

SUDAN



PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE	2016	2015
Problem understood	4	3
Target date for completion of cluster munition clearance	3	3
Targeted clearance	4	4
Efficient clearance	5	5
National funding of programme	5	5
Timely clearance	4	4
Land release system in place	7	7
National mine action standards	7	7
Reporting on progress	5	4
Improving performance	7	6
PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE	5.1	4.8

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

As at May 2017, Sudan's National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) reported that only two areas suspected to contain cluster munition contamination remained to be addressed with a total size of 2km², in South and Western Kordofan states. It is the first time Sudan has acknowledged and reported on cluster munition remnants (CMR) contamination since 2011.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Sudan should ensure its armed forces do not use cluster munitions and should urgently address the humanitarian threat from any new CMR. Sudan should investigate and publicly report on the allegations of cluster munition use in 2012 and 2015.
- Sudan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
- Sudan should re-establish conditions that allow international demining organisations to operate in Sudan and to determine the extent of CMR contamination.
- Sudan should report transparently and in detail on efforts taken to address any suspected or confirmed hazardous areas.
- Sudan should ensure that reporting disaggregates submunitions from other unexploded ordnance (UXO) and that mine action data is recorded and reported according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land release terminology.

CONTAMINATION

The exact extent of contamination from CMR in Sudan is not known. There have been reports of new use of cluster munitions as recently as 2015, as well as in 2012.¹ According to NMAC, as at May 2017, only two areas were suspected to contain CMR contamination in Sudan, one in South Kordofan and another in West Kordofan state, each with an estimated size of 1km².² In April 2017, UNAMID reported the presence of two AO-1Sch submunitions in North Darfur; Al Mengara village in Al Liet locality. The Government of Sudan undertook to deploy its military to conduct their disposal. The villagers reported that the bombs were dropped in 2008, had been identified by UNAMID at that time, and that the military had stated that they would dispose of the items.³

Previously, the most recent estimate of contamination dated back to June 2011, when the United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO) reported nine areas suspected to be contaminated with unexploded submunitions. UNMAO asserted that 81 areas had been released (see Table 1).⁴

Table 1: CMR-contaminated areas (as at June 2011)⁵

State	Open	Closed	Total
Kassala	7	2	9
South Kordofan	2	68	70
Blue Nile	0	9	9
Northern Darfur	0	1	1
Southern Darfur	0	1	1
Totals	9	81	90

In May–June 2017, NMAC, which assumed full national ownership for implementing mine action activities upon UNMAO's closure in June 2011, reported that of the nine open areas reported by UNMAO in 2011, seven were cleared in 2011–13.⁶ UNMAO and NMAC have not, however, reported on the size of any of the areas, nor has NMAC reported how much land was cleared of CMR from 2011 to 2016, or how many submunitions were destroyed in the process. According to NMAC, no new CMR contamination was recorded in 2016.⁷

In the 1990s, Sudanese government forces are believed to have sporadically air dropped cluster munitions in its civil war with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Government forces were reported as having used several types of cluster munitions, including Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21; US-manufactured M42 and Mk118 (Rockeye), and a Brazilian copy; Chinese Type-81 dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM); Chilean-made PM-1; and Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5 and AO-1Sch submunitions.⁸

In 2012 and 2015, use of cluster munitions was recorded in five separate attacks on villages in South Kordofan state. Each attack involved air-dropped RBK-500 cluster munitions containing AO-2.5RT submunitions.⁹ In 2013–15, the UN published reports of evidence of previous use of cluster munitions in Darfur, the stockpiling of RBK-500 cluster munitions and AO-2.5RT submunitions by the Sudanese Air Force, and fluctuating stock levels indicative of use for operations or for training.¹⁰

On several occasions, the Government of Sudan has denied using cluster munitions in attacks in South Kordofan.¹¹ The UN Secretary-General called on the Government of Sudan "to immediately investigate the use of cluster munitions".¹² In June 2016, NMAC claimed that Sudan had never used cluster munitions "in operations against rebels".¹³ This is not a factually accurate statement.

Other Explosive Remnants of War and Landmines

Sudan also has a significant problem with anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, and UXO, primarily as a result of more than 20 years of civil war, which led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and the independence of South Sudan in July 2011.

As at January 2017, a total of nine of Sudan's 18 states are contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), with Blue Nile, Kassala, and South Kordofan states the most heavily affected. In April 2017, Forobaranga, in West Darfur, became the first locality in the Darfur region to complete clearance of all remaining ERW.¹⁴

In 2002 through to the end of 2016, a total of 2,059 mine and ERW casualties were been recorded, of whom 589 were killed and the other 1,470 were injured. According

to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the number of victims has risen considerably in the past three years, up by 53% in 2015 from 2013. In 2016, a total of 26 victims were recorded.¹⁵

While limited CMR contamination has, in the past, been identified in Darfur, there is significant contamination from other ERW. ERW pose a serious threat to civilians, to peacekeepers from UNAMID, and to the delivery of humanitarian aid. ERW in Darfur includes unexploded air-delivered bombs, rockets, artillery and mortar shells, and grenades.¹⁶

Since South Sudan's independence, new conflicts in Abyei and in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states have resulted in increased UXO contamination in Sudan.¹⁷ The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database does not hold data on contamination in Abyei due to persistent conflict and restrictions on access.¹⁸

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and NMAC manage Sudan's mine action programme. In 2005, UN Security Council Resolution 1590 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement established the legal framework for UNMAO to manage quality assurance (QA) of all mine action activities in Sudan in the frame of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).¹⁹ The same year, the NMAC initiated a partnership with UNMAO, the NMAA was set up, and a National Mine Action Policy Framework was developed, revised, and then approved in 2006.²⁰

Following UNMIS and UNMAO's closure in July 2011 upon the independence of South Sudan, NMAC assumed full ownership of national mine action with responsibility for coordinating all mine clearance, including accreditation and certification of mine clearance agencies. In January 2015, UNMAS, which had opened an emergency programme in Sudan in 2002, reassumed its lead in UN mine action efforts in Sudan and its role in providing assistance and technical support to NMAC, after a one-year handover to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in 2014.²¹

In Darfur, under the umbrella of UNAMID, UNMAS works under the name of the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) in direct support of UNAMID priorities.²² In 2017, Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML), a commercial company, was awarded a new UN contract for the Fiscal Year 2017–18 to conduct ERW rapid-response clearance and to provide mentoring support to national Multi-Task Teams (MTTs) in Darfur.²³ In 2012–15, commercial operator The Development Initiative (TDI) was contracted by UNAMID to assess, survey, identify, mark, and clear contamination in all five Darfur states.²⁴ Mine action in Darfur is funded through assessed peacekeeping funds for UNAMID.²⁵

Strategic Planning

In April 2016, Sudan submitted an updated multi-year National Mine Action Plan for 2016–19 in order to meet its obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. The plan does not specifically address CMR. Gadaref state was declared mine and ERW free in May 2016, and according to the plan, when security permits, work will start in South Kordofan and the remainder of Blue Nile, with the aim of completing mine clearance in Blue Nile by December 2017 and South Kordofan by April 2019.²⁶

Standards

In May 2015, NMAC stated that a review of National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) was ongoing and that a new version would be published on its website after their approval.²⁷ In June 2017, NMAC reported that the process of reviewing the NMAS was in its final stages.²⁸ According to NMAC, draft standards are shared with all partners and mine action operators during their accreditation process, but do not contain a specific chapter on cluster munitions.²⁹

Operators

In 2016, no international non-governmental organisation (NGO) was demining in Sudan. Commercial operator DML contracted to clear ERW in Darfur and to provide support for national MTTs, deployed two seven-person rapid response teams and a mentoring capacity of six persons, with a total staff of 29 personnel.³⁰

Since 2015, NMAC has made repeated calls for other international NGO operators to undertake mine action in Sudan.³¹ Previously, two international demining NGOs with programmes in Sudan closed down operations owing to government restrictions that impeded their operations.³² DanChurchAid (DCA) ended its operations in 2012.³³ In June 2012, the Sudanese government's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) ordered Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and six other NGOs that provided humanitarian aid to leave Gadaref, Kassala, and Red Sea states in eastern Sudan.³⁴ Following months of negotiations with HAC and donors, MAG ended its operations in Sudan, leaving in early 2013.³⁵

National demining operators are JASMAR for Human Security, National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD), and FPDO. In 2016, a total of nine MTTs, five manual clearance teams (MCTs), two mine detection dog (MDD) teams, four Mine Action Teams, and one integrated MineWolf team were deployed for mine action operations.³⁶ This was a significant increase from 2015, when a total of six MCTs and one MDD team were deployed.³⁷

Quality Management

NMAC reported that its quality management section regularly monitors all field operations and that 18 monitoring visits and four accreditation visits were carried out in 2016.³⁸ UNAMID confirmed that in addition to its internal quality assurance (QA) procedures, external QA for DML's operations in Darfur was carried out jointly by UNMAS and NMAC during the year.³⁹

Information Management

In March 2017, NMAC's national IMSMA database was upgraded to the latest version of IMSMA software, with the assistance of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).⁴⁰ As at June 2017, NMAC reported that database clean-up was ongoing.⁴¹ Previously, the IMSMA geographic information system (GIS) function had been subject to United States (US) import restrictions.⁴² The embargo issue was finally resolved in 2016 with the support of the US Embassy in Khartoum and the GICHD.⁴³ The database does not contain information on the disputed Abyei area.⁴⁴

LAND RELEASE

NMAC reported that no CMR specific survey or clearance took place in 2016.⁴⁵ NMAC does not distinguish between different types of ERW in its reporting on clearance and is unable to confirm how much land was cleared of CMR since it was established in 2011, nor how many submunitions were destroyed. In May–June 2017, however, NMAC reported that seven areas containing CMR contamination had been cleared in 2011–13.⁴⁶

ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

Sudan is neither a state party nor a signatory to the CCM and therefore does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4. Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible. In May 2017, NMAC informed Mine Action Review that Sudan was “with the spirit of the Convention on Cluster Munitions” and that the national authorities were aware of the convention and Sudan’s current status as not yet having joined.⁴⁷

In 2016, NMAC stated that a number of international NGOs had expressed an interest in working in Sudan, which it said would further strengthen national capacity and deliver standardised quality of survey and clearance activities.⁴⁸ However, ongoing conflict and reports of new contamination, along with a lack of any recent data or records of CMR contamination disaggregated from UXO, make it extremely difficult to estimate when Sudan could complete CMR survey and clearance.

In February 2017, UNMAS reported that Sudan was on track to complete clearance of mine and ERW contamination in Red Sea and Kassala states in 2017. Ongoing peace talks and the possibility of a six-month extension to the ceasefire in South Kordofan and

Blue Nile states could allow for the start of clearance activities, it said.⁴⁹ On 24 April 2017, Forobaranga, in West Darfur, became the first locality in the Darfur region to be declared free of ERW, after nine years of clearance, and sometimes re-clearance, of the area. A pilot survey aimed at addressing any potential residual ERW was also launched.⁵⁰

The Government of Sudan contributed US\$2 million to mine action operations in 2016.⁵¹ In May 2016, NMAC reported funding for the mine action programme had become a key item within the Sudanese national budget, and in June 2017, it stated that the Government had promised to fund the programme with a further US\$2 million in 2017.⁵²

In January 2016, Italy donated €250,000 to UNMAS for mine action in Sudan for a survey, clearance, and risk education project in Kassala state.⁵³ In March 2016, Japan contributed US\$2.1 million to UNMAS to survey and clear mines and explosive hazards in Kassala, Red Sea, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile states, in coordination with NMAC. UNMAS expected release of more than 1.5km² of hazardous area as a result of the donation.⁵⁴

1 See Cluster Muniton Monitor, “Country Profile: Sudan: Cluster Muniton Ban Policy”, updated 23 August 2014; Human Rights Watch, “Under Siege: Indiscriminate Bombing and Abuses in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States”, 6 December 2012; “Unexploded Ordnance Kill 13 People in South Kordofan”, All Africa, 10 August 2013; and UN, “UNMAS Annual Report 2012”, New York, August 2013, p. 10.

2 Email from Ali Abd Allatif Ibrahim, Chief of Operations, NMAC, 18 May 2017.

3 Email from Dandan Xu, Associate Programme Management Officer, UNMAS, 12 July 2017.

4 The locations are based on a review of sites in the UNMAO database by Mine Action Review.

5 Email from Mohamed Kabir, Chief Information Officer, UNMAO, 27 June 2011.

6 Emails from Hatim Khamis Rahama, Technical Advisor, NMAC, 14 June 2017; and Ali Abd Allatif Ibrahim, NMAC, 18 May 2017. NMAC previously reported in June 2016, however, that no CMR-contaminated areas were “recorded as remaining hazards to be cleared” and that no separate survey or clearance operations for CMR occurred in 2015 and stated that no cluster munitions had been found in all mine action activities “to date”. Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, Chief of Operations, NMAC, 8 June 2016.

7 Email from Ali Abd Allatif Ibrahim, NMAC, 18 May 2017.

8 V. Wiebe and T. Peachey, “Clusters of Death: The Mennonite Central Committee Cluster Bomb Report”, Chapter 4, July 2000; Handicap International, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities, May 2007, p. 55; and Cluster Muniton Monitor, “Country Profile: Sudan: Cluster Muniton Ban Policy”, updated 23 August 2014. See also UNMAS, “Reported use of Cluster Munitions South Sudan February 2014”, 12 February 2014; and UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report”, 8 May 2014, p. 26, at: <http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Portals/unmiss/Human Rights Reports/UNMISS Conflict in South Sudan - A Human Rights Report.pdf>.

9 See Cluster Muniton Monitor, “Country Profile: Sudan: Cluster Muniton Ban Policy”, updated 23 August 2014. In 2012, use of cluster munitions was alleged in Troji and Ongolo villages, in South Kordofan, in February and April. In 2015, Human Rights Watch published evidence that Sudanese government forces used RBK-500 cluster munitions in attacks on villages in Delami and Um Durein counties in South Kordofan’s Nuba mountains in February and March. In May 2015, the Sudanese Air Force was reported to have used cluster bombs, whose submunitions failed to explode as intended, in an attack on the town of Kauda in South Kordofan. The munitions used in all of the attacks contained AO-2.5 RT submunitions.

10 “Report of the Panel of Experts on Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)”, UN doc. S/2014/87, 11 February 2014, pp. 23 and 91; and “Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur”, UN doc. S/2015/378, 26 May 2015, p. 12.

11 “Sudan denies use of cluster bombs”, United Press International, 28 May 2012; and “Sudan denies using cluster bombs in South Kordofan”, World Bulletin, 17 April 2015, at: <http://www.worldbulletin.net/world/158004/sudan-denies-using-cluster-bombs-in-sth-kordofan>.

12 UN Security Council Resolution 2228 (2015); and UN, “Prioritizing Civilian Protection, Drawdown Benchmarks, Security Council Adopts Resolution 2228 (2015) Renewing Mandate of Darfur Mission until 30 June 2016”, Press release SC/11951, 29 June 2015, at: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11951.doc.htm>.

13 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 8 June 2016.

14 UNAMID, “Milestone Achieved in Clearance of Explosive Remnants of War in West Darfur”, Press release, 27 April 2017, at: <https://unamid.unmissions.org/milestone-achieved-clearance-explosive-remnants-war-west-darfur>.

15 NMAC, “IMSMA Monthly Report”, March 2017; and UNMAS, “UNMAS in Sudan”, January 2017, at: <http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/sudan>.

16 UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Darfur”, February 2016, at: <http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/darfur>.

17 Human Rights Watch, “Under Siege: Indiscriminate Bombing and Abuses in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States”, 6 December 2012; “Unexploded Ordnance Kill 13 People in South Kordofan”, All Africa, 10 August 2013; and UN, “UNMAS Annual Report 2012”, New York, August 2013, p. 10.

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- 18 UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Sudan", at: http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/print/country_portfolio7029-1530-80354.pdf; and email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNDP, 11 May 2015.
- 19 Revised Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 6.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Email from Javed Habibulhaq, Programme Manager, UNMAS, 13 June 2016.
- 22 UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Sudan", at: http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/print/country_portfolio7029-1530-80354.pdf.
- 23 Email from Dandan Xu, UNMAS, 12 July 2017.
- 24 UNMAS, "About UNMAS in Sudan", updated August 2014.
- 25 UNMAS, "About UNMAS in Sudan", updated January 2016, at: <http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/sudan>.
- 26 NMAC, "Updated Work Plan to Meet Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Article Five Extended Deadline by April 2019", 29 April 2016, at: <https://www.apminebanconvention.org/states-parties-to-the-convention/sudan/>.
- 27 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form A, p. 12.
- 28 Email from Ali Abd Allatif Ibrahim, NMAC, 4 June 2017.
- 29 Emails from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May and 8 June 2016.
- 30 Email from Jeffrey McMurdo, UNAMID, 14 June 2017.
- 31 Article 7 Report (for 2016), p. 22; NMAC, "Updated Work Plan to Meet Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Article Five Extended Deadline by April 2019", 29 April 2016, at: <https://www.apminebanconvention.org/states-parties-to-the-convention/sudan/>; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form A, p. 16.
- 32 ICBL, "ICBL Comments on Sudan's Article 5 Extension Request", May 2013.
- 33 DCA, "Previous Programmes: Sudan", undated, at: <http://www.danchurchaid.org/what-we-do/mine-action/previous-programmes>.
- 34 "Sudan causes frustration among NGOs", *News 24*, 13 June 2012.
- 35 MAG, "MAG departs Sudan after six years of work to remove remnants of conflict", 7 March 2013.
- 36 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 14 June 2017.
- 37 Emails from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016; and Javed Habibulhaq, UNDP, 11 May 2015.
- 38 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 14 June 2017.
- 39 Email from Jeffrey McMurdo, UNAMID, 14 June 2017.
- 40 NMAC, "IMSMA Monthly Report", March 2017.
- 41 Email from Ali Abd Allatif Ibrahim, NMAC, 4 June 2017.
- 42 Interview with Javed Habibulhaq, UNDP, in London, 25 February 2015.
- 43 Email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNMAS, 2 June 2016.
- 44 Email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNDP, 11 May 2015.
- 45 Email from Ali Abd Allatif Ibrahim, NMAC, 18 May 2017.
- 46 Emails from Ali Abd Allatif Ibrahim, NMAC, 18 May 2017; and Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 14 June 2017.
- 47 Email from Ali Abd Allatif Ibrahim, NMAC, 18 May 2017.
- 48 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.
- 49 Presentation by Javed Habibulhaq, UNMAS, 20th Meeting of National Mine Action Director and United Nations Advisers, Geneva, 9 February 2017. Notes by Mine Action Review.
- 50 UNAMID, "Milestone Achieved in Clearance of Explosive Remnants of War in West Darfur", Press release, 27 April 2017.
- 51 Email from Ali Abd Allatif Ibrahim, NMAC, 4 June 2017; and UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Sudan".
- 52 Emails from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016; and Ali Abd Allatif Ibrahim, NMAC, 4 June 2017.
- 53 UNMAS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Sudan, Italian Development Cooperation Agency Section of the Embassy of Italy in Khartoum joint Press Release, "Italy Contributes to UN Mine Action Work in Sudan", Khartoum, 21 January 2016.
- 54 UNMAS, Embassy of Japan in Khartoum, and Government of Sudan joint Press Release, "Japan Contributes to UN Mine Action Work in Sudan Enabling Clearance, Risk Education and Victim Assistance Work", Khartoum, 3 March 2016.