

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- South Sudan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in line with the decision taken by the Council of Ministers announced in September 2017.
- South Sudan should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants (CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
- South Sudan should increase its financial support for mine action operations. Greater assistance from the government and international partners should be provided to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) to strengthen its capacity to develop and implement effective policies to address explosive ordnance.
- South Sudan should develop its resource mobilisation strategy and initiate dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action, including to address CMR.

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2020, South Sudan had 128 hazardous areas covering a total size estimated at just under 5.8km² contaminated with CMR, of which 5.1km² was confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and 0.7km² was suspected hazardous area (SHA).¹ Eight of South Sudan's ten states have areas

suspected to contain CMR (see Table 1), with Central and Eastern Equatoria remaining the most heavily contaminated. This is a substantial decrease from the 6.4km² across 141 hazardous areas confirmed or suspected to be contaminated with CMR at the end of 2019.²

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by state (at end 2020)³

State	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total CHAs/SHAs	Total area (m ²)
Central Equatoria	38	1,947,891	2	489,856	40	2,437,747
Eastern Equatoria	65	2,800,339	0	0	65	2,800,339
Jonglei	4	55,458	2	0	6	55,458
Lakes	1	58,040	0	0	1	58,040
Upper Nile	4	123,067	0	0	4	123,067
Warrap	1	19,745	0	0	1	19,745
Western Bahr El Ghazal	1	60,952	0	0	1	60,952
Western Equatoria	9	48,680	1	175,698	10	224,378
Totals	123	5,114,172	5	665,554	128	5,779,726

In 2017, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) initiated a review of the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and subsequently initiated targeted re-survey aimed at better defining the estimated size of SHAs. Nine areas previously suspected to be CMR-contaminated were re-surveyed and cancelled in 2020.⁴

South Sudan's national mine action programme has greatly improved the accuracy of estimates of explosive ordnance contamination. The total estimate of mine, CMR, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination remaining in the country decreased from nearly 89km² at the end of 2017 to 18.8km² at the end of 2020.⁵ Despite continued land release, however, CMR contamination has increased over

that time as a review of existing records in the database and re-survey resulted in three main changes that have proved especially significant with regard to CMR contamination: a number of existing task records had been wrongly recorded and were re-classified as CMR-contaminated areas; several overly conservative estimates of existing CHAs in the database were increased to better reflect the actual extent of contamination; and previously unrecorded areas containing CMR were added to the database.⁶

While it is understood that there are 128 hazardous areas across South Sudan, historically the size of these areas, or cluster munition strike sites, has been underestimated with analysis of previous clearance suggesting that the average task size is around 70,000m² (often reflecting multiple strikes). It is likely therefore that the current projection of CMR contamination underestimates the scale of the problem.⁷ It is also thought that, as refugees start to return, they will encounter previously unrecorded submunitions as the areas with the highest levels of contamination, especially in Central and Eastern Equatoria, are sparsely populated.⁸

In 2020, 13 hazardous areas covering a total of 216,297m² of previously unrecorded CMR contamination were added to South Sudan's mine action information management database.⁹ In addition, there was an expansion by 1,461,056m² of existing hazardous areas. These had been recorded in the database but the estimates of size were overly conservative and so were increased to better reflect the expected extent of contamination.¹⁰

Cluster munitions were used during the decade-long war between Sudan and the SPLA/M that ended in 2005. From 1995 to 2000, prior to South Sudan's independence, Sudanese government forces are believed to have air dropped cluster munitions sporadically in southern Sudan.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

South Sudan has a significant problem with mines and especially ERW, resulting from large-scale use of explosive weapons during armed conflicts in 1955–72 and 1983–2005 (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines 2021* report on South Sudan for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA)–since renamed the South Sudan National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)–was established by presidential decree in 2006 to act as the national agency for planning, coordination, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.¹¹ There is no national mine action legislation in place.¹²

In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening the capacity of the NMAA. UNMAS and the NMAA have been overseeing mine action across the country through UNMAS's main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau. Together, UNMAS and the NMAA accredit, task, monitor, and evaluate mine action organisations; conduct route verification and clearance; provide escorts for convoys on high-threat routes to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and collect data and map hazardous areas.¹³

While it is planned that the NMAA will eventually assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, according to UNMAS the NMAA continued to face serious financial and technical limitations preventing it from doing so effectively.¹⁴ It requires substantial resources and capacity building assistance if it is to manage the mine action programme.¹⁵ UNMAS continued with capacity development of the NMAA during 2020 as NMAA officers were supported in conducting joint quality assurance (QA) visits with UNMAS during which each individual received "on the job training" and was assessed. Two NMAA officers also received sustained training in operations management, which was due to end in 2021. A resource mobilisation strategy is under development and there are plans to deploy one operational team from the NMAA to conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) to manage residual contamination.¹⁶

In 2020, UNMAS and Danish Demining Group (DDG) were the co-coordinators of the mine action sub-cluster with Mines Advisory Group (MAG) replacing DDG in March 2021.¹⁷ The sub-cluster coordinates with the national- and state-level Inter-Cluster Working Groups. This enables information to be shared on mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO); for UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to inform mine action actors about their own priority locations for clearance; and for information to be integrated into the annual Humanitarian Needs Overview and Humanitarian Response Plan.¹⁸

In 2020, the Government of South Sudan funded the costs of NMAA staff salaries and its sub-offices across the country, in Malakal, Wau, and Yei. As at April 2021, use of the Yei office continued to be suspended due to the security situation.¹⁹ The NMAA did not, however, provide any funding for survey or clearance. The government's total support was reported as US\$75,000 for the year.²⁰

In South Sudan's revised 2020 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request, completing all mine clearance by July 2026 was estimated to cost US\$148 million.²¹ In 2020, South Sudan received more than US\$40 million for mine action which exceeds the costs needed if current levels of support are maintained. It is worth noting, however, that much of the funding received by UNMAS, which on average has contributed around 75% of all sector funding, is used to support the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).²² The NMAA has requested international funding and technical support for clearance of cluster munitions and for training on residual contamination capacity from 2022 to 2024.²³

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

South Sudan's second national mine action strategy for 2018–22 includes a section on gender, focusing on how different gender and age groups are affected by mines and ERW and have specific and varying needs and priorities. Guidelines on mainstreaming gender considerations in mine action planning and operations in South Sudan are also incorporated in the strategy, including on the collection of data disaggregated by sex and age.²⁴ UNMAS reported that the programme was also implementing the UN Gender Guidelines for Mine Action, monitored by a gender focal point.²⁵

South Sudan's National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) contain provisions requiring all community liaison teams to tailor activities on the basis of the gendered needs of beneficiaries, and to address the specific risks faced by women and girls.²⁶ All teams are reportedly gender balanced in composition and trained to be inclusive, for example by ensuring outreach through non-technical survey and risk education is done separately for different age and gender groups, and taking local cultural practices into consideration.²⁷ At the same time, UNMAS reported that task prioritisation was predominantly dependent on security and that resources were concentrated on tasks within limited geographical areas rather than on the basis of gender needs.²⁸ Ethnic identity is taken into account within survey and clearance teams to ensure safe access and acceptance by the respective local communities.²⁹

In 2019–20, UNMAS was providing workshops for the NMAA and mine action partners on gender equality, gender-based violence (GBV), and gender mainstreaming programming in mine action with the aim of GBV prevention practices being mainstreamed in mine action and there being equal opportunity in decision making regardless of gender.³⁰ As at April 2021, these had not yet happened due to COVID-19 and the related restrictions.³¹

UNMAS has said that in theory there are equal employment opportunities for qualified men and women in survey and clearance teams across the organisations operating in South Sudan. However, redressing the gender balance is a long-term challenge and is dependent on whether new

vacancies arise.³² As part of its initiatives to recruit female deminers UNMAS's implementing partner SafeLane Global conducted a basic demining training course in the first quarter of 2021 where 20% of the candidates were female.³³ In 2020, only 7% of staff in operational roles were women, and were only 5% of managerial or supervisory positions among international staff positions, with no female occupying a managerial position among the national staff. This was unchanged from 2019.³⁴

All of the community liaison teams within MAG are mixed gender and the organisation reports that it consults with all affected community members, including women and children. MAG also holds women-only focus groups to ensure that their voices are heard. MAG also aims to recruit team members from the more than 60 ethnic groups within South Sudan and tries to ensure that at least one team member speaks the local language of the planned area of deployment. As at May 2021, two international staff members who hold managerial positions within MAG were female as were four national staff. Within survey and clearance operations there were three female community liaison personnel out of six in total and 20 deminers. In 2021, MAG held its second basic deminer course for women with 16 women graduating who will become part of MAG's demining teams. MAG has noticed that communities very often nominate men as community focal points and MAG has worked with community representatives to increase the number of female and youth community focal points. In 2020 and 2021, MAG trained 39 men, 15 boys, 44 women, and 5 girls as community focal points.³⁵

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

A comprehensive review of all data in South Sudan's IMSMA database began in 2018, along with re-survey of recorded SHAs and CHAs thought to be exaggerated or erroneously recorded. Through the database review it was found that past efforts to upgrade the IMSMA software package had led to serious data loss, which inhibited efforts to present an accurate record of the history of mine action in South Sudan. The ongoing database review has, though, resulted in significant gains in the understanding of mine and ERW contamination. UNMAS informed Mine Action Review that, wherever possible, the database disaggregates mined areas, CMR-contaminated areas, and other ERW-contaminated areas, including spot tasks.³⁶

As previously mentioned, a review of existing records in the database and re-survey resulted in three main changes that have proved especially significant with regard to CMR contamination: a number of existing task records had been wrongly recorded and were re-classified as CMR-contaminated areas; several overly conservative estimates of the size of existing CHAs in the database were increased to better reflect the actual extent of contamination; and previously unrecorded areas containing CMR were added to the database.³⁷

South Sudan submitted a voluntary CCM Article 7 report for the first time in 2020, despite not having yet acceded to the Convention. South Sudan submitted its second voluntary Article 7 report in April 2021.

PLANNING AND TASKING

South Sudan's most recent National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2022, developed with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and using funding from Japan, was officially launched in September 2018.³⁸

According to UNMAS, the strategy has three strategic goals with related targets:³⁹

Goal 1: Advocacy and communication of South Sudan's mine/ERW problem continues through national and international awareness-raising and adoption and implementation of international conventions to facilitate a mine-/ERW-free South Sudan.

Goal 2: The extent of mine/ERW contamination is clarified and confirmed and the problem addressed through appropriate survey and clearance, ensuring safe land is handed back to affected communities for use.

Goal 3: Safe behaviour is promoted among women, girls, boys, and men to reduce mine/ERW accidents and promote safe livelihood activities.

A mid-term strategic review of South Sudan's national strategy was conducted in January 2020 supported by the GICHD. National and international stakeholders were brought together in Juba to determine progress, discuss challenges, and identify the best way forward.⁴⁰ The results of the

review were considered when elaborating the operational clearance plan for 2020–21 by adopting a pragmatic approach to prioritisation and focusing on efficient deployment of resources. The operational focus for 2020–21 was primarily on road clearance, with a view to create safe access and facilitate freedom of movement, along with clearance of CMR and large anti-personnel mined areas for the benefit of returnees.⁴¹

In its revised 2020 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request South Sudan presents a work plan through to 2026, disaggregated by region. South Sudan estimates that the clearance requirement for CMR and for battle area clearance (BAC) is 168 tasks covering just under 7.7km². CMR clearance teams using manual clearance drills are expected to clear 1,000m² per team per day equating to 176,000m² per year, while mechanically supported teams are expected

to clear 2,000m² per day or 352,000m² per team per year. This calculation includes the assumption that one month of productivity each year will be lost due to factors such as COVID-19, insecurity, and travel time.⁴²

According to its revised 2020 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, South Sudan intends to address all contamination from anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, CMR, and other ERW by its requested 2026 APMBC Article 5 deadline. To that end, aside from those tasks where specific humanitarian interventions are planned, the intention is to be pragmatic in the sequencing of tasks and to deploy clearance teams through a prioritisation process that aims to balance security, logistical requirements, and concentration of effort. South Sudan believes that this combination will lead to the most efficient clearance that allows for optimal monitoring of clearance efforts.⁴³

Table 2: Planned mechanical and manual clearance of CMR- and UXO-contaminated area (2021–25)⁴⁴

Year	No. of teams	Area cleared (m ²)	Area remaining (m ²)	Tasks remaining
2021	8 manual 2 mechanical	1,232,000 manual 616,000 mechanical	5,839,872	123
2022	7 manual 2 mechanical	1,078,000 manual 616,000 mechanical	4,145,872	81
2023	7 manual 2 mechanical	1,078,000 manual 616,000 mechanical	1,829,471	44
2024	7 manual 2 mechanical	1,078,000 manual 616,000 mechanical	245,471	7
2025	7 Manual	792,000 manual	0	0

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

South Sudan's National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs), which outline the technical requirements expected of all demining operators working in South Sudan, are adapted from the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The NTSGs are annually reviewed and revised by UNMAS and the implementing partners and then approved by the NMAA.⁴⁵ These standards and guidelines also contain provisions specific to CMR survey and clearance.⁴⁶

In 2020, a review of all of the NTSGs was conducted with amendments made in consultation with the implementing partners. Of relevance to CMR clearance, a 360° quality control (QC) check drill after the destruction of each item of ordnance was introduced.⁴⁷

Both UNMAS and MAG have reported that a significant number of initial survey reports of CMR-contaminated areas have underestimated the extent of the contamination. MAG reported that areas were often recorded based on the minimum amount of clearance that would be required to comply with the NTSGs, which require a 50 metre fade-out. In MAG's experience, however, the actual CMR-contaminated area has often proved to be significantly larger, making it difficult to accurately plan for the time and resources needed to address each task.

MAG begins CMR clearance with the expectation that the task area will reach at least 60,000m² and at times has encountered CMR tasks that had to be expanded by more than 100,000m² compared to the original estimate. It further reported that the fade-out requirements of the NTSGs sometimes resulted in handover of cleared land while simultaneously creating a new "hazardous area" comprising the fade-out distance.⁴⁸ UNMAS reported that often in a recorded strike area, multiple cluster munition canisters are found, with the consequence that the overall contaminated area extends well beyond an expected standard footprint.⁴⁹

UNMAS noted that the NTSGs require all mine action teams to conduct regular internal quality assurance (QA), along with QC sampling of 10% of each area cleared.⁵⁰ In 2020, there were improvements made to the QA/QC process with reporting migrated onto the online Survey123 IMSMA platform and standardised scoring matrices developed for accreditation of team leaders and teams. Ten NMAA officers took part in joint QA visits with UNMAS during which each individual received "on the job training" and was assessed. Two NMAA officers also received advanced on-the-job training in operations management, which was due to end in 2021.⁵¹

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

UNMAS has reported that 34 teams from five organisations conducted CMR survey and clearance tasks in 2020, however, they were also conducting other tasks and were not exclusively deployed in clearance of CMR: three international demining non-governmental organisations (MAG, DDG, and DCA), and two commercial companies (G4S Ordnance Management (G4S) and The Development Initiative (TDI)). It estimated the number of operational personnel involved in CMR survey and clearance at 336 during the year (see Table 3). The clearance teams were not deployed exclusively on CMR tasks, they also conducted EOD, manual mine clearance and/or non-technical survey.⁵² In addition, in 2020 MAG also deployed seven non-technical survey teams totalling 19 personnel.⁵³

Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2020⁵⁴

Operator	Manual clearance teams	Total clearance personnel	Mechanical assets
G4S QRT	6	48	0
G4S MTT	2	16	0
G4S MTT 2	8	120	0
G4S ICC	2	20	2
TDI MTT	8	64	0
MAG ICC	1	10	1
MAG MTT	5	40	2
DDG MTT	1	8	0
DCA MTT	1	10	0
Totals	34	336	5

MTT = Multi-Task teams QRT = Quick Response Teams ICC = Integrated Clearance Capacity

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020

A total of a nearly 2.3km² of CMR-contaminated area was released through survey and clearance in 2020. Of this, 0.03km² was cancelled through non-technical survey, 0.03km² was reduced through technical survey, and 2.2km² was cleared.

SURVEY IN 2020

In 2020, a total of 30,971m² was cancelled through non-technical survey in Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria (see Table 4).⁵⁵ This is a decrease from the 359,388m² of suspected CMR contamination cancelled through non-technical survey in Eastern Equatoria and Western Equatoria by G4S in 2019.⁵⁶

In addition, 32,238m² was reduced through technical survey in Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap (see Table 5).⁵⁷ This is an increase from the 13,614m² reduced by technical survey the year before.⁵⁸

Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2020⁵⁹

State	Operator	Area cancelled (m ²)
Central Equatoria	UNMAS	20,971
Eastern Equatoria	MAG	10,000
Total		30,971

Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 2020⁶⁰

State	Operator	Area reduced (m ²)
Central Equatoria	G4S	1,763
Eastern Equatoria	G4S	8,078
Eastern Equatoria	MAG	8,221
Warrap	TDI	14,176
Total		32,238

CLEARANCE IN 2020

In 2020, a total of just over 2.2km² of CMR-contaminated area was cleared with 1,813 submunitions destroyed (see Table 6).⁶¹ This is a decrease of one third from the 3.3km² cleared in 2019.⁶²

In addition, 197 submunitions were destroyed during anti-personnel mine clearance, and 35 submunitions were destroyed during EOD spot tasks.⁶³

MAG reported that, in 2020, one cluster munition site covering an area of 11,494m² was cleared with no CMR found.⁶⁴ UNMAS implementing partners cleared three reported cluster munition strike sites totalling 37,894m² which proved to contain no CMR.⁶⁵

UNMAS reported that the reason for the reduction in overall land release from 2019 to 2020 was due to the late start of the demining season and COVID-19 restrictions. The Government of South Sudan imposed severe restrictions on travel, both domestic and international, following the outbreak of COVID-19. The demining programme was suspended from April 2020 for three months. This reduction in the demining period is particularly significant for South Sudan as during the four-month rainy season demining operations cannot take place. This meant that only five months of 2020 were operational.⁶⁶

Table 6: CMR clearance in 2020⁶⁷

State	Operator	Area cleared (m ²)	Submunitions destroyed	Other UXO destroyed
Central Equatoria	G4S	22,610	4	4
Central Equatoria	MAG	297,877	344	8
Central Equatoria	TDI	5,883	0	1
Eastern Equatoria	G4S	132,018	92	150
Eastern Equatoria	MAG	1,392,885	1,191	37
Eastern Equatoria	TDI	172,979	55	11
Jonglei	G4S	63,064	78	3
Warrap	TDI	4,905	4	1
Western Bahr El Ghazal	DDG	131,528	45	0
Western Bahr El Ghazal	G4S	11,700	0	0
Totals		2,235,449	1,813	215

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

South Sudan is not yet a State Party to the CCM and therefore does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4. Nonetheless, South Sudan has obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible.

South Sudan has announced its intention to accede to the CCM, which is also a specific objective in the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2022.⁶⁸ In May 2019, UNMAS reported that documents relating to South Sudan's accession to the Convention were under review by the national parliament.⁶⁹ As at April 2021, the legislation was still before parliament for adoption.⁷⁰ According to UNMAS, in this time the Government of South Sudan has been focused on establishing its infrastructure and limited routine parliamentary business has taken place.⁷¹

Previously, primarily due to the ongoing conflict, it was impossible to predict when South Sudan might complete clearance of CMR, or even assess the true extent of contamination.⁷² However, with improvements in the security situation, progress in land release of CMR-contaminated areas, and a comprehensive database review, the situation has begun to look a lot more positive.

According to South Sudan's revised 2020 APMB Article 5 deadline extension request, it is expected that South Sudan will complete clearance of all CMR-contaminated areas by July 2026 in parallel with its completion of mine clearance.

In addition, the extension request clearly sets out the primary assumptions and risk factors in the implementation of land release targets which is contingent on the present level of funding being maintained and having access to contaminated areas with an end to fighting in the country.⁷³ Logistical challenges will also need to be overcome due to the poor state of South Sudan's infrastructure and the effects of the seasonal rains, which mean that clearance in much of the country is only possible for eight months of the year given widespread flooding. Furthermore, the methodology previously used to clear roads was flawed as several mines have recently been discovered on roads that had been declared safe resulting in the need for re-clearance. This has diverted resources from clearance of CMR.⁷⁴

At the end of 2020, South Sudan had 6.93km² of CMR and other UXO contamination remaining and needed to release 1.09km² in 2021 to meet its end 2021 target of 5.84km² of remaining contamination.⁷⁵ It is not clear what proportion of this land release is CMR and what proportion is other UXO but since South Sudan released nearly 2.3km² of CMR-contaminated area alone in 2020, it should be able to meet its target for 2021. It is unclear what the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic will be in 2021 and whether South Sudan will need to implement new restrictions. A partial lockdown was introduced from February to April, but this did not affect clearance operations.

The security situation also remains a significant challenge in South Sudan. In 2020, there were outbreaks of fighting across the country, but the impact was most severe in Jonglei and across Greater Equatoria, which prevented clearance teams from deploying to known tasks.⁷⁶ The Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan reported in February 2021 that while there had been a reduction in hostilities at the national level there had been a massive escalation in violence locally which threatens to spiral out of control across several regions in the country.⁷⁷

-
- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>1 Email from Richard Boulter, Senior Programme Manager, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 11 April 2021.</p> <p>2 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F; and email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 September 2020.</p> <p>3 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021.</p> <p>4 Ibid.</p> <p>5 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019; UNMAS, South Sudan IMSMA Monthly Report, January 2004 to December 2020, at: https://bit.ly/34nv9VK.</p> <p>6 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.</p> <p>7 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form A.</p> <p>8 Email from Brendan Ramshaw, Operations Manager, DCA, 22 April 2021.</p> <p>9 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021. Of this, MAG reported that they discovered three cluster strikes with a total area of 28,658m².</p> <p>10 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form F.</p> <p>11 "South Sudan De-Mining Authority", undated, at: http://bit.ly/2Y5Eb4o.</p> <p>12 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.</p> <p>13 UNMAS, "Mine Action Portfolio 2019".</p> <p>14 Interview with Richard Boulter, UNMAS at the NDM-UN23 in Geneva, 14 February 2020; and email, 30 May 2019; and emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.</p> <p>15 Interview with Richard Boulter, UNMAS at the NDM-UN23 in Geneva, 14 February 2020; and email, 30 May 2019; and emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.</p> <p>16 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021.</p> <p>17 Email from Lisa Mueller-Dormann, MAG, 9 May 2021.</p> <p>18 UNMAS, "Mine Action Portfolio 2019".</p> <p>19 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021.</p> <p>20 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form I.</p> <p>21 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 75.</p> <p>22 UNMAS, "Mine Action Portfolio 2019", pp. 20–21; and email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021.</p> <p>23 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form I.</p> <p>24 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.</p> <p>25 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.</p> <p>26 Ibid.</p> <p>27 Ibid.</p> <p>28 Ibid.</p> <p>29 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 8 July 2020.</p> <p>30 UNMAS "Mine Action Portfolio 2019".</p> <p>31 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 8 July 2020.</p> <p>32 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.</p> <p>33 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 June 2021.</p> <p>34 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021.</p> <p>35 Email from Lisa Mueller-Dormann, MAG, 9 May 2021.</p> <p>36 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019; and 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 9.</p> <p>37 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.</p> <p>38 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019</p> <p>39 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018; and Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 June 2018.</p> <p>40 Email from GICHD, 29 June 2021.</p> <p>41 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021.</p> <p>42 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 74.</p> | <p>43 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 75.</p> <p>44 Ibid.</p> <p>45 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form 4.</p> <p>46 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016; and responses to questionnaire, 30 March 2015; and email from Augustino Seja, NPA, 11 May 2015.</p> <p>47 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021</p> <p>48 Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 26 April 2019.</p> <p>49 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.</p> <p>50 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.</p> <p>51 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021.</p> <p>52 Ibid.</p> <p>53 Email from Lisa Mueller-Dormann, MAG, 9 May 2021.</p> <p>54 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021. The two G4S MTTs were contracted until June 2020 and then from July 2020 the eight G4S MTTs were deployed. Three of the mechanical assets (one from MAG and two from G4S) were only contracted until June 2020.</p> <p>55 Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021; and Lisa Mueller-Dormann, MAG, 9 May 2021. This differs from the 63,209m² reported as cancelled through NTS in South Sudan's voluntary Article 7 report where no area reported as reduced through TS.</p> <p>56 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.</p> <p>57 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021.</p> <p>58 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 September 2020.</p> <p>59 Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021; and Lisa Mueller-Dormann, MAG, 9 May 2021.</p> <p>60 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021. MAG did not report any TS in 2020.</p> <p>61 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.; and emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021; and Lisa Mueller-Dormann, MAG, 9 May 2021.</p> <p>62 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 September 2020.</p> <p>63 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021. DDG did not report any clearance in 2020.</p> <p>64 Email from Lisa Mueller-Dormann, MAG, 9 May 2021.</p> <p>65 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021.</p> <p>66 Ibid.</p> <p>67 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.; and emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021; and Lisa Mueller-Dormann, MAG, 9 May 2021.</p> <p>68 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.</p> <p>69 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019. On 5 September 2017, at the CCM 7th Meeting of States Parties, South Sudan announced its attention to accede to the Convention, stating that its Council of Ministers had taken a decision unanimously on 25 August 2017 to "fully accede" and comply with the CCM. Statement of South Sudan, CCM 7th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 September 2017.</p> <p>70 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form A.</p> <p>71 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021.</p> <p>72 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.</p> <p>73 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021.</p> <p>74 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 46–48.</p> <p>75 Ibid., p. 74.</p> <p>76 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021.</p> <p>77 UNHCR, "Despite renewed political commitment, staggering levels of violence continued across South Sudan for the second successive year, UN experts note", 19 February 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3yU0eyx.</p> |
|---|--|