

SENEGAL

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE	2017	2016
Problem understood	3	4
Target date for completion of mine clearance	1	1
Targeted clearance	0	1
Efficient clearance	2	2
National funding of programme	4	5
Timely clearance	0	0
Land-release system in place	6	6
National mine action standards	7	7
Reporting on progress	6	6
Improving performance	1	2
PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY POOR	3.0	3.4

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Senegal's mine action programme showed little sign of improvement in 2017. Its submission of an updated workplan in accordance with its Article 5 extension request in May 2017 for the remainder of its extension period, until 1 March 2021, and subsequently a revised version on 13 October 2017, is a welcome step forward. However, the plan contains inconsistencies in its reporting on annual land release targets and the total amount of contamination remaining to be addressed, and lacks detail on work to be carried out after 2018.

Overall progress in land release remained slow for yet another year in 2017, as Senegal continued to fail to make significant strides towards meeting its international legal obligations to demine as soon as possible. This failure,

combined with its apparent unwillingness to clear mines around military bases, raises serious doubt as to Senegal's compliance with its core obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). It is unclear whether national political will exists to address its remaining mine contamination.

The total amount of land released dwindled to just over 65,000m² in 2017 and the destruction of only two anti-personnel mines. Humanity and Inclusion (formerly Handicap International, HI), the only mine action operator in Senegal since 2014, was forced to suspend operations in October 2017 due to a lack of funding. As at August 2018, operations had yet to resume and HI had not been able to secure additional resources.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Senegal should complete non-technical survey as soon as possible and, where security allows, establish a complete and accurate estimate of its remaining mine contamination. It should revise its APMBC Article 5 workplan and extension request milestones on the basis of the results.
- Senegal should clarify the projected annual targets that will enable it finally to meet its extended 2021 Article 5 deadline.
- Senegal should ensure that suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) are recorded on the basis of demonstrable evidence and with specific size estimates and the information should be made public.
- The Government of Senegal should make national funding and resources available to national and international demining organisations to enable a resumption of demining without further delay. It should develop and implement a resource mobilisation strategy to secure increased and sustainable funding.
- It should prioritise clearance and technical survey in readily accessible areas and where the presence of mines is reliably attested.
- The Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (Centre National d'Action Antimines, CNAMS) should continue to improve transparency and to facilitate dialogue between all actors concerned by land release operations
- CNAMS should work actively to restore confidence among donors and international operators in its mine action programme.
- CNAMS should engage the Senegalese Armed Forces to participate in mine action activities, as and where appropriate.
- Senegal should provide regular updates on changes to the security situation which might affect its ability to meet its extension request goals and report on efforts to facilitate dialogue with stakeholders on mine action activities in the ongoing peace talks.

CONTAMINATION

Senegal has still to establish an accurate assessment of the extent of its mine contamination, nearly 20 years after becoming a state party to the APMBC. In 2017–18, it continued to report inconsistent figures for the amount of confirmed and suspected contaminated areas remaining, as it has in previous years.

According to CNAMS, as at 31 December 2017, a total of 68 areas of anti-personnel mine contamination remained to be addressed with a total size of 282,945m²: 42 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) with a size of 262,025m², 6 SHAs with a size of 20,920m², and an

additional 20 areas with an unknown size. As in previous years, Senegal continued to also report that a further 144 areas still remained to be surveyed, including 127 areas in Bignona department, 4 in Oussouye, and 13 in Ziguinchor.¹

In June 2018, however, Senegal informed states parties to the APMBC that 1.2km² of contamination remained to be addressed across 81 recorded areas: 30 in Bignona department, 25 in Goudomp department, 9 in Ziguinchor department, and 17 in Oussouye department. This is in addition to the 144 unsurveyed areas in Bignona,

Oussouye, and Ziguinchor departments. It claimed that as at June 2018, 1,932,717m² had been demined, with the destruction of 443 mines, along with the survey of 490 “localities” and the release of 69.²

Previously, at the end of December 2016, CNAMS had reported that a total of 81 areas of anti-personnel mine contamination remained to be addressed (61 CHAs covering 305,486m² and 20 SHAs of unknown size), along with the 144 unsurveyed areas.³ In April 2017, however,

CNAMS reported remaining contamination as comprising 52 CHAs (41 covering 529,027m² and 11 of unknown size).⁴

Four departments (Bignona, Goudomp, Oussouye and Ziguinchor) of Senegal’s total of forty-five still contain confirmed or suspected mined areas. The affected departments are located in the Casamance region of Senegal, between The Gambia to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by province (at end-2017)⁵

Department	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Other SHAs of unknown size
Bignona	18	14,670	1	20,020	11
Goudomp	12	140,453	0	0	0
Oussouye	9	77,240	4	N/R	4
Ziguinchor	3	29,662	1	900	5
Totals	42	262,025	6	20,920	20

N/R = Not reported

The figures reported in Table 1 do not tally with the amount of remaining contamination CNAMS reported as at end-2016 or its claim that 18 areas covering a total of 106,658m² were released in 2017.⁶

According to HI, given the historical evidence of frequent clashes and rebel bases in the area, the identification of SHAs in north-west Casamance suggests a high probability that other areas of contamination will be found as survey progresses further east, nearer to the northern border.⁷ The extent of contamination is better known in the south of Casamance, where previous survey in the region has identified several SHAs, between the Guinea-Bissau border and the Casamance river to the north and the Atlantic Ocean to the west.⁸ In August 2018, HI informed Mine Action Review that there were still unsurveyed areas such as north Sindian in Bignona department where significant contamination was suspected. However, for security reasons and a lack of resources, the area had not been addressed.⁹

Mine contamination in Senegal is the result of more than 30 years of fighting between the armed forces and a non-state armed group, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC). Sporadic fighting with some factions of the MFDC has continued despite a ceasefire in place since 2004.

In 2017, mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination continued to pose a threat to local residents in the Casamance region, seriously hindered socio-economic development, prevented the return of displaced populations, and limited access to agricultural land and livelihood activities.¹⁰ As at the end of 2017, Senegal reported a cumulative total of 829 mine casualties, an increase of three from 2016.¹¹

In August 2018, HI reported that of the remaining contamination to be addressed, the most important areas were located in the north of Bignona department, along the Gambian border, as increasing numbers of displaced persons were returning to the area following regime change in The Gambia and a lull in the conflict in the Casamance region in recent years. HI also said that the area had great economic potential, making clearance both a humanitarian and a developmental priority.¹²

Programme Management

The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention serves as the national mine action authority for Senegal. Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by CNAMS. Regional mine action coordination committees have been established in Kolda, Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor departments.

Sporadic international technical assistance was provided to the programme by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2008–14, in particular through a technical or chief technical advisor.¹³

Strategic Planning

Senegal submitted an updated workplan in accordance with its Article 5 deadline extension request in May 2017 for the remainder of its extension period, until 1 March 2021, and subsequently a revised version on 13 October 2017. The plan contains a list of all known or suspected contaminated areas and establishes annual targets for the amount of contamination to be addressed. However, there are inconsistencies and incompatibilities in its reporting on the total contamination remaining and the size of projected annual milestones for land release. Additionally, Senegal’s extension request is until March 2021, but the plan does not contain details of work to be carried out after 2018.

According to the revised workplan, Senegal would address 17 CHAs with a total size of approximately 169,771m² in 2017, 24 CHAs with a size of 343,856m², and 11 CHAs with an unknown size, along with non-technical survey of the remaining 144 areas, in 2018; and any areas confirmed as CHA by survey activities in 2019–20.¹⁴

In its latest Article 7 report for 2017, however, Senegal reported it would carry out clearance of 14 CHAs totalling 139,174m² in September 2018–January 2019, though the calculation of the total surface area is incorrect and, based on the figures given in the table, the total to be cleared would be 150,795m².¹⁵ It further claims that a total of 23 CHAs with a size of 340,291m² will be addressed in February–May 2019 in Bignona, Goudomp, and Ziguinchor departments, and 11 CHAs with an unknown size in Bignona and Goudomp departments in November–December 2019. The report also states that the 144 areas which remain to be surveyed will be addressed by non-technical survey in 2018–19, and that any CHAs identified would then be cleared in 2020, depending on security conditions.¹⁶

From the above figures in its latest Article 7 report, it would appear to indicate that at least 479,465m² of CHA will be addressed; although, according to figures in its revised workplan, 513,626m² of CHA will be addressed; but according to Senegal's most recent Article 7 transparency report, only about 262,000m² of CHA remained as of the end of 2017. As noted above, however, at the APMBIC Intersessional meetings in June 2018, Senegal estimated remaining contaminated area to cover a total of 1.2km².¹⁷

Legislation and Standards

Senegal does not have national mine action legislation in place, based on available information. There were no significant developments regarding Senegal's national mine action standards in 2017.¹⁸ According to HI, the standards have not been updated since 2013.¹⁹

LAND RELEASE

The total mined area reported released by HI in Senegal in 2017 through technical survey and clearance was just under 65,400m², with the destruction of two anti-personnel mines.²⁶ This is less than half the amount of land released by HI in 2016 (147,650m²), and a further decrease in output from 2015, when HI released 911,000m² by survey, though no clearance occurred that year. CNAMS, however, reported that in 2017 a total of 18 mined areas were addressed with the release of 106,658m² and the destruction of three anti-personnel mines.²⁷

Survey in 2017

In 2017, HI reported confirming 16 mined areas with a combined size of 65,393m²: one area in Bignona department with a size of 1,000m² and 15 areas in Goudomp department with a size of 64,393m², all of which were subsequently released through technical survey and clearance.²⁸

Quality Management

In 2017, HI reported that CNAMS was responsible for managing quality control and carried out activities on a weekly basis.²⁰

Information Management

According to HI, CNAMS's Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database system was upgraded in 2015.²¹

Operators

HI remained the only international mine action operator in Senegal in 2017 and as at October 2017, had suspended its demining operations in the country for lack of funding.²² During the year it employed 26 operational staff, two national managerial staff, and an expatriate operations manager. It deployed a soil preparation and mechanical mine clearance machine, the Digger D-3.²³

HI was also the sole international demining operator in Senegal until mid-2012, when new clearance capacities were added with the arrival of Mechem and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). In 2014, however, NPA withdrew from Senegal as a result of "government-imposed limitations on demining activities", which had prevented it from deploying demining resources where necessary clearance could be done safely, and from undertaking non-technical survey in areas suspected to be contaminated but which had not been surveyed.²⁴ The withdrawal was followed by loss of funding from the European Union (EU), Germany, and Norway.²⁵ In 2015, Mechem ended its operations in Senegal due to lack of funding.

Clearance in 2017

In 2017, as stated above, HI reported releasing a total of 65,400m² through technical survey and clearance (though it is unable to disaggregate between the two), including one area in Bignona department with a size of 1,000m² and 15 areas in Goudomp department with a combined size of 64,393m². These areas were released with the destruction of two anti-personnel mines, one anti-vehicle mine, and one item of unexploded ordnance (UXO).²⁹

However, CNAMS reported that 18 CHAs with a total size of 106,658m² were cleared in Goudomp department, Ziguinchor region, with the destruction of three anti-personnel mines.³⁰ According to its updated workplan, Senegal had intended that 17 CHAs with a total size of approximately 169,771m² would be addressed in 2017.³¹

Deminer Safety

There were no accidents involving deminers reported in 2017. However, HI reported that its operations on the Bélaye-Ebinako road in Djiniaky district, Bignona department had to be suspended because of the incursion of armed groups which claimed not to have been part of community meetings about the choice of the particular track of road where operations were to be carried out.³² The last reported incident occurred

in 2013, when a number of Mechem deminers working in the village of Kailou (Ziguinchor department) were kidnapped, some of whom were held for 90 days, although all were later safely released.³³

HI has reported that its task orders from CNAMS took into account security conditions first, before focusing on community requests.³⁴

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2015), Senegal is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021. It is unlikely to meet this deadline.

In granting the second extension request in December 2015, states parties noted that Senegal “did not have clear knowledge of the size and location of areas that will warrant mine clearance” as well as its commitment “to undertake technical survey activities and to develop a cancellation procedure which may result in implementation proceeding much faster and in a more cost-effective manner”.³⁵

Senegal’s previous Article 5 clearance deadline expired on 1 March 2016 under its first extension request approved in 2008. Despite repeatedly asserting its intention, as late as June 2014, not to seek a second extension period and to complete clearance within this deadline, in June 2015 Senegal submitted a request to extend its Article 5 clearance deadline until March 2021.

Senegal has claimed that the circumstances impeding compliance with its international legal obligations include general insecurity; MFDC reticence to agree to demining operations; the eight-month suspension of operations in 2013; ongoing concerns over deminer safety; and a decrease in technical and financial resources in recent years.³⁶ Senegal has also stated that security conditions and lack of funding could affect its ability to complete clearance in a timely manner.³⁷

In fact, since 2013, the apparently wilful lack of land release and concrete political will to address its mine problem, and as a consequence, the inadequate use of clearance capacities, have prevented Senegal from fulfilling its Article 5 obligations. This led to the withdrawal of a major operator and the loss of financial support from key donors, explaining in part the sharp reduction in its clearance capacities. Indeed, while Senegal recorded a significant increase in clearance productivity in 2012–13, the way CNAMS has allocated tasks after the 2013 kidnapping has been criticised for directing resources and clearance assets to areas without credible risk of mine contamination, while requests from operators to conduct survey prior to deploying clearance assets were denied.³⁸

In June 2018, CNAMS informed APMBC states parties that it expected approximately €6,475,000 is required to complete clearance of the remaining contaminated areas. It stated that Senegal contributes €460,000 annually for the operating costs of the CNAMS, and €308,000 for the conduct of mine action activities. It stated that with the current pace of performance it was unlikely to be able to meet its clearance objectives of end-2020.³⁹ Senegal’s revised October 2017 workplan notes that a resource mobilisation plan should be included in the document but does not contain one.⁴⁰

Senegal’s submission of an updated workplan in October 2017 for 2016–21 in accordance with its Article 5 extension obligations is encouraging. However, serious questions remain about the likelihood of its implementation, which is highly dependent, among other things; on security conditions. Senegal has regularly indicated that all demining operations would be conducted within the framework of the ongoing peace talks and would first be approved by MFDC in meetings with Senegalese officials.⁴¹ At the same time, CNAMS has stated that talks with the MFDC are made by authorities in Dakar exclusively, and not by the mine action centre.⁴² There is no explanation in the action plan presented in Senegal’s second extension request of how peace negotiations conducted in Dakar by the Reflection Group on Peace in Casamance (Groupe de Réflexion sur la Paix en Casamance, GRPC) will include the issue of mine clearance.

In 2017, CNAMS reiterated that the implementation of the revised workplan and the feasibility of the 2021 mine clearance deadline are based on the assumption that the GRPC obtains the MFDC’s agreement on the inclusion of demining activities in the peace process, in order to allow for the rapid deployment of demining teams.⁴³ In the workplan, CNAMS stated that it was unable to provide detailed updates on the development of the peace process as it is not a member of the GRPC negotiation group. However, it reported that events in The Gambia had improved the security situation in the north of Casamance, particularly in the department of Bignona, allowing significant numbers of displaced persons to return. It expected that the continued evolution of the peace process would ensure better security conditions and improve access for mine clearance in planned locations.⁴⁴

Previously, in 2015, NPA criticised CNAMS for obstructing dialogue between operators and the armed forces in particular, which could provide the specific locations of mined areas. Other stakeholders echoed that CNAMS was preventing dialogue between parties, including the spokesperson of the MFDC, who stated that there was a complete lack of communication with members of CNAMS.⁴⁵

Despite the positive step of revising and submitting an updated workplan for its Article 5 extension period in October 2017, Senegal still lacks a comprehensive understanding of its mine problem and concerns have been raised about its apparent reluctance to deploy clearance assets in CHAs, and its continued failure to clear contaminated areas around existing military bases verges on use of anti-personnel mines, a violation of Article 1 of the APMBC. According to NPA, there is overwhelming evidence that laying of landmines by rebel forces was sporadic, while the Sudanese Armed Forces placed hundreds, if not thousands, of mines around military outposts in Casamance.⁴⁶

However, in August 2017, CNAMS claimed that it has already demined around all the military bases, with the help of the army where that was necessary.⁴⁷ HI has reported that its teams cleared 22,162m² in Boutoute-Djibanar in connection with a former army base between 24 April 2015 and 23 December 2016, destroying “around” 19 anti-personnel mines.⁴⁸ It is not certain that all other bases have been demined.

In August 2018, HI stated that the probability that Senegal would meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2021 was “more than low” in view of the remaining situation of close to 1.2km² of area reported to be contaminated and nearly 144 localities which had not been surveyed, and without the resources to do so. HI additionally cited that the CNAMS’ ability to mobilise resources has been very low in recent years.⁴⁹

HI reported that there were no significant improvements to the national mine action programme in 2017. It remained the only mine action operator in Casamance, but stated it was not involved or poorly consulted on decisions with regards to the national programme. As reported above, it was forced to suspend operations in October 2017 due to lack of funding. It did not expect funding to be made available for mine action by the Government of Senegal in 2018 and was waiting for possibly funding from the United States to resume operations in Goudomp department as at August 2018.⁵⁰

- 1 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D.
- 2 Statement of Senegal, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018. It further reported that Bignona department had long been inaccessible due to conflict; however, with a lull in fighting in recent years, it had been possible to carry out non-technical surveys which identified the suspicion of mine contamination around the districts of Sindian and Kataba I, with Oulampane, Kataba I, and Djignaki villages the most affected. The villages of Sindian, Djibidione, and Suelle remained inaccessible for mine action activities, though. In the department of Bignona, the large-scale return of populations to previously abandoned land would need to be preceded and accompanied by CNAMS, it said. In the department of Oussouye, the situation was normalising, and it claimed that humanitarian mine clearance activities carried out by CNMAS had reduced mine contamination to only around the village of Santhiaba Manjack, Kabrousse district, while the district of Loudia Oulof was not expected to be contaminated. In the Sédhiou region, it stated the most affected areas are located in the department of Goudomp, in the districts of Djibanar and Simbandi Brassou, from the National Road No. 6 (RN6) to the border with Guinea Bissau.
- 3 Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D; CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-2021", 13 October 2017; and email from Ibrahima Seck, Head of Operations and Information Management, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.
- 4 CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-2021", 13 October 2017, p. 10. The workplan states that the 41 CHAs have a size of "529,027.276m²".
- 5 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Email from Faly Keita, Coordinator, Casamance Site, HI, 8 August 2018.
- 10 Emails from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018; Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017; and Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.
- 11 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D.
- 12 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.
- 13 Statement of Senegal, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Geneva, 21 May 2012.
- 14 CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-2021", 13 October 2017, pp. 13-14; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D.
- 15 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Statement of Senegal, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.
- 18 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.
- 19 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.
- 20 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.
- 21 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.
- 22 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 26 September 2016.
- 23 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.
- 24 NPA, "Humanitarian Disarmament in Senegal", undated, at: <http://www.npaid.org/Dur-work/Countries/Africa/Senegal>; and K. Millett, "Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?", Blog entry, 7 April 2014, at: <https://landmineandclustermunitionblog.wordpress.com/2014/04/07/clearance-and-compliance-in-casamance-is-senegal-doing-all-it-should/>.
- 25 NPA, "Humanitarian Disarmament in Senegal", undated; and Millett, "Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?".
- 26 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.
- 27 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D.
- 28 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D.
- 31 CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-2021", 13 October 2017, p. 13.
- 32 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.
- 33 In March 2013, clearance operations were progressing rapidly as a consequence of the new demining capacity brought by Mechem and NPA. As they approached MFDC-controlled areas, a faction of the rebel group called publicly for a halt to humanitarian demining on the ground that clearance teams had reached a "red line beyond which operators' safety could not be guaranteed". Joint Press Release from MFDC, CNAMS, Geneva Call, the Sao Domingos Prefect, and APRAN-SDP, 20 March 2013.
- 34 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.
- 35 Analysis of Senegal's request for a second Article 5 deadline extension submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 17 November 2015, p. 1.
- 36 Ibid., p. 22.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Millett, "Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?".
- 39 Statement of Senegal, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.
- 40 CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-2021", 13 October 2017, p. 20.
- 41 H. Sagna, "Humanitarian demining in Casamance: negotiations and operations still deadlocked", *Enquête+*, 17 June 2015.
- 42 Statement of ICBL, 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.
- 43 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.
- 44 CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-21", April 2017; and CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016-2021", 13 October 2017, p. 21.
- 45 A. Grovestins and A. Oberstadt, "Why landmines keep on killing in Senegal", IRIN, 3 August 2015, at: <https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/08/03/why-landmines-keep-killing-senegal>.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.
- 48 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.
- 49 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.
- 50 Emails from Faly Keita, HI, 8 and 24 August 2018.