

MOZAMBIQUE



ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2015

(DECLARED COMPLETION BUT HAS OUTSTANDING MINED AREAS)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE	For 2016	For 2015
Problem understood	9	8
Target date for completion of mine clearance	2	2
Targeted clearance	9	8
Efficient clearance	6	5
National funding of programme	6	6
Timely clearance	4	3
Land release system in place	8	8
National mine action standards	8	8
Reporting on progress	5	4
Improving performance	4	3
PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE	6.1	5.5

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Mozambique announced it had fulfilled its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 survey and clearance obligations in September 2015, to date one of the most heavily affected states to have done so. In March 2016, however, an additional mined area, initially estimated to be 63,000m², was identified by non-technical survey in Cabo Delgado province.

Mozambique failed to meet its obligations to report on this discovery or to request another Article 5 clearance

extension deadline at the following APMB Meeting of States Parties in December 2016, but in June 2017 it announced this newly identified contamination along with two other mined areas nearby, covering a total area of just under 139,000m², had all been cleared.

As at October 2017, four small areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines also remained submerged in Inhambane province, which Mozambique has pledged to monitor and address as soon as access can be gained.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Mozambique should undertake all efforts to address the four remaining submerged suspected mined areas as soon as possible, ensure that they are clearly marked and monitored, and report on the status of the areas to APMB states parties regularly.
- Mozambique should ensure sufficient national capacity remains in place to deal with mine or explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination. If future mine contamination is suspected or confirmed, Mozambique should inform states parties to the APMB of all mined areas found, request another extended Article 5 deadline if required, and report on the status of programmes for their release.
- Mozambique should ensure that the national mine action database is transferred to an appropriate government ministry and that resources are allocated to maintain the database.

CONTAMINATION

Mozambique formally declared compliance with its Article 5 obligations at the APMB Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2015, after announcing its completion of anti-personnel mine clearance on 17 September 2015.¹ In a public ceremony, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Oldemiro Baloi, declared the country to be free of the “threat” of mines following survey and clearance of more than 3,000 areas across a total of more than 55km² in 2008–14 and the destruction of over 86,000 anti-personnel mines.²

In March 2016, international demining non-governmental organisation (NGO) APOPO, which remained in country after September 2015 and responded to a number of isolated mine and ERW tasks in southern, central, and northern provinces of Mozambique in coordination with the National Demining Institute (IND), identified a mined area covering 63,000m² during non-technical survey in Nangade district, Cabo Delgado province, near the border with Tanzania.³ The IND stated that the mined area identified in Nangade required “significant confirmed funds to deploy sufficient capacity to adequately and safely resolve the threat in accordance with IMAS [International Mine Action Standards]”.⁴

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which was clearing the last remaining cluster munition remnants (CMR) in the country in 2016, secured funding to clear the mined area in early 2017. After clearance operations began in February 2017, subsequent investigation by NPA identified two further mined areas nearby, one covering approximately 14,000m² and a second with an estimated size of 8,000m².⁵ Clearance of all areas was completed on 29 May 2017, with a total of just under 139,000m² released, and the destruction of 115 anti-personnel mines and three items of UXO.⁶

According to the IND, four small suspected mined areas with a combined size of 1,881m² remain underwater in Inhambane province.⁷ At the intersessional meetings in June 2017, Mozambique informed states parties it would reassess the status of the submerged areas during the month and reiterated its commitment that the remaining areas would be continuously monitored and addressed once the water level receded and access could be gained.⁸ The IND visited the areas in June 2017 and confirmed they remained submerged and inaccessible.⁹

Mozambique previously reported the existence of “suspended” mined areas in its declaration of completion of Article 5 obligations submitted in December 2015, which it defined as “suspected hazard areas that remain seasonally or permanently submerged under water in Inhambane province”. It further stated that all suspended areas “were subjected to technical survey and clearance up to the water line during the annual dry season with no direct evidence found to confirm the presence of mines in any of these areas. Nevertheless the portion of the SHA that remains underwater will be marked and regularly monitored to confirm if the area ever dries enough to allow further technical survey”.¹⁰

Table 1: Mined areas by province (as at October 2017)¹¹

Province	Suspected areas	Area (m ²)
Inhambane	4	1,881
	4	1,881

Mozambique was contaminated with mines, mostly anti-personnel, as a legacy of nearly 30 years of conflict that ended in 1992. Mozambique also has residual contamination from ERW, including unexploded ordnance (UXO). The IND has reported that 47 items of UXO were destroyed in 2016.¹²

According to NPA, the mined area identified in 2016 in Nangade district had both a social and economic impact on the local border community, whose economic activity

primarily consists of small scale cross-border trade on a key transit route between Tanzania and Mozambique.¹³ Clearance of the mined area ensures safe passage of individuals between the two countries, and for the community of Mungano, the nearest settlement to the minefield, frees extra land for cultivation, and allows children to attend the Mungano primary school, located only 20 metres from the minefield, without the fear of landmines.¹⁴

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no national mine action authority as such in Mozambique. The IND serves as the national mine action centre in Mozambique, reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Provincial demining commissions have been created to assist in planning mine action operations. Beginning in 1999, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided technical assistance, but its support programme ended in 2015.¹⁵

As at mid-2016, UNDP no longer had a budget for mine action-related activities in Mozambique.¹⁶ At the same time, amid a growing national economic crisis, the government put in place strict austerity measures which saw financial support to the IND reduced drastically. The lack of sufficient funding resulted in the institution being downsized during the year, with only key staff remaining at the start of 2017.¹⁷ NPA expressed concern at the IND's lack of resources and its ability to maintain a capacity to address residual mine and ERW contamination.¹⁸

Strategic Planning

A "National Strategy on Management of Residual Contamination 2015-2017" was submitted to the government for adoption in 2015. It calls for Mozambique's national capacities to be "developed and structured to respond to the anticipated residual contamination problems in the most effective and efficient manner", and sets three goals: the establishment of a national ERW centre; the development of sustainable national explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity; and creation of an information management system to facilitate coordination and information sharing between stakeholders.¹⁹ The document, however, was not adopted by the government, and as at August 2017, the IND was still pushing for it to be approved.²⁰ According to the IND, under the plan, provincial police units are foreseen to address any future residual contamination.²¹

Quality Management

The IND stated that only limited quality assurance (QA) activities, primarily to APOPO's ammunition clearance operations at the Malhazine depot, could be undertaken during the year.²² APOPO reported, however, that there was regular coordination and cooperation with the IND on all residual risk tasks.²³ In its operations in Nangade, NPA stated that in addition to regular internal QA and quality control (QC) activities, external QA was provided by IND QA officers in the form of a one-week QA visit in April 2017.²⁴

Information Management

In 2016, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database remained with the IND and was managed by two information management staff at the IND's office in Maputo. The IND had reported plans to shift responsibility of the IMSMA database to a government ministry; however, as at August 2017, this had not been formalised, and the future of the database remained uncertain.²⁵

Operators

In 2016, Mozambique had two international demining operators in country: NGOs APOPO and NPA. During the year, APOPO maintained a presence of approximately 50 personnel, primarily to clear ammunition around the Malhazine weapons depot in Maputo city. It seconded personnel for ad hoc survey, EOD, and clearance of residual risk tasks on a call-out basis.²⁶

While NPA's operations in 2016 were to carry out CMR clearance only, from February to end-May 2017, NPA deployed two teams of a total of 16 deminers to conduct manual clearance of the mined area identified in Nangade.²⁷

LAND RELEASE

According to Mozambique, in April 2016, following two suspected mine incidents in Nangade district, Cabo Delgado province, a mined area covering an estimated 63,000m² was confirmed through non-technical and technical survey carried out by APOPO and IND survey teams along the Mozambique-Tanzania border.²⁸

NPA began clearance activities on the 63,000m² area at Mungano in Nangade on 1 February 2017. Following completion of clearance of that mined area, further investigation by technical survey identified two additional mined areas, one with a size of 14,000m² in Chicamba village, approximately 3.5km from Mungano, and a third area with a size of 8,000m², some 500 metres from the larger minefield at Mungano, which, according to NPA, formed part of an old mine belt at the Mozambique-Tanzania border.²⁹ Clearance of all areas was completed on 29 May 2017, with a total of 138,958m² released, including 7,537m² by manual clearance and 27,885m² by technical survey, with the destruction of 115 anti-personnel mines and 3 items of UXO.³⁰

In January–September 2015, the total hazardous area released was 0.45km², almost all through clearance and technical survey, with an additional 7,700m² cancelled by non-technical survey, as major clearance operations came to a close in Mozambique.³¹

In September 2015–October 2016, APOPO also responded to 11 tasks in Cabo Delgado, Gaza, Manica, Maputo, and Sofala provinces, surveying a total of more than 110,000m² of SHA.³² In addition to identifying the significant mined area in Nangade, APOPO reported destroying two anti-personnel mines during clearance of just over 2,100m² in a task in Massingir district, Gaza province at the end of 2015, and destruction of a total of 13 items of UXO across all 11 tasks.³³ According to the IND, anti-personnel mines were also destroyed by police trained to conduct EOD after the completion of clearance was announced.³⁴

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with its second extension for a period of ten months granted by states parties in December 2013), Mozambique was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control no later than 1 January 2015. On 1 December 2015, at the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, Mozambique officially declared that it had completed its Article 5 obligations on 17 September.

While Mozambique had made considerable progress in clearing mined areas and was planning to complete all clearance in accordance with its extended Article 5 deadline, it was unable to do so, and in June 2014, Mozambique failed to request another extension at the Third APMBC Review Conference in Maputo. It was thus in serious violation of the Convention from 1 January to September 2015, having received a no-cost extension from international donors to complete demining activities in 2015.³⁵

In late 2016, UNDP reported that a number of key challenges remained in the phasing out Mozambique's national mine action programme. These included difficulties in digitalising demining completion reports from NGO operators and the need for a back-up system to avoid the loss of data.³⁶ The transfer of the database, along with information management staff, to the Ministry of Land, Environment, and Rural Development and the proposed transfer of database copies for storage with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of State Administration, had still to occur as at August 2017. The future of the IND, which employed 24 staff, also remained uncertain.³⁷

According to the IND, due to the nature of the mine contamination in Mozambique and the lack of mine maps, the risk remained that mines would be found after Mozambique's declaration of compliance with Article 5. After the completion of clearance in September 2015, the Government of Mozambique embarked on training and equipping the provincial police to be able to respond to EOD call-outs. In total, as at October 2016, the IND had trained and certified 194 police officials from all provinces to handle residual threats, and provided provincial commanders with equipment such as personal protective kits, explosives, and metal detectors.³⁸ According to NPA, no further police EOD or residual risk related trainings were carried out as at August 2017.³⁹

Mozambique stated in its declaration of completion of its Article 5 obligations that if previously unknown areas of mine contamination were subsequently discovered, it would:

- Immediately inform states parties of any discovery and report any mined areas in accordance with its Article 7 transparency obligations and at APMBC meetings
- Ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from any contaminated areas
- Destroy all anti-personnel mine contamination as soon as possible, and
- If it cannot destroy all contamination in the mined area before the next meeting of states parties, submit a request for another extended Article 5 clearance deadline in accordance with its obligations as an APMBC state party.⁴⁰

While noting that it had not followed the course indicated in its declaration of completion by failing to inform states parties to the APMBBC of the discovery of additional contamination at the subsequent Meeting of States Parties in December 2016, or to submit a request for another extended Article 5 clearance deadline, Mozambique reported in detail on the discovery of the mined area in Nangade in its Article 7 transparency report submitted in April 2017 and informed states parties of its identification and clearance in June 2017, at the Convention's intersessional meetings.⁴¹ As noted above, Mozambique also announced that the IND would reassess the status of the remaining four submerged suspected hazard areas in Inhambane province and reiterated that the areas would be continuously monitored and cleared once access could be gained and the water level receded.⁴² The IND visited the areas in June 2017 and confirmed they remained underwater and inaccessible for operations.⁴³

The Government of Mozambique did not provide any funding for field operations in 2016, though it continued to pay the salaries of key IND staff. The IND expected it would continue to do so, for as long as it remained the coordinating authority for mine action-related activities.⁴⁴ However, the IND emphasised that with the reduction in financial support from the government, its activities and outreach would be severely affected in 2017, as was the case in 2016.⁴⁵

The IND reported that significant training had been provided to provincial police units in a training partnership between the police and the United States Africa Command in 2016 and it was hoped that the police units would be able to address any future contamination found after 2017.⁴⁶

In April 2017, APOPO closed its programme in Mozambique after it was unable to secure funding to complete its ammunition clearance operations at the Malhazine weapons depot complex.⁴⁷ Following an official handover ceremony on 1 June 2017, NPA demobilised its mine clearance operations in Nangade district. It stated that no new reports of suspected mined areas in Nangade district, or in the wider Cabo Delgado province, were received.⁴⁸

-
- 1 Email from Hans Risser, Chief Technical Advisor, Mine Action, UNDP, 13 October 2015.
 - 2 UNDP in Mozambique, "Mozambique declared 'mine free'", undated but accessed 19 October 2015 at: http://www.mz.undp.org/content/mozambique/en/home/ourwork/environmentandenergy/successstories/Mozambique_Declared_Mine_free/.
 - 3 Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, Project Manager, APOPO, 17 October 2016; and information confirmed by IND in email from Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
 - 4 Information confirmed by IND in email from Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
 - 5 Statement of Mozambique, Intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017; and email from Afedra Robert Iga, Programme Manager, NPA, 5 June 2017.
 - 6 Email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 5 June 2017.
 - 7 Statement of Mozambique, APMBBC intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017; Article 7 Report (for 2016), Forms C and F; and email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 5 June 2017. The areas were initially recorded as having a total size of 5,107m², which, following clearance of 3,226m² by Handicap International (HI) in 2015, left a total of 1,881m² remaining to be addressed in 2016.
 - 8 Statement of Mozambique, Intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017. In its April 2017 Article 7 transparency report, Mozambique reiterated that the "total areas suspended due to inaccessibility due to the high-level of water are 1,881m² with 4 tasks remaining" and confirmed that the areas are "earmarked for future clearance once access is regained". The report also erroneously lists the size of remaining contamination in the four areas as 3,226m². Article 7 Report (for 2016), Forms C and F.
 - 9 Email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 17 August 2017.
 - 10 Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5, submitted by Mozambique, 16 December 2015, p. 5. The HALO Trust, which had been tasked by the IND to address 24 mine tasks all with a size of less than 1,000m² in Inhambane province in 2015, confirmed that while it was able to resurvey and cancel or clear the majority of the areas, a number were inaccessible due to being underwater and would require to be released at a later date when the water had subsided. HALO Trust reported that the areas were among patches of standing water, swamps, and rivers, and only were accessible during the drier months of the year. It deployed three manual teams to resurvey thirteen of the minefields, during which it cleared six areas (finding no anti-personnel mines) and cancelled a further three, but reported that the remaining areas were inaccessible due to their being entirely underwater. Emails from Chris Pym, Southern Africa Regional Director, HALO Trust, 17 May 2017; and Calvin Ruysen, Regional Director for Central Asia, HALO Trust, 15 September 2016.
 - 11 Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form J; and email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 5 June 2017.
 - 12 Response to questionnaire by IND, received by email via Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 25 April 2017.
 - 13 Ibid.; and email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 5 June 2017.
 - 14 Email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 4 May 2017.
 - 15 UNDP presentation, 13th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 December 2013.
 - 16 Skype interview with Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 7 June 2016.
 - 17 Email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 23 March 2017.
 - 18 Skype interview with Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 7 June 2016.
 - 19 The strategy further calls for the development of a national policy on the management of residual contamination and the drafting of standing operating procedures (SOPs) on responding to residual contamination and risk education, and the formalisation of a solid coordination system between the ERW centre and relevant authorities, and the establishment of a sustainable archiving system to ensure the long-term availability of information. Republic of Mozambique Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation National ERW and Training Centre, "National Strategy on Management of Residual Contamination 2015-2017", undated; and response to questionnaire by IND, received by email via Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 25 April 2017.
 - 20 Response to questionnaire by IND, received by email via Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 25 April 2017; and email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 28 August 2017.
 - 21 Ibid.
 - 22 Response to questionnaire by IND, received by email via Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 25 April 2017.
 - 23 Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, APOPO, 29 May 2017.
 - 24 Email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 4 May 2017.
 - 25 Emails from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 7 June 2016 and 28 August 2017.
 - 26 Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, Grant and Regional Manager, APOPO, 29 May 2017.
 - 27 Emails from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 25 April 2017 and 5 June 2017.
 - 28 Statement of Mozambique, Intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017.
 - 29 Ibid.; and email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 3 May 2017. According to NPA, the area measuring 14,000m² was reported as mined by locals to NPA during clearance operations at Mungano.

- 30 Emails from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 5 June 2017 and 28 August 2017. At the first area with an initial size of 63,000m² in Mungano, a total of 112,723m² was released and 99 anti-personnel mines found and destroyed, including 5,252m² by manual clearance, 19,383m² by technical survey, and 88,088m² through cancellation. At the second area with an initial size of 14,000m² at Chicamba, a total of 14,800m² was released and eight anti-personnel mines found, with clearance of 1,115m², reduction of 4,229m² by technical survey, and cancellation of 9,456m². At the third area with an initial size of 8,000m², a total of 11,435m² was released with eight anti-personnel mines destroyed: 1,170m² by clearance, 4,273m² reduced by technical survey, and 5,992m² cancelled. The mines destroyed were of the types M969 and AUPS fragmentation and blast anti-personnel mines.
- 31 Emails from Calvin Ruysen, HALO Trust, 15 September 2016; Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 6 October 2016; Ashley Fitzpatrick, APOPO, 12 October 2016; Julien Kempeneers, Deputy Desk Officer, Mine Action Department, HI, 17 October 2016; and Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
- 32 In September 2015, APOPO responded to one task in Massingir district, Gaza province, and destroyed a total of two anti-personnel mines during clearance of an area of 2,102m². In a second task in Guijá, Gaza province, it cancelled 40,000m² through non-technical survey after discovering one item of UXO, but without finding any evidence of mines. In addition to confirming the 63,000m² area in Nangade in 2016, in Maputo province, APOPO cleared an area of 16m² in a police yard suspected to contain buried items, but did not discover any mines or UXO. Also in 2016, in Sofala province, it addressed a task in Chemba district, and released a total of 5,200m², including clearance of 1,647m² and reduction by technical survey of 3,553m². No mines or UXO were found. Mozambique's Article 7 Report for 2016 reports slightly different figures for APOPO's outputs for a slightly different timeframe, reporting that in 2016, 65,102m² of land was confirmed by APOPO to contain landmines, 2,102m² were cleared, and 5,216m² reduced through technical survey, and a total of two anti-personnel mines and one anti-vehicle mine recovered and destroyed. Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, APOPO, 29 May 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form F.
- 33 Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, APOPO, 14 October 2016.
- 34 Email from Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
- 35 In February 2015, Mozambique reported that it had failed to meet its extended deadline due to three primary factors. The first was ongoing "low-intensity military hostilities creating a situation of temporary insecurity" between January and August 2014 in Manica and Sofala provinces, which prevented access to some mined areas and caused logistical and transportation difficulties. Second, it stated that continuing insecurity had raised logistical costs, resulting in delays and reduced productivity in certain areas as teams and equipment had to take longer routes to reach affected areas. Third, some demining tasks in Manica and Sofala provinces were suspended due to heavy rains in December 2014, it said. Mozambique gave a detailed progress report to states parties to the APMBC on its activities in 2014 and its plans and capacity to complete remaining clearance in 2015. Letter from Amb. Pedro Comissário to Amb. Remigiusz A. Henczel, 17 February 2015; and Mozambique, "Progress Report on completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5(1) of the APMBC (from 1 March to December 2014)".
- 36 Email from Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
- 37 Emails from Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016; and Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 28 August 2017.
- 38 Email from Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
- 39 Email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 28 August 2017.
- 40 Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5, submitted by Mozambique, 16 December 2015, p. 8.
- 41 Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form I.
- 42 Statement of Mozambique, Intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017; and email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 5 June 2017. Mozambique's Article 7 report stated that NPA was scheduled to conduct the survey of the submerged areas, however, this plan was changed and the IND intended to carry out the assessment in June 2017. Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form I.
- 43 Email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 17 August 2017.
- 44 Response to questionnaire by IND, received by email via Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 25 April 2017.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Emails from Ashley Fitzpatrick, APOPO, 29 May and 7 September 2017.
- 48 Email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 5 June 2017.

NIGER



ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2020
 (NOT CLEAR IF ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE	For 2016	For 2015
Problem understood	9	8
Target date for completion of mine clearance	1	4
Targeted clearance	8	8
Efficient clearance	6	6
National funding of programme	6	6
Timely clearance	5	5
Land release system in place	6	6
National mine action standards	6	6
Reporting on progress	4	5
Improving performance	7	8
PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE	5.8	6.2

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

In December 2016, Niger was granted its third Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension, for a period of four years until the end of 2020. It failed to submit a detailed workplan to accompany the extension request as required by 30 April 2017, nor has it provided sufficient information to justify requiring up to four years to clear a relatively small area of remaining contamination. It is also in violation of its obligation to submit annual Article 7 transparency reports.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Niger should provide a detailed workplan to accompany its revised Article 5 extension request, with benchmarks against which progress can be assessed, including a monthly and annual breakdown of areas to be addressed and a corresponding budget.
- Niger should provide regular updates on progress in addressing its Article 5 obligations and submit annual Article 7 reports, which it has failed to do since 2012.
- Niger should develop a resource mobilisation plan to meet funding needs beyond expected national contributions, and should accept offers of assistance in a timely manner, which would improve the speed and efficiency of clearance and enable completion far earlier than 2020.

CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2016, Niger reported that only one suspected hazardous area (SHA) remained, with an estimated size of 196,523m² and believed to contain both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.¹ This mined area had been discovered during survey of the mined area nearby that had been the subject of Niger's extension request in 2016.

Previously, at the end of 2015, Niger had approximately 22,300m² of anti-personnel mine contamination remaining from a mined area identified in 2014, covering 39,000m².² The area, located at Madama military post, was identified during an assessment mission in June 2011 and initially estimated to cover 2,400m².³ Technical survey in 2014 concluded that the extent of contamination was considerably larger than the earlier estimate.⁴ Niger deployed a team of 60 deminers to the area in November 2014, and reported that, as at November 2015, more than 17,000m² had been cleared with 750 mines destroyed.⁵ On 25 October 2016, Niger confirmed that 39,304m² had been demined, with the destruction of 1,075 mines.⁶ It is not known if the area as a whole has yet been formally released.

Five additional SHAs were also identified in Agadez region (in the Achouloulouma, Blaka, Enneri, Orida, and Zouzoudinga) but they were believed to contain only anti-vehicle mines.⁷ Niger reported that non-technical and technical survey in May 2014 had removed the suspicion of the presence of anti-personnel mines.⁸

The areas are all located in Niger's Agadez region, in the north in a remote desert area, 450km from the rural community of Dirkou in Bilma department and reported to contain French MI AP ID 51 mines, which date back to the French colonial era.⁹

Niger's contamination includes other areas that contain only anti-vehicle mines, which are the result of rebellion in 1990–2000 as well as fighting in 2007 between the Nigerien army and a non-state armed group, the Nigerien Justice Movement (Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice), and some splinter factions.

In 2015–16, there were a number of reports of casualties and incidents involving the use of "landmines" and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by Boko Haram, primarily in the south-eastern Diffa region along the border with Nigeria, as Niger increased its participation in joint military offensives against Boko Haram as part of a Multi-National Joint Task Force launched in 2015.¹⁰ Most reports appear to describe the use of locally produced victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) made by Boko Haram, which were either anti-personnel mines or anti-vehicle mines.¹¹ It is not clear how many civilians were casualties of these devices in 2015–16; a number of reports cite mainly Nigerien soldiers, but also civilians killed or injured by mines, in incidents which appear to have involved improvised roadside bombs targeting vehicles.

In one incident, in January 2016, at least six Nigerien soldiers were reported to have been killed by an explosion when an army vehicle detonated a mine 10km from Kabalewa, in Diffa region, on the banks of the Yobe river along the border with Nigeria.¹² In February 2015, two people on a horse and cart were killed in Zaourararm when a mine exploded beneath it, thought to have been planted by Boko Haram.¹³ Just days earlier, two soldiers were reported to have been killed and four injured by a mine laid by Boko Haram near the town of Bosso.¹⁴

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national mine action programme is managed by the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI), which reports directly to the President. All demining has been carried out by the Nigerien army.

Niger's first extension request in 2013 included a workplan for 2014–15 requiring clearance of the Madama mined area, technical survey in the northern Kawar (Kaouar) department (Agadez region), and verification of other suspected mined areas. Niger's third extension request submitted in 2016 contains a vague workplan for 2016–20, but does not contain details of annual clearance outputs or milestones.¹⁵

Operators

Niger reported that, as at November 2015, it had drafted national mine action standards in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and was in the process of training deminers and eight community liaison officers for deployment in Kawar. It has reportedly had between 60 and 90 deminers operating at Madama since November 2014; in mid-2015, however, it acknowledged that due to lack of adequate equipment, it was not possible for all deminers to work at the same time.¹⁶

In May 2015, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) conducted an evaluation mission in Niger and subsequently offered to provide assistance to national demining efforts by donating equipment to enable the deployment of more deminers and short-term technical support to improve Niger's clearance productivity.¹⁷ Niger has not accepted the support NPA offered.

LAND RELEASE

According to Niger, as at 25 October 2016, all 39,304m² of the confirmed mined area at Madama had been cleared, with the destruction of 1,075 mines.¹⁸ Previously, Niger reported that from the initiation of operations at Madama in November 2014 to November 2015, a total of 17,000m² had been cleared and 750 mines destroyed.¹⁹

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the four-year extension request granted by states parties in 2016), Niger is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2020.

States parties decided to grant this second request while noting, as with its previous extension request, that Niger had failed to provide a detailed annual workplan for clearance and benchmarks against which to assess progress. As such, Niger was requested by states parties to provide a revised detailed workplan with a list of all areas known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, along with monthly and annual projections of which areas would be addressed during the extension period. The importance of submitting an updated Article 7 report on an annual basis was further emphasised.²⁰

Niger failed to submit a revised workplan by 30 April 2017, but at the convention's intersessional meetings in June 2017, Niger informed states parties of monthly and annual demining projections, beginning in July 2017 through to July 2020, including a total of 25,000m² to be addressed in 2017; 68,500m² in 2018; 69,247m² in 2019; and 35,000m² in 2020, for a total of 197,747m² to be addressed.²¹

Niger has not, however, submitted an updated Article 7 report covering calendar year 2016, also due by 30 April 2017. At the intersessional meetings, it stated it was unable to submit an updated Article 7 report as requested and that it was waiting for assistance from France, which was to be provided in the summer of 2017, to conduct a field evaluation in order to better refine its planning and inform the report.²²

Niger's Article 5 clearance deadline under its first extension request expired on 31 December 2015. It stated that due to greater than expected contamination at Madama and the identification of the other area of suspected mine contamination, it would not meet this deadline. On 12 November 2015, just a few weeks before the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Niger submitted a second request for a five-year extension until 31 December 2020.

Instead, states parties decided to grant Niger a one-year extension only, noting that Niger had failed to submit its request within the agreed timeline prior to the meeting and thus had not permitted time for sufficient analysis or discussion. The decision “noted that Niger and the Convention as a whole would benefit from a full extension process taking place” and requested that, as such, Niger “submit a request, in accordance with the established process, by 31 March 2016”.²³ The decision also observed that the plan presented by Niger in the request was “workable but lacks ambition” and requested that Niger provide, in its revised submission, an updated workplan with an up-to-date list of all areas known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines and annual clearance projections during the period covered by the request.²⁴

In April 2016, Niger re-submitted its extension request for a period of four years, until 31 December 2020.²⁵ The revised submission includes geo-coordinates for the Madama mined area, but fails to include a detailed annual workplan or any specific annual projections for the clearance of the remaining mined areas, despite this being an essential part of any extension request, and it having been explicitly requested to do so by the meeting of states parties.²⁶

In its extension requests, Niger has noted desert environment, insecurity, and lack of funding as challenges for the implementation of its clearance obligations, along with the remote location of contamination and the need for a weekly military escort to carry out demining.²⁷

Niger funded all mine action activities in 2014–15.²⁸ Under its latest extension request, Niger has said that more than US\$3.2 million in funding is needed to fulfil its remaining Article 5 obligations, including \$1 million for the CNCCAI from the national budget over the five-year period, and \$2.2 million to be mobilised from external donors.²⁹

Niger has made repeated appeals for international assistance for mine action and claimed receiving no external support for its activities, save for assistance from France for medical evacuation in the case of demining accidents.³⁰ However, as noted above, following an assessment mission to Niger in May 2015, NPA submitted an offer to provide Niger with assistance, including provision of personal protective equipment, so that more deminers could work simultaneously, as well as a technical advisor to evaluate current methodology and trial equipment, which it believed could significantly increase speed and productivity.³¹ Danish Demining Group also offered to help Niger to complete clearance, but Niger did not respond to either organisation’s offer.³²

At the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2016, France announced that it would provide support to contribute to the clearance of the area around Madama fort, set to begin in 2017.³³ In June 2017, Niger confirmed that it had accepted France’s offer for technical support for an evaluation of the terrain around Madama, which it stated would better inform its planning and allow it to prepare an updated Article 7 transparency report.³⁴ Given the relatively small amount of suspected contamination remaining, Niger should be able to complete survey and clearance of this limited area of contamination remaining well in advance of its four-year extended deadline.

- 1 Executive Summary of Niger's Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 October 2016.
- 2 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 November 2015, pp. 6 and 8.
- 3 Executive Summary of Niger's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015; and statement of Niger, Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.
- 4 Statement of Niger, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015; and interview with Youssouf Maïga, Chair, National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI), in Geneva, 25 June 2015.
- 5 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 November 2015, p. 8; and Executive Summary of Niger's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 2. Niger's extension request stated that 17,000m² had been cleared and 628 mines destroyed. Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 November 2015, p. 9.
- 6 Analysis of Niger's Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 25 October 2016, p. 3.
- 7 Observations on the extension request submitted by Niger by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 27 November 2015, p. 4; and statement of Niger, Intersessional meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 11 April 2014.
- 8 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016, p. 6.
- 9 Executive Summary of Niger's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015; and statement of Niger, Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.
- 10 See M. P. Moore, "This Month in Mines, February 2015", Landmines in Africa blog, 12 March 2015, at: <https://landminesinafrica.wordpress.com/2015/03/12/the-month-in-mines-february-2015/>; and "Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)", *GlobalSecurity.org*, at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/mnjtf.htm>.
- 11 M. P. Moore, "This Month in Mines, February 2015", Landmines in Africa blog.
- 12 "Landmine Explosion Kills 6 Soldiers at Niger-Nigerian Border", *Africa News*, 18 January 2016, at: <http://www.africanews.com/2016/01/18/landmine-explosion-kills-6-soldiers-at-niger-nigerian-border/>.
- 13 "Two people killed by suspected Boko Haram mine blast in Niger", *Reuters*, 26 February 2015, at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence-niger/two-people-killed-by-suspected-boko-haram-mine-blast-in-niger-idUSKBN0LU1NR20150226>.
- 14 "Boko Haram mines kills two soldiers in southeast Niger: ministry", *Reuters*, 24 February 2015, at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence-niger-idUSKBN0LS1E020150224>.
- 15 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received 15 April 2016.
- 16 Niger stated that in addition to the 60 deminers active at Madama since November 2014, 40 were trained in February 2015, 30 of whom were said to have been deployed by April 2015. Statement of Niger, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015; and interview with Chris Natale, Mine Action Advisor, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), in Geneva, 26 June 2015.
- 17 Interview with Chris Natale, NPA, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.
- 18 Analysis of Niger's Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 25 October 2016, p. 3. In its revised second extension request, Niger gave new, but conflicting reports that as at March 2016, "more than 39,304m² had been demined and close to 1,075 mines removed"; but then also stated that "93,042m²" had been demined, and a total of 1,075 mines destroyed. It clarified to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on 25 October 2016 that 39,304m² had been cleared and 1,075 mines destroyed.
- 19 Observations on the extension request submitted by Niger by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 27 November 2015, p. 4.
- 20 Additionally, States Parties stipulated four areas on which Niger should report, including progress made in accordance to its forthcoming 2016–20 workplan; any negative or positive impacts on implementation deriving from changes in the security situation; efforts to mobilise necessary financial and technical support; and any external finance and assistance received along with resources made available by the Government of Niger. "Decision on the request submitted by Niger for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 1 December 2016.
- 21 It erroneously reported, though, that this total was 196,253m². Statement of Niger, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 8 June 2017.
- 22 *Ibid.*
- 23 "Decision on the request submitted by Niger for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2015.
- 24 *Ibid.*
- 25 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016 (received 15 April 2016).
- 26 Historically, from 2002–06, Niger consistently reported the existence of mined areas in the country. However, at the 2008 intersessional meetings, Niger declared that no areas on its territory were suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, stating it had evidence only of the presence of anti-vehicle mines. Nonetheless, in May 2012, more than two years after the expiry of its Article 5 clearance deadline, Niger reported to states parties that at least one mined area contained anti-personnel mines in. In July 2013, more than four years after its original deadline expired, Niger submitted its first extension request, following the discovery of one known and five suspected mined areas in the Agadez region in June 2011. In granting the request, states parties regretted the delay between the discovery of contamination and the beginning of demining. See: Article 7 reports for 2002–06; statement of Niger, Intersessional meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 5 June 2008 and 28 May 2012; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Decision, 5 December 2013.
- 27 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 July 2013; Executive summary of Niger's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 2; and Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016, p. 14.
- 28 Interview with Youssouf Maïga, CNCCAI, Geneva, 25 June 2015.
- 29 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016, pp. 11–13; and Executive Summary of Niger's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 3.
- 30 Statement of Niger, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19–20 May 2016; statement of Niger, 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015; Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016, p. 13; and Executive Summary of Niger's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 3.
- 31 Email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 July 2016.
- 32 Statement of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 28 November 2016.
- 33 Statement of France, 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 30 November 2016.
- 34 Statement of Niger, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 8 June 2017.