

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012
NEW EXTENDED DEADLINE NEEDED

KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:


EXTENT UNKNOWN

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

0 km²

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

0



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): **LOW**

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Nigeria's military reopened the strategically-important Maiduguri-Bama-Banki road in March 2018 after four years when it was closed due to insecurity and the presence of explosive devices. Nigeria informed states parties in May 2019 that non-technical survey and clearance of mines and improvised explosive devices would start "as soon as security conditions permit", enabling Nigeria to report on suspected or confirmed contamination. Conflict, which is ongoing, features continued use of munitions by non-state armed groups.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Nigeria should urgently take all possible measures to clear anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature.
- Nigeria should give priority to mine action in the humanitarian response to the emergency in the north-east and establish a mine action centre to work with humanitarian partners to develop a structured programme for survey and, when security permits, clearance.
- Nigeria should encourage and facilitate the provision of assistance and expertise from humanitarian demining organisations and continue to provide risk education to the civilian population.
- Nigeria should support systematic collection of data on incidents, casualties, and contamination, disaggregated by device types.
- Nigeria should submit an Article 7 report to inform states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) of the discovery of any contamination from anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature, and report on the location of all suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. It should also report on the status of programmes for their destruction and request to its Article 5 deadline which expired on 1 March 2012.

DEMINING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- No national mine action authority or mine action centre

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army, police

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Demining Group (DDG)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS

- UNMAS

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Nigeria continued to experience casualties in 2018 and 2019 from Boko Haram's widespread use of explosive devices, including mines of an improvised nature, in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in the north east. The extent and nature of contamination remains unclear.

A scoping mission by UNMAS to assess explosive threats in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states in 2017 noted widespread use of pressure-plate devices along the main supply routes which were configured to detonate from the weight of a person and function as very large anti-personnel mines.¹ These fall within the APMBC. Borno state was the most severely impacted. Civilians reported the presence of victim-activated devices in 76% of Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Borno; 59% of LGAs in Yobe; and 52% of LGAs in Adamawa.²

Improvised devices, whether body-borne, vehicle-borne, command-detonated, or victim-activated, continue to pose the main explosive threat. The widespread presence of these devices holds back the resettlement of people displaced by conflict, prevents access to agricultural land and obstructs delivery of humanitarian aid and basic services.³

Assessments in 2015 and 2017 both cited reports of the presence of mines but that perception is changing. Interviewees in a DDG assessment in Borno and Adamawa in November 2015 reported the presence of Chinese Type 4 anti-personnel mines and Type 72 anti-vehicle mines. It noted local community reports of local government areas in Borno state that were believed to need clearance, including Bama, Dikwa, Gwoza, Kala-Balge, Kukawa, Marte, and Ngala.⁴ UNMAS's scoping mission said "reliable resources" had reported the use of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines around defensive positions.⁵ In 2019, UNMAS said that despite such oral reports, "no physical evidence of (manufactured) landmine(s) has been found".⁶

NEW CONTAMINATION

Operators report continued re-contamination of roads that have been opened by the military and police.⁷ Troops took back control of the town of Gwoza in 2014 but a roadside device explosion close to the town in March 2019 killed eight people and injured seven more.⁸

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Nigeria does not have a formal mine action programme. The Nigerian army and police conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations coordinated by the Theatre Commander to respond to operational priorities. The army's clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW) is primarily focused on facilitating military operations and clearing roads and areas to facilitate access for troops to carry out attacks on Boko Haram and keep military supply routes open.⁹ The police have seconded units to the military to conduct clearance in newly-secured areas and deployed EOD teams to Maiduguri and a number of other towns.¹⁰

The United Kingdom and the United States each provided a military support team to the Theatre Command headquarters in Maiduguri. The teams included EOD advisers capable of providing training and equipment. In 2018, the Nigerian authorities were reportedly unwilling to receive their advice or support and made no request for UN support, but cooperation with British military experts was reported to have developed in 2019.¹¹

The 2016 Buhari Plan for Rebuilding the North East from the Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative (PCNI) includes a plan for demining as part of clean-up operations in reclaimed communities before resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs). It assigns responsibility for clearance to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), the Nigerian Military, and paramilitary bodies. The plan provided a budget of 76 million naira (approximately \$380,000) for clearance of 38 local government areas but provided no details of how the plan would be implemented or the basis for this budget.¹² In September 2018, it was announced that the federal government was planning to spend \$6.7 billion to deliver the Buhari Plan.¹³

The humanitarian response programme for the north-east has a Mine Action Sub-sector co-chaired by the Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement and UNMAS. At the request of the UN humanitarian coordinator, UNMAS deployed a team of five to the capital of Borno state, Maiduguri, in July 2018 to provide planning, coordination and technical advice notably to support plans for resettlement of IDPs and for the delivery risk education, survey and clearance.¹⁴

GENDER

Nigeria, lacking a mine action programme, has not taken up gender in the context of mine action.

The UN humanitarian response programme for 2019–21 unveiled in December 2018 said women, girls, boys, and men living in, or potentially returning to, areas suspected or known to be contaminated with mines or other explosive devices would be involved in all stages of mine action

programming. It called for "age and gender appropriate risk education activities to minimize loss of life and injuries as a result of explosive remnants of war", targeting 200,000 girls, 178,000 boys, 51,000 women, and 45,000 men.¹⁵ UNMAS was conducting an analysis in 2019 on the impact of explosive devices on different socio-economic groups, genders, and age groups to inform the humanitarian response.¹⁶

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Nigeria does not have a mine action information management system and has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2012.

In a statement to the 2019 APMBBC Intersessional Meetings, Nigeria said it would provide information on all areas of contamination “as soon as security conditions permit” access for non-technical survey of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states. It acknowledged that “much needs to be done” and called for international technical support.¹⁷

UNMAS said it started to collect data on explosive incidents in 2018. Information was gathered mainly from open sources, including the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), as well as security information provided by the UN,

NGOs, and the Multinational Joint Task Force. Information was also provided by the Nigerian army and police EOD units but not on a systematic basis.¹⁸ MAG also maintained a database of different incidents related to mines and other explosive ordnance, as well as collecting information on casualties.¹⁹

UNMAS, DDG, and MAG developed standardised reporting forms to capture data on risk education, non-technical survey, and victims. Incidents and victims are not recorded due to the limited geographic reach of operators as a result of insecurity. To strengthen the reporting, UNMAS was developing a reporting network and planned to provide training for NGOs.²⁰

PLANNING AND TASKING

Nigeria does not have an institutional framework for humanitarian mine action, a strategic plan for mine action or annual workplans for the humanitarian organisations responding to emergency needs in the north-east.

The UN humanitarian response programme for 2019–21 provided for mine action activities focusing on:

- risk education on the dangers posed by explosive threats, with the aim of reducing the risk to a level where people can live safely
- non-technical surveys to collect and analyse data on the presence, type, and level of contamination, in order to support land release and the prioritisation of any subsequent clearance; and
- clearance of contaminated areas.

However, humanitarian mine action activity in 2018 and the first half of 2019 was restricted by insecurity to limited survey and risk education in areas that were accessible, which included Banki, Gwoza, and Ngala in Borno state.²¹

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

OPERATORS

All clearance is conducted by the Nigerian army and police with support from paramilitary groups.

MAG has worked in Nigeria since 2016, initially in arms management and destruction. In 2017 it opened an office in Maiduguri and started providing risk education to IDPs, refugees, and host communities affected by the conflict. In 2018, MAG operated with 12 community liaison teams delivering risk education and working to develop

understanding of contamination in Borno state, mainly through remote assessment (see Survey in 2018 section below). Since 2017, MAG has worked in Maiduguri, Ngala, Mafa, Konduga, Bama, Jere, Dikwa, Biu, Chibok, Damboa, Gwoza, Gubio, Kaga, Mobbar, Monguno, and Nganzai.²²

DDG undertook a limited explosive threat assessment in December 2015 and subsequently undertook risk education in IDP camps.²³

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

SURVEY IN 2018

UNMAS reported that MAG and DDG conducted “23 non-technical surveys” in 2018, believed to have actually been preliminary assessments, which identified two victim-activated explosive devices and a range of other items, including hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades and air-dropped ordnance.²⁴

MAG said it had not had sufficient access to locations to conduct non-technical survey, but between March 2017 and December 2018 it conducted “initial survey” in 36 areas in Borno state and marked and mapped 43 explosive ordnance devices for destruction by the army or police. In 2019 MAG has also conducted remote contamination assessments, interviewing individuals from displaced communities and compiling a profile of contamination in their villages.²⁵

CLEARANCE IN 2018

Nigeria has not released results of any clearance activities.

In March 2018, the army reopened the main road linking Maiduguri, Bama (Borno state's second biggest town), and Banki, which had been closed by Boko Haram activity for four years. The re-opening was made possible by clearance of mines, including those of an improvised nature, but no details were reported. The theatre commander, Major General Nicholas Rogers, said authorities envisaged insurgents would continue to lay mines.²⁶

The Acting Brigade Commander of the 21st armoured Brigade, Colonel Garba Nura, said in March 2018 that it was conducting operations around Bama to prepare the way for the return of IDPs.²⁷

Between January and the end of July 2019, army and police EOD teams were reported to have cleared 105 IEDs planted on roads in north eastern states, "including 46 victim-activated devices".²⁸

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 5 of the APMBBC, Nigeria was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2012. At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in November 2011, Nigeria declared it had cleared all known anti-personnel mines from its territory.²⁹

Under the Convention's agreed framework, in the event mined areas are discovered after the expiry of a state party's Article 5 clearance deadline, it should immediately inform all other states parties of this discovery and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines as soon as possible. Nigeria has not submitted an Article 7 transparency report since 2012.

Given the extent of apparent contamination from mines of an improvised nature, Nigeria should request a new extended Article 5 deadline, which should be no more than five years. It must also continue to fulfil its reporting obligations under the APMBBC, including by reporting on the location of all suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for the destruction of all anti-personnel mines therein.³⁰

1 UNMAS, "Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria 3 to 14 April 2017", p. 3.

2 Email from Lionel Pechera, Technical Advisor, UNMAS, 25 June 2019.

3 Ibid; and email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 2 September 2019.

4 DDG, "Mine Action Assessment: Northeastern Nigeria (Adamawa and Borno States) 1–15 November 2015", undated, at: bit.ly/2xS56FZ.

5 UNMAS, "Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria 3 to 14 April 2017", p. 3.

6 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June 2019.

7 Interview with Nina Seecharan, MAG, 9 July 2019.

8 Agence France Presse, "Landmine killed eight in NE Nigeria", 19 March 2019.

9 DDG, "Mine Action Assessment: Northeastern Nigeria (Adamawa and Borno States) 1–15 November 2015".

10 UNMAS, "Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria 3 to 14 April 2017", p. 5.

11 Ibid.

12 PCNI, "The Buhari Plan: Rebuilding the North East: Volume II", June 2016, pp. 23–26.

13 "Federal government to spend \$6.7 billion Northeast reconstruction, rehabilitation, resettlement plan", News Agency of Nigeria, 1 September 2018, at: bit.ly/2Z8u1ko.

14 Emails from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June and 17 July 2019.

15 UN, "Humanitarian Response Strategy January 2019 – December 2021", December 2018, pp. 43, 48.

16 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 17 July 2019.

17 Statement of Nigeria, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 23 May 2019.

18 Emails from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June and 17 July 2019.

19 Email from Nina Seecharan, MAG, 9 July 2019.

20 Emails from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June and 17 July 2019.

21 UN, "Humanitarian Response Strategy January 2019–December 2021", December 2018, pp. 43, 48.

22 Email from Nina Seecharan, MAG, 2 October 2018.

23 UNMAS, "Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria 3 to 14 April 2017", p. 6.

24 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June 2019.

25 Email from and telephone interview with Nina Seecharan, MAG, 9 July 2019.

26 A. Haruna, "Military reopens Maiduguri-Bama-Banki road held by Boko Haram for years", Premium Times, 24 March 2018, at: bit.ly/2GhEZgq.

27 A. Haruna, "How Bama IDPs will return home – Gov. Shettima", Premium Times, 30 March 2018, at: bit.ly/30IBLKD.

28 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 2 September 2019.

29 Statement of Nigeria, APMBBC 11th Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 2011.

30 Final Report of the APMBBC 12th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 January 2013, p. 10.