

## ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021 NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

### KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION:


**LIGHT,**  
BUT PRECISE EXTENT UNKNOWN

AP MINE  
CLEARANCE IN 2018

**0** KM<sup>2</sup>

AP MINES  
DESTROYED IN 2018

**N/R**



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): **LOW**

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Humanity and Inclusion (HI; formerly Handicap International), the only international mine action operator in Senegal since 2014, was forced to suspend operations in October 2017 due to a lack of funding. In February 2019, it resumed operations in Goudomp department, with new funding secured from the United States.

Under the European Union (EU) Council Decision in support of the implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Maputo Action Plan, a "National Stakeholder Dialogue" workshop was held in Dakar on 29–30 October 2018, with support from the APMBC's Implementation Support Unit.

Overall progress in land release remained painstakingly slow for yet another year in 2018, as Senegal continued to fail to make significant strides towards meeting its international legal obligations to demine as soon as possible. This failure, combined with its apparent unwillingness to clear mines around military bases, raises serious doubt as to Senegal's compliance with its core obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). Serious obstacles also remain to be overcome, primarily in regard to ongoing insecurity which denies access for demining in certain areas of Casamance and a lack of technical and financial resources.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Senegal should complete non-technical survey as soon as possible and, where security allows, establish a complete and accurate estimate of its remaining mine contamination.
- Senegal should ensure that suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) are recorded on the basis of demonstrable evidence and with specific size estimates and the information made public.
- Senegal should submit its outstanding Article 7 transparency report and ensure subsequent annual updates are submitted each year prior to the 30 April deadline.
- The Government of Senegal should make national funding and resources available for demining while developing and implementing a resource mobilisation strategy to secure longer term funding.

- Senegal should prioritise clearance and technical survey in readily accessible areas and where the presence of mines is reliably attested.
- The Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (Centre National d'Action Antimines, CNAMS) should continue to improve transparency and to facilitate dialogue between all actors concerned by land release operations.
- CNAMS should work actively to restore confidence among donors and international operators in its mine action programme.

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion  | Score (2018) | Performance Commentary  |
|--|--------------|---|
| <b>UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION</b><br>(20% of overall score)                | 5            | Senegal's reporting of its estimate of remaining mine contamination has been inconsistent. It also includes over 140 areas which have still to be surveyed and a number of areas with an unknown size, making it difficult to have much confidence in the estimate reported.  |
| <b>NATIONAL OWNERSHIP &amp; PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b><br>(10% of overall score) | 3            | Senegal has shown scant political commitment to meeting its Article 5 obligations with any urgency in recent years. The failure to demine areas around military installations raises concerns about its compliance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and even the prohibition on use of landmines.  |
| <b>GENDER</b><br>(10% of overall score)  | 5            | CNAMS informed Mine Action Review that 40% of the demining team were women in 2018.   |
| <b>INFORMATION MANAGEMENT &amp; REPORTING</b><br>(10% of overall score)        | 4            | Senegal's reporting has been highly inconsistent in recent years and difficult to make sense of. It failed to submit an updated Article 7 transparency report in 2019, in violation of its treaty obligations, and did not officially report on progress in land release in 2018.   |
| <b>PLANNING AND TASKING</b><br>(10% of overall score)                          | 3            | In October 2018, Senegal elaborated a revised timeline to address the remaining areas of contamination by its 2021 APMBC Article 5 deadline. However, a persistent problem which has curtailed progress in land release in recent years has remained a lack of access to certain areas due to ongoing insecurity. In the past, Senegal's tasking has been strongly criticised by an international mine action operator. |
| <b>LAND RELEASE SYSTEM</b><br>(20% of overall score)                           | 4            | Senegal's National Mine Action Standards were last reviewed in 2013.  |
| <b>LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE</b><br>(20% of overall score) | 3            | Senegal's progress towards meeting its 2021 Article 5 deadline has been meagre. It is hopeful, though, that the return of Humanity and Inclusion (HI) and the resumption of demining operations will prevent further stagnation while a stakeholder dialogue workshop held in October 2018 might renew interest and commitment to making progress in mine action.   |
| <b>Average Score</b>   | <b>3.9</b>   | <b>Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR</b>   |

## DEMINING CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention
- Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (CNAMS)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Humanity and Inclusion (HI)

### OTHER ACTORS

- None

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Senegal has still to establish an accurate assessment of the extent of its mine contamination, nearly 20 years after becoming a state party to the APMBC. In 2018, it continued to report inconsistent figures for the amount of confirmed and suspected contaminated areas remaining, as it has in previous years. Four departments (Bignona, Goudomp, Oussouye and Ziguinchor) of Senegal's total of 45 still contain confirmed or suspected mined areas. The affected departments are located in the Casamance region of Senegal, between The Gambia to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the south. A comprehensive claim of 1.2km<sup>2</sup> for nationwide mine contamination does not appear to be based on firm evidence.<sup>1</sup>

According to figures reported by CNAMS, as at end 2018, a total of almost 0.49km<sup>2</sup> remained to be addressed across 37 mined areas with a further 11 other areas of unknown size.<sup>2</sup> In addition, 144 areas which still remained to be surveyed (127 areas in Bignona department, 4 in Oussouye, and 13 in Ziguinchor), along with.<sup>3</sup> It is not possible to reconcile these figures with past reported estimates of remaining contamination and reported progress in land release. Moreover, according to HI, given the historical

evidence of frequent clashes and rebel bases in the area, the identification of SHAs in north-west Casamance suggests a high probability that other areas of contamination will be found as survey progresses further east, nearer to the northern border.<sup>4</sup>

The extent of contamination is better known in the south of Casamance, where previous survey in the region has identified several SHAs, between the border with Guinea-Bissau and the Casamance river to the north and the Atlantic Ocean to the west.<sup>5</sup> In August 2018, HI informed Mine Action Review that areas such as north Sindian in Bignona department where significant contamination was suspected were still unsurveyed. However, for security reasons and a lack of resources, the area had not been addressed.<sup>6</sup>

Mine contamination in Senegal is the result of more than 30 years of fighting between the armed forces and a non-state armed group, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC). Sporadic fighting with some factions of the MFDC has continued despite a ceasefire in place since 2004.

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## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention serves as the national mine action authority for Senegal. Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by the CNAMS. Regional mine action coordination committees have been established in Kolda, Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor departments.

The CNAMS is responsible for promoting the national mine action programme, mobilising resources, coordinating survey and conducting demining, designing and implementing a victim assistance programme, accrediting demining organisations, and monitoring and evaluating activities.<sup>7</sup>

In June 2018, the CNAMS informed states parties to the APMBC that it expected approximately €6.5 million is required to complete clearance of the remaining contaminated areas. It stated that Senegal contributes €460,000 annually for the operating costs of the CNAMS, and €308,000 for mine action activities.<sup>8</sup> CNAMS revised the figure reported as needed to complete clearance in October 2018, down to close to €5.5 million. It claimed that the government had earmarked more than €1.8 million for mine action in 2019.<sup>9</sup> Senegal's revised October 2017 workplan notes that a resource mobilisation plan should be included in the document but it does not contain one.<sup>10</sup>

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## GENDER

CNAMS informed Mine Action Review that the national mine action strategy prohibit sexual discrimination and strongly encourages recruitment of women in demining. Four of ten members of the demining team in the Senegalese national mine action programme were women in 2018.<sup>11</sup>

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## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

According to HI, CNAMS's Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database system was upgraded in 2015.<sup>12</sup> Senegal's reporting in recent years has been difficult to follow, and it failed to submit an updated Article 7 transparency report in 2019 or any official reporting of land release carried out in 2018.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

At the October 2018 stakeholder dialogue workshop, CNAMS outlined a workplan for completion of survey and clearance by its 2021 Article 5 deadline. This included non-technical survey of areas of unknown size and the 144 areas not yet visited in 2019, and technical survey and clearance of all remaining areas and any new areas identified through the non-technical survey in December 2018–January 2021.<sup>13</sup>

Specifically, of the 37 areas with a known size of contamination totalling just over 491,000m<sup>2</sup>, in December 2018–April 2019, 12 areas with a size of 265,233m<sup>2</sup> in Goudomp department were planned to be addressed, while in May–June 2019, six areas with a size of 37,048m<sup>2</sup> were to be addressed in Ziguinchor department along with five areas covering 38,020m<sup>2</sup> in Bignona department. In January 2020–January 2021, the remaining nine areas with a size of 77,240m<sup>2</sup> will be addressed in Oussouye and Bignona departments, along with five areas with a size of 73,554m<sup>2</sup> in Ziguinchor department, for a total of 14 areas with a size of just under 150,800m<sup>2</sup>. Of the areas of unknown size, eight areas in Bignona and three areas in Goudomp departments would, it is claimed, be addressed in October–November 2019 with all remaining areas will be addressed in January 2020–January 2021.<sup>14</sup>

Previously, Senegal submitted an updated workplan in accordance with its Article 5 deadline extension request in May 2017 for the remainder of its extension period, until 1 March 2021. A revised version was then concluded on 13 October 2017. The workplan lists all known or suspected contaminated areas and establishes annual targets for the amount of contamination to be addressed. However, there are inconsistencies and incompatibilities in its reporting on contamination and the size of projected annual milestones for land release. Additionally, Senegal's extension request is until March 2021, but the plan does not contain details of work to be carried out after 2018.

Senegal did not meet the targets set in its 2017 workplan for 2018, nor those in its most recent Article 7 report (for calendar year 2017).

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## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Senegal does not have national mine action legislation in place, based on available information.

Senegal's national mine action standards were developed in 2009 and revised in 2013. According to CNAMS, the 2013 revision included standards for accreditation, technical investigation, minimum mine clearance depth, and the use of machines and mine detection dogs in demining.<sup>15</sup>

### OPERATORS

HI has remained the only international demining operator in Senegal since 2014. As at October 2017, it had suspended its demining operations in the country for lack of funding.<sup>16</sup> During that year, it employed 26 operational staff, two national managerial staff, and an expatriate operations manager.<sup>17</sup> Operations resumed in February 2019 thanks to funding from the United States. In May 2019, however, five deminers were kidnapped and then released the same day, and some of their equipment stolen. Since then, the authorities have been in negotiations to be able to recover the equipment and restart clearance.<sup>18</sup>

### OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Prior to cessation of operations in October 2017, HI deployed a soil preparation and mechanical mine clearance machine, the Digger D-3.<sup>19</sup>

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Senegal did not formally report on progress in land release in 2018. In October 2018, CNAMS reported that since its second extension request granted in 2016 it had visited 72 of 79 locations, determining that 67 were not contaminated and the remaining 5 (with a size of 14,670m<sup>2</sup>) were recorded as SHAs. In addition, 29 areas with a total size of 164,990m<sup>2</sup> had been cleared, with the destruction of 22 mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).<sup>20</sup> It did not disaggregate these figures by year.

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018

#### SURVEY IN 2018

As noted above, Senegal has not officially reported any area released or confirmed through survey in 2018. Previously, in 2017, HI reported confirming 16 mined areas with a combined size of 65,393m<sup>2</sup>: one area in Bignona department with a size of 1,000m<sup>2</sup> and 15 areas in Goudomp department with a size of 64,393m<sup>2</sup>, all of which were subsequently released through technical survey and clearance.<sup>21</sup>

#### CLEARANCE IN 2018

Likewise, Senegal has not officially reported on any clearance in 2018. In 2017, HI reported releasing a total of 65,400m<sup>2</sup> through technical survey and clearance (though it was unable to disaggregate between the two), including one area in Bignona department with a size of 1,000m<sup>2</sup> and 15 areas in Goudomp department with a combined size of 64,393m<sup>2</sup>. These areas were released with the destruction of two anti-personnel mines, one anti-vehicle mine, and one item of unexploded ordnance (UXO).<sup>22</sup> However, CNAMS reported that 18 CHAs with a total size of 106,658m<sup>2</sup> were cleared in 2017 in Goudomp department, Ziguinchor region, with the destruction of three anti-personnel mines.<sup>23</sup>

#### DEMINER SAFETY

In mid-May 2019, demining operations, which had recently restarted thanks to US funding, were again suspended following the kidnapping of five deminers by an MFDC faction. This occurred despite an agreement having been obtained to operate in that zone, according to CNAMS. As noted above, the deminers were all released the same day.<sup>24</sup>

### ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



**Table 1: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)**

| Year         | Area cleared (m <sup>2</sup> ) |
|--------------|--------------------------------|
| 2018         | 0                              |
| 2017         | 65,400*                        |
| 2016         | 147,650                        |
| 2015         | 0                              |
| 2014         | N/R                            |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>213,050</b>                 |

\*Includes technical survey and clearance

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2015), Senegal is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021. It is improbable that it will not meet this deadline.

In August 2018, HI stated that the likelihood that Senegal would meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2021 was "more than low" in view of the remaining situation of more than 1.2km<sup>2</sup> of area reported to be contaminated and nearly 144 localities which had not been surveyed, and without the resources to do so. HI additionally cited that the CNAMS' ability to mobilise resources has been very low in recent years.<sup>25</sup>

In June 2018, Senegal informed APMBC states parties that with the current pace of performance it was unlikely to be able to meet its clearance objectives of end 2020.<sup>26</sup> In October 2018, CNAMS highlighted a lack of access to certain targeted areas, the withdrawal of traditional mine action partners, and deteriorating demining equipment as primary challenges.<sup>27</sup> Senegal has previously claimed that the circumstances impeding compliance with its international legal obligations include general insecurity; MFDC reticence to agree to demining operations; ongoing concerns over deminer safety; and a decrease in technical and financial resources in recent years.<sup>28</sup>

In fact, since 2013, the apparently wilful lack of land release and concrete political will to address its mine problem, and as a consequence, the inadequate use of clearance capacities, have prevented Senegal from fulfilling its Article 5 obligations. This led to the withdrawal of Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in 2014 and the loss of financial support from key donors, explaining in part the sharp reduction in its clearance capacities. CNAMS' allocation of tasks has also been criticised for directing resources and clearance assets to areas without credible risk of mine contamination, while requests from operators to conduct survey prior to deploying clearance assets were denied.<sup>29</sup>

Senegal has regularly indicated that all demining operations would be conducted within the framework of the ongoing peace talks and would first be approved by the MFDC in meetings with Senegalese officials.<sup>30</sup> At the same time, CNAMS has stated that talks with the MFDC are made by authorities in Dakar exclusively, and not by the mine action centre.<sup>31</sup> CNAMS has, though, reported that events in The Gambia had improved the security situation in the North of Casamance, particularly in the department of Bignona, allowing significant numbers of displaced persons to return. It expected that the continued evolution of the peace process would ensure better security conditions and improve access for mine clearance in planned locations.<sup>32</sup>

There is, though, no explanation in the action plan presented in Senegal's second extension request of how peace negotiations conducted in Dakar by the Reflection Group on Peace in Casamance (Groupe de Réflexion sur la Paix en Casamance, GRPC) will address the issue of mine clearance.

Another fundamental problem is Senegal's ongoing lack of a comprehensive understanding of its mine problem. Concerns have also been raised about its apparent reluctance to deploy clearance assets in CHAs, and its continued failure to clear contaminated areas around existing military bases verges on use of anti-personnel mines, a violation of Article 1 of the APMBC. According to NPA, there is overwhelming evidence that the laying of landmines by rebel forces was sporadic, while the Senegalese Armed Forces placed hundreds, if not thousands, of mines around military outposts in Casamance.<sup>33</sup>

Previously, in 2015, NPA criticised CNAMS for obstructing dialogue between operators and the armed forces in particular, which could provide the specific locations of mined areas. Other stakeholders echoed that CNAMS was preventing dialogue between parties, including the spokesperson of the MFDC, who stated that there was a complete lack of communication with members of CNAMS.<sup>34</sup>

However, in August 2017, CNAMS claimed that it has already demined around all the military bases, with the help of the army where that was necessary.<sup>35</sup> HI has reported that its teams cleared 22,162m<sup>2</sup> in Boutoute-Djibanar in connection with a former army base in 2015–16, destroying "around" 19 anti-personnel mines.<sup>36</sup> It is not certain that all other bases have been demined.

Based on present capacity and its poor track record, without a major change in political will and resources, Senegal will not meet its Article 5 deadline, or even the Maputo political declaration 2025 goal.

1 Email from Ibrahima Seck, Head of Operations and Information Management, CNAMS, 16 September 2019.  
 2 Ibid.  
 3 Presentation by CNAMS, "National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a Mine-Free Senegal" workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018, available at: [bit.ly/2TJTY89](http://bit.ly/2TJTY89).  
 4 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form D.  
 5 Ibid.  
 6 Email from Faly Keita, Coordinator, Casamance Site, HI, 8 August 2018.  
 7 Presentation by CNAMS, "National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a Mine-Free Senegal" workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.  
 8 Statement of Senegal, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.  
 9 Presentation by CNAMS, "National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a Mine-Free Senegal" workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.  
 10 CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016–2021", 13 October 2017, p. 20.  
 11 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 16 September 2019.  
 12 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.  
 13 Presentation by CNAMS, "National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a Mine-Free Senegal" workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.  
 14 Presentation by CNAMS, "National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a Mine-Free Senegal" workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.  
 15 Ibid.  
 16 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 26 September 2016.  
 17 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.  
 18 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 20 September 2019.

19 Ibid.  
 20 Presentation by CNAMS, "National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a Mine-Free Senegal" workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.  
 21 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.  
 22 Ibid.  
 23 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D.  
 24 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 20 September 2019.  
 25 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.  
 26 Statement of Senegal, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.  
 27 Presentation by CNAMS, "National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a Mine-Free Senegal" workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.  
 28 Analysis of Senegal's request for a second Article 5 deadline extension submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 17 November 2015, p. 22.  
 29 K. Millett, "Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?", Blog post, 2014, at: [bit.ly/33M3nRr](http://bit.ly/33M3nRr).  
 30 H. Sagna, "Humanitarian demining in Casamance: negotiations and operations still deadlocked", *Enquête*, 17 June 2015.  
 31 Statement of ICBL, 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.  
 32 CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016–21", April 2017; and CNAMS, "Updated Workplan for Senegal's Article 5 Extension 2016–2021", 13 October 2017, p. 21.  
 33 Ibid.  
 34 A. Grovestins and A. Oberstadt, "Why landmines keep on killing in Senegal", IRIN, 3 August 2015, at: [bit.ly/2THyclz](http://bit.ly/2THyclz).  
 35 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.  
 36 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.