

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

MEDIUM, 15KM²
(ESTIMATED)


AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

2.08KM²

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

1,166

(including 3 destroyed during spot tasks)



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): **MEDIUM**

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The number of areas suspected or confirmed to contain anti-personnel mines in South Sudan dropped dramatically, by nearly 50km², from just under 80km² at the end of 2017, to just under 30km² at the end of 2018. Improvements in the security situation which enabled greater freedom of movement for mine action teams, coupled with a focus on targeted re-survey and database review of large recorded suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), led to the significant cancellation of a number of hazards that were for some time thought to be either inflated or just inaccurate. Clearance of

anti-personnel mined area also rose during 2018, along with a considerable increase in the number of anti-personnel mines found and destroyed.

While South Sudan has determined it will not meet its July 2021 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline, and will request an additional extension for a period of five years, as a result of the progress made in 2018, it is now far more able to accurately present the size of the remaining challenge and the resources and time required to address it.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- South Sudan should set concrete and realistic annual targets for completing survey and clearance of anti-personnel mines in its forthcoming Article 5 deadline extension request.
- South Sudan should strive to plan, where possible, for mine action operations to support peace and stabilization efforts.
- Efforts should continue to ensure accurate recording and reporting by operators of data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land release terminology.
- South Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.
- South Sudan should increase its financial support for mine action operations as well as to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA).
- The mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) should be changed to include support for capacity development of the national mine action programme.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2018)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	7	The understanding of remaining contamination in South Sudan improved significantly in 2018, with more than 53km ² of land released, primarily as a result of re-survey and database review. The task remaining became far more achievable, with estimated contamination at end 2018 at 29.8km ² , down from nearly 80km ² the previous year.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP & PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) continued to face serious financial and technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively in 2018. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was responsible for much of the mine action programme's functioning, including database management, accreditation, tasking, and quality management.
GENDER (10% of overall score)	6	South Sudan's second national mine action strategy for 2018–22 includes a section on gender, as does South Sudan's National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs). These include a focus on ensuring gender-balanced survey teams and gender- and age-sensitive data collection and community outreach.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT & REPORTING (10% of overall score)	7	A comprehensive review of all data in South Sudan's Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was carried out in 2018, along with re-survey of recorded suspected and confirmed hazardous areas thought to be exaggerated or erroneously recorded. These activities resulted in significant gains in the understanding of mine contamination.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	6	South Sudan's most recent National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2022, developed with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), was officially launched in September 2018. Improvements in the security situation enabled an increase in access for mine action operations in a number of previously inaccessible areas.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (20% of overall score)	7	According to UNMAS, the NTSGs for mine action in South Sudan are subject to constant review by UNMAS and the NMAA. In 2018, the NTSGs were amended in regard to storage and transport of explosives and the conduct of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	7	While South Sudan will not meet its current Article 5 deadline of 2021, its remarkable progress in land release output and obtaining a more realistic picture of remaining contamination in 2018 place it in a much better situation as it prepares its second Article 5 extension request, with a much more achievable problem to tackle.
Average Score	6.5	Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Demining Group (DDG)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)
- MECHEM
- The Development Initiative (TDI)

OTHER ACTORS

- UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

South Sudan is heavily contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, as well as explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants (CMR). The weapons were used during nearly 50 years of Sudanese civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 led to the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Following two years of independence and relative peace in South Sudan, heavy fighting erupted in the capital city, Juba, in December 2013, initiating new armed conflict across the country.

According to UNMAS, at end 2018, South Sudan had a combined total of 147 areas confirmed and suspected to contain anti-personnel mines covering a total area of almost 29.8km² (see Table 2).¹ This is a massive decrease from the end of 2017, when a total of 220 areas containing anti-personnel mines were reported with a total size of nearly 80km².²

Nine of South Sudan's (formerly ten) states contain mined areas, with Central Equatoria the most heavily contaminated, followed by Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei, according to UNMAS. Of the remaining anti-personnel mine contamination, less than 3.3km² is confirmed hazardous area (CHA), while 26.5km² of SHA is thought to be mined (see Table 2).³

Table 1: Mined area (at end 2018)⁴

Type of contamination	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)
Anti-personnel mines	69	3,276,155	78	26,505,130
Anti-vehicle mines	32	1,339,612	31	1,765,906
Totals	101	4,615,767	109	28,271,036

CHAs = Confirmed hazardous areas

Table 2: Anti-personnel mined area by state (at end 2018)⁵

State	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total SHAs and CHAs	Total area (m ²)
Central Equatoria	38	1,189,016	37	443,736	75	1,632,752
Eastern Equatoria	16	546,654	11	92,836	27	639,490
Jonglei	9	1,112,036	15	20,680,535	24	21,792,571
Lakes	0	0	1	2,500	1	2,500
North Bahr El Ghazal	1	37,500	0	0	1	37,500
Upper Nile	3	93,761	4	4,684,713	7	4,778,474
Warrap	0	0	1	40,000	1	40,000
West Bahr El Ghazal	1	201,738	1	0	2	201,738
Western Equatoria	1	95,450	8	560,810	9	656,260
Totals	69	3,276,155	78	26,505,130	147	29,781,285

While significant progress was made in 2018 to more accurately define the extent of contamination remaining, its full extent is not known, as additional mined areas continue to be identified. Ongoing conflict continues to result in new unexploded ordnance (UXO), particularly in Greater Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. Insecurity continues to greatly limit access to many areas of the country, severely impeding efforts to confirm or address contamination, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region.⁶

In 2017, UNMAS reported that a review of the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database led to the conclusion that many existing hazards may have been over-reported in size. UNMAS consequently initiated a process of targeted re-survey during the year aimed at better defining the estimated size of SHAs. The results of the re-survey were not finalised as of writing, but UNMAS reported that ongoing survey in Upper Nile state,

previously reported as the most heavily contaminated in terms of the size of area recorded, has revealed remarkably little contamination. Current projections of the number of minefields and cluster strikes remaining to be addressed are thought to be highly accurate, but markedly less reliable are estimates of their sizes as well as the type of contamination.

In the Equatoria region, the NMAA reported that while the peace agreement signed in September 2018 had brought a cessation in violence across the majority of the country, fighting continued in the region as at May 2019, which prevented access to determine the full extent of contamination or clearance in the region. However, the NMAA reported that of all hazards remaining in the database, the three largest recorded areas accounted for more than 10km², and it was confident that more survey work will yield continued significant reduction in the contamination to be addressed.⁷

At the same time, new areas of anti-personnel mine contamination continued to be added to the database in 2018. A total of close to 3.2km² was added, including over 1.1km² of recorded contaminated area which was re-classified as anti-personnel contamination from other types of recorded hazardous area in a database review; just over 600,000m² of previously unknown anti-personnel mined area identified through survey; and a further nearly 1.5km² of area was added to the size of a number of recorded anti-personnel mined areas already existing in the database.⁸

While previously undiscovered areas of anti-personnel mine contamination continued to be found in 2018, Mine Action Review is not aware of any confirmed new use of

anti-personnel mines in the renewed conflict that erupted in 2013. In July 2019, UNMAS stated that no new use of anti-personnel mines, including of an improvised nature, was recorded in 2018.⁹

Previously, dating back to 2015, there were allegations of use of anti-personnel mines by South Sudanese government forces in an area around Nassir, Upper Nile state.¹⁰ In June 2018, South Sudan informed states parties to the APMBC that in November 2017, a four-person investigation team travelled to Nassir to investigate the March 2015 allegation. The investigation team found no evidence of landmines being laid in the vicinity of Nassir, on or around the alleged date in 2015.¹¹

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) – since renamed the NMAA – was established by presidential decree in 2006 to act as the national agency for planning, coordination, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.¹² There is no national mine action legislation in South Sudan.¹³

In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening the capacity of the NMAA. UNMAS (with the NMAA) has been overseeing mine action across the country through its main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau. UNMAS is responsible for accrediting mine action organisations, drafting national mine action standards, establishing a quality management system, managing the national database, and tasking operators.¹⁴

While it is planned that the NMAA will eventually assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, according to UNMAS the NMAA continued to face serious financial and technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively in 2018. It requires substantial resources and capacity building assistance if it is to operate effectively.¹⁵

UN Security Council Resolution 1996 authorised UNMISS to support mine action through assessed peacekeeping funds.¹⁶ In May 2014, UN Security Council Resolution 2155, adopted in response to the conflict that broke out in December 2013, effectively ended the mission's mandate to support capacity development of government institutions. In 2018, UNMAS reported that reversing this change in the mission mandate to support the capacity building of government institutions would greatly enhance UNMAS' ability to support the NMAA.¹⁷

In 2018, the Government of South Sudan funded the costs of NMAA staff salaries and its sub-offices across the country. It did not, however, provide any funding for the conduct of survey or clearance.¹⁸ UNMAS has reported that the Government of South Sudan is only able to provide minimal funding and support to all national institutions, including the NMAA. It has raised concerns over resource mobilisation in the face of overwhelming donor fatigue and frustration due to the ongoing conflict, which continues to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis. Mine action, which is a critical enabler for humanitarian assistance, has not been prioritised by donors, who have been increasingly unwilling to support government institutions until a peace agreement is implemented.¹⁹

Positively, UNMAS reported that as part of South Sudan's preparations to request an extension to its APMBC Article 5 deadline, a centrally-led effort to mobilise additional resources for mine action was underway in 2019.²⁰

GENDER

South Sudan's second national mine action strategy for 2018–22 includes a section on gender, focusing on how different gender and age groups are affected by mines and ERW and have specific and varying needs and priorities. Guidelines on mainstreaming gender considerations in mine action planning and operations in South Sudan are also incorporated in the strategy, including on the collection of data disaggregated by sex and age.²¹ UNMAS reported that the programme was also implementing the UN Gender Guidelines for Mine Action, monitored by a gender focal point.²²

South Sudan's National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) contain provisions requiring all community liaison teams to tailor activities on the basis of the gendered needs of beneficiaries, and to address the specific risks faced by women and girls.²³ All teams are reportedly gender balanced in composition and trained to be inclusive, for example by ensuring outreach through non-technical survey and risk education is done separately for different age and gender groups, and taking local cultural practices into consideration.²⁴

At the same time, UNMAS reported that task prioritisation in 2018 was predominantly dependent on security considerations and that resources were concentrated on tasks within limited geographical areas rather than on the basis of gender needs.²⁵ It claimed there was equal access in employment opportunities for qualified men and women in survey and clearance teams across the organisations operating in South Sudan, but reported that 16% of staff in operational roles such as deminers and community liaison officers were women, while women accounted for 11% of all staff in managerial or supervisory positions across the five operators conducting mine action operations in South Sudan in 2018.²⁶

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) reported that, in 2018, a basic demining training course was offered to 20 interested women with no previous demining experience, in an effort to increase the number of potentially qualified women applicants for operational demining positions. It reported that, since the training, 16 of the women had been hired for MAG operational teams. As at April 2019, MAG stated that all of its seven clearance teams included women deminers, including a number of women previously employed as cooks or community liaison officers who had participated in the demining training course and were subsequently offered operational positions.²⁷ MAG reported that during 2018, it continually hired women as deminers as openings became available, and by April 2019 one third of its deminers employed were female.²⁸

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

A comprehensive review of all data in South Sudan's IMSMA database was carried out in 2018, along with re-survey of recorded SHAs and CHAs thought to be exaggerated or erroneously recorded. These activities resulted in significant gains in the understanding of mine and ERW contamination. UNMAS informed Mine Action Review that, wherever possible, the database disaggregates mined areas, CMR, and other ERW-contaminated areas, including spot tasks.²⁹

PLANNING AND TASKING

South Sudan's most recent National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2022, developed with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and funded by Japan, was officially launched in September 2018.³⁰ According to UNMAS, the strategy has three strategic goals with related targets:³¹

Strategic Goal 1: Advocacy and communication of South Sudan's mine/ERW problem continues through national and international awareness-raising and adoption and implementation of international conventions to facilitate a mine-/ERW-free South Sudan.

Strategic Goal 2: The size of the mine/ERW contamination area is clarified and confirmed and the problem is addressed through appropriate survey and clearance methods, ensuring safe land is handed back to affected communities for use.

Strategic Goal 3: Safe behaviour is promoted among women, girls, boys, and men to reduce mine/ERW accidents and promote safe livelihood activities.

According to UNMAS, the operational focus for 2019–2020 would be on further clarifying the contamination remaining in the database, with re-survey of hazards that are thought to be exaggerated in size. Clearance will continue across the country, wherever it is safe to do so.³² UNMAS also reported that it was working with the NMAA to develop plans for a national capacity that will be responsible for the clearance of residual contamination. This will be the responsibility of the Government of South Sudan.³³

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

According to UNMAS, the NTSGs for mine action in South Sudan are subject to constant review by UNMAS and the NMAA. In 2018, the NTSGs were amended with respect to the storage and transport of explosives and the conduct of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations.³⁴ UNMAS also noted that the NTSGs require all mine action teams to conduct regular internal quality assurance (QA), along with quality control (QC) sampling of 10% of each area cleared. UNMAS conducted additional external QA through visits to each clearance task in 2018, as well as upon the completion of a clearance task.³⁵

In May 2019, the NMAA reported that as a result of years of fighting and insecurity, most mine action teams in South Sudan had been reconfigured to be small and mobile, able to react to rapidly changing security access, which has greatly reduced the extent of demining.³⁶ As a result, the teams are not properly scaled to undertake area clearance in the most efficient manner. The NMAA said that existing capacity would need to be reconfigured into fewer but larger demining teams, which will require additional support, as well as peace and stability to enable deployment on larger area tasks.³⁷

OPERATORS

In 2018, UNMAS reported that mine action operating capacity remained on a par with that deployed in 2017, with almost 1,000 persons working in the sector. Operators included three international demining non-governmental organisations (MAG, DanChurchAid (DCA), and Danish Demining Group (DDG)), and three commercial companies (G4S Ordnance Management (G4S), MECHEM, and The Development Initiative (TDI)).³⁸

MAG reported beginning operations in 2018 with seven clearance teams, which reduced to six at the end of the year. It deployed one dedicated team for mechanically-assisted minefield clearance, as well as number of EOD spot tasks, and four MTTs with the capacity to conduct manual or mechanically assisted clearance, depending on tasking orders. Of the five teams, one was deployed on tasks which included anti-personnel mined areas during the year.³⁹

OPERATIONAL TOOLS

According to UNMAS, a range of mine action operational tools were in use in 2018, including two MineWolf 240 machines, a MineWolf 330, Bozena, and PT300 machine, and eight mine detection dogs.⁴⁰

DEMINEER SAFETY

According to UNMAS, there were no accidents during mine clearance in 2018. However, one accident occurred during EOD activities, when a female national staff member was killed and another national staff member injured. The incident was investigated by a joint team comprised of the NMAA, UNMAS, and a third-party clearance operator. The incident led to the withdrawal of MECHEM's accreditation to work in South Sudan. UNMAS reported that lessons learned were shared with all operators in the country.⁴¹

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018

South Sudan has reported a total release of all forms of hazardous area of more than 45.1km² in 2018: 2.08km² released through clearance, 0.02km² reduced through technical survey, and 43.06km² cancelled through non-technical survey, with the destruction of 1,163 anti-personnel mines.⁴² A additional three anti-personnel mines were destroyed during spot tasks. A further 7.4km² cancelled during a desk review of database records and just under 0.5km² re-classified from anti-personnel mine contamination to other types of hazardous area.⁴³

SURVEY IN 2018

In 2018, there was a remarkable twentyfold increase in survey output compared with 2017, with 43km² cancelled through non-technical survey and a further 20,000m² reduced through technical survey.⁴⁴ This compared to just over 2km² released through survey in 2017, all by cancellation.⁴⁵

The increase in survey output was due in part to a rapprochement between the principal warring parties that culminated on 12 September 2018 with the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution on the Conflict in South Sudan. This led to greater freedom of movement for mine action teams and enabled them to access some reported hazards in previously hard to reach areas. This increased access, coupled with a focus on re-survey from all operators as well as a thorough desk review of all reported hazards by UNMAS, resulted in the cancellation of a significant number of hazards that it stated had for some time had been suspected of being either inflated or incorrect.⁴⁶

As noted in table 4, the desk review of the database led to a number of tasks being cancelled or re-classified in 2018, with a total of 65 areas with a size of just over 7.4km² cancelled outright and a further 16 areas with a size of just under 0.5km² re-classified from anti-personnel mine contamination to other types of hazardous area.⁴⁷

Table 3: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical survey in 2018⁴⁸

State	Operator	Area cancelled (m ²)
Central Equatoria	G4S	57,182
Central Equatoria	TDI	124,486
Eastern Equatoria	TDI	143,588
Jonglei	G4S	8,115,945
Lakes	G4S	21,000
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	TDI	59,686
Unity	G4S	80
Upper Nile	MAG	34,471,616
Upper Nile	G4S	3,063
Western Bahr El Ghazal	G4S	65,500
Total		43,062,146

Table 4: Reduction of mined area through technical survey in 2018⁴⁹

State	Operator	Area reduced (m ²)
Central Equatoria	MAG	14,922
Jonglei	TDI	1,426
Total		16,348

CLEARANCE IN 2018

A total of 15 mined areas covering nearly 2.1km² were released through clearance in 2018, with the destruction of 1,163 anti-personnel mines, 71 anti-vehicle mines, and 553 items of UXO (see Table 5).⁵⁰ This is a sizeable increase from 2017, when a total of 20 areas with a size of just over 1.7km² were cleared, with the destruction of 734 anti-personnel mines, 42 anti-vehicle mines, and 34,600 items of UXO.⁵¹ UNMAS reported that the increase in clearance in 2018 was in large part a reflection of increased security in the country.⁵²

An additional three anti-personnel mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks by TDI and G4S during the year.⁵³ UNMAS also reported that in 2018 a total of six areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mine contamination with a total size of just over 67,000m² were cleared, which were not found to contain any mines, although four items of UXO were found and destroyed.⁵⁴

Table 5: Mine clearance in 2018⁵⁵

State	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Central Equatoria	G4S	7	762,617	132	70	298
Central Equatoria	MAG	3	1,227,678	906	0	250
Eastern Equatoria	TDI	1	8,162	42	0	0
Jonglei	G4S	1	29,314	67	0	5
Jonglei	TDI	0	4,845	16	0	0
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	TDI	2	35,276	0	0	0
Unity	TDI	1	8,000	0	1	0
Totals		15	2,075,892	1,163	71	553

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2018	2.08
2017	1.71
2016	2.65
2015	5.10
2014	2.72
Total	14.26

In accordance with Article 5 of the APMBC, South Sudan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2021. South Sudan will not meet this deadline.

In 2020, South Sudan intends to submit an extension request asking for an additional five years to complete its Article 5 obligations. According to UNMAS and the NMAA, this is believed to be an adequate to clear all known contaminated area in the country, and that given the appropriate support and the necessary security conditions, the clearance of both mines and CMRs could be completed by 2026.⁵⁶

However, serious obstacles to completion remain the poor security situation that still prevails in some parts of the country, a lack of stable humanitarian access to certain areas, the continued discovery of previously unrecorded contamination, and a lack of certainty over sustained funding. The focus for 2019–20 will be on further clarifying the extent of contamination remaining, with re-survey of areas thought to be exaggerated in size. Clearance will continue across the country, wherever it is safe to do so.⁵⁷

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- 1 Email from Richard Boulter, Senior Programme Manager, UNMAS, 22 July 2019; and Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C.
- 2 Email from Tim Lardner, Chief, Mine Action, UNMAS, 27 February 2018.
- 3 According to UNMAS, the most heavily affected provinces are those with the highest number of SHAs, rather than those with the largest recorded total area size of contamination, as the size of contamination can change dramatically through the process of technical survey. Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018. In October 2015, South Sudan's previously established 10 states were redefined into 28 by President Salva Kiir, which were then further subdivided into 32 states by presidential decree in January 2017.
- 4 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019; and Tess Bresnan, Senior Programme Officer, 3 August 2019.
- 5 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019.
- 6 UNMAS, "2018 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan".
- 7 Statement by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 22 May 2019.
- 8 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 The monitoring group, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, consisting of seven East African states, reported that the officer made the statement on 12 March 2015, in a meeting between senior members of the government armed forces, UNMISS staff, and members of IGAD. See Intergovernmental Authority on Development Offices of the Special Envoys for South Sudan, "Summary of Latest Reports of Violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) Investigated and verified by the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in South Sudan from 1–16 March 2015", at: bit.ly/2Y5xsvT. See also ICBL-Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), "Concern at Reported Use of Antipersonnel Mines in South Sudan", Press release, Geneva, 31 March 2015, at: bit.ly/2JVspW3; and I. Gridneff, "South Sudan Army's Landmine Use Escalates War, Monitors Say", Bloomberg Business, 30 March 2015, at: bloom.bg/2LkSiPe.
- 11 Statement by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018. The three-day investigation involved formal interviews with Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) officers and the police commissioner, along with a physical inspection of the ground around the SPLA barracks.
- 12 "South Sudan De-Mining Authority", undated, at: bit.ly/2Y5Eb4o.
- 13 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.
- 14 South Sudan, "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016", Juba, 2012, p. iv.
- 15 Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 30 May 2019; and Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
- 16 UNMISS, "United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre [UNMACC]", undated, at: bit.ly/2YctHjl.
- 17 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
- 18 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.
- 19 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
- 20 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.
- 21 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
- 22 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Email from Katie Shaw, Programme Officer, MAG, 26 April 2019.
- 28 Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 21 August 2019.
- 29 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018; and Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 June 2018.
- 32 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Statement by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 22 May 2019; and emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
- 37 Statement by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 22 May 2019.
- 38 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019.
- 39 Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 19 July 2019.
- 40 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Ibid. Of the 16 tasks, five were re-classified as 'confrontation areas', three as cluster munition strikes, and eight were re-classified as UXO spot tasks.
- 44 Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 19 July 2019.
- 45 Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018; and Article 7 Report (for 2017), pp. 7 and 12.
- 46 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019. Of the 16 tasks, five were re-classified as 'confrontation areas', three as cluster munition strikes, and eight were re-classified as UXO spot tasks.
- 47 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019. Of the 16 tasks, five were re-classified as 'confrontation areas', three as cluster munition strikes, and eight were re-classified as UXO spot tasks.
- 48 Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019; and Katie Shaw, MAG, 19 July 2019.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018; and Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 5 September 2018.
- 51 Ibid.
- 52 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019.
- 53 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019.
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019; and Katie Shaw, MAG, 19 July 2019.
- 56 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.
- 57 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019.