

KEY DATA

**ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:
NO CREDIBLE ESTIMATE,
BUT BELIEVED TO BE LIGHT**

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2022


0M²

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2022

0

(OPERATOR DATA)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT



KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Libya made little progress in clearing anti-personnel (AP) mined area in 2022. Reduced funding has led to significant cuts in demining capacity.

DEMINEING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- The Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Free Fields Foundation (3F)
- The Safe Trust non-governmental organisation (NGO) (Al-Thiqa al-Amena, accredited and supported by DCA)
- The Communication NGO (Al-Tawasol)
- Libyan Peace Organisation (accredited, and supported by DRC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Libya should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Libya should conduct a national baseline survey to identify the extent of AP mine contamination.
- Libya should strengthen the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC)'s leading role as a coordinator of the mine action programme in close consultation with the national and international operators.
- Libya should facilitate the granting of visas to international clearance operators.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

There is no accurate figure for the extent of mined area in Libya and reports of mine contamination are confused and sometimes contradictory. Mine contamination is a legacy of the Second World War (mainly in the east and predominantly anti-vehicle (AV) mine contamination), as well as subsequent armed conflict with Egypt in 1977 (pattern minefields mapped, fenced and marked), with Chad in 1978–87, which resulted in mines being laid on Libya's borders with these two neighbours, and the Libya uprising of 2011 and subsequent armed conflicts.¹ The border with Tunisia is also believed to be affected. During Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's four decades in power, mines were emplaced around a number of locations, including military facilities and key infrastructure.

Mines were used by both the government and the opposition forces during the 2011 conflict leading to Colonel Qaddafi's overthrow. According to the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC), around 30,000–35,000 mines were laid in five regions and cities, but were "largely cleared" after the downfall of the Gaddafi regime by volunteers with previous military experience.² This claim is not credible. In the course of the Libyan conflict, the Gaddafi regime lost control over large parts of its conventional weapons arsenal. Weapons storage sites were accessible to opposition fighters, civilians, and soldiers alike. Since the end of the fighting, central control over the weapons arsenal has not been re-established and has led to widespread use and trafficking of arms.³

Since February 2014, Libya's governance has been divided between two main entities: the United Nations (UN)-recognised Government of National Accord (or GNA) and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), led by commander Khalifa Haftar. After a long negotiation process in 2015, a political agreement was signed in December 2015 under UN supervision. Clashes in Tripoli between rival militias escalated again in 2019, and the LNA surrounded Tripoli in January 2020 launching constant artillery and rocket attacks. In June 2020, LNA forces withdrew 600km east of Tripoli leaving behind an unknown number of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).⁴ Many of these fall within the scope of the APMBC. The fighting ended with parties to the conflict signing an agreement of "complete and permanent" ceasefire in October 2020 in Geneva under the UN auspices.⁵

According to multiple reports, fighters affiliated with the group commanded by Khalifa Haftar, and foreign fighters from Russia emplaced AP mines, including victim-activated IEDs and booby-traps, in Tripoli's southern suburbs as they withdrew.⁶ Human Rights Watch said that between April 2019 and June 2020, Haftar and affiliated forces, including the Wagner Group, a Russian government-linked private military security contractor, placed "enormous" quantities of munitions, including anti-personnel mines, in Tripoli's southern districts. Some devices were hidden inside homes and other structures, in some cases inside furniture, and often activated by tripwire.⁷ The American Embassy in Tripoli said that a United States (US)-supported demining team near the capital had deactivated 34 mines in May–June 2020, including MON-50 and POM-2 Russian-made AP mines, adding that the mines were emplaced by the Wagner Group in residential areas.⁸

In March 2021, the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), headed by Abdelhamid Dabeida, replaced these former eastern- and western-based authorities. However, the relationship with Haftar's LNA remained fraught.⁹ In spite of the challenging political and security environment, the situation in Libya continued to improve and the 2020 ceasefire agreement held. While the lessening of hostilities has brought new emplacement of mines and other explosive ordnance to a halt, considerable contamination—unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mines, booby-traps, and to other IEDs used during the siege of Tripoli—along with ordnance used during previous conflict in Libya, remain a threat.¹⁰

Media reports suggest that most of the AP mines laid since the 2011 Libyan conflict are of an improvised nature.¹¹ DanChurchAid (DCA), which has been operating in Libya since 2010, confirmed the presence of AP tripwire mines, bounding mines, and anti-lift devices in Tripoli, and legacy IEDs in Benghazi and Sirte. DCA thought that the extent of mine contamination has remained the same since the fighting in and around Tripoli in 2020.¹²

In Benghazi in the east, Libyan military engineering personnel told the media that mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Benghazi remains in the rubble of damaged buildings. Local people are said to improvise markings to warn civilians of the presence of explosive devices amid the lack of a systematic response from the authorities.¹³

1 Interview with Col. Turjoman, Director, LibMAC, in Geneva, 7 February 2019; and "Libya: The Toxic and Explosive Legacy of Modern Conflict", Presentation by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), UN National Directors Meeting, Geneva, 12 February 2020.

2 Interview with Col. Turjoman, LibMAC, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.

3 ITF Enhancing Human Security, Annual Report 2020, at: <http://bit.ly/3t8SbcV>, p. 78; and email from Catherine Alice Smith, Programme Manager, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), 20 April 2021.

4 ITF Enhancing Human Security, Annual Report 2020, p. 78.

5 UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Agreement for a complete and permanent ceasefire in Libya, Geneva, 23 October 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3Bunnej>.

6 Human Rights Watch, "Libya: landmines left after armed group withdraws", 3 June 2020, at: <http://bit.ly/2DIE5AM>; and "Libya: Landmines, Other War Hazards, Killing Civilians", 27 April 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3nkVPju>.

7 Human Rights Watch, "Libya: Russia's Wagner Group Set Landmines Near Tripoli", 31 May 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3xRfzQy>.

8 Embassy of the United States in Libya website, 21 July 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3DJZX4G>.

9 Human Rights Watch, "Libya: Landmines, Other War Hazards, Killing Civilians", 27 April 2022.

10 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Libya Humanitarian Overview 2023, December 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3o4xPEM>, p. 10.

11 "Libya inhabited with fear. Battles ended but the mines stay", *The Independent* (Arabic), 4 April 2023, at <https://bit.ly/3DKc6qk>.

12 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, Programme Manager, DanChurchAid (DCA), 1 April 2022 and 17 March 2023.

13 "Without a serious survey, mines kills Libyans", *The New Arab*, 11 November 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/441cs6K>.

Conventional minefields are rare in the west and central coastal area of Libya.¹⁴

According to The HALO Trust (HALO), the contamination of mines across Tripoli featured a mix of previously unseen items, and a possible distribution and laying of mines from the former Gaddafi stockpiles, such as the Belgian PRB-M3 AV mines. There have been reports of mines causing fatalities in the west of Sirte, but non-technical survey (NTS) has not been conducted for a baseline survey of mine contamination there.¹⁵ In 2023, HALO added that the deployment of AP mines was not a common characteristic of conflict in Libya over the last decade of conflict. HALO, therefore, believes that a countrywide survey or resurvey of AP mined area is not required. One AP mine (OZM72) was found in Tripoli that had been deployed and intended to be used as an IED.¹⁶ On 13 December 2022, the British Embassy in Tripoli reportedly tweeted that it had supported HALO in mapping of contamination areas south of Tripoli, and that it had concluded producing maps of suspected mined areas. HALO said it had identified more than 100 areas suspected of ERW contamination in Ain Zara (South of Tripoli).¹⁷

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that after the withdrawal of LNA forces in May 2020, explosive ordnance (booby-traps, landmines, and IEDs) were found scattered across southern Tripoli.¹⁸ Sophisticated tactics were deployed to hinder demining and target deminers, including placement of minimum-metal AP mines next to AV mines and the use of anti-lift devices. In addition, UNMAS reported extensive use of booby-traps and victim-activated IEDs in civilian houses that served no military purpose but inflicted high civilian casualties.¹⁹ HALO reported that finding ML-7/8 anti-lift devices being laid underneath OZM-72 AP bounding fragmentation mines.²⁰ In Tripoli, there has been evidence of conventional munitions being repurposed to operate in an improvised manner as landmines. These include projectiles containing a Soviet MUV fuze, which are tripwire initiated.²¹

In June 2020, the President of the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties to the APMB (19MSP) issued a press release expressing concern at reports of the use of AP mines of an improvised nature in and around Tripoli. In his November 2021 report on Libya to the UN Security Council, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) said that his office continued "to gather evidence related to

alleged crimes committed during the April 2019 attack on Tripoli", but did not announce the nature of these investigations.²² Amnesty International, however, has evidence that LNA-affiliated forces have laid extensive tripwire-activated AP mines and booby-traps in homes and other civilian objects.²³

Multiple types of AP mines: (T-AB-1, NR-413, NR-442), were used or left behind as part of abandoned stockpiles across the country at the start of the conflict in 2011.²⁴ Since then, Human Rights Watch has identified 10 AP mines of Soviet and Russian origin in Libya: PMN-2, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, POM-2S, POM-2R, MS-3, ML-7, and ML-8. Other AP mines (GYATA-64), in addition to AV mines (TM-62M, TM-62P3, and TM-83) have also been found. Four types of AP mine of Russian origin had not been previously documented in Libya. Explosive devices of an improvised nature were assembled and used in a manner intended to be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, meeting the treaty definition of an AP mine.²⁵

As at March 2021, national NTS had identified more than 15km² of hazardous area, of which 62% was in the east of the country, 33% in Tripoli and Al Jefarah, and the remaining 5% in Misrata and Sirte. In 2022, more than 27,400 different types and calibres of ordnance were disposed of in Libya, of which two thirds were projectiles and rockets, and the rest were grenades, aircraft bombs, mines, and small arms ammunition. Additional areas could be identified as hazardous areas in 2023 as NTS operations are ongoing.²⁶

Many suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) have yet been surveyed. According to the latest updates at April 2021, national data from the LibMAC database suggested total contamination of 287km² of mines across 61km² of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 226km² of SHAs, distributed over seven localities.²⁷ The data provided by LibMAC indicate mostly mixed contamination and are not disaggregated by contamination type. LibMAC data from 2017 indicate that the SHA of 223km² in Sirte is suspected to contain only AV mines.²⁸ Moreover, the contamination data of Sirte do not reflect clearance in 2017–20 and are therefore believed to be outdated. Aside from the SHA in Sirte, total confirmed and suspected AP and AV mined area combined is nearly 64km². It is likely that further survey will drastically reduce the figures, especially for AP mined area.

14 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022 and 17 March 2023.

15 Emails from Zita Andrassy, Programme Officer Libya, HALO, 27 February 2022; and Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022.

16 Email from Charles Fowle, Libya Programme Manager, HALO, 5 May 2023.

17 "Libya: The UK announces the conclusion of producing landmine maps in Tripoli" (Arabic), *Anadolu Agency*, 14 December 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3DRdUxC>, and "Libya seeks international help to clear developed mines", *The Libya Observer*, 24 December 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/43TSeM4>.

18 Email from Sharmeela Aminath, Chief Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, 16 March 2023.

19 Presentation by UNMAS and LibMAC to the 24th NDM meeting, Geneva, 26 May 2021.

20 Email from Lucy Reeve, Programme Manager, HALO, 12 May 2021.

21 Email from Zita Andrassy, HALO, 27 February 2022.

22 Statement of International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, to the UN Security Council on the Situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3vtpDyS>.

23 Amnesty International UK, "Libya: shocking new evidence of retaliatory attacks on civilians", 5 June 2020, at: <http://bit.ly/3f9WiPN>.

24 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Libya", accessed 27 June 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3y0blpF>.

25 Human Rights Watch, "Libya: Landmines, Other War Hazards, Killing Civilians", 27 April 2022.

26 Email from Sharmeela Aminath, UNMAS, 16 March 2023.

27 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, Operations, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.

28 Emails from Abdullatif Abujarida, LibMAC, 20 February and 9 March 2017.

In July 2022, LibMAC told Human Rights Watch that since 2019, landmines and other ordnance contaminated 720km² of the southern Tripoli districts alone.²⁹ In the absence of systematic survey efforts, however, this figure is thought to be a significantly overestimate.

Table 1: Mixed AP and AV mined area (at end 2020)³⁰

Locality	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total SHAs/CHAs	Total area (m ²)
Al Jifarah	0	0	1	5,280	1	5,280
Al Jufrah	0	0	1	408,572	1	408,572
Benghazi	16	12,382,269	4	1,564,907	20	13,947,176
Jabal Nafusa	1	0	1	604,139	2	604,139
Misratah	3	3,387,431	0	0	3	3,387,431
Sabha	2	3,990,067	0	0	2	3,990,067
Sirte	3	40,747,944	1	222,934,834	4	263,682,778
Greater Tripoli	41	654,576	14	131,990	55	786,566
Totals	66	61,162,287	22	225,649,722	88	286,812,009

LibMAC told Human Rights Watch that, between May 2020 and March 2022, 130 people died and 196 others were injured by mines and explosive devices across Libya, mostly in southern Tripoli. Of the total casualties, 78 (24%) were specialists in mine action, none of whom was able to return to work.³¹

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Libya is also contaminated by cluster munition remnants (CMR) (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2023* report on Libya for further information). Conflicts, some of which are still ongoing, have left large quantities of ERW and UXO and in cities across Libya, a large proportion of which resulted from the siege of Tripoli in 2020.³²

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action exists in a fragmented and occasionally violent political context. Since the UN-sponsored ceasefire agreement of October 2020, a roadmap leading to national elections in December 2021 did not materialise amid disputes over the eligibility of major candidates. In March 2023, Libya's UN envoy said that national elections could be held by the end of 2023 provided that a clear roadmap and electoral laws are put in place by June.³³ Despite the deadlock in the political process and the challenging environment, Libya has been slowly moving towards stability.³⁴

LibMAC was mandated by the Minister of Defence (MoD) to coordinate mine action in December 2011.³⁵ Operating under the UN-backed GNA, LibMAC's headquarters are in Tripoli, in the west of the country, and it also has offices in Benghazi³⁶ and Misrata.³⁷ ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF) has been supporting the overhead costs of LibMAC since it initiated a programme in Libya in 2014. In 2022, ITF paid the salaries of 27 LibMAC employees and covered the Centre's day-to-day costs.³⁸ LibMAC and military engineering personnel told the media that Libya lacks the capacity to tackle the scale of mine and ERW contamination, and sometimes lack the expertise

29 Human Rights Watch, "Libya: Landmines, Other War Hazards, Killing Civilians", 27 April 2022.

30 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.

31 Human Rights Watch, "Libya: Landmines, Other War Hazards, Killing Civilians", 27 April 2022.

32 OCHA, *Libya Humanitarian Overview 2023*, December, p. 10.

33 "Libya elections: Presidential poll postponed", *BBC News*, 23 December 2021, at: <https://bbc.in/39ohwez>; and "Libyan elections are possible this year, U.N. envoy says", *Reuters*, 11 March 2023, at: <https://bit.ly/40FCHy1>.

34 OCHA, *Libya Humanitarian Overview 2023*, December, p. 8.

35 LibMAC website, accessed 20 March 2020, at: <http://bit.ly/2JqVr0S>.

36 Email from Jakob Donatz, Associate Programme Officer, UNMAS, 21 June 2018.

37 Email from Roman Turšič, Head of Implementation Office Libya/Afghanistan, ITF, 26 February 2017; and interview with Brig. Turjoman, LibMAC, in Geneva, 10 January 2017.

38 ITF, "Annual Report 2022", p. 143.

to tackle certain types of mines. This poses risk for the deminers, some of whom have lost their lives as a result.³⁹

Danish Refugee Council (DRC) provided training on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) levels 1 and 2 to the local non-governmental organisation (NGO) Libyan Peace Organisation, LibMAC, and other local partners. DRC sponsored 13 individuals, including five DRC staff, five officers from the Libyan Peace Organisation, and three representatives from LibMAC.⁴⁰

In March 2022, HALO carried out an EOD Level 1 and 2 training course in Tripoli for 12 people, including LibMAC staff members and personnel from the Libyan Peace Organisation. HALO has also been providing ad-hoc support to LibMAC's transition to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core in 2022, and intended to conduct an EOD Level 3 training for LibMAC in 2023. There was concern, though, that the training might not be possible due to difficulties in obtaining visas.⁴¹

UNMAS, which is an integral part of the United Nations Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL), has largely been operating from Tunis since November 2014.⁴² UNMAS returned with international personnel to Libya in 2018, and since then has maintained permanent presence of critical operational and technical staff.⁴³ UNMAS helped LibMAC to develop the Libyan mine action standards on explosive

ordnance risk education (EORE), the migration of the database, and the accreditation assessments of four mine action organisations in 2022.⁴⁴

UNMAS also acts as the mine action lead, providing non-technical coordination through information sharing, and represents the mine action sector in various fora, including the UN protection cluster, the inter-sectoral coordination group, and the UN country team.⁴⁵ UNMAS and LibMAC chair monthly mine action sub-cluster working groups, which are attended by key mine action stakeholders.⁴⁶ UNMAS sought a budget of US\$7.5 million for the mine action sector in Libya in 2022 and was able to secure 99% of the requested amount.⁴⁷

DCA, DRC, and HALO have all experienced an eight-month long visa blockade for international staff, which has substantially impacted their operations. Operators have also unanimously reported that LibMAC has been doing what it can to support their visa requests, but to no avail.⁴⁸ DCA said that its annual Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between LibMAC and the international mine action organisations has seen delays while accreditation and registration were being sought.⁴⁹ Both DRC and HALO faced difficulties moving equipment within the country, and in the case of HALO, also into the country.⁵⁰ For DCA, there was no problem bringing equipment into the country aside from the UN arms embargo, which prohibits the importation of detonators.⁵¹

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Libya does not have a national mine action standard (NMAS) or a policy on environmental management.⁵²

DCA has an environmental management system and standard operational procedures (SOPs) in place. It takes into account the impacts of the destruction of ERW prior to any battle area clearance (BAC) or EOD spot task, and puts in place mitigation measures. DCA has a policy of non-use of explosives in favour of thermite to stop more nitrates from contaminating topsoil when operating in farmland. No open burning takes place and sandbags are made from hemp instead of plastic.⁵³

DRC does not have an environmental management system. DRC takes into account "do-not-harm" elements in consideration of environmental impact and policy when planning its operations.⁵⁴ HALO does not have an environmental management system. A global environment advisor was recruited in January 2022 to support progress in this regard, but the advisor has not visited the Libya programme nor developed an environmental management system at the global or programme level.⁵⁵ HALO's work in Libya is focused on urban clearance and therefore has little impact on biodiversity and vegetation.

39 "Libya seeks international help to clear developed mines", *The Libya Observer*, 24 December 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/43TSeM4>.

40 Email from Sonia Joly, Head of Programme, DRC, 21 August 2023.

41 Email from Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

42 UNMAS, "Programmes: Libya", accessed 14 May 2022, at: <http://bit.ly/31tU1tB>.

43 Email from Samir Becirovic, UNMAS, 2 March 2022.

44 Emails from Sharmeela Aminath, UNMAS, 16 March 2023; and Samir Becirovic, UNMAS, 2 March 2022.

45 Ibid.

46 Emails from Sharmeela Aminath, UNMAS, 16 March 2023; and Samir Becirovic, UNMAS, 10 June 2022.

47 Email from Sharmeela Aminath, UNMAS, 16 March 2023.

48 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 17 March 2023; Anna Salvari, DRC, 2 April 2023; and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

49 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 17 March 2023.

50 Emails from Anna Salvari, DRC, 2 April 2023; and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

51 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 17 March 2023.

52 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022; Alessandro Di Giusto, DRC, 7 March 2022; and Zita Andrassy, HALO, 27 February 2022.

53 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 17 March 2023 and 1 April 2022.

54 Email from Alessandro Di Giusto, DRC, 7 March 2022.

55 Email from Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

LibMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy for mine action in place. LibMAC disaggregates mine action data by sex and age.⁵⁶ Libyan women participation in the workforce in general is challenged due to societal norms. Those participating in mine action face additional obstacles from the widespread perception of the sector as male-dominated. Despite the challenges, Libyan women are becoming deminers.⁵⁷

DCA's Libya programme has an active policy of employing women into programme roles to increase their financial independence and teach them transferable skills that they may use beyond their current employment with DCA.⁵⁸ Gender mainstreaming and mainstreaming of marginalised groups form part of the programme's core policies. DCA also employs all-women teams, including two all-female EORE teams and one all-female multi-task team, to be able to engage with female-headed households. DCA actively engages with local councils, civil society organisations, community leaders, and groups working for the rights of minorities. These engagements drive project design and ensure community ownership. Women constituted 27% of all DCA employees in 2022. Of operational and managerial positions, 27% and 54% were occupied by women, respectively.⁵⁹

DRC takes into consideration gender and age factors when collecting information on how contamination impacts different groups. DRC adopts a transparent and inclusive

recruitment process to ensure that staff as much as possible originate from the area of operations and are representative of the local social context. DRC employed mixed gender teams in the field in 2022, and continues where possible.⁶⁰ DRC contracted the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to carry out a gender and diversity assessment in the first quarter of 2023.⁶¹ Women made up 15% of DRC total employees in 2022.⁶²

HALO's community liaison officers in Libya are all women who can engage with both men and women. As of writing, HALO staff were not specifically trained to work directly with children, but rather to ask parents for specific considerations for vulnerable persons under their responsibility, including children, elderly, and persons with disabilities. Data collected are disaggregated by gender and age so that representation can be targeted in a proportionate manner. HALO community liaison activities are performed at the same time as surveys, including focus group discussions when applicable, ensuring that women's voices are also heard. HALO staff are required to complete the online "Gender and Diversity in Mine Action" training module developed by the GICHD after their recruitment. HALO, however, reported difficulty in hiring women for operational roles.⁶³ Of a total of 39 national staff in 2022, 4 (10%) were women. In terms of supervisory positions, 3 out of 7 (43%) were filled by women. Women did not occupy any operational positions in 2022.⁶⁴

Table 2: Gender composition of mine action operators in 2022⁶⁵

Operator	Proportion of women among total staff	Proportion of women in operational positions	Proportion of women in managerial positions
DCA	27%	27%	54%
DRC	19%	19%	25%
HALO*	10%	43%	0%

* HALO's figures concern only national staff.

56 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.

57 "Demining: Libyan women venture into the fields of death", *Deutsche Welle*, 10 March 2023, at: <https://bit.ly/3QpAyVz>.

58 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 20 April 2021.

59 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022 and 17 March 2023.

60 Emails from Alessandro Di Giusto, DRC, 7 March 2022; and Anna Salvari, DRC, 26 June 2023.

61 Email from Anna Salvari, DRC, 2 April 2023.

62 Email from Anna Salvari, DRC, 26 June 2023.

63 Email from Zita Andrassy, HALO, 27 February 2022.

64 Emails from Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

65 Emails from Anna Salvari, DRC, 26 June 2023; Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023; and Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 17 March 2023.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

LibMAC receives technical support for the IMSMA from the GICHD and UNMAS. With support of both organisations, LibMAC's transition from IMSMA New Generation (NG) to IMSMA Core, which started in 2020,⁶⁶ was completed in August 2023.⁶⁷ All EORE, EOD, and victim assistance data were expected to be fully migrated by the end of May 2023. HALO's EOD work, which began in July 2023, will be reported to the IMSMA Core database. The remaining activities will follow the same process by the end of the 2023.⁶⁸ It is hoped that this transition leads to an improvement in the quality of mine action data.

IMSMA is accessible to clearance organisations and data collection forms are reported to be consistent and enable collection of necessary data.⁶⁹ According to HALO, software user-friendliness could be improved, especially with the shift towards IMSMA Core. This transition should allow all actors to view the entirety of data in the form of online maps, which should allow more quality checks of the information. While IMSMA NG did not support the collection of mechanical clearance data, the change to IMSMA Core is expected to enable this type of activity to be added to the clearance form. LibMAC promised to organise a workshop to finalise adding

mechanical clearance data to the IMSMA database, which requires an operational solution and not on a technical one.⁷⁰

Both HALO and DCA agree that the IMSMA database is largely reliable, accurate, and up to date. DCA reported that LibMAC lacks resources to ensure or improve the quality of data as only one person works on IMSMA. Some concerns related to the quality of data from the source (i.e. the calculation of direct beneficiaries, the reporting on ERW-related scrap during spot tasks). In addition, some data, such as on specific land use, are not always available because the previous IMSMA NG system did not consider it as a minimum reporting.⁷¹ Data is made available in the system three or four days after its reporting.⁷² According to HALO, organisations submit their information in a timely fashion. Certain entities, however, that are not working under the MoD do not submit their reports regularly, if at all.⁷³

Mine action data are checked by both the implementing organisation and LibMAC. Ongoing NTS remains critical to ensure that data are up to date. Otherwise, there is a risk that data maintenance is perceived as a static and not a dynamic activity.⁷⁴

PLANNING AND TASKING

There is no national mine action strategy for Libya.⁷⁵ In April 2021, LibMAC reported it had a short-term national operational plan.⁷⁶ LibMAC prioritises survey and clearance operations based on humanitarian, security, and development indicators,⁷⁷ and is responsible for issuing task orders. DCA considers that LibMAC is doing its best to issue task orders in a timely and effective manner within its limited capacity and resource, and reported that task orders were mostly received in a timely manner in 2022.⁷⁸ According to HALO, the issuance of clearance and/or survey task orders varied in timeliness depending on the geographic location and security situation at the time of request.⁷⁹

DCA continues to clear ERW in support of electricity and water supply facilities, and to survey and clear schools, medical facilities, and housing so that internally displaced people (IDPs) can return safely. This approach is in line with the "triple nexus" approach, which seeks to link humanitarian action to development projects as well as to contribute to stability and peace.⁸⁰ Mine action operators liaise with the municipal councils, community leaders, and security providers to build a picture of priority areas for survey and follow-on clearance. Operators then apply for task orders through LibMAC. Due to the small number of clearance teams and personnel in Libya, the priority is responding to call-outs, particularly from returning IDPs. Therefore, much of the clearance is reactive EOD spot tasks in order to minimise an immediate threat to life.⁸¹

HALO responds to the tasks as issued by LibMAC.⁸² HALO's prioritisation criteria for NTS are: number of conflict events, population density, critical infrastructure, duration of active fighting in a given area, recorded mines removed, and explosive ordnance accidents. For technical survey (TS) and clearance, HALO's criteria are: access, land use, number of beneficiaries, and direct evidence of contamination.⁸³

66 Email from Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 14 April 2020.

67 Interview with Ahmad Al-Shibani, LibMAC, Geneva, 21–22 June 2023; and email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 23 August 2023.

68 Emails from Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May and 16 August 2023.

69 Emails from Catherine Smith, HI, 12 March 2019; and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

70 Email from Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

71 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 17 March 2023.

72 Ibid.

73 Email from Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

74 Ibid.

75 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022 and 17 March 2023.

79 Email from Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

80 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022.

81 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 20 April 2021 and 17 March 2023.

82 Emails from Zita Andrassy, HALO, 27 February 2022; and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

83 Emails from Lucy Reeve, HALO, 23 April 2021; and Zita Andrassy, HALO, 27 February 2022.

While the above considerations are integrated in the assessment of contamination impact, survey, and community liaison activities, final decisions on task prioritisation fall to LibMAC, which ultimately issues task orders based on its set of criteria, plans, and engagement with local authorities.⁸⁴

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

There is no national mine action legislation in Libya, but national mine action standards (LibMAS), in Arabic and English, have been elaborated with the support of the GICHD and UNMAS, and were approved by the GNA in August 2017. The LibMAS are available on the LibMAC website.⁸⁵ According to international clearance operators, the NMAS are sufficient and aligned to the IMAS.⁸⁶ Further, while the Arabic version of the LibMAS is largely accurate, the English version misstates the issue of liability after land release, which remained uncorrected in 2022.⁸⁷ The LibMAS have not been updated since being first approved in 2017. UNMAS helped LibMAC to develop the Libyan mine action standard on EORE in 2022.⁸⁸

LibMAC and HALO are collaborating on how best to establish land release principles for urban clearance.⁸⁹ The mechanical clearance NMAS were likely to be updated in the last quarter of 2023.⁹⁰

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Table 3: Operational survey capacities deployed in 2022⁹¹

Operator	NTS teams	Total NTS personnel	TS teams	Total TS personnel	Comments
3F ⁹²	2	6	0	0	
DCA	6	39	6	39	The 39 personnel (multi-task teams), are the same as the NTS and clearance team.
DRC	2	6	0	0	One team leader and two surveyors per team.
HALO	2	7	1	4	Four TS personnel are also clearance personnel.
Libya Peace Organisation ⁹³	2	6	0	0	
Totals	14	64	7	43	

84 Emails from Alessandro Di Giusto, DRC, 7 March 2022; Zita Andrassy, HALO, 27 February 2022; and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

85 LibMAC website, accessed 20 May 2022 at: <https://bit.ly/3ldhvx2>. Report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL, UN doc. S/2018/140, 12 February 2018, p. 12; and UNMAS, "Programmes: Libya", accessed 14 May 2022 at: <http://bit.ly/31tU1tB>.

86 Emails from Catherine Smith, HI, 12 March 2019; Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 14 April 2020; and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

87 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022 and 17 March 2023.

88 Email from Sharmeela Aminath, UNMAS, 16 March 2023.

89 Emails from Zita Andrassy, HALO, 27 February and 19 June 2022.

90 Email from Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

91 Emails from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021; Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 17 March 2023; Anna Salvari, DRC, 2 April 2023; and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

92 This information was last updated in April 2021, and might not be up to date as at May 2023.

93 Ibid.

Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2022⁹⁴

Operator	Manual clearance teams	Total deminers*	Mechanical assets/machines	Comments
DCA	5	39	3	
HALO	1	4	4	In mid 2022, one machine was transferred to 3F.
Totals	6	43	7	

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers.

Demining has been conducted by the army engineers, a police unit, and the Ministry of Interior's national safety authority (NSA), also known as Civil Defence.⁹⁵ Military engineers reportedly lack mine detectors and are working with basic tools.⁹⁶ The NSA is mandated to conduct EOD in civilian areas.⁹⁷ These institutions liaise with LibMAC but are not tasked or accredited by them, nor do they provide clearance reports to the Centre.⁹⁸ LibMAC contacted all operators in May 2023 with instructions to shift EOD-focused activities to systematic release of land.⁹⁹

The national operator, Free Fields Foundation (3F), was operational in 2022, working with DRC,¹⁰⁰ and is accredited to conduct clearance and EOD tasks.¹⁰¹ In 2020, LibMAC reported having accredited two additional local operators: The Safety Trust NGO (*Al-Thiqa al-Amna*) and the Communication NGO (*Al-Tawasol*).¹⁰² Another national operator, the Libyan Peace Organisation, was present in Libya in 2022, and collaborated with DRC on EOD, EORE, and NTS.¹⁰³

DCA conducts risk education, clears residential, commercial, education, medical, and agricultural sites of mines and ERW, and provides training in clearance, search, and EOD.¹⁰⁴ Now in its thirteenth year of working in Libya, DCA has offices in Benghazi, Misrata, Sirte, and Tripoli, and is accredited to conduct clearance and EOD.¹⁰⁵ In 2022, DCA had part of its funding discontinued, which led to it losing one multi-task team, its all-female survey team, and one clearance team. Capacity was expected to continue unchanged in 2023.¹⁰⁶

DRC has been set up in Libya since 2011 and has two offices in Benghazi and Tripoli. Its offices in Misrata and Zwara were closed at the end of 2020, and its Sabha office closed in December 2021, resulting in the reduction of the number of EOD, NTS, and EORE teams.¹⁰⁷ DRC established a new EOD team in Tripoli in September 2022. In 2022, DRC conducted NTS and continued to partner with the Libyan Peace Organisation. In 2023, DRC was losing one NTS team as donors prioritised EORE and EOD.¹⁰⁸

HALO been present in Libya since November 2018, and has offices in Misrata, Sirte, and Tripoli. HALO's main operation focused on mechanical clearance in a Misrata ammunition storage area where it found CMR in 2022. HALO accredited two TS teams and one EOD team in 2021. The EOD team was deployed to support the clearance activities in Misrata in 2022. HALO also conducted NTS in Misrata in February 2022, and in Sirte between January and March 2022.¹⁰⁹ HALO's programme in Libya saw a decrease in the number of survey and clearance teams in 2022 compared to 2021. Going forward, HALO expects further reductions in the numbers of clearance personnel due to donor cuts. HALO has used the T Jet (a pyrotechnic torch used for low-order deflagration of UXO) in Libya in 2022.¹¹⁰

In 2022, LibMAC personnel opened 130 tasks mostly for NTS by international and local NGOs in Benghazi, Sirte, Tawargha, and Tripoli. In addition, LibMAC personnel conducted 134 quality control (QC) and quality assurance (QA) missions. LibMAC recorded 90 finished tasks during 2022.¹¹¹

94 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022; and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

95 Interview with Brig. Turjoman, LibMAC, in Geneva, 10 January 2017.

96 "Mines still claim legs and lives in Libya's Benghazi, months after war ceased", *Reuters*, 21 January 2018.

97 Email from Diek Engelbrecht, UNMAS Libya, 20 July 2013.

98 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.

99 Interview with Ahmad Al-Shibani, LibMAC, in Geneva, 21 June 2023.

100 Emails from Alessandro Di Giusto, DRC, 7 March 2022; and Samir Becirovic, UNMAS, 2 March 2022.

101 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022.

102 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.

103 Email from Anna Salvari, DRC, 2 April 2023.

104 DCA website, accessed 3 May 2021, at: <http://bit.ly/2vYatmb>.

105 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022 and 17 March 2023.

106 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 17 March 2023.

107 Email from Alessandro Di Giusto, DRC, 7 March 2022.

108 Email from Anna Salvari, DRC, 2 April 2023.

109 Emails from Zita Andrassy, HALO, 27 February 2022; and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

110 Email from Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

111 ITF, "Annual Report 2022", p. 143.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2022

According to data provided by international operators, 25,507m² was cancelled and released in 2022 through NTS. No mined area was released through TS or clearance in 2022, and no AP mines were destroyed.¹¹² DRC disposed of seven AV mines during spot tasks.¹¹³ HALO destroyed 259 items of UXO in 2022.¹¹⁴ The national authorities and/or operators have been conducting NTS and EOD in 2022 as reported by the international mine action stakeholders, but the results of these surveys have not been shared by LibMAC.

UNMAS has claimed that EOD spot tasks and BAC teams removed or destroyed 27,478 explosive items, of which 66% were projectiles and rockets, and the rest were grenades, aircraft bombs, mines, and small arms ammunition.¹¹⁵ It is not known how many of these, if at all, were AP mines.

SURVEY IN 2022

DRC reported releasing 25,507m² AP mined land through NTS in Al Sabri (Benghazi) in 2022.¹¹⁶ International operators did not report releasing AP mined area through TS in Libya in 2022.¹¹⁷

CLEARANCE IN 2022

There was no clearance of AP mined area in Libya by international operators in 2022.¹¹⁸ DRC destroyed seven AV mines during spot tasks.¹¹⁹ HALO reported destroying 259 items of UXO in 2022.¹²⁰ DCA removed and destroyed 3,670 items of UXO. A total of 1.6km² of UXO-contaminated land was cleared and released back into socio-economic use.¹²¹ International operators were advised by the national authorities, UNMAS, and LibMAC to report encountered IEDs for subsequent removal by the national police or army personnel.¹²² UNMAS reported that EOD spot tasks and BAC teams removed or destroyed 27,478 explosive items in 2022, mainly projectiles and rockets.¹²³ It is not known how many of these, if at all, were AP mines.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LibMAC describes the following challenges to implementation of mine action operations: the high level of contamination; ongoing conflict and the continued presence of Islamic State; the difficulty in convincing displaced persons to delay their return until the ERW threat is addressed; security and access to priority areas; the limited ERW and EOD capacity in Libya; the vast geographical area; and limited governmental and international support.¹²⁴ The strengthening of LibMAC as a mine action coordination entity in Libya continues to be needed, supported by efforts to build its capacity and enhance its resources.

112 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 17 March 2023; Anna Salvari, DRC, 2 April 2023; and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

113 Email from Anna Salvari, DRC, 2 April 2023.

114 Email from Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

115 Email from Sharmeela Aminath, UNMAS, 16 March 2023.

116 Email from Anna Salvari, DRC, 2 April 2023.

117 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 17 March 2023; Anna Salvari, DRC, 2 April 2023; and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

118 Ibid.

119 Email from Anna Salvari, DRC, 2 April 2023.

120 Email from Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

121 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 23 August 2023.

122 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022.

123 Email from Sharmeela Aminath, UNMAS, 16 March 2023.

124 PowerPoint presentation by Brig. Turjoman, LibMAC, UN National Programme Directors' Meeting, Geneva, 8 February 2017.