CNAMS.⁵⁹

Along with the timely submission of the updated workplan in 2017, the extension of survey into previously inaccessible areas and limited clearance in 2016 are also positive developments, after previous years of stagnation in mine action operations, and Senegal's apparent reluctance to deploy clearance assets in CHAs, such as around military installations. Senegal still lacks a comprehensive understanding of its mine problem and concerns have been raised that its continued failure to clear contaminated areas around existing military bases verges on use of anti-personnel mines, a violation of Article 1 of the APMBC. According to NPA, there is overwhelming evidence that laying of landmines by rebel forces was sporadic, while the Sudanese Armed Forces placed hundreds, if not thousands, of mines around military outposts in Casamance.⁶⁰

However, in August 2017, CNAMS informed Mine Action Review that CNAMS has already demined around all the military bases, with the help of the army where that was necessary.⁶¹ Mine Action Review has found scant evidence to support this claim. HI has reported, though, that its teams cleared 22,162m² in Boutoute-Djibanar in connection with a former army base between 24 April 2015 and 23 December 2016, destroying "around" 19 anti-personnel mines.

In April 2017, HI was optimistic that Senegal can still meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2021 as an increase in funding was foreseen and the security situation in the region was improving.⁶² However, it noted that key challenges such as the presence of un-detectable anti-personnel mines remained, along with the need to optimise the use of mine action assets dependent on levels of funding received.⁶³ As at late September 2017, however, HI was ending operations in Senegal for lack of funding.

In August 2017, CNAMS had reiterated its three priorities for meeting Senegal's 2021 Article 5 deadline: agreement of all parties to the conflict on the principle of clearance of mined areas; access to conduct non-technical survey in the 144 communities not yet surveyed; and mobilisation of resources to enable increased demining productivity.⁶⁴

- 1 Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D; and email from Ibrahima Seck, Head of Operations and Information Management, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.
- 2 Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D; and CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-2021", April 2017.
- 3 CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-2021", April 2017. The workplan states that the 41 CHAs have a size of "529,027.276m²".
- 4 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016. According to the programme manager of a former operator in Senegal, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), it was rare that the size of the area was recorded when an SHA was identified. Both NPA and CNAMS reported that entire villages were recorded as SHAs purely on the basis that they were located in former conflict areas. Emails from Chris Natale, former Programme Manager Senegal, NPA, 15 September 2016; and Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 13 September 2016.
- 5 Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D.
- 6 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D.
- 7 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April and 26 September 2017, incorporating input from Jason Mudingay Lufuluabo, Chief of Operations, and Jean-Michel Mathiam, Project Manager, HI.
- 8 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Emails from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017; and Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.
- 11 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D.
- 12 Statement of Senegal, Intersessional meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 21 May 2012.
- 13 CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-2021", April 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D. The workplan states that the 17 SHAs to be addressed in 2017 have a total size of "169,770.825m²" and the 24 CHAs to be addressed in 2018 have a size of "343,856.451m²". Senegal's 2017 Article 7 report states, however, that 17 areas with a size of "158,150.79m²" will be addressed in 2017.
- 14 Statement of Senegal, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 8 June 2017. At the meeting, Senegal reported that the 41 CHAs had a combined size of 529,022m².
- 15 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.
- 18 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April and 26 September 2017, incorporating input from Jason Mudingay Lufuluabo and Jean-Michel Mathiam, HI.
- 21 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 26 September 2016.
- 22 NPA, "Humanitarian Disarmament in Senegal", undated, at: <http://www.npaid.org/Our-work/Countries/Africa/Senegal>; and K. Millett, "Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?", Blog entry, 7 April 2014, at: <https://landmineandclustermunitionblog.wordpress.com/2014/04/07/clearance-and-compliance-in-casamance-is-senegal-doing-all-it-should/>.
- 23 NPA, "Humanitarian Disarmament in Senegal", undated; and Millett, "Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?".
- 24 CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-2021", April 2017; and statement of Senegal, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 8 June 2017. At the intersessional meetings, Senegal reported that a total of 433 mines had been destroyed but did not indicate the timeframe to which this referred.
- 25 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015, pp. 11-13.
- 26 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April and 26 September 2017, incorporating input from Jason Mudingay Lufuluabo and Jean-Michel Mathiam, HI.
- 27 "Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation (Chile, Costa Rica, Switzerland, and Zambia)", Intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8-9 June 2017; and CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-2021", April 2017; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.
- 28 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.
- 29 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.
- 30 "Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation (Chile, Costa Rica, Switzerland, and Zambia)", Intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8-9 June 2017.
- 31 Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D; statement of Senegal, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 8 June 2017; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.
- 32 Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D; CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-2021", April 2017; and statement of Senegal, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 8 June 2017.
- 33 In March 2013, clearance operations were progressing rapidly as a consequence of the new demining capacity brought by Mechem and NPA. As they approached MFDC-controlled areas, a faction of the rebel group called publicly for a halt to humanitarian demining on the ground that clearance teams had reached a "red line beyond which operators' safety could not be guaranteed". Joint Press Release from MFDC, CNAMS, Geneva Call, the Sao Domingos Prefect, and APRAN-SDP, 20 March 2013.
- 34 HI, "Démontage Humanitaire en Casamance: progression du processus de remise à disposition des terres" ("Humanitarian demining in Casamance: progress in the process of land release"), April 2014; and Millett, "Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?".
- 35 Email from Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 13 May 2014.
- 36 HI, "Humanitarian demining in Casamance: progress in land release", April 2014.
- 37 Millett, "Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?".
- 38 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 26 September 2017, incorporating input from Jason Mudingay Lufuluabo and Jean-Michel Mathiam, HI.
- 39 Millett, "Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?".
- 40 Ibid.; and email from Luc Sambou, Mine Coordinator, HI, 8 May 2014.
- 41 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Senegal's previous Article 5 clearance deadline expired on 1 March 2016 under its first extension request approved in 2008. Despite repeatedly asserting its intention, as late as June 2014, not to seek a second extension period and to complete clearance within this deadline, in June 2015 Senegal submitted a request to extend its Article 5 clearance deadline until March 2021.
- 46 Analysis of Senegal's request for a second Article 5 deadline extension submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 17 November 2015, p. 1.
- 47 Ibid., p. 22.
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 Millett, "Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?".
- 50 Analysis of Senegal's request for a second Article 5 deadline extension submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 17 November 2015, p. 28.
- 51 CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-21", April 2017.
- 52 Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D.
- 53 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.
- 54 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.
- 55 H. Sagna, "Humanitarian demining in Casamance: negotiations and operations still deadlocked", Enquête+, 17 June 2015.
- 56 Statement of ICBL, 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.
- 57 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.
- 58 CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-21", April 2017.
- 59 A. Grovestins and A. Oberstadt, "Why landmines keep on killing in Senegal", IRIN, 3 August 2015, at: <https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/08/03/why-landmines-keep-killing-senegal>.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.
- 62 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.