

SENEGAL



ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE	For 2015	For 2014
Problem understood	4	4
Target date for completion of mine clearance	1	2
Targeted clearance	1	2
Efficient clearance	1	2
National funding of programme	4	4
Timely clearance	0	1
Land release system in place	6	6
National mine action standards	7	7
Reporting on progress	5	4
Improving performance	1	2
PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY POOR	3.0	3.4

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Senegal's mine action programme showed small signs of improvement in 2015 with the recommencement of survey activities, but for yet another year it failed to make any significant progress in the clearance of anti-personnel mines. This continuing stagnation and the failure to clear mines around military bases raises serious doubt as to Senegal's compliance with its core obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and whether national political will exists to address its remaining mine contamination.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Senegal should complete non-technical survey (NTS) as soon as possible and, where security allows, establish a more complete and accurate estimate of its mine threat. It should record suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) on the basis of demonstrable evidence and with specific size estimates.
- Senegal should prioritise clearance and technical survey in areas readily accessible that clearly evidence the existence of mines.
- The Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (Centre National d'Action Antimines, CNAMS) should take immediate action to improve transparency and to facilitate dialogue between all actors concerned by land release operations, as well as to restore confidence among donors and international operators in its mine action programme.
- CNAMS should engage the Senegalese Armed Forces to participate in mine action activities and provide information on the location of mined areas and other resources to support clearance.
- Senegal should report regularly and transparently on its clearance efforts and results, including in the annual Article 7 reports it is legally obligated to submit.

CONTAMINATION

Senegal has still to establish an accurate assessment of the extent of its mine contamination. As at the end of 2015, Senegal reported that 83 areas with a size of nearly 1.6km² of confirmed and suspected contamination remained to be addressed. Of this, a total of 56 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) with a total size of 465,127m² had been identified, along with a further 27 SHAs whose extent had not been defined, it said.¹ Of the 216 localities that Senegal reported as still requiring survey in June 2015, by the end of the year, 67 had been cancelled by non-technical survey and 5 confirmed as mined. The 144 areas remaining to be surveyed covered a total area of just over 1.56km².²

Four departments (Bignona, Goudomp, Oussouye and Ziguinchor) out of forty-five still contain confirmed or suspected mined areas. The affected departments are located in the Casamance region of Senegal, between Gambia to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

1 Email from Ibrahima Seck, Head of Operations and Information Management, CNAMS, 22 August 2016. According to the programme manager of a former operator in Senegal, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), it was rare that the size of the area was recorded when an SHA was identified. Both NPA and CNAMS reported that entire villages were recorded as SHAs purely on the basis that they were located in former conflict areas. Emails from Chris Natale, former Programme Manager Senegal, NPA, 15 September 2016; and Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 13 September 2016.

2 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.

Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination by province at end 2015³

Department	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)
Bignona	10	52,690	8	N/K
Goudomp	32	330,669	2	N/K
Oussouye	9	77,240	4	N/K
Ziguinchor	5	4,528	13	N/K
Totals	56	465,127	27	N/K

N/K = Not known

Mine contamination in Senegal is the result of more than 30 years of fighting between the armed forces and a non-state armed group, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC). Sporadic fighting with some factions of MFDC has continued despite a ceasefire in place since 2004.

Mine contamination is said to pose a great risk to local residents, seriously hindering the socio-economic development of Casamance, and limiting access to agricultural land.⁴ As at end 2015, Senegal reported a total of more than 820 mine casualties, with one new mine casualty reported during the year, down from 15 in 2014.⁵ Senegal reported that demining of Gouraf village in Ziguinchor department had allowed more than 120 families to return and livelihood activities to resume in 2015.⁶

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention serves as the national mine action authority for Senegal. Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by CNAMS. Regional mine action coordination committees have been established in Kolda, Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor departments.⁷

Sporadic international technical assistance was provided to the programme by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2008–14, in particular through a technical or chief technical advisor. In May 2012, however, Senegal said that “slowness in the procedures of certain partners” had “significantly delayed the initiation and conduct of projects.”⁸

Strategic Planning

Senegal’s latest Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in June 2015, included plans for survey and clearance in 2016–20. The request projects that remaining non-technical survey in the 216 localities would be carried out in 2016–17, though without explaining how the insecurity reported in 111 of these areas, which is said to have prevented survey activities from being conducted in previous years, would be overcome. In August 2016, CNAMS reported that its extension request plan would be updated annually based on the results of the peace process, but did not provide any details on any further developments.⁹

3 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

4 M. Millecamps, “Sénégal: en Casamance les mines font encore des victimes” (“Senegal: mines are still claiming victims in Casamance”), *TV5 Monde*, at: <http://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/senegal-en-casamance-les-mines-font-encore-des-victimes-13575>; and Handicap International, “Senegal: country situation”, undated, but last accessed in July 2015.

5 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.

6 Ibid.

7 These committees meet three times in a year in Ziguinchor, and twice a year in Sédhiou and Kolda, bringing together local authorities, civil society, and NGO operators to coordinate demining activities.

8 Statement of Senegal, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 21 May 2012.

9 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

Concerning technical survey and clearance, the plan projects that:

- In January 2016 – June 2017: operations would be conducted in Goudomp
- In October 2016 – December 2016: operations would be conducted in Oussouye
- In October 2016 – December 2018: operations would be conducted in Ziguinchor
- In October 2016 – June 2020: operations would be conducted in Bignona.

Standards

There were no significant developments regarding Senegal's national mine action standards in 2015; however, CNAMS stated that revisions are planned in cooperation with operators to address new demining tools, such as brush-cutters.¹⁰ According to Handicap International (HI), the standards have not been updated since 2013.¹¹

Quality and Information Management

HI confirmed that CNAMS carried out external quality assurance (QA) on its technical survey operations in Diagon locality according to Senegal's "standard framework".¹²

According to HI, CNAMS's Information Management System for Mine Action database system was upgraded in 2015.¹³ CNAMS reported that the database was regularly updated with NTS reports and final reports from the Diagon area during 2015.¹⁴

Operators

With new funding from the United States (US), HI initiated a new 14-month project in July 2015 for NTS of 80 localities and technical survey over some 53,000m².¹⁵ It deployed 24 demining personnel and a team with two mine detection dogs (MDD) for technical survey on paths/roads.¹⁶ It was the only international mine action operator in Senegal in 2015.¹⁷

HI remained the sole international demining operator in Senegal until mid-2012, when new clearance capacities were added with the arrival of Mechem and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). In 2014, however, NPA withdrew from Senegal as a result of "government-imposed limitations on demining activities", which had prevented it from deploying demining resources where the necessary clearance could be done safely, and from undertaking NTS in areas suspected to be contaminated but which had not been surveyed.¹⁸ The withdrawal was followed by loss of funding from the European Union (EU), Germany, and Norway.¹⁹

In 2015, Mechem ended its operations in Senegal due to lack of funding.

LAND RELEASE

No mine clearance occurred in Senegal in 2015. A total of just over 911,000m² of SHA was released by survey activities. Senegal did not report on the extent of any land release in 2014.

HI began surveying in December 2015. As at the end of the year, HI reported having cancelled 19 SHAs with a size of 908,000m² and reducing a further 3,043m² by technical survey.²⁰ According to CNAMS, five CHAs with a total size of just over 14,670m² were confirmed by the survey.²¹ This compared to NTS of 209 localities in 2014, when HI's operations focused only on NTS activities.²²

Progress in 2016

As at end August 2016, HI had reduced an additional 29,156m² through technical survey in Diagon, in Ziguinchor department.²³

Deminer Safety

There were no reported demining accidents in 2015.²⁴ Previously, in May 2013, armed men kidnapped 12 deminers working for Mechem in the village of Kailou (Ziguinchor department). All were released safely, although nine were held for seventy days.²⁵ As a result of the incident, the government ordered a halt to all demining activities, a suspension that lasted until

10 Ibid.

11 Email from Julien Kempeneers, Deputy Desk Officer, Mine Action Department, HI, 1 September 2016.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

15 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 NPA, "Humanitarian Disarmament in Senegal", undated, at: <http://www.npaid.org/Our-work/Countries/Africa/Senegal>; and K. Millett, "Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?", Blog entry, 7 April 2014, at: <https://landmineandclustermunitionblog.wordpress.com/2014/04/07/clearance-and-compliance-in-casamance-is-senegal-doing-all-it-should/>.

19 NPA, "Humanitarian Disarmament in Senegal", undated; and K. Millett, "Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?", 7 April 2014.

20 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.

21 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

22 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016. In 2014, HI conducted NTS along a main road, the RN6, identifying 17 paths as mined areas over a total length of 17,070m, and nine other SHAs covering 22,694m². Surveyors also identified 29 abandoned villages containing at least one SHA near the RN6. Email from Nicolas Charpentier, Senegal Programme Director, HI, 6 July 2015.

23 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016. CNAMS misreported this figure as land cleared, as well as land released through technical survey. Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.

24 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.

25 In March 2013, clearance operations were progressing rapidly as a consequence of the new demining capacity brought by Mechem and NPA. As they approached MFDC-controlled areas, a faction of the rebel group called publicly for a halt to humanitarian demining on the ground that clearance teams had reached a "red line beyond which operators' safety could not be guaranteed". Joint Press Release from MFDC, CNAMS, Geneva Call, the Sao Domingos Prefect, and APRAN-SDP, 20 March 2013.

November 2013.²⁶ To help ensure deminer safety, Senegal assigned a national contact committee to meet MFDC leaders and discuss, among a number of topics, areas that could safely be cleared on a case-by-case basis. Whenever a specific agreement is reached, CNAMS claims to issue task orders for that area.²⁷

Inconsistency in Clearance Task Orders Since 2013

In November 2013, Mechem, operating with funds administered by UNDP, was tasked to clear sections of National Road 6 (Route nationale 6, RN6) and a dozen laterite quarries used in a project to renovate the RN6.²⁸ The task orders were criticised as they assigned clearance assets to areas not known to be affected by mines. However, Senegal cited its politico-security situation to justify deployment of its clearance assets in areas where the safety of its demining teams could be guaranteed.²⁹

According to HI, when task orders were given in November 2013, only one polygon crossed by the RN6 in Sindone Lagoua (20km from Ziguinchor) was recorded as an SHA in the IMSMA database, and the quarries had never been recorded as suspected or confirmed mined areas.³⁰

Additionally, reports indicated that considerable mine contamination may lie in unmarked minefields around former and active Senegalese military bases.³¹ But since the resumption of clearance operations and even though most of the military bases can be readily accessed – as they are under the control of the Senegalese Armed Forces – they have not been cleared nor considered as a priority for demining operations. Some areas are confirmed as contaminated: these include the village of Djirack, in which operations were planned to start in 2016. Others remain as either SHAs or as credible, if unrecorded and unconfirmed, reports of contamination by local populations, such as in Badème, Basséré, Kouring, and Santhiaba Mandjack.³²

Some clearance around military installations was carried out by HI in 2007–12 in Darsalam and Gonoum, during which 177 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in cooperation with the Senegalese armed forces, and by Mechem in 2013 in Mpack, during which 136

anti-personnel mines were destroyed (representing all the mines found that year).³³

In August 2016, CNAMS reported that in its criteria for prioritising tasks, emphasis was put on the level of security, the economic importance of the area, the desire of populations to return to areas, and the social cohesion of communities.³⁴ It reported that “indeed, there is a significant amount of land demined in relation to the number of mines discovered”, while noting that “it must be remembered that the main interest is to remove suspicion and to make accessible to local populations land which had formerly been abandoned”.³⁵

HI stated that CHAs were tasked for clearance on the basis of technical survey conducted by HI in 2012–14 and that CNAMS prioritised tasks on the basis of the needs of displaced villagers to return to communities.³⁶

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

In December 2015, the APMBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties granted Senegal a second extension to its Article 5 deadline, for a period of five years. Senegal is obligated to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021.

Senegal’s previous Article 5 clearance deadline was set to expire on 1 March 2016 under its first extension request approved in 2008. Despite repeatedly asserting its intention not to seek a second extension period and to complete clearance within this deadline as recently as June 2014, in June 2015 Senegal submitted a request to extend its Article 5 clearance deadline until March 2021.

In granting the second extension request, states parties noted that Senegal “did not have clear knowledge of the size and location of areas that will warrant mine clearance” as well as its commitment “to undertake technical survey activities and to develop a cancellation procedure which may result in implementation proceeding much faster and in a more cost-effective manner”.³⁷ Previously, Senegal reported release of about 730,725m² and the destruction of 383 mines in 2008–13. Most of these results were achieved between February 2012 and May 2013 with 548,137m² cleared, representing three-quarters of the total and 259 mines destroyed.³⁸

26 Interview with Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, in Geneva, 1 April 2014.

27 Email from Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 13 May 2014.

28 HI, “Démontage Humanitaire en Casamance: progression du processus de remise à disposition des terres” (“Humanitarian demining in Casamance: progress in the process of land release”), April 2014; and K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?”, 7 April 2014.

29 Email from Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 13 May 2014.

30 HI, “Humanitarian demining in Casamance: progress in land release”, April 2014.

31 K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?”, 7 April 2014.

32 Ibid.

33 Email from Luc Sambou, Mine Coordinator, HI, 8 May 2014; and K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?”, 7 April 2014.

34 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Analysis of Senegal’s request for a second Article 5 deadline Extension Submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 17 November 2015, p. 1.

38 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015, pp. 11–13.

In its latest extension request, Senegal noted as circumstances impeding compliance with its international legal obligations: general insecurity; MFDC reticence to agree to demining operations; the eight-month suspension of operations in 2013; ongoing concerns over deminer safety; and a decrease in technical and financial resources in recent years.³⁹ Senegal has also noted that security conditions and lack of funding could affect its ability to complete clearance in a timely manner.⁴⁰

In fact, the wilful lack of land release and concrete political will to address its mine problem, and as a consequence, the inadequate use of clearance capacities, have prevented Senegal from fulfilling its Article 5 obligations. This led to withdrawal of a major operator and the loss of financial support from key donors, explaining in part the sharp reduction in its clearance capacities. Indeed, while Senegal recorded a significant increase in clearance productivity in 2012–13, the way CNAMS has allocated tasks after the 2013 kidnapping has been criticised for directing resources and clearance assets to areas without credible risk of mine contamination, while requests from operators to conduct survey prior to deploying clearance assets were denied.⁴¹

In June 2015, Senegal reported contributing about US\$3.9 million to its mine action programme since 2007, though no funding was allocated to land release operations.⁴² Senegal's extension request foresees expenditure of some \$11.5 million to support its mine action programme, of which \$6.4 million would be allocated to technical survey and clearance. Senegal has pledged to contribute to about 30% of the total to cover the running costs of its programme (approx. \$3.3 million).⁴³

In its Article 7 report for 2015, Senegal claimed that FCFA 500 million (some US\$850,000) would be assigned for mine action from the national budget annually.⁴⁴ According to HI, the government contributed US\$150,000 towards the cost of mine action activities in 2015.⁴⁵

In August 2016, CNAMS stated that FCFA 200 million (almost US\$340,000) was earmarked from the national budget in fiscal year 2015; however, due to complex procurement procedures, the funds might only become available in the fourth quarter of 2016, it claimed. The government provided premises for CNAMS offices and annual salary costs for staff amounting to FCFA 300million (US\$507,200), it said. In addition, it claimed

a budget line of FCFA 700million (US\$1,183,500) for mine clearance, risk education, victim assistance, and advocacy had been made available.⁴⁶

EU funding managed by UNDP ended in 2014 and was not renewed. Senegal reported in November 2015, however, that the US was contributing US\$781,000 for mine action activities.⁴⁷ Beyond funding for its operational costs, CNAMS expected to receive additional resources from the national budget and the US in 2016.⁴⁸

The elaboration of a five-year workplan for 2016–20, though late in coming, is encouraging. However, serious questions remain regarding the likelihood of its implementation. Senegal has regularly indicated that all demining operations would be conducted within the framework of the ongoing peace talks and would first be approved by MFDC in meetings with Senegalese officials.⁴⁹ In that context, in 2015, talks between an MFDC faction (Front Sud) and Senegal were reportedly underway concerning the restarting of demining in at least seven villages in Nyassia (Ziguinchor department). The process was, though, interrupted following clashes between the Front Sud and the Senegalese army in April 2015.⁵⁰ With no changes in the situation on the ground, it is doubtful that the clearance roadmap could be followed.

Moreover, survey activities are planned to start in 2016 even though more than half of the concerned areas are said to be inaccessible due to insecurity. Senegal has not provided details on whether or not the conditions in some of these areas have changed and if surveyors can effectively access them.

While continuing to repeat its claim that demining operations must be approved by the MFDC, CNAMS has stated that talks with the MFDC are made by authorities in Dakar exclusively, and not by the mine action centre.⁵¹ There is no explanation in the action plan presented in Senegal's second extension request of how peace negotiations conducted in Dakar by the Reflection Group on Peace in Casamance (Groupe de Réflexion sur la Paix en Casamance, GRPC) will include the issue of mine clearance.

In an August 2015 report, NPA criticised CNAMS for obstructing dialogue between operators and the armed forces in particular, which could provide the specific locations of mined areas. According to NPA, there

39 Ibid., p. 22.

40 Ibid.

41 K. Millett, "Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?", 7 April 2014.

42 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015, p. 20.

43 Ibid., p. 28.

44 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.

45 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.

46 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

47 Statement of Senegal, APMBC 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

48 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

49 H. Sagna, "Humanitarian demining in Casamance: negotiations and operations still deadlocked", *Enquête+*, 17 June 2015.

50 Ibid.

51 Statement of ICBL, APMBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

is overwhelming evidence that laying of landmines by rebel forces was sporadic, while the Sudanese Armed Forces placed hundreds, if not thousands, of mines around military outposts in Casamance. Other stakeholders echoed that CNAMS was preventing dialogue between parties, including the spokesperson of the MFDC, who stated that there was a complete lack of communication with members of CNAMS.⁵²

In August 2016, when asked by Mine Action Review, CNAMS did not provide any indication that any discussions with MFDC had occurred. It stated that there was no formal entity in charge of liaising between CNAMS and the GRPC, and that dialogue would be entertained through “supervisory authorities”.⁵³

The limited survey activities and lack of any clearance in 2015, along with previous years of stagnation in survey and clearance operations, and Senegal’s apparent reluctance to deploy clearance assets in CHAs, such as around military installations, continue to be worrying signs. Senegal still lacks a comprehensive understanding of its mine problem as well as a realistic strategy to comply with its Article 5 obligations in a timely manner. Its failure to clear contaminated areas around military bases is beginning to look a lot like use of anti-personnel mines, a violation of Article 1 of the APMBC.

In August 2016, CNAMS reported it had three priorities for 2016 towards meeting Senegal’s 2021 Article 5 deadline: agreement of all parties to the conflict on the principle of clearance of mined areas; access to conduct NTS in the 144 communities not yet surveyed; and mobilisation of resources to enable increased demining productivity.⁵⁴ It reported that demining of 44,000m² in Goudomp department was planned to start in early October 2016, funded by the national government.⁵⁵

In 2016, HI planned to add a mechanical asset to its existing demining capacity. It aimed to release a total of 53,162m² of land in 2016 and a further 44,000m² by the second quarter of 2017.⁵⁶

52 A. Grovestins and A. Oberstadt, “Why landmines keep on killing in Senegal”, *IRIN*, 3 August 2015, at: <https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/08/03/why-landmines-keep-killing-senegal>.

53 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

54 *Ibid.*

55 *Ibid.*

56 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.