

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012
NEW EXTENDED DEADLINE NEEDED

KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:


EXTENT UNKNOWN

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2019

0 KM²

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2019

**NOT
REPORTED**



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Oslo Political Plan commitment): **LOW**

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Nigeria informed States Parties in May 2019 that non-technical survey and clearance of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) would start "as soon as security conditions permit". Continuing deterioration in security obstructed fulfilment of that objective but Nigeria declared its intention to submit an Article 7 report and an application for a new Article 5 deadline. As at 1 October 2020, it had done neither.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Nigeria should expedite preparation and submission of a request for a new Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline.
- Nigeria should urgently implement its stated intention of developing a national strategy harnessing the resources of security forces and humanitarian organisations to clear anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature.
- Nigeria should establish a national mine action authority to set policy and coordinate implementation of a national mine action strategy.
- Nigeria should encourage and facilitate the provision of assistance and expertise from humanitarian demining organisations and continue to provide risk education to the civilian population.
- Nigeria should submit an Article 7 report to inform States Parties to the APMBC of the discovery of any contamination from anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature, and report on the location of all mined areas.

DEMINING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No national mine action authority or mine action centre

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army, police

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Demining Group (DDG)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Nigeria experiences heavy casualties from widespread use of IEDs, including improvised mines, by Boko Haram and other jihadist groups in the north eastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The extent of contamination is not known.

Deteriorating security has prevented systematic survey of contamination and there is no record kept of hazardous areas. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) recorded 140 incidents involving explosive devices placed on roads in Nigeria in 2019, of which 67 detonated. UNMAS determined that at least 103 of these devices were victim activated, including by pressure plates. The few pressure-plate devices that were inspected were capable of being detonated by the weight of a person, meaning that they are covered by the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).¹

The findings were consistent with the results of a scoping mission by UNMAS to assess explosive threats in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states in 2017. It noted widespread use of pressure-plate devices along the main supply routes which were configured to detonate from the weight of a person and function as very large anti-personnel mines.² Borno state was the most severely impacted. Civilians reported the presence of victim-activated devices in 76% of Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Borno; 59% of LGAs in Yobe; and 52% of LGAs in Adamawa.³

Improvised devices, whether body-borne, vehicle-borne, command-detonated, or victim-activated, continue to pose the main explosive threat. UNMAS determined there was no evidence of the use of industrially manufactured anti-personnel mines.⁴ Boko Haram and other armed groups emplace improvised mines and other devices on an ad hoc basis particularly targeting key roads such as the Maiduguri-Konduga-Bama axis and the Bama-Banki or Bama-Pulka-Gwoza roads as well as some villages and water points.⁵ An explosive ordnance incident map has been compiled by national and international organisations outlines the area of conflict but insecurity has prevented any comprehensive non-technical survey.

The United Nations said 230 people were killed and more than 300 injured by improvised devices in north-east Nigeria in 2019.⁶

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Nigeria does not have a formal mine action programme. The Nigerian army and police conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations coordinated by the Theatre Commander to respond to operational priorities. The army's clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW) is primarily focused on facilitating military operations and clearing roads and areas to facilitate access for troops to carry out attacks on Boko Haram and keep military supply routes open.⁷ The army and the police also respond frequently to civilians' request for ERW clearance when they report presence of explosive ordnance and some road clearance is conducted to facilitate civilian traffic.⁸ The police have seconded units to the military to conduct clearance in newly-secured areas and deployed EOD teams to Maiduguri and a number of other towns.⁹

Nigeria stated at the Oslo Conference in November 2019 that it had formed an inter-ministerial committee to develop a mine action strategy and prepare a work plan for survey and clearance in the north-east. The committee includes the ministries of Defence and Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management as well as the North-East Development Commission, the National Emergency Management Agency and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs.¹⁰

The humanitarian response programme for the north-east has a Mine Action Sub-sector co-chaired by the Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement and UNMAS. At the request of the UN humanitarian coordinator, in July 2018 UNMAS deployed a team to Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, to provide planning, coordination and technical advice notably to support plans for return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and for the delivery of risk education, survey, and clearance.¹¹ UNMAS expected to recruit additional staff in 2020 to support new projects.¹²

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Nigeria, lacking a mine action programme, has not taken up gender in the context of mine action.

The UN humanitarian response programme for 2019–21 unveiled in December 2018 said women, girls, boys, and men living in, or potentially returning to, areas suspected or known to be contaminated with mines or other explosive devices would be involved in all stages of mine action programming. It called for "age and gender appropriate risk education activities to minimize loss of life and injuries as a result of explosive remnants of war", targeting 200,000 girls, 178,000 boys, 51,000 women, and 45,000 men.¹³

International organisations are said to be gender sensitive. UNMAS's seven-person team in Nigeria comprises five women and two men.¹⁴ Danish Demining Group (DDG) has a woman specialist leading its explosive ordnance risk education teams which has four women staff, and it has three female officers employed on non-technical survey and community liaison who also consult women and children in the community.¹⁵ Mines Advisory Group (MAG) employed a woman as operations manager in Maiduguri overseeing operations in the north-east of the country and its community liaison teams comprised one man and one woman. They also included one Hausa speaker and one Kanuri speaker and, where possible, one Muslim and one Christian to try to reach all parts of the community in the north-east.¹⁶

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Nigeria does not have a mine action information management system and does not keep any database recording hazardous areas or explosive incidents.

MAG has maintained a database of different incidents related to mines and other explosive ordnance for several years, as well as collecting information on casualties.¹⁷ UNMAS said it also started to collect data on explosive incidents in 2018 and had developed a methodology to assess which explosive ordnance fall under the APMBC based on available information and field visits. Information was gathered mainly from open sources, including the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), as well as security information provided by the UN, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and the Multinational Joint Task Force. Information was also provided by the Nigerian army and police EOD units, but not on a systematic basis.¹⁸

Nigeria last submitted an Article 7 report in 2012. It informed the Oslo Review Conference that it intended to provide an Article 7 report in 2020 but as at 1 October had not done so.¹⁹

UNMAS worked on standardising reporting and information management in consultation with MAG and DDG.²⁰ DDG and MAG share information with UNMAS on a monthly basis using agreed reporting forms.²¹ MAG reported that some non-technical survey outcomes were submitted to the Mine Action sub-Working Group.²²

PLANNING AND TASKING

Nigeria does not have an institutional framework for mine action, a strategic plan, or annual work plans for the humanitarian organisations responding to emergency needs in the north-east.

The UN humanitarian response programme for 2020 determined that 1.5 million people were in need of mine action support²³ and the multi-year strategy for 2019–21²⁴ provided for mine action activities focusing on:

- Risk education on the dangers posed by explosive threats, with the aim of reducing the risk to a level where people can live safely. Priority locations were identified and divided between mine action organisations.
- Non-technical surveys to collect and analyse data on the presence, type, and level of contamination, in order to support land release and the prioritisation of any subsequent clearance; and
- Clearance of contaminated areas.

In the absence of a national authority, DDG developed an intervention plan based on information such as reported explosive ordnance incidents and casualties and security updates.²⁵ MAG determined its activities prioritising communities most at risk and conducting some surveys at the request of stakeholders. MAG coordinated its activities and operational areas with the Mine Action sub-Working Group.²⁶

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Nigeria has no national mine action standards. UNMAS was working on preparation of mine action standards as of 2020.²⁷ In the meantime, international organisations reported following their own technical standards and standing operating procedures.²⁸

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

All clearance is conducted by the Nigerian army and police with support from paramilitary groups. UNMAS developed a project to be implemented in 2020 to provide police EOD training, including victim-activated devices.²⁹

DDG, with five international and twenty-five national staff, deployed two teams in Borno state and one team in Adamawa, conducting non-technical surveys that are based on community liaison assessments as well as explosive ordnance risk education and EOD training for police bomb squad teams. Non-technical survey teams worked in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states. In addition to its mine action work it runs an armed violence reduction programme.³⁰

MAG has worked in Nigeria since 2016, initially in arms management and destruction. In 2017, it opened an office in Maiduguri and started providing risk education to the internally displaced, refugees, and host communities affected by the conflict. In 2019, MAG worked with five international and thirty national staff conducting non-technical survey and contamination baseline assessments as well as delivering risk education in camps for the internally displaced and training in explosive ordnance awareness to aid workers, government personnel, teachers, and other service providers.³¹

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

SURVEY IN 2019


MAG community liaison teams, funded through UNMAS, carried out 20 local non-technical surveys and six explosive ordnance assessments, mainly in secured urban areas in Borno state focusing on areas designated for the creation or expansion of IDP camps.³² DDG's survey teams identified three confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in Adamawa state's Betso community but mostly recorded spot tasks.³³

CLEARANCE IN 2019

Nigeria has no record of results of clearance by security forces.

Priorities include clearing areas to support resettlement of IDPs and keep open communications. To counter the regular mining of roads, security forces are checking and clearing some roads on a daily basis as well as spot clearance of devices reported by humanitarian agencies and communities.³⁴

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Nigeria's original Article 5 deadline, Nigeria was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2012. At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in November 2011, Nigeria declared it had cleared all known anti-personnel mines from its territory.³⁵

Under the Convention's agreed framework, in the event mined areas are discovered after the expiry of a State Party's Article 5 clearance deadline, it should immediately inform all other States Parties of this discovery and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines as soon as possible.

Nigeria has acknowledged it has contamination by victim-activated mines of an improvised nature that meet the APMBC's definition of anti-personnel mines and informed the Oslo Review Conference in November 2019 that it would prepare an Article 5 extension request with a view to completing its treaty obligations by 2025.³⁶ The Ministry of Defence informed a meeting in July 2020 it would first submit a general request to be followed by a detailed request that it would submit not later than 31 March 2021.³⁷ Nigeria had yet to submit its Article 5 extension request as at 1 October 2020.

- 1 Emails from Lionel Pechera, Programme Coordinator, UNMAS, Nigeria, 11 March and 20 July 2020.
- 2 UNMAS, "Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria 3 to 14 April 2017", p. 3.
- 3 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June 2019.
- 4 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 11 March 2020.
- 5 See, e.g., "Six killed in Nigeria by land mine planted by suspected jihadists", Agence France-Presse, 27 September 2019.
- 6 "Landmines, improvised devices pose deadly risks for displaced in Sahel and Lake Chad", Press release, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 28 July 2020.
- 7 DDG, "Mine Action Assessment: Northeastern Nigeria (Adamawa and Borno States) 1-15 November 2015".
- 8 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 20 July 2020.
- 9 UNMAS, "Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria 3 to 14 April 2017", p. 5.
- 10 Statement of Nigeria to the Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 28 November 2019.
- 11 Emails from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June and 17 July 2019.
- 12 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 11 March 2020.
- 13 UN, "Humanitarian Response Strategy January 2019 - December 2021", December 2018, pp. 43, 48.
- 14 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 20 July 2020.
- 15 Email from Christopher Evans Agutu, Armed Violence Reduction Programme Manager, DDG, 27 July 2020.
- 16 Email from Pierluigi Candier, Programme Manager, MAG, 8 May 2020.
- 17 Emails from Nina Seecharan, MAG, 9 July 2019; and Llewelyn Jones, Director of Programmes, MAG, 7 September 2020.
- 18 Emails from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June and 17 July 2019, and 20 July 2020.
- 19 Statement of Nigeria, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 28 November 2019.
- 20 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 11 March 2020.
- 21 Emails from Christopher Evans Agutu, DDG, 27 July 2020; and Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 7 September 2020.
- 22 Email from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 8 May 2020.
- 23 Emails from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 20 July 2020.
- 24 UN, "Humanitarian Response Strategy January 2019-December 2021", December 2018, pp. 43, 48.
- 25 Email from Christopher Evans Agutu, DDG, 27 July 2020.
- 26 Email from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 8 May 2020.
- 27 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 20 July 2020.
- 28 Emails from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 8 May 2020; and Christopher Evans Agutu, DDG, 27 July 2020.
- 29 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 11 March 2020.
- 30 Email from Christopher Evans Agutu, DDG, 27 July 2020.
- 31 Email from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 8 May 2020.
- 32 Emails from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 8 May 2020 and Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 11 March 2020.
- 33 Email from Christopher Evans Agutu, DDG, 27 July 2020.
- 34 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 11 March 2020; A. Haruna, "Military reopens Maiduguri-Bama-Banki road held by Boko Haram for years", Premium Times, 24 March 2018, at: bit.ly/2GhEZgq; A. Haruna, "How Bama IDPs will return home - Gov. Shettima", Premium Times, 30 March 2018, at: bit.ly/30IBLKD.
- 35 Statement of Nigeria, APMBC 11th Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 2011.
- 36 Statement of Nigeria, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 28 November 2019.
- 37 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS 20 July 2020.