




ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025 NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE



KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Nigeria has extended its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline to the end of 2025 but again in 2021 made little or no progress towards meeting it. Nigeria's compliance with the APMBC is in serious doubt.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Nigeria should establish a national mine action centre as a matter of urgency to provide direction, coordination, and momentum to the mine action sector.
- Nigeria should develop a national mine strategy in consultation with implementing partners.
- Nigeria should establish a central mine action database providing humanitarian agencies timely access to comprehensive data on the location, type, and extent of mine contamination and items cleared by security forces.
- Nigeria should, as a matter of urgent priority, build national and regional capacities to enable mine clearance to be conducted.
- Nigeria's Inter-Ministerial Committee on the Convention should expedite the preparation and official adoption of national mine action standards.
- Nigeria should submit annual Article 7 reports providing comprehensive, disaggregated data and details on the progress of mine action in compliance with its obligations under the Convention (including with respect to anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature) and international law more broadly.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2021)	Score (2020)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	3	Not scored	An explosive ordnance incident map compiled by national and international organisations outlines the area of conflict while community liaison surveys provide more detailed information on particular locations. Significant areas of contamination are suspected but insecurity has severely restricted access and systematic field operations, limiting non-technical survey to community assessments of the presence of explosive ordnance.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	Not scored	Nigeria does not have a functioning mine action programme. It established an inter-ministerial committee in 2019 mandated to develop a mine action programme, set up a national mine action authority, develop a national strategy, and draft national mine action standards, but has yet to deliver these objectives.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	3	Not scored	Nigeria has not articulated any policy on gender and diversity. The United Nations (UN) supports age- and gender-appropriate policies and Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) employ women and speakers of minority languages.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	3	Not scored	Nigeria does not have a national mine action database but has proposed to establish one within 2022. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) operates an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database collating and inputting data on explosive incidents provided mainly by MAG and DRC and community reports of contamination. Nigeria has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2012.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	4	Not scored	Nigeria's Article 5 deadline extension request calls for development of a national mine action strategy "within 2022" but there has been little visible progress prompting questions about the level of priority national authorities accord this sector. In the meantime, humanitarian organisations task themselves but coordinate activities with a mine action sub-working group co-chaired by the State Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement and by UNMAS.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (20% of overall score)	2	Not scored	Nigeria has no national mine action standards in place. It planned to develop them in 2021–22 but explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) standards drafted by UNMAS in consultation with operators had not received official endorsement as of June 2022. UNMAS was in the process of drafting standards for non-technical survey and victim assistance. International organisations meantime follow their own technical standards and standard operating procedures.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	1	Not scored	Only Nigerian military and police conduct clearance of explosive ordnance but there is no record of outcomes. Nigeria has said the Police Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Unit's competencies do not meet technical requirements and is calling for capacity building and access to more modern equipment.
Average Score	2.6	Not scored	Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

No national mine action authority or mine action centre

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army
- Police
- Royal Heritage Foundation

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council Humanitarian and Disarmament and Peacebuilding Sector (DRC) (formerly Danish Demining Group, DDG)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Nigeria experiences heavy casualties from widespread use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), particularly mines of an improvised nature, by Boko Haram and other jihadist groups in the north eastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The extent of contamination is not known.¹

Deteriorating security has continued to prevent systematic survey of contamination and the nature of the insurgency has not yet allowed clearly delineated areas of contamination to be identified. Instead, the scale of the mine threat is measured in the number of explosive incidents rather than the size of suspected or confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs/ SHAs) (see Table 1). However, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has reported that "it is suspected that significant contamination exists".²

Nigeria reports improvised mines and explosive devices affect a total of 34 Local Government Areas (LGAs) in three states, including 18 of 27 LGAs in Borno, the worst-affected state; 5 of 21 LGAs in Adamawa state, and 11 of 17 LGAs in Yobe.³ However, use of mines or improvised mines by criminal elements has been reported in other states, including the central Niger state.⁴

The main threat is posed by improvised mines on roads. UNMAS recorded 255 incidents of IEDs placed on roads in 2021 (see Table 1), an increase of 37% and more than double the number two years ago. Another 220 explosive incidents were recorded in the first three months of 2022.⁵ UNMAS determined that more than 100 of the 117 devices placed on roads in 2019 were victim-activated, including by pressure plates. The few pressure-plate devices that were inspected were capable of being detonated by the weight of a person, meaning that they are covered by the APMBC.⁶ Insecurity has hindered survey but available data indicated the types of device used remained largely unchanged in 2021⁷ and the overwhelming majority of devices were mines of an improvised nature.⁸

					Explosive remnants of	
Year	Road-emplaced IED	Body-borne IED	Vehicle-borne IED	Other IED	war (ERW)	Total incidents
2017	165	211	4	1	0	381
2018	149	99	10	0	9	267
2019	117	32	4	4	32	189
2020	186	23	5	2	31	247
2021	255	6	10	23	17	311

Table 1: Explosive ordnance incidents in north-east Nigeria (2017–21)⁹

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Nigeria announced in 2020 that it planned to set up a national mine action programme, but as at September 2022 none had yet been established. Nigeria set up an Inter-Ministerial Committee on the APMBC in September 2019 to lead the process of setting up a national mine action centre (NMAC).¹⁰ This included the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Humanitarian Affairs; the Office of Disaster Management and Social Development; the National Emergency Management Agency; the North-east Development Commission; and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs. In 2021, Nigeria requested support from UNMAS in creating the NMAC¹¹ and said it would expand the Inter-Ministerial Committee to include the Police, National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and the Federal Ministry of Education.¹²

3 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 24.

^{1 2021} Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 4.

² Email from Harshi Gunawardana, Programme and Communications Officer, UNMAS, 7 May 2021.

⁴ See, e.g., "Landmine kills four security personnel in central Nigeria," Agence France Presse, 21 February 2022.

⁵ Email from Gilles Delecourt, Senior Programme Manager, UNMAS, 22 May 2022.

⁶ Emails from Lionel Pechera, Programme Coordinator, UNMAS, Nigeria, 11 March and 20 July 2020.

⁷ Email from Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, 22 May 2022.

⁸ Email from Pierluigi Candier, Country Director, MAG, 2 June 2022.

⁹ Emails from Harshi Gunawardana, UNMAS, 7 May 2021; and Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, 22 May 2022; and 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 11.

¹⁰ Statement of Nigeria, 19th Meeting of States Parties, 15 November 2021.

¹¹ Email from Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, 22 May 2022.

^{12 2021} Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known whether Nigeria has a national mine action standard on environmental management and/or a policy on environmental management. It is also not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of anti-personnel mines in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Nigeria, lacking a mine action programme, has not taken up gender in the context of mine action.

The UN humanitarian response programme for 2019–21 unveiled in December 2018 said all groups living in, or potentially returning to, areas suspected or known to be contaminated with mines or other explosive devices would be involved in all stages of mine action programming. It called for "age- and gender-appropriate risk education activities to minimize loss of life and injuries as a result of explosive remnants of war", targeting 200,000 girls, 178,000 boys, 51,000 women, and 45,000 men.¹³

UNMAS commissioned a gender baseline assessment for the Nigeria Police Force and the NSCDC in north-east Nigeria to identify ways of strengthening the role of women and the explosive ordnance disposal capabilities in these bodies.¹⁴ The assessment, which was conducted between August 2020 and February 2021, found the security services had not embraced gender mainstreaming. It called for inclusion of more women officers, the amending of obsolete recruitment practices and repeal of discriminatory regulations, and said UNMAS should engage with both organisations on the need for gender parity.¹⁵

Danish Refugee Council Humanitarian and Disarmament and Peacebuilding Sector (DRC, formerly Danish Demining Group (DDG)) employed eight women, including a team leader, as non-technical survey/explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) staff in 2021, making up one third of their non-technical survey/EORE capacity. The number of female employees fell by half in 2022 as one DRC project came to an end. The remaining female staff consisted of a team leader and three non-technical survey/EORE officers.¹⁶

Mines Advisory Group (MAG)'s staff of 34 included 18 women in 2021, including two in managerial or supervisory positions, one woman in a support role, and 15 women in field roles, mainly community liaison. Before any risk education or other activities, community liaison teams consult community elders and other key actors to identify high risk groups, whether they are men and boys collecting scrap metal or women and girls who collect water and firewood. All staff participated in a week-long workshop with MAG's Gender Diversity and Inclusion adviser in October 2021 aimed at developing an action plan on gender and diversity inclusion for implementation in 2022.¹⁷

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Nigeria does not have a national information management system or database recording hazardous areas or explosive incidents. UNMAS manages an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database that collects data from mine action stakeholders and humanitarian organisations on explosive incidents, the results of surveys, and risk education beneficiary data.¹⁸ The planned NMAC would be the custodian of the national database for mine action, responsible for maintaining it accurately and keeping it up-to-date, and UNMAS plans to train national authorities on information management when it is established.¹⁹

In the meantime, operators say there is a need for standardised data collection. Operators say collection of risk education data is standardised and they use a form for collecting victim data that was updated by MAG in 2020 and endorsed by UNMAS, but data sharing between stakeholders remains reportedly weak.²⁰ DRC said it recorded all activity in IMSMA-compatible format which was shared with UNMAS.²¹

As of writing, Nigeria had last submitted an Article 7 report almost 10 years ago at the end of 2012. It is required by the APMBC to submit a report annually.

- 13 UN, "Humanitarian Response Strategy January 2019 December 2021", December 2018, pp. 43 and 48.
- 14 Email from Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, 22 May 2022.
- 15 UNMAS, "Summary of Gender Baseline Assessment", May 2021.
- 16 Email from Goran Knezevic, Mine Action Manager, DRC, 23 September 2022.
- 17 Email from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 2 June 2022.
- 18 Emails from Harshi Gunawardana, UNMAS, 7 May 2021; and John Sorbo, DRC, 3 July 2021.
- 19 Email from Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, 22 May 2022.
- 20 Email from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 2 June 2022.
- 21 Email from Goran Knezevic, DRC, 23 September 2022.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Nigeria requested an Article 5 deadline extension in May 2021 that set out a number of broad aims:

- establish a National Mine Action Centre to address the explosive ordnance threat
- develop National Mine Action Standards
- strengthen the coordination and delivery of risk education
- continue to collect information on the threat posed by anti-personnel mines; and
- develop a national mine action strategy and a work plan for implementation.²²

The request indicates that the establishment of a NMAC, development of national standards, and a study visit to another mine action programme were all planned for 2021 to 2022. The request stated that a national mine action strategy would be developed "within 2022" when Nigeria also proposed to convene a strategy and prioritisation workshop with participation by the inter-ministerial committee, the Nigerian Police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit, UNMAS, national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and civil society organisations.²³ But stakeholders said that as of early 2022 they had detected little movement towards implementation, calling into serious question the degree of national commitment to this programme.

In the absence of a national mine action plan or strategy, Nigeria's mine action sector lacks any coordinated tasking process or any criteria for prioritising survey. MAG reported that its teams carry out focus group discussions with communities which have travelled through areas that are suspected to be contaminated with explosive ordnance. These are based on analysis of International NGO Safety Organisation reports of accidents and incidents as well as information collected from risk education sessions and community liaison.²⁴ DRC said it conducted non-technical survey activities on the basis of a combination of internal desk assessments, recommendations from UNMAS, and referrals of possible explosive ordnance locations by other agencies.²⁵

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Nigeria does not have national mine action standards (NMAS) though in 2021 it had identified development of NMAS as an objective in its Article 5 extension request that it expected to address in 2021 and 2022.²⁶ The absence of a national mine action authority, however, has slowed progress. UNMAS drafted national standards for risk education in consultation with MAG and DRC in 2021 but as of August 2022 they had not received official endorsement. In 2022, UNMAS drafted national standards for non-technical survey and discussed victim assistance standards with members of the Mine Action sub-working group.²⁷

Nigeria's extension request said it would release land through non-technical and technical survey, by clearance and by cancellation, referring to a process that apparently would be applied before survey. The process draws attention to a concern that communities may exaggerate the extent of contamination and their reports will be subjected to "an integrity test". If they fail the test, the area would be cancelled for purposes of survey. More controversially, the request says such areas would also be declared safe.²⁸ The comment underscores the challenge Nigeria faces building up credible baseline contamination data at a time when access by trained survey teams is severely curtailed by insecurity.

Nigeria's 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request noted the need for a comprehensive programme of capacity building for its security services and national commercial operators. It said the capacity of the Nigeria Police Force (EOD Unit) was "far from adequate to address our current needs" and called for training and supply of modern equipment.²⁹

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

All clearance of explosive ordnance is conducted by the Nigerian army and police primarily for military purposes and with support from paramilitary groups.³⁰ The EOD and improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD) capacity of the Nigerian security forces is not known. After conducting a needs assessment with police commanders in Borno and Adamawa states, UNMAS organised an IEDD course for security forces in Maiduguri in October 2020 that provided training for 26 operators.³¹ In 2021, UNMAS also provided IEDD training for 20 members of the Nigeria Police Force's EOD units, including two women.³² UNMAS has previously delivered training in non-technical survey and risk education to 14 members of the Youths Awaken Foundation, a national NGO.³³

- 24 Email from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 2 June 2022.
- 25 Email from Goran Knezevic, DRC, 23 September 2022.
- 26 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.
- 27 Emails from Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, 22 May 2022, and Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 2 June 2022.
- 28 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.
- 29 Ibid., p. 31.
- 30 Emails from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 11 March 2020; and Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, 22 May 2022.
- 31 Email from Harshi Gunawardana, UNMAS, 7 May 2021
- 32 Email from Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, 22 May 2022.
- 33 Email from Harshi Gunawardana, UNMAS, 17 August 2021.

^{22 2021} Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

²³ Ibid., p. 32.

MAG started working in Nigeria in 2016, focusing at that time on arms management and destruction and has been engaged in mine action in the country since 2017. In 2021, its capacity was 31 staff (3 international and 28 national personnel), working from a head office in Abuja and a field office in the Borno state's capital, Maiduguri. MAG operated with nine EORE/community liaison teams who worked in 12 LGAs across Nigeria's most affected states in the north-east. There were eight LGAs in Borno state, and two LGAs in each of Adamawa and Yobe states. MAG also worked with a national implementing partner, the Royal Heritage Foundation.³⁴

DRC's mine action programme employed a total staff of 28 in 2021, of which two were internationals. The mine action component included two technical managers and

four non-technical survey/community liaison teams with 24 personnel working in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states. One of DRC's main projects funded by the United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) ended in December 2021 and the mine action team reduced in 2022 to one international and fifteen national staff. It also ceased working in Yobe state. DRC puts emphasis on training community focal points (CFPs) and engaged with some 70 CFPs in the three states, building community awareness of explosive threats and seeking to increase community reporting on explosive incidents and contamination. DRC has also provided EOD Levels 1 and 2 training for the Nigerian police.³⁵

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

SURVEY IN 2021

Survey activity in Nigeria is severely restricted by the continuing conflict which prevents access and systematic field investigation of affected areas and limits non-technical survey to community assessments of the location of explosive ordnance. Operators work on an ad hoc basis responding to community reports of the presence of explosive items when security makes it possible to visit the area.³⁶ UNMAS coordinated 125 non-technical community surveys in 2021 which were conducted by implementing partners in 14 LGAs of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states and resulted in the reporting of 35 items of explosive ordnance, including aircraft bombs.³⁷

DRC said it conducted more than 120 non-technical surveys in 2021 and also identified 39 EOD spot tasks which it communicated to Nigerian security forces for action.³⁸ MAG reported supporting five non-technical survey teams, which were implemented by its partner, the Royal Heritage Foundation. MAG also conducted 180 remote community-based assessments (RCBA) in 2021 using this information to build understanding of the location and types of explosive ordnance affecting the civilian population. This information also informs risk education priorities and was used to support the Inter-Ministerial Committee on the APMBC in preparing Nigeria's 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request.³⁹

CLEARANCE IN 2021

Clearance is conducted exclusively by Nigerian security forces and paramilitary groups. All explosive ordnance items identified in the course of surveys and community assessments are reported to national authorities for removal but there is no record of items cleared in the course of EOD and IEDD operations.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGERIA: 1 MARCH 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (ONE YEAR): 31 DECEMBER 2021
SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (FOUR YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

34 Email from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 2 June 2022.

- 35 Emails from John Sorbo, DRC, 3 July 2021; and Goran Knezevic, DRC, 23 September 2022.
- 36 Email from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 2 June 2022.
- 37 Email from Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, 22 May 2022.
- 38 Email from Goran Knezevic, DRC, 23 September 2022.
- 39 Email from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 2 June 2022.

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the four-year extension granted by States Parties in 2021), Nigeria is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It is unlikely to meet this deadline.

Nigeria declared it had cleared all known anti-personnel mines from its territory in November 2011 at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, three months in advance of its original Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2012.⁴⁰

In November 2020, prompted by the growth of jihadist insurgency making extensive use of improvised mines in northern states, Nigeria requested and received a one-year extension until 31 December 2021 in which to prepare a detailed assessment of contamination and propose steps to mitigate it. UNMAS, in consultation with MAG, DRC, and Youths Awaken Foundation, a national NGO, prepared an initial draft which was first reviewed by the APMBC Implementation Support Unit and then forwarded to the Ministry of Defence to provide government input.⁴¹ In May 2021, it submitted a request for a four-year extension until 31 December 2025, which was granted at the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties.

Nigeria expressed optimism that the security challenges Nigeria faces in the north-east would abate enabling the start of humanitarian demining. However, it said it would apply for another extension if the insecurity persisted.⁴² Indeed, the extension request acknowledged that insecurity had prevented comprehensive survey or a determination of the extent of contamination thus far. Nigeria proposed to use the additional time to create the framework and institutions for a national mine action programme, including a national mine action strategy.⁴³ As of June 2022, none of these proposed actions had taken place. The request did not provide any estimate of costs of a mine action programme, plans for resource mobilisation, or the results of engagement with potential donors.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Nigeria does not have plans in place to address residual contamination once its Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

⁴⁰ Statement of Nigeria, 11th Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 2011.

⁴¹ Email from Harshi Gunawardana, UNMAS, 7 May 2021.

⁴² Statement of Nigeria, 19th Meeting of States Parties, 15 November 2021.

^{43 2021} Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.