MINE ACTION REVIEW

# CLEARING THE MINES 2025

A REPORT BY MINE ACTION REVIEW FOR THE TWENTY-SECOND MEETING OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION

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- *Global contamination from anti-personnel mines*


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This report was researched and written by Nick Cumming-Bruce, Rula Daoud, Laurène Deglaire, Alex Frost, Emil Hasanov, Lucy Pinches, Frances Smith, and Louise Wilson. The Mine Action Review project is managed by Lucy Pinches. The report was edited by Stuart Casey-Maslen and laid out by Optima Design in the United Kingdom. Mine Action Review would like to thank Global Affairs Canada, the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs for funding its work. We would also like to thank all those who contributed data and information, including national mine action authorities and mine action centres, clearance operators, UN agencies, and other expert mine action organisations.


## Disclaimer

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## Other information

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The report focuses on anti-personnel mine land release data for the calendar year 2024, with information on other aspects of survey and clearance programmes included up to November 2025 where possible.

Mine Action Review welcomes comments from national authorities and other relevant stakeholders. Please send any comments to **MineActionReview@npaid.org**

# CLEARING THE MINES 2025

# CONTENTS


## KEY FINDINGS 1

## OVERVIEW 3

Summary of Challenges and Progress 3
Global AP Mine Contamination 4
States That Have Completed Mine Clearance since 1997 7
Mine Clearance in 2024 8
Progress in Article 5 Implementation in Mine-Affected States Parties 10
Programme Performance in Mine-Affected States Parties 15
The Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 19
Gender and Diversity 19
Environmental Policies and Action in Affected States Parties 21
Outlook 22

## STATES PARTIES 24

Afghanistan 25
Algeria 37
Angola 43
Bosnia and Herzegovina 57
Burkina Faso 73
Cambodia 84
Cameroon 96
Central African Republic 103
Chad 110
Colombia 119
Croatia 145
Cyprus 156
Democratic Republic Of Congo 163
Ecuador 179
Eritrea 190
Ethiopia 197
Guinea-Bissau 217
Iraq 228
Mali 242
Mauritania 249
Niger 261
Nigeria 269
Oman 277
Palestine 282
Peru 292
Senegal 302
Serbia 310
Somalia 319
South Sudan 335
Sri Lanka 353
Sudan 368
Tajikistan 382
Thailand 400
Türkiye 408
Ukraine 426
Yemen 465
Zimbabwe 477

## NON-SIGNATORIES 496

Armenia 497
Azerbaijan 505
China 519
Cuba 522
Egypt 525
Georgia 529
India 535
Iran 539
Israel 544
Kyrgyzstan 553
Lao PDR 557
Lebanon 565
Libya 577
Morocco 585
Myanmar 589
North Korea 593
Pakistan 597
Russia 601
South Korea 607
Syria 613
Uzbekistan 625
Vietnam 629

## OTHER AREAS 636

Kosovo 637
Western Sahara 644

## ANNEX 650

Annex 1: Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 651

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 652

# KEY FINDINGS

- **In 2024, a global total of 175.39 square kilometres of mined area was cleared of anti-personnel (AP) mines,** which represents a drop of just over one quarter on the 2023 figure of 237.85km$^2$ (which was the highest annual clearance output ever recorded).[1]

  The decrease in global clearance was largely due to 38% reduction in clearance of mined area in State Party Cambodia, which fell by almost 50km$^2$ (although it still undertook greater mine clearance than any other State by a significant margin).

  Approximately **93% of AP mined area cleared worldwide in 2024 occurred in States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).** Four States Parties with the greatest annual clearance output—Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, and Iraq—accounted for almost 81% of all mined area cleared globally in 2024.

- Globally, 131,190 AP mines were destroyed in the course of 2024 during land release and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks, in 28 States Parties, eight States not party, and two "other areas"[2]. The total number of AP mines destroyed in 2024 was a 33% reduction on the 195,416 AP mines destroyed the year before.[3] The greatest number of mines destroyed in 2024 in a single State was in Zimbabwe (31,672), followed by Thailand (17,600), and Sri Lanka (16,510).

- One State Party, **Oman, fulfilled its clearance obligations in 2024**, ahead of its Article 5 deadline of 1 February 2025, becoming the 33rd State freed of AP mined areas since 1997 when the Convention was adopted.

- As at 1 November 2025, globally **57 States (including 35 States Parties) and 2 other areas were contaminated with AP mines.**[4] This is one fewer than a year earlier, with State Party Oman removed from the global list following its completion of clearance. The **Central African Republic** (CAR) has also been taken off Mine Action Review's list of affected State Parties pending further information, as hard evidence is lacking that areas containing improvised AP mines remain. In contrast, **Algeria**, which previously declared completion of Article 5 but which is finishing planned clearance of previously unknown mined areas, has been returned to Mine Action Review's list of affected States.

  Algeria should seek a new Article 5 deadline while it completes this AP mine clearance. **Cameroon** and **Mali** should also extend their already expired deadlines, as each has acknowledged new use of AP mines of an improvised nature on their respective territories by non-State armed groups (NSAGs) and therefore each has obligations under Article 5.

- Based on Mine Action Review's assessment of the **extent of AP mine contamination** in affected States Parties, **Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq**, and **Ukraine are massively contaminated** (defined as covering more than 100km$^2$ of land). Heavy contamination (covering more than 20km$^2$–100km$^2$) exists in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Türkiye, and Yemen. In the other 27 affected States Parties, the extent of AP mine contamination is either medium or light.

- The extent of implementation of Article 5 clearance obligations varies widely between States Parties. Of the 35 mine-affected States Parties as at 1 November 2025, **only two were believed to be on track to meet their respective treaty deadlines – Croatia**, which is just on track to meet its deadline of 1 March 2026; and Peru, which is on track to meet its recently extended deadline of 31 December 2029, having failed to meet its previous deadline of the end of 2024.

- Despite each having an **obligation to implement Article 5 "as soon as possible"**, affected States Parties Türkiye and South Sudan each conducted less then 1km$^2$ of AP mine clearance in 2024; Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, DR Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Tajikistan, and Thailand each conducted less than 0.5km$^2$ of AP mine clearance; and Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cyprus, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Serbia, and Sudan did not report any AP mine clearance at all for the year. Despite not releasing any mined area in 2024, Cameroon did, however, destroy 10 AP mines during spot tasks; Chad destroyed 7 AP mines during route clearance; Guinea-Bissau released some mined area through technical survey (TS) and destroyed two AP mines; while Serbia released some mined area through TS. In contrast, Cyprus does not have effective control over remaining AP mined areas in the northern part of the island.

1 The 2023 figure is higher than the 237.23km$^2$ reported in Clearing the Mines 2024 owing to the inclusion of clearance by Algeria and revised clearance data for 2023 provided to Mine Action Review by Sri Lanka and Ukraine in 2025.

2 These are territories not recognised as States by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) in his capacity as treaty depositary for the APMBC.

3 The 2023 figure is higher than the 192,563 AP mines reported in Clearing the Mines 2024 owing to the inclusion of revised data on the number of AP mines destroyed in 2023 provided to Mine Action Review by Sri Lanka in 2025.

4 **Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola,** Armenia, Azerbaijan, **Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad,** China, **Colombia, Croatia,** Cuba, **Cyprus, DR Congo, Ecuador,** Egypt, **Eritrea, Ethiopia,** Georgia, **Guinea-Bissau,** India, **Iraq,** Iran, Israel, *Kosovo*, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Dem. Rep., Lebanon, Libya, **Mali, Mauritania,** Morocco, Myanmar, **Niger, Nigeria,** North Korea, Pakistan, **Palestine, Peru,** Russia, **Senegal, Serbia, Somalia,** South Korea, **South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan,** Syria, **Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine,** Uzbekistan, Vietnam, *Western Sahara*, **Yemen,** and **Zimbabwe.** States Parties to the APMBC are in bold. Other areas are in italics.

- Progress to complete Article 5 implementation in both **Cambodia** and neighbouring **Thailand** is now contingent on the two States reaching agreement to clear the **border minefields**. The armed conflict between them in July 2025 seems to have thwarted an early resolution of this critical issue. Cambodia has denied Thai accusations that it had newly emplaced AP mines, and the allegations remained unverified at the time of writing.

- At the Fifth Review Conference of the APMBC, which took place in Siem Reap, Cambodia on 25–29 November 2024, States Parties adopted the five-year Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan (SRAAP). The SRAAP is a blueprint for implementation of the Convention, supporting States Parties and their implementing partners get to completion in the best way possible – efficiently, effectively, safely, and inclusively. In addition to the official APMBC monitoring of the SRAAP, **Mine Action Review is also providing civil society monitoring and analysis of the implementation of the SRAAP actions relating to survey and clearance**. We encourage readers to refer to the separate report on the Mine Action Review website.

- Of the **non-signatories** for which clearance data was available, **Azerbaijan** conducted the most clearance of AP mined area in 2024, followed by **Syria** and **Israel**. In Syria, the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 has enabled a shift to a countrywide approach to mine action coordination, with operators reporting improved access and cooperation. However, major challenges remain, including a surge in casualties, persistent funding shortfalls, the absence of a national contamination baseline, only nascent managerial capacity in the transitional government, and ongoing security risks. Syria is reportedly considering acceding to the Convention, which is to be strongly encouraged.

- Slow progress in clearance by affected States Parties and repeated Article 5 extension requests with little to no progress in between requests, should be of concern to the APMBC community. Of greatest concern at present, though, are the **serious violations of the APMBC continue to be perpetrated by Ukraine** – of its undertaking "never under any circumstances" to acquire, stockpile, and above all to use AP mines. These are grave threats to the integrity not only of the Convention but also to disarmament law more generally. What is more, Ukraine submitted an illegal declaration of suspension of implementation of its obligations in July 2025, to which several States Parties (notably Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Norway, and Switzerland) had formally objected to the United Nations Secretary General. In addition, France, Ireland, and New Zealand also made communications regarding Ukraine's attempted suspension[5]. Mine Action Review urges other States Parties to also formally object to Ukraine's attempted unlawful suspension, and we call on Ukraine itself to rescind it. The Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025 subsequently "affirmed that the Convention does not allow the suspension of its operation and consequently its obligations. The Meeting called upon Ukraine, as a State Party, to further engage within the framework of the Convention".[6]

  Five States Parties—Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—have formally announced their withdrawal from the APMBC in the mistaken view that laying even millions of AP mines on their own territory will deter Russian aggression or, should the worst come to pass, stop or even just significantly delay an invasion.

- On top of these assaults on the universalisation and implementation of the Convention comes an **unprecedented funding crisis**, prompted by the decision by the United States to reconsider its hitherto staunch support to demining – first suspending its mine action funding to conduct a review and then reducing or terminating funding in many programmes. Furthermore, funding for mine action from other traditional donors, including European States, also appears to be at risk as States increase their defence spending, potentially at the expense of humanitarian and overseas aid budgets.

5 Final report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, 5 December 2025, paragraph 50, at: https://bit.ly/493cjnY.

6 Ibid. paragraph 51.

# OVERVIEW

## SUMMARY OF CHALLENGES AND PROGRESS

The 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) is under pressure as never before in its 28-year history. Serious violations of core obligations, withdrawals by previously steadfast States Parties, use of improvised mines by armed groups, and a donor funding crisis are combining to create a perfect storm of headwinds. The most serious violations of the APMBC continue to be perpetrated by Ukraine – of its undertaking "never under any circumstances" to acquire, stockpile, and above all to use anti-personnel (AP) mines. These are grave threats to the integrity not only of the Convention but also to disarmament law more generally. What is more, Ukraine submitted an illegal declaration of suspension of implementation of its obligations in July 2025, which several States Parties (notably Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Norway, and Switzerland) had formally objected to the United Nations Secretary General. In addition, France, Ireland, and New Zealand also made communications regarding Ukraine's attempted suspension.[1] The Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025 subsequently "affirmed that the Convention does not allow the suspension of its operation and consequently its obligations. The Meeting called upon Ukraine, as a State Party, to further engage within the framework of the Convention".[2] Five States Parties—Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—have formally announced their withdrawal from the APMBC in the mistaken view that laying and spraying even millions of AP mines on their own land will deter Russian aggression or, should the worst come to pass, stop or even just significantly delay an invasion.

On top of these assaults on the universalisation and implementation of the Convention comes an unprecedented funding crisis, prompted by the decision by the United States to reconsider its hitherto staunch support to demining – first suspending its mine action funding to conduct a review and then reducing or terminating funding in many programmes. Furthermore, funding for mine action from other traditional donors, including European States, also appears to be at risk as States increase their defence spending, potentially at the expense of humanitarian and overseas aid budgets.

The impact of funding decisions of the US and other donor States on global mine clearance output will only start to impact in 2025 land release data and in the proceeding years, but already global output in 2024 was a 26% reduction compared to the previous year: down from almost 238 square kilometres in 2023 to 175 square kilometres in 2024. This was largely due to a massive drop in Cambodia in 2024, down nearly 50km$^2$ on the previous year due to a significant reduction in government funding for clearance compared to the previous year's record high. Furthermore, Cambodia stands accused by Thailand of using AP mines, something which remained unverified at the time of writing. States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, and Iraq, together with non-signatory Azerbaijan, also recorded notable drops in clearance output in 2024, compared to 2023. A further drop in global clearance output in 2025 is to be expected. And although Finland has ruled out peacetime use of AP mines, the same is not true of the other four withdrawing States Parties, meaning the extent of mined areas may be aggravated instead of being tackled. We risk starting to move further away from the goal of a world free of AP mines.

There was, however, some light piercing through the dark shadows. At the end of 2024, Oman became the 33rd State since the APMBC's adoption to complete clearance; Oman reported having fulfilled its Article 5 obligations at the Convention's Intersessional Meetings in Geneva in June 2025. At the time of writing, Croatia was (just) on track to become the 34th State freed of AP mined areas by its deadline of 1 March 2026. It is similarly hoped that Algeria, which had prematurely declared Article 5 fulfilment in 2017 and which is currently without an extended Article 5 deadline, will complete planned clearance of all remaining mined areas before the Twenty-Third Meeting of States Parties in 2026. Somewhat attenuating the effect of the five withdrawals, in March 2025, the Marshall Islands ratified the Convention (its last remaining signatory State), while in June, Tonga acceded to it. They became the 165th and 166th States Parties to the APMBC, respectively.

But if these positive developments are not to be the candle in the hurricane, all States Parties now need to show backbone and the President of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties (22MSP), Ambassador Tomiko Ichikawa of Japan, must demonstrate genuine leadership. For the failure to confront serious violations of the Convention come December 2025 will be paid for by the lives and limbs of innocent civilians around the world for years to come. Into the Ukrainian breach will surely go others who are confronted by an illegal use of force. At the Oslo Diplomatic Conference in 1997, the negotiating States grasped the nettle and stood up to the United States, which was trying to fundamentally weaken the putative treaty. The negotiating diplomats pledged in the very first preambular paragraph to "put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement". Make it happen, States Parties.

1 Final report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, 5 December 2025, paragraph 50, at: https://bit.ly/493cjnY.

2 Ibid. paragraph 51.

## GLOBAL AP MINE CONTAMINATION: TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK

As at 1 November 2025, globally **57 States and 2 "other areas"**[3] **were contaminated by AP mines**, as summarised in Table 1. While this headline figure is down by one from a year earlier, this masks a number of developments, some positive, some less so. Of the 57 affected States, 35 are party to the APMBC, one fewer than a year ago with Oman removed from the global list following its completion of clearance. The Central African Republic (CAR) has also been taken off Mine Action Review's list of affected States pending further information, as hard evidence is lacking that areas containing improvised AP mines remain. In contrast, Algeria, with planned clearance of mined areas ongoing, has been returned to the list of affected States, its 2017 declaration of fulfilment of Article 5 proving to have been premature.

At the time of writing, among the new total of 35 States Parties, four—**Algeria**, **Burkina Faso**, **Cameroon**, and **Mali**—did not have an Article 5 deadline in force. There is no suggestion of bad faith on Algeria's part and importantly Algeria has been transparent in documenting its clearance and the number of AP mines destroyed in its annual Article 7 reporting. But as occurred with Jordan more than a decade ago, Algeria has been steadily clearing mined areas it identified after its declaration of compliance while omitting to request a new clearance deadline as is expected in such a circumstance. Since declaring fulfilment of Article 5 on 10 February 2017, Algeria cleared 30km$^2$ of mined area through to the end of 2024, destroying in the process 32,269 AP mines. While the number of AP mines discovered has steadily decreased since 2020 (when 8,740 AP mines were destroyed), Algeria continues to destroy very significant numbers in identified areas. In light of this, Algeria should now request a new Article 5 deadline to enable it to complete the work. This would be in line with the Convention's agreed framework, which deems that in the event mined areas are discovered after the expiry of an Article 5 deadline, the relevant State should immediately inform all other States Parties of the discovery and undertake to destroy all AP mines as soon as possible. If, however, the affected State Party believes it will be unable to do so before the next Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference (whichever falls earlier), it should request an extended deadline. This process was accepted unanimously at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in 2012.[4]

Cameroon and Mali have also not yet requested a new deadline from the other States Parties, despite acknowledging new use of AP mines of an improvised nature on their respective territories by non-State armed groups (NSAGs). They should do so at 22MSP in December 2025. Mali has, though, announced plans to submit an extension request by March 2026, which is a welcome development. Also positive, for the first time in fifteen years, Cameroon submitted an Article 7 report in 2025, covering 2023. It reiterated that no mined areas have been identified on its territory, but acknowledged that since 2014, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by NSAGs have caused casualties, particularly in its Far North region bordering Nigeria and its Anglophone regions, including several instances involving victim-activated devices that fall within the APMBC definition of an AP mine.

More positively, in April 2025, Burkina Faso, also newly contaminated by the acts of NSAGs on its territory, submitted an extension request, allowing it to access greater support while respecting the principles of the Convention. Its request for a new Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2028 (its original ten-year deadline expired in 2009) was due to be considered at 22MSP.

With respect to the geographic spread, **Asia** (including the Middle East) is the most affected continent by number of countries, with 22 affected States. Following Oman's completion of clearance at the end of 2024, among the States with AP mined areas in Asia, only eight are party to the Convention. Of **Africa**'s 21 affected States, 18 are party to the APMBC, including Algeria which previously declared completion but which is finishing clearance of previously unknown mined areas. Only Egypt, Libya, and Morocco are not party to the APMBC. But in addition to those affected African States, "other area" Western Sahara is mine-affected. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union, but is not recognised as a State by the UN Secretary-General in his capacity as depositary of more than 550 treaties, including the APMBC.

3 These are territories not recognised as States by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) in his capacity as treaty depositary for the APMBC.

4 Final Report of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, APMBC doc. APLC/MSP.12/2012/10, 21 January 2013, para. 28.

A question mark also remains over the situation in **Mozambique,** with evidence of the emplacement of victim-activated IEDs by Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISM) in the northern Cabo Delgado province. In the course of 2024, ISM began increasingly to rely on IEDs as a means of warfare.[5] While the group has largely sought to target military personnel, inevitably civilians have also been harmed. This continued to occur in 2025, with an IED injuring a civilian in Quiterajo on 19 May, and another injuring several civilians, including children, in Nangade on 23 May.[6] In Nambija village in Macomia district, a civilian was killed by an IED in June 2025 – again the device seems to have been emplaced by ISM.[7] Mine Action Review will report on Mozambique in detail in next year's report.

**Benin**, **Côte d'Ivoire**, and **Togo** have also seen incidents in recent years involving IEDs,[8] but publicly available data are scarce and it is unclear how many of the devices in question were victim-activated. In 2025, Côte d'Ivoire submitted its first Article 7 transparency report for ten years, covering calendar year 2024, in which it described the reporting form on mined areas as "not applicable". Togo has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2004. Benin has not reported having identified or destroyed any improvised AP mines in its Article 7 report covering 2008 to the end of 2023.[9]

The extent of mined area in **CAR** was unclear at the time of writing and Mine Action Review has removed it from the list of Article 5-affected States pending further information. In 2025, CAR submitted an Article 7 report under the APMBC for the first time in 20 years, covering the period 2004–24. The report highlights a growing explosive ordnance threat since 2020. While the problem of explosive ordnance contamination is certainly increasing, of the 44 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks undertaken in 2024 by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSCA) and implementing partners for the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 66 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) but only a single improvised AP mine were destroyed. Nevertheless, UNMAS has acknowledged the possibility of significant under-reporting of incidents and victims while contamination is likely to exist that has not yet caused casualties.[10] Accordingly, Mine Action Review recommends that CAR request a new interim deadline, giving the authorities time to assess the extent, if any, of its Article 5 obligations.

In **Europe**, 10 States along with other area Kosovo are still mine-affected. These include six States Parties plus Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia. By far the heaviest contamination is in **Ukraine**, which has been massively contaminated with AP mines. While Ukraine has itself used AP mines—in serious violation of its obligations under the APMBC—**Russia** is easily the world's biggest user, with many millions of AP mines remotely deployed and manually emplaced by its armed forces in the course of its aggression against Ukraine over the past three years. **Azerbaijan** is the second most affected European nation, with hundreds of square kilometres of mined area.

In the **Americas**, only four States remain affected by AP mines: States Parties Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru; and State not party Cuba. Increasing use of IEDs by the drug cartels in Mexico over recent years, some of which are victim activated and amount to AP mines, has been recorded.[11] Mexico's Article 7 report covering 2023 referenced an article in the *Los Angeles Times* on 9 March 2024 regarding the alleged use of IEDs by organized crime groups on Mexican territory, but affirmed that "the type of artifacts reported by the press, by their very nature, do not fall within the object or the scope of the APMBC." In 2024, Mexico continued to experience a sharp increase in cartel-manufactured IEDs, mainly in Michoacán's Tierra Caliente region, but with spillover into Jalisco and Guanajuato. Submission by Mexico of its Article 7 report for 2024 was outstanding at the time of writing. While improvised anti-vehicle (AV) mines have certainly been used on occasion,[12] available evidence does not enable a determination that Mexico has areas containing AP mines. Mine Action Review will continue to pay close attention to the situation as it evolves.

5 Global Protection Cluster, 'Republic of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado Province: Protection Analysis Report', January 2025, https://bit.ly/3HivFvs.

6 OCHA, 'Mozambique: Access Snapshot – Cabo Delgado Province, as of 31 May 2025', 12 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3UxGcWC.

7 OCHA, 'Mozambique: Access Snapshot – Cabo Delgado Province, as of 30 June 2025', 10 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3JkzeSn.

8 See, e.g., P. Amoroso and M. Blancafort, "Tackling the Rising Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Supplies", Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 30 September 2024, at: http://bit.ly/4olpQ0b.

9 Benin Article 7 Report (covering 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2023), at: http://bit.ly/46IRT24, Form D.

10 Email from Sophie Van Royen, Chief of Mine Action Programmes, and Alioune Menane, Capacity Building Advisor, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.

11 See, e.g., "Soldiers and civilians are dying as Mexican cartels embrace a terrifying new weapon: Land mines", *Los Angeles Times*, 9 March 2024, at: http://bit.ly/4mLdAEJ; J. Cano, "Barata pero devastadora, la táctica del CJNG de minar campos en la región de Tierra Caliente", *Infobae*, 21 June 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4gaYLcN; "Criminal Groups Are Ramping Up Explosives in Mexico", Insight Crime, 3 February 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4pXYONR; "AMLO ordena investigar el uso de miles de minas antipersonales del crimen organizado", *Sputnik Mundo*, 21 August 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4edWV99; H. Novell, "Minas antipersonales, pero no somos Afganistán, ¿o sí?", Op-Ed, El Economista, 28 June 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4dUjT5q; "Sedena detecta uso de artefactos explosivos de la delincuencia contra grupos antagónicos y fuerzas de Seguridad", *El Imparcial*, 22 August 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3Nt1C3p; and "Ejército mexicano dice que aumenta el uso de artefactos explosivos por parte del narco", Associated Press, 22 August 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3BN7uSx.

12 See, e.g., J. P. Sullivan and R. Bunker, "Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #53: Recent Improvised Landmine attacks in Michoacán and Jalisco", *Small Arms Journal*, 31 May 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4gPKDX7.

**Table 1: Mine-Affected States and Other Areas (at 1 November 2025)**

| States Parties | States Parties | Non-signatories | Non-signatories | Other areas |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan | Mauritania | Armenia | Russia | Kosovo |
| Algeria* | Niger | Azerbaijan | Syria | Western Sahara |
| Angola | Nigeria | China | Uzbekistan | |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Palestine | Cuba | Vietnam | |
| Burkina Faso | Peru | Egypt | | |
| Cambodia | Senegal | Georgia | | |
| Cameroon* | Serbia | India | | |
| Chad | Somalia | Iran | | |
| Colombia | South Sudan | Israel | | |
| Croatia | Sri Lanka | North Korea | | |
| Cyprus | Sudan | South Korea | | |
| DR Congo | Tajikistan | Kyrgyzstan | | |
| Ecuador | Thailand | Lao PDR | | |
| Eritrea | Türkiye | Lebanon | | |
| Ethiopia | Ukraine | Libya | | |
| Guinea-Bissau | Yemen | Morocco | | |
| Iraq | Zimbabwe | Myanmar | | |
| Mali* | | Pakistan | | |
| | **35 States Parties** | | **22 Non-signatories** | **2 Other areas** |

*Has not yet submitted a request to extend its expired Article 5 deadline.

Every State should establish a national baseline of contamination as soon as security permits. This is the basis for effective planning towards completion. A number of States Parties to the APMBC still do not have a comprehensive baseline despite having joined the treaty more than two decades ago. Once a national baseline has been established, release through evidence-based non-technical and technical survey (NTS and TS) is then the critical focus. Such survey serves to confirm or discredit suspected contamination in specific areas, significantly reducing the size of hazardous areas from exaggerated estimates and enabling cancellation through NTS or reduction through TS in areas that have no mines.

Table 2 below summarises what is known or reasonably believed about the extent of contamination in affected States Parties. It is an independent assessment by Mine Action Review of the extent of AP mined area based on available evidence, which may differ from the view of the State Party in question.

**Table 2: Extent of AP Mined Areas in Affected States Parties (at 1 November 2025)**

| Massive (>100km²) | Heavy (>20–100km²) | Medium (2–20km²) | Light (<2km²) or extent of contamination unclear |
|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan | Angola | Chad | Algeria |
| Cambodia | Bosnia and Herzegovina | Colombia | Burkina Faso |
| Iraq | Türkiye | Croatia | Cameroon |
| Ukraine | Yemen | Eritrea | Cyprus |
| | | Ethiopia | DR Congo |
| | | Mauritania | Ecuador |
| | | Palestine | Guinea-Bissau |
| | | Somalia | Mali |
| | | South Sudan | Niger |
| | | Sri Lanka | Nigeria |
| | | Sudan | Peru |
| | | Tajikistan | Senegal |
| | | Thailand | Serbia |
| | | Zimbabwe | |

### ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES OF AN IMPROVISED NATURE

Significant numbers of AP mines of an improvised nature continued to be laid by NSAGs in 2024, including in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Colombia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Yemen. As the UN Secretary-General observed in July 2024, these devices are "a direct threat to civilians, humanitarian actors and security forces around the world".[13] Improvised munitions are both captured by and prohibited under the APMBC whenever they are designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. The obligations to clear mined areas and report on progress under Article 5 and Article 7, respectively, apply to AP mines of an improvised nature just as they do to conventionally manufactured landmines.[14] It does not matter under the APMBC how these weapons were produced or employed nor by whom they were laid – if they are located within the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, all of the Convention's provisions apply. Technical guidance on how to dispose of IEDs, including AP mines of an improvised nature, has been incorporated into the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[15] Reporting guidelines that encompass improvised AP mines have also been adopted under the IMAS.[16]

Of course, improvised mines are not new and the mine action sector has addressed such contamination for decades. However, the prevalence of these improvised victim-activated munitions does appear to be increasing, posing a significant risk to civilians. As the States Parties to the APMBC highlighted in the Siem Reap-Angkor Declaration on a Mine-Free World 2024 concluded at the Fifth Review Conference in 2024: "We remain profoundly alarmed by the continued presence and use of anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature, in new and protracted armed conflicts." The States Parties undertook to "uphold, promote and strengthen the norms established by the Convention and remain determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties by antipersonnel mines, including those of an improvised nature."[17] Reiterating a commitment made in the Oslo Action Plan, in the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan they declared that:

> States Parties affected by anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature (improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which meet the definition of an anti-personnel mine) will apply all provisions and obligations under the Convention to such contamination including during survey and clearance in fulfilment of Article 5 and when reporting in fulfilment of Article 7.[18]

## STATES THAT HAVE COMPLETED MINE CLEARANCE SINCE 1997

Since the adoption of the APMBC in 1997, **clearance has been completed by 33 States** (see Table 3), 32 of which are party to the Convention, along with one other area (Taiwan). Nepal remains the only State not party to have completed mine clearance on its territory. Eleven of the States that completed clearance are from Africa; ten are from Europe; seven are from the Americas; and five are from Asia (including the Pacific and the Middle East). As mentioned above, Algeria has been removed from the list this year owing to its ongoing, planned clearance of mined areas.

**Table 3: The 33 States That Have Completed Clearance Since 1997 (at 1 November 2025)**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | Denmark | Honduras | Nicaragua | Tunisia |
| Bhutan | Djibouti | Hungary | North Macedonia | Uganda |
| Bulgaria | France | Jordan | Oman | United Kingdom |
| Burundi | The Gambia | Malawi | Palau | Venezuela |
| Chile | Germany | Montenegro | Rwanda | Zambia |
| Republic of Congo | Greece | Mozambique* | Suriname | |
| Costa Rica | Guatemala | Nepal** | Swaziland | |

*As noted above, in the future Mozambique may be removed from the list as a result of ongoing use by an Islamic State affiliate in Cabo Delgado province. Mozambique also has four very small suspected mined areas that remain underwater. **State not party to the APMBC.

In 2020, the United Kingdom reported fulfilment of its Article 5 clearance obligations, after the conclusion of demining operations in the **Falkland Islands/Las Islas Malvinas**.[19] Argentina, however, has not accepted this declaration, stating that it continues to be prevented from accessing the territory and cannot verify the United Kingdom's demining operations. In November 2023, two mines were discovered by tourists at Hell's Kitchen beach on the Murrell Peninsula and three further AP mines were later discovered during clearance operations. The area had been cleared in 2019 with a total of 16 mines destroyed. In its Article 7 report for 2024, the United Kingdom declared that a total of five P4B blast AP mines were destroyed during the various operations.[20]

13 "Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, Report of the Secretary-General", UN doc. A/79/211, 22 July 2024, para. 3.

14 Oslo Declaration, adopted the Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC, 29 November 2019, at: http://bit.ly/2DFNrqY, para. 6.

15 IMAS 09.31: "Improvised Explosive Device Disposal", First Edition, February 2019, at: https://bit.ly/40wam0j

16 IMAS 05:10: "Information Management for Mine Action", Second Edition, Last amended 6 March 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/3P34GDY.

17 "Siem Reap-Angkor Declaration on a Mine-Free World 2024. A Renewed Commitment for a Safer Future", adopted at the final plenary meeting of the Fifth Review Conference on 29 November 2024, paras. 4 and 5 [added emphasis].

18 Action 20, Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, adopted at the final plenary meeting of the Fifth Review Conference on 29 November 2024.

19 There is a sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas with Argentina, which claims jurisdiction over the islands.

20 UK Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form G(2).

Since major AP mine clearance on the islands was duly completed in 2020, Mine Action Review does not consider Argentina to be mine-affected.[21] In 2025, however, Argentina again sought an extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline, calling for "joint demining" of the islands over which sovereignty is disputed.[22] It is important that States Parties strive to avoid politicisation of the Convention.

## MINE CLEARANCE IN 2024

Total **global clearance of AP mined area in 2024 was 175.39km²**, which represents a drop of just over one quarter on the 2023 figure of 237.85km² (which was the highest annual clearance output ever recorded).[23] The decrease in global clearance was largely due to 38% decrease in clearance of mined area in State Party **Cambodia**, which fell by almost 50km² (although it still undertook greater mine clearance than any other State by a significant margin). A 33% global drop was recorded in the number of AP mines destroyed worldwide in the course of the year – down from 195,416 in 2023[24] to 131,190 in 2024.

Overall, of the 35 affected States Parties with AP mined area, 15 cleared less mined area in 2024 compared to the previous year; 11 cleared the same amount or again did not conduct any mine clearance at all; and only 9 States Parties increased their annual clearance output in 2024. Some **93% of AP mined area cleared worldwide in 2024 occurred in States Parties to the APMBC**. Four States Parties with the greatest annual clearance output—Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, and Iraq—accounted for 81% of all mined area cleared globally in 2024. This is in stark contrast to affected States Parties Türkiye and South Sudan which each conducted less then 1km² of AP mine clearance in 2024; to Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, DR Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Tajikistan, and Thailand each of which conducted less than 0.5km² of AP mine clearance; and Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cyprus, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Serbia, and Sudan which did not report any AP mine clearance at all for the year.

Despite not releasing any mined area in 2024, Cameroon did, however, destroy 10 AP mines during EOD spot tasks; Chad destroyed 7 AP mines during route clearance; Guinea-Bissau released some mined area through TS and destroyed two AP mines; while Serbia released some mined area through TS. In contrast, Cyprus does not have effective control over remaining AP mined areas in the northern part of the island.

Of the non-signatories for which clearance data was available, **Azerbaijan** conducted the most clearance of AP mined area in 2024, followed by Syria and Israel. In **Syria**, the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 has enabled a shift to a countrywide approach to mine action coordination, with operators reporting improved access and cooperation. Clearance output increased in 2024 while survey output fell, but operators have been expanding survey and clearance capacity in 2025 to reach previously inaccessible areas. However, major challenges remain, including a surge in casualties, persistent funding shortfalls, the absence of a national contamination baseline, only nascent managerial capacity in the transitional government, and ongoing security risks. Syria is reportedly considering acceding to the Convention, which is to be strongly encouraged. In non-signatory **Lebanon**, mine clearance activities in the south along the Blue Line were suspended due to hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah that began on 8 October 2023 and remained suspended throughout the whole of 2024. Disaggregated clearance output for AP mines for 2024 in several other non-signatories, such as Iran and Morrocco, has not been made public.

**Table 4: AP Mine Clearance in 2024**

| States Parties | Area cleared in 2024 (km²) | AP mines destroyed in 2024* | Area cleared in 2023 (km²) | Comparison to 2023 clearance (+/- km²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan | 10.44 | 5,376 | 14.47 | -4.03 |
| Algeria | 0.30 | 600 | **0.30 | 0 |
| Angola | 3.03 | 5,680 | 6.69 | -3.66 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 0.17 | 574 | 0.36 | -0.19 |
| Burkina Faso | 0.00 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cambodia | 80.44 | 10,534 | 129.70 | -49.26 |
| Cameroon | 0.00 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| CAR | 0.00 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Chad | 0.00 | 7 | 1.69 | -1.69 |

21 In 2022, Argentina was granted an extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline until 1 March 2026.

22 'Convención de Ottawa – Reunión intersesional (17–20 junio 2025) Intervención del Emb. Carlos Foradori – R.P. de la Argentina', Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, June 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4o1rkMF.

23 The 2023 figure is slightly higher than the 237.23km² reported in *Clearing the Mines 2024* owing to the inclusion of clearance by Algeria and revised clearance data for 2023 provided to Mine Action Review by Sri Lanka and Ukraine in 2025.

24 The 2023 figure is higher than the 192,563 AP mines reported in *Clearing the Mines 2024* owing to the inclusion of revised data on the number of AP mines destroyed in 2023 provided to Mine Action Review by Sri Lanka in 2025.

Table 4 Continued

| States Parties | Area cleared in 2024 (km²) | AP mines destroyed in 2024* | Area cleared in 2023 (km²) | Comparison to 2023 clearance (+/- km²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Colombia | 1.40 | 193 | 1.73 | -0.33 |
| Croatia | 42.51 | 1,533 | 42.07 | +0.44 |
| Cyprus | 0.00 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| DR Congo | 0.05 | 29 | 0.01 | +0.04 |
| Ecuador | 0.004 | 367 | 0.01 | -0.01 |
| Eritrea | 0.00 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ethiopia | 0.16 | 23 | 0.24 | - 0.08 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 0.00 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Iraq | 9.36 | 14,644 | 14.35 | -4.99 |
| Mali | 0.00 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mauritania | 0.02 | 17 | 0.19 | -0.17 |
| Niger | 0.00 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nigeria | 0.00 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Oman | 0.09 | 0 | 0.11 | -0.02 |
| Palestine | 0.03 | 1,455 | 0.01 | +0.02 |
| Peru | 0.02 | 746 | 0.05 | -0.03 |
| Senegal | 0.01 | 19 | 0.03 | -0.02 |
| Serbia | 0.00 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Somalia | 2.17 | 151 | 1.81 | +0.36 |
| South Sudan | 0.58 | 159 | 0.58 | 0 |
| Sri Lanka | 5.98 | 16,510 | ***5.34 | +0.64 |
| Sudan | 0.00 | 0 | 0.01 | -0.01 |
| Tajikistan | 0.42 | 2,795 | 0.41 | +0.01 |
| Thailand | 0.31 | 17,600 | 0.55 | -0.24 |
| Türkiye | 0.68 | 179 | 0.92 | -0.24 |
| Ukraine | 2.07 | 14,142 | ****0.33 | +1.74 |
| Yemen | 1.44 | 545 | 0.18 | +1.26 |
| Zimbabwe | 1.95 | 31,672 | 1.91 | +0.04 |
| **Subtotals** | **163.63** | **125,563** | **224.05** | **-60.42** |
| **Non-signatories and Other areas** | **2024 clearance (km²)** | **AP mines destroyed in 2024*** | **Area cleared in 2023 (km²)** | **Comparison to 2024 clearance (+/- km²)** |
| Armenia | 0.02 | 417 | 0 | +0.02 |
| Azerbaijan | 5.32 | 4,286 | 10.00 | -4.68 |
| Israel | 2.28 | N/R | 0.27 | +2.01 |
| Kosovo | 0.05 | 8 | 0.03 | +0.02 |
| Lao PDR | 0.09 | 162 | 0.03 | +0.06 |
| Lebanon | 0.20 | 435 | 0.29 | -0.09 |
| Morocco | No credible figure | 40 | No credible figure | Unknown |
| South Korea | 0 | 167 | 0 | 0 |
| Syria | 3.61 | 84 | 3.10 | +0.51 |
| Vietnam | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| Western Sahara | 0.19 | 22 | 0.08 | +0.11 |
| **Subtotals** | **11.76** | **5,627** | **13.80** | **-2.04** |
| **Grand Totals** | **175.39** | **131,190** | **237.85** | **-62.46** |

*Includes AP mines destroyed during clearance, technical survey, and spot tasks. **AP mine clearance total for 2023 by Algeria in 2025. Previously reported as 0m² in last year's Mine Action Review report. ***Revised AP mine clearance total for 2023 provided by Sri Lanka in 2025. This was previously reported as 4.83km² in last year's Mine Action Review report. ****Revised AP mine clearance total for 2023 provided by the Ukrainian government in 2025. This was previously reported in last year's Mine Action Review report as 0.52km² of AP mine clearance in 2023, based only on NGO operator data.

Clearing mined areas without finding any AP mines continued to occur in 2024. Among States Parties this concerned especially Angola, Colombia, Croatia, and Somalia. In Angola, this occurred over almost 1.6km² of mined area – half of total clearance for the year. Some of the tasks involved did, though, contain UXO. In Colombia, half of the area cleared in 2024 contained no AP mines. In contrast, in Cambodia only six tasks covering 158,099m² were cleared without finding any mines in 2024, a big improvement on the 25 tasks covering more than 2km² that yielded no mines during the previous year.[25]

While the amount of area cleared in 2024 in Croatia increased over the previous year, the proportion of mines cleared per square metre equates to approximately one AP mine destroyed for every 30,000m² of cleared mined area – excluding items of UXO and AV mines destroyed. This is, however, a distinct improvement on the average of one AP mine per 52,000m² Croatia managed in 2023. The Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) reported that in 2024, 24 tasks totalling 13.19km² were cleared with no AP mines found (although one AV mine and 277 items of UXO) were found.[26] In 2024, The HALO Trust cleared ten AP mined areas in Somalia covering 0.65km² that proved to have no AP mines.[27] In accordance with good practice in land release, mine clearance should only occur where firm evidence exists of actual contamination.

## PROGRESS IN ARTICLE 5 IMPLEMENTATION IN MINE-AFFECTED STATES PARTIES

While all affected States and territories are obligated under international human rights law to clear AP mines as soon as possible on the basis of their customary law duty to protect life, States Parties to the APMBC have specific time-bound deadlines. Article 5 of the APMBC requires affected States Parties to complete mine clearance **as soon as possible**, but **not later than ten years** from becoming party to the Convention. If a State Party is unable to fulfil its Article 5 obligations within the initial ten-year period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of its deadline for a period of up to ten years at a time. In recent years, however, only one affected State—Ukraine—was granted an extension for the full ten years permissible and the overall trend has been for States Parties to request shorter extension periods, often for the amount of time they require to establish a baseline of mined area and elaborate a work plan for clearance.

The extent of implementation of Article 5 clearance obligations varies widely between States Parties. **Of the 35 mine-affected States Parties as of 1 November 2025, only two States were believed to be on track to meet their respective treaty deadlines** – **Croatia**, which is just on track to meet its deadline of 1 March 2026 and **Peru**, which is on track to meet its recently extended deadline of 31 December 2029, having failed to meet its previous deadline of end of 2024. Croatia should, however, submit an extension request for consideration at 22MSP in December 2025 if there is any doubt that it will meet the deadline. As noted above, **Oman** successfully met its original Article 5 deadline of 1 February 2025 with time to spare. Hopes that Ecuador might also fulfil its Article 5 obligation by its end of 2025 deadline have been dashed and it has submitted a request to extend its deadline by two-years, for consideration at 22MSP.

Progress to complete Article 5 implementation in both **Cambodia** and neighbouring **Thailand** is now contingent on the two States reaching agreement to clear the border minefields, with the armed conflict between them in July 2025 seemingly having put paid to any early resolution of this critical issue. Cambodia has denied Thai accusations that it had newly emplaced AP mines, and the allegations remained unverified at the time of writing. At the time of writing, **Senegal** risked heading for a determination that it is using AP mines. Its ongoing refusal, including in its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, to declare whether mines remain around the Djirak or other military bases or provide detailed plans for clearing any remaining mined areas around military bases is not only an unjustified delay in clearance under Article 5 of the Convention, but also potentially constitutes prohibited use under Article 1.

The other 30 affected States Parties were either not on track to fulfil Article 5 in time or were in violation of their obligations under the Convention. Burkina Faso's Article 5 deadline expired on 1 March 2009, and its submission of an Article 5 deadline extension request in 2025 which is intended to enable it to generate a clearer understanding of the extent of new improvised AP mined area, is a welcome development. Cameroon and Mali should also each submit a request to extend their already expired respective Article 5 deadlines to address new contamination. As noted above, Mali has pledged to submit an extension request by March 2026 for consideration at 23MSP, which is a positive development. Mine Action Review recommends that Cameroon request a new deadline to conduct the necessary survey and more accurately assess the nature of the contamination, while continuing to strengthen national capacity, information management, and coordination to address the threat.

25 Emails from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 15 June 2024 and 16 May 2025.

26 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025.

27 Email from Katherine Ayres, HALO Somalia, 12 May 2025.

States in a position to provide assistance should support the three sub-Saharan States Parties that require a new Article 5 deadline (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Mali), to enable each to address AP mines of an improvised nature under the framework of the APMBC, as per their respective legal obligations. Each of these States will need to develop sustainable national capacities so they can collect, disaggregate, and record contamination data correctly, and accurately report AP mines of an improvised nature under the APMBC, as well as destroy them.

Table 5 sets forth the Article 5 deadlines for all affected States Parties in alphabetical order, assessing progress in implementation of their international legal obligations.

In 2025, 13 mine-affected States Parties were seeking an extension to their Article 5 deadline for consideration at 22MSP: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, DR Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe. As noted above,

Argentina is also seeking a further three-year extension to its Article 5 deadline, but Mine Action Review does not consider Argentina to have an outstanding Article 5 obligation as clearance of mined areas in the Falkland Islands/Las Islas Malvinas has been completed. The three States Parties whose deadline has expired—and which must request a new Article 5 deadline in order to be in compliance with the Convention—are marked in bold in Table 5.

**Table 5: Progress in Implementing Article 5 Obligations**

| State Party | Article 5 Deadline | Status of progress | Implementation priorities |
|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan | 1 March 2030 | Unclear whether on track. | The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) and the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) should increase national funding for the mine action sector and enhance the engagement of women and minorities in mine action. International donors should put funding for the Mine Action Technical Cell (MATC) on a stable, long-term basis and ensure support for national as well as international demining organisations. Lower donor financial support caused the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) to lose one third of its personnel and cut UN capacity to support coordination and quality management in 2025. |
| **Algeria** | 1 April 2017 | New extended Article 5 deadline needed to return to compliance. | Request a new Article 5 deadline. Since declaring fulfilment of Article 5 on 10 February 2017, Algeria has cleared 30km$^2$ of mined area through to the end of 2024, destroying in the process 32,269 AP mines. Completing remaining planned clearance is the clear priority. |
| Angola | 31 December 2025 | Five-year extension to 31 December 2030 requested. | The government's pledge of US$240 million to support demining, with funding going primarily to the national mine action authority (NMAA) and public operators, will be critical if Angola is to meet its new deadline. Angola should ensure all operators rigorously apply land release principles to reduce clearance of uncontaminated areas. |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 1 March 2027 | Not on track. | In line with international best practice, operators should be authorised to conduct NTS, which should be enabled in the long-delayed demining law. The BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) should also re-establish technical working groups to improve programme performance. |
| Burkina Faso | 1 March 2009 | New Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2028 requested. | Burkina Faso should formalise data collection, analysis, and sharing so as to be able to disaggregate improvised AP mines from other IEDs and AV mines. When circumstances permit, it should develop a civilian mine clearance capacity in addition to its military counter-IED capabilities. |
| Cambodia | 31 December 2025 | Five-year extension to 31 December 2030 requested. | Cambodia should prioritise mine clearance in its political, diplomatic, and military engagement with Thailand in discussions to resolve the conflict on their border. Both States should precisely define the border area where they will not permit demining pending agreed demarcation and expedite clearance of the rest. |

Table 5 Continued

| State Party | Article 5 Deadline | Status of progress | Implementation priorities |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Cameroon** | 1 March 2013 | New extended interim Article 5 deadline needed to assess extent of Article 5 obligations and ensure compliance. | Considering the number of incidents and casualties caused by IEDs reported by Cameroon, including improvised mines, Cameroon should request a new interim Article 5 deadline. This would allow time to conduct the necessary survey and better assess the nature of contamination. Cameroon should put in place a data collection mechanism and a centralised database to consolidate information on incidents and casualties, disaggregating improvised AP mines from other IEDs. An improvised AV mine that is sensitive enough to be detonated by a person should be recorded as an improvised AP mine. |
| Chad | 1 January 2030 | Not on track. | Urgently conduct NTS and systematic marking to protect civilians and livestock, and seek to prevent the misuse of explosives in gold mining. Intensify resource mobilisation to secure international financial, technical, and operational support. Submit a revised 2025–29 work plan at 22MSP, as it had pledged to do. |
| Colombia | 31 December 2025 | Five-year extension to 31 December 2030 requested. | Continue exploring strategies to reduce the amount of land cleared where no mines are found. In particular, the potential for technical survey to confirm contamination should be considered again. In 2024, Colombia adopted a new national standard integrating the "4R" (rapid response to risk reduction) approach into mine action, enhancing operations in high-risk areas. The NMAA should closely monitor and evaluate its implementation to assess its relevance and effectiveness. Ensure continuity of the Knowledge Management Platform established in 2024 as a means to unify the mine action sector and mainstream successes. |
| Croatia | 1 March 2026 | Just on track. | Make every effort, including through use of TS, to meet the 1 March 2026 deadline. But Croatia should submit an extension request for consideration at 22MSP in December 2025 if there is any doubt that it will meet the deadline. |
| Cyprus | 1 July 2028 | Not on track (lack of control of mined areas). | The Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities in the north should comply with the UN Security Council's call for an agreed work plan to complete demining of Cyprus. Cyprus and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) should update, consolidate, and align data on remaining mined areas. |
| DR Congo | 31 December 2025 | Three-year extension to 31 December 2028 requested. | Complete the necessary survey to cancel and reduce hazardous areas and to identify all mined areas, including conducting the long-delayed survey of Dungu in Haut-Uele province, and engage proactively with potential donors to address remaining contamination. Improve reliability of national database by improving NTS and the designation of hazardous areas. Ensure more accuracy and consistency of its reporting under the APMBC. |
| Ecuador | 31 December 2025 | Two-year extension to 31 December 2027 requested. | Intensify efforts to secure the international support to complete pending external quality control (QC) in Morona Santiago, Pastaza, and Zamora Chinchipe. Ensure that this is Ecuador's last extension request. |
| Eritrea | 31 December 2027 | In serious violation because of the lack of clearance. | Recommit to the APMBC and its machinery, and report to States Parties on the latest developments in Eritrea's planned restructuring of the Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA) and on results of preliminary assessments to determine a work plan. Re-start survey and clearance operations. |
| Ethiopia | 31 December 2025 | Five-year extension to 31 December 2030 requested. | Accelerate efforts to produce a national mine action strategy, in collaboration with implementing partners. Complete ongoing efforts to establish a functioning IMSMA database. |

**Table 5 Continued**

| State Party | Article 5 Deadline | Status of progress | Implementation priorities |
|---|---|---|---|
| Guinea-Bissau | 31 December 2027 | Not on track. | Maintain resource mobilisation efforts, both nationally and internationally, to ensure Article 5 implementation can continue. Allocate consistent annual funding from the national budget to the National Mine Action Coordination Centre (CAAMI) to ensure institutional continuity and avoid operational disruption. Ensure the national survey clearly disaggregates areas that contain AP mines from areas containing other explosive ordnance. |
| Iraq | 1 February 2028 | Not on track. | Provide the Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) with the legal authority, funding, and equipment to discharge its responsibilities as the NMAA and stabilise management. Urgently strengthen information management in the national programme. Establish a national mine action platform for regular dialogue among all stakeholders, including donors. |
| **Mali** | 1 March 2009 | New extended Article 5 deadline needed to return to compliance. | Submit an extension request for consideration by 23MSP at the latest. Set up an NMAA and a national structure to coordinate the humanitarian response to mine contamination. |
| Mauritania | 31 December 2026 | Not on track. | Put in place a national mine action platform/coalition forum to support resource mobilisation strategy and serve as a strategic avenue to engage potential donors. Secure operational support and funding to accelerate the pace of survey and clearance. |
| Niger | 31 December 2029 | Not on track. | Make every effort to resume survey and clearance of the remaining mined area at the Madama military base in Agadez region, whose release has been pending for five years. Re-engage with operators and donors, and ensure timely reporting under the APMBC, including submission of the annual Article 7 report, an updated work plan, and a resource mobilisation strategy. Share plans for identifying and addressing improvised mine contamination affecting several regions. |
| Nigeria | 31 December 2025 | Three-year extension to 31 December 2028 requested. | Accelerate development of its national mine action strategy and maximise in-country capacity by enabling qualified international and national mine action organisations to support survey, particularly NTS, even if restrictions on handling explosives remain in place. |
| Palestine | 1 June 2028 | Not on track (lack of control of mined areas). | Give permission for all remaining mined areas on Palestinian territory to be cleared without delay. Ensure the passage and implementation of the long-delayed national mine action law. |
| Peru | 31 December 2029 | On track. | Strive to improve operational efficiency and continue to collaborate with international partners to strengthen land release methodology, including further reviewing its national mine action standards (NMAS). Ensure evidence-based NTS and TS are conducted prior to full clearance. |
| Senegal | 1 March 2026 | Three-year extension requested, but Senegal was only granted a one-year extension to 1 March 2027 due to late submission of its Article 5 deadline extension request. Compliance with Article 5 in serious doubt regarding mined areas around military bases. | Demonstrate its commitment to the APMBC by stating definitively whether AP mines remain around the Djirak or other military bases and provide detailed plans for clearing any remaining mined areas around military bases. Establish a national mine action platform to provide a forum for discussion and improved coordination among all stakeholders. |
| Serbia | 31 December 2026 | Not on track (interim deadline). | As a matter of priority, conduct the planned survey of the suspected mined area discovered in recent years in order to determine the size of the mined areas and plan for their release. Undertake NTS and TS rather than full clearance wherever survey is the most efficient means to release part or all of mined areas. |

**Table 5 Continued**

| State Party | Article 5 Deadline | Status of progress | Implementation priorities |
|---|---|---|---|
| Somalia | 1 October 2027 | Not on track. | Ensure robust land release standards, policies, and methodologies are in place and keep full mine clearance for areas confirmed to be mined. Recognise the status of the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) in law and ensure national resources are budgeted annually for its operations. |
| South Sudan | 9 July 2026 | Four-year extension to 9 July 2030 requested. | Ensure consistent financial support for the NMAA and start to fund mine action operations directly. Publish a detailed resource mobilisation plan to match its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request work plan. |
| Sri Lanka | 1 June 2028 | Not on track. | Complete the process of developing a comprehensive baseline of mined areas. Set a realistic completion target by reassessing contamination levels and operational capacity. Ensure all of its NMAS are brought up to date and review all operator Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in line with the updated NMAS without further delay. |
| Sudan | 1 April 2027 | Not on track. | As soon as the conflict allows, re-start land release and re-survey any suspected mined areas from the ongoing conflict, along with re-survey of legacy mined areas. Update and issue a new multiyear national mine action strategic plan and develop a resource mobilisation strategy. |
| Tajikistan | 31 December 2025 | Seven-year extension requested, but Tajikistan was only granted a one-year extension to 1 March 2027 due to late submission of its Article 5 deadline extension request. | Expedite survey in order to establish a clear national baseline of mine contamination and upscale multi-task teams to address hazardous areas, which are mostly located in remote and difficult to access areas, as efficiently as possible. Seek to ensure the coming extended Article 5 period is the last. |
| Thailand | 31 December 2026 | Not on track. | Thailand should prioritise mine clearance in its political, diplomatic, and military engagement with Cambodia in discussions to resolve the conflict on their border. Both States should precisely define the border area where demining cannot proceed pending agreed demarcation and expedite clearance of the rest. |
| Türkiye | 31 December 2025 | Five-year extension to 31 December 2030 requested. | Accelerate the pace of clearance and provide further details of its plans to address contamination in non-border areas. Plan, implement, and report on mine clearance in areas controlled by Turkish forces in northern Cyprus and in areas thought likely to remain under its control in northern Syria. |
| Ukraine | 31 December 2033 | Not on track. Multiple extensions will be needed once Russian aggression has ceased and the conflict ends. In serious violation of the APMBC with respect to use of AP mines and receipt of transferred AP mines. | End use of AP mines and rescind its unlawful suspension of implementation of the APMBC. Continue to scale up capacity and, as soon as conditions allow, conduct a baseline survey of AP mine contamination in areas that can be safely accessed. |
| Yemen | 1 March 2028 | Not on track. | All parties to the conflict should cease use of mines and conform to the obligations of the APMBC. The UN, YEMAC-South, and YEMAC-North should engage constructively to develop a framework for mine action that can facilitate a resumption of international donor funding. |
| Zimbabwe | 31 December 2025 | Five-year extension to 31 December 2030 requested. | Prioritise efforts to secure additional national and international funding to complete clearance as soon as possible. Seek to ensure that this is Zimbabwe's last extension request. |

As of 1 November 2025, only Palestine and Sri Lanka were still within their respective original 10-year clearance deadline. All other States Parties had either been granted one (or more) extension periods or were currently in violation of the Convention. In 2024, the Fifth APMBC Review Conference granted further extensions to States Parties: Afghanistan, Chad, Eritrea, Cyprus, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Peru, and Serbia.

**Eritrea** is still in serious violation for its failure to resume survey or clearance of its mined areas. It was granted a three-year extension to its deadline to 31 December 2027 at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024. In order to be in compliance with Article 5, however, Eritrea must also re-start survey and clearance of its mined areas.

As a matter of international law, **Afghanistan** is represented by the Taliban government following its assumption of effective control of the territory of Afghanistan. The issue of recognition of the Taliban Government by the United Nations and individual States Parties is a separate matter from treaty application and implementation, just as it is under international humanitarian law. Since the change of regime, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) is thus bound directly by the prohibitions on production, stockpiling, transfer, and use under Article 1 of the APMBC as well as by the duty to destroy or ensure the destruction of AP mines in Afghanistan under Article 5 and the duty to report on progress under Article 7. Mine Action Review hopes that the APMBC community can find a way to enable the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) to provide substantive updates to States Parties at future treaty meetings, on key provisions such as victim assistance and clearance, even if virtually.

## PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE IN MINE-AFFECTED STATES PARTIES

To help affected States Parties and their partners focus their capacity development and technical assistance efforts on areas of need, and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of survey and clearance programmes, a performance scoring system is used by Mine Action Review. For their survey and clearance work in 2024, each of the affected States Parties was scored on the basis of the following eight criteria:

- Understanding of AP mine contamination,
- National ownership and programme management,
- Gender and diversity,
- Environmental policies and action,
- Information management and reporting,
- Planning and tasking,
- Land release system, and
- Land release outputs and Article 5 compliance.

The text box below outlines the eight programme performance criteria and key factors affecting scoring in detail.

**Mine Action Review Criteria to Assess National Programme Performance of States Parties to the APMBC**

| Criterion | Key Factors Affecting Scoring |
|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | ■ Has a national baseline of AP mine contamination been established and is it up to date and accurate?<br>■ If no national baseline, or only a partial or inaccurate baseline, exists, is survey and/or re-survey being conducted or is it planned?<br>■ Are mined areas disaggregated from areas with other types of explosive ordnance (e.g. other explosive remnants of war (ERW) such as submunitions)?<br>■ Is contamination classified into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), based on whether there is indirect or direct evidence of mines, respectively?<br>■ Is there a high ratio of CHAs to SHAs? |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | ■ Is there a national entity, such as a national mine action authority, overseeing mine action?<br>■ Is there a national mine action centre coordinating operations?<br>■ Are the roles and responsibilities in mine action clear and coherent within the national programme?<br>■ Is the mine action centre adequately staffed and skilled?<br>■ Are clearance operators involved in key decision-making processes?<br>■ Does national legislation, or other suitable administrative measures, effectively underpin the mine action programme?<br>■ Have the authorities created an enabling environment for mine action?<br>■ Has the government facilitated the receipt and efficient use of international assistance?<br>■ Is there political will for timely and efficient implementation of Article 5 of the APMBC?<br>■ Does the affected State contribute national resources to support the cost of the mine action centre and/or survey and clearance of mined areas?<br>■ Does the affected State have a resource mobilisation strategy in place for Article 5 implementation? |

**Mine Action Review Criteria to Assess National Programme Performance of States Parties to the APMBC Continued**

| Criterion | Key Factors Affecting Scoring |
|---|---|
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY**<br>(10% of overall score) | ■ Does the national mine action programme have a gender policy and implementation plan? Do the main mine action operators have one?<br>■ Is gender mainstreamed in the national mine action strategy and national mine action standards?<br>■ Are women and children in communities affected by mined areas consulted during survey and community liaison activities?<br>■ Are survey and community liaison teams inclusive and gender balanced, to facilitate access and participation by all groups, including women and children?<br>■ Are the needs of women and children in communities affected by mined areas considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities?<br>■ Are ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by mined areas consulted during survey and community liaison activities?<br>■ Do survey, clearance, and community liaison teams include representatives from different ethnic or minority groups, to facilitate access and participation by all groups?<br>■ Are the needs of ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by mined areas considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities?<br>■ Is relevant mine action data disaggregated by gender and age?<br>■ Is there equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams, including for managerial level/supervisory positions? |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION**<br>(10% of overall score) | ■ Does the national mine action programme have an environmental management policy?<br>■ Does the affected State have a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management and climate change in mine action? If yes, is it in line with IMAS 07.13?<br>■ Are environmental assessments conducted to support informed decision-making on the planning and delivery of survey and clearance tasks?<br>■ Where required, are measures implemented to prevent or minimise environmental harm, including to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, during demining operations, at demining camps, at mine action centres, and during travel?<br>■ When planning and prioritising survey and clearance tasks, is the affected State taking into account climate-related or extreme weather risks (such as increased risk of flooding that may cause operations to be stood down or potentially displace mines or even displace people into contaminated areas)? |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING**<br>(10% of overall score) | ■ Is there a national information management system in place (e.g. IMSMA), and is the data accurate and reliable?<br>■ Are data collection forms consistent and do they enable collection of the necessary data?<br>■ Is data in the information management system disaggregated by type of contamination and method of land release?<br>■ Is the data in the information management system accessible to all operators?<br>■ Are ongoing efforts being made to ensure or improve the quality of data in the mine action database?<br>■ Does the affected State Party submit accurate and timely annual Article 7 reports on Article 5 progress?<br>■ Are Article 5 deadline extension requests of a high-quality and submitted in a timely manner?<br>■ Is the survey and clearance data reported by the affected State Party (e.g. in Article 7 reporting) accurate and disaggregated by type of contamination (i.e. mines from ERW) and method of land release?<br>■ Does the affected State Party report on progress in Article 5 implementation at the Meetings of States Parties and Intersessional Meetings and is reporting accurate and consistent between reporting periods? |

**Mine Action Review Criteria to Assess National Programme Performance of States Parties to the APMBC Continued**

| Criterion | Key Factors Affecting Scoring |
|---|---|
| **PLANNING AND TASKING**<br>(10% of overall score) | ■ Is there a national mine action strategy in place and does it include realistic goals for land release?<br>■ Is there a realistic annual work plan in place for land release?<br>■ Are there agreed and specified criteria for prioritisation of tasks?<br>■ Are key stakeholders meaningfully consulted in planning and prioritisation?<br>■ Is clearance of AP mines tasked in accordance with agreed prioritisation?<br>■ Are task dossiers issued in a timely and effective manner?<br>■ Where relevant, is there a plan for dealing with residual risk and liability? Is it realistic and sustainable? |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM**<br>(10% of overall score) | ■ Does the affected State have national mine action standards in place for land release?<br>■ Do the standards enable or impede efficient evidence-based survey and clearance?<br>■ Are national standards reflected in standard operating procedures (SOPs)?<br>■ Are standards and SOPs periodically reviewed against IMAS and international best practice, in consultation with clearance operators?<br>■ Is there an effective and efficient: i) **non-technical survey** capacity, ii) **technical survey capacity**, iii) **clearance** capacity in the programme? Does this include national capacity?<br>■ Are areas being cleared that prove to have no mine contamination?<br>■ Where relevant, is there national survey and clearance capacity in place to address mines discovered after the release of mined areas or post completion?<br>■ Is there an appropriate range of demining assets (manual, mechanical, and animal detection systems) integrated into land release operations?<br>■ Is there an effective quality management system in place for survey and clearance operations?<br>■ Where an accident has occurred within a mine action programme, was there an effective investigation? Were lessons learned shared between operators? |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**<br>(20% of overall score) | ■ Is the affected State seeking to clear all AP mines from territory under its jurisdiction or control, including along national borders, in and around military installations, and in hard to access areas?<br>■ Have national mine action authorities set a target date for the completion of mine clearance and is this within the State Party's Article 5 deadline?<br>■ Is the target date for completion ambitious, yet realistic, based on existing capacity?<br>■ What were the outputs of survey and clearance of mined area in 2024, and were they greater or lesser than the previous year and why?<br>■ Are survey and clearance outputs in line with plans and Article 5 obligations?<br>■ Is the affected State on track to meet the target completion date and/or Article 5 deadline? |

In the scoring, given their relative importance, double weighting is accorded to two criteria: Understanding of AP mine contamination; and Land release outputs and Article 5 compliance. An average is then calculated that determines the overall score. A score of 8 or more is ranked Very Good. A score of 7.0–7.9 is ranked Good. A score of 5.0–6.9 is ranked Average. A score of 4.0–4.9 is ranked Poor. A score of less than 4 is ranked Very Poor.

The results of the scoring for 2024 are summarised in Table 6. The country-specific assessments of the eight criteria, which should be viewed alongside the recommendations for action in the country reports, are intended as an implementation tool to assist States Parties to identify and overcome challenges and fulfil their Article 5 obligations as efficiently as possible.

For 2024, no mine action programme was rated "Very Good". This was also the case for 2023. **Zimbabwe** remained the **top scoring State Party**. Angola, Cambodia, Oman, and Thailand were also rated Good. Ethiopia and Somalia moved up to Average from Poor, joining Afghanistan, Colombia, Croatia, DR Congo, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Türkiye. Bosnia and Herzegovina dropped to a Poor rating, joining Burkina Faso (ranked for the first time this year), Chad, Senegal, Ukraine, and Yemen. Despite remaining as Very Poor, Nigeria's performance in 2024 increased, compared to the previous year, indicating a positive trajectory as it establishes its national mine action programme. Eritrea and Niger also continued to be ranked as Very Poor for 2024, joined by Cameroon (ranked for the first time).

The greatest improvement in programme performance for 2024 was registered in Oman, followed by Peru and Ethiopia. The greatest drop in programme performance was registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by Cambodia and Niger. Overall programme performance in the 32 ranked States Parties was slightly better than in 2023, with 13 States Parties increasing their score, 8 remaining the same, 9 decreasing their score, and 2 States—Parties-Burkina Faso and Cameroon—scored for the first time.

**Table 6: Mine Action Programme Performance in Affected States Parties for 2024**

| State Party | Performance Rating for 2024 | Score for 2024 | Change from 2023 Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zimbabwe | Good | 7.9 | No change |
| Oman | Good | 7.5 | + 1.0 |
| Cambodia | Good | 7.2 | - 0.4 |
| Thailand | Good | 7.2 | - 0.2 |
| Angola | Good | 7.1 | + 0.1 |
| Colombia | Average | 6.9 | + 0.2 |
| South Sudan | Average | 6.9 | + 0.1 |
| Croatia | Average | 6.8 | No change |
| Sri Lanka | Average | 6.6 | No change |
| Tajikistan | Average | 6.5 | + 0.3 |
| Peru | Average | 6.4 | + 0.9 |
| Türkiye | Average | 6.1 | No change |
| Sudan | Average | 6.0 | - 0.3 |
| Afghanistan | Average | 5.9 | + 0.1 |
| Ecuador | Average | 5.8 | + 0.5 |
| Serbia | Average | 5.4 | - 0.2 |
| Guinea-Bissau | Average | 5.3 | - 0.1 |
| Iraq | Average | 5.3 | - 0.2 |
| Mauritania | Average | 5.3 | No change |
| DR Congo | Average | 5.2 | + 0.1 |
| Ethiopia | Average | 5.0 | + 0.6 |
| Somalia | Average | 5.0 | + 0.3 |
| Senegal | Poor | 4.7 | + 0.2 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Poor | 4.6 | - 0.5 |
| Ukraine | Poor | 4.6 | - 0.2 |
| Chad | Poor | 4.4 | No change |
| Burkina Faso | Poor | 4.3 | Not scored in 2023 |
| Yemen | Poor | 4.3 | No change |
| Nigeria | Very Poor | 3.8 | + 0.3 |
| Cameroon | Very Poor | 3.4 | Not scored in 2023 |
| Niger | Very Poor | 3.4 | - 0.4 |
| Eritrea | Very Poor | 1.6 | No change |

Four affected States Parties were not ranked: Cyprus and Palestine (not assessed due to issues related to jurisdiction or control of mined areas); and Algeria and Mali.

## THE SIEM REAP-ANGKOR ACTION PLAN

The Fifth Review Conference of the APMBC took place in Siem Reap, Cambodia on 25–29 November 2024. Under Cambodia's presidency of the Review Conference and in collaboration with States Parties, mine action NGOs, and other expert organisations, the five-year Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan (SRAAP) was elaborated, building on the Oslo Action Plan (OAP) which was adopted in 2019.

The SRAAP is a blueprint for implementation of the Convention, supporting States Parties and their implementing partners get to completion in the best way possible – efficiently, effectively, safely, and inclusively. The Action Plan has actions with measurable indicators. A baseline of the current status of implementation will be established, against which progress will be measured year-on-year up to the next Review Conference in 2029. It is essential for national authorities to have the systems in place to support implementation of the Treaty and of the SRAAP. This means ensuring that the obligations in Article 5 and the guidance provided by the SRAAP are integrated into national strategies, annual work plans, information management systems, and national mine action standards. National ownership, the subject of the first Action, is critical to successful Article 5 implementation.[28]

**Monitoring the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan**

Members of the Coordinating Committee, under the auspices of the APMBC Presidency, will be responsible for establishing a baseline value for the SRAAP and measuring progress in implementing the APMBC within their mandates, with the support of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU). The information submitted in the States Parties' annual Article 7 will serve as the main source of data to assess progress.[29]

In addition to the official APMBC monitoring of the SRAAP, Mine Action Review is also providing civil society monitoring and analysis of the implementation of the SRAAP actions relating to survey and clearance. This is based on our broader research, which includes not only official treaty reporting (Article 7 reports and official government statements and updates under the Convention), but also liaison with national mine action authorities and mine action centres, clearance operators, UNMAS, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

This year's baseline results of Mine Action Review's 2025 monitoring of survey- and clearance-related indicators in the SRAAP can be found on the Mine Action Review website. Mine Action Review welcomes feedback from States Parties and other stakeholders on the results of the assessment. Please send an email with any feedback or additional information for Mine Action Review's consideration to MineActionReview@npaid.org.

As the 2025 baseline of current progress illustrates, States Parties have not yet fully implemented the actions and indicators applicable to them. But the hope is that through the efforts of national authorities, with the support of implementing partners, they can identify where there are gaps and make progress in addressing them, which will then be reflected in progress in the indicators each year between now and the Sixth Review Conference in 2029.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Since Norway's leadership on gender and diversity during its Presidency of the Fourth Review Conference in 2019, the sector has seen significant progress in the mainstreaming of gender and diversity considerations in treaty implementation. In the Siem Reap-Angkor Declaration on a Mine-Free World 2024, adopted at the Fifth Review Conference, States Parties built on a similar commitment in the Oslo Declaration and declared: "We recognise the importance of our implementation efforts ensuring consideration for the different needs and vulnerabilities of girls, women, boys, and men, including mine victims, in mine-affected communities, as well as other factors such as disability, ethnicity, and different socio-economic groups. By ensuring an inclusive approach, including removing barriers to full, equal, and gender-balanced participation in mine action and Convention meetings, we aim to protect all people from the negative consequences of anti-personnel mines".[30] Building on the Oslo Action Plan, gender and diversity were similarly embedded throughout the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2024–2029.

With respect to Mine Action Review's assessment of the performance of States Parties against the "gender and diversity" criterion, the performance of five of 32 States Parties assessed improved in 2024 compared to the previous year, the performance of 26 States Parties remained constant, and one State Party (Afghanistan) declined in performance. Mine Action Review again scored Cambodia as the highest ranking State Party for its performance on gender and diversity in 2024. Cambodia, together with Colombia, remained the only two States Parties to achieve a rating of "Very Good". Both provide good examples to other mine-affected States Parties on what efforts can be taken to mainstream gender and diversity. While five States Parties were rated Good, fifteen were judged to be Average, five were Poor, and five were Very Poor, demonstrating there is still significant room for improvement in most affected States Parties.

28 'The States Parties have defined national ownership as entailing the following: 'maintaining interest at a high level in fulfilling Convention obligations and addressing challenges; empowering and providing relevant state entities with the human, financial and material capacity to carry out their obligations under the Convention; articulating the measures its state entities undertake to implement relevant aspects of the Convention in the most inclusive, efficient and expedient manner possible and plans to overcome any challenges that need to be addressed; and, making a regular significant national financial commitment to the state's programmes to implement the Convention'.

29 Siem Reap–Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, paragraph 5.

30 Action 5, Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029.

A selection of both positive and disappointing examples from Mine Action Review's research on affected States Parties are included below, but for additional information please see the *Gender and Diversity* section of the individual *Clearing the Mines 2025* country reports. The country reports include the number and percentage of women working at national mine action centres and clearance operators, including those in managerial/supervisory roles and operational positions.

**Cambodia** has again led the way in mainstreaming gender in its mine action programme. The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) is implementing a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine Action Plan (GMMAP) in line with the objectives of the National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025. In 2024, it adopted a national standard on mainstreaming gender and diversity in mine action, the first programme to do so, establishing mandatory requirements for operators and reinforcing a commitment to inclusion. Among operators, The HALO Trust was again a leading light, with 41% of its 1,190 staff women, and 45% of its 978 operational positions filled by women.

In **Colombia,** the Knowledge Management Platform, established in 2024, includes a technical group dedicated to cross-cutting approaches including gender and ethnicity, with the goal of promoting practical, inclusive approaches that address inequalities and reflect the diverse identities of affected populations. While the proportion of women in the National Army's Humanitarian Demining Brigade (BRDEH) and in the BDIAN (previously known as the Marine Corps Explosives and Demining Association, AEDIM) disappointingly remained extremely low, Colombia continued to have one of the highest rates of women's participation in the global mine action sector among civilian operators. The five civilian operators reported employing a total of 416 women out of 1,038 staff members in 2024 – amounting to some 40%. A majority (52%) of the employees of the coordinating OCCP-AICMA Group are women. Humanity & Inclusion (HI) has a majority (18 of 35) of its managerial/supervisory positions filled by women. In addition, all civilian demining operators have gender focal points, although their structure and responsibilities vary. What is more, in 2024, all operators reported implementing initiatives to strengthen the integration of gender and diversity in their programmes.[31] National operator the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM) organised a workshop for focal points from Afro-descendant and Indigenous communities, a community garden project linking gender-based violence prevention with land care, a cultural diversity bazaar in Putumayo, and a leadership meeting for women affected by armed conflict.

In **Angola** in 2024, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) supported the national mine action agency (ANAM) to develop its first national mine action gender equality and diversity policy. NPA was the only operator to increase the proportion of women employed in 2024, although it still lags far behind HALO, which has nearly achieved gender parity overall with 41% of its more than 1,500 staff being female. Women are, however, still under-represented in HALO's managerial and supervisory positions. In 2024, an EOD Level 2 course was completed by 11 participants, of whom five were female staff from Mines Advisory Group (MAG).

In 2025, **Cameroon** was serving as the gender focal point of the APMBC Committee on Cooperation and Assistance, but domestically, it has still to detail how gender and diversity are considered in its defence sector, and its Article 7 reporting data were not disaggregated. That said, the Cameroonian Army Engineering Corps includes women among its deminers, serving in various units, including those tasked with EOD.

**Ukraine** also appears to be making some progress in promoting gender, diversity, and inclusion. Its national mine action strategy published in 2024 contains nine measures intended to ensure equality and inclusion and specifies professional involvement in mine action of women, veterans, persons with disabilities, and victims of explosive ordnance as a State priority. A national working group on gender in mine action is up and running, and an assessment on gender and diversity in mine action was conducted for the first time in 2024.

In **Iraq**, despite increased political sensitivity around gender issues, the national mine action strategy continues to support diversity while operators have adapted recruitment and employment conditions to meet resistance posed by conservative social attitudes to women's employment in the sector. National NGO Shahreteah Humanitarian Organisation (SHO) led the sector, with women comprising nearly 40% of its staff. HALO provided childcare support for all female staff with children, helping to ensure they were able to stay in full-time employment.[32] MAG increased the number of women in leadership positions and for the first time had three national women staff in its senior management team. It introduced new recruitment standard operating procedures (SOPs) in 2024 to facilitate entry of under-represented groups and address religious diversity by accommodating observances of Christian, Yazidi, and Muslim staff as well as providing separate rest areas for men and women.[33]

In **Tajikistan**, while the mine action programme has a gender strategy few women are employed in the sector and none work in the Ministry of Defence Humanitarian Demining Company (MoD HDC), the largest operator. A gender and diversity working group did reconvene in 2024, having not met since 2022. In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**'s mine action centre (BHMAC) only 23% of staff are women. But the figures are even worse in MAG and NPA, with 13% and 12%, respectively. Moreover, among operational staff, the figures drop further – to 8% and 7%, respectively.

In **Afghanistan**, implementing partners, with DMAC's support, have been able to keep some women in office and field roles (in risk education and community liaison) but draconian Taliban restrictions on women in public life[34] continue to undercut meaningful Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) gender mainstreaming, and conditions for deploying female staff vary regionally. Funding cuts, which have impacted national implementing partners particularly severely, are driving down female employment in mine action even further.

31 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April 2025; Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025; and Juan David Arcila Collazos, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025.

32 Email from Asad Ali Husain, Programme Manager, HALO, 29 May 2025.

33 Email from Lisa Jean, Country Director, MAG, 1 May 2025.

34 In July 2025, a pre-trial chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued warrants of arrest for the Supreme Leader of the Taliban and its Chief Justice, having found reasonable grounds to believe they have committed the crime against humanity of persecution on gender grounds against girls and women. ICC, "Situation in Afghanistan: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issues arrest warrants for Haibatullah Akhundzada and Abdul Hakim Haqqani", Press release, The Hague, 8 July 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4q1Cjb0.

# ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION IN AFFECTED STATES PARTIES

In the Siem Reap-Angkor Declaration on a Mine-Free World 2024, States Parties declared that: "We recognise that climate change and environmental degradation can exacerbate challenges in affected communities and commit to adopting environmentally-sound practices and take climate considerations into account in the prioritisation and implementation of the Convention."[35] Climate and the environmental considerations have also been incorporated throughout the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, an element largely absent in the Oslo Action Plan.

Every mine action programme should systematically assess, and where possible prevent or mitigate, possible adverse environmental impacts of their activities. There is also significant potential for mine action to support efforts to stem, but also adapt to, the effects of climate change and to proactively protect the environment.

International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 on environmental management in mine action, first published in 2017, was revised and adopted in 2024 and is now entitled "Environmental management and climate change in mine action".[36] It provides a valuable framework for action by the mine action sector. In addition, a Technical Note on Mine Action (TNMA) 7.13/01,[37] published in January 2025, provides further guidance and a list of practical measures to be used by national mine action authorities, mine action centres, and mine action organisations to support the implementation of IMAS 07.13. All affected States should elaborate and implement a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management and climate change, in line with IMAS 07.13 Second Edition.

A new Mine Action Review policy brief, ***Environmental Protection in Mine Action: An Overview of Good Policy and Practice***, published in November 2024, is available for download on the Mine Action Review website. The policy brief is based on the premise that every NMAA and mine action operator should be embedding environmental and climate-change considerations at each stage of the mine action process – from planning to operations to post-clearance activities. The aim is to inspire and equip all mine action stakeholders to elaborate, adopt, and implement policies and practices that minimise environmental harm; contribute to climate resilience; and maximise the positive benefits of land release on both the human beneficiaries and the planet we all share. The policy brief serves three main purposes: guiding policy development; showcasing good practice; and advocating for greater donor engagement.

In addition, we encourage affected States and their implementing partners to make use of environmental assessment tools, such as the **Green Field Tool (GFT)** — an environmental assessment and screening tool developed by NPA and the Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS). It is designed to support environmentally responsible planning and implementation of mine action activities, including the consideration of the potential risks from the impact of climate change on mine action activities and affected communities. The tool and its supporting guidance are available on the resources page of the **environmentinmineaction.org** website. Environmental assessments should ideally be conducted as early as possible in the planning process, including during programme design, community engagement, and NTS which has the added benefit of saving workdays and reducing costs.

Several mine-affected States and other areas, such as Afghanistan, Armenia, Cambodia, Georgia, Israel, Kosovo, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Lebanon, Senegal, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen, and Zimbabwe, now have a dedicated NMAS on the environment, and others (DR Congo and Ukraine) incorporate the environment, but currently lack a dedicated environmental standard. All affected States should elaborate and implement an NMAS on environmental management and climate change, in line with IMAS 07.13. Clearance operators also have environmental policies and management systems in place at their headquarters and sometimes also in country programmes, although the comprehensiveness of these varies across organisations. Some international clearance operators now have dedicated personnel working on the environment at head office and country level.

Last year, Mine Action Review introduced a new criterion on "Environmental policies and action" to the framework used to annually assess the performance of national mine action programmes in APMBC States Parties. There continued to be significant advances in protecting the environment in certain States Parties in 2024. In some instances, the achievements were regulatory in nature, while in others, practical progress in the field was documented.

Examples of some of the latest developments are included below, but for additional information please see the *Environmental Policies and Action* section of the country reports for each State Party. As they had done a year earlier, Croatia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe again achieved the highest scores for their performance in 2024 with respect to Mine Action Review's assessment criterion of "Environmental policies and action", joined by Peru which was previously assessed as average for its performance in 2023.

In **Angola** in 2024, APOPO increased its efforts to reduce generator reliance and vegetation cutting during operations and has been undertaking an analysis of greenhouse gas emissions through standardised reporting protocols. The HALO Trust has recruited an Environment Project Coordinator and commissioned the conduct of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and an Environmental Management Plan for implementation in the second half of 2025. HALO also delivered large-scale forestry inventories for the US Forestry Service, conducted surveys

35 Siem Reap-Angkor Declaration on a Mine-Free World 2024, paragraph 13.

36 IMAS 07.13, Edition 2: "Environmental management and climate change in mine action", available at: https://www.mineactionstandards.org/standards/07-13/.

37 IMAS Technical Note for Mine Action, TNMA 07.13/01: "Environmental management and climate change in mine action", available at: https://bit.ly/3IYaWNW.

of peatland for The Nature Conservancy, and trained national conservation authority staff in drone use for habitat monitoring and protected area law enforcement.

In **Cambodia**, under the national standard, operators are required to take account of erosion or soil degradation; possible pollution of air, water, or soil; and damage to infrastructure, wildlife, and vegetation, while also dealing with litter, debris, and other waste as well as damage to heritage sites or objects. The CMAA held a two-day workshop with operators in 2024 on environmental management. NPA also rolled out its "Green Field Tool" during the year, requiring environmental impact assessments of all survey and clearance tasks.

**Iraq** ranks among the five most vulnerable nations to effects of climate change, including drought, water scarcity, flash floods, frequent sand and dust storms, and extreme heat, all of which pose a growing operational challenge. While Iraq has yet to elaborate a policy or national mine action standard on environmental management in mine action, the GICHD and the Ministry of Environment conducted a workshop in 2024 to develop approaches to environmental management in mine action. Demining organisations mostly apply their own SOPs for managing the environment and minimising harm from operations. NPA appointed an Environmental Advisor for the Iraq programme in August 2024.

**Peru** is seeking to minimise the environmental impact of demining in the Cordillera del Cóndor, aligning operations with the Master Plan for the Ichigkat National Park (2019–23). In 2024, the programme appointed an environmental focal point within CONTRAMINAS and began reviewing national mine action standards to align with IMAS 07.13 on environmental management. Its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request underscored the growing impact of climate change, with heavy rains frequently delaying operations and affecting the accuracy of CHA locations, prompting use of a 600-metre buffer zone during land release.

In **Sri Lanka**, which does not have an NMAS on environmental protection, operators and the National Mine Action Centre nonetheless consider seasonal weather changes and associated climate-related risks when planning and prioritising survey and clearance.[38] For instance, The HALO Trust prioritises areas prone to flooding or waterlogging to minimise disruption and reduce the risk of landmine movement.[39] Such areas are scheduled for clearance outside the rainy season wherever possible, guided by historical weather patterns and local knowledge. Clearance of flood-prone sites is generally advanced into the drier months when ground conditions allow safer and more efficient operations. If ground saturation occurs unexpectedly, work may be paused until conditions improve. MAG reported that the impact of climate change on seasonal rains in Sri Lanka has become increasingly evident, and in both January 2024 and January 2025, heavy rainfall caused near-total suspension of operations.[40]

In **Tajikistan**, a mine action working group on the Climate Change and Environment has been established, which includes participation from NPA, FSD, OSCE, the Humanitarian Demining Company of the Ministry of Defence, Union of Sappers of Tajikistan, and the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan. A representative of the Committee for Environmental Protection under the Government of Tajikistan will also participate in this Working group so that the planned activities are coordinated and agreed. The working group is intended to provide technical expertise, strategic advice, and coordination on climate change and environment-related issues. The first of planned bi-annual meetings was held in June 2024 to identify possible steps on how the mine action community can contribute to the environment protection.[41]

**Thailand** has had an NMAS on environmental management in place since 2010 but which is in need of revision and updating. In 2024, NPA piloted environmentally responsible planning of clearance operations in Phanom Dong Rak Wildlife Sanctuary and took new measures to manage waste in its head office and field operations and reduce vehicle emissions. NPA also held a seminar on climate awareness for NPA and Thai Mine Action Centre (TMAC) staff and co-hosted a regional workshop on tackling the environmental impact of explosive remnants of war.

In **Zimbabwe**, operators are taking a range of steps to reduce their carbon emissions. HALO field camps have been run on solar power since 2016. HALO also uses electric strimmers to clear vegetation. NPA extended solar panel installation to the remaining two of its three field camps in 2024. MAG continued to use solar power for field activities and is collecting data within its Zimbabwe programme for a global Carbon Accounting Project, which should offer further country-level advice on minimising its local environmental impact. In line with its global initiative, APOPO had a carbon sequestration plan for its Zimbabwe programme, which included emissions reduction and a primary goal to plant and monitor more than 110,000 trees.

## OUTLOOK

Huge progress has been made in implementing the obligations set out in Article 5 of the APMBC in States Parties and in improving the practices of the mine action sector more broadly. But given the potent headwinds confronting the implementation of the Convention, the decisions and actions of States Parties at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties will be critical in determining its future for years to come. Who will stand up and be counted in 2025?

38 Emails from Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 6 June 2024; Anil Udaya Kumara Kuruwita Arachchige, DASH, 10 June 2024; Cristy McLennan, MAG, 11 June 2024; and Philippa Coates, HALO, 13 June 2024.

39 Email from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025.

40 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.

41 Article 5 Extension Request of Tajikistan, 16 October 2025, p. 39.

# STATES PARTIES

# AFGHANISTAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2030

Unclear whether on track

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 182KM²

Massive
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 10.44 | 14.47 |
| Technical Survey | 0.21 | 0.29 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 39.13 | 18.04 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 5,376 (incl. 3,989 in spot tasks) | 5,971 (incl. 2,242 in spot tasks) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
- Organisation for Mine Clearance
- Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Afghanistan requested a five-year extension of its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline in 2024, which was granted at the Fifth Review Conference in Siem Reap in November. Lower donor financial support caused the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) to lose one third of its personnel and cut United Nations (UN) capacity to support coordination and quality management. Implementing partners achieved a sharp rise in land cancelled through non-technical survey (NTS) and a slight increase in clearance of areas contaminated by improvised mines but clearance of "legacy" anti-personnel (AP) mines fell sharply.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) should increase and expedite delivery of national funding for the mine action sector, including by integrating demining into projects undertaken by government ministries.**
- **The IEA and the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) should enhance the participation of women in mine action.**
- **International donors should put funding for the critical support provided by the Mine Action Technical Cell (MATC) on a stable, long-term basis.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Afghanistan has a good, if incomplete, knowledge of pre-2001 or legacy AP mine contamination and improving knowledge of improvised mine contamination but still locates significant amounts of previously unrecorded mined area. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | The MAPA is nationally managed but heavily dependent on international funding. Diplomatic isolation and reduced donor support since the 2021 Taliban takeover left DMAC with only a skeleton management team and has severely impacted UN coordination support. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 3 | 4 | Implementing partners, with DMAC's support, have been able to keep some women in office and field roles (risk education and community liaison) but draconian Taliban restrictions on women in public life undercut meaningful MAPA gender mainstreaming, and conditions for deploying female staff vary regionally. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Afghanistan has a national mine action standard on environmental management and DMAC says operational planning considers environmental factors. Implementing partners have standard operating procedures on managing environmental impact that align with local conditions and international operators also follow their organisations' global policies. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 5 | DMAC and the MATC largely cleared the backlog of reports waiting to be uploaded after the hiatus following the August 2021 change of regime and DMAC is moving ahead with plans to upgrade the database from Information Management System for Mine Action New Generation to Core. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 5 | DMAC set out a five-year strategy in its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, including clearance milestones released in March, but its ambitious targets looked largely aspirational in the absence of donor funding to implement them. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | The MAPA has national mine action standards (AMAS) in Dari and English that are subject to regular review but which may need comprehensive updating. Reduced donor funding has severely impacted quality management capacity. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | The IEA was granted a five-year extension to Afghanistan's Article 5 deadline but steep declines in donor support have resulted in cuts in MAPA workforce that threaten to undermine its clearance targets. But in 2024, cancellation through NTS more than doubled which offset steep declines in clearance. |
| **Average Score** | **5.9** | **5.8** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA)
- Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)
- Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA)
- Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)
- Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
- Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC)
- Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR)
- Starlight Afghan Demining Services Company (SADC)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

### OTHER ACTORS

- UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)/Mine Action Technical Cell (MATC)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Afghanistan estimated conventional and improvised AP mined area as covering 182km² at the end of 2024 (see Table 1), 3% more than a year earlier, reflecting increased knowledge of the improvised mine threat. The level of contamination by "legacy" conventional AP mines was 8% lower than at the end of 2023.[1] Operators identified 2.7km² of previously unrecorded mined area in 2024, a fraction of what they found in 2023 (49km²), and mostly located in the eastern half of the country.[2]

**Table 1: Mined area by contamination type (at end 2024)[3]**

| Contamination type | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AP mines | 1,235 | 90,240,361 | 40 | 13,066,524 | 103,306,885 |
| Improvised mines | 2,165 | 70,257,949 | 12 | 8,652,148 | 78,910,097 |
| **AP mined area totals** | **3,400** | **160,498,310** | **52** | **21,718,672** | **182,216,982** |
| AV mines | 1,049 | 170,312,576 | 107 | 38,779,458 | 209,092,034 |
| **Mined area totals** | **4,449** | **330,810,886** | **159** | **60,498,130** | **391,309,016** |

CHA = Confirmed hazardous area SHA = Suspected hazardous area

Legacy mine contamination, dating from before 2001, affects 30 (90%) of Afghanistan's 34 provinces but has fallen by one third – from 152km² at the end of 2020 to 103km² four years later. The mines, which are mainly concentrated in north eastern and central provinces, notably Baghlan, Badakshan, Kabul and Parwan (see Table 2), result from the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet invasion of 1979, the 1992–96 internal armed conflict, and the 1996–2001 fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Much of what remains after two decades of clearance is located in remote and mountainous areas and as a result receives a lower clearance priority than other forms of explosive ordnance, which cause a higher number of casualties.

**Table 2: AP mined area (excluding improvised mines) by region (at end 2024)[4]**

| Region | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North-east | 445 | 31,429,918 | 8 | 1,755,310 | 33,185,228 |
| Central | 335 | 24,188,864 | 3 | 587,544 | 24,776,408 |
| South | 55 | 5,593,236 | 0 | 0 | 5,593,236 |
| West | 89 | 12,265,780 | 0 | 0 | 12,265,780 |
| South-east | 122 | 7,871,104 | 7 | 924,985 | 8,796,089 |
| North | 70 | 2,523,304 | 0 | 0 | 2,523,304 |
| East | 76 | 6,368,155 | 0 | 0 | 6,368,155 |
| **Totals** | **1,192** | **90,240,361** | **18** | **3,267,839** | **93,508,200** |

Improvised mines extensively used in the years leading to up to the Taliban's 2021 takeover have been identified in 26 provinces,[5] but are heavily concentrated in the south-west. Estimates of contamination continue to rise, increasing 24% in 2024 to 79km², although close to 90% is in SHAs (see Table 3). Almost all (99%) of confirmed contamination is in Kandahar province which, together with neighbouring Helmand and the south-eastern province of Ghazni, account for 61% of the total estimated contamination.[6]

1 Email from Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 26 March 2025.
2 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025. The total included 161,599m² contaminated by a mix of AP and AV mines and other ERW.
3 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025.
4 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March and 15 July 2025.
5 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 45.
6 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025.

**Table 3: Improvised AP mined area by region (at end 2024)[7]**

| Region | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North-east | 2 | 52,268 | 28 | 266,612 | 318,880 |
| Central | 0 | 0 | 276 | 7,615,026 | 7,615,026 |
| South | 7 | 8,568,085 | 987 | 36,852,872 | 45,420,957 |
| West | 0 | 0 | 243 | 6,128,494 | 6,128,494 |
| South-west | 0 | 0 | 9 | 252,315 | 252,315 |
| South-east | 0 | 0 | 354 | 10,856,249 | 10,856,249 |
| North | 3 | 31,795 | 118 | 2,718,094 | 2,749,889 |
| East | 0 | 0 | 149 | 5,568,287 | 5,568,287 |
| **Totals** | **12** | **8,652,148** | **2,164** | **70,257,949** | **78,910,097** |

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

More than 90% of Afghanistan's explosive ordnance casualties in 2024 were caused by unexploded ordnance.[8] Contamination includes cluster munition remnants (CMR) affecting around 9km² (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report) and a significant threat from anti-vehicle (AV) mines (see Table 4). Afghanistan's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request identified 1,015 areas affected by AV mines only, covering more than 172km² at the start of 2024.[9] The end of active conflict after the change of government opened areas previously shut off by insecurity such as Ghazni, Wardak, and Zabul, which had AV mined areas inside villages that are a high priority for clearance.[10]

Afghanistan recorded 166km² of unspecified explosive remnants of war (ERW) at the start of 2024 but said it also had 38 former firing ranges used by International Security Assistance Forces in 15 provinces and which cover an estimated 632km², although it expected that survey would significantly reduce this area.[11]

**Table 4: Other explosive ordnance contamination[12]**

| Contamination | CHAs | Area (km²) | SHAs | Area (km²) | Total area (km²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AV mines | 921 | 153.1 | 94 | 19.3 | 172.4 |
| CMR | 15 | 9.2 | 0 | 0 | 9.2 |
| ERW | 465 | 165.7 | 2 | 0.02 | 165.7 |
| **Totals** | **1,401** | **328.0** | **96** | **19.32** | **347.3** |

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

MAPA's management structure has remained unchanged since the Taliban takeover of government in 2021. The mine action sector falls under the authority of a High Commission for Disaster Management led by a first deputy prime minister and supported by an interministerial board.[13] Afghanistan's National Disaster Management Authority remains in the role of a national mine action authority (NMAA), setting overall policy, while DMAC continues to be responsible for strategic planning; managing and coordinating survey and clearance operations; risk education, victim assistance, information management; and quality management (QM). The IEA-appointed director of DMAC has commented that the only change resulting from the change of government was in the personnel running it.[14]

DMAC's capacity remains severely constrained by the international sanctions imposed on the IEA regime and a sharp downturn in the donor funding on which the MAPA has always been largely dependent. DMAC completed the transition from being a project of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to national management in 2018. By 2021, the Government of Afghanistan paid salaries of only 15 of DMAC's 155 staff, the rest being paid by UNMAS and the US Department of State's Office of Political and Military Affairs (PM/WRA) through ITF Enhancing Human Security.[15]

7 Ibid.
8 UNMAS Afghanistan Monthly Updates, February 2025.
9 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2024, p. 6.
10 Interview with Farid Homayoun, Country Director, HALO, Kabul, 4 June 2022; and email, 22 June 2023.
11 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6, 35, 62 and 64.
12 Ibid., pp. 46–47.
13 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 31 May 2025, pp. 9-10.
14 Interview with Qari Nooruddin Rustamkhail, Director, DMAC, in Kabul, 4 June 2022.
15 Email from Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, DMAC, 17 March 2021.

After August 2021, international sanctions imposed on the IEA ended the cooperation agreement between UNMAS and DMAC, and DMAC technical staff on internationally funded salaries mostly transferred to UNMAS. In March 2025, DMAC employed 13 civil servants, including its director, and one contractor. Other DMAC staff included the Quality Management Senior Manager, Chief of Operations, and Head of Coordination, and managers of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), planning, mechanical demining, mine detection dogs (MDDs), risk education, information, and investigations.[16]

A UN Security Council resolution from March 2022, which was renewed in 2025, mandated UNAMA to "advise and coordinate explosive ordnance threat mitigation measures in support of humanitarian and development initiatives, support the coordination of the humanitarian mine action sector."[17] DMAC and UNMAS cooperated through a series of interim arrangements designed to continue UN coordination and technical support for the MAPA, but they proved short term due to disagreements and financial shortfalls.[18] These culminated in an October 2023 agreement on the UN providing cooperation through a Mine Action Technical Cell. The MATC employed 51 people at the end of 2024 supporting planning and prioritisation, operations coordination (six staff), information management (five staff), and quality management (fourteen staff), along with risk education, victim assistance, and gender and diversity. It also operated four regional offices in Kabul (covering the central region), Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Kunduz.[19]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

National funding for mine action since 2021 was limited to the government paying the salaries of 14 DMAC staff and "some operational expenses," reportedly amounting to a total of about $40,000 a year.[20] Afghanistan's updated Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 deadline extension request submitted in 2025 reported that DMAC had established a Resource Mobilisation Team which met ANDMA's leadership in December 2024 and later with the Prime Minister's Office. The team concluded that "it is highly likely that the IEA will consider some funding" for clearance of explosive ordnance.[21] In 2024, the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum funded some mine and battle area clearance by DAFA around the Aynak copper mines.[22] The government has made no commitment as of July 2025 but DMAC hoped State funding would be available in late 2025 or early 2026.[23]

Cuts in donor support for the MAPA resulted in mass lay-offs of deminers in 2024 and 2025 affecting all implementing partners but particularly national implementing partners (IPs). The suspension of US funding in February 2025 halted 10 projects employing 95 teams and 755 personnel, including 88 teams and 698 staff engaged in land release. It also severely impacted the MATC's support for planning, tasking, and coordination.[24]

The MATC, which received PM/WRA funding for January to August 2024 and from Germany for September to December 2024, was expecting to receive PM/WRA funding for the period January through October 2025. The suspension of PM/WRA funding resulted in the MATC cutting its staff by 73% to 14, and closing three of its four provincial offices (Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Kunduz) with the loss of regional staff and all quality management in the field.[25] The MATC was preparing to shut down at the end of July 2025 and had issued staff termination notices but the UK stepped in with funding from 1 August 2025 until the end of March 2026. The funding covered employment of nine technical staff in Kabul but also allowed for recruitment of six quality management officers (down from thirteen in 2024) and planning for a resumption of field visits.[26]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Draconian Taliban policies excluding women from public life have still left some space for their engagement in sectors such as health and mine action. Afghanistan's APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2024 said that DMAC, in consultation with IPs, had developed a gender and diversity mainstreaming policy for the MAPA.[27] The CCM Article 4 deadline extension request affirms that its mine action programme is gender sensitive; that planning and prioritisation consider the needs and priorities of all; and that IPs have gender focal-points.[28]

16 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025.

17 UN Security Council Resolution 2626, 17 March 2022, operative para. 5(j). Operative para. 3 of Council Resolution 2777 of 17 March 2025 extended UNAMA's mandate until 17 March 2026 "as defined in" Resolution 2626.

18 For more details on mine action coordination and the role of the UN after August 2021 see *Clearing the Mines 2023*, pp. 31–34.

19 Emails from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, Senior Technical Adviser, Mine Action Section, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 12 March 2025; and Mohammad Akhbar Oriakhil, Mine Action Operations Officer, UNMAS Afghanistan, 11 June 2025.

20 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 12 January 2025.

21 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 12 January 2025; and Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, p. 15.

22 Email from Bismillah Haqmal, Operations and Planning Manager, DAFA, 17 August 2025.

23 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 15 July 2025.

24 UNMAS, "The Funding Cessation Impact on Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan", PowerPoint presentation, 5 April 2025.

25 Email from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, Mine Action Section, UNAMA, 12 March 2025; and 'Funding Cessations Impact on Mine Action Coordination, MATC PowerPoint Presentation, 7 April 2025.

26 Online interview with Nick Pond, Chief of Mine Action Section, UNAMA, and Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, UNAMA, 13 August 2025.

27 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 41.

28 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 31 May 2025, pp. 17–18.

DMAC says it has government permission for women to work in the mine action sector and they can operate without facing any issues in all of the 32 provinces, with the exception of Kandahar and Uruzgan[29] and IPs also identify Helmand as particularly difficult. In practice, IPs report that although they continue to deploy women in *maharam*[30] teams for risk education and victim assistance, their involvement is limited. Operators say it depends on what local authorities permit, which is not consistent, and that it limits outreach to women and children. Not all IPs have gender focal points.

Most national IPs employed only a handful of female staff in 2024: ATC reported employing six women in its staff of 239, and OMAR a single female employee among its 64 staff.[31]

Funding cuts, which have impacted national IPs particularly severely, are driving down female employment in mine action even further. DAFA reported employing a gender focal point and 12 female staff in 2024 with funding from the UN's Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund. It expected the number of female staff to fall to six in 2025.[32] MCPA, which employed six women in its staff of 133, said they would be out of a job in May 2025.[33] The 2,450 MAPA personnel working at the end of 2024, included 84 women and 13 persons with disabilities. The US suspension of funding in February 2025 halted employment of 30 women and three persons with disabilities.[34]

**Table 5: Gender composition of international operators in 2024**[35]

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DRC | 355 | 36 (10%) | 62 | 1 (2%) | 175 | 34 (19%) |
| FSD | 43 | 0 (0%) | *2 | *1 (50%) | 40 | 0 (0%) |
| HALO | 1,996 | 28 (1%) | 25 | 3 (12%) | 1,381 | 22 (2%) |
| **Totals** | **2,394** | **64 (3%)** | **89** | **5 (6%)** | **1,596** | **56 (4%)** |

*Based outside Afghanistan.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Afghanistan's national mine action standard (AMAS) 07.06 addresses environmental management, climate change and sets out an environmental protection policy. It requires operators to ensure environmental factors are considered in the planning of operations; that they conduct environmental impact assessments close to protected locations or where there is uncertainty about the environmental impact of operations; and that they include environmental factors in post-demining impact assessments.[36]

DMAC factors a range of environmental issues into operational planning. These range from seasonal issues such as snow cover affecting deployment in mountainous to dealing with flood risks and ensuring deployment of machinery compatible with local conditions.[37] Challenges that affected mine action in 2024 included heavy rain and severe flooding in the north-east interrupting operations and displacing mines and ERW.[38]

Most IPs have their own standard operating procedures (SOPs) aligned with the local context. HALO, reporting that it is giving higher priority to environmental issues in all its programmes, pursued a project focused on regenerative agriculture in Kandahar province and the impact of mine clearance on soil quality. It employs solar panels to power offices and demining camps and has contracted an Afghan non-profit NGO, Ecology and Conservation of Afghanistan (ECO-A), to advise on post-clearance activities.[39]

29 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025.
30 Maharam teams combine a female staff member and male relative.
31 Emails from Farid Elmi, Operations Manager, ATC, 8 July 2025; and Abid Fzel, Deputy Programme Manager, OMAR, 28 March 2025.
32 Emails from Bismillah Haqmal, DAFA, 17 and 18 August 2025.
33 Email from Mir Mohammad, Executive Operations Manager, MCPA, 27 March 2025.
34 Email from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, MATC, 12 March 2025.
35 Emails from Hannah Rose Holloway, Head of Humanitarian Disarmament, DRC, 1 May 2025; and Farid Homayoun, HALO, 16 April 2025.
36 AMAS 07.06 Environmental management in mine action, March 2017.
37 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 5 June 2024.
38 Emails from Farid Homayoun, HALO, 16 April 2025; and Mir Mohammad, MCPA, 27 March 2025.
39 Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO, 16 April 2025.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The MAPA is supported by an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation database overseen by DMAC with support in 2024 of five IM staff from the MATC. After major disruption in information management between the change of regime in August 2021 and DMAC's agreement with the MATC in October 2023, it inherited a backlog of around 28,000 unprocessed reports. It reported clearing the backlog in 2024 alongside the year's reports of IP operations. MATC retained five IM staff in 2025 despite sharp human resource cuts imposed in January 2025 as a result of the PM/WRA's suspension of funding.[40]

DMAC had planned to upgrade the database to IMSMA Core since before the change of government in August 2021. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) visited Afghanistan in May 2025 to conduct an assessment and IM workshops. DMAC expected work on the upgrade to start in late 2025 and for the process to last about two years.[41]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

DMAC submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request in March 2024 asking for an additional five years until 31 March 2030 to achieve completion of AP mines and all other explosive ordnance at a projected total cost of $256 million.[42] The request provided for a three-year village-by-village re-survey of Afghanistan's 23 provinces to be conducted by 54 quick response teams (QRT) at a projected cost of $10.5 million, starting in April 2025. It included a multi-year work plan which sets annual targets for clearance of AP mines and other ordnance. It envisaged completing clearance of all improvised mine contamination estimated to cover 63.5km$^2$ in the first three years of the extension period.[43]

**Table 6: Article 5 deadline extension request clearance targets (m$^2$)[44]**

| | 2025–26 | 2026–27 | 2027–28 | 2028–29 | 2029–30 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Improvised mines | 8,617,978 | 19,741,276 | 15,175,976 | 0 | 0 |
| AP mines | 10,047,341 | 19,006,446 | 22,511,895 | 19,454,212 | 20,737,263 |
| AP/AV mines | 2,173,789 | 3,199,506 | 4,105,927 | 6,152,924 | 5,406,458 |

However, some assumptions and targets were quickly overtaken by developments. Improvised mine contamination estimated at 63.5km$^2$ in the extension request had increased to 79km$^2$ by the end of 2024 and total AP mine contamination had risen from 176km$^2$ in the request to 182km$^2$. The work plan called for deploying a total of 472 teams in 2025, including 269 teams to clear IM, 44 for AP mines, and 54 for survey/EOD.[45]

IPs are tasked by DMAC with support from MATC in planning and prioritising operations. IPs reported DMAC convened regular meetings to discuss strategic plans and operational issues. Improved security since the Taliban takeover in 2021 has opened access to areas where their movement was previously curbed or prevented by conflict, but IPs reported sporadic obstacles to securing permission for international staff to travel to provinces and further intermittent obstruction by authorities at a local level. HALO experienced three occasions when staff were temporarily detained by local authorities and occasions where non-technical survey (NTS) teams' GPS devices were confiscated. Operators also reported local demands for clearance of tasks which did not fall within SOPs or operating criteria.[46]

40 Email from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, Mine Action Section, UNAMA, 12 March 2025.

41 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March and 15 July 2025; and from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, Mine Action Section, UNAMA, 12 March 2025; and interview with Russell Bedford, Country Director, and with Mats Hektor, Senior Technical Adviser, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 5 May 2025.

42 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 71.

43 Ibid., p. 58.

44 Ibid., p. 64.

45 Ibid., pp. 65–66.

46 Emails from Hannah Rose Holloway, DRC, 1 May 2025; and Farid Homayoun, HALO, 16 April 2025.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

The MAPA has comprehensive NMAS that are compliant with IMAS. Before the change of government in August 2021 and the disruption to MAPA management, DMAC had reviewed them annually and amended them in consultation with IPs. In 2019, Afghanistan became the first country to release a standard for clearance of improvised mines (AMAS 06.09).[47] It was updated in 2023 to provide for mechanical clearance.[48]

The 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline extension request states that all standards were under review and that updated standards would be released in 2025 for land release, clearance, NTS, and technical survey (TS).[49] DMAC reported the AMAS review process started in 2024 with the establishment of a technical working group and the first workshop was held in February 2025. It expected all standards and SOPs would be updated in the course of 2025.[50]

MAPA land release results have previously drawn attention for the persistently high percentage of full clearance, averaging 78% between 2018 and 2020,[51] calling into question the efficiency of the MAPA survey and land release practices, but the balance has shifted. Official data showed full clearance accounted for a little over half the total area released in 2023 and a little under half (46%) in 2024.[52]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

MAPA staffing fell by approximately one third in 2024 as a result of donor funding cuts and it experienced further lay-offs in 2025. The MAPA operated 360 teams in 2023, employing approximately 3,600 personnel in survey, clearance, EOD, risk education, and victim assistance.[53] At the end of 2024, it had a total of 285 teams employing 2,450 personnel, of which national IPs had 56 teams with 669 personnel. US stop-work orders in February 2025 halted operations by 67 teams employing a total of 543 personnel.[54] By July 2025, the MAPA operated a total of 188 teams, including 85 conducting clearance as well as 47 QRTs. The remainder included 14 NTS teams, 39 risk education teams and 3 victim assistance teams.[55]

Donor funding cuts have reduced the operating capacity of all IPs but particularly national IPs that lack international network support. DAFA, alone among national IPs, appears to have employed more staff in 2024 than the previous year, with manual teams and QRT funded by the United Kingdom, the UN's Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund (AHF), and the UN Central Emergency Response Fund conducting clearance of legacy and improvised mines.[56] ATC was assigned a survey, clearance, and risk education project funded by the AHF in July 2024 for which it added 65 personnel, but said the loss of US funding in 2025 would result in it laying off 174 staff.[57] MCPA, on completion of a clearance project funded by the AHF in 2024, laid off 108, mostly clearance staff. In 2022, MCPA operated 37 manual clearance teams employing 370 deminers.[58] At the start of 2025, it reported employing two manual clearance teams with a total of twenty-five deminers, but had two survey projects under way funded by the UN and due for completion in July 2025.[59] MDC reported laying off 252 field staff in 2024.[60] OMAR, which had operated 41 manual teams with 738 deminers at the end of 2022, deployed 14 teams and 208 deminers in 2024, but had released almost all field operations staff by the end of the year.[61]

Among the international operators, Danish Refugee Council (DRC) assigned more teams to clearing improvised mines in 2024 than the previous year but its overall manual clearance capacity fell by more than half from 13 teams employing 104 deminers in 2023 to six teams with 36 deminers in 2024.[62] In 2024, the Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) lost funding from a key donor, the Patrip Foundation, which resulted in its laying off manual clearance, risk education, and victim assistance staff. Its demining capacity fell from five teams with 80 deminers in 2023 to two teams with 43 deminers in 2024 and the loss of PM/WRA funding in 2025 has resulted in further cuts.[63]

HALO, much the biggest operator in Afghanistan with a programme spanning survey, mine and battle area clearance, weapons and ammunition disposal, and risk education, reduced overall staffing from 1,913 in 2023 to 1,851 in 2024, and braced for further staff losses in 2025. Clearance of improvised mines remained HALO's operational priority, and despite cuts in other parts of the programme it maintained the same number of deminers on this activity in 2024.[64]

47 AMAS 06.10, March 2019, p. 5; Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form F, p. 15.
48 Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO, 15 July 2024.
49 Revised 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
50 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025.
51 See for example GICHD, Integrated Capacity Assessment Report, 5 July 2019 (draft), p. 7.
52 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 8 May 2024 and 26 March 2025.
53 Interview with Nick Pond, UNAMA, 28 April 2024.
54 Email from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, Mine Action Section, UNAMA, 12 March 2025.
55 Online interview with Nick Pond and Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, UNAMA, 13 August 2025.
56 Emails from Bismillah Haqmal, DAFA, 17 and 18 August 2025.
57 Email from Farid Elmi, Operations Manager, ATC, 8 July 2025.
58 Emails from Mir Mohammad, MCPA, 5 and 12 April 2023.
59 Email from Mir Mohammad, MCPA, 27 March 2025.
60 Email from Mohammad Shoab Hakimi, Director, MDC, 16 March 2025.
61 Email from Abid K. Fazel, Head of Programmes, OMAR, 28 March 2025.
62 Emails from Hannah Rose Holloway, Head of Humanitarian Disarmament, DRC, 23 April and 21 July 2024 and 1 May 2025.
63 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiom, Programme Manager for Central Asia, FSD, 25 March 2025.
64 Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO, 16 April 2025.

NPA in 2024 had 18 staff providing third party monitoring of PM/WRA funded projects but following the change of administration in the United States it received a stop-work order in January 2025 and final termination notice in April 2025. By the end of March 2025, NPA retained only the country director, a senior technical adviser, and national administrative staff required to complete closure of the US project by early August 2025, while exploring possibilities for continuing support for the MAPA.[65]

**Table 7: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024[66]**

| Operator | Manual clearance teams | Total deminers | Animal detection capacity (dogs and handlers) | Machines/ personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ATC | 9 | 84 | 0 | 1/4 | Includes one team/4 personnel on improvised mine clearance. Also 1 QRT team/3 staff |
| DAFA | 6 | 93 | 0 | 3/12 | Also 11 QRT teams/66 personnel and 11 teams/187 conducting battle area clearance |
| DRC | 3 | 36 | 0 | 5/15 | Also deployed 10 quick reaction teams/30 personnel |
| FSD | 2 | 43 | 0 | 0 | |
| HALO | 70 | 739 | 0 | 23/153 | 30 AP manual teams/351 deminers and 40 IM teams/388 deminers. Also 2 QRT teams/9 personnel |
| MCPA | 5 | 25 | 0 | 1/3 | |
| MDC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7/0 | |
| OMAR | 14 | 208 | 0 | 1/4 | 10 AP teams/180 deminers, 4 IM teams/28 deminers |
| **Totals** | **109** | **1,228** | **0** | **41/191** | |

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Despite severe funding pressures, Afghanistan appears to have released close to the same amount of mined area in 2024 as the previous year. The MAPA released a total of 49.7km$^2$ through survey and clearance in 2024, according to official data (see Table 8).[67] This was 50% more than the 32.8km$^2$ officially recorded in 2023, when the national database was still catching up with a backlog of operating results, and slightly (4%) below the 52km$^2$ that IPs reported releasing in 2023.[68]

**Table 8: Mined area release in 2024[69]**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km$^2$) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 10.4 | |
| **Technical Survey** | 0.2 | |
| **Non-Technical Survey** | 39.1 | Includes 11km$^2$ cancelled through NTS. |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 5,376 | Includes 3,989 during spot tasks: 386 legacy and 3,603 improvised mines. |

65 Online interview with Russel Bedford, Country Director, and Mats Hektor, Senior Technical Adviser, NPA, 5 May 2025.

66 Emails from Farid Elmi, ATC, 8 July 2025; Bismillah Haqmal, DAFA, 17 August 2025; Hannah Rose Holloway, DRC, 1 May 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiom, FSD, 25 March 2025; Farid Homayoun, HALO, 16 April 2025; Mir Mohammad, MCPA, 27 March 2025; and Abid K. Fazel, OMAR, 28 March 2025.

67 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025.

68 See Mine Action Review, *Clearing the Mines 2024*, p. 38.

69 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March and 15 July 2025.

DMAC reported the destruction of 5,376 AP mines in 2024 to Mine Action Review, including 687 conventional AP mines and 4,689 improvised mines.[70] This represented a 10% drop compared with the previous year, much smaller than the drop in the area released through clearance and reflecting the predominant role of items destroyed in EOD operations, which accounted for nearly three quarters of the total.[71] Afghanistan's Article 7 report for 2024 recorded a slightly higher total of 5,417 AP mines destroyed – 695 conventional mines and 4,722 improvised mines.[72]

## SURVEY IN 2024

DMAC reported that IPs conducted village-by-village survey in 14 provinces and completed the survey of 45 districts in 2024. The survey found 52 previously unrecorded conventional AP mined areas (recorded as hazardous area, HAs) covering 2.9km$^2$ and 114 improvised mine "HAs" covering 2.5km$^2$.[73]

NTS resulted in release of a total of 39km$^2$, according to official data (see Table 9). This included 28km$^2$ that DMAC reported was cancelled by its staff conducting assessments to confirm survey reports of hazardous areas that lacked direct evidence or were located in areas not linked to military activity.[74]

**Table 9: Release of AP mined areas through NTS in 2024 (DMAC data)**

| Operator | Legacy AP mines (m²) | Improvised AP mines (m²) | Total area released (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| DAFA | 9,320 | 114,106 | 123,426 |
| DRC | 1,556,971 | 377,836 | 1,934,807 |
| DMAC | 800,000 | 27,206,884 | 28,006,884 |
| HALO | 1,143,483 | 581,382 | 1,724,865 |
| MCPA | 5,283,542 | 1,742,877 | 7,026,419 |
| OMAR | 4,868 | 309,875 | 314,743 |
| **Totals** | **8,798,184** | **30,332,960** | **39,131,144** |

However, DMAC's data indicated IPs cancelled 11km$^2$ through NTS in 2024, half the amount recorded by the six IPs that provided details of their operations to Mine Action Review (see Table 10). They reported cancelling 5.8km$^2$ of suspected improvised mine hazards and nearly 17km$^2$ of suspected legacy mine contamination, including 10km$^2$ reportedly cancelled by OMAR in the course of implementing two contracts, one from the PM/WRA and a second from the UN. IPs also reported reduction through technical survey (TS) of nearly 2km$^2$ in 2024 compared with reduction of 0.2km$^2$ recorded by DMAC.[75]

**Table 10: Release of AP mined area through NTS in 2024 (IP data)**

| Operator | Legacy AP mines (m²) | Improvised mines (m²) | All mined area combined (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATC | 382,643 | 765 | 383,408 |
| DAFA | 0 | 1,039 | 1,039 |
| DRC | 635,112 | 1,299,937 | 1,935,049 |
| HALO | 380,157 | 2,783,920 | 3,164,077 |
| MCPA | 5,457,290 | 1,739,026 | 7,196,316 |
| OMAR | 10,095,186 | 12,205 | 10,095,186 |
| **Totals** | **16,950,388** | **5,836,892** | **22,775,075** |

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

DMAC and IP data largely align on clearance of AP mines totalling a little over 10km$^2$ in 2024 (see Tables 11 and 12), down 28% from the previous year's official total.[76] IPs foresaw a further steep decline in 2025 following the loss of funding from the US and other donors.

70 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025.

71 Ibid.

72 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

73 Ibid. The survey also recorded 170 AV mined areas covering 11km$^2$ and 40 areas contaminated by ERW covering 11.75km$^2$.

74 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 16 July 2025.

75 Emails from Farid Elmi, ATC, 8 July 2025; Hannah Rose Holloway, DRC, 1 May 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiom, FSD, 25 March 2025; Farid Homayoun, HALO, 16 April 2025; Mir Mohammad, MCPA, 27 March 2025; and Abid K. Fazel, OMAR, 28 March 2025.

76 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025.

The 2024 total included 6.75km² of area containing improvised mines, a small increase on the previous year's result and reflecting the priority given to clearance of these hazards. HALO, while reducing staff in response to funding cuts, maintained its capacity to deal with improvised mines.[77] The progress of clearance, however, has seen a decline in the number of improvised mines destroyed – from 1,590 in 2023 (DMAC data) to 1,086.

**Table 11: Clearance of improvised mines in 2024 (DMAC data)**

| Operator | Province/district | Area cleared (m²) | Improvised mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATC | Maydan Wardak/Central/Saidabad | 10,011 | 0 |
| DAFA | Hilmand, Kandahar, Kunduz, Logar | 240,174 | 49 |
| DRC | Hilmand- Nangarhar | 986,715 | 61 |
| HALO | Ghazni, Ghor, Hilmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul | 5,239,626 | 870 |
| MCPA | Kunduz, Laghman, Nangarhar | 135,818 | 52 |
| OMAR | Baghlan, Kunduz | 80,462 | 54 |
| SADC | Balkh | 2,338 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **6,695,144** | **1,086** |

Clearance of legacy/conventional AP mines dropped sharply to 3.7km², less than half the level recorded by DMAC in 2023. DRC and HALO deployed more capacity to tackle unexploded ordnance (UXO) as well as improvised mine clearance to deal with the type of explosive ordnance causing the most casualties.[78] OMAR also focused on battle area clearance but undertook AP mine clearance in Kunar province with funding from the UN.[79]

**Table 12: Legacy AP mine clearance in 2024 (DMAC data)**

| Operator | Province/district | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATC | Baghlan, Maydan Wardak | 867,543 | 15 |
| DAFA | Faryab, Kabul | 183,467 | 3 |
| DRC | Kabul | 15,735 | 0 |
| FSD | Kunduz | 212,651 | 118 |
| HALO | Ghazni, Kabul | 35,722 | 10 |
| MCPA | Khost, Kunduz | 2,454 | 2 |
| MDC | Herat | 1,347,517 | 86 |
| OMAR | Baghlan, Kunar | 1,079,982 | 67 |
| **Totals** | | **3,745,071** | **301** |

## DEMINER SAFETY

Two HALO deminers clearing improvised mines in Uruzgan province were killed by an uncontrolled detonation in May 2024 believed to have been initiated by a deminer stepping on a pressure plate. HALO's investigation found failings in planning, command and control, and adherence to SOPs, following which it conducted a review of safety procedures.[80]

A DRC deminer suffered injury leading to a below-the-knee amputation after detonation of a PMN-2 AP mine on the access path to a task in Kabul province in October 2024. Investigation found that the Task Implementation Plan did not take account of heavy rainfall identified in NTS of the site and which likely caused migration of the mine onto the access route, which had been frequently used (and as a result was not cleared before clearance started).[81]

77 Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO, 16 April 2025.
78 Emails from Hannah Rose Holloway, DRC, 1 May 2025; and Farid Homayoun, HALO, 16 April 2025.
79 Email from Abid K. Fazel, OMAR, 28 March 2025.
80 Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO, 16 April 2025.
81 Email from Hannah Rose Holloway, DRC, 1 May 2025.

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR AFGHANISTAN: 1 MARCH 2003

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2013

↓

FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (10 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2023

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (2 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2025

↓

**THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2030**

**UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

Under the Article 5 deadline extension request granted at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024 Afghanistan is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2030.

Afghanistan's extension request aimed to complete clearance of all explosive ordnance in five years at a total cost of $256 million.[82] It underscored the Taliban authorities' commitment to compliance with the APMBC but the targets set for the MAPA, which is almost totally dependent on international donor support, bore little relation to the prevailing financial environment. Prospects for completing clearance were slim even when DMAC estimated mine contamination at 176km$^2$. Since then, the estimate has increased to 182km$^2$ (see Table 1) and the extension request acknowledges a "high possibility" of finding more hazardous areas,[83] while donor support has declined even further.

The extension request work plan called for deploying 472 teams for survey, clearance, and risk education in 2025–26, the first year of the extension period, including 333 teams for clearing all forms of mines, dropping to a total of 261 teams in the fifth year.[84] These totals are far in excess of available capacity. DMAC reported a total of 285 teams operating at the end of 2024, including 123 demining teams and further steep cuts have occurred in 2025 as a result of US and other donor cuts.[85]

By July 2025, the number of active teams had fallen to 188, of which 132 conducted clearance of all forms of EO.[86]

Afghanistan's third request states that "it would be very challenging or impossible" to consider Afghanistan's AP mined area in isolation from other explosive ordnance, reflecting the higher threat posed by other ordnance types. The operation would also include re-survey and clearance of 38 remaining former NATO firing ranges.[87] After decades of demining, remaining areas contaminated by conventional AP mines are increasingly in remote, often mountainous locations. UXO accounted for 91% of casualties in 2024 while improvised mines, though affecting a much smaller area, caused as many casualties as conventional mines.[88]

**Table 13: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**[89]

| Year | Area cleared (km$^2$) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 10.44 |
| 2023 | 14.47 |
| 2022 | 13.85 |
| 2021 | 17.71 |
| 2020 | 24.24 |
| **Total** | **80.71** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Afghanistan's mine action plans do not yet address management of residual contamination.

82 The request envisages expenditure of $200.5 million on clearance, $12.5 million on survey, $7.1 million on risk education, and $15 million on victim assistance. Also included are the costs of coordination ($17.5 million), equipment ($2.8 million), and "development" ($0.5 million).

83 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 76.

84 Ibid., pp. 65–66.

85 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025.

86 UNMAS, MAPA team location July 2025.

87 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. iii and 58–60.

88 UNMAS Afghanistan Monthly update, February 2025.

89 Clearance of conventional and improvised AP mines reported by six implementing partners totalled 30.38km$^2$ in 2022 and 21.1km$^2$ in 2023, which would raise the five-year total to 103.87km$^2$.

# ALGERIA



## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2017 (deadline expired)

New extended deadline required: Algeria declared fulfilment of Article 5 on 10 February 2017

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unclear

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0.30 | 0.30 |
| Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |
| Non-Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 600 | 1,168 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Algerian Army and Territorial Security Forces

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, the Algerian Army Specialised Units and Security Forces discovered and destroyed 600 anti-personnel (AP) mines during clearance of 0.30km² (30.16 hectares). Since formally completing its national demining programme and declaring fulfilment of Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) on 10 February 2017, Algeria has reported clearing a total of 30.45km² as of the end of 2024. This effort included the destruction of 32,269 AP mines, of which 4,790 were isolated mines believed to be remnants of colonial-era contamination, while 27,479 were found in Tindouf province, near the borders with Mauritania, Morocco, and Western Sahara.

Given the reported extent of contamination and the scale of land cleared annually, the situation exceeds what is purely residual contamination. To date, Algeria has acted in good faith in continuing to clear and report on AP mines on its territory. But while the number of AP mines discovered has steadily decreased since 2020 (when 8,740 AP mines were destroyed), Algeria continues to destroy very significant numbers in identified areas. According to an agreed view of States Parties to the APMBC, if a State Party discovers a mined area under its jurisdiction or control after the expiry of its original or extended Article 5 deadline and is unable to complete destruction before the next Meeting of States Parties, it should submit a request for an extended deadline. In light of this, Algeria should now request a new Article 5 deadline to enable it to complete the work.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Algeria should clarify the extent of contamination along its south-western borders, including the size of suspected and confirmed hazardous areas, and conduct ongoing survey and clearance in line with internationally accepted land release methodology.**
- **Unless Algeria can clear all of the AP mined areas along its south-western border with Morocco before the Meeting of States Parties in December 2025, it should request a new Article 5 deadline.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- The Interministerial Committee on the Implementation of the APMBC

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Algerian Army Specialised Unit
- Territorial Security Forces

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- None

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Algeria was a country heavily contaminated by AP mines. It is estimated that more than 10 million mines were laid by France during the National Liberation War (1954–62) along the Morice and Challe defensive lines, also known as barriers ("barrages linéaires"), created to prevent the passage of external support along the Tunisian border in the east (wilayas of El Tarf, Souk Ahras, and Tébessa) and the Moroccan border in the west (wilayas of Béchar, Naâma, and Tlemcen). More than 80% were blast mines while most of the remainder were fragmentation mines.[1] Outside these border areas, mines were also scattered throughout the national territory, particularly near military encampments and along certain combat routes.[2]

Upon independence and for 25 years subsequently (1963–88), Algeria undertook massive clearance operations, clearing some 500km$^2$ of mined area and destroying more than 7.8 million AP mines.[3] This was done by two specialised army engineering demining battalions who dismantled the Challe and Morice defensive lines and systematically cleared other areas where evidence of mine contamination emerged.[4] These efforts were halted during counterterrorism operations in the 1990s, when new AP mines were laid, especially in 1994–95 in the north of the country. After ratifying the APMBC in 2002, Algeria launched another large demining programme in 2004, which successfully eliminated all known contamination by December 2016, several months ahead of its extended Article 5 deadline of 1 April 2017. Algeria reported clearing 124km$^2$ of AP mined area, destroying 850,000 mines.[5]

Since declaring completion, Algeria has continued to submit annual Article 7 reports confirming that all known areas with confirmed or suspected AP mines have been cleared, and all mines found have been destroyed. The reports also address residual threats in detail, with Algeria emphasising that "specialised army units and territorially competent security services continue to address any suspected residual threats, particularly along the southwestern border".[6] These specialised teams have continued to detect and destroy mines in two distinct circumstances.

First, they have been clearing isolated mines outside the areas once crossed by the Morice and Challe defensive lines, dating back to the colonial era. These mines are believed to have migrated due to natural phenomena and are found scattered and in low density. Between 1 December 2016 and 31 December 2024, Algeria reported the discovery and destruction of 4,790 such mines.[7] Second, Algeria is facing a more recently discovered threat along its south-western border, close to the borders with Mauritania, Morocco, and Western Sahara, particularly in the north of Tindouf province.

This threat came into sharp focus on 16 October 2014, when an anti-vehicle (AV) mine detonated in the Foum Tangarfa area, just 425 metres from the border. The explosion led to the discovery of a previously unknown minefield in the area.[8] In its Article 7 report for 2020, Algeria stated that follow-up search operations had identified 22 additional minefields, and three others where operations were conducted in 2020 (See Table 1).[9] As a precaution, demining capacity in the region has been maintained, and reconnaissance activities ("*fouille et recherche*") are ongoing.[10]

Algeria attributed the presence of these mines to the "ongoing conflict in the area".[11] The exact circumstances under which the mines were laid have not been clearly documented. They are located in Algerian territory, and it is possible that they were emplaced during a past conflict such as the Sand War of September–October 1963 that affected the regions of Tindouf and Béchar.

1 2011 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11 and 63.
2 Ibid., pp. 5 and 8; and Algeria Declaration of Fulfilment of APMBC Article 5, 10 February 2017, pp. 1–2.
3 Algeria Declaration of Fulfilment of Article 5, 10 February 2017, p. 2.
4 2011 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 13.
5 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 11.
6 Ibid., p. 25.
7 Ibid., p. 7.
8 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 36.
9 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 36–37.
10 Ibid.; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.
11 Ibid.

**Table 1: Mined areas discovered between 2014 and 2020**[12]

| Province | Area | Number of mined areas | Clearance periods |
|---|---|---|---|
| Béchar | Meksem El Dahma | 1 | 2016–19 |
| Tindouf | El Bettina | 4 | 2016–22 |
| Tindouf | El M'Hareth | 2 | 2017–21 |
| Tindouf | Foum Tengarfa | 4 | 2014–19 |
| Tindouf | Foum Alguim | 2 | 2016–22 |
| Tindouf | Hassi Boukhchiba | 3 | 2020–23 |
| Tindouf | Hassi Lehouira | 4 | 2018 |
| Tindouf | Oum Lâachar | 4 | 2016–21 |
| Tindouf | Si Brahim Ben Rezzoug | 1 | 2017 |
| Tindouf | Tafgount | 1 | 2018–21 |
| N/R | Khang Ben Zerhmine* | N/R | 2019 to date |
| N/R | Oued Essmira* | N/R | 2016 to date |
| **Total** | | **26** | |

*The Article 7 report covering 2021 added Khang Ben Zerhmine and Oued Essmira minefields where operations have been ongoing since 2019 and 2016, respectively.

Since the discovery of the Hassi Boukhchiba minefield in 2020, no further mined areas have been identified. Only two minefields remained to be released at the time of writing: Oued Essmira, which was discovered in 2016; and Khang Ben Zerhmine, where considerable clearance has been undertaken, with the destruction of 1,521 AP mines and 428 AV mines. The size and number of minefields in each of the two areas have not been provided.[13]

Between 2014 and 2024, a total of 27,479 AP mines of US (M-2A3), Italian (VS-50), Belgian (M-35), and Portuguese manufacture—distinct from those dating back to the colonial period—were destroyed in these areas, along with 5,646 AV mines (see Table 2 below). This includes 466 AP mines destroyed in 2024.[14] In the first half of 2025, Algeria reported destroying 282 AP mines and 41 AV mines.[15]

**Table 2: AP mines destroyed along the border with Morocco since 16 October 2014**[16]

| Year | AP mines destroyed |
|---|---|
| 2014 | 306 |
| 2015 | 0 |
| 2016 | 6,905 |
| 2017 | 794 |
| 2018 | 1,922 |
| 2019 | 5,568 |
| 2020 | 8,740 |
| 2021 | 1,177 |
| 2022 | 1,010 |
| 2023 | 591 |
| 2024 | 466 |
| **Total** | **27,479** |

## OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Algeria is massively contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW) left from the colonial era.[17] It found and destroyed 67 devices in 2024, bringing the total discovered since December 2016 to 32,698.[18]

12 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 36 and 37; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Table 4, p. 10.
13 Email from Serine Zidouri, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 5 September 2025.
14 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 8–10; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 19 and 21.
15 Email from Serine Zidouri, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 5 September 2025.
16 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Table 2, p. 8.
17 Ibid., p. 5.
18 Ibid., p. 7.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Interministerial Committee for the Implementation of the APMBC, set up by presidential decree in 2003, is the national focal point for all mine action activities. Chaired by the Ministry of National Defence, the committee was formally inaugurated by the head of the government on 5 September 2004. It brings together representatives from key ministries directly involved in mine-related issues, including the Ministries of National Defence, Health, and Veterans (Moudjahidine), as well as those responsible for the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Communication, and National Solidarity.[19] The Committee meets regularly to exchange updated information related to the APMBC. In addition to its official members, it may invite experts and representatives from civil society organisation, in order to broaden the scope of consultation and enhance coordination.[20]

Since its independence, Algeria has made its mine action programme a national priority. It has taken full responsibility for mine clearance and victim assistance. Algeria has not received any financial or other forms of assistance in carrying out its demining programme, which has been fully funded by the State's own resources. The State also funds social and economic support for victims through annual budget allocations distributed among the relevant ministries.[21]

As part of its commitment to international cooperation and technical assistance, Algeria conducted training in 2023 for several African countries involved in mine action, including Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Palestine, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, and Tunisia. Algerian experts also participated in regional meetings and exercises to share experience and best practices in demining.[22] In the context of South to South cooperation, an Algerian delegation visited Guinea-Bissau in late May 2024. A similar visit to Senegal was scheduled twice, once in 2023 and again in October 2024, but did not take place.[23]

Algeria has held various positions within the APMBC committees over the years. In September 2024, Algeria delivered a joint statement at the Human Rights Council on behalf of a group of States Parties to the APMBC – all members of the Convention's Coordination Committee. The statement advocated for the universalisation of the APMBC and underscored the negative impact of AP mines on the enjoyment of fundamental human rights. In 2025, Algeria, on behalf of the same group, presented a draft resolution which was adopted in April on the human rights implications of AP mines.[24]

On 30–31 May 2023, Algeria hosted an African international seminar on AP mine action in Algiers under the theme "For a Safe and Mine-Free Africa: Algeria's Pioneering Experience." Held with the participation of the APMBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), the event marked the 60th anniversary of Algeria's independence and was funded by the Algerian government. It brought together over 50 representatives from African and Arab States Parties, along with key mine action stakeholders, international organisations, civil society actors, and mine victims and survivors.[25]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

In accordance with its Constitution and relevant legislation, Algeria said it was fully committed to addressing the diverse needs and perspectives of its population without discrimination based on gender or age.[26] Women currently represent two thirds of the members of the Interministerial Committee tasked with implementing the APMBC. Additionally, almost one third of the civil society associations active in this field are led by women. Algeria also ensures the inclusion of women in its official delegations to meetings related to the APMBC. Since 2020, female representatives have participated regularly, both as members and as heads of the country's delegation, underscoring the commitment to gender-inclusive engagement.[27] There is no available information indicating whether women participate in demining operations in an operational capacity.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Environmental considerations are not addressed in Algeria's official mine action reports. The national demining programme, concluded in 2016, and the latest deadline extension request submitted in 2011, as well as subsequent Article 7 reports, make no reference to national environmental legislation or to mine action policies and standards related to environmental protection. However, an environmental initiative is presented in Algeria's Article 7 report submitted in 2024. The report highlights national reforestation campaigns on land previously released, under the initiative "one mine destroyed = one tree planted".[28]

19 2011 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.

20 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 21.

21 Ibid., p. 20.

22 Ibid., p. 21.

23 Ibid., p. 22.

24 Statement of Algeria on Universalization, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024; and Resolution on "The impact of AP mines on the full enjoyment of all human rights", adopted by the Human Rights Council on 4 April 2025, available at: http://bit.ly/4gdcfoy.

25 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 21; and Statement of Algeria on Universalis9ation, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25-29 November 2024.

26 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 20.

27 Ibid.

28 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 27.

Environmental and climatic conditions affected mine action operations in Algeria. Many contaminated areas were located in difficult terrain, such as mountainous regions or internationally protected wetlands, where the nature of the soil, which ranges from sand to rock, added to operational complexity. Mines were sometimes found embedded in rock or displaced from their original positions, prompting Algeria to expand minefield boundaries as a precaution. Harsh weather conditions further slowed the pace of clearance.[29]

Mine action has yielded positive environmental and developmental impacts. Clearance has taken place in areas of ecological importance, such as El Kala National Park and the oases of Moghrar and Tiout, contributing to habitat restoration and the protection of endangered species like the Barbary deer and the Houbara bustard. Clearance has also supported national infrastructure projects, including the development of a standard-gauge railway in the south-west of the country.[30]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The Interministerial Committee maintains a database that is regularly updated by its member ministries, each contributing information within their respective areas of expertise.[31] It is not known if it is an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

Algeria has attended most meetings of States Parties, including the Fifth Review Conference in Siem Reap in November 2024. It has diligently submitted its Article 7 transparency report every year, most recently in May 2025.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

The means by which Algeria is planning and tasking clearance along its south-west border with Morocco is not known. Algeria has indicated to Mine Action Review that two AP mined areas remain open: Oued Essmira and Khang Ben Zerhmine,[32] but has not provided further information on the size of remaining areas, or a timeline showing annual clearance outputs.

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Operations were reported to be conducted in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), but official reports make no mention of any national mine action standards (NMAS), except in relation to victim assistance.[33] In its 2011 Article 5 deadline extension request, Algeria stated that, while its clearance forces possessed knowledge of conventional military demining procedures and had accumulated 25 years of field experience, they would be introduced to international standards from the outset of resumed operations. This was intended to support a gradual alignment with United Nations norms as they were adopted.[34]

Algeria opted exclusively for manual demining due to its reliability, despite being slower and less productive. The decision was driven by the limited effectiveness of mechanical methods—evidenced by the continued presence of mines in previously cleared areas—and the difficult terrain in many operational zones, including mountainous regions, wetlands, and varied soil types such as sand and rock.[35]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

All demining in Algeria has been carried out manually by the Algerian army.

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, specialised units of the Algerian Army discovered and destroyed a total of 600 AP mines from 30.16 hectares of clearance.[36] The total destroyed includes 234 isolated mines believed to be remnants of colonial-era contamination, along with

29 2011 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 18.
30 Ibid., p. 21.
31 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 15.
32 Email from Serine Zidouri, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 5 September 2025.
33 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 18.
34 2011 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.
35 Ibid., p. 18.
36 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 12.

466 mines found during clearance along the south-western border with Morocco.[37] The number of mines destroyed in 2024 is down from the 1,168 cleared in 2023, although the area reported as cleared was identical.[38] Algeria noted that along its south-western borders two minefields remained open at the end of 2024.[39]

**Table 3: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 0.3 | 30.16 hectares |
| **Technical survey** | N/R | |
| **Non-technical survey** | N/R | |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 600 | 466 mines found along the south-west border with Morocco and 234 mines from the colonial era. |

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ALGERIA: 1 APRIL 2002

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2012

↓

FIRST EXTENSION DEADLINE (5-YEAR-EXTENSION): 1 APRIL 2017

**DECLARATION OF COMPLETION: 10 FEBRUARY 2017**
**NEW EXTENDED ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE NEEDED**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties at the Eleventh Meeting of State Parties, Algeria was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2017. Algeria completed demining in late 2016, several months in advance of its extended Article 5 deadline. Algeria submitted a Declaration of Fulfilment of Article 5 on 10 February 2017.[40] In order to remain in compliance with the Convention it needs to request a new deadline.

Between 1 December 2016, when Algeria officially finalised its clearance programme, and the end of 2024, Algeria reported the destruction of 32,269 AP mines. This total includes 4,790 isolated mines considered legacy contamination from the colonial era, as well as 27,479 AP mines found in Tindouf province, near the borders with Mauritania, Morocco, and Western Sahara.[41] Algeria also reported that 30.45km² of mined area have been cleared during this period.[42] Algeria reported to Mine Action Review that only two minefields remained open at the end of 2024, but did not provide further details on the size of remaining areas, or a timeline showing annual clearance outputs.

Given the reported extent of contamination and the scale of land cleared annually since Algeria declared completion, the situation has for some time exceeded what is purely residual contamination. According to an agreed approach by States Parties to the Convention, if a State Party discovers a mined area under its jurisdiction or control after the expiry of its original or extended Article 5 deadline that is known or suspected to contain AP mines, it must immediately inform all States Parties and undertake to destroy the mines as soon as possible. If the State believes it will be unable to complete destruction before the next Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference (whichever falls sooner), it should submit a request for an extended deadline. The deadline should be as short as possible and no more than ten years.[43] In light of this, and unless it is able to complete clearance before the Meeting of States Parties in December 2025, Algeria should request a new Article 5 deadline.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Algeria has developed and implemented action plans to ensure a sustainable national capacity is in place for addressing areas suspected of containing AP mines, in accordance with its obligations under the APMBC. The national capacity responsible for managing residual contamination consists of specialised army units, as well as territorial security services. These entities are equipped to respond promptly to any suspected presence of mines, particularly in neutralising residual threats along the south-western border with Morocco.[44]

37 Ibid., pp. 7 and 8.
38 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 11.
39 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 8.
40 Algeria Declaration of Fulfilment of Article 5, 10 February 2017.
41 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 7 and 8.
42 Ibid., p. 12.
43 "Proposed rational response to States Parties discovering previously unknown mined areas after deadlines have passed", Twelfth Meeting of State Parties, Geneva, 3–7 December 2012; and Final Report of the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 January 2013, p. 10.
44 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 6.

# ANGOLA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025

Not on track to meet deadline:
Five-year extension to 31 December 2030 requested

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 30KM²

Heavy
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 3.03 | 6.69 |
| Technical Survey | 2.38 | 3.93 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0.14 | 0.72 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 5,680 (incl. 44 in spot tasks) | 4,996 (incl. 425 in spot tasks) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- APOPO
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Angola will not meet its current Article 5 clearance deadline and in 2025 it requested a further five-year extension to 2030. Survey and clearance output both dropped substantially in 2024 from 2023, but Angola should be able to meet the annual land release targets set out in the extension request given past performance. However, persistent challenges such as falling survey output, discovery of unrecorded contamination, and limited deployment of public operators poses risks to timely completion. The government's pledge of US$240 million to support demining, with funding going primarily to the national mine action authority (NMAA) and public operators, will be critical if Angola is to meet its new deadline.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Angola should ensure all demining operators rigorously apply land release principles to reduce clearance of uncontaminated areas and improve efficiency.**
- **Angola should ensure that public operators, including the National Demining Centre (CND) and the Angolan Army Demining Brigades, align their activities with the country's obligations under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). All survey and clearance data, including those generated by the CND, should be integrated into the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Coordination between the national mine action authority (ANAM) and the CND should be strengthened to promote consistent reporting and compliance with national standards.**
- **Angola should finalise its residual risk management strategy and the national mine action standard (NMAS) for management of residual contamination.**

- **The Angolan government should sustain funding for international operators as well as public operators to increase operational capacity.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | Angola has a high ratio of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) compared to suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and continues to improve the accuracy of the baseline through data reconciliation. The discovery of new contamination is likely to continue over the coming years as clearance progresses and communities return to remote areas. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 9 | 8 | The national mine action programme is managed by ANAM. There is strong national ownership with Angola approving more than US$240 million from the national budget to the end of 2028 for demining operations. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 6 | In 2024, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) supported ANAM to develop its first national mine action gender equality and diversity policy. Of ANAM's 2023 workforce, 36% were women, including in 48% of operational positions and 33% of managerial positions. It is not known if this changed in 2024. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Angola does not have an environmental management policy or standard on environmental management but ensures operators comply with national environmental legislation. ANAM is planning under the development of the National Mine Action Strategy 2026–2030 to develop a National Mine Action Standard (NMAS) on environmental management, in line with International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | ANAM, with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and NPA, is transitioning its database to IMSMA Core. However, clearance data from public operators is still not fully integrated into the database |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 6 | A new National Strategic Mine Action Plan 2026–2030 is under development with GICHD support. As part of its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request Angola has drafted a new work plan to 2030 and is prioritising the provinces that are closest to completion. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | In 2024, the NMAS on residual contamination management was revised, the NMAS on monitoring of clearance activities was updated, and a new NMAS on accident investigation was elaborated. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 7 | Overall land release output declined from 2023 to 2024, and Angola did not meet its target for the year. Operators also cleared more than 1.6km$^2$ of AP mined area without finding any mines. Angola submitted its third Article 5 deadline extension request with targets to complete clearance by the end of 2030. |
| **Average Score** | **7.1** | **7.0** | **Overall Programme Performance: GOOD** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Agency (Agência Nacional de Acção Contra as Minas, ANAM)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- The Association of Angolan Mine Professionals (Associação de Profissionais Angolanos de Acção Contra Minas, APACOMINAS) (NGO)
- The National Demining Centre (Centro Nacional de Desminagem, CND)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- APOPO
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, a total of 963 anti-personnel (AP) mined areas covering an estimated 57km² remained in 17 of Angola's 21 provinces (see Table 1).[1] Moxico and Lunda Sul are believed to be the most heavily contaminated provinces. Total estimated contamination is down from the 1,016 AP mined areas covering an estimated 67km² that remained at the end of 2023.[2] This is not consistent with reported land release in 2024 and the new contamination added to the database, but ANAM says the decrease in AP mined area is also partly the result of reconciliation of the national database with operator data.[3]

**Table 1: AP mined area by province (at end 2024)[4]**

| Province | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total HAs | Area of HA (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bengo | 36 | 2,275,328 | 1 | 0 | 37 | 2,275,328 |
| Bié | 144 | 5,999,391 | 0 | 0 | 144 | 5,999,391 |
| Cabinda | 27 | 1,279,321 | 0 | 0 | 27 | 1,279,321 |
| Cuando | 116 | 6,066,104 | 0 | 0 | 116 | 6,066,104 |
| Cuanza Norte | 4 | 311,948 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 311,948 |
| Cuanza Sul | 84 | 5,866,540 | 0 | 0 | 84 | 5,866,540 |
| Cubango | 90 | 4,610,096 | 0 | 0 | 90 | 4,610,096 |
| Cunene | 35 | 2,505,156 | 9 | 0 | 44 | 2,505,156 |
| Huila | 40 | 3,011,367 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 3,011,367 |
| Icolo e Bengo | 7 | 1,101,439 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1,101,439 |
| Lunda Norte | 48 | 1,739,436 | 10 | 143,913 | 58 | 1,883,349 |
| Lunda Sul | 32 | 6,166,746 | 19 | 917,218 | 51 | 7,083,964 |
| Malanje | 9 | 173,395 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 173,395 |
| Moxico | 173 | 11,972,587 | 34 | 844,707 | 207 | 12,817,294 |
| Moxico Leste | 31 | 1,272,282 | 5 | 285,355 | 36 | 1,557,637 |
| Namibe | 2 | 173,026 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 173,026 |
| Uige | 6 | 300,851 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 300,851 |
| **Totals** | **884** | **54,825,013** | **79** | **2,191,193** | **963** | **57,016,206** |

CHA = confirmed hazardous area SHA = suspected hazardous area HA = hazardous area

Angola reported in its latest Article 7 report that the provinces of Benguela, Huambo, Luanda, and Zaire have no mined areas registered in the national database.[5] In Angola's 2025 revised Article 5 deadline extension request, the provinces of Huambo, Namibe, Uige, Kwanza Norte, and Launda will be officially declared mine free by the end of 2026 and Benguela, Zaire, Malange, and Bengo by the end of 2027.[6] Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) completed clearance of the last known minefield in Cuanza Norte in August 2025, making this province also eligible for official declaration. In Uíge, three minefields remain: NPA is clearing one, while two are inaccessible and, according to NPA, unless the government provides support with road access the latter will have to be left for future operations.[7]

In 2019, non-technical survey (NTS) was completed in all provinces, redefining or cancelling previously inflated mined areas and establishing the most accurate baseline of AP mine contamination to date.[8] Operators hold differing views on next

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.
2 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form C.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form J.
4 Ibid., Form C.
5 Ibid., Form J.
6 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, Table 11.
7 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, Country Director, NPA, 2 September 2025.
8 ANAM Updated Article 5 Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025, June 2021, p. 4.

steps: APOPO calls for further survey/resurvey to remove some hazardous areas from the database; HALO notes new minefields are still being found near existing mined areas;[9] Mines Advisory Group (MAG) advocates for evidence-based survey to confirm mined areas;[10] and NPA, while expecting the continued discovery of mined areas, argues a new countrywide assessment would be inefficient.[11] ANAM also feels that a new national survey is unnecessary.[12] Given Angola's conflict history, many mined areas remain unknown to communities and were missed in baseline surveys, so the Government mandates technical survey (TS) and clearance in areas designated for investment projects to ensure safety.[13]

The 2020–25 Article 5 Implementation Work Plan integrates NTS into all operations, with survey to be conducted in areas needing verification. ANAM acknowledged gaps in past coordination and monitoring under the, now dissolved, Executive Commission for Demining (CED), meaning some cleared areas may require further assessment and verification.[14] New mined areas may also be added to the database as people return to remote or previously uninhabited locations.[15] Data clean-up has improved baseline reliability, and Angola's 2019–25 mine action strategy stresses ongoing analysis to ensure accurate classification of CHAs and SHAs. According to the Geneva International Centre of Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the accuracy of the data in the strategy and work plan needs to be continuously verified and updated.[16]

Angola's contamination is the result of more than 40 years of internal armed conflict that ended in 2002, in the course of which a range of national and foreign armed movements and groups laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Historically, the most affected provinces have been those with the fiercest and most prolonged fighting, such as Bié, Cuando, Cubango, Huambo, and Moxico. In addition to AP mines, as at the end of 2020 Angola had 1.02km$^2$ of anti-vehicle (AV) mined area.[17] Many minefields contain a mix of AP and AV mines. MAG found earlier evidence of AP mines being laid and reinforced with other explosive ordnance to maximise damage. HALO also confirmed the presence of improvised AP mines using mortars or grenades. These were found recently in Benguela province, and HALO expects more to be found in Benguela, Bié, and Cuando Cubango. HALO destroyed five AP mines of an improvised nature in 2023 in Cuando Cubango province, in Menongue and Nancova municipalities.[18] NPA has also found AP mines reinforced with mortars in Cuanza Norte.[19]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Angola also has a significant problem of explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially unexploded ordnance (UXO). Evidence suggests that Angola has only a residual threat from cluster munition remnants (CMR), but no known or suspected cluster munition-contaminated areas that would involve an Article 4 obligation under the Convention on Cluster Munitions (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2024* report on Angola for further information).

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The mine action programme is managed by ANAM, established by Presidential Decree in July 2021 following the dissolution of the National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH). Its mandate is to regulate and supervise mine action work by public and private institutions as well as NGOs. ANAM is a government agency and is subject to the oversight of the president through the Minister of State and the Chief of Staff.[20]

The National Demining Centre (Centro Nacional de Desminagem, CND) was created by presidential decree in July 2022, resulting from the merger of the National Demining Institute, the Executive Demining Commission, the Demining Brigades of the Angolan Armed Forces and the Demining Brigades of the Military House of the President of the Republic.[21] The CND to date has conducted demining and associated activities in support of socio-economic development projects, usually on tasks outside contamination listed in the national mine action database. Angola's revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request says that the CND will be operationalised to conduct demining that contributes to the fulfilment of Angola's Article 5 obligations.[22]

Operators continue to report smooth collaboration with the Angolan authorities, though securing visas remains a challenge for some operators. In 2024, HALO noted improved visa procedures with ANAM's support, though issuance still takes several months.[23] While NPA faced major difficulties, unable to secure a visa for its new operations manager despite ANAM's involvement, leaving the post vacant and

9 Email from Daniel Richards, HALO, 25 June 2022.
10 Email from Nelson Verissimo, MAG, 6 June 2023.
11 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 30 March 2023.
12 Email from Mário Nunes (on behalf of ANAM), NPA, 10 May 2023.
13 Ibid.
14 ANAM, updated Article 5 Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025, June 2021, p. 5; and telephone interview with Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 22 February 2021.
15 Email from Ralph Legg, HALO, 30 March 2020.
16 Email from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 4 May 2022; and National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025, p. 19.
17 Comprising 934,525m$^2$ across 89 CHAs and 84,235m$^2$ across 21 SHAs. Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form C.
18 Email from Sarah Coomb, HALO, 8 May 2024.
19 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 2 September 2025.
20 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form A.
21 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 14.
22 Ibid., p. 15.
23 Email from Jack Lister, Programme Manager, HALO, 25 July 2025.

operations negatively affected.[24] MAG initially benefitted from a fast-tracked visa process through an arrangement between ANAM and the SME (*Serviço de Migração e Estrangeiros*, the Migration and Foreigners Service), with visas issued within two months, but since late 2024 it has faced delays due to SME management changes, which ANAM is working to resolve.[25]

In August 2023, NPA received a $1.3 million grant from the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the United States (US) Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) for an 18-month capacity development project for ANAM which was ended in March 2025.[26] The project's key objectives were to strengthen ANAM's capacity in quality management (QM), information management, residual contamination planning, and gender mainstreaming. These objectives were largely achieved with QM standards updated, 54 ANAM monitoring officers trained, and nearly 300 quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) visits conducted, exceeding targets. A new IMSMA Core system was established ahead of schedule, with trained staff and digital reporting tools introduced. An updated national residual contamination strategy was developed, provincial sensitisation workshops held, and the first-ever gender and diversity policy for ANAM drafted. However, some gaps remain as the national residual management strategy has not yet been formally adopted or operationalised and capacity to manage residual risk is still underdeveloped. The proportion of women in ANAM remains low, the US Stop-Work Order delayed the full roll-out of IMSMA Core to all operators and caused a slight budget underspend, while long-term sustainability continues to depend heavily on external funding and technical support.[27]

In 2024, HALO delivered explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 1 training to 11 ANAM staff, strengthening its QA capacity when monitoring operators' EOD.[28] The GICHD in collaboration with NPA has supported ANAM for information management and the development of the new national mine action strategy in 2025.[29]

ANAM leads quarterly mine action coordination meetings with national authorities, clearance operators, and occasionally donors.[30] In 2024, two technical coordination workshops were held, where all operators reviewed 2023 progress, outlined 2024 plans, and discussed land release and IMSMA reporting ahead of the IMSMA Core roll-out. Later in the year, NPA convened a coordination meeting for operators to share 2024 progress and 2025 plans, also addressing VAT exemptions on imported demining equipment. ANAM also hosted a further technical workshop covering the Article 5 deadline extension request, the "residual contamination strategy", and the accreditation process, with operators again reporting on their 2024 activities and 2025 outlook.[31]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2024, the Government of Angola funded ANAM and the CND. This has mostly covered overhead costs, but also met some of ANAM's operational costs, particularly the monitoring and QC teams. In addition, the Angolan government continued to fund HALO for the clearance of protected areas along the Okavango Delta in Cuando Cubango province. As to international funding, mine action in Angola continued to receive financial support from the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, Belgium, and Japan.[32]

Angola has calculated that it needs more than US$197 million to clear all remaining mined areas by 2030. This amount was calculated taking into account the average cost of demining operations at US$3.10 per square metre.[33] Clearance operations in more remote and densely mined areas will cost more than clearance of low-density tasks with good road access.[34]

In October 2024, the President announced in his annual "State of the Nation" address that Angola will invest US$240 million dollars of national funding in demining over the course of 2025 and 2026 so that the country can be declared mine-free in 2027.[35] The announced funding is intended to primarily support public operators, such as CND and Angolan Army Demining Brigades, but in 2025, MAG, APOPO, and NPA held discussions with ANAM and jointly submitted three concept notes seeking some of this funding.[36] In its revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, it states that the US$240 million has been approved to fund demining operations from 2025 to 2028 and that it will be dispersed annually. It has mainly been earmarked for the procurement of equipment and to cover the running costs of ANAM and public operators. That said, funding proposals from national and international operators APACOMINAS, APOPO, HALO, MAG, and NPA totalling over US$63 million have also been approved.[37]

24 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025.
25 Email from Catherine Harris, Programme Officer, MAG, 28 April 2025.
26 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 2 September 2025.
27 NPA, Final Report, Quality Management and Information Management Capacity Development of ANAM, 24 July 2025.
28 Email from Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.
29 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form J; and email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 2 September 2025.
30 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, Programme Manager, APOPO, 29 April 2024; Sarah Coomb, HALO, 8 May 2024; Catherine Harris, MAG, 3 May 2024; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 2 May 2024.
31 Email from Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025.
32 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form J.
33 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 123.
34 Email from Robert Syfret, Deputy Regional Director, HALO, 22 September 2025.
35 "President of the Republic wants the country to be free of mines by 2027", *Ver Angola*, 16 October 2024, at: http://bit.ly/4lljQwI.
36 Emails from Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 2 September 2025.
37 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 123; and email from Cristy McLennan, MAG, 7 October 2025.

In 2024, APOPO was funded by Belgium, Japan, and the UK People's Postcode Lottery. Funding from Japan ended in March 2024 but in 2025, APOPO continued to receive support from its other donors.[38] HALO was supported in 2024 by the Angolan government, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), PM/WRA, and Welt Ohne Minen (WOM). In 2025, HALO continued to be funded by those donors.[39] NPA's activities in 2024 were supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (via the Japanese Embassy), the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and PM/WRA. The grants from Japan, Belgium, and the United States ended in the first quarter of 2025, after which NPA will be funded by Norway (Norad) for the remainder of the year.[40] In 2024, MAG was funded by PM/WRA, the FCDO, and Japan (via the Japanese Embassy). In 2025, MAG continued to be supported by those donors.[41]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Gender and diversity are integrated as cross-cutting issues in Angola's National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, which calls for activities to be designed so as to meet the distinct needs of different groups and requires sex- and age-disaggregated data collection across all SOPs and tools. While Angola has no dedicated gender and diversity implementation plan, the sector has made notable progress on gender balance, reflected in increased participation of women at all levels.[42] In 2024, NPA supported ANAM to develop its first national mine action gender equality and diversity policy.[43] In 2023, 36% of ANAM's employees were female, with women holding 48% of operational positions and 33% of managerial positions.[44] The figures for 2024 are not known. NPA was the only operator to increase the proportion of women employed in 2024, although it still lags far behind HALO, which has nearly achieved gender parity overall. Women are, however, still under-represented in HALO's managerial and supervisory positions.

**Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2024**[45]

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women in managerial or supervisory positions | Total operational staff | Women in operational positions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| APOPO | 45 | 6 (13%) | 6 | 0 (0%) | 38 | 5 (13%) |
| HALO | 1,512 | 615 (41%) | 140 | 26 (19%) | 957 | 541 (57%) |
| MAG | 208 | 55 (26%) | 27 | 6 (22%) | 154 | 48 (31%) |
| NPA | 111 | 29 (26%) | 7 | 1 (14%) | 98 | 27 (28%) |
| **Totals** | **1,876** | **705 (38%)** | **180** | **33 (18%)** | **1,247** | **621 (50%)** |

In 2024, an EOD Level 2 course was completed by 11 participants (10 from MAG and 1 from NPA), of whom five were female MAG staff.[46] In 2025, MAG's Global Gender and Inclusion Advisor was due to conduct a programme-wide gender assessment and to provide gender sensitivity training. HALO planned to deliver a workshop on gender, diversity, and inclusion in mine action for ANAM staff.[47] The GICHD held a dedicated online workshop on gender, diversity and inclusion ahead of the strategy stakeholder workshop in May 2025.[48]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

ANAM ensures demining complies with national environmental legislation, supporting reduced emissions, renewable energy use, and biodiversity conservation. Operators are required to apply environmentally responsible methods, including safe landfills, proper fuel storage, controlled demolitions, limited vegetation cutting, protection of water sources and wildlife, safe battery disposal, and the use of solar power. To strengthen this framework, ANAM, in

38 Email from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025.
39 Email from Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.
40 Emails from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April and 2 September 2025.
41 Email from Cristy McLennan, MAG, 7 October 2025.
42 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA (on behalf of CNIDAH), 1 April 2020.
43 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025.
44 Email from Narciso Paulo Simão Tiacafe, Head, Demining Operations Accreditation and Certification Department, ANAM, 26 June 2024.
45 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025; Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025; Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.
46 Email from Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025.
47 Email from Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.
48 Email from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 16 September 2025.

collaboration with the relevant ministries and mine action operators, is planning under the development of the National Mine Action Strategy 2026–2030 to develop a National Mine Action Standard (NMAS) on environmental management in line with IMAS 07.13, alongside specific operational guidelines for the sector.[49]

**Table 3: Environmental policies and action**[50]

| Operator | Environmental policy in place for country programme | Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| APOPO | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| HALO | No – global policy in place; programme-wide plan under development | Yes – external EIAs commissioned | Yes |
| NPA | No – follows global guidelines, not country-specific | Yes | Yes |
| MAG | No – global Climate and Environment Strategy under development | No | Yes |

In 2024, APOPO increased its efforts to reduce generator reliance and vegetation cutting during operations and has been undertaking an analysis of greenhouse gas emissions through standardised reporting protocols.[51] HALO recruited an Environment Project Coordinator and commissioned an external consultants to conduct environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and an Environmental Management Plan, which was due for implementation in the second half of 2025. HALO also delivered large-scale forestry inventories for the US Forestry Service as part of Angola's national forest inventory, conducted surveys of peatland for The Nature Conservancy, and trained national conservation authority staff in drone use for habitat monitoring and protected area law enforcement.[52] NPA started to implement its Green Field Tool in 2024 to conduct environmental assessments of operations and integrate mitigation measures. It has ensured that each task implementation plan contains a dedicated chapter on environmental considerations.[53] In 2025, MAG appointed a Climate and Environment Officer who has been working with MAG's Global Climate Advisor to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the programme's carbon emissions in 2024.[54]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

ANAM, with support from the GICHD and NPA, is migrating its database from IMSMA NG to IMSMA Core.[55] In June 2024, ANAM, with support from the GICHD, hosted a workshop for all operators on IMSMA Core and information management principles.[56] ANAM has also been meeting with individual operators to reconcile data and eliminate discrepancies. Reporting templates have been updated, and automated checks introduced to improve accuracy.[57] Operators report that they have sufficient access to the national database.[58] Nevertheless, ANAM's information management system does not yet capture all mine action data nationwide, an issue which is being discussed with public operators.[59] The CND and the Angolan Armed Forces are expected to play a larger role in clearing mined areas during the extension period, with ANAM reviewing public operator data to ensure their compliance with NMAS and full integration into the database.[60]

49 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 108.

50 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April and 9 October 2025; Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April and 2 September 2025; Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.

51 Email from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025.

52 Email from Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.

53 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025.

54 Email from Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025.

55 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 22.

56 Email from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025.

57 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025.

58 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025; Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025; Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.

59 Email from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 4 May 2022.

60 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 105.

According to NPA, the CND's activities must be streamlined and consistently reported to ANAM, as the current lack of reporting risks duplication where areas remain recorded as open despite having been cleared. Many CND tasks are verification activities linked to construction projects, which do not meet land release standards, and yet have been counted within national clearance figures. NPA recommends that such "verification" outputs be reported separately to avoid misrepresenting actual land release figures.[61]

Angola submitted a timely and detailed Article 7 report covering 2024, alongside a comprehensive Article 5 deadline extension request. The request was revised to respond to questions from the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Angola's National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025 was drafted by CNIDAH with GICHD support in 2019 but has never been formally adopted.[62] The strategy set five objectives, with specific targets for land release, residual contamination, and coordination, including completion of Article 5 obligations by the end of 2025. None has been achieved. A new national strategic mine action plan for 2026–30 is under development with support from the GICHD and in consultation with operators and relevant government entities.[63] The process for developing the new strategy is said to have included an inclusive and participatory context analysis and engagement of stakeholders.[64] The new strategy will be launched by the end of 2025 and will align with the content of Angola's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request.[65]

In 2021, Angola released a work plan detailing all confirmed or suspected hazardous areas, annual clearance targets to 2025, milestones, and funding projections. Angola is not on track to meet these targets and has developed a new work plan to 2030 as part of its 2025 Article 5 extension request. Survey and clearance will be conducted by public operators, the Armed Forces and CND, across all provinces, while national and international operators will be assigned the following provinces: Bengo, Uige, and Cuanza Norte (NPA), Cuanza Sul (APOPO), Cuanza Sul and Huila (APACOMINAS), Bié and Cuando Cubango (HALO), and Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, and Moxico (MAG). ANAM will oversee monitoring, QA, QC, and certification.[66]

Angola expects land release to average 10km$^2$ annually.[67] Of the 963 remaining hazardous areas (884 CHAs and 79 SHAs), 434 are assigned to the Armed Forces, 341 to the CND, and 190 to national and international operators.[68] Nine provinces—Benguela, Cuanza Norte, Huambo, Icolo e Bengo, Luanda, Malanje, Namibe, Uige, and Zaire—will be prioritised for completion, with contamination totalling 2,235,034m$^2$ across 34 mined areas.[69] Benguela, Huambo, Luanda, and Zaire are understood to be mine free and are awaiting the official declaration of completion.

Guidelines for a new tasking and prioritisation system were adopted in 2021.[70] A key feature of the new system is that provinces are assigned to operators, giving them responsibility over that province.[71] ANAM says priority is given to the most contaminated areas and those close to the communities. The criterion is to prioritise the tasks in the provinces close to completion, so that resources can then be focused on the other provinces and geared towards completion.[72] APOPO, MAG, and NPA all reported that the prioritisation system is functioning effectively.[73] According to operators, clearance and task dossiers are issued by ANAM in a timely and effective manner.[74]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Ten chapters of NMAS were adopted in 2021.[75] Three additional standards on animal detection systems, EOD, and residual contamination management were drafted with GICHD support, with the first of these two launched in 2023.[76] The NMAS

61 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025.
62 Emails from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 4 May 2022; and Narciso Paulo Simão Tiacafe, ANAM, 26 June 2024.
63 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025.
64 Email from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 16 September 2025.
65 Email from Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025.
66 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 118.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., Table 9.
69 Ibid., pp. 118 and 119.
70 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 4 July 2021.
71 Interview with Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 22 February 2021.
72 Email from Mário Nunes (on behalf of ANAM), NPA, 10 May 2023.
73 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 29 April 2024; Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 2 May 2024; and Catherine Harris, MAG, 3 May.
74 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025; Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025; Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.
75 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form J.
76 Ibid.; and emails from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 4 May 2022; Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 10 March 2022; Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 2 May 2024; and Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 29 April 2024.

on residual contamination management was revised in 2024 to align it with the residual risk strategy. Also in 2024, the NMAS on monitoring of clearance activities was updated and a new NMAS on accident investigation was elaborated.[77]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Four international NGOs conducted demining in Angola in 2024: APOPO, HALO, MAG, and NPA. No survey or clearance by national operator, APACOMINAS, or public operators, the CND or the Armed Forces were reported by ANAM in its Article 7 report covering 2024. According to the revised extension request, the CND have 17 demining teams and 17 NTS teams with a total of 159 personnel (although it is thought that this is all related personnel and not just the deminers themselves) and 684 detectors, while the Armed Forces have 23 demining teams and 8 NTS teams with a total of 982 personnel and 330 detectors.[78]

**Table 4: Operational NTS capacities deployed in 2024[79]**

| Operator | NTS teams | NTS personnel |
|---|---|---|
| APOPO | 1 | 2 |
| HALO | 9 | 11 |
| NPA | 1 | 2 |
| MAG* | 3 | 12 |
| **Totals** | **14** | **27** |

*No NTS-only teams but two community liaison teams and one multi-task team with personnel trained to conduct NTS.

**Table 5: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024[80]**

| Operator | Manual teams | Total deminers | Animal detection capacity | Machines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| APOPO | 2 | 20 | 5 handlers, 10 rats | 1 | Clearance teams also conduct TS. |
| HALO | 90 | 782 | 0 | 2 JCBs | Average no. of demining teams in 2024. Totals include medics as they also conduct clearance. |
| MAG | 5 | 82 | 0 | 3 tillers, 5 excavators | Ten deminers per manual team (50 total), plus 32 deminers in mechanical teams. |
| NPA | 5 | 57 | 0 | 4 | Clearance teams also conduct TS. |
| **Totals** | **102** | **941** | **5 handlers, 10 rats** | **15** | |

From 2023 to 2024, APOPO and HALO reported no change in their survey and clearance capacity.[81] NPA more than doubled its clearance capacity due to additional funding.[82] MAG also increased its capacity during 2024, through the addition of new mechanical teams.[83] APOPO and MAG did not anticipate a change in their capacity in 2025.[84] HALO and NPA, however, were both reducing their capacity due to a drop in funding.[85]

HALO is investing in research and development to reduce manual excavations and minimise staff exposure to AP mines, while improving clearance efficiency. This has focused on field trials of the Micro-Excavator (Bobcat) mechanical asset, which has been deployed for field trials in areas with dense quantities of AP mines only. It has already proven effective in Zimbabwe, where it reduced accidents and increased efficiency, and HALO Angola is likely to scale up its use significantly.[86]

77 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025.

78 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, Table 7.

79 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025; Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025; Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.

80 Ibid.

81 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025; and Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.

82 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025.

83 Email from Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025.

84 Email from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025; and Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025.

85 Emails from Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025.

86 Email from Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 6: Summary of land release outputs in 2024 (National authority data)**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 3.03 | |
| **Technical survey** | 2.38 | |
| **Non-technical survey** | 0.14 | |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 5,680 | Includes 44 during spot tasks |

## SURVEY IN 2024

ANAM reported that a total of 2.52km² was released through survey in 2024, of which 0.14km² was cancelled through non-technical survey (NTS) (see Table 7) and 2.38km² reduced through technical survey (TS) (see Table 9).[87] This is a 46% decrease from the 4.65km² released through survey in 2023.[88] There are, though, differences in the NTS and TS data reported by operators and ANAM. Operators reported a total of 4.77km² of release through survey – 0.23km² cancelled through NTS (see Table 8) and 4.54km² reduced through TS (see Table 10).[89]

Considering the national survey that was completed in 2019, ANAM and operators believe that the remaining contamination should be released through a combined application of TS and clearance, with the expectation that the ratio of land cleared to that released through survey will increase over time.[90]

In addition, a total of 1.55km² of previously unrecorded AP mined area was discovered by operators in 2024. APOPO discovered two areas totalling 0.13km², MAG reported 11 areas covering 0.76km²; HALO identified 22 new areas totalling 0.60km²; and NPA reported two areas totalling 0.06km².[91]

**Table 7: Release of mined area through NTS in 2024 (national authority data)[92]**

| Province | Operator | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Cuanza Norte | NPA | 1,579 |
| Cuanza Sul | APOPO | 95,000 |
| Lunda Sul | MAG | 24,073 |
| Moxico | MAG | 19,778 |
| **Total** | | **140,430** |

**Table 8: Release of mined area through NTS in 2024 (operator data)[93]**

| Province | Operator | Areas cancelled | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cuanza Norte | NPA | 0 | 0 |
| Cuanza Sul | APOPO | 0 | 0 |
| Lunda Sul | MAG | 1 | 20,073 |
| Moxico | MAG | 1 | 19,778 |
| Cuando Cubango | HALO | 3 | 185,228 |
| **Totals** | | **5** | **225,079** |

87 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

88 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F.

89 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025; Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025; Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.

90 Emails from Mário Nunes on behalf of ANAM, NPA, 14 September 2022; Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 6 September 2022; Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 14 September 2022; Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 6 September 2022; and Robert Syfret, HALO, 14 September 2022.

91 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025; Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025; Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.

92 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

93 Email from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025.

In addition, HALO reported partial cancellation of 17 areas through NTS totalling 1,387,797m², comprising six areas totalling 102,817m² in Bié, two in Huila covering 742,863m², and nine in Cuando Cubango of 542,117m².[94]

**Table 9: Release of mined area through TS in 2024 (national authority data)[95]**

| Province | Operator | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Bengo | NPA | 276,058 |
| Benguela | HALO | 174,612 |
| Cuando | HALO | 126,703 |
| Cuanza Norte | NPA | 176,766 |
| Cuanza Sul | APOPO | 675,682 |
| Cubango | HALO | 415,114 |
| Lunda Sul | MAG | 176,958 |
| Moxico | MAG | 359,170 |
| **Total** | | **2,381,063** |

**Table 10: Release of mined area through TS in 2024 (operator data)[96]**

| Province | Operator | Areas reduced | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bengo | NPA | 7 | 722,031 |
| Bié | HALO | 7 | 229,214 |
| Cuando Cubango | HALO | 30 | 1,868,734 |
| Cuanza Norte | NPA | 6 | 214,642 |
| Namibe | HALO | 1 | 84,070 |
| Cuanza Sul | APOPO | 6 | 866,224 |
| Lunda Sul | MAG | N/R | 174,976 |
| Moxico | MAG | N/R | 384,996 |
| **Totals** | | **57** | **4,544,887** |

N/R = Not reported

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

ANAM reported that 3.03km² of mined area was cleared in 2024 (see Table 11), with 5,636 AP mines found and destroyed.[97] This is a 49% decrease from the 5.95km² cleared in 2023 (with 4,445 AP mines destroyed).[98] There are differences between the data reported by operators (see Table 12) and that provided by ANAM, but these are not as significant as in earlier years. Operators reported clearance of 3.42km², with 5,821 AP mines found and destroyed. ANAM reported a total of 44 AP mines destroyed by operators during spot tasks in 2024[99] whereas HALO, MAG, and NPA reported destroying 67 AP mines and 18 AV mines in spot tasks.[100]

In previous years, ANAM also reported on clearance by the CND, along with APACOMINAS and various commercial demining companies, that supports socio-economic development projects. These efforts have focused on areas not recorded in the IMSMA database but were not reported in its Article 7 report covering 2024.

94 Email from Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.
95 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F.
99 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
100 Emails from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025; Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.

**Table 11: Mine clearance in 2024 (national authority data)[101]**

| Province | Operator | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bengo | NPA | 7,213 | 46 | 0 | 21 |
| Benguela | HALO | 8,539 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bié | HALO | 410,321 | 22 | 15 | 36 |
| Cuando | HALO | 1,234,839 | 5,193 | 1,357 | 56 |
| Cuanza Norte | NPA | 29,792 | 123 | 0 | 42 |
| Cuanza Sul | APOPO | 172,672 | 22 | 0 | 18 |
| Cubango | HALO | 479,576 | 197 | 5 | 24 |
| Huila | HALO | 8,446 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lunda Sul | MAG | 143,481 | 9 | 0 | 9 |
| Moxico | MAG | 509,850 | 24 | 2 | 945 |
| Namibe | HALO | 21,881 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **3,026,610** | **5,636** | **1,379** | **1,151** |

**Table 12: Mine clearance in 2024 (operator data)[102]**

| Province | Operator | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Benguela | HALO | 3 | 8,539 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bié | HALO | 8 | 412,040 | 21 | 16 | 26 |
| Cuando Cubango | HALO | 54 | 1,588,024 | 5,369 | 1,617 | 39 |
| Cuanza Norte | NPA | 10 | 60,058 | 278 | 0 | 308 |
| Cuanza Sul | APOPO | 6 | 159,850 | 83 | 0 | 184 |
| Huila | HALO | 0 | 8,446 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lunda Sul | MAG | 12 | 279,300 | 9 | 0 | 19 |
| Moxico | MAG | 18 | 882,891 | 61 | 6 | 1,506 |
| Namibe | HALO | 3 | 21,881 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **114** | **3,421,029** | **5,821** | **1,639** | **2,082** |

In 2024, more than 1.6km² of AP mined area was cleared with no landmines found (see Table 13), an increase from 1.4km² in 2023. According to operators, ANAM ensures consistent application of land release approaches through routine QA and QC visits to operators' tasks, review and approval of survey and completion reports, and coordination meetings with operators where methodologies are clarified and inefficiencies addressed.[103]

**Table 13: Area cleared in 2024 in which no AP mines were found**

| Operator | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| APOPO | 3 | 620,876 | Historical mine incidents had been reported in all three tasks. APOPO suspects that either the devices had been removed and not reported to ANAM or that the incidents were isolated incidents with no other contamination in the area. |
| HALO | 18 | 619,197 | Of these tasks 1 contained an AV mine and 4 others contained items of UXO. |

101 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

102 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April and 9 October 2025; Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025; Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025. MAG applied clearance and reduction methodologies to all 30 task sites. Of these 30 task sites, 14 were completed in 2024 covering 354,957m².

103 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025; Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025; Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.

**Table 13 Continued**

| Operator | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| NPA | 2 | 45,942 | These were mainly road tasks and road are treated as full clearance. |
| MAG | 8 | 354,957 | Three tasks contained a total of 2,902 items of UXO.<br>Two tasks contained only small arms ammunition (SAA).<br>Three tasks totalling 7,260m² did not contain any mines or UXO or SAA, but 3 accidents had been reported so full clearance was applied. |

In August 2024, after a visit from MAG's Global Technical Advisor, MAG shifted its use of mechanical assets from full clearance to TS, enabling faster identification of mine patterns and area reduction where full clearance is unnecessary. This resulted in higher area reduction and lower clearance output. However, recurring mechanical faults left machines out of service for extended periods during the year.[104]

## DEMINER SAFETY

In 2024, HALO reported three non-fatal demining accidents during clearance operations. On 3 April, a staff member sustained minor facial injuries following the detonation of an R2M2 AP blast mine. On 21 May, another lost their right arm below the elbow after unauthorised handling of an R2M2 mine. On 30 May, a third had a finger on their right hand amputated following the detonation of a PN-1 AP blast mine. Each accident was investigated by HALO operations staff in accordance with its Accident and Incident Investigation SOP, with evidence collected from the scene, witness testimonies gathered, and contributing factors analysed. Recommendations and safety actions were shared with ANAM and across clearance organisations to mitigate risks and prevent recurrence.[105]

HALO has reported demining accidents in Angola every year since 2020.

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ANGOLA: 1 JANUARY 2003

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2013

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2018

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (8 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

**THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (5 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2030**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by States Parties in 2017), Angola is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. Angola will not meet this deadline and has requested a further five-year extension to 31 December 2030.

In 2024, Angola released a total of 5.5km² of mined area against its annual target of 14.29km² and there was a significant drop in both survey and clearance output from the previous year. Under its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, ANAM has set new annual land release targets averaging 10km² per year, a level Angola has achieved in previous years. Meeting these targets will require sufficient capacity and improved targeting of clearance, particularly as survey output has fallen sharply, from 14km² in 2021 to 2.52km² in 2024, reflecting the completion of nationwide NTS and better definition of mined areas. At the same time, previously unrecorded mined areas continue to be added to the database each year (1.5km² in 2024, 6.1km² in 2023, and 4.4km² in 2022), as operators discover contamination that was previously unknown to communities and was missed in baseline surveys.

ANAM claimed that strict application of land release principles has improved operational efficiency.[106] But operators reported of clearance over 1.4km² in 2023

104 Email from Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025.

105 Email from Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.

106 ANAM, Updated Article 5 Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025, June 2021, p. 6.

and 1.6km² in 2024 without finding any mines, suggesting that pre-clearance survey and better targeting of clearance are still needed. Additional obstacles include the public operators being tasked with infrastructure projects outside the IMSMA database, diverting capacity from registered mined areas. Despite earlier plans, the public operators did not shift focus to database-recorded areas in 2024, and government funding shortfalls have prevented their full operationalisation. With national funding now secured, greater participation from the Armed Forces and CND is expected during the extension request period although it is not clear how much capacity building is needed before they can be deployed nationwide.

The absence of an official declaration process has meant that while several provinces have released all mined areas, they cannot yet be formally recognised as completed. ANAM reported, however, that a residual risk management strategy and standard are being finalised, and the first provinces are expected to be declared completed by the end of next year.

**Table 14: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 3.0 |
| 2023 | 6.7 |
| 2022 | 5.9 |
| 2021 | 4.0 |
| 2020 | 1.8 |
| **Total** | **21.4** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

In accordance with Strategic Objective 4 of the draft National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025, CNIDAH and the CED, with the participation of all relevant actors, aimed to establish a national strategy on the management of residual contamination by the end of 2020.[107] According to Angola's revised Article 5 deadline extension request, the residual risk strategy has been drafted and will be approved by September 2025. It will be implemented as soon as a province is declared free of known mined areas.[108]

A national standard on residual contamination management has also been developed by the GICHD for the transition phase. This includes process maps that outline the responsibilities of the currently involved stakeholders.[109] According to Angola's revised Article 5 deadline extension request, completion of the standard will take place once the strategy has been approved.[110] An information management database for residual contamination will be established for each of the provinces that enters the residual phase, and regional rapid response teams will be trained to respond to call-outs.[111]

107 Telephone interview with Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 8 June 2021; and ANAM, Updated Article 5 Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025, p. 8.

108 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 123.

109 Email from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 4 May 2022.

110 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 123.

111 Ibid., Table 11.

# BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2027

Not on track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 50KM²

Heavy
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0.17 | 0.36 |
| Technical Survey | 3.25 | 5.5 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 12.03 | 25.64 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 574 | 1,363 (including 577 during spot tasks) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Armed Forces of BiH
- Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska (CPA RS)
- Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP)
- Point
- Detector
- DCM Media
- In Demining
- N&N Ivsa
- UEM
- Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC)
- Stop Mines
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) still lacks a reliable estimate of anti-personnel (AP) mined area as the overall estimate reported by the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) is significantly inflated. Although BHMAC migrated to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core in 2024, at the time of writing, the system was not yet being used operationally. The Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027 includes land release targets of 75km² per year for 2025 and 2026, which are entirely unrealistic given falling land release output and record-low clearance of just 0.17km² in 2024. Operators are still not permitted to conduct non-technical survey (NTS) despite revisions made to national mine action standards (NMAS) and without which BiH will be unable to achieve the amount of cancellation needed and meet its targets. Donor confidence is waning as fulfilment of its clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) remains far out of reach.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **BHMAC should present AP mined area data in line with international best practice, clearly disaggregating suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) from confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).**
- **BHMAC should prioritise cancellation of SHAs based on desk research and deployment of NTS teams to conduct**

survey in order to generate a more accurate estimate of AP mined area. In line with international best practice, operators should be authorised to conduct NTS which will require a change in legislation and should be included in the forthcoming Demining Law.

- BHMAC should ensure IMSMA Core is finally operating and grant operators access to the database.
- BHMAC should delegate greater operational decision-making authority to operators, recognising their expertise and ability to make decisions about operational safety and efficiency.
- BHMAC should streamline decision-making to reduce delays in approving changes and procedures, addressing the centralisation of authority and political obstacles that hinder progress.
- BHMAC should accelerate certification of cleared areas and removal from the national database.
- BHMAC should strengthen communication and coordination with operators and other stakeholders, including by reinstating the Country Coalition, and hold technical working group (TWGs) meetings with operators that address the challenges to the implementation of Article 5.

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 4 | 5 | BiH estimated that nearly 823km$^2$ of AP mined area remained in its territory at the end of 2024. Of this, 165km$^2$ is categorised as CHAs, which is a large increase from the 18km$^2$ reported in 2023. The basis for this new estimate is unclear. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | The process to adopt the amended demining law was restarted in 2022. As at October 2025, the Working Group had agreed on the draft Demining Law, but the adoption process was still pending. A Board of Donors meeting and a Technical Working Group meeting were held in 2025, but no Country Coalition meetings have been held since 2020. Coordination mechanisms remain insufficiently participatory and are ineffective. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | The Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027 aligns with the 2003 Law on Gender Equality. But within BHMAC and clearance operators, women make up only a small proportion of staff. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | BiH does not have an NMAS on environmental management, though laws and BHMAC procedures include some measures to minimise contamination, protect ecosystems, and restore land to an appropriate state. Environmental considerations feature in a limited way in the revised mine action strategy. Environmental assessments are conducted for certain projects such as the planned demining of the River Sava. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 6 | BHMAC has migrated from its own information management system to the new web-based IMSMA Core, but at the time of writing had still to use the system. BiH submitted its Article 7 report covering 2024, disaggregating mined area into SHAs and CHAs. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | The Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027 was adopted in April 2025. It includes new targets on land release for 2025 and 2026. A demining plan for 2025 had been finalised and adopted. Final task completion certificates have been delayed, and task dossiers lack detailed NTS information. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | A number of NMAS, including on land release, NTS, technical survey, and clearance, were revised in 2024 and have been implemented since January 2025. Only BHMAC can conduct NTS, a situation that operators have been seeking to change, but this continues to be met by resistance from BHMAC and any change would require amendments to legislation under the authority of higher levels of government and the NMAA. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 4 | 5 | Land release output decreased by 51% between 2023 and 2024 and fell far short of BiH's land release target for the year. BiH will not meet its current Article 5 deadline and will submit its fourth extension request in 2026. In order to achieve completion within the medium term, BiH will need to increase its annual land release output significantly, with a particular focus on cancellation through NTS as well as greatly increased clearance. |
| **Average Score** | **4.6** | **5.1** | **Overall Programme Performance: POOR** |

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- The Demining Commission (representatives from three ministries (Civil Affairs, Security, and Defence) elected to represent BiH's three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs))
- Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Armed Forces of BiH
- BHMAC
- Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska (CPA RS)
- Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP)
- NGOs:
  - DEMIRA
  - Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC)
  - Pro Vita
  - Stop Mines
- Commercial demining companies:
  - Detektor
  - Heksogen
  - In Demining
  - N&N Ivsa
  - Udruga "Pazi mine"
  - UEM (UEM is also an NGO)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

### OTHER ACTORS

- European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

BHMAC reported that, as at the end of 2024, nearly 823km$^2$ of suspected mined area remained (see Table 1).[1] Of this, nearly 165km$^2$ is categorised as CHA while more than 658km$^2$ is in SHA.[2] This is an overall decrease from the 838km$^2$ of mined area reported by BiH a year earlier, although it includes greatly increased CHA, which in 2023 covered only some 18km$^2$.[3] In its latest Article 7 report covering 2024 (and the Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027), BiH refers to the overall total of suspected mined area and number of minefield records as an indication of AP mined area. However, this is misleading as it is known that the overall total is hugely inflated and actual contamination covers between 2% and 10% of the estimate.[4]

**Table 1: Mined area (at end 2024)[5]**

| | Suspected area by priority category (km$^2$) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Canton** | **1st category** | **2nd category** | **3rd category** | **Total Area (km$^2$)** |
| Unsko-Sanski | 34.05 | 31.82 | 19.15 | 85.02 |
| Posavski | 2.98 | 9.10 | 1.81 | 13.89 |
| Tuzlanski | 12.58 | 15.35 | 38.82 | 66.76 |
| Zeničko-Dobojski | 25.98 | 11.48 | 74.71 | 112.17 |
| Bosansko-Podrinjski | 2.39 | 7.86 | 32.22 | 42.48 |
| Srednjebosanski | 20.11 | 36.27 | 42.99 | 99.38 |
| Hercegovačko Neretvanski | 11.06 | 22.22 | 93.31 | 126.59 |
| Zapadnohercegovački | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.20 | 0.20 |
| Kanton Sarajevo | 14.66 | 9.91 | 23.67 | 48.25 |
| Kanton 10 | 7.28 | 10.62 | 42.69 | 60.59 |
| Republika Srpska | 0.77 | 7.28 | 2.31 | 10.35 |
| Brčko district | 51.97 | 51.94 | 53.28 | 157.19 |
| **Totals** | **183.83** | **213.85** | **425.16** | **822.87** |

1 Email from Mirjana Marić, Senior Officer for Analysis and Reporting, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.
2 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Annex 2.
3 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 29 April 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form C.
4 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 10; and Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
5 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.

In 2017, BHMAC, clearance operators, and the European Union (EU) formalised plans for a country assessment project to establish a more accurate baseline of mine contamination and improve clearance efficiency.[6] The project, conducted from 2018 to 2020, involved a nationwide NTS by BHMAC, the Armed Forces of BiH, and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). The project processed data for 143 municipalities, confirming mined areas in 118 of them. During the project, 103km$^2$ of land was released, reducing total mined area from 1,069km$^2$ to 966m$^2$. The NTS corrected 1,151 mined area locations, added 300 new minefield records, and removed 6,023 records from the database.[7]

The remaining mined area was divided into 478 Mine Suspected Areas (MSAs), which average 1.94km$^2$ in size.[8] MSA is a BiH-specific term, not consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), and defined locally as "an area made up of SHAs and CHAs which encompasses one or more impacted communities and due to economic, cultural or geographical and other reasons is selected as a logical unit".[9] In addition, some mine contamination outside the MSAs is assigned to operators for release. BHMAC has not specified how much of the contaminated area is within MSAs and how much is outside. It had been expected that the assessment project would result in a significant amount of cancellation, but in fact this amounted to less than 10% of the total mined area at the time.[10] Significant further cancellation is therefore expected during release of the MSAs.

BiH is heavily contaminated with mines, primarily as a result of the 1992–95 conflict related to the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. All warring factions in BiH laid mines, primarily between confrontation lines.[11] More than twenty-five years after the end of the conflict, BiH is still heavily contaminated with mines. Mined areas generally contain relatively small numbers of mines, which are typically either in patterns or are "randomly laid". In its Article 7 report for 2020, BiH stated it had collected 70% of all minefield records.[12] The quality of approximately 30% of minefield records was not sufficiently accurate to enable the precise location and shape of the mined area in question to be identified.[13] BiH is also reported to be affected by AP mines of an improvised nature in Čapljinka and Goraždanka, but claims their detection is possible through standard methods.[14]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

BiH is also contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW). The last cluster munition remnants (CMR) were destroyed at the end of August 2023, and BHMAC declared completion of its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 clearance obligations at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the CCM in Geneva in September 2023.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Demining Commission, under the BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs, supervises the State-wide BHMAC and represents BiH in its relations with the international community on mine-related issues.[15] The Demining Commission is composed of representatives from three ministries (Civil Affairs, Defence, and Security) elected to represent BiH's three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). Whereas the Minister for Civil Affairs remains ultimately responsible for mine action, the Demining Commission is the body tasked with setting mine action policy on periodic re-accreditation of field operators, based on a recommendation from BHMAC. It also proposes appointment of BHMAC senior staff for approval by the Council of Ministers.[16]

BHMAC is responsible for regulating mine action and implementing BiH's survey and clearance plans.[17] It operates from its headquarters in Sarajevo, two main operations offices in Sarajevo and Banja Luka, and eight regional offices (in Banja Luka, Bihac, Brčko, Mostar, Pale, Sarajevo, Travnik, and Tuzla).[18]

Since 2008, efforts have been made to adopt new mine action legislation in BiH with a view to creating a stable platform for mine action funding by the government and local authorities. The process was restarted in 2022 with adoption planned in June 2025.[19] As at October 2025, the Working Group had agreed on the draft Demining Law, but the adoption process was still pending.[20] The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) believes the amended demining law should be revised further and re-submitted for adoption, with the topics of "all reasonable effort" and liability discussed in parallel to the revision.[21] Clearer legislation on liabilities related to mine action activities would be beneficial to all stakeholders in BiH.

6 Interviews with Darvin Lisica, then Programme Manager and Regional Director, NPA, Sarajevo, 8 May 2017; Fotini Antonopoulou, EU, Sarajevo, 8 May 2017; and Tarik Serak BHMAC, Sarajevo, 10 May 2017.
7 Email from Jonas Zachrisson, Country Director, NPA, 26 March 2020.
8 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 10–11; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form C.
9 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6 and 16.
10 Based on BiH's draft Mine Action Report for 2020, p. 11.
11 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.
12 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form C.
13 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
14 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.
15 BHMAC Organisational chart, accessed 6 May 2022 at: http://bit.ly/2Ycj4xl.
16 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 22.
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina Official Gazette, Sarajevo, 17 March 2002.
18 BiH, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 8.
19 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 12 April 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
20 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 8 October 2025.
21 Email from the GICHD, 14 May 2021.

Since 2010, NPA has supported capacity building of the Armed Forces of BiH's demining battalion.[22] National capacity development remains a strategic priority for NPA, which, in collaboration with national stakeholders, developed a Capacity Development Plan for 2022–25, which aimed to strengthen the battalion's role in implementing BiH's mine action strategy. Progress under the plan depends, in part, on the availability of funding. In 2024, NPA provided training in information management and land release to BHMAC staff, although this had limited impact on BHMAC's processes or operations.[23] ITF Enhancing Human Security supported BHMAC by providing three vehicles to aid its operational capacity.[24] Mines Advisory Group (MAG) continued to support national capacity development through the implementation of a digital risk education project.[25]

After a 10-year hiatus, Board of Donors meetings resumed in September 2015.[26] BiH's Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027 specifies that at least one such meeting should be organised every year with one held in June 2025.[27]

It had been hoped that the "Country Coalition" established between BiH and Germany would provide a forum for regular dialogue among all mine action stakeholders, help demonstrate national ownership, strengthen coordination of Article 5 (and CCM Article 4 implementation, now completed), identify and overcome challenges, and monitor progress against the 2018–25 strategy. The first Country Coalition meeting, convened jointly by BiH and Germany, was in 2020, attended by representatives from a wide range of mine action stakeholders, including NGO clearance operators and donors.[28] Regrettably, as at June 2025, no further Country Coalition meetings had been convened.[29]

Since the appointment of the new BHMAC director in June 2024, MAG and NPA have noted increased openness within BHMAC to reform and reinvigorate TWGs to foster dialogue between operators, BHMAC, and its regional offices. The intention is for these TWGs to provide a platform to share lessons learned, operational challenges, and successes across BiH, with the aim of their being convened every two or three months.[30] In June 2025, BHMAC convened a TWG meeting, but it focused solely on administrative issues related to a recent ITF tender without any discussion of technical matters.[31] MAG and NPA have continued to advocate for regular TWG meetings and have offered their support to organise them.[32] BHMAC has suggested TWGs will continue, but whether this happens remains to be seen.

Overall, operators report that BHMAC should establish more frequent, focused, and participatory coordination mechanisms that go beyond a tick-box exercise, actively seeking operator input to inform the development and updating of standards and processes.[33]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

National funding supports BHMAC and survey and clearance by the BiH Armed Forces, financed by the State budget through the Council of Ministers. The Federation of BiH funds the Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP), while the Republika Srpska government finances the Civil Protection Administration for Republika Srpska (CPA RS).[34] In 2020, 55% of mine action funding came from international donors, with 45% from national sources, but total funding fell short of the Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 targets.[35] In 2024, BHMAC received more than BAM 7.8 million (approximately US$4.4 million) from BiH, an increase on the support provided the year before. Additionally, domestic institutions allocated over BAM 10.8 million for demining (BAM 2.8 million for the Armed Forces, BAM 4.3 million for the FACP, and BAM 3.7 million for the CPA RS).[36] BiH also secured €10 million from the EU's Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) in 2024 for a three-year clearance programme in more than 20 municipalities, aiming to clear over 70km$^2$ of land.

Clearance along the Sava river's right bank is planned in partnership with the Ministry of Transport and Communication and The World Bank, although the tender had yet to be announced.[37] In 2024, funding for AP mine survey and clearance in BiH came from Czechia, the European Union, Germany, Norway, Slovenia, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United States.[38]

In 2024, NPA was funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Foreign Office (GFFO) and the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC). The GFFO withdrew funding to mine action in BiH at the end of December 2024 although it was later extended to the end of March 2025. An NMFA contract with NPA for mine action in BiH finishes at the end of 2025. Future Norwegian support may be channelled

22 Email from Jonas Zachrisson, NPA, 14 March 2021.

23 Email from Valerie Warmington, Country Director, NPA, 25 June 2025.

24 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.

25 Email from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025.

26 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 10 May 2017; and emails from Fotini Antonopoulou, EU, 19 June 2017; and Suad Baljak, Mine Action Officer, UNDP, 15 June 2017; and UNDP BiH, "Mine Action Board of Donors Meeting", 31 March 2016, at: http://bit.ly/300f4lp.

27 BiH, Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–27, p. 24; and email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 8 October 2025.

28 BHMAC website, "Embassy of the Republic of Germany in Bosnia and Herzegovina in cooperation with the BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs, organized online Country Coalition conference", 14 October 2020, at: http://bit.ly/2NwxatH; and Statement of Germany, Second CCM Review Conference (Part 1), virtual format, 25–27 November 2020.

29 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.

30 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 25 April 2024; and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 9 May 2024.

31 Email from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

32 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025; and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

33 Email from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025.

34 Emails from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 22 March 2022; and Suad Baljak, UNDP, 18 September 2020.

35 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

36 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.

37 Statement of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024; and email from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 30 September 2025.

38 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.

through global funds allocated by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) to NPA in Oslo. Funding from the SDC has fallen sharply since 2023, as resources were redirected to Ukraine. Other donors have also indicated to NPA that they have no funding available or no further interest in supporting mine action in BiH.[39]

In 2024, MAG was funded by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the US Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), the GFFO, and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Humanitarian Demining and Weapons Contamination Management Programme (MACM). The Dutch support, part of a multi-year, multi-country grant, ended in May 2024. In 2025, MAG was funded by PM/WRA, with GFFO funding ending in March. The PM/WRA grant was due to conclude at the end of 2025, and its extension into 2026 remained uncertain at the time of writing.[40]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027 specifies that: "Under BHMAC leadership, the relevant actors will include the issues of gender and diversity in all phases of planning, realisation and monitoring of all mine activities".[41] The revised mine action strategy reflects the 2003 Law on Gender Equality in BiH, which foresees equal treatment and equality of opportunity and prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination on the ground of gender. The Law on Gender Equality determines that equal representation of men and women exists when the percentage of either gender in bodies at all levels in BiH (State, entity, cantonal, and municipality level) is at least 40%. BiH's national mine action strategy also considered the 2007 Gender Equality Action Plan.[42]

BHMAC reported having a gender and diversity policy in place and claimed that BHMAC upholds the Law on Gender Equality and routinely includes it in the development of strategies, standards and work plans.[43]

**Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2024**[44]

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BHMAC | 148 | 34 (23%) | 18 | 4 (22%) | 122 | 28 (23%) |
| Demining Battalion | 501 | 23 (5%) | 109 | 1 (1%) | 392 | 22 (6%) |
| FACP | 191 | 41 (21%) | 12 | 5 (42%) | 142 | 14 (10%) |
| NPA* | 109 | 13 (12%) | 16 | 3 (19%) | 90 | 6 (7%) |
| MAG | 94 | 12 (13%) | 9 | 4 (44%) | 84 | 7 (8%) |
| **Totals** | **1,043** | **123 (12%)** | **164** | **17 (10%)** | **830** | **77 (9%)** |

*Data from December 2024.

MAG and NPA both have a policy on gender for their work.[45] In 2024, MAG developed a regional Gender and Inclusion Action Plan to increase internal female participation and gender-sensitive programming in MAG's Eastern Europe programmes. Two of MAG BIH's staff members participated in a Gender & Conflict Sensitivity Training organised in collaboration with International Alert. MAG also launched a recruitment campaign focused on attracting women to deminer positions. The response was, though, very limited, and MAG then had to suspend the recruitment campaign due to budget cuts that lead to a reduction in the number of deminer positions available.[46]

39 Emails from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June, 11 and 30 September 2025.

40 Email from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 2 September 2025.

41 Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027, p. 17.

42 Ibid.

43 Emails from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 24 April 2019; and Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.

44 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025; Čazim Mahmić, Head of the Demining and EOD Department, Operational Command of the Armed Forces of BiH, 4 June 2025; Muamer Husilović, FACP, 16 June 2025; and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

45 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025; and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

46 Email from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

BiH does not have an NMAS on environmental management. The Law on Protection and Rescue of People and Material Goods from Natural and Other Disasters[47] recognises environmental protection as integral to protection from unexploded ordnance and land restoration. BHMAC procedures, followed by the FACP, include guidelines for safe handling of explosives to prevent contamination, controlled detonations to limit harmful emissions, environmental impact assessments to identify protected areas and ecosystems, and post-demining land restoration.[48] Threshing machines are banned in agricultural areas due to soil disturbance and compaction, and machines are not used on mountain pastures to protect against removal of layers of grasses.[49] Environmental considerations are included in the revised mine action strategy but only in reference to the 2022 study on the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and mine action in Bosnia which identified the direct contribution of land release to 12 SDGs and 35 of their associated targets, including relating to flood prevention.[50] Environmental assessments are sometimes conducted to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance tasks, with an environmental study for the project "The demining of the River Sava right bank" currently in preparation and to be published upon completion.[51]

**Table 3: Environmental policies and action**[52]

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| Demining Battalion | No | No | No |
| NPA | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| MAG | Organisational, not country programme-specific. | No | No |
| MAG | No – global Climate and Environment Strategy under development | No | Yes |

In 2024, NPA BiH trialled and adopted the Green Field Tool, which confirmed it was already taking all reasonable measures to minimise environmental impact, and noted limited community interest in environmental and climate issues. NPA also introduced recycling for paper, glass, metal, and plastic at its main base.[53] MAG BiH began drafting an Environmental Action Plan, distributed reusable tote bags and water bottles, promoted energy and water conservation, and continued reusing plastic marking tape where possible. In 2025, MAG will conduct a baseline environmental assessment to measure and reduce the climate and environmental impact of its operations.[54]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

BHMAC continues to use its Paradox-based information management system, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Information System (BHMAIS),[55] with migration to IMSMA Core ongoing since 2019. Phase one was completed in 2020.[56] A follow-up project to migrate the remaining data and workflows supported by the GFFO and conducted in partnership with the GICHD and NPA began in February 2023 and concluded in August 2024.[57]

A monitoring team of NPA and the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) oversaw progress. The GICHD deployed an information management staff member to conduct regular missions, visiting for two weeks each month to support implementation.[58] NPA reported that despite IMSMA Core being fully installed, reliable data migrated, regional staff trained, and tablets provided for field-level reporting, BHMAC has yet to operate the system. NPA continues to follow up and offer support, but neither

47 Official Gazette of the Federation of BiH, No. 59/03.

48 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.

49 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 22 March 2022.

50 GICHD and UNDP, "The Sustainable Development Outcomes of Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina", 2 June 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3X9qv8z.

51 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.

52 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025; Ćazim Mahmić, Operational Command of the Armed Forces of BiH, 4 June 2025; and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

53 Email from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

54 Email from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025.

55 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 22 March 2022.

56 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 5; and email from the GICHD, 27 April 2022.

57 Emails from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 6 April 2023; Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 25 May 2023; Henrik Rydberg, GICHD, 29 June 2023; and Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 12 April and 16 September 2024.

58 Email from Boris Ohanyan, GICHD, 2 July 2024.

NPA, GICHD, nor the BHMAC Director has identified any credible barriers to its use. However, the Director maintains his commitment to adopting IMSMA Core and advancing its implementation.[59] MAG noted that in August 2024, BHMAC held a presentation on IMSMA Core without inviting MAG, which risks further slowing the system's effective roll-out as all implementers will need to report through it and adapt their internal processes.[60]

At present, while clearance operators do have access to data on specific tasks being undertaken, they do not have access to BHMAC's information management database.[61] Operators rely solely on materials provided in task dossiers prepared by BHMAC from their old system (BHMAIS).[62] According to BHMAC, the full use of IMSMA Core depends on harmonising operational procedures and completing system integration and training. They emphasise that the transition is ongoing and contingent on these foundational steps being finalised.[63]

Information management is the first strategic goal in BiH's revised mine action strategy. Targets are to establish a staffed and trained Information Management Unit by the end of 2026; revise and implement relevant NMAS and standard operating procedures (SOPs) as necessary in coordination with partners; define organisational structures to integrate information management across BHMAC by the end of 2026; and maintain IMSMA Core in line with future revisions to NMAS and SOPs.[64]

BiH has submitted its APMBC Article 7 transparency report covering 2024 and disaggregated remaining mine contamination into SHAs and CHAs. However, the fact that some AP mined area is classified as being within the MSAs and some remains outside MSAs in "classic tasks" creates a lack of clarity in land release data. BiH explained that individual tasks are generally integrated into the MSAs but may be prepared separately when funded by specific donors or local communities.[65] There are also issues with data accuracy, with errors made in the calculations in the contamination table.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

BiH's National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 sought to release all mine contamination. Planned revisions in 2020 and 2023 were delayed, with the first revision completed in 2024, led by BHMAC but with the collaboration of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Demining Commission.[66] National and international mine action operators as well as the representatives from EUFOR, the Red Cross, and civil society participated in the revision of the strategy.[67] The revised strategy was adopted by the Council of Ministers in April 2025.[68]

The Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025-2027 includes a comprehensive action plan for all five strategic goals, detailing operational objectives, indicators and targets for 2025 and 2026. Strategic goal three is about survey and clearance with the target that 67km$^2$ will be cancelled through NTS annually, which will be undertaken in 32 MSAs. In the same goal, however, another target plans that 75km$^2$ will be released each year, of which 60km$^2$ will be cancelled through NTS, 13.5km$^2$ reduced through TS, and 1.5km$^2$ cleared.[69]

According to BiH's 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, from 2020 to 2027 BiH plans to release a total of 967km$^2$: 816.6km$^2$ through cancellation; 141.7km$^2$ through reduction; and 7.8km$^2$ through clearance (see Table 4).[70] While BiH did disaggregate the amount cancelled, reduced, and cleared each year in its operational plan, the totals in several columns did not correctly sum to the annual total.[71]

BiH has fallen well behind its land release targets each year since 2020. BiH was asked by the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to submit an updated work plan by 30 April 2023 but had not done so at the time of writing.[72] In January 2025, BHMAC developed the Demining Plan for 2025 under Article 16 of the Demining Law which has been approved by the Council of Ministers.[73] The Plan outlines mined areas to be addressed; available and estimated personnel; required equipment and materials; funding needs; demining priorities; and an operational demining plan. It is aligned with the Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025. As at April 2025, the Work Plan for 2025–26 had been finalised and was due to be submitted to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation once adopted by the Council of Ministers.[74]

59 Email from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.
60 Email from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025.
61 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025 and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.
62 Email from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.
63 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.
64 Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025-2027, p.20-22.
65 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 8 October 2025.
66 BiH, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 34; and Statement of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.
67 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.
68 Email from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.
69 Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027, pp. 27 and 29.
70 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24.
71 Ibid.
72 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.
73 "Official Gazette BIH", No. 5/02; and email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 8 October 2025.
74 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.

**Table 4: Planned land release in 2023–27 (km²)**[75]

| Year | Land release target in extension request | Land release target in mine action strategy | Release achieved | Gap in implementation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 71.8 | | 16.2 | 55.6 |
| 2021 | 91.3 | | 34.0 | 57.0 |
| 2022 | 110.3 | | 52.8 | 57.5 |
| 2023 | 126.4 | | 31.5 | 94.9 |
| 2024 | 145.5 | | 15.5 | 130.0 |
| **Subtotals** | **545.3** | | **150.0** | **395.0** |
| 2025 | 155.7 | 75 | | |
| 2026 | 131.4 | 75 | | |
| 2027 | 134.6 | | | |
| **Totals** | **967.0** | **150** | **150.0** | **395.0** |

In its 2020 extension request and its Article 7 report covering 2024, BiH described its prioritisation system for releasing MSAs, which is based on the humanitarian, socio-economic, and safety needs of the municipality and local communities; the level of threat (high, medium, or low); and on operational factors such as accessibility and cost-efficiency.[76] Of the 478 MSAs created, 189 were considered high impact, 274 medium impact, and 15 low impact.[77] In its revised mine action strategy, AP mined area is divided into three levels of priority but this just includes contamination as SHAs and makes no mention of the MSAs.[78]

In 2024, BHMAC prepared 10 MSAs and 14 tasks outside MSAs for clearance and technical survey (TS).[79] Operators are assigned whole MSAs by BHMAC, inside which BHMAC designates specific areas (CHA or SHA polygons) for either systematic TS, based on "general, non-location-specific" evidence of contamination, or targeted TS, based on "location-specific" evidence of contamination, as well as clearance (if contamination is confirmed). Formally, only BHMAC can conduct NTS and cancel areas no longer suspected to contain mines.[80]

MAG has faced delays with the issuance of task dossiers and final task completion certificates due to BHMAC's continued reliance on its outdated database (as IMSMA Core is not yet operational) and slow internal quality management procedures requiring multiple layers of central approval. These constraints also limit the number of survey and clearance tasks regional offices can oversee annually, especially when State operator activities occur in parallel.[81] While NPA noted that task dossiers for activities within the annual operational plan are generally issued on time there are often delays in the issuance of task completion certificates stemming from administrative bottlenecks and coordination challenges between regional offices and BHMAC headquarters. NPA also reported that task dossiers often lack the detailed NTS information needed for efficient TS and clearance. As a result, operators frequently need to conduct additional survey and community liaison to supplement the dossiers and support BHMAC with updated information.[82]

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2016, the Demining Commission adopted revised NMAS chapters on land release, NTS, and TS, developed with technical assistance from the EU, UNDP, and the GICHD.[83]

In 2024, BHMAC conducted a comprehensive revision of the NMAS with the revised NMAS formally adopted and published by May 2024.[84] The 2024 revisions included

75 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table, p. 24; and Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027, pp. 27 and 29; and email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 8 October 2025.

76 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6 and 19–22; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.

77 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form C.

78 Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027, Table, p. 26.

79 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.

80 Emails from Muamer Husilović, FACP, 12 March 2021; Clement Meynier, MAG, 11 March 2021; and Jonas Zachrisson, NPA, 14 March 2021.

81 Email from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025.

82 Email from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

83 BHMAC, "Report on Mine Action in BiH for 2016", February 2017, p. 18.

84 Email from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

updated chapters on land release, NTS, TS and clearance, and quality management, aligning more closely with IMAS but also introducing additional administrative requirements for operators.[85] BHMAC also revised its SOPs for NTS and introduced new accreditation regulations for mine action organisations, including extending accreditation validity from two to three years, reducing the minimum number of deminers required from eight to six, and removing the requirement to use two clearance methods. Accredited organisations must now include community liaison personnel, either in dedicated teams or embedded in operations, with relevant accreditation. Clearance standards were also amended to require medical evacuation teams to be within five minutes of clearance sites, and BHMAC's final quality control sampling was reduced from 5% to 2%. These updated standards have been implemented since January 2025.[86]

The NMAS updates were developed in consultation with clearance operators. While NPA reported that their feedback was reflected in the final standards, MAG's comments were largely not taken into account.[87]

In recent years, land release projects that have included use of systematic TS and TS with targeted investigation have revealed that around 90% of mined area can be cancelled through NTS and a further 8% or 9% can be reduced through TS. This means than 2% needs to be cleared.[88] These and previous land release data indicate that actual AP mine contamination in BiH is only a small proportion of the total hazardous area on the database and therefore deployment of clearance assets is only required for relatively small areas.[89] It is thus crucial that NTS is used to identify the location of mined areas more accurately before TS and clearance are conducted. BHMAC conducts NTS and cancels some area before an MSA is assigned to an operator although, as previously mentioned, operators often find they need to conduct additional survey and/or community liaison to supplement the information provided. In practice, most cancellation by BHMAC occurs following completion of TS and clearance of all hazardous areas within an MSA.[90]

MAG and NPA both advocate for operators with adequate capacity and experience to take responsibility for cancellation through NTS but this continues to be resisted by BHMAC and would require amendments to legislation under the authority of higher levels of government and the NMAA.[91] This could improve the efficiency of the land release process, by alleviating the strain on essential BHMAC resources responsible for NTS, including the preparation of land release projects. MAG believes operators should make recommendations for cancellation to BHMAC, who then formally approve and therefore take responsibility for the cancellation, as part of the overall site completion and handover process.[92] NPA stressed the importance of BHMAC enabling operators to plan and implement land release projects effectively in line with international best practice.[93]

MAG and NPA believe that, in general, the NMAS in BiH are suitable to enable efficient land release. However, NPA and MAG continued to notice differences in the processes and approach to land release between the BHMAC regional offices.[94] It is important, therefore, that land release workshops are organised at all levels, including BHMAC headquarters and all BHMAC regional offices, to ensure consistent application of land release methodology.[95] BHMAC has previously pledged to ensure through quality management (QM) that all organisations accredited for TS and clearance comply with the principles of land release.[96]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, a total of 13 organisations were deployed for survey and clearance in BiH: three government organisations (Armed Forces of BiH, the FACP, and the CPA RS); six commercial organisations, all national (Point, Detector, DCM Media, In Demining, N&N Ivsa, and UEM); two national NGOs (Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC) and Stop Mines); and the two international NGOs (MAG and NPA).[97]

**Table 5: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2024[98]**

| Operator | No. of teams | Total personnel | Dogs and handlers | Machines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Point | 1 | 11 | N/R | N/R | Clearance and TS |
| Detector | 1 | 10 | N/R | N/R | Clearance and TS |
| N&N Ivša | 1 | 8 | N/R | N/R | Clearance and TS |

85 Ibid.

86 Email from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025.

87 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025; and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

88 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 10; and Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

89 BiH, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, pp. 6 and 11; and Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 17.

90 Emails from Clement Meynier, Country Director, MAG, 14 March 2022; and Charles Frisby, NPA, 11 April 2022.

91 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025; and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June and 30 September 2025.

92 Email from Clement Meynier, MAG, 14 March 2022.

93 Email from Charles Frisby, NPA, 11 April 2022.

94 Emails from Clement Meynier, MAG, 14 March 2022; and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 6 April 2023 and 30 September 2025.

95 Email from Charles Frisby, NPA, 11 April 2022.

96 Draft Demining plan in BiH for 2020, Annex 6 to the Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 20.

97 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.

98 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025; Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025; Muamer Husilović, FACP, 16 June 2025; and Ćazim Mahmić, Operational Command of the Armed Forces of BiH, 4 June 2025.

**Table 5 Continued**

| Operator | No. of teams | Total personnel | Dogs and handlers | Machines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UEM | 1 | 9 | N/R | N/R | Clearance and TS |
| DCM Media | 1 | 10 | N/R | N/R | Clearance and TS |
| In Demining | 3 | 21 | N/R | N/R | Clearance and TS |
| MDDC | 2 | 13 | N/R | N/R | Clearance and TS |
| Stop Mines | 3 | 19 | N/R | N/R | Clearance and TS |
| NPA | 8 | 52 | 6 dogs, 6 handlers | 2 | Clearance and TS |
| MAG | 8 | 52 | 3 dogs, 2 handlers | 0 | Clearance and TS |
| FACP | 11 | 64 | 4 dogs, 4 handlers | 2 | Clearance and TS |
| Armed Forces of BiH | 34 | 204 | 12 dogs, 16 handlers | 2 | Clearance and TS |
| CPA RS | 6 | 33 | N/R | N/R | Clearance and TS |
| **Totals** | **80** | **506** | **25 dogs, 28 handlers** | **6** | |

MAG does not conduct its own NTS in BiH but contributes information gathered by its community liaison teams through identification and interviews with informants during TS and clearance.[99] Similarly, NPA has a two-person NTS team that reports collated information to BHMAC to be incorporated into their NTS data.[100] While the Demining Battalion of the Armed Forces of BiH had six NTS teams totalling 12 personnel in 2024.[101] BHMAC integrated drones into NTS after their successful use in the country assessment project. Drone records help identify confrontation line trenches, roads, areas in use, and other crucial elements for demining project development. Targeted investigation is used to identify hazardous areas during NTS.[102]

Clearance and TS operations in BiH involve mechanical ground preparation, manual clearance, and the use of mine detection dogs (MDDs), depending on the conditions of the mined area.[103] Much of the remaining mined area is on hills or in mountains, which restricts machinery use.

BHMAC reported an overall decrease in capacity from 2023 to 2024 but expected an increase in the total number of TS and clearance personnel in 2025 thanks to two new demining projects – one under the EU Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance "IPA III" and another for demining of the River Sava.[104] Under the IPA III project, €10 million of funding has been allocated over three years and will cover 42 MSAs across BiH, spanning 65.87km$^2$: 24 in the Federation of BiH and 18 in Republika Srpska.[105]

MAG reported that its clearance capacity remained the same in 2024 and has reduced its operational capacity in 2025 due to funding cuts.[106] NPA reported capacity was down in 2024 with 54 survey and clearance personnel terminated in December due to funding cuts. NPA did not expect any major changes to capacity for most of 2025 but as efforts to confirm funding beyond the end of 2025 have not been successful this suggests that NPA will have to reduce capacity further before the start of 2026.[107]

There was no change in capacity in 2024 for the BiH Armed Forces' Demining Battalion and no change was expected in 2025.[108] State operators such as the BiH Armed Forces' Demining Battalion and the Civil Protection entities are thought to be good partners with effective capacities, but they have suffered from logistical challenges and equipment deficits, which can prevent them from fully functioning.[109]

With the exception of MAG and NPA, clearance operators in BiH typically compete for international tenders in order to secure funding. A UNDP evaluation found this resulted in considerable capacity being underused and recommended alternative contracting models that would be more appropriate for land release in BiH, either by having longer term contracts or by being contracted to clear larger areas. This could be more attractive to the demining organisations in terms of security and could make better use of capacity.[110] National demining NGOs, such as Stop Mines or Pro Vita, which are registered in a similar way to companies, have the

99 Emails from Clement Meynier, MAG, 11 March 2021 and 14 March 2022.

100 Email from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 22 April 2024.

101 Email from Ćazim Mahmić, Operational Command of the Armed Forces of BiH, 4 June 2025.

102 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 15 April 2022.

103 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

104 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.

105 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 16 September 2024.

106 Email from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025.

107 Emails from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June and 30 September 2025.

108 Email from Ćazim Mahmić, Operational Command of the Armed Forces of BiH, 4 June 2025.

109 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 29; and interviews with Darvin Lisica, NPA, Sarajevo, 8 May 2017; Haris Lokvancic, Swiss Embassy, Sarajevo, 9 May 2017; and Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 10 May 2017.

110 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, p. 35.

ability to quickly mobilise additional resources and upscale operations.[111] According to the CPA RS, the lack of trained deminers was becoming a problem.[112]

The Demining Commission is responsible for periodic re-accreditation of field operators, based on a recommendation from BHMAC. Quality control and quality assurance are both conducted by BHMAC.[113]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 6: Summary of land release outputs in 2024 (BHMAC data)**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) |
|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 0.17 |
| **Technical survey** | 3.25 |
| **Non-technical survey** | 12.03 |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 574 |

Mine Action Review has used the land release data reported by BHMAC but there are significant discrepancies with the data reported by operators as noted in the tables below. BHMAC reported a decrease in the amount of mined area cancelled, reduced, and cleared in 2024 compared to 2023. According to BHMAC, this corresponds to the limited number of MSAs certified as completed in 2024, with many MSAs still undergoing clearance and/or quality assurance, with the MSAs covering a total of 63.8km². Due to the extensive size of these areas, clearance often extends over several years and BHMAC only reports MSAs that were officially certified by the end of 2024.[114]

## SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, a total of 15.28km² was released through NTS and TS. BHMAC cancelled 12.03km² through NTS, of which 3.36km² was cancelled following completion of TS and clearance of assigned tasks by operators (see Table 7), and 8.67km² was cancelled through NTS before the tasks were assigned. A total of 3.25km² was reduced through TS, of which 1.84km² was within MSAs and over 1.41km² was in tasks outside MSAs (see Table 8).[115] This is a 51% decrease from 2023 when 31.14km² was released through survey – 25.64km² cancelled through NTS and 5.5km² reduced through TS.[116] BHMAC is directly responsible for reporting all cancellation of mined areas in BiH and does so only upon completion of whole MSAs. There were substantial discrepancies between the TS data reported by BHMAC and the data reported by operators.

**Table 7: Release of mined area in MSAs through NTS in 2024 (BHMAC data)[117]**

| Canton | Operator | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Tuzlanski | MAG | 1,003,942 |
| Tuzlanski | Armed Forces of BiH | 536,750 |
| Unsko Sanski | MDDC | 365,820 |
| Srednje Bosanski | MDDC | 271,341 |
| **Totals BiH Federation** | | **2,177,853** |
| Republika Srpska | Armed Forces of BiH | 1,057,250 |
| Republika Srpska | MAG | 120,167 |
| **Totals Republika Srpska** | | **1,177,417** |
| **Grand Total** | | **3,355,270** |

111 Email from Fotini Antonopoulou, EU, 18 September 2017.
112 Email from Milisav Pantic, CPA RS, 23 September 2022.
113 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
114 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.
115 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.
116 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form C.
117 Email Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025. Demining Battalion of the Armed Forces of BiH reported cancelling 14.73km² through NTS in 2024.

**Table 8: Release of mined area outside MSAs through TS in 2024 (BHMAC data)**[118]

| Canton | Operator | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Hercegovacko Neretvanski | CPA RS | 58,731 |
| Canton 10 | Armed Forces of BiH | 46,713 |
| Posavski | FACP | 69,020 |
| Hercegovacko Neretvanski | Armed Forces of BiH | 338,766 |
| Zenicko Dobojski | FACP | 35,935 |
| Posavski | POINT | 10,030 |
| Hercegovacko Neretvanski | UEM | 88,088 |
| Srednje Bosanski | N&N IVSA | 53,829 |
| Srednje Bosanski | Armed Forces of BiH | 45,170 |
| Unsko Sanski | UEM | 60,737 |
| Srednje Bosanski | DETEKTOR | 30,410 |
| Zenicko Dobojski | IN DEMINING | 43,760 |
| Srednje Bosanski | POINT | 17,915 |
| **Totals BiH Federation** | | **899,104** |
| Republika Srpska | Armed Forces of BiH | 104,416 |
| Republika Srpska | CPA RS | 107,627 |
| Republika Srpska | UEM | 31,299 |
| Republika Srpska | DCM MEDIA | 92,693 |
| Republika Srpska | POINT | 100,300 |
| Republika Srpska | STOP MINES | 76,968 |
| **Totals Republika Srpska** | | **513,303** |
| **Grand Total** | | **1,412,407** |

**Table 9: Release of mined area through TS in 2024 (data from MAG, Armed Forces of BiH, FACP, and NPA)**[119]

| Canton | Operator | Areas reduced | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Goražde | FACP | 1 | 4,320 |
| Brcko District | MAG | 1 | 445,679 |
| Brcko District | NPA | 13 | 372,097 |
| Canton 10 | FACP | 1 | 12,300 |
| Central Bosnia | FACP | 2 | 61,845 |
| Herzegovina-Neretva | MAG | 1 | 448,780 |
| Herzegovina-Neretva | FACP | 4 | 100,858 |
| Posavina | FACP | 2 | 92,207 |
| Sarajevo | FACP | 2 | 46,561 |
| Tuzla | MAG | 3 | 866,686 |
| Tuzla | NPA | 4 | 397,894 |
| Una-Sana | FACP | 4 | 67,723 |
| Zenica-Doboj | FACP | 2 | 188,516 |

118 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.

119 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025; Ćazim Mahmić, Operational Command of the Armed Forces of BiH, 4 June 2025; Muamer Husilović, FACP, 16 June 2025; and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

**Table 9 Continued**

| Canton | Operator | Areas reduced | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| N/R | Armed Forces of BiH | N/R | 903,326 |
| **Totals BiH Federation** | | **40** | **4,008,792** |
| Republika Srpska | MAG | 1 | 128,544 |
| Republika Srpska | NPA | 6 | 204,224 |
| **Totals Republika Srpska** | | **7** | **332,768** |
| **Grand Totals** | | **47** | **4,341,560** |

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, BHMAC reported clearance of 0.17km², of which 0.079km² was within MSAs (no breakdown provided) and 0.092km² was outside (see Table 10). A total of 574 AP mines were found and destroyed during clearance and TS.[120] This is a significant decrease from the 0.36km² of mined area cleared in 2023, of which 0.18km² was within MSA and 0.18km² was outside MSA, with 786 AP mines destroyed.[121] There were substantial differences between the clearance data reported by BHMAC and the data reported by operators. However, Mine Action Review has not been able to verify the difference as no breakdown of clearance within MSAs was provided by BHMAC.

**Table 10: Clearance outside MSAs in 2024 by canton (BHMAC data)[122]**

| Canton | Operator | Area cleared (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Posavski | FACP | 6,288 |
| Tuzla | FACP | 2,220 |
| Zenica-Doboj | FACP | 4,701 |
| Herzegovina-Neretva | In Demining | 9,261 |
| Central Bosnia | Detektor | 14,333 |
| Zenica-Doboj | In Demining | 6,984 |
| Unsko Sanski | Detektor | 17,223 |
| Sarajevo | UEM | 2,158 |
| **Totals BiH Federation** | | **63,168** |
| Republika Srpska | Armed Forces of BiH | 253 |
| Republika Srpska | N&N IVSA | 6,723 |
| Republika Srpska | IN DEMINING | 4,543 |
| Republika Srpska | N&N IVSA | 16,606 |
| Republika Srpska | DCM MEDIA | 1,286 |
| **Totals Republika Srpska** | | **29,411** |
| **Grand Total** | | **92,579** |

**Table 11: Clearance in 2024 by canton (data from MAG, Armed Forces of BiH, FACP, and NPA)[123]**

| Canton | Operator | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Goražde | FACP | 1 | 14,980 | 47 | 0 | 10 |
| Brcko District | NPA | 6 | 4,709 | 20 | 1 | 37 |
| Brcko District | MAG | 1 | 136,233 | 64 | 0 | 8 |
| Central Bosnia | FACP | 3 | 1,160 | 8 | 0 | 16 |

120 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.

121 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 29 April 2024.

122 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.

123 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June and 5 October 2025; Ćazim Mahmić, Operational Command of the Armed Forces of BiH, 4 June 2025; Muamer Husilović, FACP, 16 June 2025; and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

**Table 11 Continued**

| Canton | Operator | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Herzegovina Neretva | MAG | 2 | 160,193 | 110 | 0 | 10 |
| Herzegovina Neretva | FACP | 4 | 43,466 | 83 | 0 | 8 |
| Posavina | FACP | 1 | 38,751 | 5 | 0 | 1 |
| Sarajevo | FACP | 2 | 7,803 | 55 | 6 | 17 |
| Tuzla | MAG | 3 | 349,660 | 329 | 11 | 89 |
| Tuzla | NPA | 3 | 14,770 | 57 | 0 | 21 |
| Una-Sana | FACP | 1 | 450 | 5 | 0 | 10 |
| Zenica-Doboj | FACP | 2 | 20,258 | 33 | 6 | 37 |
| N/R | Armed Forces BiH | N/R | 33,196 | 205 | 10 | 239 |
| **Totals BiH Federation** | | **29** | **825,629** | **1,021** | **34** | **503** |
| Republika Srpska | MAG | 1 | 2,255 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Republika Srpska | NPA | 5 | 9,261 | 137 | 1 | 28 |
| **Totals Republika Srpska** | | **6** | **11,516** | **137** | **1** | **28** |
| **Grand Totals** | | **35** | **837,145** | **1,158** | **35** | **531** |

In addition, the FACP also reported destroying 1,212 AP mines and 46 AV mines during EOD spot tasks in 2024.[124]

In 2024, BHMAC reported that 22 AP mined area tasks, totalling 702,229m², were cleared with no mines found, a substantial increase on the 19 tasks totalling 28,730m² cleared in 2023 with no AP mines found.[125] Both MAG and NPA stated that mines were found on all their clearance tasks in 2024.[126] However, NPA noted that almost all of its tasks are for TS rather than clearance, and on many of these tasks no mines or other ERW are found. Of the 23 TS tasks assigned to NPA in 2024, nine contained no mines. Analysis shows that when mechanical ground preparation is included in its calculations, NPA processed an average of 48% of the total area reduced through its technical survey work. As high as 27% of the reduced area was processed when only manual and MDD assets were included in the calculation. This is a higher proportion than in other countries where NPA operates which is believed to reflect a growing inability to direct operations in line with evidence on the ground. In particular, NPA believes that land release productivity could be improved through improved analysis and operational planning based on NTS results and greater use of targeted rather than systematic technical survey. Additional reductions in the percentage of reduced area requiring technical interventions could be achieved by reducing requirements from two MDD searches to a single MDD search on mechanically prepared land.[127]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR BIH: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (2-YEAR INTERIM EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2021

↓

**THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (6-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2027**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

124 Email from Muamer Husilović, FACP, 16 June 2025.

125 Emails from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 29 April 2024 and 5 June 2025.

126 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025; and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

127 Emails from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June, 30 September and 8 October 2025.

Under Article 5 of the APMBC and in line with the third extension of its deadline, BiH is required to destroy all AP mines under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2027. BiH will not meet this deadline and is planning to submit a fourth Article 5 deadline extension request in 2026.

The 2020 extension request, granted by the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, was for the purpose of conducting NTS and TS "to better define the precise perimeter of mined areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina".[128] It is, however, assumed that there was an accidental omission of land release through clearance, and that BiH intended to complete clearance of remaining mined areas by the requested deadline. Prior to this, BiH had been granted a second extension request in 2018, for an interim two-year extension to 1 March 2021, during which it conducted a "country assessment", to better understand the extent of AP mined area remaining and plan more effectively for its release.[129]

Over the last five years, BiH has released 2.67km$^2$ thorough clearance (see Table 12). The painfully slow pace of survey and clearance has resulted in lack of confidence in the national mine action programme from donors but also from people living in mine-affected communities, who feel disillusioned that the mines have not been cleared.[130] Land release output decreased by 51% between 2023 and 2024 and BiH fell considerably short of its land release target of 145km$^2$ for the year. BiH has been consistently lagging behind the land release targets set out in its 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request and has released updated targets for 2025 and 2026 as part of the review of its national strategy. The new targets of 75km$^2$ per year are also very ambitious based on BiH land release outputs in recent years. There is also 63.8km$^2$ of contaminated area that is still in progress, where clearance and/or quality assurance are ongoing and no area has yet been officially certified. At the current, negligible rate of land release output, it will take BiH two decades to complete clearance.

**Table 12: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 0.17 |
| 2023 | 0.36 |
| 2022 | 0.92 |
| 2021 | *0.69 |
| 2020 | *0.53 |
| **Total** | **2.67** |

*Combined TS and clearance output for MSAs.

Systematic survey conducted in BiH over recent years has determined that 90% of mined area can be cancelled through NTS. To address this challenge, BHMAC should focus on enhancing NTS resources and capacity. The current approach seems inefficient and lacks transparency with operators. For instance, as NPA neared completion of the "Mine-Free Majevica" project, the BHMAC Regional Office in Tuzla added 4km$^2$ to NPA's tasks, with another new task expected in Lopare, yet NPA has not been able to access the NTS information behind these decisions.[131] A more effective strategy would be to empower operators to conduct NTS, with BHMAC focusing on oversight and approval. This change would unlock more potential resources and capacity and could lead to substantial increases in NTS output. If BHMAC also ensures a consistent and efficient approach to land release operations across all stakeholders, it could result in significant improvements in overall land release practices, helping BiH make meaningful progress towards its clearance goals.

In addition, BHMAC (both headquarters and its regional offices) must ensure stronger coordination and an enabling operating environment, with a more sustained and efficient mobilisation of strategic national demining resources such as the Demining Battalion and Civil Protection entities. This does, however, require political will and strong oversight and commitment from BHMAC, the Demining Commission, and their superiors in the government, which is lacking at present.

It is disappointing that no Country Coalition meetings have taken place since the first one in 2020 nor have the TWGs been reformed. BiH should fully embrace and use the Country Coalition formed with Germany, as a useful platform to help strengthen coordination and actively address and overcome the ongoing challenges in Article 5 implementation. In order to achieve completion, BiH must sustain national and international funding to its Mine Action Programme, and mechanisms such as the Country Coalition and Board of Donor meetings are an essential element in achieving this.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 required the development of a residual contamination management strategy by 2022, but as at August 2025 this had yet to be elaborated.[132] It is unclear whether an NMAS on residual contamination has been incorporated into the updated standards. While the revised mine action strategy includes residual contamination management and suggests BiH could enter a residual management phase in 2027, this is not feasible given that completion of clearance remains many years away.[133] In its latest Article 7 report, BiH notes it still lacks a legal framework for a sustainable national capacity to address residual contamination. Nonetheless, BiH recognises that it has national capacity in place that could assume this role, and that planning for sustainable capacity will begin once clearance is completed.[134]

128 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 17.

129 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19; and "BiH Statement on Interim Request for Extension to the Deadline for Fulfilling Obligations as per Article 5", Geneva, 7 June 2018.

130 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 14.

131 Email from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 22 April 2024.

132 Emails from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 23 March and 31 August 2023; and Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 29 April 2024.

133 Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027, p. 37.

134 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.

# BURKINA FASO

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009 (deadline expired)

Not on track to meet deadline:
New extended deadline to 31 December 2028 requested

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Light, extent unknown

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Not reported | 0 |
| Technical Survey | Not reported | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | Not reported | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Not reported | Not reported |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Army explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

On 30 April 2025, Burkina Faso requested an Article 5 deadline extension request for the first time, seeking a new deadline of 31 December 2028. This followed its initial disclosure in June 2023, during the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) intersessional meetings, where it informed States Parties of a new explosive threat involving the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by non-State armed groups (NSAGs), including improvised anti-personnel (AP) mines. The nature and scope of this threat were further detailed in Burkina Faso's Article 7 report, submitted in 2024 and covering 2022 and 2023.

The extension request is intended to give Burkina Faso the time needed to conduct the necessary surveys to generate a clearer understanding of the extent of improvised AP mined area. During this period, Burkina Faso plans to carry out an initial contamination analysis, establish an information management (IM) system, conduct non-technical survey (NTS), and perform explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks. While the extension request indicates that international NGOs play a limited role in the mine action sector—focused on capacity-building and risk education—Burkina Faso is open to allowing demining organisations to conduct NTS, and possibly clearance, in areas where security conditions have improved. The extension request was due to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Burkina Faso should aim to establish, by the end of the extended deadline, a baseline contamination estimate including both the number and size (in square metres) of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).**
- **Burkina Faso should ensure its data collection system accurately records the nature of the contamination involved in incidents. An improvised anti-vehicle (AV) mine sensitive enough to be detonated by a person should be recorded as an improvised AP mine.**

- **When circumstances permit, Burkina Faso should develop a civilian mine clearance capacity in addition to its military counter-IED capabilities, seeking international assistance as required.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 3 | Not scored | Burkina Faso submitted its first extension request in 2025 in order to conduct an initial threat analysis and NTS to determine the nature and extent of contamination. The effort is based on 124 communes that have reported improvised AP mine incidents since 2017, along with 102 neighbouring communes suspected of contamination across 10 of the nation's 13 regions. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 6 | Not scored | The National Commission for Arms Control (CNCA) serves as the national mine action authority. Burkina Faso has also established a national demining centre, which provides expertise and resources for EOD and training. While Burkina Faso plans to cover nearly 30% of its mine action work plan through national funding, it is seeking international support to strengthen capacity and support Article 5 implementation. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 5 | Not scored | Burkina Faso does not have a policy or standards specifically addressing gender and diversity in mine action, but has noted that national law applies and that the CNCA has a gender focal point. While it has not provided details on women's participation in EOD teams, UNMAS had reported the first woman completed EOD level 2 training in 2023. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 4 | Not scored | The 2025 extension request emphasises that demining will comply with national environmental regulations, notably the 2013 Environmental Code, to prevent (or at least minimise) negative impacts on local ecosystems. It further indicates that Burkina Faso plans to develop a national standard on environmental management during the first semester of 2026. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 4 | Not scored | Burkina Faso started to develop an information management system to collect data on incidents and victim in 2023. However, with the departure of UNMAS in August 2024, it lost a functional mine action database. In response, the country formally requested support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, which visited the country in February 2025 and agreed to assist in establishing a new IM system during its Article 5 extension period. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 4 | Not scored | Burkina Faso is currently unable to define annual projections for survey activities or the expected number of EOD tasks. However, it submitted a detailed work plan as part of its 2025 extension request through to 2028. NTS and the deployment of EOD teams for spot tasks are planned throughout the implementation period. Final survey results to identify all priority intervention areas are expected by the end of 2027, with a national workshop scheduled in 2028 to refine the land release process. Due to limited technical and financial capacity, very few civilian actors are engaged in the mine action sector. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 6 | Not scored | Currently, only military-led clearance is conducted. Between 2021 and 2023, Burkina Faso developed 12 Burkinabè Mine Action Standards to regulate mine action. Operations involve manual demining and mine detection dogs, on-site destruction (or safe removal of devices), quality control by EOD team leaders, basic victim assistance, and incident reporting to the authorities. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 4 | Not scored | Burkina Faso did not share any data in 2024 on spot tasks or the number and types of devices neutralised and destroyed. In April 2025, Burkina Faso submitted its first Article 5 deadline extension request since acceding to the APMBC. The request proposes a new deadline of the end of 2028, and was due to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties. |
| **Average Score** | **4.3** | **Not scored** | **Overall Programme Performance: POOR** |

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Commission for the Control of Arms (Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Armes, CNCA)
- National Demining Centre (Centre National de Déminage, CND)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army Engineers EOD Unit
- Defence and security forces (Forces de Défense et de Sécurité)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).
- International NGOs are present but only working on risk education and/or capacity building: DanChurchAid (DCA); Danish Refugee Council (DRC); Humanity & Inclusion (HI); Mines Advisory Group (MAG).
- National NGOs include RASALAO, AMMIE, WILPF, TIN TUA (risk education only).
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (only risk education)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) left in August 2024

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mined area in Burkina Faso is not known.

Burkina Faso has undergone major political and security upheavals in recent years. Since the end of 2016, it has been confronted with widespread terrorist attacks by NSAGs which have killed thousands and displaced approximately two million people.[1] The violence is mainly concentrated in the Liptako-Gourma area (known as the three-border area), which, in Burkina Faso, encompasses the Sahel, East, North, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions. NSAGs, designated as "terrorists" by the national authorities,[2] have used victim-activated and command-detonated IEDs as well as landmines to control supply routes and increase their areas of influence.[3] Security operations are carried out by the defence and security forces supported by the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP) that were established under the law in 2022 as auxiliaries to the armed forces and the defence and security forces.[4]

In its latest Article 7 report covering 2022 and 2023, Burkina Faso indicated that 729 IED incidents had occurred since 2017 in 12 of Burkina Faso's 13 regions, with most occurring in the Sahel region (197), followed by Est (164), Centre-Nord (123), Nord (86), and Boucle du Mouhoun (65).[5] These incidents had caused 1,433 victims – 713 fatalities and 720 injured.[6] At the time of writing this report, Burkina Faso had not yet submitted an Article 7 report covering 2024 to provide updated annual data. However, in its April 2025 extension request, it indicated that the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) had recorded 817 incidents between 2017 and June 2024, including 146 in the first half of 2024, compared with 101 recorded in the first half of 2023 (45% increase).[7] In 2024, an intensification of IED presence has been observed in the Boucle du Mouhoun and Centre-Nord regions, along with an expansion into the Cascades region.[8]

While the initial target of NSAGs were mainly defence and security forces convoys, the first civilian victim was registered in 2019.[9] The number of civilian casualties has since risen steadily over the last few years. Civilians accounted for 62% of total casualties in 2023 and in 2024 through to the end of March.[10] Of the 293 victims recorded in the first half of 2024, 185 (63%) were civilians, the majority being women and children.[11]

1 Presentation of Burkina Faso, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024; and see: "Violent Extremism in the Sahel", *Center for Preventive Action*, 23 October 2024, at: https://bit.ly/47GoFR6; and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), "Burkina Faso", Last updated 14 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3SeHGnM.

2 Burkina Faso, Semantic clarification, Communiqué of 25 March 2025 issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at: http://bit.ly/3JMRVOY. Mine Action Review uses the term "non-State armed groups (NSAGs)" as a standard, generic designation applied consistently across all countries to describe armed groups, regardless of national designations. We refer to "terrorist attacks" because terrorism is understood as a tactic—a means of warfare—rather than an organisational principle. This approach is in no way intended to diminish the barbarity endured by the Burkinabè people.

3 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2024-31/12/2024, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Burkina Faso", accessed 29 July 2025, at: www.acleddata.com; ACLED, "Africa overview", 5 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3SeOZfi; Global Centre for the Responsibility To Protect, "Central Sahel", 15 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4d9GJoU; and Amnesty International, "Burkina Faso: Armed groups committing war crimes in besieged localities", 2 November 2023 at: https://bit.ly/4d6ckru.

4 Law 028-2022/AN of 17 December 2022, Article 2, at: http://bit.ly/4lSqvnT.

5 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), pp. 3, 4, and 13.

6 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), pp. 3 and 13. The figure of 1,433 was indicated on page 3 but 1,430 on page 13.

7 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9 and 17 (map).

8 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, Burkinabé Air Force, and (new) Permanent Secretary of the CNCA, 29 July 2025.

9 Statement of Burkina Faso on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025; and presentation of Burkina Faso, UN National Directors Meeting (NDM-UN28), Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.

10 Calculated by Mine Action Review based on data provided in the Article 7 report (p. 13).

11 OCHA, "2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), Burkina Faso", 13 December 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/4fcnIEB.

Burkina has explained that most explosive devices are victim-activated, intended to slow down security and supply operations or prevent civilians from carrying out their daily activities and returning to their area of origin while in displacement.[12] NSAGs have also improved their ability to produce more IEDs, and faster, employing available components such as fertiliser, sugar, fuel, and batteries. In 2024, the National Commission for Arms Control (CNCA) even reported the dropping of explosive devices from drones.[13] The containers used included can, gas bottles, and bags.[14]

In its 2025 extension request, Burkina Faso provided, as a baseline estimate, a list of "communes" (municipalities) that have experienced incidents involving improvised AP mines, along with a list of communes suspected to be contaminated as they are located in surrounding areas. The combined list includes 226 communes—124 where incidents have been recorded and 102 suspected of contamination—across 10 of Burkina Faso's 13 regions (see Table 1). As improvised AP mines tend to be laid without a clear pattern, the data collected relate to incidents occurring in scattered areas, making it difficult to delineate affected zones and develop polygons. Consequently, only the geographical coordinates of incidents and suspected areas have been recorded.[15] Burkina Faso specified that the modus operandi of NSAGs involves the continuous laying of improvised mines, even after clearance operations, which does not allow these areas to be definitively declared safe.[16]

The extension period to 31 December 2028 is intended to allow the country to gain a clearer understanding of the extent and nature of contamination. In the current context, marked by ongoing security operations in many parts of the country, strengthening data collection on both incidents and victims remains essential to accurately identify hazardous areas. From 2019 until the middle of 2024, UNMAS was responsible for collecting and managing data related to IED incidents and victims. However, due to lack of funding, UNMAS closed its programme in August 2024, resulting in a gap in data collection and management.[17] The CNCA does not have sufficient capacity to assume this role, and since that time it has not shared any updated data on victims or incidents.

**Table 1: Summary of communes with mined areas**[18]

| Region | Province | Communes with improvised AP mine incidents | Communes with suspected improvised AP mines | Totals | Total confirmed and suspected communes by region |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Boucle du Mouhoun | Mouhoun | 4 | 3 | **7** | **37** |
| | Banwa | 5 | 1 | **6** | |
| | Nayala | 3 | 3 | **6** | |
| | Sourou | 5 | 3 | **8** | |
| | Kossi | 5 | 5 | **10** | |
| Cascades | Comoé | 4 | 5 | **9** | **9** |
| Centre-Est | Boulgou | 2 | 11 | **13** | **21** |
| | Koulpélogo | 6 | 2 | **8** | |
| Centre-Nord | Sanmatenga | 6 | 5 | **11** | **28** |
| | Namentenga | 3 | 5 | **8** | |
| | Bam | 4 | 5 | **9** | |
| Centre-Ouest | Sissili | 2 | 5 | **7** | **13** |
| | Ziro | 2 | 4 | **6** | |

12 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.
13 Presentation of Burkina Faso, NDM-UN27, Side event, Geneva, 30 April 2024.
14 Presentation of Burkina Faso, NDM-UN28, Side event, Geneva, 10 April 2025.
15 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.
16 Ibid., p. 15.
17 OCHA, 2025 HNRP, Burkina Faso, 13 December 2024.
18 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 1, pp. 17–19.

**Table 1 Continued**

| Region | Province | Communes with improvised AP mine incidents | Communes with suspected improvised AP mines | Totals | Total confirmed and suspected communes by region |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Est | Gourma | 6 | 0 | **6** | **27** |
| | Gnagna | 2 | 5 | **7** | |
| | Komandjari | 3 | 0 | **3** | |
| | Kompienga | 3 | 0 | **3** | |
| | Tapoa | 7 | 1 | **8** | |
| Hauts-Bassins | Houet | 2 | 11 | **13** | **33** |
| | Kénédougou | 3 | 10 | **13** | |
| | Tuy | 3 | 4 | **7** | |
| Nord | Yatenga | 11 | 2 | **13** | **22** |
| | Loroum | 4 | 0 | **4** | |
| | Zandoma | 1 | 4 | **5** | |
| Sahel | Séno | 5 | 1 | **6** | **26** |
| | Soum | 9 | 0 | **9** | |
| | Oudalan | 5 | 0 | **5** | |
| | Yagha | 6 | 0 | **6** | |
| Sud-Ouest | Poni | 3 | 7 | **10** | **10** |
| **Totals** | | **124** | **102** | **226** | **226** |

The explosive threat emerged in Burkina Faso in January 2016 following the use of explosive devices during the terrorist attack on the Splendid Hotel and the Cappuccino Café in Ouagadougou. After a period of relative calm, IED attacks resumed in August 2017 in Soum Province, in the Sahel region, and almost systematically targeted defence and security forces along roadways. These IED attacks have since expanded both geographically—affecting an increasing number of administrative regions across the country—and in terms of impact, with a growing number of civilian victims.[19]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

At the time of writing, no information was available on other types of contamination beyond IEDs.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Commission for Arms Control (CNCA) serves as the national mine action authority (NMAA) in Burkina Faso. In addition to its mandate to oversee transfers of conventional arms, the CNCA is responsible for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the State's obligations under the APMBC, including survey, clearance, and risk education related to improvised AP mines, as well as reporting. Operating under the Prime Minister, the CNCA also coordinates the activities of mine action actors.[20] The Permanent Secretary of the CNCA informed Mine Action Review that in 2025 a review of the legal texts governing the CNCA is underway, with the aim of reorganising and strengthening mine action within the Commission's work.[21]

19 Ibid., p. 15.

20 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9 and 21–22.

21 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

EOD is primarily the responsibility of the military engineering corps, which houses the National Demining Centre (Centre National de Déminage, CND), which was established in 2023 with the support of Germany, along with a mine detection dog (MDD) breeding centre.[22] The CND has facilities that include an educational building with two classrooms and a laboratory; a detector testing field; and two training grounds – one for "hook and line" operations and the other simulating a village for EOD training. In addition to these facilities, the Centre benefits from the logistical support of the Technical Engineering School and the Special Company for Demining and Clearance. This support includes instructors, equipment, and materials; access to an MDD training field; and direct access to a veterinary clinic.[23]

In response to the threat of improvised AP mines, for which national actors were initially unprepared, Burkina Faso launched several initiatives to strengthen its mine action capacity. Key measures included establishing an UNMAS office (in 2019), creating a mine action working group (the same year) and the NMAA (in 2021), along with the development of national mine action standards (NMAS) and providing training to defence and security forces in EOD, IM, and risk education. Regulations governing the import, marketing, distribution and use of IED components and precursors have also been adopted.[24] In its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, Burkina Faso observes that national structures lack technical, financial, and training resources. Despite national efforts and partner support, Burkina Faso requires further assistance to meet its Article 5 obligations.[25]

The national counter-IED strategy (2023–27), developed with the support of UNMAS and based on an assessment undertaken by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in 2022–23, was officially adopted by the government on 30 August 2024. The goal is to strengthen legal and institutional frameworks, build national capacity, and enhance coordination and international cooperation. The strategy is supported by a three-year work plan outlining concrete actions, including training programmes, risk education, equipment acquisition, and the establishment of both an MDD breeding centre and a national demining centre,[26] some of which have already been achieved.

The coordination framework for information exchange on IEDs in Burkina Faso is the Mine Action Working Group (GTLAM – Groupe de Travail de la Lutte Antimines), which was created in 2019. It brings together the Permanent Secretariat of the CNCA, the Military Engineers, the Ministry of Humanitarian Action, UN agencies (specifically UNICEF), international NGOs such as DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Humanity & Inclusion (HI), and Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and civil society organisations (CSOs) such as RASALAO, AMMIE, and WILPF. The GTLAM, co-led by MAG (since UNMAS's departure), meets each month.[27] However, several key actors involved in counter-IED operations—including the gendarmerie and civil protection services—do not consistently share information with the CNCA, limiting the effectiveness of its efforts at mine action coordination.[28]

From 2019 to the middle of 2024, UNMAS supported Burkina Faso in response to a request from the government as well as on the UN Resident Coordinator's initiative. UNMAS's work focused on civilian protection, through IED awareness, humanitarian staff training, and coordination, and on strengthening national capacities. In 2023, UNMAS contributed to developing four additional NMAS and the national counter-IEDs strategy, and provided training and equipment to the defence and security forces for IED detection and neutralisation.[29] In August 2024, due to lack of funding, UNMAS closed its office in Burkina Faso.

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Burkina Faso's extension request includes a national contribution of US$175,000 per year to the mine action programme under the CNCA, totalling US$700,000 in 2025–28 period.[30] To implement its work plan, Burkina Faso requires US$3.94 million in international support to complement the US$1.66 million allocated from national resources.[31]

In April 2025, during the International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors & UN Advisors in Geneva (NDM-UN28), Burkina Faso hosted a side event with Mali and Niger. Burkina Faso delivered a presentation on the progress, challenges, and needs in addressing explosive ordnance threats. The session emphasised the need for sustained support in the region.[32] It also appealed for international cooperation and assistance during the intersessional meetings in June 2025.[33]

Burkina Faso has received financial support for its mine action efforts from both international and national stakeholders. The UN, through agencies such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, and UNMAS, has provided both technical and financial assistance to support demining across the country. Among government donors, Germany has played a key role by funding the construction of the National Demining Centre and the MDD training centre, contributing approximately two billion CFA francs (approximately US$3.5 million). Canada has also provided critical support through UNMAS and MAG, funding the development of the national IED strategy and helping to strengthen Burkina Faso's overall demining capacity. The government has allocated funds to train specialists in search and detect and EOD; for the

22 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

23 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

24 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

25 Ibid., pp. 46-49.

26 SNLC-EEI – "Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Contre les Engins Explosifs Improvisés au Burkina Faso 2023-2027"; and 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16; and Presentations of Burkina Faso, Intersessional Meetings, 20 June 2023; and NDM27 Side event, 30 April 2024.

27 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), p. 6; and 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.

28 Email from Stéphane Lombela, Regional Programme Manager, MAG, 5 August 2024.

29 Email from Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.

30 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 49.

31 Ibid.

32 Presentation of Burkina Faso, NDM-UN28, Side event, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

33 Statement of Burkina Faso on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

acquisition of detection and neutralisation equipment, and the provision of risk education.[34]

The current context in the three Member States of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, is shaped by new political and security dynamics. Following military coups, these countries faced regional sanctions and a reduced engagement from several international donors. They withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and established military-led governments. Despite this, other partners have maintained their support.[35] Regional and international cooperation has also been affected by uncertainty surrounding travel restrictions imposed on certain individuals.

Burkina Faso's 2025 extension request emphasizes that the withdrawal of UNMAS had a significant impact on information management, mine action funding, and the capacity-building of national actors. To mitigate this, the request noted that the Mine Action Area of Responsibility within the protection cluster provides a potential funding channel to strengthen partner engagement. It further explained that donors unable to provide direct support to the CNCA may still channel assistance through other structures and organizations active in mine action in Burkina Faso.[36]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

In its 2025 extension request, Burkina Faso stated that demining would incorporate a gender-sensitive approach, addressing the specific needs of women, men, and children while considering the diverse requirements of affected communities.[37] The country has also provided gender-disaggregated data on recipients of its risk education activities in its latest Article 7 report.[38]

However, Burkina Faso has not elaborated on broader efforts to mainstream gender and diversity within its mine action work plan. It remains unclear whether NTS teams will be gender-balanced to ensure access and participation by all groups, including women and children. The EOD units of the Military Engineering Corps include women among their personnel,[39] but neither their number nor their roles have been specified. Notably, however, the first woman in Burkina Faso completed EOD Level 2 training in 2023.[40] The CNCA has a gender focal point (reportedly since its establishment) and 6 of its 39 staff are women, amounting to 15% of the total (see Table 2). Among them, four hold managerial or supervisory positions: a private secretary, head of legal affairs, head of communications, and head of press relations.[41]

UNMAS conducted a study on gender inclusion in mine action in 2023–24, which identified the low representation of women in the **defence and security forces** and the limited opportunities available to them as key challenges. It also issued recommendations to enhance women's participation, particularly in the provision of risk education.[42] The CNCA trained women's organisations in risk education. It has also been working in collaboration with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) to strengthen the capacities of girls and women in disarmament, peace, and security.[43]

The five-year national counter-IED strategy identifies the need to better integrate gender and disability considerations, in line with the spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (on women, peace, and security) and Resolution 2250 (on youth, peace, and security).[44] Burkina Faso has a national gender strategy for 2020–24, a national gender policy, and a dedicated ministry – the Minister of Solidarity, Humanitarian Action, National Reconciliation, Gender and Family.[45]

**Table 2: Gender composition of the CNCA (all services) (at end 2024)**[46]

| | Staff | Women staff | Managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNCA | 39 | 6 (15%) | 11 | 4 (36%) | 9 | 0 (0%) |

34 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11–12.
35 "Burkina Faso: La Suisse propose un nouveau Programme de Coopération", *Coopération Internationale*, 20 May 2025, available at: http://bit.ly/3JFGkkk.
36 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.
37 Ibid., pp. 40–41.
38 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), p. 11.
39 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.
40 Emails from Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June and 5 August 2024.
41 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 1 September 2025.
42 Ibid.
43 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.
44 Burkina Faso, National IED Strategy 2023–27, p. 22.
45 Ibid., p. 25; and email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 1 September 2025.
46 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The 2025 extension request emphasised that demining activities comply with national environmental regulations to prevent (or at least minimise) negative impacts on local ecosystems. The right to a healthy environment is enshrined in Burkina Faso's 1991 Constitution. Additionally, a national environmental policy (from October 2005) and an Environmental Code (established by Law 006-2013/AN) provide legal protections against environmental degradation, aiming to safeguard living beings from harmful effects and risks that threaten their existence.[47]

Burkina Faso stated that an NMAS on environmental protection will be developed in the second quarter of 2026, with the aim of strengthening environmental considerations within the national authority.[48]

To better integrate environmental considerations into survey and clearance, Burkina Faso highlighted two initiatives in the 2025 request: the "Battle for the Reinforcement of Vegetative Cover in Faso" (BARCOUVE), and a Guide for the Design and Implementation of Climate Projects in Fragile Territories, developed under the Green Climate Fund.[49] Burkina Faso notes that geographic and environmental conditions have an impact on demining. These include the remoteness of affected regions, dense vegetation that complicates mine detection, difficult soil conditions (rocky or sandy), and adverse climatic factors such as extreme heat, heavy rain, and strong winds, which can delay operations and limit the use of detection methods involving animals.[50] The authorities acknowledged the severe social, economic, and environmental consequences of improvised AP mine contamination, including the contamination of soil and water sources, damage to ecosystems, reduced biodiversity, and an increase in conflict between people and wildlife. This in turn undermines economic activities that rely on natural resources, which represent more than 20% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP).[51]

Environmental considerations are mentioned in Burkina Faso's counter-IED national strategy and work plan, but in relation to the management of agricultural fertilisers and other physico-chemical products and substances. Burkina Faso plans to set up an "environmental police" to control the import, export, and use of the chemicals that can serve as precursors of IEDs.[52]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

During its time in Burkina Faso, UNMAS managed a database of IED incidents and regularly shared relevant information with both humanitarian operators and the CNCA. In 2023, the CNCA established a national mine action database; however, processes for data collection, analysis, and sharing had not yet been formalised and the system was not operational by the time UNMAS departed in August 2024.[53]

The 2025 extension request outlines plans to develop a national IM system, with the CNCA responsible for centralising and analysing the data, producing mine action statistics and reports, and updating and disseminating the necessary information to all stakeholders. Data collection forms will be provided to actors holding information on ERW/IEDs. Training of CNCA staff is already underway, and steps have been taken with partners to acquire the necessary equipment and software, including Survey123 and ArcGIS.[54] On 27 and 28 February 2025, a delegation from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), including the Chief of the Mine Action Programme, Valon Kumnova, visited Burkina Faso and Mali to engage with national mine action authorities and mine action stakeholders. Following this visit, Burkina Faso formally requested support to deploy Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core.[55]

Since 2016, Burkina Faso submitted two Article 7 reports. The first, in 2021, indicated that most chapters were not applicable at the time. Following its notification to States Parties in June 2023 regarding the emergence of threats related to IEDs and improvised mines, Burkina Faso submitted a second Article 7 report in July 2024, covering both 2022 and 2023. The subsequent Article 5 deadline extension request was detailed and internally consistent, and submitted in a timely manner with an initial version in April 2025 and a revised version in July 2025, addressing most of the comments of the Analysis Group. It was developed with the support of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and MAG. Burkina Faso attends both intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties, including the Fifth Review Conference in Cambodia in November 2024, and has consistently provided updates on its mine action efforts and needs. At the time of writing this report, it had not yet, however, submitted its Article 7 report covering 2024.

47 Ibid.; and 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 41.
48 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 22, and 33–34.
49 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 34.
50 Ibid., p. 9.
51 Ibid., p. 38.
52 Burkina Faso, National IED Work Plan, 2023–2025, p. 21.
53 Interview with Intendant Col.-Maj. Anselme Sanou, (former) Permanent Secretary, CNCA, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.
54 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 39–40 and 46–47.
55 Interview with Jérémy Repond, GICHD, Geneva, 9 April 2025; and email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Burkina Faso is not yet in a position to offer annual projections for survey, including the number and size of areas to be surveyed or the number of EOD tasks to be conducted. However, it submitted a detailed work plan as part of its extension request covering 2025 to the end of 2028.

Burkina Faso plans to conduct an inclusive initial contamination assessment with consultation of relevant stakeholders to determine potential contamination and prioritise intervention areas. The assessment will include an evaluation of the government's response efforts.[56] The work plan also foresees the development of a national IM system.[57] Risk education, NTS, and the deployment of EOD teams for spot tasks are scheduled to take place throughout the implementation period. Final survey results to define all priority intervention areas are expected by the end of 2027, followed by a national workshop in 2028 to define the land release process.[58]

Burkina Faso has presented a detailed, costed budget for 2025–28 totalling some US$5.6 million. Of this amount, US$1.66 million is expected to be covered by the State (more than 29%), while the remaining US$3.94 million is to be mobilised from external sources. The budget includes the following allocations: US$5,000 for a national contamination assessment workshop; US$95,000 to develop a national IM system (with US$33,400 funded nationally); US$1.25 million for risk education (including US$60,000 in national funding); US$1.25 million for NTS; US$2.2 million for EOD spot tasks and marking (with US$867,000 funded nationally); US$83,000 for victim assistance; and US$700,000 for the CNCA mine action programme, fully funded by the State.[59]

In 2023, Burkina Faso developed its first national strategy to counter IED threats for the period 2023–2027. The CNCA, supported by UNMAS, organized regional workshops to present its objectives, work plan, and budget in 2024. The strategy focuses on four priorities: strengthening legal and institutional frameworks, building national capacity, enhancing cooperation, and improving coordination.[60] The total budget of €18.8 million—including €10.23 million for detection and neutralisation—did not specify how costs will be split between national and international sources.[61] Implementation remains uncertain, as Burkina Faso's alignment with the AES and withdrawal from ECOWAS have led to the suspension of certain donor support. The departure of UNMAS in August 2024 also represents the loss of a key funding and technical support channel.

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Currently, only military-led demining is conducted, with no humanitarian clearance underway. Burkina Faso's EOD unit uses manual and canine methods to detect improvised AP mines, in line with its NMAS. Destruction is conducted on site or devices are safely removed where possible, with quality control effected by EOD team leaders.[62]

Between 2021 and 2023, Burkina Faso developed 12 Burkinabè Mine Action Standards (Normes burkinabè d'action contre les mines, NOBAM) to regulate mine action activities, including for NTS (NOBAM 05), task allocation procedures (NOBAM 08), neutralisation and destruction of explosive ordnance/EOD (NOBAM 09), animal detection systems (NOBAM 11), and neutralisation of IEDs (NOBAM 12). These national standards are said to align with the IMAS and are planned be updated as needed to reflect evolving best practices.[63]

In its 2025 extension request, Burkina Faso outlined methods for conducting survey and EOD through to the end of 2028. Survey will include NTS to gather preliminary information and the CNCA clarified that no TS is planned.[64] Intervention priorities will be determined in consultation with local communities, national authorities, and international partners, with particular focus on high-risk and densely populated zones. Survey in areas facing major security challenges will be conducted by the National Demining Centre, while CSOs and both international and national NGOs will conduct NTS in areas where the security situation has significantly improved.[65]

For EOD spot tasks, the National Demining Centre will be responsible for the detection and neutralisation of improvised AP mines in hard-to-reach areas. Demining NGOs will carry out operations—under the supervision of the National Demining Centre—within the framework of humanitarian projects and primarily in regions considered accessible from a security perspective.[66] A national workshop to define the land release process is scheduled for 2028,[67] indicating that the methodology will be refined based on lessons learned throughout the extension period.

56 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 39.
57 Ibid., pp. 39–40.
58 Ibid., pp. 40–42 and 50–51 (Table 7).
59 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 46–49.
60 Burkina Faso, National IED Strategy 2023–2027, Résumé, pp. v, vi, and 1.
61 Ibid., p. 59.
62 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 34.
63 Ibid., p. 22.
64 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 1 September 2025.
65 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 40.
66 Ibid., p. 41.
67 Ibid., p. 51.

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Until now, the army engineer EOD unit held sole responsibility for locating and neutralising mines and IEDs, primarily as part of ongoing military operations. This unit is deployed to regions facing elevated security threats, supported by army combat engineers.[68] Burkina Faso strengthened its capacity to address the explosive ordnance threat by diversifying the range of national actors involved and increasing the number of personnel qualified for counter-IED operations. Initially, the number of EOD specialists was limited to the military engineering corps, but training has since been extended to include the police and gendarmerie. Some members of the defence and security forces have also received training in incident data collection.[69] UNMAS has supported the defence and security forces with training in IED neutralisation and destruction, as well as a training of trainers (ToT) in IED detection. It has also provided relevant equipment to the defence and security forces.[70]

The National Demining Centre, despite facing limitations, performs key functions, most notably training of intervention personnel. Its capacity includes training in manual demining, mechanical demining, animal-assisted demining, data collection, and the development of operational procedures. The Centre does, though, require technical support to strengthen its operations across several key areas: ToT, the establishment and management of databases, and information management. In 2024, the CNCA indicated that training sessions in EOD were conducted for the benefit of units from the Rapid Intervention Battalions and the Intervention Units Group of the National Police. These training sessions were continuing in 2025, still in support of the defence and security forces units.[71]

The 2025 extension request opens the possibility for demining operators to intervene in areas where security conditions have improved, operating under the supervision of the National Demining Centre.[72] At present, no international or national NGOs are conducting mine survey or clearance in Burkina Faso, only risk education and victim assistance.

MAG, active in Burkina Faso since 2015, has focused on weapon and ammunition management (WAM). It has supported the CNCA in developing a five-year national action plan to address the threat from SALW, which was approved in 2024 and adopted in June 2025. Between 2022 and 2024, MAG also provided risk education to humanitarian personnel, later expanding to communities through a small regional project covering Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, funded by Norway, and implemented by a national partner. This project has now concluded.[73] MAG also secured funding from the Government of Canada, through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program, for a multi-country project that includes selected countries in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as Burkina Faso and Mali (with the exception of Niger). This project focuses on mine action and related thematic areas, notably: (i) risk education, (ii) victim assistance, (iii) and initiatives addressing WAM and the prevention of small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation.[74]

HI has been providing risk education since 2021. In 2024, however, HI did not carry out any RE activities but supported the CNCA by organising a stakeholder mapping workshop on victim assistance.[75]

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

At the time of writing, Burkina Faso had not submitted an Article 7 report covering 2024. The 2025 extension request provided no information on IED disposals. The Permanent Secretary of the CNCA stated that data on the number of improvised AP mines destroyed in 2024 were not available. This is because spot tasks are conducted as part of territorial security and counterterrorism operations conducted by military engineers and specially trained security forces.[76]

According to Burkina Faso's 2024 Article 7 Report, the country recorded a neutralisation rate of nearly 30% for explosive devices between 2017 and March 2024, corresponding to 217 neutralised incidents from a total of 729 reports.[77] In 2023 alone, UNMAS reported 168 IED incidents, of which 30% (around 50) were neutralised, but cautioned that operational units do not always report detailed information.[78] There is no detailed land release process in Burkina Faso, only spot tasks conducted as part of territorial security operations and efforts to support resettlement of displaced populations in their areas of origin.[79]

68 Presentations of Burkina Faso, Intersessional Meetings, 20 June 2023; and NDM27, Side event, 30 April 2024.

69 Presentation of Burkina Faso, NDM-UN28, Side event, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

70 Email from Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.

71 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

72 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 41.

73 Online interview with Francois Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 13 February 2025.

74 Email from Stéphane Lombela, MAG, 8 September 2025.

75 Online interviews with Marwan Nadim, Regional Specialist, HI, 24 April 2024, and Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 17 March 2025.

76 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 1 September 2025.

77 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), p. 9.

78 Email from Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.

79 Interview with Intendant Col.-Maj. Anselme Sanou, CNCA, in Geneva, 29 April 2024.

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR BURKINA FASO: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

↓

**FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED: 31 DECEMBER 2028**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Burkina Faso was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control no later than 1 March 2009. In its initial transparency report in 2000, it stated that it was not affected by AP mines, but in June 2023, it informed States Parties at the intersessional meetings of new use of IEDs, including AP mines of an improvised nature, by NSAGs, qualified as terrorists by the NMAA. Burkina Faso has submitted its first Article 5 deadline extension request in April 2025, which is a welcome development. The request, proposing a new deadline of 31 December 2028, was due to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties.

The request is effectively an interim request to allow for survey to gain a better understanding of the extent of contamination (rather than achieving fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations by the requested deadline). This is inevitable given the volatile security situation and limited access to certain areas of the country. The 2025–28 work plan outlines initial contamination analysis, the establishment of an IM system, NTS and targeted EOD tasks, accompanied by risk education throughout the period. The key challenge identified by the NMAA in implementing the work plan is the intensity of armed activities in certain areas, which limits access to several municipalities. As a result, depending on the security context, some locations could remain inaccessible to demining.[80]

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

It is unclear whether Burkina Faso has plans in place to address residual contamination after fulfilling its Article 5 obligations. However, to support the development of a sustainable national clearance capacity, the country has emphasised in its Article 5 deadline extension request that it is strengthening national capabilities through training of specialised units within the armed forces and internal security forces, specifically for the detection and neutralisation of improvised AP mines. Strategic frameworks have also been developed, including the NMAS and a national counter-IED strategy for 2023–27. In addition, partnerships with the United Nations, engagement with civil society organisations, and support from international NGOs are cited as key efforts to help build and sustain national capacity.[81]

80 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.

81 Ibid., p. 10.

# CAMBODIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025

Not on track to meet deadline
Five-year extension to 31 December 2030 requested

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 524KM²

Massive
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 80.44 | *129.70 |
| Technical Survey | 34.48 | 135.39 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 15.43 | 33.18 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 10,534 (Incl. 2,902 in spot tasks) | 19,229 (Incl. 2,056 in spot tasks) |

*Mine Action Review estimate

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Cambodia Mine Action Centre (CMAC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Cambodia, which hosted the Fifth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in Siem Reap, released 130km² of mined area through survey and clearance in 2024, less than targeted but achieved without the previous year's level of government funding. Cambodia started a survey of mined areas on its border with Thailand in November 2024 intended to provide the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) with a national baseline estimate of anti-personnel (AP) mined area, but the survey was incomplete when it halted in June 2025 due mainly to escalating border tensions with Thailand. Cambodia requested a third extension of its Article 5 deadline in April 2025 and submitted a revised request in October 2025 updated to include the results of the partially completed border survey. Conflict with Thailand in July 2025 temporarily suspended some demining tasks close to their common border. Cambodia denied Thai accusations that Cambodia had newly emplaced AP mines.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Cambodia should prioritise mine clearance in its political, diplomatic, and military engagement with Thailand in discussions to resolve the conflict on their border.**
- **Cambodia and Thailand should precisely define the border area where they will not permit demining pending agreed demarcation and expedite clearance of the rest.**
- **The CMAA should prepare work plans detailing clearance priorities and its proposed timeline for tackling them.**
- **The Cambodian government should clarify the level of funding it will commit to mine action.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Cambodia reduced its estimate of contamination by 2% to 424km$^2$ at the end of 2024 but raised it to 524km$^2$ in 2025 to include results of a partially completed border survey. Cambodia does not disaggregate confirmed hazardous areas and suspected hazardous areas in line with international best practice. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | The government did not repeat its 2023 allocation of US$30 million to mine action in 2024, halting deployment of army deminers and leaving the sector reliant mainly on international donors. The CMAA worked closely with operators and provincial stakeholders on planning and tasking but authorities continued to restrict international demining organisations' access to border areas. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 9 | 9 | The CMAA introduced a national standard on mainstreaming gender and diversity in mine action in 2024, the first country to do so, establishing requirements for operators and reinforcing a commitment to promoting inclusion. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Cambodia has a national standard on environmental management but implementation is not strictly monitored and operators follow internal standard operating procedures (SOPs). Norwegian People's Aid rolled out a "Green Field Tool" in 2024, requiring environmental impact assessments of all survey and clearance tasks. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | The CMAA updated Cambodia's Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database from New Generation to Core in 2023, but operating results recorded by the CMAA and operators suffer from persistent and significant discrepancies. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Cambodia asked for a five-year extension of its Article 5 deadline in April 2025 providing an annual work plan and costings but with the proviso that it would need to revise the plan to take account of the findings of its border survey. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Cambodia has national standards that are broadly compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and the CMAA continuously reviews and develops standards in consultation with operators. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 7 | 9 | Reduced funding for mine action led to land release in 2024 that was 60% the level of the previous year. Cambodia submitted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline but cross-border fighting with Thailand in 2025 further stalled border clearance and exposed Cambodia to Thai allegations of use, which it denied. |
| **Average Score** | **7.2** | **7.6** | **Overall Programme Performance: GOOD** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC)
- Cambodian Self-help Demining (CSHD)
- Royal Cambodian Army (RCA)
- National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance (NPMEC)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- APOPO
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre (ARMAC)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, Cambodia assessed it had 3,917 mined areas with AP mines affecting 424km$^2$,[1] 2% less than a year earlier. By 1 July 2025, it had raised its estimate to 524km$^2$ (see Table 1)[2] and it was likely that significant additional mine contamination remained to be identified.

**Table 1: Estimated AP mined area by province (m$^2$)[3]**

| Province/Region | 31 December 2024 | 1 July 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Banteay Meanchey | 39,876,952 | 38,968,493 |
| Battambang | 81,342,637 | 209,791,037 |
| Kampong Thom | 823,924 | 3,510,164 |
| Koh Kong | 15,760,005 | 4,986,230 |
| Oddar Meanchey | 68,396,487 | 48,475,236 |
| Pailin | 12,208,822 | 21,097,546 |
| Preah Vihear | 100,338,423 | 62,712,711 |
| Pursat | 92,251,338 | 106,499,658 |
| Ratanak Kiri | 112,118 | 170,352 |
| Siem Reap | 13,127,530 | 28,068,982 |
| **Totals** | **424,238,236** | ***524,280,409** |

*The small difference in total compared to the revised Article 5 extension request is due to rounding errors in the extension request.

The increase resulted from a survey conducted by the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) in collaboration with the Royal Cambodian Army (RCA) and coordinated by the CMAA which started in November 2024 along Cambodia's 508-mile border with Thailand. The survey was seen as a key step towards providing Cambodia for the first time with a comprehensive baseline estimate of AP mine contamination and a clear basis for preparing its Article 5 deadline extension request.

Cambodia's border provinces contain most of its remaining mine contamination and its densest minefields, a legacy of 30 years of armed conflict that ended in the 1990s. In 2023, Cambodia had assessed that 353km$^2$ of mined area was located within a 7km-wide zone along its border, including 90km$^2$ of dense contamination.[4] Many of Cambodia's 39 mine casualties in 2023 and 2024[5]—a remarkably low figure—are said to have occurred outside areas of recorded contamination.

The border survey was planned to revisit 21 districts, including some areas that had been covered by earlier non-technical survey (NTS) but also areas that had never been surveyed due to security concerns or difficult terrain. Due to increasing tensions with Thailand on the border and resource shortages, survey was completed in eight provinces and in 55% of the other 13 targeted districts. Cambodia planned to complete survey of these districts when the security situation permitted.[6]

In 2024, Cambodia had added to the database 466 previously unrecorded hazardous areas in nine provinces covering 75.8km$^2$, underscoring the extensive gaps in the knowledge of mine contamination.[7] All of the areas were located in border provinces, notably Battambang (25.5km$^2$), Pursat (20.9km$^2$), and Prey Vihear (18.9km$^2$).[8] The partially completed border survey added another 277 mined areas covering 149.8 km$^2$ (see Table 2).

**Table 2: Results of the partially completed comprehensive border survey[9]**

| | Mixed AP/AV mined areas | | Scattered mines | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. of areas | Area (m$^2$) | No. of areas | Area (m$^2$) | Total area (m$^2$) |
| Bantheay Meanchey | 3 | 226,368 | 37 | 8,042,323 | 8,268,691 |

1 Email from Hean Kimsin, Director, Social and Economic Planning Department, CMAA, 16 May 2025; Article 7 Report (covering 2024), #4.

2 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, pp. 7 and 18.

3 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025; Article 7 Report (covering 2024), #4; and Cambodia's Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, pp. 7 and 18.

4 Revised Work Plan submitted 10 May 2023 pursuant to 2019 Article 5 Extension Request, p. 4; and email from Tep Kallyan, Deputy Secretary General, CMAA, 3 May 2023.

5 UNDP, Clearing for Results IV, 2024 Annual Project Progress Report, p. 10.

6 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, p. 21.

7 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.

8 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), #4.

9 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, p. 22.

**Table 2 Continued**

| | Mixed AP/AV mined areas | | Scattered mines | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. of areas | Area (m²) | No. of areas | Area (m²) | Total area (m²) |
| Battambang | 20 | 11,348,228 | 85 | 74,359,314 | 85,707,542 |
| Oddar Meanchey | 8 | 2,246,560 | 11 | 2,993,269 | 5,239,829 |
| Preah Vihear | 2 | 493,926 | 58 | 13,903,785 | *14,397,711 |
| Pailin | 0 | 0 | 26 | 16,546,149 | 16,546,149 |
| Pursat | 0 | 0 | 27 | 19,624,122 | 19,624,122 |
| **Totals** | **33** | **14,315,082** | **244** | ***135,468,962** | ***149,784,044** |

*Small differences in totals compared to the revised Article 5 extension request are due to rounding errors in the extension request.

Cambodia announced that mine clearance in Kratie province had been completed, bringing the number provinces declared mine-free to 15 (from the total of 25). Before the end of 2025, Cambodia expected to declare three more provinces—Kampong Thom, Ratanak Kiri, and Siem Reap—mine free.[10]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Cambodia's mine hazards are a legacy of 30 years of conflict that ended in 1998 concentrated in, but not limited to, 21 north-western districts along the border with Thailand, which also left significant contamination from explosive remnants of war (ERW). This includes an estimated 681km² affected by unexploded submunitions dropped by the United States (US) during the Vietnam War (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Cambodia for further information).[11]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The CMAA, which was established by royal decree in 2000, has a mandate to regulate, monitor, and coordinate mine action in Cambodia. The Authority has Prime Minister Hun Manet as its President and a government minister, Ly Thuch, as first vice president. Its Secretary General, Ly Panharith, who was appointed in December 2022, manages CMAA's planning and operations.[12] CMAC, which had previously combined the roles of regulator and operator, has concentrated since 2000 on conducting humanitarian and commercial survey and clearance.[13] It remains Cambodia's largest mine action operator.[14]

Since 2004, Cambodia has created Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMACs) and Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) in mined and cluster munition-contaminated areas. These bodies prepare work plans for the CMAA's priority areas in consultation with affected communities to ensure that clearance addresses their housing, agricultural, and infrastructure needs.[15] MAPUs meet regularly with all demining operators to plan annual activities.[16]

The Cambodian government established a Technical Working Group on Mine Action (TWG-MA) as a consultative mechanism to facilitate coordination between the government and implementing partners.[17] The Mine Action Coordination Committee (MACC) and seven Technical Reference Groups (TRGs) have been established by the CMAA to facilitate coordination and feedback at a strategic and technical level in areas such as survey and clearance, risk education, victim assistance, information management, gender, and capacity development.[18] The CMAA convened several meetings of the TRG on survey and clearance in 2024.[19]

The CMAA receives technical support from a range of international organisations. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has supported the upgrade of the CMAA's information management system, gender mainstreaming, and the development of Cambodian national mine action standards (CMAS).[20] Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), with funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provided financial and technical support for the CMAA database unit, including paying the salaries of seven employees, and supported the CMAA's quality management (QM) department, funding seven of the CMAA's QM teams.[21]

10 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.

11 Ibid.

12 CMAA, "Legal framework and mandate", at: http://bit.ly/2W7r3dJ.

13 CMAC, "20 Years' Achievement in Mine Action 1998-2018 and Path Ahead", 2018.

14 Interview with Heng Rattana, Director General, CMAC, Phnom Penh, 25 April 2019.

15 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, p. 10; and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), "Landmines and Land Rights in Cambodia", December 2010, pp. 9 and 13.

16 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, Programme Manager, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 5 May 2020.

17 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 24; and email from Tong Try, National Mine Action Adviser, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 18 June 2019.

18 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 24; and emails from Tong Try, UNDP, 18 June 2019 and 27 July 2021.

19 Emails from Alexey Kruk, Country Director, MAG, 22 April 2025; and Hans Risser, Country Director, NPA, 16 May 2025.

20 Email from the GICHD, 1 July 2020.

21 Email from Sron Samrithea, Programme Manager, NPA, 6 May 2023.

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Between 2020 and 2024, international donors provided almost three quarters (73%) of funding for the mine action sector.[22] The government provided nearly US$32 million in 2023 as well as $20 million raised in 2022 from private contributions (see Table 3), which enabled deployment of military deminers. Former Prime Minister Hun Sen had envisaged "similar payments" in 2024 and 2025, but these did not materialise. The government provided $200,000 for demining in Siem Reap province in 2024 and pledged $5 million for 2025.[23]

Donor support in 2024 included $5 million provided through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)'s "Clearing for Results" programme by Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea, and including $0.5 million in government matching funds.[24] Other donors included Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, India, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[25]

**Table 3: Mine action funding (US$)[26]**

| Year | Cambodian Government | International donors | Private sector | Total funding |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 4,458,086 | 32,210,589 | 20,046,596 | 56,715,271 |
| 2023 | 31,771,454 | 40,562455 | 1,723,680 | 74,057,589 |
| 2024 | 2,260,900 | 57,523,175 | 873,000 | 60,657,075 |
| **Totals** | **38,490,440** | **130,296,219** | **22,643,276** | **191,429,935** |

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The CMAA is implementing a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine Action Plan (GMMAP) in line with the objectives of the National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, focusing on training, inclusive participation, and gender-responsive action. In September 2024, it adopted a national mine action standard on mainstreaming of gender and diversity in mine action, the first country to do so.[27]

The CMAA established a Gender Mainstreaming Team (GMT) in 2019 to coordinate with the TRG on Gender (TRG-G), which is composed of representatives from UNDP, the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MoWA), the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY), MAPUs, operators, and organisations working in risk education and victim assistance.[28] The TRG-G met twice in 2024 to review the CMAS on Gender.[29] Cambodia's Article 5 deadline extension request said mine action operators will follow up the 2024 introduction of a national standard on gender mainstreaming by developing standard operating procedures (SOPs), and that the CMAA Gender Team plans to develop reporting forms, and a work plan, as well as conducting field monitoring of how the CMAS is implemented and making recommendations to strengthen compliance.[30]

**Table 4: Gender composition of operators in 2024[31]**

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMAA | 181 | 40 (22%) | 76 | 13 (17%) | N/A | N/A |
| CMAC[32] | 2,115 | 423 (20%) | N/R | N/R | N/R | NR |
| CSHD | 37 | 14 (38%) | 2 | 1 (50%) | 35 | 13 (37%) |
| APOPO | 102 | 39 (38%) | 7 | 2 (29%) | 84 | 18 (21%) |

22 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised),30 September 2025, p. 17.
23 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.
24 UNDP, Clearing for Results IV 2024 Annual Report, p. 19.
25 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.
26 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, p. 17.
27 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.
28 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 22.
29 Email from Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May 2025.
30 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, p. 27.
31 Emails from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025; Alexey Kruk, MAG, 22 April 2025; Ung Sokcheng, Director, CSHD, 2 June 2025; Tobias Hewitt, Programme Manager, HALO, 7 July 2025; and Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May 2025.
32 Third 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, p. 15. In 2023, women reportedly held 5% of CMAC managerial or supervisory positions (2 out of 38) and made up 16% of its operational staff (204 out 1,072).

Table 4 Continued

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HALO | 1,190 | 483 (41%) | 108 | 15 (14%) | 978 | 443 (45%) |
| MAG | 523 | 199 (38%) | 28 | 10 (36%) | 449 | 174 (39%) |
| NPA | 117 | 56 (48%) | 10 | 3 (30%) | 111 | 53 (48%) |
| **Totals** | **4,265** | **1,254 (29%)** | **231** | **44 (19%)** | **1,657** | **701 (42%)** |

N/A = Not applicable N/R = Not reported

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The CMAA issued a national standard, CMAS 20, on "Environmental Management in Mine Action" in 2022. This requires operators to minimise the adverse impact of their operations on the environment; identify steps necessary to mitigate harm; and ensure that land is left in a suitable condition for its intended use. Operators are required to take account of erosion or soil degradation; possible pollution of air, water, or soil; and damage to infrastructure, wildlife, and vegetation, while also dealing with litter, debris, and other waste as well as damage to heritage sites or objects.[33] The CMAA held a two-day workshop with operators in 2024 on environmental management.[34]

Demining organisations also follow internal SOPs on managing the environmental impact of their operations. HALO, which adopted use of solar-powered charging stations for detectors in 2023 among measures to exploit renewable energy, appointed a dedicated water and sanitation officer to develop best practice for waste management in remote camps.[35] Mines Advisory Group (MAG) follows the organisation's Global Technical Standards,[36] while NPA applies its Climate and Environmental Policy along with the organisation's Green Office Tool and Green Field Tool launched in March 2025 and designed to help staff identify and manage environmental risks.[37] CMAC's environmental management policies are unknown.

Table 5: Environmental policies and action

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| APOPO | Yes | No | No |
| CMAC | N/R | N/R | N/R |
| MAG | Yes | Yes | No |
| NPA | Yes | Yes | Yes |

N/R = Not reported

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The CMAA began upgrading its database from Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation to Core in 2023, which is now used by most operators. This has helped to keep the database up to date with the progress of survey and clearance. It retains IMSMA NG as an interim platform to receive data from CMAC. International operators submit reports directly through digital platforms using Survey123.[38]

In 2023, the CMAA temporarily suspended survey in order to clear a backlog of more than 1,100 survey reports accumulated on the workbench pending quality assurance checks. In 2024, it sought to streamline the process requiring operators to inform the CMAA before surveying tasks to facilitate quality assurance (QA) and then allowing checked results to be uploaded to the database.[39]

33 Email from Tep Kallyan, CMAA, 9 May 2023; and CMAS 20.
34 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.
35 Email from Tobias Hewitt, HALO, 7 July 2025.
36 Email from Alexey Kruk, MAG, 22 April 2025.
37 Email from Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May 2025.
38 Email from Tobias Hewitt, HALO, 7 July 2025.
39 Emails from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025; and Tobias Hewitt, HALO, 7 July 2025.

The CMAA database is operated by an information management unit of 15 staff with the support of Norway through NPA. In March 2025, it assigned a technical advisor to the unit.[40]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Cambodia's plans were in a state of flux in 2025 because of uncertainty about the scale of remaining mine contamination pending the outcome of a survey of border minefields or the resources available to address it. The CMAA submitted a provisional Article 5 deadline extension request in April 2025 and a revised request in October for consideration by the 22nd Meeting of States Parties in December 2025. It also planned to complete a 10-year policy for 2026 to 2035 by the end of 2025.[41] As noted above, Cambodia has declared 15 of its 25 provinces mine-free in the past three years with three more expected to be added to the list in the course of 2025.[42]

A work plan submitted by the CMAA in 2023 said Cambodia would release 356km$^2$ in 2023 and 168km$^2$ in each of 2024 and 2025. It said the government planned to mobilise significant military capacity to help accelerate land release, including 910 personnel from the RCA and 805 personnel from the National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance (NPMEC).[43] Funding shortfalls in 2024 prevented Cambodia from deploying any RCA deminers.

The CMAA submitted its third Article 5 deadline extension request in April 2025 and an update in October aiming to complete clearance of all AP mined areas by the end of 2030 at a projected cost of US$146.7 million. A work plan updated to include contamination identified in the partially completed border survey projected cancellation through NTS would make up 16% of total land release and area reduction through TS for 30%, with clearance accounting for 54% of the total (see Table 5).[44] Completing the border survey may identify significant additional contamination but the CMAA considered Cambodia would still be able to tackle all remaining mined areas within the requested five-year extension.[45]

**Table 6: Land release targets (m²)[46]**

| | Cancellation through NTS | Reduction through TS | Clearance | Total land release |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 (1 July-31 Dec) | 12.83 | 24.06 | 43.31 | 80.20 |
| 2026 | 20.80 | 39.00 | 70.20 | 130.00 |
| 2027 | 12.56 | 23.56 | 42.40 | 78.52 |
| 2028 | 12.56 | 23.56 | 42.40 | 78.52 |
| 2029 | 12.56 | 23.56 | 42.40 | 78.52 |
| 2030 | 12.56 | 23.56 | 42.40 | 78.52 |
| **Totals** | ***83.87** | ***157.30** | **283.11** | ***524.28** |

*Small differences in totals compared to the revised Article 5 extension request are due to rounding errors in the extension request.

Cambodia has followed both a top-down and a bottom-up approach to planning and prioritisation. The CMAA prepares a list of priority villages based on agreed criteria and national priorities while MAPUs coordinate with operators at the provincial level to develop a list of local communities' priority clearance tasks for their annual work plans using agreed criteria.[47] The CMAA introduced a Mine Free Village policy in May 2022 designed to mobilise funding from development organisations, the private sector, and individuals to support clearance of specific villages.[48]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Mine action is conducted according to CMAS, which are broadly consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[49] The CMAA revised the standard for baseline survey for mines in late 2023 to increase accuracy by clarifying different evidence requirements for mines and cluster munitions and putting more emphasis in mine survey on post-clearance land use.

40 Emails from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025; and Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May 2025.
41 Interview with Ly Panharith, Secretary General, CMAA, in Geneva, 17 June 2025.
42 Provinces declared mine-free in 2022 were Kep, Preah Sihanouk, Prey Veng, Stung Treng, and Tbung Khmum, together with Phnom Penh – a municipality.
43 Email from Tep Kallyan, CMAA, 3 May 2023.
44 Third Article 5 Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, p. 22.
45 Interview with Ly Panharith, CMAA, in Geneva, 17 June 2025.
46 Third Article 5 Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, p. 22.
47 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, p. 10.
48 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 15 June 2024.
49 Emails from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020; and Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 19 March 2020.

In 2024, it introduced the world's first standard on gender mainstreaming.[50]

To keep up standards, the CMAA deployed six QM teams in 2024 which conducted a combined total of 3,901 inspections – 2,806 for QA and 1,095 for quality control (QC).[51]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The total capacity operating in 2024 is unclear. CMAC, Cambodia's biggest operator, did not report its activities for 2024 although its integrated work plan for the year indicated it planned to deploy operational teams with a total staff of 1,446. These included 600 deminers divided between 4 manual demining platoons with 68 personnel and 76 technical survey (TS) and clearance teams with 532 personnel.[52] The RCA reportedly had 35 teams and 910 trained deminers available in 2024,[53] but the government did not provide the funding that supported RCA demining in 2023 and they do not appear in land release results for 2024.

**Table 7: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024**[54]

| Operator | Manual teams | Total deminers | Animal Detection and handlers | Machines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| APOPO | | | 4 MDR teams<br>39 rats/37 handlers<br>1 TSD team<br>4 dogs/4 handlers | 4 | 1 MDR team, 10 rats/9 handlers, working with MAG in Battambang.<br>1 MDR team (10 rats/9 handlers) in Siem Reap; 2 MDR teams 19 rats/19 handlers) in Prey Vihear with CMAC.<br>4 TSD dogs and 4 handlers in Prey Vihear with CMAC. |
| CMAC | N/R | N/R | N/R | N/R | |
| CSHD | 1 | 16 | 0 | 0 | Also 2 EOD teams/8 personnel. |
| HALO | 82 | 740 | 0 | 3 | Also 12 NTS teams with 60 personnel. |
| MAG | 17 | 136 | 2 MDD teams,<br>8 dogs, 8 handlers (in partnership with CMAC) | 5 | Also 5 CL/NTS teams with 10 personnel.<br>1 EOD team/5 personnel in Battambang responding to call-outs by the community. |
| NPMEC | 17 | 476 | 0 | 0 | |
| **Totals** | **117** | **1,368** | **39 rats/37 handlers**<br>**12 dogs/12 handlers** | **12** | |

International operators worked with largely the same capacity in 2024 as the previous year. APOPO discontinued one manual team with five deminers but its TS dogs, operated in conjunction with CMAC and MAG, using digital track and trace technologies on all areas they worked, which accelerated survey. It also reported trialling use of integrated GPS technology to track and map areas explored by hand-held detectors.[55] MAG stood down two mechanical teams as there were no remaining tasks suitable for their assets, including a Mini MineWolf and a digger.[56]

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 8: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**[57]

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 80.44 | |

50 Emails from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 15 June 2024 and 16 May 2025.

51 UNDP, Clearing for Results IV, 2024 Annual Report, p. 9.

52 CMAC, Integrated Work Plan 2024, undated, accessible at: http://bit.ly/3JoXumv.

53 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.

54 Emails from Michael Raine, APOPO, 8 April 2025; Ung Sokcheng, CSHD, 2 June 2025; Tobias Hewitt, HALO, 7 July 2025; Alexey Kruk, MAG, 24 June 2025; and Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.

55 Email from Michael Raine, APOPO, 8 April 2025.

56 Email from Alexey Kruk, MAG, 24 June 2025.

57 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 21 October 2025.

**Table 8 Continued**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Technical Survey** | 34.48 | |
| **Non-Technical Survey** | 15.44 | |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 10,534 | Includes 2,902 during spot tasks |

Cambodia, according to official data, released 130km² in 2024 (see Table 8), 62% of it through full clearance. Three-quarters of what was released was area contaminated by scattered AP mines. The result was little more than a third of the 362km² released in the previous year. A total of 32km² was released under the UNDP-managed Clearing for Results programme, 12km² through survey, and 20km² through clearance.[58] The CMAA also reported a sharp drop in AP mines destroyed to 10,534 in 2024 from 19,229 in 2023.[59]

The downturn reflected the financial squeeze the mine action sector has experienced since 2023 when the government had provided $30 million from the national budget and private sector contributions.[60] However, persistent, significant discrepancies between results recorded by the CMAA and by operators left uncertainty about the exact outcomes.

## SURVEY IN 2024

Cambodia recorded high levels of land release through survey in the past two years (103km² in 2022 and 169km² in 2023) as the sector focused on recorded hazardous areas already reclaimed for use or sparsely contaminated. In 2024, the area released through survey dropped to just under 50km² (see Table 9) partly due to funding constraints but also the shrinking amount of reclaimed land left to be released.

**Table 9: Release of mined area through survey in 2024 (CMAA)[61]**

| Operator | Area | Area cancelled (m²) | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| CMAC | Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Thom, Kandal, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear, Pursat, Siem Reap | 167,668 | 31,964,322 |
| CSHD | Siem Reap | 68,858 | 91,190 |
| HALO | Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Pursat | 905,300 | 434,822 |
| MAG | Battambang | 2,130,934 | 1,164,971 |
| NPA | Battambang, Koh Kong, Oddar Meanchey | 12,131,743 | 14,063 |
| NPMEC | Koh Kong, Siem Reap | 31,533 | 807,830 |
| **Totals** | | **15,436,036** | **34,477,198** |

As a result, the amount of land cancelled in 2024 amounting to 15.4km² was less than half the previous year's level and largely conducted by NPA which accounted for more than three-quarters of the area cancelled. CMAC, which largely shuns cancellation through NTS as insufficiently safe and focuses instead on TS, accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total area released through survey.[62] Official 2024 data, however, attributes higher amounts of land release through survey to the four other NGOs than they reported (see Table 10).

58 UNDP, Clearing for Results IV 2024 Annual Report, pp. 8–9.

59 Emails from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May and 21 October 2025.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

**Table 10: Release of mined area through survey in 2024 (Selected operator data)[63]**

| Operator | Area cancelled (m²) | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| CSHD | 160,048 | 148,860 |
| HALO | 907,225 | 313,261 |
| MAG | 1,603,693 | 235,524 |
| NPA | 12,025,046 | 14,063 |
| **Totals** | **14,696,012** | **711,708** |

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

Cambodia's heavy investment in demining in 2023 pushed up mined area released through clearance to 193km$^2$ in official data and nearly 130km$^2$, according to the Mine Action Review's estimate.[64] In 2024, with reduced funding and operating capacity, official figures show operators cleared 80km$^2$ (see Table 11 ). At the same time, only six tasks covering 158,099m$^2$ were cleared without finding any mines, a big improvement compared with the 25 tasks covering more than 2km$^2$ that yielded no mines in 2023.[65] Operator reports, however, suggest official data may understate the area that was actually cleared in 2024.

CMAC accounted for 87% of the cleared area in official data, most of it in the three provinces of Prey Vihear, Banteay Meanchey, and Battambang. Official results also credited CMAC with destroying 8,846 AP mines in clearance and EOD operations, representing 84% of the 2024 total.[66] Official data also attributes destruction of 899 AP mines to EOD tasks by CSHD, MAG, HALO, and NPA (see Table 12), a higher figure than they report.

**Table 11: Mine clearance by operator in 2024 (CMAA data)[67]**

| Operator | Region | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed in clearance | AP mines destroyed in EOD tasks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMAC | Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Oddar Meanchey, Prey Vihear, Pursat, Rattanak Kiri, Siem Reap | 69,831,220 | 6,843 | 2,003 |
| CSHD | Siem Reap | 148,860 | 16 | 184 |
| HALO | Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Oddar Meanchey, Pursat | 4,626,857 | 490 | 630 |
| MAG | Battambang, Ratanak Kiri | 991,559 | 149 | 84 |
| NPA | Ratanak Kiri | 33,784 | 28 | 1 |
| NPMEC | Koh Kong | 4,812,362 | 106 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **80,444,642** | **7,632** | **2,902** |

CMAA data, however, showed clearance by CSHD, HALO, and MAG amounting to only 5.8km$^2$ in 2024 whereas the three operators recorded 50% more clearance (see Table 12). The discrepancy reflects the fact that official data recorded only clearance tasks confirmed by CMAA QA teams for handover to land owners rather than tasks completed by operators.

63 Emails from Ung Sokcheng, CSHD, 2 June 2025; Tobias Hewitt, HALO, 7 July 2025; Alexey Kruk, MAG, 22 April 2025; and Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May and 10 October 2025.

64 For explanation of the Mine Action Review clearance estimate, see *Clearing the Mines 2024*, p. 91.

65 Emails from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 15 June 2024 and 16 May 2025.

66 Emails from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May and 14 October 2025.

67 Ibid.

**Table 12: Mine clearance in 2024 (operator data)[68]**

| Operator | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed in clearance | AP mines destroyed in EOD tasks |
|---|---|---|---|
| CSHD | 308,908 | 16 | 110 |
| HALO | 5,286,722 | 448 | 641 |
| MAG | 3,138,113 | 330 | 43 |
| **Totals** | **8,733,743** | **794** | **794** |

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CAMBODIA: 1 JANUARY 2000

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2010

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2020

↓

SECOND EXTENSION DEADLINE (5 YEARS 11 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

**THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (5 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2030**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the second extension of 5 years and 11 months, granted by States Parties in 2019), Cambodia was required to destroy all AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. Despite a government-funded drive to accelerate land release in 2023, Cambodia acknowledged in 2024 it would not meet the deadline and in April 2025 requested a new extension of five years to the end of 2030.

Cambodia submitted its initial request for an extension in April 2025 and updated the request in October 2025 to take account of the findings of a partially completed survey of heavily mined border districts. Cambodia had planned to complete the survey by the end of June 2025 but had to suspend operations due to escalating tensions with Thailand that erupted into open conflict in July 2025.[69]

As a result, Cambodia's estimate of 524km² of remaining AP mine contamination and the land release targets based on it are incomplete and the extension request work plan will need further amendment when border tensions have eased sufficiently to allow it to complete the survey. In the meantime, implementation of the 2025 extension request faces a number of risks:

- **Security**: Clashes on the border with Thailand in July 2025 underscored decades-old border demarcation tensions that have held back demining of some of Cambodia's most densely mined areas for years and threaten to put a brake on border mine clearance for years to come. Cambodia and Thailand launched a Joint Coordinating Task Force on 24 September 2025 to oversee and coordinate humanitarian demining on the border. A joint statement said "this task force reflects the shared commitment of both countries to address the lingering danger of landmines for border communities and to strengthen cooperation on humanitarian grounds."[70] Cambodia subsequently accused Thailand's military of further attacks on the border.[71]
- **The scale of AP mine contamination**: The CMAA believes that the modest clearance required in the last two years of the work plan submitted with its initial extension request has left sufficient room to accommodate additional contamination identified within a five-year extension.
- **Funding and capacity**: Cambodia's extension request does not give details of the capacity required to achieve land release on the level set out in its work plan or project costs of completion. The manpower available will depend partly on the whether the government provides funding to deploy RCA and NPMEC deminers.
- **Known unknowns**: Accident data for the decade to 2024 shows nearly half mine incidents occurred in areas not recorded in the mine action database.[72] Survey of non-border areas added 176km² to the database in the past two years underscoring the expectation that Cambodia's contamination estimate will continue to rise.
- **Terrain**: High rates of clearance in recent years have been helped by the light levels of contamination. Densely mined areas made up 19% of Cambodia's contamination at the end of 2024 but accounted for less than 3% of the area released that year.[73] The pace of clearance is likely to slow as operators complete release of sparsely contaminated areas and face more heavily mined tasks. The border with Thailand includes some of Cambodia's most densely mined areas and most difficult terrain.

68 Emails from Ung Sokcheng, CSHD, 2 June 2025; Tobias Hewitt, HALO, 7 July 2025; and Alexey Kruk, MAG, 22 April 2025.

69 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, p. 7.

70 "Coordinating Task Force on border demining," *Khmer Times*, 24 September 2025.

71 Ministry of National Defence press release, 27 September 2025.

72 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, April 2025, p. 31.

73 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.

- **Border access**: Authorities also have to clarify how far they will allow access to border minefields by international demining organisations which say they have been excluded from operating within a 7 kilometre-wide belt since 2020. The CMAA said that restriction had already been eased and in 2025 it had issued 33 clearance tasks covering 4,835,803m$^2$ to HALO and MAG within 7km of the border, although MAG reported it had not received any tasks in the 7km zone.[74]

**Table 13: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**[75]

| Year | Area cleared (km$^2$) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 80.44 |
| 2023 | *129.70 |
| 2022 | 88.48 |
| 2021 | 43.73 |
| 2020 | 49.99 |
| **Total** | **392.34** |

*Mine Action Review estimate

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION

Cambodia's 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request said that "it is likely the Royal Cambodian Army will be the national capacity [that] remains to address the residual threats."[76] It said Cambodia would have the necessary legal, institutional, and operational framework in place for dealing with residual risks by 2025. It did not fulfil that objective and Cambodia's third Article 5 extension request submitted in April 2025 and subsequently revised in October, said the issue would be a "key component" of a National Mine Action Policy 2026–2035, which was said to be in the final stages of development at the time of writing.[77]

With respect to establishment of a sustainable national capacity and framework to manage residual contamination, Cambodia planned to start with a comprehensive review of the existing institutional framework, to clearly define roles and responsibilities and identify the key institutions responsible for managing residual contamination by 2030. Cambodia plans for a national capacity for managing residual contamination to be in place by 2035.[78]

74 Ibid; and email from Alexey Kruk, MAG, 6 October 2025.

75 In September 2024, the CMAA provided different figures for AP mine clearance in 2019–21: 2021: 74.90km$^2$; 2020: 60.13km$^2$; and 2019: 35.44km$^2$. Email from Kol Vireak (on behalf of the Secretary General), CMAA, 8 September 2024.

76 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, p. 5.

77 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, p. 29.

78 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 30 September 2025, p. 30.

# CAMEROON

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2013 (deadline expired)

New extended interim deadline needed to assess extent of Article 5 obligations and ensure compliance

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Light, extent unknown

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 ($m^2$) | Release in 2023 ($m^2$) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0 | 0 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 10 (all during spot tasks) | Not reported |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Military engineer corps and Gendarmerie

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In January 2025, and for the first time in 15 years, Cameroon submitted an Article 7 report under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), covering calendar year 2023. The report identified 11 districts affected by improvised explosive device (IED) explosions. Cameroon reported 120 incidents for 2023 and informed Mine Action Review of 77 recorded incidents in 2024, including 19 victim-activated IEDs that may constitute AP mines. The North-west region of the country was the most affected by explosive ordnance. Cameroon does not yet have a national mine action authority (NMAA) or formal mine action programme, but it has taken steps to establish a national coordination framework and designated two national focal points to oversee mine action efforts in the meantime. Since 2014 it has worked to strengthen its counter-IED capacity.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Cameroon should establish an NMAA to coordinate efforts to address threats posed by IEDs, including improvised mines, and take urgent steps to minimise harm to civilians.**
- **Cameroon should conduct investigations and surveys to confirm or refute whether the IED explosions involved improvised AP mines as defined by the APMBC.**
- **Cameroon should request an interim Article 5 deadline to conduct the necessary survey and assess the extent of improvised AP mine contamination.**
- **Cameroon should continue to include in its Article 7 reports details of the location of any mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. It should also begin reporting on the status of programmes for the destruction of all AP mines, including those of an improvised nature.**
- **Cameroon should put in place a systematic data collection mechanism and a centralised database to consolidate information on explosive ordnance incidents and casualties, disaggregating AP mines of an improvised nature from other IEDs. An improvised anti-vehicle (AV) mine sensitive enough to be detonated by a person should be recorded as an improvised AP mine.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 3 | Not scored | Cameroon has no conventional mined areas under its jurisdiction. Since 2014, it has been increasingly affected by IEDs used by non-State armed groups (NSAGs), including some victim-activated devices. Cameroon needs to conduct investigations and survey to better assess the nature and extent of contamination and confirm whether devices involved include AP mines as defined in the APMBC. In 2023, Cameroon recorded 120 incidents in 11 districts across the Far North, North-West, and South-West regions. For 2024, Cameroon reported 77 incidents to Mine Action Review, 19 (25%) of which concerned victim-activated devices. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 4 | Not scored | Cameroon does not yet have a formal institutional mechanism dedicated specifically to mine action, but has appointed two focal points to oversee mine action efforts based respectively in the Ministry of External Relations and the Ministry of Defence. Cameroon has technical partnerships with France, the United States, and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), to strengthen capacities of its Defence and Security Forces. The 2025 Finance Law prioritised counter-IED operations, with dedicated resources for awareness, training, and response. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 5 | Not scored | In 2025, Cameroon served as the gender focal point of the APMBC Committee on Cooperation and Assistance. Domestically, it has not yet detailed how gender and diversity are considered in its Defence sector, and its Article 7 data were not disaggregated. However, it emphasised that considering the different needs of women, children, and persons with disabilities is an integral part of its national approach. Women serve among its Army Engineering Corps, some taking part in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 3 | Not scored | Cameroon has not yet developed a national mine action standard (NMAS) on the environment, but reports that its national environmental protection laws, applicable to mine action and EOD, are aligned with International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 4 | Not scored | Cameroon does not yet have an IMSMA database to centralise data on incidents, victims, or hazardous areas, although an information management system is under development. In January 2025, it submitted its first Article 7 report since 2009, covering calendar year 2023. The report covering 2024 was underway at the time of writing, indicating a resumption of the reporting cycle. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 3 | Not scored | Cameroon—without an Article 5 deadline—does not have a work plan in place. It has expressed its intention to develop a national counter-IED strategy, with the groundwork to be established at the upcoming national conference, the date of which has not been set. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 3 | Not scored | Cameroon conducts spot task clearance and other EOD operations through the Military Engineer Corps and Gendarmerie. In 2024, it built national capacity through police training and international cooperation. With support from France, the United States, and UNMAS, it expanded training in demining and counter-IED, including the development of national instructors. It is not known whether Cameroon has adopted national mine action standards (NMAS) for EOD. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 3 | Not scored | Cameroon reported to Mine Action Review that in 2024, spot tasks resulted in the destruction of 10 improvised AP mines. Cameroon's Article 5 deadline to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control expired on 1 March 2013. Considering the number of incidents and causalities caused by IEDs, including improvised mines, Cameroon should request an interim deadline to return to compliance with the Convention. |
| **Average Score** | **3.4** | **Not scored** | **Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR** |

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No NMAA or NMAC but two national focal points oversee mine action efforts (one within the Ministry of External Relations and one within the Ministry of Defence).

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army Engineer Corps
- Gendarmerie (military police)
- Police

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) (Training only)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of mine contamination in Cameroon has not been quantified. For more than a decade, Cameroon's Far North region bordering Nigeria has been affected by the armed conflicts in the Lake Chad Basin, particularly the actions of Boko Haram, an armed Islamist group. Since 2017, Cameroon has also faced a crisis in its North-West and South-west (NWSW) Anglophone regions, where separatist groups have used IEDs against both security forces and civilians.

In its Article 7 report submitted in January 2025, Cameroon indicated that more than 2,300 people have been victims of explosive devices since it became a State Party to the APMBC, of whom 127 (82 injured and 45 killed) were casualties in 2023. Cameroon recorded 120 incidents in 11 districts across three affected regions—Far North, North-West, and South-West—known or suspected to be contaminated by IEDs (see Table 1). While Cameroon has reported a limited number of victim-activated IEDs, the extent to which all of these devices meet the definition of improvised AP mines is unclear.[1] For 2024, Cameroon reported 77 incidents to Mine Action Review, of which 19 involved victim-activated devices.[2] Improvised AP mines are all munitions designed to be placed under, on, or near the ground and that are designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person.[3] Such munitions fall within the scope of the APMBC.

IEDs, including improvised AP mines, began to be used in 2014 when Boko Haram in Nigeria spread into Cameroon's Far North region, planting mines extensively on roads targeting defence and security forces.[4] Many incidents have also resulted in civilian casualties. The number of IED attacks in the Far North region significantly decreased after 2017, with very few incidents reported between 2021 and 2022. In 2023, however, there was a resurgence of IED attacks by NSAGs, as shown in Table 1.[5] For 2024, Cameroon has yet to provide disaggregated data by region. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) project recorded 24 incidents in the Far North region killing 25, of whom eight were civilians.[6]

In the first half of 2025, the number of recorded incidents fell to four in the Far North region, yet civilians continued to be harmed, with two children killed in July.[7] In June 2025, the Office of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that two children had died after the explosion of booby-trapped toys in which grenades are believed to have been concealed. The explosion occurred near a defence and security camp. OCHA also noted that the continued presence of IEDs along movement routes is worsening the humanitarian situation, making some areas completely inaccessible to humanitarian responders.[8]

Since 2017, Anglophone separatist groups have been fighting against the government for the independence of the NWSW regions which have recorded the highest number of IED incidents. In 2023, Cameroon reported that 105 of the 120 recorded incidents occurred in these regions, with the majority (77) in the North-west (see Table 1). Most involve improvised AV mines planted on roads, though IEDs have also been placed in densely populated areas endangering civilians. Targets included not only the security forces but also civilian infrastructure such as a bus station, a bar, markets, roundabouts, and a public square during celebrations. On 11 February 2024, an IED exploded in a North-west region town during National Youth Day celebrations, killing one person and injuring 120, most of whom were children and women attending the festivities.[9] ACLED reported a second fatality from the same incident and noted that 11 civilians required lower-limb amputations.[10]

According to the Small Arms Survey database on IEDs, 310 IED incidents occurred in Cameroon between January 2014 and July 2022, resulting in 570 deaths and 827 injured.

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D, pp. 7–8; and Form H, p. 18.

2 Email from Dr Paul Serges Ntamack Epoh, First Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the UN in Geneva, 5 June 2025.

3 Art. 2(1) and (2), APMBC.

4 P. Kum, "Landmine explosion kills two Cameroon soldiers", *Anadolu Agency*, 28 September 2017, at: https://bit.ly/2LxKjQO; and M. E. Kindzeka, "Boko Haram Surrounds Havens With Land Mines," *Voice of America*, 24 May 2015, at: https://bit.ly/46ZkeDb.

5 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D, pp. 7–8; and "La menace des engins explosifs pèse sur l'Extrême-Nord du Cameroun", *Institute for Security Studies*, 16 June 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3siaul8.

6 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2024-31/12/2024, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Cameroon".

7 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2025-31/07/2025, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Cameroon".

8 OCHA, Situation Report, June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3UQSARL.

9 OCHA, "L'explosion d'un engin explosif improvisé à Nkambe fait un mort et plus de 100 blessés", Press release, 28 February 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4cba2X8.

10 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2023-14/07/2024, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Cameroon"; and Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Cameroon, 15 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mMafpA.

Between 2020 and 2022, IEDs were also used outside conflict zones, notably in the capital, Yaoundé, and in the coastal city of Douala.[11]

IED trigger mechanisms have been diverse. They include victim-operated IEDs (VOIEDs), command-wire (CWIEDs), and remote-controlled by radio or telephone (RIEDs). A manufacturing laboratory was discovered and destroyed in the town of Kumba in the South-West region in May 2023.[12] During a conference on IEDs in Ghana in February 2024, Cameroon reported that Boko Haram has typically used industrial explosives such as ANFO (ammonium nitrate and fuel oil), to manufacture IEDs, but more recently has shifted to military-grade explosives and repurposed explosive remnants of war (ERW), including mortar shells, grenades, and submunitions, as well as AV mines. In the NWSW regions, separatist groups mainly employ chemical precursors such as locally manufactured black powder, ammonium nitrate, nitric acid, and aluminium nitrate.[13]

**Table 1: Incidents by region as reported in Article 7 report (covering 2023)[14]**

| Region | Incidents | Killed | Injured | Districts with victims |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Far North | 15 | 29 | 13 | Logone-et-Chari (hot-spot)<br>Mayo-Sava<br>Mayo-Tsanaga |
| North-West | 77 | 7 | 19 | Mezam<br>Momo<br>Boyo<br>Donga-Mantung |
| South-West | 28 | 9 | 50 | Fako<br>Meme<br>Manyu<br>Lebialem |
| **Totals** | **120** | **45** | **82** | **11 districts** |

NB: Cameroon did not provide disaggregated data (by gender or civilian status) and only reported districts where IEDs caused casualties. For example, in the North-West, IED incidents occurred in seven districts, but only four of these recorded victims.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Cameroon does not yet have a formal institutional mechanism dedicated specifically to mine action, but has said it is working to establish a "national body" to address the threat posed by AP mines and IEDs. The country has chosen to appoint two Focal Points to oversee mine action efforts—one civilian and one military—based, respectively, in the Ministry of External Relations and the Ministry of Defence. The Permanent Mission in Geneva works with them to monitor APMBC implementation.[15]

In 2025, Cameroon announced it was preparing to organise its first national conference on counter-IED efforts, which would lay the groundwork for more structured interministerial coordination and provide a platform for dialogue between public authorities, civil society, and technical and financial partners.[16] A timeframe for this to occur was not available as of August 2025.

Over the years, Cameroon has strengthened its legislative and regulatory framework. Particularly between 2014 and 2019, Cameroon enacted several laws and decrees, including a law on the repression of acts of terrorism; a law on the general regime of weapons and ammunition; and a decree establishing the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of former Boko Haram fighters and other armed groups in the NWSW regions.[17] Administrative measures and inter-institutional coordination enable the prosecution of offenders, and several individuals have been arrested and sanctioned in connection with victim-activated IEDs, particularly in the Far North, North-west, and South-West regions.[18]

11 Small Arms Survey, "Hors de Contrôle. Le trafic de composants d'EEI et d'explosifs commerciaux en Afrique de l'Ouest", November 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3WoPMvo, p. 39.

12 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3.

13 Statement of Cameroon, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form H, p. 22.

14 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D, p. 7.

15 Email from Paul Serges Ntamack Epoh, Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the UN in Geneva, 5 June 2025.

16 Statement of Cameroon on Assistance and Cooperation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025.

17 Report on national implementation measures, submitted to the President of the Fourth APMBC Review Conference, 15 May 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form A, p.2.

18 Statement of Cameroon on Compliance, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025.

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Cameroon regularly organises government-funded training seminars on AP mine action, aimed primarily at raising awareness of the risks and promoting appropriate safety measures. The Ministry of Defence launched a programme in 2015 to organise seminars aimed at raising community awareness of the risks posed by AP mines, preparing local stakeholders (including the army, security forces, NGOs, and communities) for risk management and response, and strengthening cooperation with international partners in mine action. The 2025 Finance Law prioritized the fight against IEDs, with dedicated resources for awareness, training, and response.[19]

Since 2014, training courses for gendarmes and military personnel in IED detection and neutralisation have been provided by the United States (US) Special Operations Command for Africa (SOCAFRICA). Since 2021, defence and security forces have received training from both France and the United States (See the subsection below, "Operators and Operational Tools" for further details of training in 2024).[20]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

At the June 2025 Intersessional Meetings, Cameroon, as the gender focal point of the Committee on Cooperation and Assistance, made a strong statement calling for gender and diversity to be treated as core elements of mine action, commending States that have taken steps to disaggregate data, consult affected communities, and tailor mine action to specific needs.[21] Cameroon has yet to explain how gender and diversity considerations are addressed in its work domestically, and data provided in its Article 7 report were not disaggregated. It stated, however, that identifying and meeting the different needs of women, children, and persons with disabilities is now an integral part of its national approach, and that it places particular importance on promoting inclusion and gender equality in cooperation policies.[22]

The Cameroonian Army Engineering Corps includes women among its deminers, serving in various units, including those tasked with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). Women are also present in other areas of the armed forces, such as education, catering, administration, social services, and health. Currently, there are two women in training, both holding EOD Level 1 and Defence Explosive Science and Technology (DEST) IED qualifications.[23] There is also one Cameroonian woman qualified as a UN instructor for Explosive Hazard Awareness Threat (EHAT). Increasingly, women are specialising in mine risk education as trainers or officers.[24]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Cameroon has not developed a national mine action standard (NMAS) but reports that its national environmental protection laws, applicable to mine action and EOD, are aligned with IMAS 07.13. Among these is Law No. 11/009 of 9 July 2011 on the fundamental principles of environmental protection, which establishes procedural mechanisms and operating rules for safeguarding the environment. Cameroon said that environmental impact assessments must be conducted to identify risks and define mitigation measures before any intervention; where impacts are irreversible, compensation may be required. Local communities and stakeholders must be consulted and involved in decision-making. Demining activities must avoid harming biodiversity, soil, water, and forests, and explosive waste must be managed appropriately to prevent pollution.[25]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Cameroon does not yet have an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database to centralise data on incidents and victims or to identify and map location of confirmed and suspected hazardous areas. However, efforts are underway to strengthen this capacity. Since 2019, Cameroon has established the "National Joint Commission of Inquiry on the Placement of Improvised Explosive Devices", a strategic-level body under the authority of the Central Director for Coordination of the National Gendarmerie. The Commission is responsible for forward-looking studies and situational analyses, with the authority to make recommendations. It is an important component of the information management system currently under development.[26]

19 Email from Paul Serges Ntamack Epoh, Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the UN in Geneva, 5 June 2025.
20 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p.4.
21 Statement of Cameroon as Gender Focal Point of the Committee on Assistance and Cooperation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025.
22 Statement of Cameroon on Assistance and Cooperation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025.
23 Email from Paul Serges Ntamack Epoh, Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the UN in Geneva, 5 June 2025.
24 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form E, p. 14.
25 Email from Paul Serges Ntamack Epoh, Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the UN in Geneva, 5 June 2025.
26 Ibid.

The commission acts as a coordination platform, linking the military engineering corps, which conducts operations in strategic areas; the gendarmerie, deployed in rural areas; and the police, deployed in urban areas. The gendarmerie also conducts post-explosion investigations to identify the type of device used in incidents. Cameroon said it is seeking support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to help prioritise and centralise information flows, and potentially deploy IMSMA.[27] In October 2024, one of Cameroon's Focal Points attended the GICHD regional workshop on information management for mine action in Senegal.[28]

In January 2025, for the first time in fifteen years, Cameroon submitted an Article 7 report under the APMBC, covering calendar year 2023. Cameroon indicated the resumption of its reporting cycle and committed to the regular submission of reports. At the June 2025 Intersessional Meetings, it stated that the report covering 2024 was underway and would be submitted as soon as possible.[29]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Although official statements refer to planning and national policies, Cameroon—without an Article 5 deadline—does not have a work plan against which it is accountable to other States Parties. It has expressed its intention to develop a national counter-IED strategy, with the groundwork to be established at the upcoming national conference, the date of which has not been set.

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Cameroon does not conduct humanitarian demining or follow land release methodology. Contaminated areas are theatres of military operations, and EOD is the prerogative of the Ministry of Defence. It is not known whether Cameroon has adopted national mine action standards (NMAS) for ad hoc clearance and EOD operations, nor whether such standards are compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and regularly reviewed or updated.

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Ad hoc clearance and EOD operations are conducted by the Military Engineer Corps under the authority of the Ministry of Defence, along with the Gendarmerie (military police), which are deployed in rural areas and which are responsible for post-explosion investigations.[30]

Cameroon has started expanding its national capacity by training police officers, and in November 2024, a group completed training in demining and IED countermeasures at the Yaoundé Police Academy. The training, supported by France, was implemented by the General Directorate of National Security (DGSN) in partnership with GEOMINES, a company specialising in explosive risk management. Over the course of 2024, this partnership delivered three training sessions: a one-month EOD Level 1 course for 25 officers, a two-month EOD Level 2 course for 16 officers, and a two-month IED neutralisation course for 12 officers.[31]

From 4 to 8 November 2024, a training course on awareness and response to IED threats was held in Yaoundé. Organised in cooperation between the US Department of State's Bureau of International Security and Non-proliferation, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and the Government of Cameroon, the course brought together representatives from law enforcement, customs, border security, and internal security agencies. Participants received instruction on topics such as IED threats, vehicle-borne devices, insider threats, and the use of drones in terrorist activities.[32]

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) IED Threat Mitigation Advisory Team (TMAT) undertook training recognition at the Centre Spécialisé d'Instruction d'Application et de Perfectionnement (CSIAP GEN) in Cameroon. The training recognition was to assess the suitability of the Centre in providing UN aligned training for Explosive Hazard Awareness Training (EHAT). With support of UNMAS's TMAT, Cameroon has been developing national counter-IED instructor capacity with nine instructors in the process of being trained at the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Kenya, taking the training of trainers "All Arms Search" course.[33]

In 2024, 27 members of the armed forces received EOD training provided by CSIAP-GEN, UNMAS, and France (through the Training Centre for Post-Conflict Mine Clearance and EOD, CPADD in Benin).[34]

27 Interview with Paul Serges Ntamack Epoh, Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the UN in Geneva, and Lt.-Col. Eric Dingom Komon, Focal Point under the Ministry of Defence, UN National Directors Meeting, 9 April 2025.

28 Email from Paul Serges Ntamack Epoh, Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the UN in Geneva, 5 June 2025.

29 Statement of Cameroon on Compliance, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025.

30 Email from Paul Serges Ntamack Epoh, Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the UN in Geneva, 5 June 2025.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Social media posts by UNMAS, 20 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mIMNcD; and https://bit.ly/41IxoAU.

34 Email from Paul Serges Ntamack Epoh, Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the UN in Geneva, 5 June 2025.

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Cameroon reported to Mine Action Review that in 2024, spot tasks resulted in the destruction of 10 improvised mines (eight in the North-West and two in the Far North), the neutralisation of 48 IEDs, and the destruction of 19 ERW (see Table 2). Its Article 7 report, covering 2023, did not include information on EOD tasks or the destruction of improvised mines.

**Table 2: EOD spot tasks in 2024 by region**[35]

| | Number and type of devices | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Region | AP mines (including improvised mines) | Other IEDs | ERW | Totals |
| Centre | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Far North | 2 | 14 | 6 | 22 |
| North | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| North-West | 8 | 27 | 12 | 47 |
| South-West | 0 | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| **Totals** | **10** | **48** | **19** | **77** |

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CAMEROON 1 MARCH 2003

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2013

**NEW ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE REQUIRED**

Cameroon's Article 5 deadline to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control expired on 1 March 2013. For the first time in fifteen years, Cameroon submitted an Article 7 report covering 2023, in which it reiterated that no mined areas have been identified on its territory, but acknowledged that since 2014, IEDs used by NSAGs have caused casualties, particularly in its Far North region bordering Nigeria and its NWSW Anglophone regions, including a few instances involving victim-activated devices that fall under the definition of an AP mine. In 2023, 11 districts across these regions have recorded explosions resulting in casualties. Nevertheless, in the absence of systematic post-blast investigations and a national survey, Cameroon remains unable to determine the nature and extent of contamination.

Under the APMBC's agreed framework, Cameroon must immediately inform all States Parties of any newly discovered AP mines following the expiry of its Article 5 deadline and ensure their destruction as soon as possible. If necessary, it should also submit a request for a new Article 5 deadline, which should be as short as possible and not more than ten years. Cameroon must continue to fulfil its reporting obligations under the convention, including on the location of any suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for the destruction of all AP mines within them.

Considering the number of incidents and causalities caused by IEDs reported by Cameroon, including improvised mines, albeit to a lesser extent, Mine Action Review recommends that Cameroon request a two-year interim deadline. This would allow time to conduct the necessary survey and better assess the nature of contamination, while continuing to strengthen national capacity and coordination to address the threat. Cameroon is encouraged to seek and facilitate assistance and expertise from other States Parties and humanitarian demining organisations.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Cameroon does not have plans in place to address residual contamination once its Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

35 Ibid.

# CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC



## KEY DATA

### ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2013

New extended interim deadline needed during which to assess the extent, if any, of Article 5 obligations

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Light, extent unknown

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Not reported | Not reported |
| Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |
| Non-Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 1 (spot task) | Not reported |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSCA) explosive ordnance disposal teams
- The Development Initiative (TDI)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, and for the first time in 20 years, the Central African Republic (CAR) submitted an Article 7 report under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), covering 2004–2024. The report highlights a growing explosive ordnance (EO) threat since 2020. In 2024 alone, 73 EO incidents were recorded, with 81% involving explosive remnants of war (ERW). During the year, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSCA) and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) implementing partners conducted 44 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks, destroying 66 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and one improvised device that met the definition of an anti-personnel (AP) mine.

CAR made institutional progress in 2024 by finalising a national roadmap in September and drafting a decree in December establishing a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), which received presidential approval on 4 September 2025. Internationally, CAR increased its engagement by attending key forums in 2025, including the 28th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisors (NDM-UN28), where it hosted a side event, and, for the first time, the APMBC intersessional meetings in Geneva where the National Focal Point called for international support to launch a nationwide non-technical survey (NTS) and operationalise the future NMAA.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **CAR should operationalise the newly established NMAA and mine action centre by providing them with the resources necessary to fulfil their functions as stipulated in the presidential decree.**
- **CAR should seek an interim Article 5 deadline to conduct a national survey to determine and confirm the extent of AP mine contamination.**
- **CAR should strengthen efforts to mobilise international funding by sharing a detailed budget and resource mobilisation strategy to conduct the national baseline survey.**

- **CAR should pursue efforts to establish a national monitoring and information management capacity to support systematic collection of data and reporting, disaggregating AP mines, including those of an improvised nature, from other explosive devices. An improvised anti-vehicle (AV) mine sensitive enough to be detonated by a person should be recorded as an improvised AP mine.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- The National Mine Action Authority ("Autorité Nationale de Lutte Anti-Mines", ANLAM) formally established on 4 September 2025, along with a Mine Action Center ("Centre de Lutte Anti-mines", CLAM).

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Central African Armed Forces (FACA)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The Development Initiative (TDI) (UNMAS implementing partner)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) EOD teams

### OTHER ACTORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA) (provisional accreditation)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI) (risk education and capacity building)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of AP mine contamination in CAR is not known, but is believed to be small in scale and extent. In 2025, CAR submitted its first Article 7 transparency report in two decades, covering the period from 2004 to 2024. The report stated that the country was not contaminated by AP mines at the time of its ratification of the APMBC. However, since 2020, with the resurgence of internal armed conflicts, the extent of EO contamination has been increasing.[1]

The report identified several areas where explosive devices have been discovered. In Bambari, MINUSCA teams neutralised two AP mines in 2022. The regions of Équateur, Yade and Kaga have also been impacted, with 70 incidents involving EO, primarily AV mines or similar victim-activated devices, including 46 recorded explosions. In 2022 and 2023, MINUSCA and UNMAS teams neutralised two PRB-M3 AV mines in Équateur. CAR reported that AV mines are being placed on roads "sporadically and on an ad-hoc basis". However, the full extent of contamination is not known in the absence of NTS and technical survey (TS).[2] Other regions, including Fertit and Haut Oubangui, have also experienced EO-related incidents.[3]

CAR has said that the full extent of EO contamination cannot be determined until a nationwide survey is conducted. At present, there is no coherent or comprehensive analysis of the contamination. The only existing database is maintained by UNMAS, relying on incident reports provided by the multinational force, the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), and humanitarian organisations. CAR stated that the survey will be the first step in establishing a reliable database for planning clearance.[4]

In 2024, UNMAS recorded 73 incidents involving explosive devices – a slight decrease from the 78 incidents recorded in 2023. Of the 73 incidents, 59 were caused by ERW, 7 incidents involved AV mines and similar victim-operated devices; 4 were related to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) including 2 airborne; 2 involved caches, and one involved a booby-trapped device that met the definition of an AP mine under the APMBC.[5]

These incidents resulted in 41 casualties (28 injured and 13 killed), of which 58% were civilians, including 10 children. Despite the continued threat, this represents a significant halving of casualties compared to 2023 and marks the lowest number since the emergence of the threat in 2020. UNMAS cautioned, however, that due to under-reporting—particularly in areas where MINUSCA is not present—the casualty figures may not reflect the full scope of the problem.[6]

Between June 2020 and June 2025, UNMAS has recorded more than 285 EO-related incidents, resulting in 270 victims, including 188 civilians (70%). In 2025, 38 incidents have already been reported as at June, causing 15 civilian casualties. The most affected regions are the west of the country (22 incidents) and the capital Bangui (7 incidents). Most incidents involve ERW although AV mines in the western regions also pose a significant threat.[7]

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2002–24), Form C, p. 5.
2 Ibid., Form C, pp. 5–6.
3 Ibid., Form C, p. 9.
4 Ibid, Form C, p. 7.
5 Email from Sophie Van Royen, Chief of Mine Action Programmes, and Alioune Menane, Capacity Building Advisor, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.
6 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.
7 MINUSCA, "Des avancées significatives réalisées dans la lutte antimines avec le soutien de la MINUSCA", 11 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4m58x27.

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

CAR is predominantly contaminated with ERW, a legacy of the many armed conflicts that have shaped its recent history. These explosive devices pose a threat to the civilian population, particularly in rural and peripheral areas where the fighting has been most intense and armed groups remain active.[8] As in 2023, ERW remained the most common explosive threat in 2024, with 59 incidents involving abandoned explosive ordnance or UXO reported. These incidents have primarily affected civilians, with children reportedly accounting for 60% of all ERW casualties.[9]

The threat of IEDs emerged in CAR in 2022. In 2024, four IED-related incidents were reported in the western and central parts of the country (Yade, Équateur, and Fertit regions). These incidents are said to have caused a total of twelve casualties, including three civilians (two men and one boy) killed and one civilian (a man) injured. The government currently lacks the capacity to accurately identify the perpetrators behind these devices.[10]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In March 2023, a National Focal Point for mine action was appointed within the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Later that year, during the ninth session of the Strategic Committee on DDRR-RSS-RN,[11] the President of CAR announced the decision to establish a national authority to coordinate the government's response to mines and explosive devices.[12] This decision was formalised through a decree signed on 4 September 2025, officially launching the NMAA.[13]

In 2024, the National Focal Point (a senior officer of the FACA) coordinated mine action efforts with international stakeholders. His responsibilities included leading the establishment of the NMAA, monitoring compliance with international obligations (the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the APMBC), and overseeing national priorities in clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.[14] To support efforts to create an NMAA, the Minister of Defence appointed a Ministerial Advisor for Security Reform Sector (SSR) in September 2024.[15]

In April, the government allocated a building for the future NMAA. In June 2024, a three-day national self-assessment workshop was held by Humanity & Inclusion (HI), with support from UNMAS and MINUSCA. Using a methodology inspired by UNIDIR's counter-IED self-assessment tool, the workshop brought together representatives from the armed forces, military engineers, police, gendarmerie, the Primature (Office of the Prime Minister), key ministries, UN agencies, NGOs, and a private contractor.[16] The workshop resulted in key recommendations, including the establishment of the NMAA, the elaboration of a national strategy and work plan, and the development of national mine action standards (NMAS).[17]

These recommendations were used to develop a national roadmap, which was validated in September 2024 and handed to the MoD and SSR Advisor for action.[18] An organisational chart for the future NMAA has been proposed with four departments: operations, risk education and victim assistance, information management, and support (administration, finance, and logistics). The structure will be expanded to include three regional centres (West, Centre, and East). The Operations Department will be responsible for accreditations and quality control, while the Information Management department will oversee data management. The NMAA will be placed under the Presidency.[19]

In December, a draft presidential decree establishing the NMAA—defining its structure, mandate, and functions—was finalised by the MoD, with UNMAS's support. The decree was signed by the President on 4 September 2025, formally launching the institution.[20] A draft national implementation law for the APMBC has also been submitted to the government.[21]

CAR is being supported by MINUSCA and its mine action service, UNMAS, which is providing technical expertise, capacity-building for both national authorities and the MINUSCA Forces, and logistical support. UNMAS assisted drafting the legal instruments, structuring the future NMAA, defining the National Roadmap for mine action, and submitting the Article 7 report. UNMAS has contracted a dedicated Capacity Development Advisor in December 2024 to support the establishment of the NMAA.[22]

In 2025, CAR participated to the 28th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisors (NDM-UN28), where it hosted a side event, supported by UNMAS to present

8 Article 7 Report (covering 2002–24), Form C, p. 6.

9 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025; and "UNMAS Explosive Ordnance Threat, Non-Technical Overview", 2023.

10 Article 7 Report (covering 2002–24), Form C, p. 7.

11 DDRR-RSS-RN stands for Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Repatriation (DDRR), *Security Sector Reform (RSS)*, National Reconciliation (RN).

12 Article 7 Report (covering 2002–24), Form A, p. 4.

13 Decree No. 25-327 establishing, organising and governing the functioning of ANLAM in the Central African Republic, 4 September 2025; and email from Lt.-Col. Edgar Ghazaka, National Focal Point, MoD, 9 September 2025.

14 Article 7 Report (covering 2002–24), p. 12.

15 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.

16 Ibid.

17 Online interview with Seydou Gaye, Mine Action Specialist, HI, 7 June 2024.

18 Article 7 Report (covering 2002–24), p. 12.

19 Presentation of CAR, Side Event, NDM-UN28, 11 April 2025.

20 Emails from Lt.-Col. Edgar Ghazaka, MoD; and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 9 September 2025.

21 Article 7 Report (covering 2002–24), p. 12; MINUSCA, "Des avancées significatives réalisées dans la lutte antimines avec le soutien de la MINUSCA", 11 June 2025.

22 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.

progress, plans, and challenges.[23] On 28 April 2025, CAR submitted an Article 7 report under the APMBC, and, for the first time, was represented at the Intersessional Meetings in Geneva in June. During the meeting, the Focal Point appealed to States Parties, donors, and UN agencies to support the rapid launch of a nationwide survey and assist in operationalising the NMAA while strengthening local capacities.[24]

As co-chairs of the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AOR) within the Protection Cluster, UNMAS and the National Focal Point held six coordination meetings in 2024 with mine action stakeholders to strengthen national capacities, integrate mine action into protection efforts, share information and challenges, and provide technical briefings to humanitarian actors. These meetings included participation from a wide range of stakeholders, including UN agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WHO), international NGOs (Norwegian Refugee Council, Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD), HI, DanChurchAid, DCA), national NGOs (Femmes en Danger, IRAD, AHD, HDS, AFJDD, ICRE Africa, FED, ARND), along with representatives from the National Association of the Deaf.[25]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

CAR, lacking a functioning mine action programme, has not yet taken up gender in the context of mine action. However, the National Focal Point informed Mine Action Review that the programmes implemented by operators consider gender and diversity issues.[26] The Article 7 report outlined risk education campaigns conducted by UNMAS and HI, particularly in areas with a high number of incidents reported. These campaigns targeted communities with a specific focus on children and women, aiming to encourage the reporting of suspicious objects and promote safe behaviours. CAR also provided data on number of recipients, disaggregated by gender and age.[27]

UNMAS maintained its commitment to gender mainstreaming, resulting in a gender-balanced team composition over the years (see Table 1). On 4 April 2024, UNMAS organised a roundtable with women's associations in a locality heavily affected by recent conflicts, providing a platform for dialogue and inclusion. Additionally, UNMAS published "best practice" stories showcasing the role of female peacekeepers, including their participation in search and detect teams.[28]

**Table 1: Gender composition of operators and UNMAS in 2024**

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TDI | 47 | 6 (13%) | 3 | 1 (33%) | 44 | 5 (11%) |
| UNMAS | 46 | 23 (50%) | 4 | 1 (25%) | 15 | 7 (47%) |
| **Totals** | **93** | **29 (31%)** | **7** | **2 (29%)** | **59** | **12 (20%)** |

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

CAR does not have an environmental policy specifically applicable to the MoD.[29] UNMAS, as a MINUSCA section, aligns with and applies MINUSCA's environmental management policies and frameworks. The national technical standards and guidelines for CAR, developed by UNMAS in 2017, include a chapter on occupational health and environmental management. UNMAS informed Mine Action Review that the NTSG will be reviewed and updated by the future NMAA, to ensure alignment with the revised International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 07.13.[30]

23 Side Event: "A global call to strengthen mine action efforts in the CAR", 11 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3GXv027.
24 Statement of CAR on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17-20 June 2025.
25 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.
26 Email from Lt.-Col. Edgar Ghazaka, MoD, 2 September 2024.
27 Article 7 Report (covering 2002–24), Form I, p. 11.
28 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.
29 Email from Lt.-Col. Edgar Ghazaka, MoD, 22 April 2025.
30 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

In the absence of a functioning national mine action authority in 2024, UNMAS continued to maintain an information management database since June 2020 with support from two national staff, collecting and sharing information on EO incidents. It includes data on incidents reported by the multinational force, FACA, and humanitarian organisations. UNMAS attempts to disaggregate incidents by type of contamination based on the information available; however, post-blast investigations cannot always be conducted considering the security situation, consequent challenges to movement of personnel, and limited technical expertise.[31]

Improving the quality of information remains an ongoing effort, involving regular coordination with UN agency security officers, the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), and the MINUSCA Joint Operations Centre (JOC). In 2024, efforts to improve victim data included developing a new data collection form and collaborating with the MINUSCA Child Protection Unit to ensure better data alignment.[32]

The organisational chart of the future NMAA includes an IM department that will be responsible for data management.[33] CAR plans to transition to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core, but this will be a long-term process requiring sustained support and guidance.[34]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

At the NDM-UN28 in Geneva in April 2025, CAR stated that, once the NMAA is officially established, the next steps will include developing a national counter-EO strategy and an accompanying work plan.[35] In the meantime, a National Road Map approved in September 2024 outlined milestones for the establishment of the NMAA, including definition of its mandate, structure, and roles; formal approval in national legislation; and appointment of key personnel. The authority's first tasks will include developing and implementing a national mine action strategy and action plan.[36]

In the absence of a national mine action authority, UNMAS has been responsible for managing accreditation and tasking processes (responsibilities that will now be transferred to the NMAA). In 2024, HI was accredited for a risk education project in the north-west[37] where it worked to build the capacities of two national organisations in Bocaranga. However, due to funding cuts in 2025, HI ceased its operations in CAR.[38] DCA received provisional accreditation in March 2024 for NTS, risk education, and victim assistance but did not implement any activities due to a lack of funding. In August 2025, DCA launched a risk education and national NGO capacity-building project in the north-west, taking over from HI, following a reallocation of the UN reserve humanitarian funds.[39]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

The National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for CAR were developed by UNMAS in 2017 and include an extensive list of chapters covering, among others, accreditation; quality assurance; NTS, TS, manual and mechanical clearance; battle area clearance (BAC); EOD; occupational health and safety; environmental management; transport, use, and storage of explosives; and information management. The standards are, though, in need of review and update, a process that is planned to be carried out by, or in coordination with, the future NMAA once established.[40] UNMAS will provide technical assistance for the drafting of the NTSGs taking into account the specific context in CAR as well as the internal systems and procedures required for effective programme management.[41]

31 Interview with Sophie Van Royen, UNMAS, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.
32 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.
33 Presentation of CAR, Side Event, NDM-UN28, 11 April 2025.
34 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.
35 Presentation of CAR, Side Event, NDM-UN28, 11 April 2025.
36 CAR, Roadmap for the Establishment of a NMAA, September 2024, p. 7.
37 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.
38 Intervention of Arturo Bureo, Global Technical Director, HI, at the NDM-UN28, Geneva, 11 April 2025.
39 Emails from Jerome Berson, Country Director, DCA, 4 April 2025; and Alioune Menane, 4 August 2025.
40 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.
41 CAR, Roadmap for the Establishment of a NMAA, September 2024, p. 8.

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Operations are primarily conducted by EOD teams from MINUSCA and UNMAS implementing partners.

MINUSCA was established in 2014. Its mandate includes assisting the authorities in preventing, mitigating, and combating the threat posed by explosive devices. This encompasses the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices, as well as strengthening the capacity of FACA, in coordination with UNMAS.[42] MINUSCA has dedicated teams for EOD response and spot tasks: it maintains one Force EOD reserve platoon in Bangui and five EOD teams, each embedded within a multirole engineering company, located in Bangassou, Bangui, Bouar, Bria, and Kaga-Bandoro.[43] Some infantry battalions also have EOD teams integrated into their units, although their exact capabilities or operational use is not publicly available. In December 2024, MINUSCA inaugurated the first post-blast investigation laboratory in the Central African Republic. The following month, MINUSCA conducted the country's first post-blast investigation training for 25 members of the national defence and security forces.[44] UNMAS also trained 173 peacekeepers in post-blast investigation.[45]

UNMAS employed 46 people in CAR in 2024. Personnel were initially based in four offices: Bangui, Bouar, Paoua, and Bambari, although the Bambari office closed in June 2025. UNMAS is entirely funded through the MINUSCA Assessed Budget. In 2024, UNMAS continued to contract two multi-task teams (MTTs) from an international company, TDI. The teams carry out EOD spot tasks and post-blast investigations, and provide training to MINUSCA and national forces, primarily in Bangui. Additionally, UNMAS deployed two mobile risk education teams rotating locations approximately every two months, one "surge" search-and-detect training team operating in the western region (Bouar, Berbérati, and Bossangoa) delivering training to peacekeepers, and one surge search and weapons and ammunition management (WAM) training team delivering training to national forces in Bangui and in the regions.[46]

Since February 2023, UNMAS has been providing training to officers of the FACA. By the end of 2024, 33 officers had completed EOD Level 3 training. Among them, 12 were further trained through a four-week Training-of-Trainers (ToT) course delivered by UNMAS, enabling them to conduct basic Explosive Ordnance Threat Mitigation (EOTM) training within their own units. This approach supports the development of national capacity for independent explosive ordnance disposal and management.[47] UNMAS has also conducted a training in incident management to national security forces as well as post-blast investigation training.[48]

Between 2022 and 2024, HI implemented a risk education programme in the north-western prefecture of Ouham-Pendé. In June 2024, it also helped organise the self-assessment workshop aimed at defining the national mine action framework and priorities.[49] As noted above, however, due to funding cuts in May 2025, HI ceased its operations in CAR.[50] DCA planned to start a mine action project in Nana-Mambere (West) involving NTS, risk education, and victim assistance but the project did not materialise due to lack of funding.[51] In August 2025, DCA took over from HI, and began a risk education and national NGO capacity-building project in the north-west of the country.[52]

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

There is currently no area clearance in CAR, only EOD spot tasks. This is largely due to the absence of identified minefields and the unknown extent of contamination. In 2024, a total of 44 spot tasks resulted in the destruction of 66 items of UXO and one AP mine.[53]

MINUSCA EOD Forces conducted 23 of these spot tasks, removing 31 items of UXO, with the highest numbers reported in Nana-Mambéré (6 items of UXO), Ouaka (6 items of UXO) and Ouham-Fafa (6 items of UXO) prefectures. TDI, contracted by UNMAS, carried out 21 spot tasks for MINUSCA, destroying 35 items of UXO and an AP mine. Of these, 18 tasks took place in Bangui, resulting in the destruction of 25 items of UXO. One task was conducted in Nana-Mambéré, where an item of UXO was destroyed; and two in Ombella-Mpoko, where nine items of UXO and one booby-trapped hand grenade, which met the definition of an AP mine under the APMBC, were destroyed.[54]

42 MINUSCA webpage at: https://bit.ly/4dbmJ5v.

43 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.

44 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, 14 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/47c62Xs, p. 8 (point 36).

45 Email from Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 4 August 2025.

46 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.

47 UNMAS, "MINUSCA, through UNMAS, Strengthens National Capacities in Explosive Ordnance Threat Mitigation and Mine Action in CAR", 11 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3UnhQhV.

48 Presentation of CAR, Side Event, NDM-UN28, 11 April 2025; and email from Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 4 August 2025.

49 Online interview with Seydou Gaye, HI, 7 June 2024.

50 Intervention of Arturo Bureo, HI, NDM-UN28, Geneva, 11 April 2025; and email from Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 31 July 2025.

51 Email from Jerome Berson, DCA, 4 April 2025.

52 Email from Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 4 August 2025.

53 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.

54 Ibid.

According to UNMAS, 98 incidents involving EO were safely cleared between 2020 and 2024. In 2024, 21% of EO incidents resulted in explosions, down from 44% in 2023. MINUSCA safely removed 60% of EO, an increase from 46% in 2023. Over 10% were reportedly removed by other actors, while the remaining cases involved EO for which removal could not be confirmed.[55]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CAR: 1 MAY 2003

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2013

**INTERIM EXTENDED ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE SHOULD BE REQUESTED**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, CAR was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, and no later than 1 May 2013. In its first Article 7 report, submitted in November 2004, CAR stated that there were no mined areas on its territory.

In 2025, for the first time in two decades, CAR submitted an Article 7 report, outlining a persistent and evolving EO threat that began in June 2020. Since then, a total of 285 incidents have been reported, causing 270 casualties, 70% of whom were civilians.[56] In 2024, 80% of incidents involved ERW, causing 41 casualties, including 10 children and 6 peacekeepers. There is a growing concern over continued, though limited, use of improvised AV mines. Recorded incidents and devices likely represent only a small fraction of the actual contamination.[57] With support from UNMAS, CAR has identified the regions most affected by EO incidents, including a few isolated cases involving AP mines. Nevertheless, in the absence of systematic post-blast investigations and a national survey, the country remains unable to determine the full extent of contamination or locations of suspected or confirmed mined areas.

CAR is seeking international support to conduct a national survey to better assess the extent and nature of EO contamination.[58] Mine Action Review recommends that it submits an interim Article 5 extension request—of no more than two years—to allow sufficient time to determine and confirm the extent of AP mine contamination. In the meantime, CAR should continue fulfilling its reporting obligations, including by providing updated information on the location of any suspected or confirmed mined areas and on the status of programmes for the destruction of all AP mines within those areas.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

While CAR does not yet have plans for managing residual contamination, strengthening the capacity of security forces will help build a national capacity to address the threat. UNMAS is supporting this process by promoting sustainable capacity development and reinforcing national ownership of mine action activities. The establishment of the NMAA is expected to be "a transformative step for CAR's mine action sector", enhancing coordination. The NMAA will oversee and guide EO mitigation efforts, contributing to more structured and effective implementation.[59]

55 Presentation of CAR, Side Event, NDM-UN28, 11 April 2025.

56 MINUSCA, "Des avancées significatives réalisées dans la lutte antimines avec le soutien de la MINUSCA ", 11 June 2025.

57 Article 7 Report (covering 2002–24), p. 13; and email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.

58 Statement of CAR on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

59 UNMAS, "MINUSCA, through UNMAS, Strengthens National Capacities in Explosive Ordnance Threat Mitigation and Mine Action in CAR", 11 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3UvCnAV.

# CHAD

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2030

Not on track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 77.6KM²

Medium
(National authority estimate, including AP and AV mine contamination)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0 | 1.69 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 7 (all during route clearance) | 5 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- National High Commission for Demining (HCND)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

At the Fifth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in November 2024, Chad was granted a fifth extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline to 1 January 2030. The extension is to address anti-personnel (AP) mined areas estimated to cover 77.6km² across the northern provinces of Borkou, Ennedi (East and West), and Tibesti, with more than half of the contamination located in Tibesti. In 2024, faced with urgent priorities and limited funding, the National High Commission for Demining (HCND) deployed three explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams to secure roadways in these provinces, after torrential rains displaced mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Between September and November, these hazards caused casualties when gold miners drove over them. The HCND also cleared the site of the June 2024 explosion at the country's largest ammunition stockpile, in a northern district of N'Djamena, which, according to the HCND's official account, killed two people and injured 38 others.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Given the security risk—authorities describe hazardous areas as an open-air arsenal ("magasin à ciel ouvert")—Chad should urgently conduct non-technical survey (NTS) and systematic marking to protect civilians and livestock, and seek to prevent the misuse of explosives in gold mining.**
- **Chad should intensify and report on its efforts to secure and diversify funding and attract technical expertise and operational support.**
- **Chad should report on its contamination and land release by clearly distinguishing AP mined areas from those containing only explosive ordnance not covered by the APMBC, such as anti-vehicle (AV) mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).**

- **Considering the country's vulnerability to climate change and associated risks, such as the massive floods in 2024, Chad should integrate environmental considerations into its mine action programme as per the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Chad has a fairly clear but incomplete estimate of its mine contamination as Tibesti, the most affected province, faces access constraints challenging survey and clearance operations. Following severe summer floods, EOD operations were conducted in northern provinces, including Tibesti, paving the way for continued operations if funding allows. In 2024, no AP mine clearance was conducted, however, and no mined areas were newly recorded, leaving 119 areas with 21.7km$^2$ of suspected hazardous area (SHA) and 55.9km$^2$ of confirmed hazardous area (CHA). |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | In 2024, the Chadian government allocated approximately US$1.45 million to the HCND, a similar sum to previous years. The funding supported the deployment of seven teams for risk education and emergency clearance following the ammunition depot explosion near N'Djamena and severe flooding in the north. A restructuring of the HCND was reportedly underway in 2025. Chad depends on international funding to complete clearance and is seeking US$52 million for its extension period of 2025–29. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 3 | 3 | Chad's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request and draft Article 7 report covering 2024 did not address gender and diversity. Women made up less than 4% of HCND staff in 2024. The only woman employed in clearance operations, an EOD level 3 expert, has reportedly left the sector. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 2 | 2 | Chad has no policy, national standards, or focal point for environmental management in mine action, and has reported no measures to address environmental impacts from clearance. Severe flooding in 2024 required emergency clearance, with climate change increasing such risks. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | The HCND's Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was cleaned and updated during the 2017–2021 PRODECO project. Since then, it has not been updated, as no new areas have been found, and is considered reliable by the HCND. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Following feedback on inconsistencies in its 2025–2029 work plan, Chad stated it will submit a revised, detailed version at the 22MSP in December 2025. Given the scale of the challenge and limited funding, Chad intends to focus efforts in 2025–26 on Borkou and Ennedi (East and West), with the final three years assigned exclusively to Tibesti province. Its ability to implement the plan depends on attracting international donor support, which it has yet to secure, as well as gaining sustained access to the challenging Tibesti province. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Chad reported having 22 national mine action standards compliant with IMAS. While its 2024 Article 5 extension request stated that the National Mine Action Standards are regularly updated, no review has been carried out since the end of the PRODECO project in 2021. At the June 2025 intersessional meetings, Chad clarified that 48 SHAs first require NTS, while 71 CHAs are planned for TS and clearance. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Land release outputs fell to zero in 2024 as Chad directed its limited funding to emergency responses following the depot explosion and flooding in the north. At the Fifth Review Conference, Chad was granted a fifth deadline extension to 1 January 2030 and requires substantial international support to complete its Article 5 obligations. |
| **Average Score** | **4.4** | **4.4** | **Overall Programme Performance: POOR** |

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National au Déminage, HCND)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- HCND
- Army Engineers
- General Directorate of the Strategic Reserve (DGRS)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Chad has a relatively clear, though not yet complete, understanding of its mine contamination. Indeed, survey is still required in Tibesti, the most contaminated province, as well as in Borkou and Ennedi to cancel and reduce the size of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). At the conclusion of the European Union-funded PRODECO project, implemented between 2017 and 2021, Chad estimated its AP mined area as covering around 77km$^2$.[1] At the end of 2024, Chad reiterated this estimate, with 48 SHAs covering nearly 21.7km$^2$ and requiring NTS (38 areas totalling 19 km$^2$ are in Tibesti province) and 71 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering 55.9km$^2$ requiring technical survey (TS) and clearance (see Table 1 below).

More than half of Chad's mined area is in its northern province of Tibesti. Maps accompanying Chad's 2019 and 2024 Article 5 deadline extensions show most mines in Tibesti as being around Aouzou; Bardaï; south-west of Goubonne; and in Wour and Yebidou.[2] That said, no survey has been conducted in the province for more than a decade due to insecurity. Mined areas in Borkou are reported to be mainly around Faya-Largeau and Yarda, and in Ennedi West, close to Fada.[3]

The contamination estimate is unchanged from the previous year, as no AP mine clearance was carried out in 2024 and no mined areas were added to the national database.[4] Two minefields discovered in Ennedi East in July 2023, at Nohi and Mounou, still require survey to determine their size and be added to the national database.[5] These were reported by the Sub-Prefect of Itou to the HCND as it was conducting battle area clearance (BAC) in Ennedi West.[6]

During the 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request process, inconsistencies were noted between the reported number and size of hazardous areas in Chad's official submissions to the Convention. Chad clarified these figures at the June 2025 Intersessional Meetings and in its draft Article 7 report (covering 2024), which are now consistent with data provided to Mine Action Review.

In its successive statements at meetings of States Parties, Chad raised the issue of the Wadi Doum minefield (in Ennedi West) which alone covers 16.4km$^2$,[7] where the fence has gaps and accidents are recorded each year, including one involving a child in November 2024.[8] Using drones, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) detected vehicle tracks indicating attempts to dig up mines and informed the authorities during the PRODECO period. These are believed to be less likely non-State armed groups (NSAGs) using them in the sub-region to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and more likely individuals seeking explosive charges for gold extraction.[9]

**Table 1: Mined area (both AP and AV mines) by Province (at end 2024)**[10]

| Province | CHAs | Area (m²)* | SHAs | Area (m²)* | Total area (m²)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Borkou | 9 | 13,491,891 | 8 | 2,266,963 | 15,758,854 |
| Ennedi East and West | 11 | 18,220,266 | 2 | 361,798 | 18,582,064 |
| Tibesti | 51 | 24,224,623 | 38 | 19,049,801 | 43,274,425 |
| **Totals** | **71** | **55,936,781** | **48** | **21,678,562** | **77,615,343** |

*Figures rounded to the nearest square metre.

1 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
2 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Annex 9, p. 54.
3 Ibid., Annex 5, p. 50 (Borkou) and Annex 7, p. 52 (Ennedi West).
4 Draft APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2024); and Statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17-20 June 2025.
5 Statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18-20 June 2024.
6 Email from Soultani Moussa, Director of Operations and Logistics, HCND, 3 September 2025.
7 Presentation of Chad, Individualised Approach side event, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2022; and 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Annex 4a, p. 44.
8 Statements of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024 and 17–20 June 2025; and Draft Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.
9 Remote interview with Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, and Seydou Gaye, Global Land Release Specialist, HI, 17 march 2025.
10 Draft Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 2; and Statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17-20 June 2025.

Chad's explosive ordnance contamination dates back to the conflict with Libya in 1987–88 that affected the former Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region—now split into four provinces—and which covers more than one quarter of the country's total surface area.[11]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Chad is significantly contaminated by ERW throughout its northern provinces of Borkou, Ennedi East and West, and Tibesti, as well as in the east, notably along the border with Sudan.[12] Clashes between armed groups and the army in 2021 which resulted in the death of President Idriss Déby left thousands of items of UXO that the national clearance capacity partially cleared in 2022 and 2023.[13] At the end of 2023, Chad had 178km$^2$ of recorded battle area, but a single CHA in Kanem province comprised 177km$^2$ of this.[14] These figures remained unchanged in 2024, with only limited BAC conducted in Hadjer-Lamis.[15] Chad's work plan submitted in its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request indicated that three ERW-contaminated areas are prioritised for NTS – one in Kanem North, another in Ouaddaï, and the third in Salamat province.[16]

The northern province of Tibesti is the last area suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants (CMR). In 2024, Chad was granted a second interim deadline extension to its Article 4 clearance obligation under the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). The new deadline of 1 October 2026 is intended to allow NTS to take place in Tibesti and any requisite clearance to be planned. (See Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Chad for further information.)

Chad stated in February 2024 at a regional conference in Ghana that it is also confronted with an increasing threat from IEDs emplaced by NSAGs. Most of the incidents involve devices that are remotely activated and which are therefore not covered by the APMBC.[17] In March 2024, an explosive device killed seven Chadian soldiers during a patrol in the west of the country, near Lac province.[18] Another similar incident involving an explosive device reportedly took place in May 2024 injuring three soldiers.[19]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Chad's mine action programme is coordinated by the HCND, which was set up by government decree in 1998 with a mandate to implement a humanitarian programme tackling mines and other explosive ordnance.[20] The Commission, which is under the Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation, is responsible for preparing the national demining strategy, annual work plans, and corresponding budgets, and for implementing the mine action programme.[21] Since 2007, the HCND reports to a Steering Committee which meets twice a year in ordinary session.[22]

In 2017, following an audit commissioned by the Government and conducted by the Ministry of Control and Moralisation, a decree ordered a restructuring of the HCND, reducing the number of personnel by more than half – from 744 to 329. This drastic downsizing and the non-payment of salaries for the reduced workforce led to a long-term strike by Tibesti deminers starting in 2018, which prevented planned survey and clearance in the province during the PRODECO project.[23]

At the end of 2024, the HCND numbered 419 staff.[24] Headquartered in N'Djamena, the HCND was reorganised in 2019 into four departments: Operations and Logistics; Planning, Monitoring, and Victim Assistance; Administration and Finance; and Human Resources and Training.[25] In 2024, it maintained four provincial offices in Bardaï (Tibesti province), Faya-Largeau (Borkou province), Fada (Ennedi West province), and Abéché (Ouaddaï province), as well as one sub-provincial office in Amtiman (Salamat province). The HCND informed Mine Action Review that a new organisational chart for the Commission was pending approval from the Ministry in 2025. This new chart does not include the three offices that remained non-operational in 2024: Bol (Lac province), Amdjarass (Ennedi East province), and the sub-office in Zouar (Tibesti province).[26]

In 2022–23, the HCND focused on BAC in the aftermath of the 2021 clashes.[27] In 2024, the HCND deployed seven teams, comprising 49 personnel, to conduct risk education and respond to emergencies following two major incidents.[28]

11 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.
12 Statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18-20 June 2024.
13 Presentation by Chad on Article 4, CCM Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 11–14 September 2023, p. 10.
14 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 15 August 2024.
15 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 11 June 2025.
16 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 36 and 37.
17 Presentation by Chad, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024, p. 7.
18 Africanews and Associated Press, "Tchad: au moins 7 soldats tués par un engin explosif", *Africanews*, 26 March 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4aQ8Vvz.
19 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 7 June 2024.
20 2024 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.
21 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11 and 12.
22 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 11 June 2025.
23 Email from Romain Coupez, Country Director, MAG, 4 March 2019; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 9.
24 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.
25 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.
26 Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April and 11 June 2025.
27 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), p. 4; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3.
28 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

The first was the explosion of the General Directorate of the Strategic Reserve (DGRS) military ammunition storage facility on the night of 18 June, in a northern N'Djamena neighbourhood. According to the HCND, the blast resulted in two fatalities and 38 injured, with its Victim Assistance department conducting investigations and visiting victims in hospital.[29] Clearance operations were undertaken by three HCND teams over a period of several weeks.[30] The second response involved a short-term deployment of three EOD teams to the provinces of Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti following severe flooding that hit the country in the second half of 2024.[31]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Mine action in Chad has been consistently hampered by a lack of funding. Government financial support has long been limited to payment of staff salaries and some administrative costs. In 2024, the government allocated 873,420,000 CFA francs (approximately US$1.45 million) to the HCND, consistent with the previous year (and the planned funding outlined in its 2024 extension request). The annual subsidy was intended to cover staff salaries and running costs, with limited support for operations.[32]

In its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, Chad said it will continue to contribute financially to the programme for the payment of salaries, operating costs, and limited clearance, but that it needs international technical and operational support to address its AP mine contamination. It estimated funding needs at more than US$52 million through the end of 2029.[33] The €23 million PRODECO project, funded by the European Union between 2017 and 2021, enabled the cancellation, reduction, and clearance of part of the contamination. Since then, international donors have not been contributing to Chad's mine action programme, with the exception of France that supported a joint Mines Advisory Group (MAG)–HCND project from October 2023 to September 2024 with €500,000 in funding. The project involved BAC, spot-task EOD, and explosive ordnance risk education in western provinces, focusing on ERW and IEDs, but not addressing conventional AP mined areas. Chad had also been supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), primarily for risk education in the provinces of Lac-Chad and Hadjar-Lamis.[34]

At the 27th UN National Directors Meeting in Geneva in 2024, Chad said it had renewed contact with several donors, including Japan, Norway, and the United States.[35] During the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2024, France made a statement in support of Chad's resource mobilisation efforts and regretted being the sole donor at the time.[36] At the June 2025 Intersessional Meetings, Chad reported that no donor support had yet been secured.[37]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Chad's national plans make no reference to gender and inclusion. Chad's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request and Article 7 report covering 2024 fail to address gender. The HCND employed 16 women in its total of 419 staff at the end of 2024, representing less than 4% of the workforce (see Table 2). Among them are the deputy director of finance, while several women serve as managers and assistants in administrative departments.[38] Chad had one EOD Level 3 expert.[39]

**Table 2: Composition of operators by gender (at end 2024)**[40]

| Operator | Staff employed | Women staff | Managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HCND | 419 | 16 (4%) | 16 | 8 (50%) | *15 | 1 (7%) |
| MAG | 27 | 5 (19%) | 7 | 1 (14%) | 12 | 1 (8%) |
| **Totals** | **446** | **21 (7%)** | **23** | **9 (39%)** | **27** | **2 (7%)** |

*The 15 members are personnel holding operational positions and do not include deminers or supervisors.

29 "Tchad: un incendie dans un dépôt de munitions militaires fait plusieurs morts", *Le Monde*, 19 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4krNJkA; and email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 3 September 2025.

30 "Tchad: fin des opérations de déminage après l'incendie", *Le Monde*, 3 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4jf2eHf; and email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

31 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025; "Inondations au Tchad: au moins 487 décès et des moyens très insuffisants pour aider les sinistrés", RFI, 16 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3YUo77E; and "On sait où elles sont mais avec les inondations, tout a changé: au Tchad, la vie entre les mines après la guerre", *Libération*, 4 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/43u7Qrx.

32 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

33 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 38; and statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17-20 June 2025.

34 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8; and statement of Chad, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25-29 November 2024.

35 2024 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

36 Statement of France, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18-20 June 2024.

37 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April and 11 June 2025.

38 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

39 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 7 June 2024.

40 Emails from Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 17 March 2025; and Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April and 3 September 2025.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Chad lacks a policy, national standards, and a designated focal point for environmental management in mine action. It has not reported any specific measures to prevent or mitigate environmental impacts of clearance operations. In 2024, Chad was impacted by massive flooding, prompting the need for emergency clearance. Climatic change is increasing the intensity of such natural hazards, underscoring the need for stronger environmental safeguards.[41]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The HCND maintains an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database (version New Generation, NG-6), which underwent a major clean-up supported by the Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) during the PRODECO project from 2017 to 2021. This process cancelled many duplicate entries, including eight hazardous areas deleted in 2021 alone.[42] Since the project ended, the database has not been updated as no new areas have been discovered, and the HCND considers it still accurate. It is managed by an IMSMA unit chief and a database operator, who received basic training in Senegal in 2024 with support from HI.[43] MAG does not have ready access to the database.[44]

Chad's reporting under the APMBC is uneven, as the information provided is not always comparable over time and can be inconsistent. However, following the extension request process in 2024 and inconsistencies noted by the Analysis Group, Chad clarified information regarding its hazardous areas and the required budget until 2030 during the intersessional meetings in June 2025.[45] Chad submits its Article 7 reports annually and consistently participates in meetings of States Parties. However, as at early September 2025, the Article 7 report covering 2024 was not available online.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

In 2024, Chad prepared a five-year provisional work plan as part of its Article 5 deadline extension request, outlining general goals and approximate timelines for the extension period from 1 January 2025 to 1 January 2030. At the Fifth Review Conference, held from 25 to 29 November 2024 in Siem Reap (Cambodia), the Analysis Group issued several recommendations and observations on Chad's work plan, prompting a revision. Chad presented the general concept at the June 2025 Intersessional Meetings and indicated that a detailed work plan would be submitted at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025.

Chad indicated that the 48 SHAs covering 21.7km$^2$ required NTS to cancel areas. These comprise eight SHAs in Borkou (2.3km$^2$), two in Ennedi East (0.4km$^2$), and 38 in Tibesti (19km$^2$). The 71 CHAs, covering 55.9km$^2$, are to undergo TS, followed by manual or mechanical clearance. The majority (51 CHAs) are in Tibesti. Given the scale of the remaining challenge and the lack of financial support, Chad said it intends to focus efforts in 2025–26 on the provinces of Borkou and Ennedi (East and West), with the final three years exclusively dedicated to Tibesti (see Table 3). At the 2025 Intersessional Meetings, Chad also stated that the government had agreed to fence the Wadi Doum minefield, as incidents continue to decimate the livestock in Ounianga Kébir department.[46] The existing fencing has gaps and requires maintenance.

Chad's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request sets out a total budget of approximately US$63 million for its mine action programme, covering all explosive ordnance contamination (not only AP mines) through the end of 2029. National funding would provide US$11 million of this budget for HCND salaries and running costs, while over US$52 million will be sought from international donors. This includes US$50 million for operations and capacity building; US$1.55 million for risk education and victim assistance; and US$0.3 million for material and equipment.[47]

41 Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 7 June 2024 and 25 April 2025.

42 Emails from Moussa Soultani, HCND, 27 April 2020 and 9 September 2025; and Eugenio Balsini, Programme Manager, FSD, 28 April 2022.

43 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

44 Email from Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 17 March 2025.

45 Statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

46 Ibid.

47 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 38; and statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

**Table 3: Planned mine clearance year on year (2025–29)[48]**

| Years | Sector | SHAs requiring NTS | Area (km²)* | CHAs requiring TS and clearance | Area (km²)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025–26 | Borkou | 8 | 2.26 | 9 | 13.49 |
| 2025–26 | Ennedi (East and West) | 2 | 0.36 | 11 | 18.22 |
| 2027–29 | Tibesti | 38 | 19.05 | 51 | 24.22 |
| **Totals** | | **48** | **21.67** | **71** | **55.93** |

*Figures rounded to the nearest hectare.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Chad's 2024 CCM Article 4 and APMBC Article 5 deadline extension requests state that the country has 22 National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), all aligned with IMAS, and that they are updated annually based on field experience or when new equipment requires revisions to SOPs.[49] However, the last review dates back to the PRODECO project, when FSD completed a three-year revision of 17 NMAS in 2021.[50] The NMAS were intended to be included as Annex 7 to the 2024 extension request, but only eight are listed, and their internet hyperlinks do not work.[51]

Land release methods involve NTS, TS, marking, clearance, quality assurance/quality control, land release, and information management (database, mapping, and reporting).[52] Clearance in Chad can be done either manually (by excavation or using detectors or a magnetic probe) or mechanically. Chad has two clearance machines, both owned by the HCND.[53] The first is an ARMTRAC 100-350, in use since 2014, which has been operated by MAG. The second is a GCS 200 (Ground Compaction System), introduced in 2018, which was used by HI during the PRODECO project.[54]

During the PRODECO project, HCND staff benefited from technical assistance and different trainings took place including on survey; EOD Levels 1, 2, and 3; quality assurance and quality control; drone piloting for survey; and IMSMA.[55] Chad had planned to reassess its training needs and further develop its capacity during the extension period.[56]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Over the course of 2024, the HCND deployed seven teams, comprising a total of 49 personnel. One team was deployed in Kanem and Bahr El-gazal for risk education activities. Three teams were tasked to clear the ammunition storage area following the explosion; and three other teams were deployed in response to the unprecedented torrential rains that struck the far north in the second half of the year. For this operation, the Chadian government allocated emergency funds to the HCND for post-flood disaster response, enabling it to clear roads of AP and AV mines and ERW that had been displaced by floodwaters in Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti.[57]

In the first half of 2024, MAG and the HCND implemented a clearance project in Massaguet, Hadjer-Lamis Province. The project involved BAC, EOD spot tasks, and risk education. However, operations were suspended following the explosion of the ammunition storage area at Goudji on 18 June 2024. In response, the HCND redirected its efforts toward emergency clearance. In the aftermath of the ammunition depot explosion, 40 personnel from the HCND, military engineering units, and the DGRS were seconded to MAG to support ammunition destruction efforts.[58]

Since the conclusion of the PRODECO project, no operator has specifically addressed AP mined areas. The project, with a budget of €23 million, started in 2017 and concluded in April 2022, after a no-cost extension granted due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[59] It was implemented by a consortium of four organizations: HI and MAG conducted survey and clearance operations; FSD provided technical support; and Secours Catholique et Développement (SECADEV) led on victim assistance.[60] HI and FSD concluded their mine action work in Chad with the end of the project. Since 2022, MAG remains the only international clearance operator in the country.[61]

48 Statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

49 2024 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 22.

50 Email from Eugenio Balsini, FSD, 28 April 2022.

51 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 32 and 43.

52 Ibid., p. 22.

53 Presentation by Chad on Article 4, CCM Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 11 to 14 September 2023; 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 23 and 24.

54 Emails from Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 23 May 2025; and Seydou Gaye, HI, 26 May 2025.

55 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

56 Ibid., p. 35.

57 Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April and 3 September 2025.

58 Ibid.

59 Emails from Gérard Kerrien, Country Director, MAG, 4 April 2022; and Eugenio Balsini, FSD, 28 April 2022.

60 EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, "PRODECO: déminage humanitaire, une approche novatrice et participative", 31 January 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3tHBOY5.

61 Email from Matt Wilson, Head of Operations, FSD, 22 May 2024; and online interview with Seydou Gaye, HI, 22 April 2024.

**Table 4: Operational capacities deployed in 2024**[62]

| Provinces | Operator | Teams | Personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N'Djamena, Goudji neighbourhood ("La poudrière ») | HCND | 3 | 21 | Emergency clearance after the ammunition storage area explosion. |
| Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti | HCND | 3 | 21 | Emergency clearance following severe flooding. |
| Nord-Kanem and Bahr El-gazal | HCND | 1 | 7 | Only risk education. |
| **Totals** | | **7** | **49** | |

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Chad reported no release of AP mined areas through survey or clearance in 2024, a decrease from the 1.69km$^2$ reportedly cleared in 2023 in the Kori-Bogodi area of Tibesti province, where 2 AP mines, 2 AV mines, and 205 ERW were destroyed before a security incident halted operations.[63]

With funding from the government, three EOD demining teams were deployed to clear and neutralize hazardous areas in the second half of 2024 along roadways in the provinces of Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti, as part of efforts to secure these routes after heavy rains displaced explosive ordnance onto certain sections. According to Chad's 2025 draft Article 7 report, seven AP mines (type PRB NR-442) were found in Bardaï, along with 24 AV mines (21 in Bardaï and 3 in Faya) and 336 ERW (6 in Bardaï, 235 in Faya, and 95 along 3 routes from Fada town covering 290km), all of which were destroyed.[64]

## DEMINER SAFETY

In August 2023, 11 HCND staff were abducted when conducting clearance at Hadjar-Magdoud site, in the Kori-Bogodi area of Tibesti province. At the end of April 2024, they were released after nine months in captivity.[65]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHAD: 1 NOVEMBER 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (1-YEAR, 2-MONTHS): 1 JANUARY 2011

↓

SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2014

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (6 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2020

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2025

↓

**FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2030**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, Chad is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2030.

The prospects of Chad achieving its Article 5 deadline in the near to medium term are remote. Chad stated at the Intersessional Meetings in Geneva in June 2025 that the various financial appeals have not produced results so far.[66] Chad has not received any international funding for AP mine clearance since the closure of the PRODECO project in 2021.

62 Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April and 3 September 2025; and Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 17 March and 23 May 2025.

63 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3; and emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 7 and 17 June 2024.

64 Draft Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 3; and email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 3 September 2025.

65 Interview with Gen. Brahim Djibrine, Coordinator, and Soultani Moussa, HCND, in Geneva, 30 April 2024; and emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 7 and 17 June 2024.

66 Statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17-20 June 2025.

France supported some BAC and risk education in 2023 and 2024, but not addressing AP mined area. UN agencies (UNDP and UNICEF) funded some risk education projects but not in 2024. Chad says it requires US$52 million in international funding to fulfil its Article 5 obligations.

Even if funding becomes available, Chad's ability to fulfil the plans set out in its extension request will be tested by progress in Tibesti, identified as its most mine-affected province, where access constraints and insecurity have long hindered operations. Tibesti faces several challenges. One concerns former HCND deminers from Tibesti, demobilised during downsizing in 2017–18, whose actions have restricted access for HCND staff from outside the province and for international operators; for example, international operators were unable to operate there during the PRODECO project. Another challenge involves armed groups engaged in gold mining in the Miski area, where HCND deminers were kidnapped in August 2023 and released in April 2024. The extension request plans that Chad will focus on other contaminated provinces in 2025–26 and address Tibesti during the final three years.

Lack of data prevents a precise determination of what Chad was able to release during the PRODECO project. A total of 3.35km$^2$ of AP mined area has been cleared in the last five years according to official data (see Table 5). In its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, however, Chad indicated that the figure was 5.25km$^2$, a claim that Mine Action Review could not reconcile with available data. In the process, operators destroyed only 58 AP mines as well as several AV mines and a number of cluster munition remnants and other items of UXO.[67]

**Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**[68]

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 0 |
| 2023 | 1.69 |
| 2022 | *0 |
| 2021 | 1.45 |
| 2020 | 0.21 |
| **Total** | **3.35** |

*Chad Article 7 report covering 2022 indicated BAC with no AP mines destroyed.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The new HCND organisational chart, currently under validation, includes a multi-task rapid response unit ("Unité d'Intervention Polyvalente") designed to respond to explosive ordnance incidents and address all residual contamination in towns and extended urban areas.[69] There is no active planning for the management of residual contamination.

67 "*Clearing the Mines 2021*"report; and "*Clearing the Mines 2021*"report on Chad.

68 Article 7 reports (covering 2021, 2022, and 2023); Draft Article 7 report (covering 2024); and *Clearing the Mines 2021* report for Chad.

69 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

# COLOMBIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025

Not on track to meet deadline
Five-year interim extension to 31 December 2030 requested

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 20KM²

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024* (m²) | Release in 2023* (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 1,398,340 | 1,731,607 |
| Technical Survey | 113 | 145,335 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 75,044 | 6,502 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 193 (incl. 11 during spot tasks) | 231 (incl. 27 during spot tasks)*** |

*Based on Article 7 report data. **Based on OCCP-AICMA Group data. ***The number of AP mines destroyed in 2023 was previously recorded in last year's report as 148, but has been adjusted to reflect the revised figures provided by Colombia in September 2024, after data verification.

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado Humanitario (BRDEH)
- Batallón de Desminado e Ingenieros Anfibios (BDIAN)
- Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM)
- Corporación HUMANICEMOS DH (HUMANICEMOS DH)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, the use of munitions surged in Colombia, with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reporting an 89% increase in casualties from explosive ordnance, including remotely activated devices, compared to 2023. The security and humanitarian situation deteriorated significantly as armed groups fragmented, territorial disputes intensified, and hostilities with national security forces resumed following the end of several ceasefires. In response, the humanitarian mine action sector sought to adapt by adopting a new national standard based on a rapid-response approach to risk reduction (known as 4R), which is designed to facilitate operations in high-risk areas. According to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), survey and clearance outputs declined slightly in 2024 compared to the previous year.

Colombia prepared and submitted a new Article 5 deadline extension request for 2026 to the end of 2030, which was due to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties (22MSP) in December 2025. The request, an interim one, recognised that Colombia will not meet its Article 5 obligations within the five-year extension period. It was accompanied by a detailed intermediate Operations Plan for 2025–27. The extension request showcased efforts by the NMAA to improve baseline contamination data, including municipalities with suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) whose size remains undetermined due to insecurity and lack of access. Colombia also informed States Parties that some municipalities have experienced new mine laying, including areas previously declared mine-free.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The demining sector should continue exploring strategies to reduce the amount of land cleared found to have no landmine contamination. Given that half of all mined areas cleared in 2024 were found to contain no AP mines, further discussion on this long-standing issue is urgently needed. In particular, the potential for technical survey (TS) to confirm contamination could be revisited.**
- **Colombia should ensure continuity of the Knowledge Management Platform established in 2024 as a means to unify the mine action sector and mainstream successes. It should also consider establishing a National Mine Action Platform to serve as a biannual forum for collective dialogue among all stakeholders—including donors and government branches—to monitor progress in Article 5 implementation.**
- **Colombia should ensure thorough evaluation of the recently adopted 4R approach. If successful, this approach could serve as a useful model for States Parties that face mine contamination during active armed conflicts and need to conduct operations in environments with unstable humanitarian access.**
- **Colombia needs a robust resource mobilisation plan to address anticipated funding cuts to demining in 2025 and navigate an increasingly competitive global funding landscape.**
- **Colombia should adopt national mine action standards (NMAS) on gender and diversity, as well as on environmental protection, in conformity with the revised International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13.**
- **Colombia should continue working to assume full responsibility for its Quality Management (QM) system, which is being transitioned from the Organization of American States (OAS) Comprehensive Mine Action Programme (OAS-AICMA) and scheduled for completion by the end of 2026.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | While a nationwide survey remains unfeasible, the NMAA established a new baseline for AP mine contamination as part of its interim Article 5 deadline extension request. Municipalities were categorised in three groups: those with known baseline contamination identified through non-technical survey; those with suspected but unconfirmed contamination where insecurity prevents access; and those previously declared mine-free, where new contamination has been detected. By the end of 2024, 935 municipalities (83%) were declared mine-free, while 17% remain contaminated, with 84 municipalities receiving a mine action response and 102 awaiting an intervention. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | There is strong national ownership, with overall responsibility for the mine action programme sitting with the Counselling Office Commissioned for Peace (OCCP), which was renamed from the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP) in April 2024. In March 2024, Nathalie Ochoa Niño was appointed head of the OCCP-AICMA Group, bringing fresh momentum and leadership in the sector before stepping down in March 2025. OAS-AICMA qualified the national authority's 2024 efforts as "unprecedented" and a "significant and extraordinary step toward national ownership". To further support technical dialogue among demining operators, a Knowledge Management Platform was launched with eight dedicated working groups. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | While Colombia does not have a dedicated gender and diversity policy or action plan for mine action, gender and identity have been integrated as a cross-cutting elements in the 2023–2025 Operations Plan, aligned with the 2022–2026 National Development Plan. Colombia continues to have one of the highest rates of women's participation in the global mine action sector. All civilian demining operators have gender focal points, though their structure and responsibilities vary. Survey and community liaison teams across all operators include representatives from ethnic and minority groups to promote inclusivity and strengthen community trust. The Knowledge Management Platform, established in 2024, includes a technical group dedicated to cross-cutting approaches including gender and ethnicity, with the goal of promoting practical, inclusive approaches that address inequalities and reflect the diverse identities of affected populations. |

**Assessment of National Programme Performance Continued**

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Colombia does not have a specific NMAS on environmental management in mine action. A 2017 presidential decree remains in force, outlining the environmental measures that operators must follow when demining in national parks and other ecologically sensitive areas. All operators have standard operating procedures addressing environmental concerns, and in 2024, both national civilian operators (CCCM and HUMANICEMOS DH) adopted detailed environmental and climate policies. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 6 | The NMAA worked with demining operators to improve the accuracy of "event" records in its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) in 2024. These included field investigations and verification processes to ensure the database more accurately reflects the current contamination. The 2025–27 operations plan in Colombia's Article 5 deadline extension request outlines the transition from the current IMSMA system to IMSMA Core. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 6 | As part of its Article 5 deadline extension request for 2026–30, Colombia introduced a new operations plan for 2025–27. In 2024, Colombia also made significant changes to its prioritisation process for tackling AP mined area as well as on the allocation of municipalities among demining operators. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | In 2024, the AICMA-OCCP Group adopted the "National Standard for Humanitarian Demining in Areas with Security Instability and Response to Specific Incidents." Aligned with IMAS, this new standard equips the State and operators with technical and operational tools to conduct mine action operations in high-risk, unstable areas, enhancing Colombia's response capacity in complex contexts. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | While Colombia met its clearance targets during the current extension period, it acknowledged that large mined areas remain, with their full extent still undetermined. Colombia will not meet its 31 December 2025 clearance deadline and has submitted a third interim extension request, seeking a new deadline of the end of 2030. Despite operating one of the world's largest demining programmes, progress remains slow—particularly in remote and conflict-affected areas—while funding continues to decline. |
| **Average Score** | **6.9** | **6.7** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- OCCP-AICMA: Colombia's Comprehensive Action Against Anti-Personnel Mines (Acción Integral contra las Minas Antipersonal, AICMA) under the Counselling Office Commissioned for Peace (Oficina Consejería Comisionada de Paz, OCCP)
- Intercollegiate Humanitarian Demining Body (Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario (IIDH)
- Intersectorial National Mine Action Commission (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal (CINAMAP)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado Humanitario (BRDEH)
- Batallón de Desminado e Ingenieros Anfibios (BDIAN)
- Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM)
- Corporación HUMANICEMOS DH (HUMANICEMOS DH)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Organization of American States (OAS) Comprehensive Mine Action Program (OAS-AICMA)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of AP mined area in Colombia remains unknown, and current estimates based on survey data are only partial. The NMAA and international operators agree that the dynamics and complexities of the Colombian conflict, the size of the country, and remoteness of many of the mined areas preclude the conduct of a nationwide baseline survey.[1] In its latest Article 5 deadline extension request, Colombia stressed that establishing a comprehensive baseline of AP mine contamination is a major challenge, as ongoing conflict, the presence of multiple non-State armed groups (NSAGs), the lack of reliable data on the type and location of devices, access restrictions to remote or insecure areas, combined with the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by NSAGs without technical patterns or formal records, all hinder the development of a reliable, up-to-date baseline.[2]

Nonetheless, during the preparation of its 2025 extension request, the NMAA made a notable effort to scope municipalities with AP contamination, divided into three groups:

- municipalities with suspected or confirmed contamination identified and marked through non-technical survey (NTS), the "known baseline contamination";
- municipalities with suspected contamination but no confirmed areas, where insecurity and access constraints prevent survey;
- municipalities previously declared mine-free where new evidence of contamination has emerged.

The first group, the "known baseline contamination", was estimated to cover just over 3km$^2$ at the end of 2024, down from 4.47km$^2$ in 2023. It includes 1.35km$^2$ of SHA across 281 areas and 1.71km$^2$ of confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) across 214 areas, as shown in Table 1 below.[3] This baseline contamination covers 495 hazardous areas across 54 accessible municipalities in 12 departments, where survey made it possible to determine the size of the contaminated areas. Colombia's extension request sets a target of clearing those 3km$^2$ by the end of 2027, contingent on operational conditions and current and projected capacity.[4]

**Table 1: Known baseline AP mined area by department (at end 2024) (Article 7 report data)[5]**

| Department | Affected municipalities | CHAs | CHA (m²)* | SHAs | SHA (m²)* | Total area (m²)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Antioquia | 17 | 45 | 225,905 | 19 | 74,174 | 300,079 |
| Bolívar | 4 | 7 | 30,995 | 11 | 69,553 | 100,548 |
| Caldas | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 9,287 | 9,287 |
| Caquetá | 5 | 18 | 93,408 | 29 | 360,398 | 453,806 |
| Cauca | 1 | 3 | 19,674 | 0 | 0 | 19,674 |
| Huila | 1 | 4 | 239,288 | 9 | 145,016 | 384,304 |
| Meta | 8 | 67 | 775,285 | 19 | 128,071 | 903,356 |
| Putumayo | 7 | 50 | 92,015 | 168 | 345,800 | 437,814 |
| Santander | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 17,275 | 17,275 |
| Tolima | 3 | 6 | 148,722 | 8 | 122,334 | 271,056 |
| Valle del Cauca | 3 | 11 | 81,627 | 7 | 74,325 | 155,952 |
| Vichada | 1 | 3 | 1,902 | 4 | 3,820 | 5,722 |
| **Totals** | **54** | **214** | **1,708,821** | **281** | **1,350,053** | **3,058,873** |

*Figures rounded to the nearest square metre.

The second group corresponds to 102 identified municipalities with SHAs whose extent remains undetermined due to insecurity and lack of access. Colombia's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request acknowledged the existence of extensive hazardous areas not included in the known baseline contamination. These municipalities were identified based on several factors, including recorded "events" and accidents (2022–24), military demining, impacts on educational facilities, early warning alerts, population return plans, and the presence of NSAGs.[6] The vast majority of these 102 municipalities are located in territories with ethnic minorities, particularly in indigenous reserves (resguardos) along the borders with Brazil and Peru, and in Afro-Colombian community councils (Consejos Comunitarios) along the Pacific coast.[7]

The third group consists of municipalities experiencing new instances of mine contamination, including some previously declared mine-free. However, in the absence of

1 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, Project and Monitoring Coordinator, CCCM, 5 May 2025; Oliver Ford, Programme Manager Colombia, HALO, 10 May 2025; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, Colombia Country Director, HI, 15 April 2025.

2 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 July 2025, p. 33.

3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 24–28.; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 July 2025, pp. 30–32.

4 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 32.

5 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 24–28.

6 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 33–35.

7 Ibid., illustration 6, p. 37.

a standardised national methodology to rigorously verify and assess the existence of this new contamination, these municipalities have not been officially re-categorised.[8]

Colombia has a total of 1,121 municipalities. Of these, 935 (83.4%) are classified as mine-free, 84 (7.5%) are currently under intervention, and 102 (9.1%) are awaiting intervention.[9] The mine-free municipalities largely correspond to areas that were accessible and easier to address. As a result, most of the remaining contamination is now concentrated in regions affected by insecurity linked to the presence of NSAGs, including volatile border areas with Venezuela and Ecuador.[10] Several of the 935 municipalities classified as mine-free have since reported new contamination, suggesting this figure may decrease in 2025.

In May 2024, a National Standard for Humanitarian Demining in Areas with Security Instability and for the Response to Specific Incidents was issued. This standard provides guidance on assigning demining tasks in those unstable areas, offering an alternative approach to operate in regions with security challenges and to address incidents as they arise. Under this framework, parts of the 102 municipalities pending intervention may be addressed through punctual interventions.[11] The new standard removes the requirement for both full territorial release and a military-issued security assessment. It enables interventions in specific, high-priority locations that pose an immediate risk to community safety—such as roads, water sources, schools, or gathering places—based on a "favourable" assessment issued by local authorities and the affected communities.[12]

In Colombia, AP mines are predominantly of an improvised nature, with NSAGs making the devices with locally available materials, and adapting them to local conditions, including the particularities of the terrain. Devices typically employ homemade explosives—such as ANFO, pentolite, RDX, or TNT—encased in repurposed plastic containers and are triggered using pressure- or tension-sensitive mechanisms. As a result, they are difficult to detect and their deployment is not in consistent patterns. This contamination is commonly found in areas linked to illicit economies, including drug trafficking and illegal mining. In line with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Colombia treats improvised mines as it would conventionally produced mines, ensuring "full compliance with the Convention's principles and obligations".[13]

According to the authorities, the continued use of AP mines by armed groups is a consequence of the ongoing reconfiguration of Colombia's armed conflict following the 2016 Peace Agreement. As long as territorial control remains a key objective and underlying factors such as illegal mining and drug trafficking persist, landmine use is expected to continue. Notably, some armed groups that had not previously relied on landmines have now adopted them to secure strategic corridors.[14]

In 2024, civilians accounted for more than 60% of all victims, while the security forces comprised the remainder. Of particular concern is the increase in child casualties: the proportion of victims who are children and adolescents rose from 12% to 23% during the same period.[15] In 2024, mines killed or injured 108 people of whom 66 – almost two thirds – were civilian, indicating that considerable use was indiscriminate.[16] For the first time in eight years, casualties from explosive ordnance were also reported in Amazonas, signalling the spread of contamination to new areas.[17]

## NEW CONTAMINATION

Colombia is also experiencing new instances of mine contamination, including in some municipalities previously declared mine-free, although no official record has been shared. Colombia indicated plan to develop a methodology to validate field data and, based on the evidence, reclassify municipalities in line with demining standards.[18] Operators reported discovering previously unrecorded AP mine contamination in 2024 (149 discovered areas covering 238,356m$^2$, see Table 9).[19] The HALO Trust (HALO) noted that many newly identified areas likely include both recently laid landmines (within the last two to three years) and older, legacy contamination (over five years old in post-conflict zones). This marks a major shift from previous years when HALO mostly marked legacy areas. Going forward, HALO will ensure that only areas without strategic value to NSAGs are marked and cleared, working closely with communities to safeguard its neutrality.[20]

## OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Colombia is also contaminated with ERW, although the threat posed to communities is significantly less than that from landmines.

8 Ibid., p. 28.

9 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 22; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, illustration 4, p. 29.

10 Emails from Nathalie Ochoa Niño, Coordinator, OCCP-AICMA Group, 11 October 2024; and Oliver Ford, HALO, 12 August 2025.

11 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 23.

12 Email from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025.

13 Ibid., p. 34.

14 Online interview with Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025.

15 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

16 Of particular concern was the increase in child casualties – the proportion rose from 12 per cent in 2023 to 23 per cent of the total in 2024. Article 7 Report (covering 2024), https://bit.ly/44zFjSD, p. 63; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 5 June 2025, http://bit.ly/4mybAk7, p. 4.

17 ICRC, "Humanitarian Challenges 2025, Colombia", April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3GOMuxF, p. 5.

18 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 28–29.

19 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; Paula Ximena Cadena, Peacebuilding and Humanitarian Disarmament Programme Coordinator, DRC Colombia, 8 April 2025; Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025.

20 Email from Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025.

# NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

## INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Since August 2022, the Colombian government has adopted what it calls a "Total Peace" agenda. As part of this approach, Presidential Decree 2647 issued in December 2022 restructured the Presidential Office and institutionalised the role in mine action of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, OACP), assigning it responsibility for leading Colombia's AICMA programme.[21] Mine action had already been formally integrated into the Total Peace agenda through Law 2272 of 4 November 2022. Article 16 of the law mandates prioritisation of territorial and national demining plans and requires cooperation from armed groups to identify and clear contaminated areas. The law also extended Article 9 of Law 1421 of 2010, which allows civilian organisations to continue demining in Colombia for an additional four years.[22]

Within the OACP, AICMA became one of three official working groups. A new High Commissioner for Peace was appointed in December 2023, and a new head of the AICMA Group, Nathalie Ochoa Niño, took up her post in March 2024. In April 2024, responsibility for mine action was transferred to the Counselling Office Commissioned for Peace (Oficina del Consejero Comisionado de Paz, OCCP), following the re-structure of the OACP.[23] OCCP continue to oversee the planning, regulation, and supervision of demining, in coordination with the other institutions that make up the Inter-Institutional Humanitarian Demining Body (IIDH). It also leads efforts in risk education, victim assistance, and post-clearance activities.[24]

In 2024, the government drafted a decree to establish the Directorate for Comprehensive Action Against Anti-Personnel Mines (Dirección De Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, DAICMA) as a dedicated unit within the Office of the President. This measure aims to institutionalise and strengthen the work previously conducted by the OCCP-AICMA Group, granting it the status of a directorate with greater technical capacity, operational autonomy, and political visibility. The new DAICMA will lead the coordination and monitoring of the mine action public policy across all pillars.[25]

The IIDH, which was created in 2011, brings together representatives from the Ministry of National Defence, the General Inspectorate of the Military Forces, and OCCP-AICMA Group. It is responsible for recommending or suspending the certification of demining organisations to the Ministry of National Defence as well as for prioritising, at national level, areas, zones, and municipalities to be demined and then assigning specific demining tasks. Responsibility for drafting and adopting NMAS and overseeing their dissemination, implementation, and compliance had been already reassigned to the OACP under Presidential Decree 1784 of 2019.[26] The OACP (now OCCP) also serve as the Technical Secretariat of the National Intersectoral Commission for Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP).[27] In 2024, Colombia drafted a decree to update CINAMAP's regulatory framework to enhance its coordination, decision-making, and operational efficiency.[28]

In August 2025, Mauricio Silva was appointed as the new Coordinator of the AICMA Group of the OCCP, following the resignation of Nathalie Ochoa Niño earlier in the year. He brings more than 20 years of mine action experience with organisations such as HALO Trust, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), and the Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM). Most recently, he directed the External Monitoring Component of the OAS in Colombia.[29]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Colombia had estimated the total cost of the mine action programme for 2020–25 would be almost US$250 million, with 30% covered by the government and the remainder expected from international community. Of this, approximately US$183 million was allocated specifically for demining, including US$55 million from the Ministry of National Defence to support the Army's humanitarian demining brigades.[30] To cover the remaining costs, Colombia sought nearly US$128 million in international support for the strengthening of QM capacity within the national authority, supporting civilian operators, and maintaining or replacing military demining equipment.[31] Colombia reported receiving a total of US$242 million in international funding between 2021 and 2024, well above the initial requirements. This support enabled a substantial increase in clearance outputs, with 8.66km$^2$ cleared compared to the 3.33km$^2$ originally planned.[32] However, it was noted that international funding for mine action has sharply declined – from nearly US$150 million in 2021 to just US$37.5 million in 2023.[33] Colombia reported a reduced budget of US$1.6 million in 2024. However, this figure may not fully reflect the resources allocated, as most contracts are multi-year and operators have reported higher budgeted amounts.

21 Art. 23(17)–(18), Presidential Decree 2647, 30 December 2022, at: https://bit.ly/4nGTSvA.
22 Art. 16, Law 2272, 4 November 2022, at: https://bit.ly/4lnlRhc.
23 Arts. 1 and 4, Presidential Decree 438, 5 April 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/2pcf88zh. This transformed the OACP into the OCCP.
24 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 12.
25 Ibid., p. 5.
26 OACP-AICMA Group "Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario – IIDH", undated but accessed 10 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4kEGwgM.
27 Art. 23(17)–(18), Presidential Decree 2647, 30 December 2022.
28 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.
29 Email from Mauricio Silva, Coordinator, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.
30 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 86–87.
31 Ibid; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), pp. 94–95.
32 Email from Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.
33 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, illustration 10, p. 51.

In 2024, Colombia allocated COP 6.04 billion (approx. US$1.57 million) to the AICMA-OCCP Group, along with COP182.9 million (US$47,561) from the national budget to support the Army's Humanitarian Demining Engineers Brigade (BRDEH).[34] An additional COP2.25 billion (approximately US$510,320) was allocated to strengthen mine risk prevention in ethnic communities.[35] In terms of international cooperation, Colombia secured US$2.5 million from the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Peace in 2024 to support AICMA initiatives. Despite a range of efforts to diversify funding, financial sustainability remains a major challenge due to reliance on international funding. This vulnerability is exacerbated by Colombia's reclassification as an upper-middle-income country, shrinking global post-pandemic funding, and shifting donor focus to other geopolitical crises.[36]

In January 2025, the US government funding suspension significantly reduced mine action capacity in Colombia, with some organisations reducing operations, such as DRC who stopped intervening in the departments of Bolivar and Caquetá, and others such as HALO, temporarily losing up to two-thirds of clearance teams and half of NTS teams. The suspension was lifted, or partially lifted, in March for certain organisations (HALO, HI, and the CCCM) allowing gradual recovery through careful management of remaining US funds and support from other donors. Funding levels for 2025 and beyond are still to be confirmed, though the US State Department indicated being committed to supporting demining efforts in Colombia. Operators across the sector are pursuing funding from new donors, including through the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund. Additional efforts focus on innovative financing through private and corporate foundations.[37] The OAS AICMA programme, which supports Colombia's mine action efforts, was also required to suspend its quality control operations in the country as of January 2025, with the US as its largest donor. The programme expected only limited capacity to gradually resume activities between June and July 2025 at best.[38]

As of August 2025, the funding situation for operators was as follows. CCCM's suspension was lifted for two projects in March, while two others ended during the suspension and were terminated. One of the projects concluded on 31 May, leaving CCCM with a single active project, which has received a cost-extension and expanded geographical coverage to sustain operations.[39] DRC halted its programmes in Caquetá (three municipalities) and Bolívar (four municipalities), but continues mine action in Tumaco, Nariño, with funding from the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund.[40] HALO was notified in July that it will continue to receive US support, though funds were to be available only in the 2025/26 fiscal year.[41] HI reported returning to full capacity, with funding secured until August 2026.[42] OAS-AICMA continued to support the Colombian Army's Battalion of Humanitarian Demining Engineers (BDIAN) through logistical and operational assistance, while also working closely with the government to plan an efficient and timely transfer of quality management responsibilities.[43]

## NATIONAL PLATFORM AND COORDINATION

Colombia has not formally established a National Mine Action Platform to convene all stakeholders, as recommended in Action #42 of the Siem Reap–Angkor Action Plan under the APMBC. However, coordination mechanisms are in place, particularly among humanitarian demining organisations and the national authority. Operators noted that the sector now meets more frequently than it has in years.[44]

In 2024, the OCCP-AICMA Group brought together demining organisations to address key issues and seek to strengthen coordination among stakeholders. Discussions covered the development of the National Standard for Humanitarian Demining in Areas with Security Instability and Response to Specific Events (approved on 6 May 2024); tasks assignment and expressions of interest for operations in high-risk areas; presentation of the 2024 sector Operations Plan by OCCP-AICMA (serving as a management roadmap); and participation in the Knowledge Management Platform.[45] Organisations were also brought together to discuss the new extension request. In addition, director's meetings were held to ensure strategic and operational alignment.[46]

The launch of the Knowledge Management Platform stands out as a significant achievement in 2024. Designed to foster multi-stakeholder dialogue, it promotes the exchange of knowledge and best practices—potentially driving future innovation—on the following eight themes:[47] operational efficiency; explosive ordnance recognition; impact assessment methodology; local capacity development and localisation; methodology for measuring community impact; mine action cross-cutting approaches; technology and innovation; and the environment.

34 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 74.

35 Ibid., p. 55.

36 Ibid., p. 74.

37 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 26 August 2025; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC Colombia, 22 August 2025; Oliver Ford, HALO, 12 August 2025; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 25 August 2025.

38 Email from Lina Maria Castillo, Department of Public Security, OAS, 23 September 2025.

39 Email from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 26 August 2025.

40 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 22 August 2025.

41 Email from Oliver Ford, HALO, 12 August 2025.

42 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 25 August 2025.

43 Email from Lina Maria Castillo, Department of Public Security, OAS, 23 September 2025.

44 Email from Steven Griner, Director, Department of Public Security (DPS), OAS, 4 October 2024.

45 Email from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025.

46 Email from Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

47 Email from Diana Marisol Peñalosa, Advisor, OACP-AICMA Group, 17 September 2024.

For each topic, a dedicated Working Group was established, most often led by operators from the sector. These groups were tasked with leading technical discussions on their respective topics. Each Working Group included one or more OCCP focal points, whose role was to support the discussions and facilitate decision-making.[48] OAS-AICMA played a leading role in designing and implementing the overall methodology behind the Platform's structure and outputs.[49] By the end of 2024, each Working Group had produced a summary report, which contributed to the development of Colombia's Article 5 deadline extension request and operations plan for 2025–27. Action points for 2025 were agreed upon during a final meeting. Since the 2025 leadership change at the NMAA, the platform has not been reconvened as at July 2025.[50]

The revised extension request, submitted on 31 July 2025, stated that the NMAA will work to maintain and strengthen the platform from 2025 to 2030, consolidating it as a sector-wide mechanism to enhance the impact, efficiency, and sustainability of operations. Its sustainability, however, will depend on the capacity and willingness of demining organisations to dedicate time, effort, and resources, and could be undermined by budgetary or logistical constraints. Colombia reaffirmed its commitment to the platform as an integral part of its Article 5 strategy, positioning it as a tool for technical governance, sector collaboration, and inter-institutional coordination.[51]

To improve coordination with national and international partners, the AICMA Group was considering establishing a formal and regular dialogue platform in 2025.[52] HALO continues to advocate for a more effective strategic-level dialogue between the OCCP-AICMA Group and its partners. Operators note that coordination efforts remain largely bilateral, either between operators and the NMAA or among operators within the Mine Action Area of Responsibility, and often without the involvement of the Demining Brigade and only occasional participation from the NMAA. Some donors, such as Norway and Switzerland, also convene joint meetings with the operators they fund.[53]

Colombia's 2025 extension request explained that inter-institutional coordination has been reinforced through established platforms such as the National Intersectoral Commission for Mine Action (CINAMAP), technical sub-commissions, thematic roundtables, and territorial committees. These bring together ministries, oversight bodies, international cooperation agencies, and civil society organisations, enabling mine action to align with key national programmes such as the Development Programmes with a Territorial Approach (PDET), the National Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS), and sectoral policies in inclusion, health, education, and rural development. To further this integration, the AICMA Group has designed an inter-institutional management strategy that links mine action with Colombia's stabilization, development, and peacebuilding goals. The strategy also promotes the "Triple Nexus" approach—peace, humanitarian action, and development—recognising mine action as an enabling activity for territorial transformation.[54]

## CAPACITY SUPPORT

The OAS provides technical and capacity support to OCCP-AICMA for humanitarian demining, through its AICMA programme (OAS-AICMA). It is responsible for external monitoring of all accredited humanitarian demining organisations in Colombia, including HUMANICEMOS DH. It also assesses demining personnel for accreditation, with additional support provided by the Group of Interamerican Monitors of the Interamerican Defense Board. In addition, OAS-AICMA monitors compliance with NMAS and operator standard operating procedures (SOPs) and inspects released land before handover to local authorities and communities.[55]

Since 2023, OAS-AICMA, under the Department of Public Security, has been working to gradually transfer responsibilities from its External Monitoring Component (CEM) to Colombian authorities. This process included refining the CEM's operational model and convening a joint data analysis workshop with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[56] In 2024, efforts focused on strengthening national ownership of monitoring and quality assurance (QA) components within the two national civilian organisations.[57]

OAS-AICMA also provided international technical assistance to the OCCP-AICMA Group, particularly in strategic planning, to support Colombia's goal of assuming full ownership between 2026 and mid-2027. To facilitate this transition, OAS-AICMA seconded two officers to the OCCP-AICMA Group to provide direct technical and operational support, promote best practices, and strengthen understanding of the Colombian national authority's existing technical and operational capacities and needs.[58]

In 2025, the GICHD conducted an assessment of Colombia's NMAA and its institutional needs in relation to the country's Article 5 deadline extension request. The assessment provided recommendations on how to strengthen the national

48 AICMA Programme – OAS, Knowledge Management Platform, 2024, p. 3.

49 Email from Lina Maria Castillo, Department of Public Security, OAS, 23 September 2025.

50 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; and Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025.

51 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 140.

52 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 76.

53 Emails from Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025.

54 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 87–88.

55 Email from Lina Maria Castillo, Department of Public Security, OAS, 23 September 2025; and "Programa de Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal de la OEA (AICMA-OEA)", at: https://bit.ly/3RDT3TD.

56 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), pp. 79–80.

57 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 12; and email from Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

58 Email from Lina Maria Castillo, Department of Public Security, OAS, 23 September 2025.

framework, evaluating the authority's key capacities in governance, planning, coordination, and regulation.[59]

In 2024, UNMAS supported Colombia's mine action sector, including the OCCP–AICMA Group, through technical assistance and capacity building. Its efforts focused on strengthening the NMAA's technical capacities, improving coordination among sector actors, and integrating mine action into local development plans. UNMAS also delivered risk education, supported victim referral pathways and medical access, and coordinated emergency responses. In parallel, it engaged in advocacy to highlight the worsening humanitarian situation and mobilise resources to address the growing use of explosive devices.[60]

### MINE ACTION ENVIRONMENT

In 2024, operators did not report major changes to the environment for mine action. The most significant positive development in the sector was the appointment of a permanent National Coordinator of the OCCP-AICMA Group, following a prolonged period of interim leadership. The new coordinator, who brought substantial experience, has reinvigorated the sector, launched important processes, particularly around territory allocation and improved coordination among HMA operators.[61]

HALO noted that, as part of efforts to mitigate money laundering risks, financial oversight for all NGOs based in Bogota increased, demanding more detailed and frequent financial management reports to different authorities, in particular the Superintendency, in addition to the national tax authority (DIAN).[62]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Colombia does not have a specific gender and diversity policy for mine action, and the OCCP-AICMA Group currently lacks a gender specialist, which is ascribed to limited resources.[63] However, gender and identity have been integrated as a cross-cutting elements in the 2023–2025 Operations Plan, aligned with the 2022–2026 National Development Plan. In its 2025 extension request, Colombia committed to operationalising these frameworks by 2030.[64]

The approach is to be implemented as an inclusive and sustainable process through concrete actions across all pillars of mine action. Diagnostic and planning will collect data disaggregated by gender, age, and ethnicity to support territorial planning. Recruitment and training will apply equity criteria in selection, capacity building, and promotion, with the goal of increasing women's participation in technical and operational roles. Women and men from ethnic communities will be encouraged to participate in mine risk education, humanitarian demining teams, and territorial prioritisation, recognising their key role in the sustainability of interventions.[65] Monitoring and evaluation will use gender- and age-disaggregated indicators, combined with intersectional, ethnic, and cultural approaches to ensure meaningful inclusion of Afro-descendant, Indigenous, and rural populations. This is expected to strengthen legitimacy, local ownership, and operational performance, while promoting greater women's participation in strategic roles and contributing to more equitable and sustainable peacebuilding processes.[66]

Colombia's mine action programme incorporates gender and diversity considerations at various levels. According to Article 7 reports, this includes three main strategies: mainstreaming gender across all areas of intervention, strengthening advocacy and communication with a gender focus, and using disaggregated data to improve analysis and decision-making.[67] The inclusive approach has been reinforced by incorporating gender, age, disability, and survivor experiences into planning processes and information systems.[68] It addresses differences in vulnerability and impact between men and women; prioritises children and adolescents both as potential victims and as agents of reconstruction; promotes rehabilitation and inclusion for persons with disabilities; and incorporates ethno-cultural and "campesino" (peasant) perspectives, recognising their unique relationships with land and livelihoods.[69]

Colombia has a significant Indigenous and ethnic minority group population (13.7% of the total population), who are afforded constitutional protections and therefore require a specific approach during demining. Indigenous communities are said to have been disproportionately affected by AP mines. According to the OACP-AICMA Group, since the Final Agreement between the Colombian government and FARC in November 2016, the impact on the civilian population has increased and one third of the victims have been indigenous or Afro-descended persons.[70] Colombia's extension request emphasised that explosive ordnance has

59 Emails from Alice Spazian, Regional Focal Point, GICHD, 16 May and 23 September 2025.

60 Email from Mohammed Martinez, Programme Assistant, UNMAS Colombia, 23 September 2025; and UNMAS Annual Report, Colombia, 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4eNgUwG, p. 48.

61 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April 2025; Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025.

62 Email from Oliver Ford, HALO, 12 August 2025.

63 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27.

64 Ibid., pp. 108–09.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., p. 110.

67 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 15.

68 Ibid., p. 33.

69 Ibid., p. 53.

70 Email from Nathalie Ochoa Niño, OCCP-AICMA Group, 11 October 2024.

a distinct impact on ethnic communities, affecting not only physical safety but also cultural identity, spirituality, and traditional ways of life. Contamination restricts access to sacred sites and subsistence areas, disrupts ancestral ties to land, and undermines autonomous governance, leading to forced displacement, loss of community cohesion, and erosion of intergenerational knowledge. Recognising these differentiated impacts, Colombia has begun integrating ethnic perspectives into mine action planning and implementation. This includes collecting ethnicity-disaggregated data, designing indicators that capture cultural dimensions of risk, and ensuring active community participation in decision-making. Such measures aim to make demining not only technically effective but also culturally relevant and socially sustainable.[71]

The OACP (now OCCP) and demining operators have developed annexes to the NMAS on NTS and territorial management in order to facilitate negotiation with ethnic communities on demining. The NTS Technical Note has a specific methodology for interacting and negotiating with Indigenous communities to guarantee meaningful participation throughout the land release cycle.[72] In 2024, the AICMA-OCCP Group invested COP 2.25 billion (approximately US$510,320) from the national budget to strengthen mine risk prevention in ethnic communities.[73]

The Knowledge Management Platform, established in 2024, includes a technical group dedicated to cross-cutting approaches including gender and ethnicity, with the goal of promoting practical, inclusive approaches that address inequalities and reflect the diverse identities of affected populations.[74]

## WOMEN IN MINE ACTION

According to the latest Article 5 deadline extension request, the number of women involved in NTS, clearance, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) has increased to 181 in 2024, up from 168 in 2023. However, despite the increase in absolute numbers, the proportion of women employed compared to men has dropped—from 7.9% in 2023 to 6.8% in 2024—due to a rise in overall staffing and the number of men hired. The total number of personnel, regardless of gender, grew from 2,115 in 2023 to 2,674 in 2024.[75] Colombia's Operations Plan for 2025–2027 plans to rely on the same workforce.[76]

The five civilian operators reported employing a total of 416 women out of 1,038 staff members in 2024 – approximately 40% (see Table 2 for details). This remains one of the highest rates of women participation in mine action globally.

**Table 2: Gender composition of NMAA and operators in 2024 (as reported by demining operators and by OCCP-AICMA Group for BDIAN and BRDEH capacity)[77]**

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial and supervisory staff | Women managerial and supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OCCP-AICMA Group | 27 | 14 (52%) | 1 | 1 (100%) | 26 | 14 (54%) |
| BDIAN | 89 | 0 (0%) | N/R | N/R | N/R | N/R |
| BRDEH | 2,097 | 8 (0.4%) | N/R | N/R | N/R | N/R |
| CCCM | 399 | 186 (47%) | 94 | 45 (48%) | 196 | 85 (43%) |
| DRC | 103 | 32 (31%) | 23 | 7 (30%) | 82 | 28 (34%) |
| HALO | 281 | 109 (39%) | 98 | 35 (36%) | 183 | 74 (40%) |
| HI | 103 | 46 (45%) | 35 | 18 (51%) | 68 | 28 (41%) |
| HUMANICEMOS DH | 152 | 43 (28%) | 36 | 11 (31%) | 115 | 32 (28%) |
| **Totals** | **3,251** | **438 (13%)** | **287** | **117 (41%)** | **670** | **261 (39%)** |

71 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 110–11.

72 Email from Yessika Morales, then Coordinator, OACP-AICMA Group, 20 July 2022.

73 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 55.

74 Ibid., p. 15.

75 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 7, p. 22.

76 Ibid., Table 12, p. 57.

77 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April 2025; Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025; Juan David Arcila Collazos, Project Coordinator, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025; and Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

All civilian demining operators report having gender focal points.[78] CCCM stands out from the group with a dedicated gender "area", which consists of a director, a manager, two support staff, and a network of 33 gender focal points across the country, 14 of whom also serve as ethnic focal points, supporting an intersectional approach. These focal points are based at both headquarters and field offices, including in Cumaribo, Montelíbano, Putumayo, and Urabá. Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and HALO each have a designated gender focal point, with HALO assigning the role to its Chief of Staff. HI has a regional specialist focused on gender, age, and disability. HUMANICEMOS DH has trained and deployed 10 gender focal points across its intervention areas to support implementation at field level.

In 2024, all mine action operators reported implementing initiatives to strengthen the integration of gender and diversity in their programmes.[79] CCCM organised activities such as a workshop for Ethnic Gender Focal Points from Afro-descendant and Indigenous communities; a community garden project linking gender-based violence (GBV) prevention with land care; a cultural diversity bazaar in Puerto Asís (Putumayo); and a leadership meeting for women affected by armed conflict. DRC began incorporating ethnic and disability considerations into its risk education assessments to better address community needs. HALO launched a gender empowerment project focused on leadership and sexual and reproductive health and rights, including staff-wide workshops, the training of 12 trainers of trainers, and open discussions on Indigenous worldviews. It also evaluated and made specific recommendations on how to increase the number of women in leadership positions, based on assessments and working sessions with a sample of 29 women from all field offices. HI promoted inclusion through community dialogues, institutional training partnerships, use of a gender-age-disability marker in projects, and by adapting feedback mechanisms into Indigenous languages to ensure accessibility. HUMANICEMOS DH conducted 19 gender workshops for 479 participants.

The needs of ethnic and minority groups are integrated into the prioritisation and planning of survey and clearance.[80] CCCM applies a culturally sensitive, differential approach by involving local leaders, respecting traditions and languages, and employing community members in operational roles. DRC requires prior consultation and approval from Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities before operating in ancestral territories. HALO worked closely with Indigenous communities in Mesetas (Meta) in 2023 to resume demining operations suspended due to security concerns. This effort succeeded in 2024 with the deployment of three demining teams made up entirely of local Indigenous community members. HI held regular meetings with Indigenous leaders to support contamination mapping and prioritisation and follows formal, legally mandated "Ethnic Liaison" processes, which are documented and monitored nationally.

Survey and community liaison teams across all operators include representatives from ethnic and minority groups to promote inclusive participation and strengthen community trust.[81] CCCM uses territorial analyses and inclusive hiring practices, employing 399 staff in 2024, including 48 Indigenous, 39 Afro-Colombian individuals, and 311 Mestizos (mixed-heritage persons). DRC ensures each liaison and risk education team includes at least one local ethnic representative to reflect community diversity. HALO deployed its first all-Indigenous demining teams in Meta, a successful community-led model aimed at reducing security risks. HI primarily recruits local staff in ethnic areas, with community-selected liaison officers representing each ethnic group involved.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Colombia has not produced a specific NMAS on environmental management. Presidential Decree 1195 of 2017, issued by the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, establishes the environmental conditions applicable to humanitarian demining activities across the national territory. The decree allows temporary use of renewable natural resources, provided that good environmental practices—such as waste and wastewater management, emission control, and biodiversity protection—are followed. Special approval is required for operations in protected areas while coordination with local environmental authorities is encouraged. The Decree also requires accredited humanitarian demining organisations to submit environmental management plans.[82] These plans must assess potential impacts, include mitigation and restoration measures, and are closely monitored by the AICMA Group, particularly in relation to protected areas. Operators must consult environmental authorities and local communities, and follow the principles of precaution, sustainability, and 'do no harm' throughout operations, reporting to the competent authority at their conclusion. In practice, accredited organisations minimise environmental impact by using manual, low-impact tools, engaging with communities, and complying with additional regulations such as the 2023 ban on single-use plastics in protected areas.[83]

The OCCP-AICMA Group expects significant progress to be made in the coming years towards a more detailed and specific regulation on the environment that will demand more detailed environmental management while contributing to the recovery of ecosystems affected by AP mines.[84] Colombia's latest Article 7 report (covering calendar year 2024) states that systematic

78 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April 2025; Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025; and Juan David Arcila Collazos, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 74–75; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 16.

83 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 75.

84 Email from Nathalie Ochoa Niño, OCCP-AICMA Group, 6 September 2024.

integration of environmental and climate-related criteria into the planning and prioritisation of interventions remains a pending challenge. This is, however, identified as a key area for future strengthening within mine action.[85] The OCCP-AICMA Group has emphasised the environmental impact of landmine contamination, particularly in Indigenous and Afro-Colombian territories, where it affects traditional relationships with the natural environment. This concern was raised internationally, including at the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP16), reinforcing a commitment to sustainable development and the protection of affected communities.[86]

One of the working groups within the Knowledge Management Platform established in 2024 is responsible for addressing environmental issues. This group focused on developing a stronger conceptual and regulatory framework, first by conducting a bibliographic and documentary review and consulting stakeholders through surveys. Based on this diagnostic work, the groundwork has been laid for incorporating environmental and climate approaches across the programme, including developing a national environmental and climate management standard.[87] That said, there are no firm plans to issue a new NMAS yet.

**Table 3: Environmental policies and action of NMAA and operators in 2024 (as reported by demining operators and by OCCP-AICMA Group for BDIAN and BRDEH capacity)[88]**

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| OCCP - AICMA | Yes (not a NMAS but a Decree) | Not Applicable | Yes |
| BDIAN | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| BRDEH | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| CCCM | A national policy and a SOP | Yes | Yes (environmental advisor and internal team) |
| DRC | SOP | Yes | No |
| HALO | SOP | Yes | Yes, the capabilities manager |
| HI | SOP | Yes | A consultant |
| HUMANICEMOS DH | A national policy and a SOP | Yes | 10 territorial FP (also gender) |

CCCM updated its environmental policy in 2024, renaming it Environmental and Climate Policy and incorporating commitments and guidelines to address climate change, both to tackle operational challenges and to strengthen community resilience. A notable initiative that year was the planting of 1,180 trees in Zone 3 (now cleared) of the municipality of Urrao, assigned to CCCM for land release. The planting focused on key community spaces—such as schools, a park, and a property containing the water source for a community aqueduct—directly contributing to environmental conservation and the well-being of the local population. CCCM includes systematic environmental impact assessments, emissions reduction, waste management, resource efficiency, and climate adaptation measures. CCCM uses a dual-level evaluation system: macro-level assessments to identify protected areas and secure approvals, and field-level tools like the Quick Environmental Verification to guide operational decisions based on local risks and land use. An internal environmental team, guided by an environmental advisor, supports implementation and monitoring, while staff receive training on environmental procedures. Field operations also incorporate wastewater control, wildlife protection, vehicle use regulations, and vegetation preservation. Climate adaptation is supported through community engagement, terrain assessments, and operational pauses during extreme weather, in line with IMAS 07.13.[89]

DRC has a generic operating procedure and an SOP for health, safety, and environmental management, but no dedicated in-country environmental focal point. Environmental assessments are conducted to inform the planning and implementation of survey and clearance, addressing potential impacts such as wastewater generation, solid waste, tree felling, vegetation clearing, soil excavation, hazardous waste, and detonations. The environmental impact analysis considers demining activities, affected resources, and their potential consequences. Climate and environmental factors—such as seasonal droughts, floods, high temperatures, and disease risks—are also evaluated to inform both community and staff safety. This information is shared with the NMAA during follow-up meetings but does not influence initial tasking or zone assignment by the OCCP.[90]

HALO's "Capabilities Manager" acts as the environmental focal point for the programme. HALO's SOPs cover environmental considerations during clearance, including

85 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 33.

86 Ibid., p. 16.

87 Email from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025.

88 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 33; and emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April 2025; Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025; Juan David Arcila Collazos, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025; and Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

89 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May and 25 August 2025.

90 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April 2025.

waste management, restrictions on cutting trees over 10cm in diameter, proper placement of septic tanks, and measures to reduce plastic use, fire risks, and potential spills. In 2023, HALO appointed a Global Environmental Manager who visited Colombia and met with key stakeholders—such as the Ministry of Environment, National Parks, and the Humboldt Institute—to explore future partnerships. HALO also considers climate and extreme weather risks during operational planning. In 2024, no significant climate-related incidents or flood-related movement of explosive devices were reported.[91]

HI has a global "environmental agenda" and a global environmental specialist. In Colombia, HI is supported by a consultant who advises on compliance and good practices in land release activities. In line with Decree 1195 of 2017, HI has developed its own SOP for environmental management, conducts environmental assessment in each operational area, obtains permits for work in protected areas, and integrates official recommendations into intervention plans. It also implements compensation measures such as tree planting, coordinated with local communities and authorities. HI calculates its carbon footprint and, after identifying major contributors like frequent flights and high meat consumption in 2023, took steps in 2024 to reduce emissions.[92]

HUMANICEMOS DH has an environmental management policy, outlined in its "Comprehensive Environmental Sustainability Policy" (Version 1.0 of 23 June 2024). The policy establishes principles such as environmental responsibility, sustainable practices, and regulatory compliance, with commitments to efficient resource use, carbon footprint reduction, and the application of clean technologies in demining. It also defines roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for monitoring and accountability. To support implementation, 10 territorial environmental focal points have been trained in environmental management, gender, inclusion, and risk education.[93]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Colombia's Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is led by the AICMA-OCCP Group under Law 759 of 2002. It stores, updates, and verifies intervention data, with QA ensured through internal validation and external control by OAS-AICMA. The recording of new evidence of AP mine contamination is governed by the AICMA-OCCP Information Management Guide, which standardises data collection forms and requires the use of platforms such as IMSMA NG, ArcGIS, and Periférico (SharePoint). Each record undergoes validation for completeness, format, and consistency before being consolidated in the national database. All demining task data is recorded following a strict document verification process to ensure accuracy, accessibility, and reliability.[94]

Information products—datasets, dashboards, and reports—are subject to periodic review to identify gaps or inconsistencies and are updated as the integrated information management system advances. Statistical reporting is certified by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), reinforcing system integrity and transparency. Colombia also maintains data-sharing agreements with institutions such as the Unit for Victims, Agustín Codazzi Institute, Ministry of Health, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the Crop Substitution Programme, and the Land Restitution Unit, improving interoperability and cross-sectoral analysis.[95]

Colombia's 2025–27 Operations Plan outlines a future transition from the existing IMSMA NG system to IMSMA Core. This upgrade aims to enhance information flow and coordination between humanitarian demining organisations and the NMAA. The migration involves designing the new system to meet sector needs and interoperability requirements, developing a detailed work plan, and creating supporting applications and data collection forms.[96]

Colombia's national database contains reports on explosive device incidents dating back to 1990 and serves as the baseline for identifying AP mine contamination. However, this baseline is still largely dependent on victim and incident data ("event"), which can be unreliable. Many records were initially collected without technical tools, resulting in inaccuracies such as cartographic errors or the misplacement of coordinates (often recorded in the nearest population centre than the actual incident location). As a result, there are often major discrepancies between database entries and the evidence found during NTS, leading to cancellation or discarding of many investigated IMSMA events.[97] Operators are nonetheless assigned municipalities and provided with a "municipal file", in which these events are presented for reference only. Each organisation then reviews this information and designs its operational plan and priorities.[98] The 2025 extension request acknowledged that inaccuracies have been detected in historical event data—sometimes leading to inappropriate tasking—and stated that a review of these records is being considered. Additionally, Colombia has implemented a tool based on ArcGIS Enterprise to strengthen quality control of "events" reported by primary

91 Email from Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025.

92 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025.

93 Email from Juan David Arcila Collazos, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025.

94 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 85; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 18.

95 Ibid.

96 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 20, p. 86.

97 Emails from Francisco Moreno, then Projects and Monitoring Director, HALO, 28 June 2024; Arturo Bureo, HI, 17 June 2024; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 12 June 2024; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025.

98 Email from Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

sources in the IMSMA database. This platform incorporates validation routines to check the completeness of mandatory fields, coordinate formats, and internal consistency of records, while automatically detecting duplicates and overlaps between events.[99]

In 2024, the NMAA worked with demining operators to improve the accuracy of event records in IMSMA. These included field investigations and verification processes to ensure the database more accurately reflects the current state of contamination.[100] Additionally, regular coordination meetings and systematic updates to municipal case files, drawing on new data from FULE reports (Formulario de Ubicación y Localización de Eventos) and direct inputs from local authorities and community sources, support more effective decision-making.[101]

Operators have adequate access to the database, with data on events and intervention areas provided to support planning and implementation. This information is regularly updated.[102] Once areas are assigned, sufficient data is available; however, it often requires verification with communities, as discrepancies can emerge between the database records and the findings from NTS, as explained earlier. For peripheral reporting, teams maintain communication with the NMAA, and the process of assigning passwords and access is said to be efficient.[103] However, delays can occur in creating new users, as this process involves multiple offices within the Presidency.[104] Each organisation is responsible for submitting timely and complete information to the NMAA based on validated field reports, using an approved flat .xls template. This format supports quarterly progress tracking but has limitations for data consultation, as the large content volume makes it difficult to efficiently filter by ranges, domains, or time intervals.[105]

While current data collection forms are useful for tracking progress and outcomes, there is a recognised need to improve them by adding variables that more effectively capture the impact of interventions on affected communities and territories.[106] For example, HI has pointed out that the NTS forms do not currently require the collection of disability-related data, limiting the ability to assess how interventions address the needs of people with disabilities.[107] DRC suggested expanding the forms to include data on broader territorial needs (such as disaster risk or displacement) to support a more integrated response.[108]

Colombia's reporting under the APMBC is timely and consistent. Article 7 reports are structured using the Oslo—and now Siem Reap-Angkor—Action Plan. Discrepancies between operator data reported to Mine Action Review and figures reported by the national authority are said to be largely unavoidable due to the fact that the OCCP only reports on land release after completion of tasks and the CEM has certified the process. Meanwhile, delays in information processing, by both operators and the CEM, continued to be reported and likely point to systemic challenges in information reconciliation.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

### PLANNING

Throughout 2024, Colombia continued to implement its national mine action strategy, guided by three key technical frameworks: the 2020–2025 Strategic Plan, the 2023–2025 Humanitarian Demining Operational Plan, and the earlier Article 5 deadline extension request.[109] In 2024, Colombia prepared a new interim Article 5 deadline extension request to cover 2026 to 2030. An initial, incomplete version was submitted on 31 March 2025. Uncertainties in the request stemmed from US funding announcements and their impact on the clearance capacity of humanitarian organisations made the agreed projections unreliable. A complete version was eventually submitted on 5 June 2025, accompanied by an intermediate Operations Plan for 2025–27.[110] Despite financial constraints and worsening security conditions, Colombia has set ambitious targets for the period through to 2027, including:

- Declaring 42 municipalities free of contamination (of 84 municipalities currently undergoing operations), averaging 14 municipalities per year;
- Clearing 495 hazardous areas totalling more than 3.05km$^2$ across 54 municipalities, with annual clearance targets of 0.8km$^2$ in 2025; 1.64km$^2$ in 2026; and 0.6km$^2$ in 2027 (see Table 4).
- Implementing the 4R approach, in line with the new NMAS, across 66 municipalities with a high factor of instability.[111]

On 31 July 2025, Colombia submitted a revised version, which projecting that by 2027, around 977 municipalities will be free from suspected contamination by AP mines, representing 87% of the national territory. Of the remaining 144 municipalities, at least 40 are expected to be under

99 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 85–86.
100 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; and Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025.
101 Email from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025.
102 Email from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025.
103 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025.
104 Email from Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025.
105 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April 2025.
106 Email from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025.
107 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025.
108 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April 2025.
109 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 29.
110 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 5 June 2025, Operations Plan for 2025–27, presented on pp. 37–50.
111 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 14, pp. 65–66.

active intervention, provided the necessary conditions for humanitarian demining are maintained.[112]

While the extension request set clearance target of 3.05km$^2$ by 2027 (corresponding to the Known Baseline Estimate presented in Table 1), Colombia's 2025 Article 7 report includes a table projecting slightly different targets in terms of number of areas and total surface to be cleared between 2025 and 2027, amounting to less than 2.6km$^2$.[113] OCCP-AICMA explained that the difference stems from an updated calculation that temporarily excludes projected intervention areas where operational conditions for clearance are not yet in place (as at early 2025). These areas, however, remain recognized as zones with confirmed contamination. OCCP-AICMA advised using the extension request targets, which reflect Colombia's commitment.[114]

**Table 4: Planned mine clearance by year in 2025–27 (data from 2025 Article 5 extension request)**[115]

| Year | Area (m²) |
|---|---|
| 2025 | 821,786 |
| 2026 | 1,643,571 |
| 2027 | 593,515 |
| **Total** | **3,058,872** |

To develop a costed, context-specific plan with clear targets, each demining organisation was asked to submit intervention projections, including estimated costs and timelines.[116] The projected operational capacity for 2025–27 is based on a total workforce of 2,674 deminers from seven organisations as at the end of 2024, and assumes stable funding throughout the three-year period of the plan.[117] This marks an increase from the 2,225 deminers at the end of 2023.[118] Notably, 82% of the projected capacity comes from two national entities: the Humanitarian Demining Engineers Brigade (BRDEH) and the Amphibious Engineers Battalion (BDIAN).[119] Colombia's operational capacity also includes 15 accredited dog-handler teams and 24 mine clearance machines.[120]

Colombia presented a US$158 million budget for 2025–27, with 59% planned to come through the national budget for national military demining units.[121] Colombia provided annual cost breakdowns by team type—NTS, clearance, risk education, community liaison, EOD, and multi-task teams—highlighting both secured funding and gaps. For 2025, US$39.87 million was secured, with 59% going to BRDEH and BDIAN, leaving a US$9.14 million gap. In 2026, US$30 million is secured (78% to BRDEH and BDIAN), with a US$24.86 million gap. By 2027, US$23.36 million is secured, entirely for BRDEH and BDIAN, with the gap rising to US$30.71 million.[122] Colombia thus estimates needing almost US$65 million in international funding to implement its three-year operations plan.[123] The plan's success will certainly depend on the ability to secure international resources, with a dedicated mobilisation strategy set to be developed in 2025.[124] Demining organisations based their projections on the assumption that current capacity could be sustained or even expanded, which will ultimately depend on their securing the required funding.[125]

## TASKING

Municipal prioritisation is based on criteria such as early warnings from the Ombudsman's Office, contamination density, and municipal file data. Once assigned, each organisation develops an Operational Plan in three phases: addressing priorities set by authorities and the task order, targeting historically contaminated sectors, and covering remaining areas for closure. Municipality assignments are made based on proposals voluntarily submitted by each organisation to the IIDH.[126]

In 2024, Colombia introduced significant changes to its prioritisation process for tackling mined areas, as well as to the allocation of municipalities among demining operators. These changes, outlined in the 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, are based on lessons learned from the 2020–25 extension period and form the foundation for a revised methodology to be applied from now on.[127]

The existing prioritisation system, based on municipal typologies, has proven insufficient for addressing the evolving dynamics of the territory and the challenge of operating in municipalities most affected by AP mines and insecurity. A shift toward a more comprehensive approach was needed to incorporate security conditions, humanitarian needs, and sustainable development. This includes using impact analysis tools that combine data from multiple sources to better identify and prioritise high-risk areas, while integrating human security criteria such as livelihoods, access to basic services, and social cohesion.[128] Based on this lesson, a joint planning process involving the AICMA-OCCP

112 Ibid., p. 10.
113 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Table 3, p. 30.
114 Email from Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.
115 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 14, pp. 65–66.
116 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 33.
117 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 12, p. 57.
118 Ibid., Table 5, p. 20.
119 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 58.
120 Ibid., p. 57.
121 Ibid., p. 74.
122 Ibid., pp. 70–74.
123 Ibid., p. 74.
124 Ibid., p. 52.
125 Ibid., p. 70.
126 Email from Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.
127 Ibid., Annex V, Lessons Learnt 2020-2025, pp. 122–40.
128 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 132.

Group and accredited operators was carried out in 2024 to define the so-called "micro-zones" and prioritise nine affected zones/municipalities using criteria such as contamination level, security conditions, the presence of ethnic communities, and protected areas.[129]

To complement this process—and in response to instability in certain regions—a refined zoning approach was also implemented, called "micro-targeting strategy". This approach allowed previously prioritised municipalities to be divided into smaller, more homogeneous operational areas, making verification, planning, and eventual tasking more efficient and secure.[130] Previously, entire municipalities were assigned to a single organisation. Now, they are subdivided into operational zones based on accessibility, with the national authority using the zone as the unit of measurement when assigning a municipality or part of it.[131]

This granular approach enables the certification of specific zones as "free from suspected contamination" even when full municipal access remains impossible.[132] The improved allocation system allows demining operators to express interest in specific areas based on their capacity, though actual assignments remain dependent on available funding, meaning plans may be disrupted if donor funding to humanitarian operators reduces.[133]

Task orders are a key part of the area assignment process. When an operator is allocated to working in a particular territory, the NMAA, together with the operator, local authorities, and communities, collaborates to define and propose the task order, which is then signed with the NMAA and becomes the official contractual document for the intervention. The NMAA delivers the final task order to the operator, facilitates coordination with local authorities, and provides the corresponding municipal data file ("Expediente Municipal").[134] While task orders are generally issued on time, delays can occur, particularly when local authorities provide incomplete or unclear geographic information. In such cases, maps must often be created manually, using community input or historical records. Inconsistencies between national and local data—such as differences in village names or boundaries—can further complicate the process.[135]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### NATIONAL MINE ACTION STANDARDS

According to Article 23(17) of Decree 2647 of 2022, the OCCP-AICMA Group is responsible for drafting, adopting, disseminating, and enforcing technical regulations for mine action in Colombia. This mandate is key to regulating and supervising demining operations nationwide, ensuring they comply fully with established technical standards.[136]

The Colombian Technical Standards for Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (NTC-AICMA) are a set of 17 NMAS formally issued in 2021. Colombia has taken steps to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of AP mine survey and clearance in line with IMAS. In 2024, the annexes of the NTC-AICMA were updated, incorporating input from demining organisations and enabling a significant reduction of non-conformities during demining operations.[137]

In 2024, OAS-AICMA supported progress in the national authority's transition to updated national standards. This included sustained assistance to the OCCP-AICMA Group in finalising the legal process to phase out ICONTEC technical standards in Colombia and in launching the revision and amendment process. OAS-AICMA also defined the next steps for 2025, identifying priorities such as community liaison, documenting evidence on contaminated areas, task assignment, and clarifying the State's legal responsibilities. Further opportunities for improvement were highlighted in residual risk management, application of the "all reasonable effort" principle, technical survey procedures, and territorial management, as well as competencies in improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD), risk management, impact assessment, and land release indicators.[138]

Colombia's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request confirmed the need to update the NTC-AICMA to better reflect evolving field conditions, particularly in insecure and unstable areas. This requires a shift from rigid ISO-based norms to more adaptable national standards that integrate lessons learned, best practices, and recent technical advancements. The objective is to improve operational effectiveness while still ensuring staff safety. In 2025, Colombia planned to review and revise the NTC annexes by identifying those that remain relevant, those needing updates, and those to be removed or replaced. Where documentation gaps exist, new annexes will be proposed.[139] Operators noted that current technical norms can only be modified through annexes, and formalising them as national standards would improve operational efficiency.[140]

129 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 22.
130 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 22.
131 Email from Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.
132 Email from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025.
133 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025.
134 Ibid.
135 Emails from Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025.
136 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 14.
137 Ibid., p. 49.
138 Email from Lina Maria Castillo, Department of Public Security, OAS, 23 September 2025.
139 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 137.
140 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April 2025.

### The 4R approach and the National Standard for Humanitarian Demining in Areas with Security Instability and Response to Specific Incidents action

In 2024, the OCCP-AICMA Group made progress in fulfilling this mandate, most notably through the adoption of the "National Standard for Humanitarian Demining in Areas with Security Instability and Response to Specific Incidents". This new instrument provides the State with technical and operational tools to conduct demining in prioritised territories with high levels of security instability, thereby strengthening the national response capacity in complex contexts.[141]

The new standard was introduced because the existing NTC-AICMA framework limited interventions to traditional land release approaches and only in municipalities deemed secure by the military through a formal security assessment. These assessments determined which municipalities or areas could be assigned through task orders. However, many of the remaining areas in Colombia face unstable security conditions, marked by the presence of multiple NSAGs with strong levels of territorial control. As a result, the Colombia Armed Forces were unable to issue the necessary assessments, effectively halting new task orders. The new standard removes the requirement for both full territorial release and a military-issued security assessment. Instead, it enables interventions in specific, high-priority locations that pose an immediate risk to community safety—such as roads, water sources, schools, or gathering places—based on a "favourable" assessment issued by local authorities and the affected communities. These interventions are only possible when NSAGs in the area have no strategic interest in the targeted sites – an essential condition to safeguard both civilian populations and the demining teams.[142]

The adoption of the new standard marked the integration of the 4R approach into the AICMA regulatory framework, ensuring methodological and operational consistency. The 4R approach was developed to address territories with high levels of explosive ordnance contamination and unstable security conditions, as recorded in the IMSMA. As traditional land release methodologies cannot be applied in such areas, 4R adopts a humanitarian demining approach tailored to instability, aiming to provide immediate relief and reduce risks to communities. This includes strengthening preparatory work before interventions, such as community engagement, coordination with local and ethnic authorities and other stakeholders, and the delineation and management of humanitarian spaces. This allows demining to be context-specific, prioritise the protection of civilians, and contribute effectively to risk reduction.[143]

Another distinctive feature of 4R is its capacity to quickly assign spot tasks for destroying explosive devices without the formal declaration of a SHA. This flexibility has been reported to shorten response times to incidents affecting civilians and to enhance the effectiveness of interventions.[144] In the middle of 2024, HI amended its SOP on this and has since conducted 19 tasks under this framework.[145]

Colombia indicated that the 4R approach will be implemented by the seven accredited humanitarian demining organisations, combining civilian operators and state capacities represented by BDIAN and BRDEH. Its deployment will be accompanied by technical and political support from the OCCP, in close coordination with the AICMA Group. During 2025, Colombia stated that operations using the 4R approach will be conducted in departments such as Nariño, financed by the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Peace in Colombia. These pilot operations will also feature a continuous monitoring system to assess effectiveness and impact, designed to track outcomes on the safety and well-being of affected communities.[146]

Within this framework, CCCM reported being assigned areas in the departments of Nariño and Córdoba, where it was awaiting the necessary funding to begin operations at the time of writing. Additionally, this standard has enabled the resumption of interventions in areas that had previously been assigned for land release but where operations had to be suspended due to a deterioration in the security situation. Since those areas required a favourable security assessment from the Armed Forces, it was not possible to resume operations. Under the new standard, however, it is now possible to resume operations in specific locations within those territories based on a "favourable" concept issued by the community and local authorities. This has been the case in Puerto Leguízamo (Putumayo), where CCCM was able to resume operations after being suspended years ago due to worsening security.[147]

HALO received its first two assignments under the new standard in Sardinata (Norte de Santander) and Cáceres (Zone 2, Antioquia). The organisation has also coordinated with the national authority to identify a new set of municipalities affected by active conflict where it aims to expand operations, particularly in the Catatumbo region. With the updated framework in place, HALO has begun the necessary community liaison processes to initiate activities.[148]

## LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

A key issue affecting land release efficiency—regularly flagged by Mine Action Review based on operators' annual results—is the high number of mined areas cleared where no AP mines are found, revealing persistent challenges in survey. In 2023,

141 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 14.

142 Email from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025.

143 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 63.

144 Ibid., p. 65.

145 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 25 August 2025.

146 Ibid.

147 Email from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025.

148 Email from Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025.

nearly two-thirds of all mine clearance operations yielded no explosive ordnance. In 2024, this proportion decreased slightly, with several operators still reporting significant clearance of areas that ultimately contained no AP mines. A total of 153,749m$^2$ was cleared without finding any AP mines from a total of 309,885m$^2$ of AP mine clearance operations in 2024, equivalent to a staggering 49.6% of all clearance (See Table 5).

**Table 5: Civilian demining clearance with no AP mines found (operators data)**[149]

| Operator | No of SHA | Area cleared (m²) with no AP mine found | Percentage of total clearance |
|---|---|---|---|
| CCCM | 66 | 69,117 | 52% |
| DRC | 2 | 2,907 | 16% |
| HALO | 23 | 28,866 | 28% |
| HI | 11 | 28,672 | 100% |
| HUMANICEMOS | 15 | 24,187 | 100% |
| **Totals** | **117** | **153,749** | **49.6%** |

Note: this table refers specifically to AP mines; the percentages would differ if all types of explosive ordnance were included.

While there is no straightforward solution, the demining sector should continue exploring strategies to reduce the amount of land cleared found to have no landmine contamination. Not all the NTC-AICMA have yet been fully operationalised, in particular due to continuing debate on the TS standard. The key issue is whether areas reduced through TS can be considered free of contamination, as improvised AP mine laying does not follow a regular pattern.[150] The absence of patterns in Colombia's mined areas is a fact upon which all operators agree.[151] With half of all CHAs and SHAs cleared in 2024 found to contain no AP mines, there is a strong need to further discuss the suitability and potential use of TS in the Colombian context and adopting more flexible clearance approaches that reflect the actual threat posed by devices as they rapidly degrade over time and their potential lethality decreases.[152]

The 2025 extension request planned 495 areas, covering 3.05km$^2$, to be addressed through NTS and full clearance by the end of 2027. It clarified that TS is not foreseen for these areas, as experience has shown that "the small size of the plots and the improvised nature of the explosive devices make it impossible to obtain reliable characterisation through conventional technical methodologies". It further explained that this decision is based on planning assumptions and past experience: "applying full clearance ensures definitive land release and minimises the risk of gaps that could result from inadequate TS. In addition, concentrating resources on full clearance operations optimises the use of specialised personnel and equipment in a context of improvised mine contamination".[153]

Another recurring issue relates to the way demining organisations investigate "events" recorded in the IMSMA database and the municipal file, which—as detailed in the information management and tasking sections—remains a generally unreliable source. Many of these "events" are erroneous or unrelated to mine action or credible evidence of contamination, but operators are still required to investigate 100% of IMSMA-listed events. In contrast, newly identified areas recorded by operators during NTS are typically more accurate and can be directly classified as mined areas.[154]

In 2024, the NMAA worked in coordination with the operators to improve the accuracy of event records in IMSMA. These included field investigations and verification processes to ensure the database more accurately reflects the current state of contamination.[155] As detailed in the section below, "survey outputs", there is also a difference in methodology between operators with respect to "cancelling" mined area after investigating IMSMA events versus only cancelling mined area previously identified through NTS and which is already recorded in the database.[156] However, OCCP-AICMA clarified that the investigation of IMSMA events "has nothing to do with the cancellation process under the IMAS and NMAS, which specifically aims to cancel or confirm areas, or parts of these".[157]

In 2024, the OAS-AICMA programme continued revising and simplifying the "non-conformity" matrix used to assess mine action operators. Monitoring visits conducted during the year showed a general decline in non-conformities among implementing organisations. Nonetheless, some recurring issues persisted, particularly the need to strengthen NTS. TS also remained underused, "sparking renewed interest among humanitarian stakeholders in reassessing its role to improve operational efficiency". The monitoring approach followed the revised model introduced earlier in the year, focusing

149 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 25 August 2025; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 27 August 2025; Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025; and Juan David Arcila Collazos, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025.

150 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 34.

151 Emails from Francisco Moreno, CCCM, 6 June 2023; Marie-Josée Hamel, then Programmes Manager, DRC, 24 May 2023; Oliver Ford, HALO 16 June 2023; Arturo Bureo, then Operations Manager, HI, 26 May 2023; and Maria Sanz, then Resources Mobilisation Manager, HUMANICEMOS DH, 8 June 2023.

152 Email from Oliver Ford, HALO 16 June 2023.

153 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 69.

154 Email from Nathalie Ochoa Niño, OCCP-AICMA Group, 6 September 2024.

155 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; and Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025.

156 Email and telephone interview with Maicol Velázquez, Lead of Information Management component, OACP-AICMA Group, 4 and 5 August 2023, respectively; and telephone interview with Tammy Hall, OAS, 5 August 2023.

157 Email from Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

on fewer but more strategically targeted visits. A new monitoring system is planned for early 2025 to better identify institutional and operational areas requiring improvement.[158]

A dedicated working group within the Knowledge Management Platform assessed operational inefficiencies in Colombia, identifying issues related to the nature of contamination, logistical challenges, regulatory shortcomings, and poor practices. The group delivered two foundational documents: one defining land release indicators and another outlining identified inefficiencies in Colombia's humanitarian demining operations. Both will serve as inputs for future updates to the National Mine Action Standards (NMAS).[159] Another technical working group focused on impact measurement, advancing the identification of 11 preliminary impact indicators. OAS-AICMA is supporting OCCP-AICMA in developing a methodology and documentation to guide impact measurement.[160]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Colombia has a large operational clearance capacity at its disposal with seven operators accredited for demining: two military operators and five civilian ones. By far the largest clearance operator is the National Army's Humanitarian Demining Brigade (BRDEH), although its capacity has decreased over time – from 3,760 deminers in 2020 to 2,105 in 2024.[161] BDIAN (previously known as the Marine Corps Explosives and Demining Association, AEDIM), a smaller military operator, clears and destroys AP mines and ERW in areas under the jurisdiction of the National Navy. Demining is also conducted by civilian organisations: two national (the CCCM and HUMANICEMOS DH) and three international (DRC, HALO, and HI).

A successful experience arising from the 2016 Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP is the national demining and risk education organisation, HUMANICEMOS DH. Comprising personnel that signed the Peace Agreement with the government, and who are in the process of being reintegrated economically and socially into civilian life, HUMANICEMOS DH was first accredited in August 2017. In 2020, HUMANICEMOS DH began survey and clearance in La Montañita, Caquetá.[162] Since then, it has conducted operations in various territories affected by AP mines and ERW, aligning its efforts with rural development, land restitution, and territorial peacebuilding initiatives.[163] In its latest bulletin, HUMANICEMOS DH emphasises that it has developed a unique and replicable model for reintegration. With seven years of experience on the path of reconciliation and commitment to non-repetition, the organisation positions itself as a valuable resource for the government's peacebuilding efforts.[164]

UNMAS was initially responsible for external QM and monitoring of HUMANICEMOS DH due to US funding restrictions that prevented direct OAS involvement.[165] In April 2023, the OAS's CEM component assumed this role, supported by Swiss funding that was later extended through 2024, to integrate HUMANICEMOS DH into the national monitoring framework.[166] HUMANICEMOS DH noted that delays in CEM certification had caused planning issues.[167] However, since implementing an improvement plan in November 2023, external QM by CEM has shifted positively into a process which encourages operational efficiency across different organisations and entities, rather than creating delays on operations as had been reported to be the case previously.

According to Colombia's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, the annual operational capacity of demining organisations has significantly declined between 2020 and 2024, with a 55% reduction in NTS capacity and a 40% decrease in the number of deminers. Colombia indicated that this reduction correlates directly with the drop in operational output observed in 2023 and 2024.[168] Despite this decline, capacity for the 2023–25 period has remained partially stable, reflecting the sector's progressive adaptation to financial constraints. Colombia's 2025–27 work plan is based on 2,194 BDIAN and BRDEH personnel for survey, demining and EOD tasks, representing a slight increase from 2024.[169]

Regarding survey capacity during 2024, the operators recorded an increase compared to 2023, up from 179 survey personnel to 336 (see Table 6).

**Table 6: Survey capacities in 2024 (as reported by demining operators and by OCCP-AICMA Group for BDIAN and BRDEH capacity)[170]**

| Operator | NTS teams | NTS personnel | TS teams | TS personnel |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BDIAN | 5 | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| BRDEH | 43 | 184 | 0 | 0 |

158 Email from Lina Maria Castillo, Department of Public Security, OAS, 23 September 2025.

159 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 5 May 2025; and Lina Maria Castillo, Department of Public Security, OAS, 23 September 2025.

160 Email from Lina Maria Castillo, Department of Public Security, OAS, 23 September 2025.

161 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 6, p. 21.

162 Emails from Maria Sanz, HUMANICEMOS DH, 8 June 2023 and 19 July 2022; and HUMANICEMOS DH, "Boletín Externo No. 2", 14 February 2023.

163 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 99.

164 HUMANICEMOS DH, "Boletín Informativo No. 2", 11 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4lWtV9x.

165 Email from Pablo Parra, Chief Mine Action Programme, UNMAS Colombia, 22 August 2023.

166 Email from Tammy Hall, OAS Mine Action Programme, 31 August 2023; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023) p. 77.

167 Emails from Matia Sanz, HUMANICEMOS DH, 8 June and 8 September 2023.

168 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 7, p. 22.

169 Ibid., Table 13, p. 58.

170 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April 2025; Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025; Juan David Arcila Collazos, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025; and Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

**Table 6 Continued**

| Operator | NTS teams | NTS personnel | TS teams | TS personnel |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CCCM | 21 | 42 | 0 | 0 |
| DRC | 9 | 27 | 0 | 0 |
| HALO | 6 | 18 | 0 | 0 |
| HI | 9 | 33 | 0 | 0 |
| HUMANICEMOS | 4 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| **Totals** | **97** | **336** | **0** | **0** |

With regard to clearance capacities during 2024, civilian operators reported a total of 238 manual deminers (see Table 7), a slight decrease from the total of 243 in 2023. Civilian operators are moving towards using multitask teams (MTTs), which can conduct both NTS and clearance.[171]

**Table 7: Clearance capacities deployed in 2024 (monthly averages reported by operators and by OCCP-AICMA Group for BDIAN and BRDEH capacity)[172]**

| Operator | Manual teams | Total deminers | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| BDIAN | 3 | 61 | Reduced from 20 teams and 98 deminers in 2023. |
| BRDEH | 121 | 1,855 | Reduced from 396 teams and 1,980 deminers in 2023. In addition, the BRDEH had 15 mine detection dogs and handers, and 24 mechanical assets in 2024. |
| CCCM | 20 | 72 | Increased from 15 teams and 60 deminers in 2023. In addition to these personnel, CCCM has 6 MTT leaders, 15 clearance team leaders, 14 MTT supervisors, and 4 clearance supervisors who, depending on operational needs, also provide direct support to clearance. Likewise, most paramedics are accredited as MTT members and frequently shift roles to support clearance. |
| DRC | 7 | 35 | Increased from 5 teams and 30 deminers in 2023. |
| HALO | 17 | 68 | Reduced from 19 teams and 82 people in 2023. Each clearance team is made up of one supervisor and four deminers. The supervisor is not counted in the figure. |
| HI | 6 | 31 | Reduced from 10 teams and 47 people in 2023. The total number of deminers does not include supervisors and team leaders.<br>As in 2023, a ground-preparation machine (GCS-100) was used to assist clearance operations together with a mechanical team (4 operators, 1 team leader, and 1 supervisor). |
| HUMANICEMOS DH | 4 | 32 | Increased from 3 teams of 24 deminers in 2023. The teams are multi-task. |
| **Totals 2024** | **178** | **2,154** | |

CCCM reduced its NTS personnel by 13% compared to 2023, while increasing clearance personnel by 33%. The decrease in NTS capacity is attributed to the successful completion of NTS in most assigned sectors. Many of the affected personnel, accredited as multi-task teams, have been reassigned to clearance operations.[173] DRC decreased

171 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; and Juan David Arcila Collazos, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025.

172 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April 2025; Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025; Juan David Arcila Collazos, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025; and Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

173 Email from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025.

personnel in the department of Caquetá compared to 2023, due to the worsening security conditions, which led to the suspension of operations and the reduction of personnel. It slightly increased clearance staff in the department of Bolívar to support existing teams.[174]

HALO deployed an average of 17 clearance teams per month, two fewer than in 2023. Although clearance resumed in Meta after an 18-month suspension, a continued decline in funding limited the overall number of deminers deployed. Meanwhile, NTS capacity remained consistent with 2023 levels.[175] HI increased its NTS teams compared to 2023 due to two key developments: the launch of activities in newly assigned territories, such as Tierralta (Córdoba) and the Abades subregion, and the implementation of the new methodology for responding to events in Cauca where HI had two MTTs dedicated to EOD spot tasks in parts of territories not assigned for full territorial release.[176] HUMANICEMOS DH did not experience any significant increases or decreases in the number of survey or clearance personnel deployed in 2024 compared to 2023.[177]

The OCCP-AICMA Group noted that demining organisations have employed a range of tools, including drones, to support NTS, and noted that this initiative was in an experimental phase. Results were expected to be gathered to assess the feasibility of including these technologies in their standard procedures.[178] HUMANICEMOS DH has received official authorisation from the OAS CEM to use thermite in disposing of explosive devices. Thermite, a pyrotechnic compound that produces extremely high temperatures, is a specialised tool used to neutralise explosive ordnance, particularly when conventional detonation methods pose higher risks to personnel or surrounding communities. This authorisation has been described as a "significant milestone" in the organisation's operational capabilities, enabling it to apply internationally recognised technical standards for the safe destruction of ERW.[179]

Aside from HI, which is accredited to deploy a land preparation machine, BRDEH is the only entity with mine detection dog (MDD) capacity and with the logistical capability to deploy and use machines across the entire national territory.[180]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Colombia reported clearing 1.47km$^2$ of mined area in 2024 in 27 municipalities across 14 departments, down from the 1.73km$^2$ achieved the previous year, along with cancellation of 0.075km$^2$ through NTS and a tiny amount of reduction through TS. In 2024, all five civilian operators again reported clearing substantial areas of land without finding AP mines, estimated at half of all their mine clearance by Mine Action Review based on the data provided by operators (see Table 5 above).

**Table 8: Mined area release in 2024 (based on Article 7 data)[181]**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m$^2$) |
|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 1,398,340 |
| **TS** | 113 |
| **NTS** | 75,044 |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 193 |

According to OCCP-AICMA data, a total of 119 previously unrecorded mined areas, covering 319,458m$^2$, were identified through NTS in 2024. This included one area of 1,897m$^2$ discovered by BDIAN and eleven areas totalling 89,395m$^2$ discovered by BRDEH. The remaining 107 areas (228,166m$^2$) were reportedly discovered by the five civilian operators.[182]

Figures reported directly to Mine Action Review by civilian operators in 2024 were higher. HUMANICEMOS DH reported no new areas (see Table 9).

174 Emails from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April and 22 August 2025.
175 Email from Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025.
176 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 25 August 2025.
177 Email from Juan David Arcila Collazos, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025.
178 Email from Diana Marisol Peñalosa, OCCP-AICMA Group, 17 September 2024.
179 HUMANICEMOS DH, "Boletín Informativo No. 2", 11 September 2024.
180 Emails from Diana Marisol Peñalosa, OCCP-AICMA Group, 17 September 2024; and Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.
181 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 41.
182 Email from Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

**Table 9: Newly discovered SHAs thought to contain AP mines in 2024 (civilian operator reports)[183]**

| Operator | Department | Number of SHAs | SHA (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| CCCM | Antioquia | 19 | 48,815 |
| CCCM | Putumayo | 60 | 71,819 |
| CCCM | Vichada | 4 | 6,242 |
| **Subtotals** | | **83** | **126,876** |
| DRC | Bolivar | 5 | 9,992 |
| DRC | Caquetá | 1 | 8,197 |
| **Subtotals** | | **6** | **18,189** |
| HALO | Antioquia | 28 | 24,700 |
| HALO | Casanare | 1 | 708 |
| HALO | Cauca | 5 | 8,902 |
| HALO | Meta | 4 | 10,176 |
| HALO | Tolima | 1 | 653 |
| HALO | Valle del Cauca | 11 | 29,373 |
| **Subtotals** | | **50** | **74,512** |
| HI | Antioquia | 8 | 16,802 |
| HI | Meta | 2 | 1,977 |
| **Subtotals** | | **10** | **18,779** |
| **Totals 2024** | | **149** | **238,356** |

## SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, demining operators conducting NTS cancelled a total of 75,044m² according to Colombia's Article 7 report (see Table 10). Last year, OCCP-AICMA Group indicated to Mine Action Review that the actual area cancelled through NTS in 2023 was 6,502m² (contradicting the information provided earlier through its Article 7 report). This means that the area cancelled in 2024 was nearly twelve times higher than in 2023.

**Table 10: Release of mined area through NTS in 2024 (Article 7 data)[184]**

| Department | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|
| Antioquia | 22,626 |
| Caldas | 1,561 |
| Caquetá | 4,615 |
| Putumayo | 1,423 |
| Santander | 11,685 |
| Tolima | 13,472 |
| Valle del Cauca | 19,662 |
| **Total** | **75,044** |

Different figures for cancellation have been provided to Mine Action Review by NGO operators, as set out in Table 11. This is a decrease, compared to cancellation of 126,787m² reported by operators for 2023. HUMANICEMOS DH did not report cancellation of mined area through NTS for a second consecutive year, although it had released area through cancellation in 2022.[185]

There is a difference in methodology between operators with respect to "cancelling" mined area after investigating IMSMA events versus only cancelling mined area previously identified through NTS and which is already recorded in the database.[186] One operator indicated to Mine Action Review using different average sizes for IMSMA events within each municipality. However, OCCP-AICMA clarified that the national authority does not establish an average sizes per IMSMA event in each municipality. The information contained in the municipal files is provided solely as contextual reference. Within the framework of event investigation, it is the operator who—based on technical criteria, NTS, and field evidence—determines the size of hazardous areas. NTS teams must rigorously evaluate available evidence to establish whether it constitutes one or more hazardous areas. This process is intended to precisely delineate the threat, avoid overestimation, and optimize

183 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April 2025; Oliver Ford, HALO, 12 August 2025; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 25 August 2025; and Juan David Arcila Collazos, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025.

184 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Table 6, pp. 42-48.

185 Email from Juan David Arcila Collazos, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025.

186 Email and telephone interview with Maicol Velázquez, OACP-AICMA Group, 4 and 5 August 2023, respectively; and telephone interview with Tammy Hall, OAS, 5 August 2023.

the use of technical means and available resources. This methodology is supposed to uniformly apply to all accredited operators, civilian and military, ensuring technical consistency in the estimation and cancellation of IMSMA events.[187]

**Table 11: Release of mined area through NTS in 2024 (civilian demining operator data)[188]**

| Department | Operator | Areas cancelled | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antioquia | HI | 18 | 17,920 |
| Antioquia | HALO | 2 | 1,050 |
| Caquetá | DRC | 1 | 4,020 |
| Cauca | HI | 5 | 10,203 |
| Nariño | HI | 2 | 3,248 |
| Putumayo | CCCM | 1 | 814 |
| **Totals** | | **29** | **37,255** |

Reduced area through TS in 2024 amounted to 113m$^2$ according to data from Colombia's Article 7 report (see Table 12). This is hugely reduced compared to the 145,335m$^2$ reported by the OCCP-AICMA Group in 2023 or the 160,389m$^2$ reported in its Article 7 report covering 2023.

**Table 12: Release of mined area through TS in 2024 (Article 7 report data)[189]**

| Department | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|
| Putumayo | 113 |
| **Total** | **113** |

TS is only implemented by the national military operators. Civilian operators are not using TS in Colombia due to several problems: first, a lack of clarity on the required procedure for TS which they feel would either duplicate efforts or delay the land release process in some cases; and second, the dynamics of the Colombian conflict, which mean that devices do not reflect predictable patterns.[190] HI noted that given the nature of contamination in Colombia, and based on the evidence found in the field by NTS teams, the average size of areas reported are often up to 4,000m$^2$. Because NTC-AICMA requires a 25-metre safety distance between deminers, it is rarely possible to deploy more than six deminers per task, making area reduction through TS almost impossible in practice. In TS, a lane usually has to be opened from a safe area to the evidence point, after which clearance can only be carried out within a defined distance of the explosive ordnance found. This means that, at the start of TS, only one deminer can normally be deployed. In clearance, by contrast, operations can begin from any point along the perimeter, allowing the deployment of more than one deminer—though rarely more than six, given the relatively small average size of SHAs.[191]

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

Clearance output reported by the authorities in Colombia's Article 7 report for 2024 showed a slight decrease compared to 2023, with nearly 1.4km$^2$ cleared manually by demining operators and the destruction of 193 AP mines and 148 other items of explosive ordnance.[192] For 2023, Colombia revised its previously reported clearance figures following data verification, updating the total to 1.73km$^2$—just below the 1.84km$^2$ cleared in 2022.[193] This downward trend in clearance output continued in 2024.

**Table 13: Mine clearance in 2024 (Article 7 report data)[194]**

| Department | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed* | UXO destroyed during mine clearance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antioquia | 243,831 | 65 | 18 |
| Bolivar | 6,253 | 0 | 7 |
| Caldas | 77,406 | 27 | 5 |
| Caqueta | 194,244 | 2 | 23 |
| Cauca | 16,433 | 15 | 8 |

187 Email from Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

188 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 22 August 2025; Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025.

189 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Table 6, pp. 42–48.

190 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 34; and emails from Francisco Moreno, CCCM, 6 June 2023; Paola Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 3 August 2023; Oliver Ford, HALO, 3 August 2023; Arturo Bureo, HI, 26 May 2023; Maria Sanz, HUMANICEMOS DH, 8 June 2023.

191 Emails from Arturo Bureo, HI, 26 May 2023; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 25 August 2025.

192 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Table 6, pp. 42–48.

193 Email from Nathalie Ochoa Niño, OCCP-AICMA Group, 6 September 2024.

194 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Table 6, pp. 42–48.

**Table 13 Continued**

| Department | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed* | UXO destroyed during mine clearance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cesar | 18,544 | 0 | 7 |
| Huila | 129,821 | 19 | 1 |
| Meta | 142,705 | 3 | 24 |
| Norte de Santander | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Putumayo | 153,459 | 49 | 7 |
| Santander | 185,590 | 5 | 8 |
| Sucre | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Tolima | 127,203 | 4 | 1 |
| Valle Del Cauca | 101,710 | 4 | 2 |
| Vichada | 1,141 | 0 | 33 |
| **Totals** | **1,398,340** | **193** | **148** |

*The numbers of AP mines destroyed by civilian operators and reported to the NMAA were not consistently reflected in the data in the Article 7 report (for example, six AP mines destroyed by HALO in Meta; 11 by DRC in Bolivar were not included).

Clearance figures reported directly to Mine Action Review by civilian demining operators are presented in Table 14. In 2024, reported clearance outputs by civilian demining operators presented a small increase from 295,892m² cleared and 188 AP mines destroyed in 2023, to 309,885m² cleared and 171 AP mines destroyed. Notably, half of the area cleared in 2024 contained no AP mines.

Some of the areas reported as cleared by the OCCP-AICMA Group are not reflected in the NGO data, as the NMAA also includes clearance by the military brigades (almost 80% of clearance). In addition, OCCP-AICMA only reports land release once tasks are completed and certified by the CEM, which creates discrepancies between operator data reported to Mine Action Review and figures reported by the national authority.

**Table 14: Mine clearance in 2024 (civilian demining operator data)**[195]

| Department | Operator | Number of SHA or CHA | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AP mines destroyed in spot tasks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Antioquia | CCCM | 75 | 113,640 | 2 | 0 |
| Putumayo | CCCM | 18 | 18,545 | 47 | 0 |
| Vichada | CCCM | 3 | 1,746 | 0 | 0 |
| **Subtotals** | **CCCM** | **96** | **133,932** | **49** | **0** |
| Bolivar | DRC | 6 | 18,602 | 11 | 4 |
| **Subtotals** | **DRC** | **6** | **18,602** | **11** | **4** |
| Antioquia | HALO | 41 | 62,552 | 58 | 5 |
| Cauca | HALO | 11 | 19,093 | 4 | 0 |
| Meta | HALO | 2 | 7,041 | 6 | 0 |
| Valle del Cauca | HALO | 2 | 15,806 | 32 | 2 |
| **Subtotals** | **HALO** | **56** | **104,492** | **100** | **7** |

195 Emails from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May and 25 August 2025; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 8 April and 22 August 2025; Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025; and Juan David Arcila Collazos, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025.

**Table 14 Continued**

| Department | Operator | Number of SHA or CHA | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AP mines destroyed in spot tasks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Antioquia | HI | 7 | 22,582 | 0 | 0 |
| Cauca | HI | 1 | 361 | 0 | 0 |
| Meta | HI | 1 | 2,331 | 0 | 0 |
| Tolima | HI | 2 | 3,398 | 0 | 0 |
| **Subtotals** | **HI** | **11** | **28,672** | **0** | **0** |
| Antioquia | HUMANICEMOS DH | N/R | 14,155 | 0 | 0 |
| Caquetá | HUMANICEMOS DH | N/R | 10,032 | 0 | 0 |
| **Subtotals** | **HUMANICEMOS DH** | **15** | **24,187** | **0** | **0** |
| **Totals 2024** | | **184** | **309,885** | **160** | **11** |

Note: This table does not include the operational progress of the military demining brigades (BRDEH and BDIAN). BRDEH, which has the highest operational capacity, conducts almost 80% of clearance operations nationwide.

In addition to destroying AP mines, operators also reported destroying remote-controlled IEDs and items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) during clearance operations and/or EOD spot tasks. CCCM destroyed six IEDs in Putumayo and one item of UXO in Antioquia, both during clearance operations.[196] HALO destroyed three IEDs during clearance in Valle del Cauca, two IEDs during EOD spot tasks in Antioquia and Meta, three UXO items during clearance in Antioquia and Cauca, and five additional UXO items during EOD spot tasks across all four departments where it is intervening, plus one in Norte de Santander.[197] HI destroyed six IEDs during clearance in Antioquia, four IEDs during EOD spot tasks in Antioquia and Cauca, and 11 items of UXO in Antioquia, Cauca, and Meta.[198] HUMANICEMOS destroyed two IEDs and two items of UXO during clearance in Antioquia.[199]

Among demining operators, CCCM cleared the greatest areas in 2024, with 133,932m² cleared compared to 108,511m² in 2023. HALO cleared 104,492m² in 2024, similar to the previous year (103,838m² in 2023). HI more than doubled output, from 11,843m² in 2023 to 28,672m² in 2024, although HI did not find AP mines, but destroyed 10 remote-controlled IED and 11 item of UXOs. In contrast, DRC saw an 18% decrease, from 22,777m² to 18,602m². HUMANICEMOS DH reported a 51% reduction—from 48,923m² to 24,187m²—mainly due to the suspension of operations in Solita, Caquetá caused by increased activity of NSAGs and worsening conflict. Security guarantees were not restored, and operations remain suspended through the end of 2024 and into 2025.[200]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR COLOMBIA: 1 MARCH 2001

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2011

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2021

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS, 9 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

**THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (5 YEARS, INTERIM): 31 DECEMBER 2030**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (INTERIM EXTENSION REQUESTED)**

196 Email from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 5 May 2025.
197 Email from Oliver Ford, HALO, 10 May 2025.
198 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 15 April 2025.
199 Email from Juan David Arcila Collazos, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025.
200 Ibid.

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the four-year and nine-month extension granted by States Parties in 2020, Colombia is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. Colombia will not meet this deadline and has requested a five-year interim extension to 31 December 2030 (its third extension request). The request was due to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025.

Colombia became a State Party on 1 March 2001. In 2010, it submitted its first extension request, which was granted at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties (10MSP), setting a new 10-year deadline. A second extension request was submitted in 2020 and approved at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties (18MSP), establishing the current deadline of 31 December 2025.

While Colombia largely met its clearance targets between 2020 and 2024 —clearing 8.66km$^2$ against a projected 3.33km$^2$ of clearance[201]—it acknowledged the presence of large contaminated areas whose full extent remains undetermined. Several factors continue to constrain Colombia's ability to meet its Article 5 obligations, including widespread and continued contamination caused by 35 years of AP mine use by armed groups, with insecurity limiting access to many contaminated areas. National authorities report that the reconfiguration of armed groups not covered by the 2016 Peace Agreement has contributed to new contamination in 2024, including in municipalities previously declared mine-free. By the end of 2024, Colombia reported that 935 municipalities (83% of the country) were mine-free, while 17% of the territory remains contaminated. This includes 84 municipalities (7.5%) under active intervention and 102 municipalities (9.1%) pending intervention, many of which are located in areas still affected by ongoing conflict.

Despite having one of the world's largest demining programmes, Colombia's operational progress remains slow, particularly in remote and hard-to-reach areas. The government noted that the country's operational capacity for implementing its operations plan has declined by approximately 41% compared to 2020.[202] This reduction is attributed to a combination of factors, including decreased external funding and worsening security conditions. In 2024, the sector took important steps to adapt to the complex security environment. This included the adoption of the new national standard for demining in insecure areas. At the same time, the prioritisation system for demining and the tasking process using a micro-targeting approach were improved. However, the pace of operations remained slow. A freeze in US funding at the start of 2025 nearly brought operations to a halt for several months, with some operators forced to cease operations in certain municipalities.[203]

By 2030, Colombia will have to request another extension to its mine clearance deadline, as the country remains far from fulfilling Article 5. In its 2025 extension request, Colombia clearly stated it will not be able to meet its Article 5 obligations within the proposed five-year extension period.[204]

**Table 15: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**[205]

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 1.40 |
| 2023 | 1.73 |
| 2022 | 1.84 |
| 2021 | 1.27 |
| 2020 | 1.08 |
| **Total** | **7.32** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Colombia has established a sustainable national capacity to implement the APMBC and effectively respond to the emergence of previously unknown or newly contaminated mined areas, even after the declaration of mine-free zones. Its Article 7 report covering 2024 indicated that a methodology for addressing residual risk has been adopted, in line with its NTC-AICMA. Residual risk is currently managed by State capacity with funding from the national budget and international cooperation. Civilian organisations are only permitted to intervene for a maximum of six months after clearance operations are completed.

By the end of 2024, 14 CHAs were under intervention using this methodology, covering an estimated 87,306m$^2$ across several municipalities.[206] Its operations plan for 2025–27 includes the development and implementation of a methodology for analysing new contamination and monitoring residual risk, ensuring that annual work plans include monitoring actions. In 2025, Colombia plans to establish inter-institutional technical working groups to define the scope and criteria of the methodology; in 2026, to advance the design, pilot testing, and validation of analytical tools; and in 2027, to begin operational implementation in selected territories, supported by a monitoring and feedback system to adjust the methodology as residual risk evolves. The aim is to build a coherent, context-specific approach for Colombia, with a clear protocol for data collection, assessment of new findings, and mitigation measures against residual risk.

Colombia acknowledges that re-contamination poses both operational and methodological challenges, particularly in areas affected by ongoing conflict dynamics or the presence of NSAGs. To address this, specific procedures have been introduced for the identification, documentation, and evaluation of such events, ensuring that reported information accurately reflects the real status of territory regarding the presence or suspicion of AP mines.[207]

201 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 1, p. 12.

202 Ibid., p. 20.

203 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 22 August 2025.

204 Revised 2025 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11.

205 Data extracted from Mine Action Review's previous reports, based on exchanges with the NMAA and operators. Clearance figures reported in Article 7 reports or Article 5 deadline extension requests are not always consistent. According to the NMAA, a total of 8.66km$^2$ was cleared between 2020 and 2024 (as reported in the Revised 2025 deadline Extension Request, Table 1, p. 12).

206 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 36.

207 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 41–42.

# CROATIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026

Just on track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 57.3KM²

Heavy
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 42.51 | 42.07 |
| Technical Survey | 4.20 | 5.61 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 5.02 | 10.86 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 1,533 (including 138 mines handed in for destruction) | 969 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Various commercial companies
- CROMAC
- Pioneer Company of the Engineering regiment

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Croatia did not meet its land release targets in 2024, but believes it is still on track to meet its Article 5 clearance deadline of 1 March 2026. While this goal is achievable, it is ambitious, particularly given continued clearance of extensive areas where no anti-personnel (AP) mines are found. Croatia does not plan to expand its survey or clearance capacity in 2025 but will need to significantly increase clearance output to meet remaining targets. This includes the release of a substantial area of AP mined area in areas under military control, making well-targeted survey and clearance critically important.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Croatia should submit an Article 5 deadline extension request if there is any doubt that it will meet its deadline under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).**
- **The Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) should survey remaining suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and review the basis on which confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) are established. In particular, it should use survey to confirm evidence of mines before embarking on full clearance.**
- **CROMAC should fulfil the pledge in Croatia's 2018 extension request to explore the potential for mine detection dogs (MDDs) to enhance the efficiency of technical survey (TS). The 2015 demining law, which only allows MDDs to be used in clearance and not for survey, should be amended.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Croatia considers its current national baseline of AP mined area to be reasonably accurate and evidence-based (although considerable mined area is being released without any mines being found). Croatia has AP mined area not only in civilian areas but also in areas under military control. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | There is strong national ownership of mine action, with good political will to implement Article 5. In 2024, Croatia contributed €45 million (68% of the total) to the overall mine action budget. National funding has been secured through to 2026. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | The proportion of women employed at CROMAC remains low and there was no change in 2024, or any significant initiatives introduced. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Croatia does not have a dedicated environmental management policy or standard for mine action, but relevant national legislation applies, and environmental protection is identified as a key goal in the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2026. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | Croatia provides regular, accurate, and consistent updates on its progress in Article 5 implementation at APMBC meetings and in its Article 7 reports. However, there were some discrepancies between the data in its Article 7 report and those reported to Mine Action Review. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Croatia has a National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2026. In 2024, Croatia submitted an updated work plan to 2026 with annual targets for land release. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | There is a continued need to conduct survey prior to clearance, to avoid clearing CHAs where no contamination is found. In 2024, hazardous areas which did not contain AP mines accounted for 31% of all cleared areas, an increase from the—already high—rate of 28% in 2023, although UXO and anti-vehicle mines may still be found. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Clearance output increased slightly in 2024, but Croatia still fell short of its overall land release target for the year, mainly due to clearing only 34.4km$^2$ of the planned 41.1km$^2$ in civilian areas. Croatia will need to significantly increase its survey and clearance outputs in 2025 to meet its Article 5 deadline. |
| **Average Score** | **6.8** | **6.8** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Ministry of the Interior (MoI), in which CROMAC and the Government Office for Mine Action (GOMA) are integrated within the Civil Protection Directorate.

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- A total of 42 commercial demining companies are accredited for mine clearance
- Pioneer Company of the Engineering Regiment, Croatian Armed Forces

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, Croatia reported a total of more than 47km$^2$ of mined area remaining, excluding military areas. Of this, nearly 41km$^2$ is in CHAs and over 6km$^2$ in SHAs (see Table 1).[1] This represents an 49% decrease in estimated contamination (excluding military areas) compared to 92km$^2$ of mined area at the end of 2023.[2] Croatia believes that hazardous areas, excluding military zones, contain 5,624 AP mines and 739 anti-vehicle (AV) mines.[3]

**Table 1: AP mined area in civilian areas (at end 2024)[4]**

| County | Municipal areas with hazardous areas* | CHA (m²) | SHAs | SHA (m²) | Total mined area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lika-Senj | 8 | 37,511,399 | 4 | 5,500,143 | 43,011,542 |
| Split-Dalmacija | 2 | 656,430 | 0 | 0 | 656,430 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | 6 | 2,832,065 | 3 | 701,176 | 3,533,241 |
| **Totals** | **16** | **40,999,894** | **7** | **6,201,319** | **47,201,213** |

*Not including mined areas under military control.

A further 10.1km$^2$ of confirmed mined area existed in areas under military control at end 2024 (down from 18.9km$^2$ at the end of 2023).[5] This mined area, which is also contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO), is across military barracks, training sites, radar stations, and storage sites. More than 2.1km$^2$ of UXO contamination remaining in Karlovac county, the result of explosions at military ammunition storage sites in two locations.[6]

Three of Croatia's twenty-one counties are still mine-affected, one fewer than in 2023. At the end of 2024, 98.5% of mined areas were in forests; 1.4% was on agricultural land; and 0.1% was classified as unspecified "other area".[7] Much of the remaining mined area is mountainous and has not been accessed for 20 years, so the terrain and conditions will make the demining challenging.[8] According to Croatia's Civil Protection Directorate, the baseline of AP mine contamination has been established through inclusive consultations. Croatia considers the baseline evidence-based and reasonably accurate.[9] That mined areas continue to be cleared without AP mines found calls this into question.

Croatia's mine contamination is the result of four years of armed conflict associated with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. During the conflict, landmines were laid by all warring parties, including Croatian government forces as well as the Yugoslav People's Army and local Serb paramilitaries. Mines were laid along shifting front lines and around strategic infrastructure, such as railways, power stations, and pipelines, leading to mine contamination in 14 of Croatia's 21 counties. Large agricultural areas, sections of infrastructure, forested land, and riverbanks were rendered inaccessible due to the known or suspected presence of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).[10]

## OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Croatia is thus also affected, though to a much lesser extent, by ERW. On 1 August 2020, Croatia declared fulfilment Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, having completed release of all known or suspected cluster munition-contaminated areas.[11]

1 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.
2 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 21 May 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form C.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.
4 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025. This differs from the 49.3km$^2$ reported in Croatia's Article 7 report covering 2024 although this is likely due to summing errors in the Article 7 report.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Interview with Nataša Mateković, CROMAC, Sisak, 18 May 2017.
9 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020.
10 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
11 Statement of Croatia on Clearance, CCM Second Review Conference, 25–27 November 2020.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In August 2018, the Croatian government decided to integrate 54 agencies, including CROMAC and the Government Office for Mine Action (GOMA), into existing State administration bodies. This was formalised through legislation effective from the beginning of 2019.[12] As a result, CROMAC and GOMA ceased to exist as separate entities, with CROMAC becoming an "operational sector" within the Civil Protection Directorate under the Ministry of the Interior (MoI).[13] The aim was to create a more efficient Civil Protection Directorate to handle all aspects of civil protection, including mine action.[14] Before 2019, CROMAC (established in 1998) and GOMA (created in 2012) operated independently.[15]

A new law on mine action was adopted by the Croatian parliament in 2015.[16] While the Law marked an improvement in certain respects—for instance, by permitting land release through TS—there were concerns it would impede efficient and effective mine action.[17] For accreditation, the MoI provides three separate permits: for manual mine detection, for mechanical mine detection, and for operations using mine and explosive detection dogs (MDDs/EDDs). This replaces the former unified accreditation licence.[18] On 18 September 2024, Parliament passed an amendment to the mine action law, introducing new regulations on land release methods to enhance Open Burning and Open Detonation (OBOD) procedures and improve stockpile destruction clearance operations.[19]

The Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC is not responsible for survey and clearance of military areas, which comes under the remit of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). But to address the slow progress in release of mined areas under military control, CROMAC and the MoD met in 2024 to improve cooperation between them. This included plans for joint non-technical survey (NTS) and TS to identify CHAs and SHAs that fall within the MoD's responsibility.[20] The Civil Protection Directorate also reported that an in-country platform for dialogue, consisting of representatives from the MoI and the association of private companies involved in demining, meets on a regular basis.[21]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In its 2018 Article 5 deadline extension request, Croatia estimated that fulfilment of its APMBC obligations would cost a further €459 million.[22] In its Revised Work Plan 2022–2026, Croatia estimated it would cost €219 million to clear the remaining mined area.[23] Half of the funding for land release through to 2025 was expected to come from the Croatian government with the remainder coming from the European Union (EU) and other sources.[24] In 2024, the overall annual mine action budget for survey and clearance in Croatia was €66.3 million. The State contribution was 68.3% of the total (approx. €45.3 million), an increase on the €38 million it provided in 2023. EU funding remained a significant contribution in 2024 at 31.5% of the total, while the Swiss-Croatian Cooperation Programme contributed 0.2%. The Swiss-Croatian Cooperation Programme ended in the summer of 2024 but the EU was expected to maintain its funding for 2025.[25]

Croatia does not have a resource mobilisation strategy for Article 5 implementation and the Civil Protection Directorate has indicated that such a strategy is unnecessary, as the financial framework for completing clearance and survey operations is fully defined through to 2026.[26]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The Gender Equality Act,[27] which establishes national guidelines for gender equality, prohibits gender-based discrimination and requires equal opportunities for men and women, including in employment.[28] The Civil Protection Directorate does not compile or disclose data regarding commercial demining companies, which are privately owned.[29] According to Croatia, the very low proportion of women working in the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC (see Table 2) is due to the fact that when CROMAC ceased to exist as an independent centre and was downsized when

12 Act on Amendments to the Act on Mine Action (OG No. 118/2018); and Act on Amendment to the Act on the Government (OG No. 116/2018).
13 Emails from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019 and 8 April 2020; and Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form J; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 1.
14 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form 4.1.
15 CROMAC, "National Mine Action Strategy of Croatia 2009–2019", Zagreb, June 2009, p. 2; interviews with Dijana Pleština, Director, GOMA, in Geneva, 23 May 2012 and 10 April 2014; and email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 4 July 2013.
16 OG No. 110/15; and Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form A.
17 Interviews with Neven Karas, and Tomislav Ban, Assistant Director and Head of Sector for Operational Planning and Programming, CROMAC, Sisak, 18 May 2017.
18 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 24 August 2016.
19 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025.
20 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2022.
21 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 7 April 2023.
22 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 44.
23 Revised Work Plan 2022–2026, April 2022, p. 13.
24 Ibid.
25 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025.
26 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 21 May 2024.
27 Official Gazette 82/08 and 69/17.
28 Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form C; Statement of Croatia, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 June 2018; and email from Davor Laura, CROMAC, 6 April 2018.
29 Email from Ivana Odalj, Civil Protection Directorate, 16 August 2021.

it was integrated within the Civil Protection Directorate/MoI in 2019, many women (including those in managerial positions) were transferred or promoted into other sectors and managerial positions in the MoI or in other State or local authority institutions.[30] There was no change in the proportion of women employed between 2023 to 2024.

**Table 2: Gender composition of CROMAC in 2024**[31]

| Total staff | Women staff | Total staff in managerial or supervisory positions | Women in managerial or supervisory positions | Total operations staff | Women in operational positions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 81 | 10 (12%) | 8 | 0 (0%) | 69 | 2 (3%) |

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Croatia has no plans to develop a stand-alone environmental management policy for mine action or specific national standards for environmental management as they feel this is already incorporated into current legislation. Several synchronised cross-ministry policies and laws already regulate environmental protection and sustainable waste management, and these also apply to mine action.[32] In addition, the 2015 Mine Action Act (as amended) requires that mine action operations minimise their adverse impact on the environment. Environmental management and nature protection are designated key goals in the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2026.[33]

Croatia's annual mine action plans are coordinated through several ministries, including the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development and local and regional administrations. Planning for mine action operations must identify and assess environmental issues and determine effective mitigation measures, which are then evaluated by county-level authorities. These plans are assessed for their impact, and prescribed protection measures must be strictly followed by the companies undertaking clearance.[34]

For EU and international projects targeting Natura 2000 Ecological Network areas or national park areas (particularly recent projects financed by the EU Cohesion Fund), the environmental considerations are more complex. Every clearance project is subject to a comprehensive environmental study, which details specific measures that must be performed before, during, and after clearance.[35] Three of these projects—"Naturavita", "Fearless Velebit", and "Karlovac Karst"—where clearance was completed in 2022, were subject to strict restrictions on when and how clearance could take place so as to minimise disruption to local species and habitats. As a high proportion of the remining mined area land is in forests, Croatia is putting sustainable development and environmental stewardship at the forefront with a focus on preserving and restoring forest ecosystems.[36]

Croatia considers climate-related and extreme weather risks when planning and prioritising survey and clearance tasks. There is a heightened risk of potentially uncontrollable forest fires and, in certain areas, floods. These risks are addressed in the "Disaster Risk Management Strategy of the Republic of Croatia until 2030",[37] which was officially adopted by the Croatian Government and developed by the Civil Protection Directorate. This strategy is the first document to provide a comprehensive, unified, and proactive approach to disaster risk management. It directs activities and investments across all phases of risk management.[38]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

CROMAC established its own mine information system (MIS), which is said to be compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and customised to meet CROMAC's needs. The MIS uses databases and a geographic information system (GIS) to deliver a fully integrated information management system.[39] Croatia was accepted into the eurozone in 2022, so all financial data were converted into euros.[40]

Croatia submits timely and accurate annual Article 7 transparency reports and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation at the APMBC intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties. However, there were some discrepancies between the land release data reported by Croatia to Mine Action Review and the figures in its Article 7 report.

30 Ibid.

31 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025.

32 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2022; and European Committee of the Regions, "Croatia - Environment & the Fight against Climate Change", at: https://bit.ly/4fdDZbZ.

33 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 21 May 2024.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 7 April 2023.

37 "Disaster Risk Management Strategy of the Republic of Croatia until 2030", at: https://shorturl.at/6t6HS.

38 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 21 May 2024.

39 CROMAC website, "CROMAC's Mine Information System", accessed 26 June 2018.

40 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 7 April 2023.

# PLANNING AND TASKING

Croatia has a National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2026, an updated text of which was approved in February 2023.[41] In 2018, Croatia's request to extend its Article 5 deadline by seven years to 1 March 2026 was granted by States Parties. In its extension request, Croatia said it had prioritised the remaining mined areas according to those which affect safety, pose barriers to socio-economic development, or impact the environment in other ways. Priorities at the operational level are elaborated in annual demining action plans.[42]

A "Mine Action Revised Work Plan 2020–26" was adopted by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior in 2019.[43] In accordance with the decision by States Parties on Croatia's extension request, a newly updated workplan was submitted in 2022–26, setting out how Croatia proposed to release the 234km$^2$ of mined area remaining at the end of 2021.[44] And then in April 2024, Croatia submitted a newly updated work plan to 2026.

From 2019 to 2023, Croatia released almost 275.3km$^2$ compared to the 279.4km$^2$ planned in the extension request.[45] Croatia provided land release targets for 2024 to 2026 with a total of 108.4km$^2$ of mined area, including 18.9km$^2$ under the MoD's jurisdiction, to be released (see Table 3).[46] The planned land release output of 89.5km$^2$ excludes 2.6km$^2$ of UXO contamination in Karlovac.

**Table 3: Planned land release of mined area (km$^2$) (2024–26)[47]**

| | Total | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Karlovac | 11.8 | 11.8 | 0* | 0 |
| Lika-Senj | 59.3 | 22.0 | 37.3 | 0 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | 10.4 | 9.3 | 1.1 | 0 |
| Split-Dalmacija | 8 | 8.0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Subtotals** | **89.5** | **51.1** | **38.4** | **0** |
| Croatian Army (MoD area) | 18.9 | 7.1 | 11.8 | 0 |
| **Totals** | **108.4** | **58.2** | **50.2** | **0** |

*Planned release of 2.6km$^2$ of UXO-contaminated area.

Based on approved funding, CROMAC drafts annual work plans, which are submitted to the responsible ministries and other concerned State bodies for comment and approval.[48] In 2024, CROMAC planned to release 41.1km$^2$ through clearance, 5.4km$^2$ through TS, and 5km$^2$ through NTS, totalling 51.5 km$^2$ (up slightly from the 51.1km$^2$ in the work plan), as well as 7.1km$^2$ in military areas.[49] It met its overall land release target for the year, but fell short of it clearance target. In 2025, Croatia planned to release 38.4km$^2$ of mined area in civilian areas and 11.8km$^2$ of military mined area totalling 50.2km$^2$.[50]

The army was set to release mined area at military training grounds and barracks totalling 910,000m$^2$ in 2024. But since, due to its limited demining capacity, the MoD will not be able to clear the remaining mined areas under its responsibility by 2026 on its own, release of mined area at the "Eugen Kvaternik – Slunj" military training ground will be undertaken with the help of the Civil Protection Directorate and CROMAC. The necessary financial resources will be allocated from the State budget to conduct the demining plan for military locations in 2024.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

The 2015 law on mine action allowed use of TS to confirm the presence or absence of contamination.[51] The law introduced a new procedure for "supplementary general survey" (a form of NTS) and enabled "exclusion" (i.e. reduction) of SHAs through TS, which was not possible under the previous law.[52] The law also eliminated the need for standard operating

41 Ibid.
42 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 11.
43 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 30 April 2021.
44 Revised Work Plan 2022–2026, April 2022, p. 10.
45 Ibid., p. 3.
46 Ibid., p. 14.
47 Ibid.
48 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019.
49 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 21 May 2024.
50 Ibid; and Revised Work Plan 2024–2026, April 2024, p. 14.
51 National Gazette No. 110/15; and CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form A.
52 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form A; and emails from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 and 18 May 2016.

procedures (SOPs), as all aspects of mine action were defined in detail.[53] National mine action standards are also encompassed within it.[54] The law was amended in 2023, with revisions made to regulations to enhance the effectiveness of land release.[55]

In recent years, many CHAs have been cleared in which no AP mines were found, although the Civil Protection Directorate said many of these areas did contain AV mines or UXO. Other oversized CHAs were cleared with very few AP mines discovered. In 2024, hazardous areas that did not contain AP mines accounted for 31% of all cleared areas, an increase from 28% in 2023.[56] The high proportion of cleared land containing no AP mines in recent years calls into question the efficiency of the demining. It strongly suggests a need for better use of evidence-based survey to confirm contamination before time- and cost-intensive full clearance of mined areas recorded by CROMAC as "confirmed".

According to CROMAC, however, these figures should be understood in the wider context of Croatia's remaining contamination and the limitations of survey methods in difficult terrain. Over the past five years, most remaining areas have been in mountainous or heavily forested environments, where conditions such as soil erosion, dense vegetation, incomplete records, and irregular emplacement patterns of mines mean that TS cannot provide the necessary level of safety assurance. As a result, more of these areas are cleared, where only isolated mines or small groups of mines may be found. While technologies such as UAVs, advanced sensors, and AI models are being explored, they have yet to prove efficient in Croatia's challenging terrain. This has contributed to the higher proportion of areas cleared without finding AP mines, although some of these areas still contain other types of ordnance, including UXO and AV mines.[57]

Croatia organises an annual Mine Action Symposium, which discusses new detection and clearance technologies. The 2024 symposium brought together more than 220 participants from 35 countries to exchange experiences, explore solutions to technical and management challenges, and gain insights into the latest technologies in mine action, with a particular focus on efforts in Croatia and Ukraine.[58]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, 40 commercial companies were engaged in mine clearance operations in Croatia (see Table 4). But all survey is conducted by CROMAC, with two NTS personnel and twenty-four TS personnel deployed in 2024. Additionally, 19 deminers are assigned for quality control (QC). No significant changes to NTS, TS, or clearance capacity were planned for 2025.[59] The Pioneer Company of the Engineering Regiment is responsible for clearing all military facilities.[60]

**Table 4: Clearance capacity (in 2024)**[61]

| Clearance capacity | Numbers | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| Deminers | 343 | Down from 362 in 2023. In addition, there were 88 work site leaders. |
| Mine detection dogs | 50 | Up from 44 in 2023. |
| Machines | 32 | Down from 55 in 2023. |

Croatia has calculated that with the clearance capacity currently available, manual deminers would be able to release a total of 30.4km$^2$ per year; "work site leaders" 8.2km$^2$ per year; MDDs 4.4km$^2$ per year; and machines 19.3km$^2$ per year, for an annual total of 62.3km$^2$ per year. That said, the figure given in the work plan is 43.04km$^2$ per year.[62]

**Table 5: Clearance output from current capacity**[63]

| Clearance capacity | Number | Daily output (m²) | Workdays | Totals (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deminers | 362 | 400 | 210 | 30,408,000 |
| Work site leaders | 98 | 400 | 210 | 8,232,000 |
| MDDs | 44 | 1,000 | 100 | 4,400,000 |
| Machines | 55 | 3,500 | 100 | 19,250,000 |
| **Totals** | **559** | **5,300** | **620** | **62,290,000** |

53 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May 2016; and Article 7 Report (covering 2015), Form A.
54 Emails from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May 2016; and Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 7 April 2023.
55 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form A; and email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 21 May 2024.
56 Emails from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025; and Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 21 May 2024.
57 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 September 2025.
58 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025.
59 Ibid.
60 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25; and email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 30 April 2021.
61 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025.
62 Revised Work Plan 2024-2026, April 2024, p. 13.
63 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 7 April 2023.

Clearance is largely conducted manually, but machines and MDDs are also used. Demining machines are mainly used as a preparatory tool to support manual and MDD clearance due to the type of terrain making it unsuitable to use machines for clearance.[64] In accordance with the 2015 Act on Mine Action and its prescribed methodologies, MDDs are used only for clearance and not TS.[65] Croatia had previously reported plans to develop methods and techniques for use of MDDs for TS, as a potentially more effective tool to address mined areas in mountainous terrain.[66] However, this would require amendment of the 2015 demining law. The Civil Protection Directorate reported to Mine Action Review in 2024 that, due to existing challenges and the dense forested areas, there were no plans to use MDDs for TS in Croatia.[67]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Croatia released over 51.7km² of mined area in 2024, most by clearance, destroying in the process 1,533 AP mines (see Table 6). This is a drop on the 58.5km² of mined area released the year before.

**Table 6: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 42.51 | National authority data |
| **Technical survey** | 4.20 | National authority data, including release in areas under military control |
| **Non-technical survey** | 5.02 | National authority data |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 1,533 | Includes 138 handed into to the police by members of the public |

## SURVEY IN 2024

CROMAC released a total of nearly 8.5km² of civilian areas through survey in 2024, a 48% decrease on the more than 16.5km² released through survey in 2023.[68] More than 5km² was cancelled through NTS and over 3.4km² was reduced through TS in 2024 (see Tables 7 and 8). In addition, 0.75km² of military area was reduced through TS in 2024, an increase from 2023 when no military areas were released through survey.[69]

There was also 402,772m² of previously unrecorded AP mined area added to the database through NTS in 2024.[70] The majority of this area (0.35km²) was in the municipalities of Hrvace and Vrlika in Split-Dalmatia County, where areas were found to be contaminated following analysis of completed clearance operations in adjacent areas.[71]

**Table 7: Release of mined area through NTS in 2024**[72]

| County | Operator | Areas cancelled | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Karlovac | CROMAC | 6 | 1,694,869 |
| Lika-Senj | CROMAC | 4 | 2,171,710 |
| Split-Dalmacija | CROMAC | 1 | 45,852 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | CROMAC | 1 | 1,103,166 |
| **Totals** | | **12** | **5,015,597** |

64 Emails from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 12 and 23 September 2025.
65 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019.
66 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 43, 44, and 45; and Additional information submitted 21 June 2018, p. 1.
67 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 21 May 2024.
68 Emails from Civil; and Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 21 May 2024.
69 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.
70 Ibid.
71 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 12 September 2025.
72 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025.

**Table 8: Release through TS of mined area (in civilian areas only) in 2024**[73]

| County | Operator | Areas reduced | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lika-Senj | CROMAC | 6 | 3,000,278 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | CROMAC | 1 | 447,596 |
| **Totals** | | **7** | **3,447,874** |

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, a total of more than 42.2km² of mined area was released through clearance (34.4km² by operators working under the direction of CROMAC and nearly 7.8km² of military areas cleared by commercial companies under the direction of CROMAC and in cooperation with the MoD). During land release, a total of 1,395 AP mines were destroyed during clearance (1,100 by the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC and 295 by the MoD).[74] This is a small increase from the 42.07km² of mined area released through clearance in 2023.[75] In addition, 0.29km² of area was cleared by the Pioneer Company of the Engineering Regiment and 138 AP mines were handed over by the public to the police as part of their 'Less arms, less tragedies' campaign where members of the public are encouraged to turn in any mines or other ordnance in their possession without legal penalty.[76]

**Table 9: Mine clearance in 2024 (including military clearance)**[77]

| County | Operator | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Split-Dalmacija | Zeleni Kvadrat | 980,869 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Titan | 1,117,848 | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| Lika-Senj | Zeleni Kvadrat | 630,513 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lika-Senj | Zeleni Kvadrat | 691,831 | 16 | 0 | 9 |
| Split-Dalmacija | Fas | 636,878 | 34 | 0 | 2 |
| Lika-Senj | Titan | 681,336 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Dok-Ing Razminiranje | 1,115,449 | 130 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Fas | 583,461 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Lika-Senj | Manang | 1,089,469 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | Manang | 554,211 | 185 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Fas | 1,294,310 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Istraživač | 1,163,208 | 7 | 0 | 1 |
| Lika-Senj | Istraživač | 506,517 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| Lika-Senj | Rumital | 944,033 | 23 | 3 | 4 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | Istraživač | 81,386 | 30 | 0 | 1 |
| Lika-Senj | Cor | 1,003,640 | 0 | 0 | 251 |
| Karlovac | Dok-Ing Razminiranje | 848,832 | 39 | 0 | 2 |
| Lika-Senj | Piper | 396,294 | 71 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Zeleni Kvadrat | 1,027,788 | 20 | 0 | 27 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | Orkan | 982,750 | 4 | 0 | 7 |
| Karlovac | Orkan | 632,404 | 20 | 0 | 4 |
| Karlovac | Diz-Eko | 1,022,842 | 46 | 0 | 40 |
| Karlovac | Piton | 999,962 | 32 | 1 | 126 |

73 Ibid.

74 Emails from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May and 12 September 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C. In the Article 7 report the amount of clearance of civilian areas is recorded as 34.7km².

75 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 21 May 2024.

76 Emails from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May and 12 September 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.

77 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025.

**Table 9 Continued**

| County | Operator | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Karlovac | Cor | 528,429 | 11 | 0 | 1 |
| Lika-Senj | Cor | 200,165 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lika-Senj | Harpija | 751,157 | 31 | 0 | 0 |
| Lika-Senj | Rumital | 376,289 | 4 | 0 | 20 |
| Split-Dalmacija | Orkan | 41,813 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Istraživač | 1,122,862 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Karlovac | Piton | 1,024,186 | 67 | 0 | 45 |
| Karlovac | Diz-Eko | 583,867 | 12 | 0 | 321 |
| Karlovac | Istraživač | 1,054,521 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | Rumital | 635,359 | 58 | 0 | 0 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | Orkan | 74,366 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | I.T.R. | 1,031,833 | 104 | 17 | 94 |
| Lika-Senj | Piper | 1,056,952 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lika-Senj | Harpija | 384,808 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Istraživač | 499,844 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lika-Senj | Piper | 571,293 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | Orkan | 935,771 | 14 | 0 | 14 |
| Karlovac | Rumital | 137,094 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lika-Senj | Istraživač | 224,944 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lika-Senj | Harpija | 987,738 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Istraživač | 302,524 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | Piper | 119,665 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Piper | 119,573 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lika-Senj | Cor | 483,681 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Istraživač | 411,247 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Split-Dalmacija | Heksogen | 844,780 | 21 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Piper | 42,985 | 0 | 0 | 22 |
| Split-Dalmacija | Cor | 980,355 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Split-Dalmacija | Heksogen | 426,877 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Split-Dalmacija | Fas | 775,173 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Dok-Ing Razminiranje | 1,134,764 | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | Piper | 738,308 | 38 | 0 | 0 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | Istraživač | 742,900 | 303 | 0 | 2 |
| Split-Dalmacija | Tornado Razminiranje | 1,071,494 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Split-Dalmacija | Cor | 883,066 | 13 | 0 | 6 |
| Split-Dalmacija | Fas | 966,901 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | Fossio | 52,443 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Sisak-Moslavina | Heksogen | 462,869 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Karlovac | Fas | 451,132 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **42,219,859** | **1,395** | **22** | **1,007** |

The amount of area cleared in 2024 increased compared to the previous year, as did the proportion of mines cleared per square metre, which increased from one AP mine destroyed for every 52,000m$^2$ of cleared area (excluding the items of UXO and AV mines destroyed) to one AP mine per 30,000m$^2$. However, Croatia is still clearing large amounts of area with no AP mines found, indicating very poor targeting of clearance and suggesting that Croatia could be releasing much greater area through survey. CROMAC reported that in 2024, 24 tasks totalling 13.19km$^2$ were cleared with no AP mines found (although one AV mine and 277 items of UXO) were found, an 11% increase from 2023.[78]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CROATIA: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019

↓

**SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (7-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2026**

**JUST ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Croatia is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026. It is just on track to meet this deadline.

Croatia's clearance output increased slightly from 2023 to 2024, but it fell short of its overall land release target of 58.6km$^2$, instead releasing 51.7km$^2$. In civilian areas, Croatia had planned to release 51.5km$^2$, of which 41.1km$^2$ would be through clearance, 5.4km$^2$ through TS, and 5km$^2$ through NTS. While Croatia met its target for NTS, it fell short on clearance (achieving only 34.4km$^2$), as well as on TS. In military areas, Croatia exceeded its land release target of 7.1km$^2$, managing to release 8.84km$^2$ of which 8.09km$^2$ was through clearance and the remainder 0.75km$^2$ was through TS.

At the end of 2024, Croatia had 57.3km$^2$ of AP mined area remaining, including 10.1km$^2$ of military areas. As at September 2025, Croatia remained confident it is on track to meet its Article 5 mine clearance deadline.[79] While possible, this is an ambitious goal and would require higher annual land release output than Croatia has achieved in recent years. This also does not include any previously unrecorded AP mine contamination that may be added to the baseline. In 2025, 0.4km$^2$ was added to the database.

**Table 10: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km$^2$) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 42.51 |
| 2023 | 42.07 |
| 2022 | 40.67 |
| 2021 | 34.48 |
| 2020 | 49.66 |
| **Total** | **209.39** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

CROMAC has reported that managing residual contamination will be the joint responsibility of several departments within the MoI.[80] Activities which must be conducted upon discovery of residual contamination are predefined in law by the Mine Action Act.[81] Croatia plans to reduce its demining capacity once it has met the requirements of its Article 5 deadline, while retaining core capabilities for addressing residual contamination and explosive ordnance disposal. It also aims to maintain capacity for knowledge transfer, international cooperation, database management, risk education, victim assistance coordination, and related functions.[82]

78 Ibid.

79 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 12 September 2025.

80 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 7 April 2023.

81 Statement of Croatia on Clearance, CCM Second Review Conference (Part 1, virtual meeting), 25–27 November 2020.

82 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025.

# CYPRUS

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JULY 2028

Not on track to meet deadline
(Lack of effective control)

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 1KM²

Light
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0 | 0 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 0 | 0 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- None

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

No progress was reported in 2024 towards the Republic of Cyprus (Cyprus) and Türkiye/the Turkish Cypriot authorities agreeing to complete mine clearance on the island, and for a fifth consecutive year no mined area was released. In March and July 2025, however, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General held two informal meetings with the leader of Cyprus, President Nikos Christodoulides, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Ersin Tatar, which resulted in agreeing six new initiatives to build trust, including one on demining. Following the second of these meetings, held in July 2025, the UN Secretary-General reported that, "an agreement on demining will be closed once the final technical details are established".

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities should both work to achieve a mine-free Cyprus and make progress towards releasing the 29 remaining hazardous areas on the island.**
- **Cyprus and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) should update, consolidate, and align data on remaining mined areas.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No national mine action authority or mine action centre

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None (Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and DOK-ING were last active in 2017)

### OTHER ACTORS

- UN-supported mine action in Cyprus is coordinated by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) on behalf of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of anti-personnel (AP) mined area in Cyprus is unclear. Cyprus's most recent Article 7 report, submitted in July 2024, repeated that 21 AP minefields laid by Turkish Armed Forces remained: 1 in the buffer zone in the vicinity of the Deryneia village, and the other 20 north of, but "overwhelmingly situated adjacent to the buffer zone". Cyprus said it did not know the size of these mined areas or if they contained mines other than AP mines.[1] In a media report in June 2024, sources from the Cypriot government indicated that no AP mines were left in the buffer zone, or indeed elsewhere "inside the Republic", although it is unclear if the reference to demining in the buffer zone referred only to AP mines laid by its own forces.[2] The sources acknowledged that anti-vehicle (AV) mines remain in territory controlled by the Cypriot government for defence purposes. The media report also claimed to cite an estimate from the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) that 7,000 mines remain emplaced across the island, covering a total of 2km$^2$.[3]

Contamination data in UNFICYP's mine action database cited by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) differ from those provided by Cyprus. It showed that, across Cyprus, 29 mined areas covered a total of 1.5km$^2$ at the end of 2024, a level unchanged since the end of 2019.[4] The contamination consisted mostly of AV mines (see Table 1). North of the buffer zone, mined areas include one confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and five suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) thought to contain a mixture of AP and AV mines. Nineteen hazardous areas recorded south of the buffer zone contain only AV mines (13 CHAs and 6 SHAs) as do three of four CHAs in the buffer zone (the mine type in the fourth was unknown).[5] UNMAS reported that there were no changes in recorded contamination in 2024.[6]

**Table 1: Mined area in Cyprus (at end 2024)[7]**

| Location | CHAs | Contamination | Area (m²) | SHAs | Contamination | Area (m²) | Total areas | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| South of the buffer zone (territory under effective control of the Government of Cyprus) | 13 | AV mines | 418,543 | 6 | AV mines | 174,014 | 19 | 592,557 |
| Buffer Zone | 4 | AV mines (3 areas)<br>Unknown (1 area) | 703,581 | 0 | N/A | N/A | 4 | 703,581 |
| North of the buffer zone (territory not under the effective control of the Government of Cyprus) | 1 | Mixed (AV mines and AP mines) | 170,493 | 5 | Mixed | 65,281 | 6 | 235,774 |
| **Totals** | **18** | | **1,292,617** | **11** | | **239,295** | **29** | **1,531,912** |

Cyprus has been divided since 1974 by a 180km-long buffer zone, following the invasion by Turkish Armed Forces in the north of the island. Minefields were laid by both the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Armed Forces. Permission for UNFICYP to access areas within and outside the buffer zone remains limited.[8]

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form C.

2 "Buffer zone now free of mines, government says", *Cyprus Mail*, 8 June 2024 at: https://bit.ly/3KGlRcz.

3 Ibid.

4 Emails from Mark Connelly, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 8 April 2020, 26 June 2020, 28 May 2021, 12 May 2022, and 22 March 2023; and interview in Geneva, 30 April 2024.

5 Email from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 22 March 2023.

6 Interview with Mark Connolly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, in Geneva, 9 April 2025.

7 Emails from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 8 April and 26 June 2020, 28 May 2021, 12 May 2022, 22 March 2023; and interviews with Mark Connelly in Geneva, 16 April 2024 and 9 April 2025.

8 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Stefan De Coninck, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich Pearce, UNFICYP), 26 September 2017.

## TERRITORY UNDER THE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS

Cyprus' latest Article 7 report (covering 2023) reiterates that no AP mines remain in the minefields laid by the National Guard that are in territory under its effective control.[9] In total, between becoming a State Party on 1 July 2003 and its original Article 5 deadline of 1 July 2013, Cyprus released 20 mined areas under its effective control.[10]

Türkiye has accused Cyprus of disseminating "inaccurate and misleading information", saying that, "as part of its false allegations, the Greek Cypriot side claims that it has cleared all anti-personnel mines as of 2013 as part of its obligations stemming from the Ottawa Convention and that the only other mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines are located in the areas north of the buffer zone."[11] Türkiye has called this allegation by Cyprus, "a blatant falsehood."[12] The self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) used very similar terminology in its letter of 3 June 2024 to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Committee on Article 5 Implementation regarding the request by Cyprus for an extension to its Article 5 deadline.[13] UNMAS UNFICYP records, however, also indicate that there are no remaining AP mines in territory south of the buffer zones, and that only AV mines remain in territory controlled by Cyprus (see Table 1).

Türkiye and TRNC have pointed to the response of Cyprus to the Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2023 (covering 2022) as one reason to question information provided by Cyprus on the clearance of AP mines.[14] In its response to the Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines the previous year, in 2022 (covering 2021), Cyprus stated at question 10, "On 20 January 2011, the clearance of all minefields laid by the National Guard located in the Buffer Zone was completed," and this is repeated in Form B of the document. In its response to the OSCE questionnaires since 2023, however, Cyprus has stated (at question 10) that it concluded clearance of all minefields laid by the National Guard by 20 January 2023 rather than 20 January 2011, though in Form B, it has reiterated that clearance was completed on 20 January 2011.[15]

## BUFFER ZONE

Four mined areas remained in the buffer zone at the end of 2022, three of which belong to the National Guard and contain only AV mines. The fourth belongs to Turkish Armed Forces and the mine type is unknown.[16] The Government of Cyprus considers the three minefields with only AV mines to be under its control and not within the buffer zone.[17]

## TURKISH-CONTROLLED TERRITORY IN NORTHERN CYPRUS

The extent of mined area in areas controlled by Turkish Armed Forces is not known. Cyprus made its 2024 Article 5 extension deadline request for the same reason as the previous four extension requests (in 2012, 2015, 2018, and 2021), on the grounds that areas "occupied by Türkiye" are, "the only ones in the jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus that remain emplaced with anti-personnel mines or are suspected" to be so.[18]

Since the end of 2019, Cyprus has estimated that 20 Turkish-laid AP minefields remain north of and mostly adjacent to the buffer zone, plus one in the buffer zone near Deryneia village,[19] while UNMAS UNFICYP has recorded one CHA and 5 SHAs of mixed AP and AV mines north of the buffer zone covering a total of 235,774m$^2$ (see Table 1 above). Cyprus reports that both the size of the minefields north of the buffer zone and whether the mined area include mines other than AP mines is unknown.[20] It has further stated that it "continue[s] to be forcefully prevented from exercising effective control over a large area of its sovereign territory in the northern part of the island, which is occupied by Türkiye, rendering it impossible to verify the status of known or suspected minefields in this area".[21]

One minefield has been reported just north of the buffer zone in Mammari, where heavy rains led to mines being washed into the buffer zone in 2014 and 2015. UNFICYP has raised the issue of clearance of this minefield with the Turkish Armed Forces and has offered assistance in this regard.[22] In 2017, a small area of the Mammari minefield was cleared by a Croatian commercial operator contracted by the Turkish Armed Forces.[23] No further information was available and it is assumed that there has been no further progress.

9 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form C.

10 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Observations on implementation of Article 5 by Cyprus", 23 June 2015; and Article 7 Report (covering 2013), Form G.

11 Statement of Türkiye on Cyprus's Article 5 deadline extension request, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024.

12 Ibid.; and Statement of Türkiye, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Riep, 25–29 November 2024.

13 Letter from Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) of the TRNC, to H.E. Gustavo Gallón, Chair of the APMBC Article 5 Implementation Committee, 3 June 2024.

14 Statement of Türkiye, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Riep, 25–29 November 2024; and letter from Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, MoFA, TRNC, to Gustavo Gallón, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 3 June 2024.

15 Response of Cyprus to the OSCE Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines for 2024, 2023, 2022, and 2021.

16 Email from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 23 March 2023; and Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2018/676, 6 July 2018, para. 44.

17 Interview with Demitris Samuel, Deputy Permanent Representative, Cyprus Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 19 May 2016.

18 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.

19 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form C.

20 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form C.

21 Statement of Cyprus, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024.

22 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form C; and email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich Pearce, UNFICYP), 24 July 2017.

23 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Stefan De Coninck, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich Pearce, UNFICYP), 10 September 2018.

# NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

UN-supported mine action operations in Cyprus are coordinated by UNMAS on behalf of UNFICYP.[24] UNMAS is a component of UNFICYP, providing expertise in mine action planning and coordination, quality assurance (QA) oversight, and management of mine action information.[25] UNMAS also provides assistance to the Committee on Missing Persons to ensure safe access to areas where it conducts activities and to UNFICYP for small arms ammunition storage.[26]

In 2024, Cyprus sought and was granted a fifth extension to its Article 5 deadline on the same basis as previous requests, that "areas of Cyprus's sovereign territory are occupied by Türkiye and are therefore de facto outside the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus".[27] The Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted the importance of Cyprus seeking a cooperative solution to the situation so that it will be in a position to declare completion of its obligations under Article 5, and of keeping States Parties regularly apprised of efforts and other developments regarding its implementation of Article 5.[28]

The most recent reported release of mined area was in 2019 when 18 SHAs (nine under the effective control of Cyprus and nine in the north of the island) were checked and declared mine-free.[29] UNFICYP had defined the 18 areas as potentially hazardous as a result of mines laid in the areas. The successful inspection of the 18 SHAs was achieved following a 2019 agreement between the President of Cyprus and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community in the context of confidence-building measures.[30]

The UN Security Council has made repeated calls for mine clearance on the island, most recently in January 2025, when it urged "the sides to agree and continue a plan of work to achieve a mine-free Cyprus, and … to make expeditious progress towards clearing the 29 remaining suspected hazardous areas on the island".[31] In his report to the Council in January 2025, the UN Secretary-General stated that: "The mission's Mine Action Service continued to support the Force Commander in engaging with both sides regarding options for a new phase of clearance activities, with a special focus on the buffer zone and on remaining anti-personnel mines. No progress was made during the reporting period in clearing the 29 remaining suspected hazardous areas on the island, including the 4 active minefields in the buffer zone, 3 of which belong to the National Guard and 1 to the Turkish Forces."[32]

While the Turkish Cypriot authorities have expressed potential interest in reaching an agreement on mine clearance if it involved reciprocity from the other side, most recently setting out proposals for cooperation via the UN Secretary-General in 2022,[33] the Greek Cypriot National Guard previously did not wish to discuss the matter.[34] The Government of Cyprus has maintained that mined areas in which AP mines have been or are suspected to be emplaced are in areas outside its effective control.[35]

The year 2025, however, has brought some signs of progress after the UN Secretary-General held informal meetings with the leaders of Cyprus and the TRNC. After the first, held in Geneva in March 2025, the Secretary-General reported that demining had been agreed as one of six trust-building initiatives.[36] He suggested that this agreement "lent some political impetus" to efforts to clear the remaining 29 mines on the island, even though "the previously-held positions of the sides remain the same."[37] Further meetings took place at the UN base in Cyprus between the two leaders in April and May 2025, to discuss the six initiatives.[38] In July 2025, after a second meeting with the UN Secretary-General in New York, the Secretary-General reported that demining was one of four initiatives to have been achieved, albeit that the agreement would be "closed" when the technical details were established.[39]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

UNMAS Cyprus is funded by the UN peacekeeping assessed budget for UNFICYP. The resources cover technical capacity for planning and coordination; awareness training for UNFICYP personnel; advocacy activities; and data management of mine action information.[40]

24 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Stefan De Coninck, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich Pearce, UNFICYP), 10 September 2018.

25 UNMAS, "Cyprus" webpage, accessed 6 June 2024, at: http://bit.ly/2GtTXje.

26 Ibid.

27 Cyprus Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 8 March 2024; and Decision of the APMBC Fifth Review Conference, 27 November 2024.

28 Analysis of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2025.

29 Cyprus Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 11 August 2021.

30 Ibid.; and email from Aysan Mullahasan Atılgan, Director for Political Affairs, MoFA, TRNC, 11 August 2022.

31 UN Security Council Resolution 2771 (2025), 31 January 2025, operative para. 18.

32 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2025/6, 3 January 2025, operative para. 22.

33 Email from Aysan Mullahasan Atılgan, MoFA, TRNC, 11 August 2022; Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2023/6, 3 January 2023, Annex II, pp. 22–23; and letter from Damla Güçlü, Director-General, MOFA, TRNC, 2 May 2023, attached to email from Aysan Mullahasan Atılgan, MoFA, TRNC, of 3 May 2023.

34 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2024/12, 3 January 2024, operative para. 24.

35 Email from Giorgos Samouel, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations Office, 10 August 2023; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.

36 United Nations Office at Geneva, "Informal Meeting on Cyprus, UN Geneva: UN Secretary-General António Guterres Media Stakeout", 18 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3TSk8Wd.

37 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2025/447, 3 July 2025, operative para. 20.

38 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2025/448, 3 July 2025 operative paras. 4 and 5; and "Rival Cypriot sides to work on removing landmines, other peace initiatives", *Reuters*, 2 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3H0lP0V.

39 United Nations Secretary-General, "Secretary-General's remarks to press following informal meeting on Cyprus", 17 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4m5N6Or.

40 UNMAS, "Cyprus" webpage, accessed 22 July 2025; and UNFICYP, "Mine Action" webpage, accessed 22 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4lz8tYy.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

In recent years, including 2024, only one member of staff has been deployed at UNMAS UNFICYP—the Chief of Operations—who is male.[41]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

There was no available information on environmental policies relevant to demining in Cyprus.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

UNFICYP uses the New Generation version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).[42]

Cyprus has submitted annual Article 7 reports regularly since becoming a State Party to the APMBC in July 2003, most recently in 2024, covering calendar year 2023. As at July 2025, Cyprus had not submitted an Article 5 report covering 2024. Cyprus has submitted five Article 5 deadline extension requests: in 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021, and most recently in 2024. Cyprus submitted most of the reports in a timely manner but provided only limited information due to its lack of effective control over the remaining AP mined areas.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Neither the Republic of Cyprus nor Türkiye/the Turkish Cypriot authorities have yet disclosed plans to survey and clear the remaining mine contamination. The self-proclaimed TRNC has reported that it made a proposal for a mine-free island on 8 July 2022 and that it had previously made comprehensive proposals for clearing mines from the island in 2014, 2015, and 2018.[43]

In its proposal for a mine-free island, dated 8 July 2022, reportedly conveyed to the Government of Cyprus through the UN Secretary-General, the TRNC said that it proposed that the ultimate goal be clearance of the 29 remaining SHAs to free the island from all landmines; demining to be facilitated by UNFICYP in coordination with the two sides; demining to commence in areas adjacent to the buffer zone (one minefield under the "jurisdiction" of the Turkish Cypriot authorities in Deryneia, the other three under the control of the Government of Cyprus); demining in each side to be conducted proportionately and simultaneously; and that both sides convene to discuss, in detail, the modalities of the demining operations.[44] At the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2024, Türkiye confirmed that this proposal was "still on the table".[45]

As indicated above, there were some initial developments in 2025 following informal meetings brokered by the UN Secretary-General, that could result in a plan for demining on the island of Cyprus as part of a number of trust-building initiatives.[46]

41 Interviews with Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, in Geneva, 30 April 2024 and 9 April 2025.

42 Email from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 16 June 2021.

43 Email from Aysan Mullahasan Atılgan, MoFA TRNC, 11 August 2022; and letters from Damla Güçlü, MOFA, TRNC, 3 May 2023, and from Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, MoFA, TRNC, to Gustavo Gallón, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 3 June 2024.

44 "Proposal of the TRNC for a Mine-Free Island", provided via an email from Aysan Mullahasan Atılgan, MoFA TRNC, 11 August 2022; see also Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2023/6, 3 January 2023, Annex II, pp. 22–23.

45 Statement of Türkiye (right of reply) on Cyprus's Article 5 deadline extension request, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024.

46 United Nations, "Secretary-General's remarks to press following informal meeting on Cyprus", 17 July 2025.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

All UN-supported mine action operations in Cyprus are said to be conducted in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[47] In 2016, UNMAS updated the national technical standards and guidelines that are used in UNFICYP to reflect current best practice and to ensure the highest standards are applied for UNFICYP clearance operations.[48] It is not known whether there have been further updates.

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

UNMAS conducts non-technical survey (NTS) and technical survey (TS) in cooperation with representatives of the National Guard and Turkish Cypriot Security Force.[49] No clearance has been conducted since 2017 when the Turkish Armed Forces contracted DOK-ING to conduct clearance in the Mammari minefield and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) to conduct QA of the demining.[50]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

No mine survey or clearance was reported in Cyprus between 2020 and 2024.[51]

UNFICYP continued to raise the issue of demining in accordance with its mandate, but by the end of 2024, there had been no agreement on options to continue demining.[52] It was, however, reported in 2024 that UNMAS had prepared options for a new phase of clearance with a focus on the buffer zone and on remaining AP mines,[53] though no further details were disclosed.

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CYPRUS: 1 JULY 2003

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JULY 2013

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JULY 2016

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JULY 2019

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JULY 2022

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JULY 2025

↓

**FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JULY 2028**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (LACK OF EFFECTIVE CONTROL)**

Cyprus is obligated to destroy or ensure the destruction of all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than 1 July 2028.

Cyprus reported clearing all AP mines in mined areas that it accepted were under its control within ten years of becoming a State Party, namely by 1 July 2013. In 2012, Cyprus submitted the first of five Article 5 deadline extension requests, on the grounds that Cyprus does not have effective control over remaining contaminated areas in the northern part of the island which are "occupied by Türkiye". Cyprus has provided the same justification for all subsequent extension requests. The fifth request, submitted in March 2024, sought an extension of three years until 1 July 2028.[54]

47 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich Pearce, UNFICYP), 24 July 2017.

48 Ibid.

49 Email from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 26 July 2019.

50 Ibid.

51 Article 7 Reports (covering 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023), Forms C and F; 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request; emails from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 28 May 2021, 12 May 2022, 23 March 2023, and 16 April 2024, and interview in Geneva, 9 April 2025.

52 Interview with Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFCYP, in Geneva, 9 April 2025.

53 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2024/527, 5 July 2024, operative para. 22.

54 See, e.g., the latest request by Cyprus: 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.

This request was granted at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024.

Türkiye received a three-year, nine-month extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline until 31 December 2025 but did not request additional time for clearance of the areas it controls in the northern part of Cyprus.[55] Türkiye also did not make reference to clearing AP mines in the northern part of Cyprus in its five-year Article 5 deadline extension request of 28 March 2025,[56] which was due to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025.

In 2025 there were indications of some initial movement towards reaching an agreement on demining on Cyprus following meetings between the leaders of the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC, facilitated by the UN, when demining was agreed as one of six initiatives to build confidence between the two sides.[57] It remains to be seen if this will result in any concrete outcomes.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

It is not known whether plans are in place to address residual contamination once Cyprus' Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

55 Türkiye's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2021. On the issue of Turkish jurisdiction, see, e.g., European Court of Human Rights, *Güzelyurtlu and others v. Cyprus and Turkey*, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 29 January 2019.

56 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request [Türkiye].

57 United Nations Office at Geneva, "Informal Meeting on Cyprus, UN Geneva: UN Secretary-General António Guterres Media Stakeout", 18 March 2025; and United Nations, "Secretary-General's remarks to press following informal meeting on Cyprus", 17 July 2025.

# DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025

Not on track to meet deadline
Three-year extension to 31 December 2028 requested

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 307,024M²

Light
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS (Operator Data)

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 52,033 | 5,184 |
| Technical Survey | 1,547 | 4,938 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 10,161 | 7,530 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 29 | 0 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Congolese Mine Action Center (CCLAM)
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Synergie pour la Lutte Antimines (SYLAM)
- The Development Initiative (TDI)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, national operator SYLAM, which is mentored by The Development Initiative (TDI), completed the long-delayed survey in Aru (a territory in Ituri province), identifying new AP mined areas, including nine that were cleared during the year. The remaining four confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) were added to the national database. Meanwhile, the Congolese Mine Action Centre (CCLAM) re-surveyed areas in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu to update contamination data from the 2013 national survey. The survey reportedly cancelled 6,235m$^2$, although the CCLAM has not been able to share the list and respective size of the areas cancelled. DanChurchAid (DCA) received five task orders that turned out to be battle area clearance (BAC); and as such, their outputs are not included in the land release totals of this report, except for one area, Mpoyi, where it found and destroyed one anti-personnel (AP) mine.

Ongoing armed conflict, which intensified in 2024 and early 2025, disrupted mine action efforts and increased explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination. The Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23) armed group's capture of Goma and Bukavu led to the temporary suspension of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and other operators' activities, limiting them to non-technical survey (NTS), marking of unexploded ordnance (UXO), and risk education. Simultaneously, a sharp drop in funding—due to the end of South Korean (KOICA) support and the suspension of United States (US) funding—threatened to bring all mine action operations to a halt in 2025.

In this context, DR Congo submitted a three-year Article 5 deadline extension request in order to address 31 remaining hazardous areas, carry out survey in Dungu (a territory in Haut Uele province), and strengthen national explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD) capacities. The request, which seeks a new deadline of 31 December 2028, was due to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **DR Congo should complete the national survey and strengthen efforts to accurately identify and classify all contaminated areas.**
- **DR Congo should align its work plan with available capacity and develop a detailed resource mobilisation plan to meet its 31 December 2028 deadline.**
- **When survey is conducted, DR Congo should report on areas cancelled through NTS and reduced through technical survey (TS), submitting the list of areas in its official documents submitted in accordance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).**
- **DR Congo should ensure the accuracy and consistency of its mine action information management system and its consequent reporting under APMBC, regularly updating its database and disaggregating reported contamination. As it stands, information included in 2025 extension request and draft Article 7 report covering 2024 do not align.**
- **DR Congo should continue improving the designation of hazardous areas in its national database by type of ordnance, clearly distinguishing battle area and mined area.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Survey by TDI-SYLAM in Aru territory added over 40,787m$^2$ of AP mined area to the database, while CCLAM cancelled 6,235m$^2$ in Ituri and North Kivu. DR Congo's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request reported that 26 confirmed hazardous areas (covering a total of 58,725m$^2$) and 5 suspected hazardous areas (over 248,292m$^2$) remained across eight provinces (11 territories), in addition to Dungu territory in Haut Uele, which has yet to be surveyed. However, the national database remains unreliable due to weak NTS, errors, and frequent confusion between battle area and mined area. Operators believe the baseline is still incomplete. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 7 | In 2024, CCLAM began decentralising and expanded to 250 staff. The government maintained its US$600,000 annual contribution to the Centre, but operations remained fully reliant on international support. With US and KOICA funding withdrawn, and access to North and South Kivu capitals lost due to AFC/M23 control, the programme risked stalling in 2025. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | CCLAM made limited reference to gender in its 2025 extension request and does not have a gender policy or action plan specific to mine action. However, women reportedly represented 49% of its staff in 2024, including nine in operational roles and 20 in management positions. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 3 | DR Congo does not have a dedicated environmental protection policy for mine action, but environmental considerations are addressed in a chapter of the national mine action standards, which were last reviewed in 2022. All operators have specific standard operating procedures on environmental protection. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 5 | While DR Congo is making efforts to track and document mine action operations, official records often lack consistency. Reporting under the APMBC is often late, and in 2025, discrepancies persisted between the extension request and Article 7 transparency reporting. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 4 | The 2025 extension request and additional information included a work plan with annual clearance targets, aiming to address 31 remaining AP mined areas, covering 307,024m$^2$, and to conduct survey and clearance in Dungu, located in the remote province of Haut-Uele, by December 2028. However, the plan and budget included two ERW-contaminated areas and are entirely dependent on receiving international funding for the work. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 6 | In 2024, CCLAM tasked DCA with clearing five mined areas that were later identified as battle areas, despite joint efforts with CCLAM to prioritise mine clearance. Operators reported that current standard operating procedures are fit for purpose, and CCLAM plans to review the NMAS during the upcoming extension period. |

**Assessment of National Programme Performance Continued**

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 5 | 4 | Land release outputs were significantly higher than in 2023, but the discovery of new mined area offset these gains, limiting overall progress. In 2025, DR Congo submitted a fifth Article 5 deadline extension request, seeking an additional three years. However, the current security and financial situation leaves little hope for significant progress during the coming three years. |
| **Average Score** | **5.2** | **5.1** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Commission Nationale de Lutte Antimines (CNLAM)
- Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)
- Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC)
- Afrique pour la Lutte Antimines (AFRILAM)
- Synergie pour la Lutte Antimines (SYLAM)
- National NGOs conduct NTS and/or risk education (ACOLAM, ADIC, BADU, SYOPADI)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- G4S
- The Development Initiative (TDI)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

DR Congo is believed to have very limited AP mined area. As at the end of 2024, national authorities estimated it covered 0.3km$^2$, although the exact figure remains unclear due to incomplete surveys and inconsistent official reports.

The last national survey was in 2013. It identified 130 hazardous areas covering an estimated 1,8km$^2$.[1] However, subsequent re-surveys found that a number of areas were contaminated by the (more prevalent) problem of UXO, leading to a marked fall in the estimate of mined area.[2] In its 2025 deadline extension request, DR Congo acknowledged that, following its ratification of the APMBC and for the next decade, many contamination estimates—based on impact surveys by national and international operators—relied on flawed methodologies and assumptions. This led to inflated figures for both the number of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and the extent of contamination by AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines.[3]

By 2021, with 33 hazardous areas covering around 117,031m$^2$ remaining, DR Congo submitted a fourth Article 5 deadline extension request, asking for 42 additional months to complete clearance and extending the deadline to the end of 2025.[4] This request was soon overtaken by new data that tripled the baseline,[5] with survey by DCA adding 4 new areas and increasing the number of mined areas to 37 covering a total of 399,969m$^2$.[6] In 2022 and 2023, no new hazardous areas were reported and eight areas were released (six in Tanganyika and two in Kasai).[7]

In 2024, surveys in various parts of the country helped a better assessment of the extent of mine contamination. National operator SYLAM, in partnership with TDI, carried out the long-delayed survey in Aru territory in Ituri province – one of two territories not included in the 2013 national survey. The 2024 survey identified new areas contaminated with AP mines, including nine that were cleared during the year.[8] The remaining four areas (marked with an asterisk in Table 1) added 40,787m$^2$ of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) to the national database.[9]

1 "Plan Stratégique National de Lutte contre les Mines Antipersonnel et les REG en RDC 2023–2032", CCLAM, March 2024 ("National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2023–32"), pp. 21 and 32–34.
2 Email from Steven Harrop, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 20 September 2017.
3 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted 10 June, pp. 9-10.
4 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and Table 1, p. 42.
5 Article 7 Report (covering 1 January 2019 to 31 March 2022), Form C.
6 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted 10 June, p. 9.
7 Article 7 Report (covering 1 April to 31 December 2022), p. 3; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3.
8 Email from Laure Ngoie, Head of Information Management Department, and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, Coordinator, CCLAM, 6 May 2025.
9 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted 10 June 2025, p. 13.

In addition, CCLAM conducted a re-survey of areas previously recorded in the national database across the three eastern provinces—Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu—with the aim of updating the mapping of AP mined area established by the 2013 national survey. It was implemented by selected NGO personnel, trained by CCLAM in community liaison and NTS, with the aim of mitigating language barriers. The survey covered 15 hazardous areas (four in Ituri, nine in North Kivu, and two in South Kivu), totalling 19,711m$^2$. Following the NTS, CCLAM confirmed 16 hazardous areas—one more than initially recorded—but covering a revised total of 13,475.8m$^2$: three in Ituri (10,058m$^2$), 11 in North Kivu (2,567m$^2$), and two in South Kivu (850.8m$^2$); meaning that 6,235m$^2$ were cancelled.[10] However, when comparing the findings with the list of remaining CHAs provided in July 2025, inconsistencies appear, and the cancelled area is likely larger. CCLAM has yet to provide a table presenting the areas cancelled through NTS in 2024.

In its 2025 extension request, DR Congo reported 31 remaining hazardous areas as at end 2024, covering 307,024m$^2$ (see Tables 1 and 2), planned to be addressed over the next three years. It also undertook to complete outstanding survey and clearance in Dungu in Haut-Uele province.[11] CCLAM reported that, of the 31 remaining mined areas, 5 are classified as SHAs and the other 26 as CHAs.[12] Some of these areas may in fact require BAC rather than mine clearance. A persistent challenge in 2023 and 2024 was the misclassification of mined areas, with clearance teams deployed to locations that actually called for BAC.[13] In the additional information provided by DR Congo as part of its extension request, CCLAM reclassified two former SHAs as areas suspected to contain only ERW.[14]

Beyond these 31 areas, additional suspected contamination exists. CCLAM received five AP mine "alerts" from local communities during road rehabilitation work in Ubundu territory (in Tshopo province),[15] while UNMAS reported a minefield in Itendey village, along with UXO and AXO, to be addressed through EOD spot tasks.[16]

**Table 1: AP mined area (at end 2024) excluding Dungu, Haut Uele province (yet to be surveyed)[17]**

| Province | Territory | Village / Name | SHAs | CHAs | Area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ituri | Aru | Agorobo ** | 0 | 1 | 315 |
| Ituri | Aru | Kendio/Kengezi * | 0 | 1 | 17,776 |
| Ituri | Aru | Midigo 2 * | 0 | 1 | 5,969 |
| Ituri | Aru | Midigo 3 * | 0 | 1 | 5,912 |
| Ituri | Aru | Lisoka * | 0 | 1 | 11,130 |
| Ituri | Djugu | Awupe 2 | 0 | 1 | 5,000 |
| Ituri | Djugu | NLCS/DA-003_Usi (Itendey) | 0 | 1 | 435 |
| Kasai | Dekese | Ipoka 2 | 1 | 0 | 1,088 |
| Kasai Central | Demba | Kabinda Mukole | 1 | 0 | 218,128 |
| Kasai Central | Demba | Kabuluanda Musasa | 1 | 0 | 21,915 |
| Maniema | Lubutu | Puits de gisement-droite | 0 | 1 | 2,793 |
| Maniema | Lubutu | Lieux exploitation diamants | 0 | 1 | 1,959 |
| Nord Kivu | Béni | Bulese 01 ** | 0 | 1 | 94 |
| Nord Kivu | Béni | Bulese 02 ** | 0 | 1 | 770 |
| Nord Kivu | Béni | Bulese 03 ** | 0 | 1 | 87 |
| Nord Kivu | Béni | Bulese 04 ** | 0 | 1 | 67 |
| Nord Kivu | Béni | Bulese 05 ** | 0 | 1 | 883 |
| Nord Kivu | Béni | Bulese 06 ** | 0 | 1 | 30 |

10 Ibid; and additional information submitted to its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, CCLAM, 31 July 2025, pp. 3–7.
11 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted 10 June 2025, p. 6.
12 Email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025.
13 Emails from Jacob Payton, Operations Manager and Head of Mine Action Operations EOD 3, DCA, 8 August 2024 and 2 April 2025.
14 Additional information submitted to its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, CCLAM, 31 July 2025, p. 9.
15 Email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025.
16 Email from Julian Bustamante, Programme Management Officer Specialist, UNMAS DRC, 4 June 2025.
17 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted 10 June 2025, Table 1.6 in Annex, pp. 33-34.

**Table 1 Continued**

| Province | Territory | Village / Name | SHAs | CHAs | Area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nord Kivu | Béni | Bulese 07 ** | 0 | 1 | 204 |
| Nord Kivu | Béni | Irangyo 1 | 0 | 1 | 86 |
| Nord Kivu | Béni | Irangyo 2 | 0 | 1 | 235 |
| Nord Kivu | Béni | Irangyo 3 | 0 | 1 | 64 |
| Nord Kivu | Béni | Kitembo | 0 | 1 | 47 |
| Nord Kivu | Béni | Mulenzo | 0 | 1 | 1,466 |
| Nord Kivu | Béni | Tsavitumbi | 0 | 1 | 700 |
| Nord Ubangi | Yakoma | Kotakoli - Polongo | 1 | 0 | 3,150 |
| Nord Ubangi | Yakoma | Kotakoli - Ido | 1 | 0 | 4,017 |
| Sud Kivu | Fizi | Sentier Mwanzalulu vers champs Maonde | 0 | 1 | 132 |
| Sud Kivu | Shabunda | Shabunda | 0 | 1 | 719 |
| Sud Kivu | Kalehe | Katare | 0 | 1 | 533 |
| Tshuapa | Ikela | Ene | 0 | 1 | 1,320 |
| **Totals** | | | **5** | **26** | **307,024** |

*Areas added to the database in 2024 following survey by TDI-SYLAM in Aru territory. **Remaining areas after cancellation by NTS in 2024 by CCLAM in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu.

Note: DR Congo provided conflicting information on the size of three areas in the additional information submitted on 31 July 2025: Agorobo (350m² instead of 315m²), Awupe 2 (4,708m² instead of 5,000m²) and NLCS/DA-003_Usi (5,000m² instead of 435m²). In the same document, the CCLAM also listed two new areas, Bulese 10 (770m²) and Bulese 11 (94m²), identified following re-survey in Beni, which are not included in the remaining surface to be addressed during the new extension request period. Mine Action Review did not receive consistent clarification, it has retained the data from the initial version.

**Table 2: AP mined area by province (at end 2024)**[18]

| Province | SHAs | Area (m²) | CHAs | Area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ituri | 0 | 0 | 7 | 46,537 |
| Kasai | 1 | 1,088 | 0 | 0 |
| Kasai Central | 2 | 240,043 | 0 | 0 |
| Maniema | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4,752 |
| North Kivu | 0 | 0 | 13 | 4,733 |
| North Ubangi | 2 | 7,167 | 0 | 0 |
| South Kivu | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1,384 |
| Tshuapa | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1,320 |
| **Totals** | **5** | **248,298** | **26** | **58,726** |

18 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted 10 June 2025, Table 1.6 in Annex, pp. 33–34; and additional information submitted to its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, CCLAM, 31 July 2025.

CCLAM reported different figures for remaining contamination in its Draft Article 7 report for 2024, which cited 41 hazardous areas covering 460,820m$^2$ as at end 2024. However, this list includes areas marked as "closed" in the same report, such as Midigo 1, Dulawate 2, Dibamba, and Mpoyi. For consistency, Mine Action Review used data from the Article 5 deadline extension request and additional information provided in July 2025.

AP mine contamination in DR Congo is the legacy of decades of conflict with neighbouring States, non-State armed groups (NSAGs), and militias since the nation's independence in 1960. Due to the history of the mine action programme, multiple past and present armed conflicts, the size of the country, and the poor state of the road infrastructure, CCLAM has acknowledged that "the coordination, monitoring, and reporting of mine action activities have not always been optimal".[19]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

DR Congo is contaminated by ERW in all areas that have experienced armed conflicts since the country's independence, making the problem widespread. To date, no systematic national survey has been conducted. The National Mine Action Strategy 2023–32 indicates that, while AP mined area is relatively limited, the country faces a significant level of ERW contamination due to the presence of UXO, abandoned munitions, cluster munition remnants (CMR), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[20] In the additional information submitted in connection with its 2025 extension request, DR Congo reclassified two areas of North Ubangi as suspected of contamination with ERW not mines: Kotakoli airport (11,028m$^2$) and Champs de Tir (17,222m$^2$).[21]

For the period from January to February 2025, ACLED recorded 70 deaths from explosive devices: 37 in South Kivu and 33 in North Kivu. Following the takeover of Goma and Bukavu by M23, numerous alerts reported the presence of UXO in several neighbourhoods of both cities, as well as in schools. The return of populations to their areas of origin poses another major challenge. In many cases, these areas have been the scene of violent clashes between warring parties. Initial assessments conducted by the UN Protection Cluster in the return zones confirm the presence of IEDs, which are found both in fields and inside homes.[22]

DR Congo has been facing an increase in the use of IEDs by NSAGs since 2021. The national strategic plan indicated that IED contamination has been confirmed in the eastern provinces, primarily Ituri and North Kivu, but also extending into Tanganyika. This has caused both military and civilian casualties, including of women and children.[23] UNMAS reported a surge in IED incidents in the second half of 2021.[24] The Islamist Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) uses IEDs widely, some of which are AP mines under the APMBC.[25] Initially targeting DRC soldiers and police, attacks have increasingly been aimed at civilians.[26] In 2024, UNMAS recorded 60 incidents involving IEDs, 50 in North Kivu and 10 in Ituri, a sharp rise from 22 incidents recorded in 2023.[27]

DR Congo has a small amount of CMR contamination but the precise extent is not known. The latest available data from end of 2021 recorded six CHAs containing CMR in four provinces, affecting a total of 161,523m$^2$.[28] See Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on DR Congo for further information.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national structures for DR Congo's national mine action programme were established by a 2011 law implementing the APMBC, namely the Commission Nationale de Lutte Antimines (CNLAM) and the Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM).[29] CNLAM is the national authority overseeing CCLAM. It is a multi-sectoral body composed of deputies from both parliamentary chambers, officials from four ministries, and representatives of five civil society organisations involved in mine action.[30] A decree formally setting out the role and responsibilities of CNLAM has yet to be adopted.[31]

Established in 2012, CCLAM is the technical coordinating body for all mine action activities in the country. It works in close collaboration with UNMAS.[32] CCLAM is responsible for strategy development, accreditation and tasking of operators, information management, quality control (QC), budgeting, and resource mobilisation. By the end of 2024, the size of CCLAM's workforce had grown significantly to 250 employees, up from 168 the previous year. This increase is due to the decentralisation process initiated in 2024, under the National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32, which led to

19 "National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2023–32", CCLAM, March 2024, p. 21.

20 Ibid.; and "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", p. 17.

21 Additional information submitted to its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, CCLAM, 31 July 2025, p. 9. Champs de Tir means "firing range" in English.

22 UN Protection Cluster, "Analyse de Protection", 11 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3J4GYYn, pp. 10–11; and "Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO", UN doc. S/2025/176, 20 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/457c3lE, pp. 7-8; and ICRC, "DR Congo: ERW yet again threaten lives", at: https://bit.ly/454Aq3h.

23 "National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2023–32", CCLAM, March 2024, p. 21; and "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", CCLAM, March 2024, p. 17.

24 Emails from Erly Munoz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 16 August 2023; and UNMAS DRC team, 30 April 2024.

25 "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", CCLAM, March 2024, pp. 17 and 18. See also "Alarming IED proliferation in eastern DR Congo", 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3LF9uy6; and "Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO", UN doc. S/2024/251, 21 March 2024, at: https://bit.ly/46ivSXw, p. 4.

26 Email from UNMAS DRC team, 30 April 2024.

27 Email from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025.

28 Voluntary CCM Article 7 Report (covering the period 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2021), Form F.

29 "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", CCLAM, March 2024, p. 5.

30 Ibid., p. 6.

31 Ibid., p. 28.

32 Ibid., p. 6.

the opening of 11 provincial offices to coordinate mine action efforts and manage QC activities at local level.[33]

In 2024, several operators were involved in capacity building to the national mine action sector. UNMAS focused on strengthening CCLAM's information management capabilities and it also provided training to 288 personnel (including 9 women) from the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and the Congolese National Police (PNC) on key mine action topics. These included Explosive Hazard Awareness Training (EHAT), Post-Blast Investigation (PBI) related to IEDs, Search and Detect (S&D), and the Explosive Threat Assessment Course (ETAC).[34]

The mine action operating environment in DR Congo is of a "mixed" quality, with certain enabling conditions in place, but also persistent bureaucratic and logistical obstacles. While visas for international personnel are generally obtainable, the process is often slow and inconsistent, frequently requiring multiple follow-ups that can delay timely deployment. The approval of memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with government entities is similarly time-consuming and lacks predictability. Although cooperation at the national level is generally strong, the decentralised administrative structure of the country often results in delays at the provincial level. Furthermore, while exemptions exist for the importation of humanitarian mine action equipment, customs clearance is frequently hindered by unclear or inconsistently applied tax regulations. This can lead to requests for additional documentation or unofficial fees, causing further disruption to operational planning and logistics.[35]

The Mine Action Working Group, co-chaired by CCLAM and UNMAS under the Protection Cluster, aims to facilitate regular coordination among stakeholders. In April 2024, CCLAM nominated a new focal point to resume its coordination role.[36] While the frequency and consistency of meetings varied, operators reported improve coordination with national authorities in 2024, particularly through regular engagement with CCLAM. However, coordination at provincial level remains uneven in effectiveness and participation.[37]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The government provided an annual contribution of US$600,000 in 2023 and 2024 to CCLAM to cover salaries, running costs, and QC activities. However, no national funding is allocated to survey or clearance, leaving DR Congo entirely dependent on international support to address explosive ordnance contamination.[38]

International funding for AP mine survey and clearance in DR Congo came from multiple sources in 2024. UNMAS is funded through MINUSCA's assessed budget, through which it funded AFRILAM and G4S. UNMAS received additional support from KOICA under a contract running from 2022 to 2025. KOICA funding, which was used to contract the TDI-SYLAM partnership, ended in March 2025, while the contract with G4S ended in May 2025. In addition, AFRILAM receives supplementary funding from Monde sans Mines, a Swiss foundation, while DCA has been supported by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the US Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA).[39]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

CCLAM recognised the significance of gender in the 2023–32 national mine action strategy and successive Article 5 deadline extension requests. All activities, especially risk education and victim assistance, are required to consider the needs of different age groups and genders.[40] DR Congo's 2025 extension request highlighted that women are currently 48% of CCLAM staff. DR Congo reports placing particular emphasis on encouraging operators to increase the inclusion of women within their workforce. Progress has already been made, with female deminers trained across all implementing partners, and greater female participation observed in risk education, NTS, and victim assistance activities, including within national organisations.[41]

CCLAM has had a gender focal point since 2016, which aims to increase the participation of women in mine action and implement gender-sensitive policies. CCLAM has reported an increased proportion of women in its ranks – from 27% in 2023 to 49% in 2024 (see Table 3).[42] The nine women in operational roles are QA/QC inspectors and heads of department.[43] AFRILAM had six women on its teams: one EOD Level 3 deminer, three EOD Level 2 deminers, one doctor, and one finance and logistics assistant.[44]

33 Interview with Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, in Geneva, 8 April 2025; and email, 6 May 2025.

34 Email from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025; and UNMAS, Training Bulletin: July 2024–June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4l1k8y5.

35 Email from Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025; and Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025.

36 Email from UNMAS DRC, 30 April 2024.

37 Emails from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025; and Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025.

38 Email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025.

39 Emails from Germain Apanane Bawala, AFRILAM, 28 May 2025; Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025; Kevin Umali, Regional Operation Manager, TDI, 13 June 2025; and Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 4 June 2025.

40 "National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2023–32", pp. 28 and 29.

41 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted 10 June, p. 16.

42 Email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025.

43 Email from Laure Ngoie, CCLAM, 18 September 2025.

44 Email from Germain Apanane Bawala, Project Manager, AFRILAM, 28 May 2025.

**Table 3: Gender composition of CCLAM, operators, and UNMAS (at end 2024)**[45]

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CCLAM | 250 | 124 (50%) | 57 | 20 (35%) | 40 | 9 (23%) |
| AFRILAM | 38 | 6 (16%) | 2 | 0 (0%) | 32 | 4 (13%) |
| DCA | 51 | 6 (12%) | 9 | 0 (0%) | 24 | 0 (0%) |
| TDI-SYLAM | 45 | 8 (18%) | 9 | 2 (22%) | 14 | 2 (14%) |
| UNMAS | 31 | 10 (32%) | 6 | 2 (33%) | 25 | 8 (32%) |
| **Totals** | **415** | **154 (37%)** | **83** | **24 (29%)** | **135** | **23 (17%)** |

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

DR Congo lacks national policies specifically addressing environmental considerations during mine action operations. While the Congolese Mine Action Standards issued by CCLAM in 2022 include a chapter titled: "Occupational Health and Safety and Environment Management", this only outlines basic measures to minimise the environmental harm of demining.[46]

Official reports do not explicitly reference environmental considerations in planning or tasking survey or clearance. The 2025 extension request did not address the environmental implications of mine action activities, nor does it mention any environmental policy—whether in legislation or national mine action standards. The additional information provided in July 2025 indicated that DR Congo will revise its 2023–32 work plan to include a review of the NMAS to add a chapter on environmental protection. This chapter will cover aspects such as site selection and worksite management (e.g., latrine construction and waste management), as well as measures to be applied during destruction operations.[47] CCLAM also does not have a designated focal point for environmental issues in mine action.[48]

CCLAM informed Mine Action Review that it initiated a process in 2024 to revise its national mine action standards (NMAS) and intends to align with the new International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 on environmental management in mine action.[49]

UNMAS, operating both as a MONUSCO section and a project of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), complies with and applies the environmental management policies and frameworks of both MONUSCO and UNOPS. All UNMAS implementing partners are required to establish environmental procedures as a mandatory measure.[50]

AFRILAM says it has developed a standard operating procedure (SOP-14) on environmental management, which includes the conduct of environmental assessments to support planning and operations.[51] DCA (not an UNMAS implementing partner) and TDI also reported having an environmental policy and conducting environmental assessments to support survey and demining.[52]

**Table 4: Environmental policies and action of CCLAM and operators in 2024**[53]

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| CCLAM | No | NA | No |
| AFRILAM | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| DCA | Yes | Yes | No |
| TDI-SYLAM | Yes | Yes | Unclear |
| UNMAS | Yes | Yes | Yes |

45 Emails from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025; Germain Apanane Bawala, AFRILAM, 28 May 2025; Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025; Kevin Umali, TDI, 13 June 2025; and Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 4 June 2025.

46 Emails from UNMAS DRC, 30 April 2024; and Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025.

47 Additional information submitted to its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, CCLAM, 31 July 2025, p. 23.

48 Email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025.

49 Email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025.

50 Email from Nana Kadidia Cisse, Senior Programme Management Officer, UNMAS, 8 August 2025.

51 Email from Germain Apanane Bawala, AFRILAM, 28 May 2025.

52 Emails from Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025; and Kevin Umali, TDI, 13 June 2025.

53 Emails from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025; Germain Apanane Bawala, AFRILAM, 28 May 2025; Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025; Kevin Umali, TDI, 13 June 2025; and Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 4 June 2025.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

CCLAM took over responsibility for information management from UNMAS in 2016, but despite capacity building by UNMAS over many years still lacks capacity, equipment, and funding to manage the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database effectively. The National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32 identifies the need to build staff capacity, improve data collection, update the database on a regular basis, and provide data disaggregated by age and gender.[54]

In 2024, demining operators reported that the list of hazardous areas in the database was not up to date. It did not include the latest information from operators and still listed areas that had already been cleared. The designation of hazardous areas also needed improvement, as teams were operating in locations that clearly concerned battle areas but were still designated as minefields.[55]

As at early 2025, DR Congo's national information management system still relied on IMSMA New Generation, which is stored locally on a single laptop and limited to manual data entry by one user. This makes it outdated, inaccurate, and unsustainable. In March 2025, CCLAM received IMSMA Core from the Geneva International Centre of Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), with implementation support from UNMAS expected throughout 2025 and additional assistance from the GICHD in 2026. Full roll-out is projected to take about two years. Preparatory efforts began in late 2024, with UNMAS leading weekly training sessions and a November workshop focused on IMSMA Core and digitalisation of CCLAM's data collection forms.[56] CCLAM and AFRILAM participated in a three-day workshop organised by the GICHD on information management in October 2025 in Senegal.[57]

There has been some progress in the level of detail provided in DR Congo's reporting in recent years. In 2024, the country submitted two Article 7 reports: one covering April to December 2022 and the second for 2023. While the draft report covering 2024 was shared with Mine Action Review, it had not yet been published on the UN database as at mid-September 2025. Despite these efforts, data consistency remains a significant issue. Official reports often present conflicting or difficult-to-reconcile figures. For instance, the 2025 extension request included survey and clearance data for 2022–25 that did not align with the information in the Article 7 reports. The additional information provided in July substantially revised the data from the initial version submitted in June, both regarding the cleared areas from the previous period, and the contaminated areas remaining by the beginning of the next extension period, and introduced new inconsistent information. On a more positive note, survey efforts and the attempt to clean and update the database led to the declassification of two areas now recorded as ERW contaminated and not mined.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

DR Congo's 2021 extension request was quickly outdated as a result of new contamination data. In 2024, mine action was framed by a 10-year strategic plan (2023–32), which aims to clear all AP mines by 2025 and CMR by 2032, while building decentralised EOD capacity.[58] The strategy includes a detailed budget, though its US$91.3 million estimate appears wildly unrealistic.[59] DR Congo says the multi-year work plan 2023–32 is under revision and it promises to incorporate the relevant elements of the Siem Reap–Angkor Action Plan (SRAAP).[60]

In its 2025 three-year extension request—scheduled for consideration at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025—DR Congo sets out to: clear the remaining 31 hazardous areas covering 307,024m$^2$; complete survey and clearance in Dungu in Haut-Uele province; and strengthen national capacities within the Government Humanitarian Demining Service in EOD and IEDD.[61] The request spans three years, through to the end of 2028, and includes a budget US$4.86 million for demining the 31 hazardous areas (plus 2 ERW-contaminated areas), US$0.57 million for survey in Dungu, and US$0.9 million for risk education. The overall budget is presented as US$6,329,830. This figure does not include US$600,000 allocated annually to CCLAM from national funding.[62]

The additional information provided with the extension request included annual clearance targets (see Table 5), although the total exceeds the remaining surface areas as DR Congo included two ERW-contaminated areas in the work plan.

54 "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", pp. 21, 22, and 29.

55 Email from Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025.

56 Email from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025.

57 Emails from Germain Apanane Bawala, AFRILAM, 28 May 2025; and Jérémy Repond, Programme Officer, GICHD, 9 May 2025.

58 "National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2023–32", CCLAM, March 2024, p. 11.

59 Ibid., p. 12.

60 Additional information submitted to its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, CCLAM, 31 July 2025, p. 22.

61 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted 10 June 2025, pp. 5 and 17; and Additional information submitted to its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, CCLAM, 31 July 2025, pp. 8–9.

62 Additional information submitted to its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, CCLAM, 31 July 2025, pp. 22–23.

**Table 5: Planned mine and ERW clearance by year in 2026–28**[63]

| Year | Months | Province | Area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | January to November | Ituri | 22,000 |
| | January | Kasai | 1,088 |
| | January to November | Kasai Central | 88,015.73 |
| | January to March | Maniema | 4,752 |
| | January to March | North Kivu | 4,733 |
| | January to November | North Ubangi | *22,000 |
| | January | South Kivu | 1,383.8 |
| | January | Tshuapa | 1,320 |
| **Total for 2026** | | | **145,292.53** |
| 2027 | January to November | Ituri | 22,000 |
| | January to November | Kasai Central | 88,015.73 |
| | January to July | North Ubangi | *13,416.9 |
| **Total for 2027** | | | **123,432.63** |
| 2028 | January | Ituri | 2,000 |
| | January to August | Kasai Central | 64,011.44 |
| **Total for 2028** | | | **66,011.44** |
| **Totals** | | | **334,736.60** |

*These areas include ERW-contaminated areas.

DR Congo has planned for deployment of six multi-task teams (two per province), each comprising nine members (five deminers, supervisor, team leader, medic, and a driver), to address the remaining areas. Daily productivity per deminer is estimated at 20m², except in Kasai and Kasai Central, where the contaminated areas are grasslands and productivity is estimated at 80m² per day.[64]

It is not clear whether these six teams are in addition to the multi-task teams of AFRILAM, DCA, and TDI-SYLAM, or whether they are in fact the same teams. In any case, the plan was not developed on the basis of an assessment of available operational capacity, although it listed the five organisations that will be tasked (TDI, SYLAM, DCA, SYOPADI and AFRILAM).[65] In early 2025, most clearance operations were suspended due to the AFC/M23 armed group's takeover of Goma and Bukavu, and the end of KOICA funding to UNMAS, which had been supporting the TDI–SYLAM partnering. G4S services ended in May 2025 due the financial crisis affecting MONUSCO. This left only AFRILAM and DCA operational—although DCA funding from the US Department of State (PM/WRA) was also suspended in early 2025. Resources for 2026 are by no means secured.

Despite UNMAS having a Memorandum of Understanding with CCLAM that included capacity support for preparing the extension request, the document was submitted without consultation or coordination with UNMAS.[66]

CCLAM categorised hazardous areas according to four criteria. Security was assessed based on the situation as of January 2025, taking into account the presence of armed groups and the number of kidnappings and violent incidents. Accessibility was measured according to communication routes, vegetation, road conditions, and seasonal factors affecting access to the mined areas. The value of clearance was determined by its socio-economic impact, including the potential to enable development activities such as livestock, farming, construction, and hunting or fishing. Finally, casualty evacuation (Casevac) was evaluated in terms of the assistance available to victims of clearance operations, considering accessibility, capacity, and the medical infrastructure of the nearest health facility.[67]

Operators are facing planning challenges due to limited access to CCLAM task orders and data. Information provided is often unreliable, requiring new surveys to obtain credible information. Operators do not have access to the CCLAM database.[68] CCLAM's misclassification of hazardous areas—designating battle areas as minefields—further hampers operations and may reflect gaps in training and technical knowledge.[69] Task dossiers issued by UNMAS are delivered in a timely and efficient manner.[70] Each task order from UNMAS is formally endorsed by CCLAM to ensure alignment with national priorities and operational standards.[71]

63 Ibid., pp. 13–17.
64 Ibid, pp. 11–12.
65 Ibid., p. 18.
66 Email from Nana Kadidia Cisse, UNMAS, 8 August 2025.
67 Additional information submitted to its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, CCLAM, 31 July 2025, p. 11.
68 Emails from Germain Apanane Bawala, AFRILAM, 14 May 2024; and Miroslav Skoumal, Country Director, DCA, 23 April 2023.
69 Email from Jacob Payton, DCA, 8 August 2024.
70 Emails from Kevin Umali, TDI, 13 June 2025; and Germain Apanane Bawala, AFRILAM, 28 May 2025.
71 Email from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

DR Congo has 25 national standards (Normes Nationales Congolaises de la Lutte Antimines), developed with support from the GICHD, which were adopted by all stakeholders during a national workshop held in Kinshasa from 24 to 28 January 2022.[72] Updates were reportedly made in early 2024 to the NMAS and associated SOPs on survey and clearance of AP mines. The key changes focused on refining task prioritisation criteria based on contamination impact and community feedback. The updates were made in consultation with national and international clearance operators through a series of technical working group meetings facilitated by CCLAM.[73] The accreditation commission was reviewing the updates made end of 2025 for official approval.[74]

According to operators, the NMAS are generally aligned with the local threat and context. However, they also identified areas of improvement to avoid limiting the effectiveness of evidence-based survey and clearance.

For example, some clearance depth requirements and fade-out distances may be excessive given the actual threat level, leading to unnecessary resource expenditure. Additionally, there are certain restrictions on the use of TS and demolitions that limit flexibility in adapting operations to site-specific conditions. A review and potential revision of the NMAS could enhance operational efficiency and effectiveness in land release efforts.[75]

A persistent challenge in 2024 was the mis-designation of hazardous areas, with clearance teams often deployed to locations that are clearly battle areas, but which were designated as minefield tasks by CCLAM. This has impacted the efficiency of operations.[76] The 2025 extension request was no exception, as it included ERW-contaminated areas in both the budget and planning, applying the same daily output capacity for AP mine clearance and BAC.[77]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

UNMAS, which began operating in DR Congo in 2002, is headquartered in Goma, North Kivu, with additional offices in Kinshasa, Beni (North Kivu), Bukavu (South Kivu), and Bunia (Ituri). In 2024, it employed 31 staff: 11 international, 16 national, and 4 in-kind contributions. Staffing is down from the total of 42 in 2023. UNMAS is mandated to provide EOD and IED disposal in support of MONUSCO, funded through the UN assessed budget, and additional support from KOICA in 2022 to March 2025.[78]

UNMAS contracted national operator AFRILAM for EOD spot tasks, G4S for IEDD, and TDI to train and mentor SYLAM in conducting NTS, TS, manual mine clearance, spot tasks, and demolitions (see Table 6).[79] UNMAS also contracted other national organisations to conduct NTS and provide risk education. The end of KOICA funding in 2025 led to the suspension of many of these contracts.[80] Only AFRILAM, funded through the MONUSCO assessed budget, continued to be contracted through 2025, with two multi-task teams (MTTs) in North Kivu (Goma and Beni) and a third deployed to Ituri (Bunia) in August.[81]

TDI resumed its mine action programme in 2023 through a UNMAS contract focused on building the capacity of SYLAM. Under a teaming agreement, TDI deployed staff to mentor three SYLAM MTTs and key personnel, including a project manager, operations manager, and logistics manager. The goal was to accredit SYLAM for explosive hazard capabilities so that it could take over and manage the mentored teams.[82] TDI-SYLAM launched manual mine clearance on 15 December 2023 in the Lirunga area of Aru and continued operations throughout 2024 and early 2025, clearing nine mined areas. The contract concluded in 2025 and any continued activities will depend on new funding.[83]

G4S has been contracted by UNMAS since 2022 for IEDD and EOD training. In 2024, as in the previous year, UNMAS contracted a four-person IED disposal team (three for operations and one for training), along with one national staff for logistics support, all based in Beni, North Kivu province.[84] The G4S contract ended in May 2025 due to lack of funding.[85]

72 "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", p. 18; and Additional information submitted to its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, CCLAM, 31 July 2025, p. 21.
73 Email from Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025.
74 Email from Laure Ngoie, CCLAM, 18 September 2025.
75 Emails from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025; and Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025.
76 Emails from Jacob Payton, DCA, 8 August 2024 and 2 April 2025.
77 Additional information submitted to its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, CCLAM, 31 July 2025, pp. 15–16.
78 Email from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025.
79 Emails from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025; and Kevin Umali, TDI, 13 June 2025.
80 Interview with Jean-Denis Nsoki Larsen, Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.
81 Email from Nana Kadidia Cisse, UNMAS, 8 August 2025.
82 Emails from Howard Barnes, Project Manager, TDI, 15 June 2024; and UNMAS DRC team, 13 June 2024.
83 Email from Kevin Umali, TDI, 13 June 2025.
84 Email from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025.
85 Email from Nana Kadidia Cisse, UNMAS, 8 August 2025.

**Table 6: Mine action capacity under contract to UNMAS 2024**[86]

| Capacity | Location | Coverage areas | No. of personnel |
|---|---|---|---|
| AFRILAM Management | Goma | Management and support | 4 |
| AFRILAM Multitask Team 1 | Goma | North Kivu | 8 |
| AFRILAM Multitask Team 2 | Bukavu | South Kivu | 8 |
| AFRILAM Multitask Team 3 | Beni | North Kivu and Ituri | 8 |
| G4S IEDD team | Beni | North Kivu | 5 |
| SYLAM Management Trainees | Goma | Management and support | 3 |
| TDI Management | Goma | Management, and Quality Assurance | 6 |
| TDI-SYLAM Multitask Team 4 | Rotational basis | North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri | 11 |
| TDI-SYLAM Multitask Team 5 | Rotational basis | North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri | 11 |
| TDI-SYLAM Multitask Team 6 | Rotational basis | North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri | 11 |

National operator AFRILAM, an UNMAS implementing partner, also undertook activities outside the UNMAS contractual framework. DCA, which is not an UNMAS implementing partner (see Table 7), also conducted mine action operations. However, neither operators addressed AP mined areas in 2024.

AFRILAM employed 38 staff in 2024, up from 37 in 2023, with four MTTs comprising 32 personnel. Three of these MTTs are contracted by UNMAS and based in Beni, Bukavu, and Goma, engaged in a series of tasks in support of MONUSCO operations. This included BAC, bulk demolitions, and spot tasks. The fourth MTT, based in Kalemie and funded by Monde Sans Mines, operated in two territories. In Kalemie, the team focused on BAC in Kyomba, while in Moba, it conducted NTS, TS, and spot task EOD.[87]

DCA's mine action programme, funded by the US PM/WRA and managed from Goma, employed 51 personnel in 2024. These comprised three international staff (operations manager, technical field manager, and medical coordinator) along with three clearance teams each with 16 members: a national supervisor, a team leader, eight deminers, and six support staff (a medic, a logistics officer, a finance officer, and three drivers). In 2025, DCA reduced its workforce after losing the PM/WRA funding.[88]

**Table 7: Additional mine action capacity (outside UNMAS contractual framework)**[89]

| Capacity | Location | Coverage areas | No. of personnel |
|---|---|---|---|
| AFRILAM Management | Kalemie | Management and support | 2 |
| AFRILAM Multitask Team 4 | Kalemie and Moba | Tanganyika | 8 |
| DCA Management | Goma | Management and support | 3 |
| DCA Multitask Team 1 | Kalemie and Moba | Tanganyika | 16 |
| DCA Multitask Team 2 | Dimbelenge | Kasai-Central | 16 |
| DCA Multitask Team 3 | Fizi | South Kivu | 16 |

86 Email from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025.

87 Emails from Germain Apanane Bawala, AFRILAM, 28 May 2025; and Yannick Malamba, Chief of Operations, AFRILAM, 13 June 2025.

88 Email from Jacob Payton, DCA, 13 June 2025.

89 Emails from Germain Apanane Bawala, AFRILAM, 28 May 2025; and Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025.

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

According to operators, DR Congo released a total of 63,741m² of mined area in 2024 through cancellation by NTS, reduction by TS, and manual clearance, and destroyed 29 AP mines (see Table 8). This marks a significant increase compared to the 17,652m² released in 2023, especially since the total is likely underestimated, as CCLAM cancelled certain areas during the re-survey of hazardous areas in Ituri, South Kivu and North Kivu in 2024, but has not yet provided details on the number and size of each area cancelled. Indeed, the additional information submitted with the 2025 extension request included eight tables on pre/post survey data, but none provided details of the cancelled areas.[90]

For this year's report, Mine Action Review used data provided directly by TDI and DCA data directly, as CCLAM and UNMAS reported different figures. TDI shared with Mine Action Review data disaggregated by year (for 2024 and 2025), whereas CCLAM and UNMAS has combined the outputs. Mine Action Review will account for TDI's 2025 operations in next year's report. With regard to DCA data, Mine Action Review only recorded a single area—Mpoyi, in Dimbelenge territory, Kasai-Central province—since DCA found and destroyed one AP mine there.

**Table 8: Summary of land release outputs in 2024 (TDI and DCA data)**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 52,033 | Clearance of 47,430m² by TDI-SYLAM in Ituri province (Aru territory) and North Kivu. Clearance of 4,603m² by DCA in Kasai-Central (Dimbelenge territory). |
| **TS** | 1,547 | Reduced by DCA in Dimbelenge territory. |
| **NTS** | 10,161 | Cancelled by TDI-SYLAM in Aru. |
| **Destruction of AP mines in clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 29 | 28 AP mines (Belgium PRB-409) by TDI-SYLAM and one (PMA 2) by DCA. |

Land release outputs do not align with the totals reported by DR Congo in its draft Article 7 report covering 2024 or its 2025 extension request, which included survey and clearance outputs attributed to DCA in Kasai Central and Tanganyika. However, DCA confirmed to Mine Action Review that, despite coordinated efforts with CCLAM to prioritise minefield clearance, the assigned tasks in 2024 were in fact BAC.

Specifically, DCA was given five manual mine clearance tasks, through which it reduced 5,991m² through TS in two areas and cleared 18,880m² in four areas, while one area (Kasenga) remained inaccessible and is still pending at the time of writing. In addition, DCA was assigned one BAC task in the Kyomba area of Kalemie territory, Tanganyika province, where it cleared 25,588m² and destroyed four PM1 submunitions (see Table 9).[91]

**Table 9: Mined and battle area release by DCA in 2024**[92]

| Province | Territory | Name | Task order | Area reduced (m²) | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines | UXO | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kasai-Central | Dimbelenge | Dibamba | MMC | 0 | 7,920 | 0 | 0 | Not considered mine clearance by Mine Action Review (MAR) |
| Kasai-Central | Dimbelenge | Mpoyi | MMC | 1,547 | 4,603 | 1 | 1 | Considered mine clearance by MAR |
| South Kivu | Fizi | Lulimba | MMC | 0 | 1,051 | 0 | 0 | Not considered mine clearance by MAR |
| Tanganyika | Kalemie | Kasenga | MMC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Not accessible in 2024 |
| Tanganyika | Kalemie | Kyomba | BAC | 0 | 25,588 | 0 | 4 | PM1 submunitions. Not considered mine clearance by MAR |
| Tanganyika | Moba | Lukunde | MMC | 4,444 | 5,306 | 0 | 3 | Not considered mine clearance by MAR |
| **Totals** | | | | **5,991** | **44,468** | **1** | **8** | |

MMC = Manual mine clearance

90 Additional information submitted to its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, CCLAM, 31 July 2025, pp. 3–7.

91 Email from Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, Technical Field Manager, DCA, 21 August 2025.

92 Ibid.

AFRILAM conducted 10,383m² of BAC in 2024, destroying 13 submunitions (including 3 during spot tasks), along with 19 ERW. AFRILAM also completed 272 spot and bulk demolition tasks in the course of which it destroyed 44,039 items of UXO.[93]

In 2024, TDI also conducted BAC, addressing 319,716m² and resulting in the destruction of 536 items of UXO and one AV mine. It completed a total of 135 task orders (manual mine clearance, BAC, and EOD spot tasks).[94] G4S received 20 task orders, which led to the destruction of 16 IEDs and 25 items of UXO.[95]

## SURVEY IN 2024

As noted above, contradictory information has been provided by DR Congo in its official documents. TDI cancelled 10,161m² through NTS in Lirunga zone 6. With regard to DCA, Mine Action Review only records the operations carried out in the Mpoyi area, where 1,547m² were reduced prior to clearance (see Table 10).[96]

Survey outputs for 2024 are higher, as CCLAM supervised re-survey of the hazardous areas in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu recorded in its database. The 2025 extension request only provides the area sizes before and after the survey (19,710.8m² and 13,475.8m², respectively), indicating a cancellation of 6,235m². These figures, however, cannot be reconciled with the list of remaining CHAs provided in July 2025. Mine Action Review is therefore not able to list the respective areas cancelled by NTS by the CCLAM in Table 10.

**Table 10: Release of mined areas through NTS and TS in 2024 (TDI and DCA data)**

| Province | Territory | Name | Operator | Area cancelled (m²) | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ituri | Aru | Lirunga 6 | TDI-SYLAM | 10,161 | 0 |
| Kasai-Central | Dimbelenge | Mpoyi | DCA | 0 | 1,547 |
| **Totals** | | | | **10,161** | **1,547** |

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, DR Congo reported manual clearance in Aru territory, Ituri province. This marked the first time since the 2013 national survey that clearance operators accessed the area. The operations were carried out by SYLAM under the mentorship of TDI. The survey identified 15 minefields (despite the draft Article 7 report incorrectly stating 19), of which nine were cleared in 2024. Conflicting data were provided on the size of the extent of land cleared. UNMAS recorded 67,865m² but the data included TDI's operations in early 2025.[97] CCLAM presented 76,181m² in its draft Article 7 and 2025 extension request but the data included survey outputs. Revised figures in the additional information were conflicting. Table 11 shows clearance outputs of TDI-SYLAM until the end of 2024 in Ituri and North Kivu. To the total of 47,430m² is added 4,603m² of manual mine clearance by DCA at Mpoyi, Dimbelenge territory in Kasai-Central province.

TDI outputs for early 2025 (16,446m² cleared in three areas with seven AP mines destroyed) will be included in next years' report.

**Table 11: AP mine clearance in 2024 (operator data)[98]**

| Province | Territory | Name | Operator | Area (m²) | No. AP mines |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ituri | Aru | Lirunga 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 | TDI-SYLAM | 24,368 | 14 |
| Ituri | Aru | Lirunga 6 | TDI-SYLAM | 4,138 | 0 |
| Ituri | Aru | Dulawate 1 | TDI-SYLAM | 3,200 | 4 |
| Ituri | Aru | Midigo 1 | TDI-SYLAM | 6,572 | 10 |
| Ituri | Aru | Gaki (spot task) | TDI-SYLAM | 440 | 0 |
| North Kivu | Beni | Banyangala (spot task) | TDI-SYLAM | 100 | 0 |
| North Kivu | Beni | Vukara 1 & 2 | TDI-SYLAM | 8,612 | 0 |
| **Totals TDI-SYLAM** | | | | **47,430** | **28** |
| Kasai-Central | Dimbelenge | Mpoyi | DCA | 4,603 | 1 |
| **Totals** | | | | **52,033** | **29** |

93 Emails from Germain Apanane Bawala and Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM, 28 May and 13 June 2025; and Nana Kadidia Cisse, UNMAS, 8 August 2025.

94 Email from Kevin Umali, TDI, 14 August 2025.

95 Email from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025.

96 Email from Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, DCA, 21 August 2025.

97 Emails from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025; and Nana Kadidia Cisse, UNMAS, 8 and 19 August 2025.

98 Email from Kevin Umali, TDI, 14 August 2025.

## DEMINER SAFETY

No accidents were reported during demining or EOD operations in 2024. However, persistent insecurity in the eastern provinces, posed significant operational challenges. As the AFC/M23 armed group expanded its territorial control throughout the year, organisations such as DCA reported severe disruptions to their activities, especially in North Ubangi and Ituri, where insecurity restricted access. These conditions hindered the implementation of NTS and clearance operations, delayed team deployments, and required continuous adjustments to ensure staff safety while maintaining programme goals. DCA also reported an incident of illegal detention of staff for five days, as well as confiscation of two computers and mobile phones.[99]

In early 2025, following the AFC/M23 takeover of Goma and Bukavu, mine action activities were temporarily suspended, with many staff evacuated from Goma. Operators were later prevented from conducting UXO/ERW destruction, removal of hazardous items, TS, and clearance. The only permitted activities were NTS, marking of UXO/ERW, and risk education. Efforts were underway to secure authorisation to resume full operations, but approval had not yet been granted at the time of writing.[100]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THE DR CONGO: 1 NOVEMBER 2002

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2012

↓

FIRST EXTENSION DEADLINE (2-YEAR, 2-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2015

↓

SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (6-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2021

↓

THIRD EXTENSION REQUEST (18 MONTHS): 1 JULY 2022

↓

FOURTH EXTENSION REQUEST (42 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

**FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (3 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2028**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 42-month extension granted by States Parties in November 2021), DR Congo is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It will not meet this deadline and on 10 June 2025, it submitted a new extension request seeking an additional three years until 31 December 2028. The request, its fifth, was due to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of State Parties in December 2025.

At the Intersessional Meetings of States Parties in June 2025, DR Congo outlined several constraints that had prevented it from fulfilling its Article 5 obligations within the current deadline.[101] These included a deteriorating humanitarian and security situation, which reached a new peak in early 2025, with AFC/M23 forces taking control of Lake Kivu shore and large parts of North and South Kivu. Since the last extension request, new suspected hazardous areas have been recorded, notably in 2024 following the deployment of TDI-SYLAM to Aru (Ituri Province). DR Congo also stressed the lack of financial support, highlighting that cuts in US funding to DCA led to the suspension of planned operations in Kasai Central, North Kivu, and South Kivu. In addition, KOICA's funding to UNMAS ended in early 2025, casting doubt on the likelihood of significant achievements during the year. The lack of clear or consistent data from CCLAM has prevented a clear determination of DR Congo's operating results or progress towards its Article 5 targets.

**Table 12: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (Mine Action Review estimate)**

| Year | Area cleared (m²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 52,033 |
| 2023 | 5,184 |
| 2022 | 28,628 |
| 2021 | 43,149 |
| 2020 | 10,562 |
| **Total** | **139,556** |

99 Email from Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025.

100 Emails from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS, 2 April 2025; Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025; and Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025. See also "Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO", UN doc. S/2025/176, 20 March 2025, pp. 7–8; and Protection Cluster, "Analyse de Protection", 11 April 2025, p. 11.

101 Statement of DR Congo on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32 aims to strengthen national ownership by setting up a Government Humanitarian Demining Service ("Service Gouvernemental de Déminage Humanitaire", SGDH) to address residual contamination. Teams will consist mainly of personnel from the DR Congo armed forces, the police, and civilians qualified in EOD.[102] The 2025 deadline extension request also emphasised the need to strengthen EOD capabilities of FARDC and PNC deminers, who are seconded by the Military Engineering Corps.[103] The plan foresees the training and retraining of five to six teams in EOD and IEDD teams, with the acquisition of technical equipment.[104]

102 "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", CCLAM, March 2024, p. 7.

103 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted 10 June 2025, pp. 5–6.

104 Ibid., p. 7.

# ECUADOR



## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025

Not on track to meet deadline:
Two-year extension to 31 December 2027 requested

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 9,964M²

Light
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 4,190 | 10,389 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 5,814 | 1,587 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 367 | 8 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Engineer Battalion No. 68 (B.E.-68) "Cotopaxi"

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Ecuador released just over 10,000m² in 2024–equating to about half of the remaining contamination—through non-technical survey (NTS) and clearance, destroying 367 anti-personnel (AP) mines. Although Ecuador reported at the Fifth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in November 2024 that it was on track to complete its Article 5 obligations by the end of its 31 December 2025 deadline, it informed States Parties at the intersessional meetings in June 2025 that it would need to request a new two-year extension to 31 December 2027. The request, submitted on 7 July 2025, cites unforeseen financial constraints and a series of overlapping national emergencies (a declared internal armed conflict, natural disasters, and public health crises) that disrupted resource allocation and halted all demining operations in 2025, making it impossible to meet its deadline.

The request is accompanied by a National Humanitarian Demining Plan for 2026–2027, which allocates national funds to complete clearance of the remaining 22 tasks by the end of 2026. AP mined area covers 9,964m² and is stated to contain 1,713 AP mines, all located in Zamora Chinchipe province along the border with Peru. The two-year extension period is also intended to enable Ecuador to conduct quality control (QC) of previously demined areas, some of which were cleared more than 15 years ago. These are a total of 127 areas covering 280,031m² across the provinces of Morona Santiago, Pastaza, and Zamora Chinchipe. To conduct this work, Ecuador is seeking international funding of US$2.3 million.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Ecuador should intensify efforts to secure the international support to complete pending external QC in Morona Santiago, Pastaza, and Zamora Chinchipe, and provide a detailed breakdown of the estimated US$2.3 million budget for these activities to enhance transparency.**
- **Ecuador should clarify its quality management (QM) methodology and clearly explain the difference between the process of handing over released land from the demining battalion to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and QC by the Humanitarian Demining Certification Unit (Unidad Certificadora de Desminado Humanitario, UCDH).**

- **Ecuador should clarify the reasons delaying the official mine-free declaration in Loja and El Oro, given that the UCDH's clearance and internal and external QC were completed in 2018.**
- **Ecuador should use the remaining period to develop a residual risk management strategy and ensure that sufficient national capacity—human, financial, and material—is sustained to address any contamination found after completion as well as to finalise any outstanding QM issues.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 7 | 6 | Ecuador's estimate of remaining contamination covered under 10,000m$^2$ at the end of 2024, with one of the 22 tasks alone covering 7,009m$^2$. In 2025, its Article 7 report and deadline extension request identified for the first time the three cantons where 21 remaining tasks are located. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Ecuador funds its demining programme through a multi-year budget, with US$9.45 million allocated for 2022–25. This funding was extended through 2027. The programme is managed by CENDESMI while a battalion of the Army Corps of Engineers conducts demining. Ecuador is working with Peru to address the remaining contamination at their shared border but is seeking international support to complete external QC. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 3 | Ecuador does not have a gender and diversity policy or plan for mine action. While there are female deminers within the Army Battalion of Engineers, no details were provided on their proportion or roles in 2024. Diversity considerations, such as recognising cultural and linguistic differences are, however, considered in Ecuador's mine risk education efforts. In August 2024, Ecuador implemented its seventh mine risk education campaign since 2006, which was implemented in the province of Zamora Chinchipe. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Ecuador has reiterated in its 2025 Article 7 report that it complies with environmental and security norms as per the Ecuadorian Manual of Procedures for Demining as well as the Binational Manual. However, its extension request makes no reference to environmental protection in mine action. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Ecuador uses IMSMA as its national mine action database. In June 2024, it published an updated work plan for 2022–25 and then confirmed at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024 that it was on track to meet its Article 5 deadline. In July 2025, however, it submitted a two-year extension request. The information provided in the June 2024 work plan is not entirely consistent with that in the 2025 extension request, particularly regarding the budget, methodologies, and the total surface area still pending QC. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | The June 2024 work plan noted slight operational delays in 2022 that were made up for in 2023. In 2024, targets were met. In July 2025, Ecuador's new extension request was accompanied by a national demining plan for 2026–27, which identified 22 tasks covering the remaining 9,964m$^2$ to be cleared by the end of 2026. It also identified 127 areas across three provinces—totalling 280,031 m$^2$—that are still pending external QC. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Ecuador's land release follows two operational manuals—one national and the other binational with Peru—based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) but tailored to local conditions. Clearance is done manually while mine detection dogs continued to be used for QC in 2024. Since the programme began, Ecuador has reported cancellations through NTS but no reduction through technical survey, except in 2018. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 5 | Ecuador met its land release targets for 2024 and had less than 10,000m$^2$ of AP mined area remaining in 2025. Although it had reported at the Fifth Review Conference being on track to meet its Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2025, Ecuador ultimately submitted a request for a new two-year extension. The extension is intended to allow for the completion of demining, QC activities covering 280,000m$^2$ across three provinces, and the issuance of official mine-free declarations in two others. |
| **Average Score** | **5.8** | **5.3** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (CENDESMI)
- Humanitarian Demining Certification Unit (UCDH)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Engineer Battalion No. 68 Cotopaxi (B.E.-68) of the Army Corps of Engineers (Cuerpo de Ingenieros del Ecuador, CEE)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- Comprehensive Mine Action Program Ecuador – Organization of American States (AICMA EC Mission – OAS)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Ecuador reported that, as at end 2024, 9,964m$^2$ of AP mined area remained in Zamora Chinchipe province of the Cordillera del Condor region, thought to contain a total of 1,713 mines.[1] The contamination consists of 22 tasks spread across four sectors (see Table 1). This includes a single confirmed hazardous area (CHA) known as "Puesto de Vigilancia (PV) Peringos-01", located in the southern part of the Chinchipe province, which alone covers 7,009m$^2$ and contains 1,280 AP mines.

Regarding the other hazardous areas, Ecuador's 2025 Article 7 report and extension request identified for the first time the specific three sectors they are located: Condor Mirador, Miazi, and Paquisha Alto – areas that had been previously reported as "undefined" hazardous areas.[2] Despite the sectors now being identified, these areas do not have precise coordinates and are therefore classified as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).[3] They consist of 22 tasks which are relatively small: 13 cover areas smaller than 100m$^2$, each containing an average of 14 AP mines. The smallest task covers just 9m$^2$ and contains 3 AP mines, while the two largest each span 600m$^2$ and are thought to contain 40 and 43 AP mines.[4]

**Table 1: AP mined area (at end 2024)[5]**

| Province | Canton | Sector | Tasks | CHA (m²) | SHA (m²) | AP mines |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zamora Chinchipe | Chinchipe | Chito (PV Peringos-01) | 1 | 7,009 | 0 | 1,280 |
| | El Pangui | Tundayme (Cóndor Mirador) | 18 | 0 | 2,793 | 400 |
| | Paquisha | Miazi | 1 | 0 | 135 | 15 |
| | Paquisha | Paquisha Alto | 2 | 0 | 27 | 18 |
| **Totals** | | | **22** | **7,009** | **2,955** | **1,713** |

Note: The 2025 extension request contains inconsistencies regarding the classification of hazardous areas as either suspected hazardous area (SHA) or confirmed hazardous area (CHA). Additional information shared on 4 September 2025 clarified that 7,009m$^2$ are CHAs and 2,955m$^2$ are SHAs, indicating that only one task falls within a CHA while the remaining 21 are in SHAs, despite the document referring to 2 CHAs and 20 SHAs.

All the mined areas are in the Amazon rainforest of Zamora Chinchipe province, which is characterised by dense vegetation, steep ravines, and cliffs at altitudes reaching up to 2,400 metres above sea level. Access is only possible by air, significantly increasing costs and logistical complexities. Adverse weather conditions, with temperatures ranging from 12°C to 35°C, constant humidity, and year-round rainfall also challenge operations.[6]

1 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 1, p. 8.

2 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 7–8; and "Updated Work Plan 2022–2025", submitted 18 June 2024 (Plan de Acción para la Etapa Final del Proceso de Desminado Humanitario del Ecuador, 2022–2025), pp. 8–9.

3 Ecuadorian Ministry of Defence (MoD), Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, p. 6.

4 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Annex 4, p. 66; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 7–8.

5 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 8, p. 31; Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 7–8 and MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, Table 2, p. 6.

6 "National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–2027", 12 June 2025 (Plan Nacional de Desminado Humanitario 2026-2027), p. 7. The Plan is annexed to the 2025 deadline Extension Request, pp. 40-63.

Mine contamination in Ecuador results from its 1995 border conflict with Peru. The most heavily mined section of the border is the Cordillera del Condor region that was at the centre of the dispute between the two nations. After the signing of the Brasilia Peace Agreements in 1998, Ecuador began the process of demining the border areas.[7]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (Centro Nacional de Desminado, CENDESMI), established in 1999, serves as the NMAA. It is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility, and includes representatives of the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Public Health, and the Army Corps of Engineers (Cuerpo de Ingenieros del Ecuador, CEE). CENDESMI, with three personnel, is responsible for defining Ecuador's national demining plans and overseeing the implementation and monitoring of the humanitarian demining process.[8]

Clearance operations are conducted by the CEE's Engineer Battalion No. 68 "Cotopaxi" (B.E. 68). It is the operational unit tasked with conducting land release operations and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in Ecuador.[9] The Certification Unit (UCDH) is the national entity in charge of conducting QC after clearance by the Cotopaxi Battalion, just before released land is formally declared mine-free. It was created in 2018 through interministerial agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence and sits at CENDESMI.[10]

Ecuador and Peru have jointly conducted demining effort along their shared border, supported by ongoing coordination between their NMAAs and demining commanders. Since 2002, the process has been guided by formal agreements—23 between military commanders and 19 between national authorities—establishing a strong foundation for effective binational cooperation.[11] In October 2024, Peru and Ecuador held the 25th Meeting of National Mine Action Authorities in Quito, which brought together CENDESMI and the Peruvian Mine Action Centre (CONTRAMINAS). During the meeting, the authorities reviewed the progress of demining in their respective nations and developed joint strategies for international cooperation.[12]

In 2023–24, Peru and Ecuador received international support in the form of advisory visits from the Convention's Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), as well as equipment donations and training from Italy via the Italo-Latin American Institute (IILA).[13]

In a joint statement at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, Ecuador and Peru highlighted their mutual trust and cooperation, which has enabled significant progress in demining, especially along their shared border. Regular annual meetings between their national mine action authorities and high-level political support have been "essential", the statement said, in coordinating technical efforts and advancing the implementation of the Convention.[14]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Ecuador has demonstrated strong national ownership of its demining programme by committing multi-year budget to survey and clearance. Between 2014 and 2021, it allocated US$21 million, although no funds were provided in 2020 and 2021 as resources were redirected to the COVID-19 pandemic response.[15] For the 2022–25 action plan, Ecuador allocated US$9.45 million,[16] of which US$7.3 million was budgeted through 2025.[17] However, no funding was made available for 2025, prompting the need for a fourth, and hopefully final, extension request.[18] This request spread the original US$9.45 million allocation over a longer period, extending through to 2027, explaining that 2025 funds had been diverted to other national priorities.[19] To complete QC activities and complete clearance by the end of 2027, Ecuador is seeking an additional US$2.3 million in international funding.[20]

International support for demining has been essential in Ecuador since 1999. Technical, financial, and logistical assistance was received from several States, including Canada, Spain, and the United States. Between 2001 and 2014, Ecuador had an agreement with the Organization of American States (OAS)'s Comprehensive Action Program against Anti-Personnel Mines (AICMA).[21] In 2022, Ecuador signed a new agreement with the OAS to support Article 5 implementation.[22] The agreement was meant to receive technical assistance for capacity building; training and

7 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 3; and "National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–2027", p. 6.

8 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 24–25.

9 Ibid.

10 Interministerial Accord No. 000001 (Acuerdo Interministerial 000001), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility – Ministry of Defence, 11 July 2018, at: https://bit.ly/47GDdjW.

11 "National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–2027", p. 6.

12 Joint Statement of Peru and Ecuador on Cooperation and Assistance, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Presentation of Ecuador on Article 5, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

16 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 28-29.

17 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, p. 14.

18 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27.

19 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27, Table 6.

20 Ibid., p. 27, Table 7.

21 "Humanitarian demining Process in Ecuador", MoFA and Human Mobility, 13 November 2023. Document shared during the Hybrid Dialogue "Building Peace: A Future Free from Anti-Personnel Mines in Ecuador and Peru" organised by the AICMA Programme of the OAS in Washington DC.

22 Ecuador to Move Forward on Demining Task", OAS, 15 March 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3GX5H04.

accreditation in QA; external monitoring; international fundraising; and the provision of equipment and supplies.[23] In November 2023, with OAS support, Ecuador appealed to donor countries and organisations for assistance during an event in Washington DC entitled: "In support of the completion of demining efforts: Reaching the goal of a mine-free Ecuador and Peru".[24] In its 2025 extension request, however, Ecuador noted that despite bilateral efforts, both directly and through the OAS, no external support was received for the implementation of the 2022–2025 National Humanitarian Demining Plan.[25]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Ecuador's 2025 extension request mentioned that the Engineer Battalion No. 68—composed of 103 deminers and ten civil servants—includes female deminers who are trained and equipped for demining. However, additional information in September 2025 clarified that no women are currently available in the engineering corps promotions, and those previously trained have been reassigned under personnel rotation rules.[26] The training of new women specialists depends on the assignment of female personnel by the Army's Directorate of Human Resources.[27] Ecuador reported that, in 2014, the Army incorporated two women as Latin America's first demining specialists, assigning them to operations along the southern border (provinces of El Oro, Loja, Pastaza, Zamora Chinchipe, and Morona Santiago).[28]

In granting Ecuador's last extension request in 2022, the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties reminded of the significance of providing details on how it will mainstream gender and diversity within the mine action programme.[29] Ecuador did not explain how gender considerations are integrated across all stages of operations — from survey and clearance to QM. Diversity is, however, considered in Ecuador's mine risk education efforts. Campaigns began in 2005, initially focusing on Shuar Indigenous leaders in El Oro and Loja. Recognizing the cultural and linguistic differences in Morona Santiago, Ecuador adapted its approach in Tiwinza by implementing bilingual campaigns in Spanish and Shuar, reaching 15 affected Shuar communities. Trained community leaders then served as local educators, spreading the message "Explosive Mines Kill." Binational campaigns with Peru began in 2006 and have been conducted regularly along the shared border. In August 2024, Ecuador implemented a seventh risk education campaign, in the areas of Tundayme parish and El Pangui canton in Zamora Chinchipe.[30]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Although Ecuador is not known to have specific environmental policies for its mine action programme, it reaffirmed in its latest Article 7 report that operations follow environmental and safety standards outlined in the Ecuadorian Demining Procedures Manual and the Binational Manual with Peru (though without specifying the environmental standards applied).[31] According to additional information provided by Ecuador in its 2025 extension request, the 2026–27 demining plan incorporates technical procedures and national decrees to prevent and mitigate environmental damage. Measures include waste management points located away from demining sites, strict site delimitation with signage and access control, and communication with communities on risks. Environmental monitoring is conducted under national regulations, while Decree 1195 (2017) grants exceptional authorisation for the use of renewable resources in demining, subject to an Environmental Alternatives Assessment (DAA) and licensing.[32]

Environmental conditions were listed as potential risk to the implementation of the successive work plans. The remaining hazardous areas in Zamora Chinchipe are in remote Amazon rainforest terrain, accessible only by air. Dense vegetation, steep elevations, and adverse weather conditions—including constant humidity and heavy rainfall—pose significant logistical and operational challenges. As a result, Ecuador had indicated that only about 45% of planned operations can be completed on time.[33] However, Ecuador confirmed that the new 2026–27 planning takes into account climatic and terrain conditions in determining the number of working days and deminer performance, building on the experience of operations in 2024 in the same province.[34] Ecuador also stated that the combination of heavy rainfall and the physical characteristics of the devices can also cause mines to shift into areas with greater movement of people, posing a serious risk to the safety of residents.[35]

23 Email from Tammy Hall, General Coordinator, OAS Mine Action Program, Department of Public Security, 13 August 2022; and "OAS.

24 Hybrid Dialogue "Building Peace: A Future Free from Anti-Personnel Mines in Ecuador and Peru", OAS, Washington DC, 16 November 2023.

25 Introductory letter dated 9 June 2025 from the Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the United Nations in Geneva regarding the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.

26 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, p. 17.

27 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 25–26.

28 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, p. 17.

29 Decision on the Article 5 deadline extension request by Ecuador, 20MSP, 21–25 November 2022, p. 4.

30 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 22–24.

31 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 12–13.

32 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, pp. 15–16.

33 "National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–2027", p. 7; and "Updated Work Plan 2022–2025", submitted 18 June 2024, p. 2.

34 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, p. 11.

35 Updated Work Plan 2022–2025", submitted 18 June 2024, p. 9.

Demining in high-biodiversity areas such as Zamora Chinchipe directly supports ecosystem restoration, as many affected zones are part of critical biological corridors and natural reserve buffers. Clearance enables flora and fauna to recover, facilitates sustainable agriculture, and reduces poverty in rural communities. By rehabilitating degraded areas and promoting sustainable land use, demining also enhances climate resilience and strengthens Ecuador's long-term environmental sustainability.[36]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Ecuador uses an unspecified version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). During 2022 and 2023, the general database was being upgraded with geo-referenced tools to improve the quality of information; no information was provided for 2024.[37]

Ecuador has consistently submitted its Article 7 reports, including the most recent one in May 2025, covering calendar year 2024. It also submitted an "Updated Work Plan" (Plan de Acción para la Etapa Final del Proceso de Desminado Humanitario del Ecuador, 2022–2025) for Article 5 implementation in June 2024 and participated in the APMBC Fifth Review Conference in Cambodia in November 2024.

There, Ecuador reaffirmed its commitment to meeting the 31 December 2025 deadline and delivered joint statements with Peru highlighting continued bilateral cooperation. At the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025, however, Ecuador announced that it would be submitting a late two-year extension request, as demining operations had been suspended that year due to the reallocation of funds to other national priorities. The information provided in the Updated Work Plan (June 2024) is not always consistent with that in the 2025 extension request, particularly with regard to budget, methodologies, and the extent of surface areas still pending QC and a mine-free declaration.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Ecuador initially outlined its mine clearance plan for 2022–25 in its 2022 Article 5 deadline extension request. Its June 2024 Updated Work Plan noted that demining operations had resumed in 2022 following a two-year suspension caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and national budget reallocation. Although operations experienced slight delays and 2022 outputs fell short of targets, Ecuador had caught up in 2023.[38] Ecuador's Article 7 report for 2024 confirmed that annual targets were again met during the year, with 11 areas covering 10,004m² released through NTS and clearance.[39] Table 2 below shows the initial plan compared to the actual achievements as at July 2025.

**Table 2: Initial plan for land release in Zamora Chinchipe against achievements (2022–25)[40]**

| Year | Mined areas projected for release | Mined areas released | Area projected for release (m²) | Area released (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 17 | 10 | 10,056 | 8,103 |
| 2023 | 9 | 18 | 10,000 | 11,985 |
| 2024 | 8 | 11 | 10,004 | 10,004 |
| 2025 | 19 | 0 | 9,996 | 0 |
| **Totals** | **53** | **39** | **40,056** | **30,092** |

In June 2025, Ecuador informed States Parties at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings that demining funding for 2025 had been redirected to other national priorities (security, health, and natural disaster), citing force majeure and making it impossible for clearance to be completed by the 31 December 2025 treaty deadline.[41] As a result, Ecuador submitted a new extension request in July 2025, accompanied by a National Humanitarian Demining Plan for 2026–2027, which listed 22 tasks covering the remaining 9,964m² to be addressed by the end of 2026 (see Table 3).[42] Notably, for the first time in 2025, Ecuador provided the specific sectors for 21 areas previously been listed as "undefined" (see Table 1 above).

36 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, pp. 16–17.

37 Emails from CENDESMI, 4 August and 6 and 7 September 2023; and Engineers Battalion No. 68 Cotopaxi, 11 March 2022.

38 "Updated Work Plan 2022–2025", submitted 18 June 2024, pp. 7–8.

39 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 17.

40 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 31, Table 7; 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9, Tables 3 and 4; "Updated Work Plan 2022–2025", submitted 18 June 2024, p. 7; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 17.

41 Introductory letter dated 9 June 2025 from the Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the United Nations in Geneva regarding the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.

42 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 8, p. 31.

While the initial version of the 2025 extension request planned for completion of all demining by the end of 2026, additional information shared in early September 2025 indicated that teams would be deployed in both 2026 and 2027, with ten squadrons each year over three operational cycles of 21 days.[43]

**Table 3: National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–27**[44]

| Year | Province | Tasks | Area (m²) | AP mines |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Zamora Chinchipe | 22 | 9,964 | 1,713 |

Ecuador's extension request also aims to complete long-standing external QC for areas cleared between 2000 and 2013, where the process was never fully completed following the end of the OAS-AICMA programme in the country.[45] External QC is also pending for areas cleared after 2013. As at end 2024, 127 areas across three provinces—covering a total of 280,031m²—awaited external QC and, as a result, have not yet been formally handed over to communities (see Table 4).

For QC, Ecuador intends to deploy four squadrons in 2026 and eight in 2027 over six operational cycles of 21 days each (plus seven days of rest). This is equivalent to six months of operations per year from June to December — a total of 12 squadrons and 12 operational cycles across the two years.[46]

**Table 4: Cleared areas pending external QC (at end 2024)**[47]

| Province | Areas | Area (m²) | Observations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Morona Santiago | 91 | 219,471 | External QC pending with OAS-AICMA ending in 2013 |
| Pastaza | 1 | 1,000 | External QC pending with OAS-AICMA ending in 2013 |
| Zamora Chinchipe | 35 | 59,560 | A total of 11,911m² was cleared in 2018,[48] and a further 30,092m² in 2022–24.[49] It is not known when the remaining area was cleared. |
| **Totals** | **127** | **280,031** | |

In addition, cleared areas in the provinces of El Oro and Loja are still awaiting official mine-free declarations (see Table 5). These areas underwent both internal and external QC by the UCDH for land released in 2018.[50] For reasons unknown, the national process to formally declare these areas mine-free was, however, never completed. While Ecuador's 2022 extension request anticipated completing this process in the second half of that year,[51] the 2025 extension request has postponed the timeline to the end of 2027, but without offering a clear justification for the continued delay or specifying the obstacles preventing completion.[52]

**Table 5: Areas awaiting official mine-free declaration**[53]

| Province | Internal QC (m²) | External QC (m²) | Observations |
|---|---|---|---|
| El Oro | 6,427 | 2,174 | Internal and external QC conducted by the UCDH in 2018. |
| Loja | 7,963 | 8,051 | |

43 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, pp. 7 and 9.
44 Ibid.
45 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
46 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, pp. 8 and 10 (the table on page 8 has wrong totals).
47 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 33 and Annex 5, pp. 70–73; and "National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–2027", Table, pp. 10–11.
48 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.
49 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 3, p. 9.
50 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
51 Ibid., p. 8.
52 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.
53 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

It remains unclear why such retrospective external QC or mine-free declaration are still pending, given that a quality assurance (QA) process was in place and no incidents have occurred in the past 24 years.[54] Ecuador has not provided evidence to indicate that clearance was not conducted to sufficiently high standards. Although Ecuador was asked to clarify its position, it had not responded on this issue as at early September 2025.

The Ecuadorian government had allocated a budget of US$9,449,520 for the third extension period (2022–25) to support demining. This funding covered personnel costs and specialised demining materials and equipment.[55] Ecuador's 2025 extension request simply extended the original national budget (US$9.45 million) across a longer timeframe, through to 2027, explaining that funding for demining in 2025 was reallocated to other national priorities.[56] The remaining budget for 2026–27 is estimated at just over US$2 million and will be allocated to enhancing the operational capacity of BE-68 for demining and EOD operations through equipment acquisition, as well as ensuring logistical support for clearance.[57]

This budget, which is fully funded by the Ecuadorian government, does not include costs related to pending external QC, for which Ecuador is seeking US$2.3 million in international financial support.[58] This is an increase from the US$1.96 million estimated for pending QC activities in the Updated Work Plan submitted in June 2024.[59] For several years, Ecuador has relied on the support it expected under its agreement with the OAS, with the intention that the AICMA-EC Mission would conduct external QC of cleared areas, as was the case from 2000 to 2013.[60] However, this has not materialised. In its 2025 extension request, Ecuador expressed a continued hope for future support, either through the OAS-AICMA or through direct cooperation with partner countries and organisations.[61]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Demining is conducted in accordance with Ecuador's Humanitarian Demining Procedures Manual and the Binational Humanitarian Demining Procedures Manual jointly developed with Peru in 2015. Both manuals are said to be based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), but adapted to the Ecuadorian context.[62] National procedures are detailed over 12 pages in Ecuador's 2025 extension request.[63] They involve a combination of techniques, including manual demining using "one man, one lane"; mechanical demining (a DOK-ING MV-4), and mine detection dogs for QC.[64] However, due to the current terrain conditions, which are characterised by dense vegetation, mountainous landscapes, steep cliffs, and hard-to-reach ravines, Ecuador had said it is no longer feasible to use mechanical assets to improve clearance efficiency.[65] In the additional information on its 2025 extension request, Ecuador clarified that the MV4 robot is currently non-operational, having sustained damage during operations, and that its weight (5,560kg) has prevented extraction for maintenance, as no helicopter can support the load. Ecuador also confirmed that MDDs are employed exclusively for QC.[66]

To accurately determine the location and extent of hazardous areas along the border, Ecuador planned to conduct both NTS and technical survey (TS). These efforts were to rely on existing national records of known mine-contaminated areas. Modern equipment and technology were expected to be used for survey of the suspected areas prior to the start of clearance operations.[67] Ecuador clarified that suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) are identified through NTS, national assessments, or community reports, while CHAs have been verified through TS. The term defined hazardous area (DHA) is used for a zone within a CHA that has been clearly delineated for full clearance.[68] Since the start of its demining programme, Ecuador has reported reduction by TS only once – in 2018. In all other years, it has reported cancellation through NTS and full clearance.[69]

In its successive extension requests and Work Plans, Ecuador has consistently referred to the same provision (Chapter VII) of the Binational Humanitarian Demining Procedures Manual, jointly developed with Peru in 2015, which outlines QC procedures.[70] According to this manual, the handover process is conducted as follows: once demining and internal QC are completed, an External Monitoring Team (accompanied by a representative from B.E.-68 "COTOPAXI") conducts a final inspection of the cleared or released area. Based on

54 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 23.
55 "Updated Work Plan 2022–2025", submitted 18 June 2024, p. 11, Table 10.
56 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27, Table 6.
57 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, p. 13.
58 Ibid., p. 27, Table 7.
59 "Updated Work Plan 2022–2025", submitted 18 June 2024, p. 15.
60 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6; and Cooperation and Technical Assistance Agreement between Ecuador and the General Secretariat of the AOS in relation to the Integral Mine Action Program in Ecuador, 15 March 2022, Annex 1, p. 8.
61 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27, Table 7.
62 Ibid., p. 10.
63 Ibid., pp. 10–22.
64 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 12.
65 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.
66 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, pp. 11–12.
67 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6 and 31.
68 Ibid, p. 10.
69 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 17.
70 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 34–36; "Updated Work Plan 2022-2025", submitted 18 June 2024, pp. 16–19; 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 33–35.

this inspection, the team prepares a final status report on the area, which is submitted to CENDESMI, with a copy sent to COTOPAXI. During the handover process, both entities formally certify the area as cleared by signing a declaration.[71] Since 2018, responsibility for QC following the handover process has rested with the UCDH.[72] Nonetheless, the areas subjected to QC under the authority of the UCDH have yet to receive mine-free declaration status (see Table 5), thereby calling into question the effectiveness of the current process.

While Ecuador's extension requests mention the use of dogs in demining, Ecuador did not specify whether MDDs are employed to expedite the QA process.

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

As noted, Engineer Battalion No. 68 "Cotopaxi" is responsible for demining and EOD across Ecuador.[73] The Battalion has 103 trained deminers (down from 140 in 2022) who receive regular training through the Military Engineering School.[74] Based in Quito, the unit is deployed to regional commands in border provinces as operations are conducted. The demining personnel are supported by medical and paramedical teams and their equipment is said to comply with both national and international mine action standards.[75]

In 2015, Ecuador and Peru began working toward the establishment of a Binational Demining Unit. Over the next four years, the Unit conducted coordinated operations that led to the clearance of AP mines from the "Tiwinza square kilometre" in October 2018. This milestone was praised as both a step forward in mine clearance and a symbol of the mutual trust and commitment between the two nations.[76]

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, Ecuador released a total of 10,004m$^2$ of mined areas through 11 tasks: 5,814m$^2$ cancelled through NTS and 4,190m$^2$ cleared, destroying in the process 367 AP mines.[77]

**Table 6: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m$^2$) |
|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 4,190 |
| **Technical survey** | 0 |
| **Non-technical survey** | 5,814 |
| **Destruction of AP mines in clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 367 |

### SURVEY IN 2024

During 2024, 5,814m$^2$ was cancelled through NTS – an increase on the 1,587m$^2$ cancelled in 2023. No mined area has been reported to have been reduced through TS since 2018.[78]

### CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, 4,190m$^2$ of mined area was cleared with the destruction of 367 AP mines. Although this is less than the 10,398m$^2$ cleared in 2023, it remains in line with Ecuador's work plan.

71 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 33–34.
72 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
73 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 24–25.
74 Ibid., p. 24; and 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.
75 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.
76 "National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–2027", p. 6.
77 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 17.
78 Ibid.

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ECUADOR: 1 OCTOBER 1999
↓
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2009
↓
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8 YEARS): 1 OCTOBER 2017
↓
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2017
↓
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2022
↓
FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2025
↓
**FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (2 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2027**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the three-year extension granted by States Parties in 2022), Ecuador is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. Although Ecuador reaffirmed its commitment to this deadline in both its 2024 Updated Work Plan and at the Fifth Review Conference, it informed States Parties in June 2025 it would not meet the deadline. As a result, Ecuador has submitted a new extension request for an additional two years until 31 December 2027. The request, its fifth, was due to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of State Parties in December 2025.

At the Fifth Review Conference, Ecuador reported that since the start of its demining programme, it had cleared 98% of its AP mined area, totalling 580,152.56m$^2$, and destroyed 12,347 AP mines.[79] At the end of 2024, Ecuador still had 9,964m$^2$ of AP mined areas to be addressed with an estimated 1,713 AP mines to be destroyed in the Zamora Chinchipe province along the border with Peru.[80] In 2025, Ecuador cited internal armed conflict, natural disasters, and health crises as force majeure circumstances that prevented it from meeting its Article 5 obligations. In the initial version of its extension request, Ecuador aimed to complete clearance by the end of 2026 using national funds (unspent resources from 2025), and is seeking US$2.3 million in international support to complete QC and issue mine-free declarations by the end of 2027.

**Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (m$^2$) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 4,190 |
| 2023 | 10,389 |
| 2022 | 5,096 |
| 2021* | 0 |
| 2020* | 0 |
| **Total** | **19,675** |

*Operations halted in 2020 and 2021 due to COVID-19.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

In its 2022 extension request, Ecuador stated that it would rely on current capacity to address areas of residual contamination after fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations. Thus, all personnel, material, and equipment used for demining by Engineer Battalion 68 would be transferred to army EOD teams retaining the competencies and capacities to address any newly identified mined areas.[81]

In the additional information submitted on its 2025 extension request, Ecuador confirmed measures to ensure institutional and operational continuity. These include regular meetings of CENDESMI, supported by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility, Defense, and Health; the establishment of a national rapid response teams to identify and release newly discovered or reclassified hazardous areas; and ongoing training for technical staff in advanced detection, safe neutralisation, and environmental rehabilitation. Ecuador also committed to maintaining and updating its national mine information system (IMSMA or equivalent), with qualified staff, upgraded monitoring tools, and sustainable financing to ensure reliable data management.

79 Presentation of Ecuador on Article 5, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

80 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 7–8.

81 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.

Ecuador said it will continue strengthening ties with the OAS and other international organisations for equipment, training, and accreditation, building on agreements such as the 2022 OAS–CENDESMI accord. It also plans to maintain binational cooperation with Peru in mine action, focusing on information exchange and joint training. In parallel, Ecuador plans to implement post-demining monitoring mechanisms, including semi-annual internal reports and annual Article 7 updates, to track progress in national capacity, area coverage, and IMSMA performance.

To guarantee long-term sustainability, Ecuador intends to allocate national budget resources to demining, complemented by mixed financing models involving international donors and bilateral or regional cooperation. Taken together, these elements — rapid response teams, international cooperation, robust information management, institutional strengthening, and continuous monitoring — will form "the foundation of a sustainable national mine action capacity in Ecuador".[82]

82 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, pp. 12–13.

# ERITREA



## KEY DATA

### ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2027

Not on track and in serious violation of the Convention (renewed demining needed to return to compliance)

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 10KM²

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Not reported | Not reported |
| Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |
| Non-Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Not reported | Not reported |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- None

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

On 17 November 2024, Eritrea submitted its fifth request to extend its Article 5 deadline, this time for three years to 31 December 2027. This request was granted at the Fifth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in Siem Reap on 29 November 2024. No survey or clearance of anti-personnel (AP) mines was reported by Eritrea for 2024. The lack of progress in demining is a serious violation of Eritrea's obligations under Article 5 of the Convention. Furthermore, as at July 2025, Eritrea had still to submit an Article 7 report covering 2024. It has not submitted one since 2014.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Eritrea should report to States Parties on the latest developments in its planned restructuring of the Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA) and on results of preliminary assessments to determine a work plan.**
- **The government of Eritrea should ensure that identification and release of mined areas confirmed or suspected to contain AP mines is undertaken as a matter of urgency.**
- **Eritrea should urgently submit an up-to-date list of all confirmed or suspected mined areas and a detailed annual and multi-year work plan for survey and clearance.**
- **Eritrea must urgently submit its outstanding annual Article 7 transparency reports, the latest of which was due by 30 April 2025.**
- **Eritrea should reconsider its policy of excluding international technical assistance in mine action, which would support efficient land release and re-open international funding paths.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 3 | 3 | The last estimate of mined area dates back to the end of 2013, when Eritrea reported that 434 mined areas remained covering a total of 33.4km$^2$. All area is reportedly suspected hazardous area (SHA). Mine Action Review is unaware of any progress in land release or updated information on the extent of contamination since then. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 3 | 3 | Eritrea's mine action programme, to the extent it exists, is entirely nationally managed. The EDA is responsible for mine clearance. Eritrea reported in November 2024, as it had a year earlier, that the EDA was undergoing "restructuring" of its operational mandate. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 3 | 3 | It is not known if Eritrea has policies in place relating to gender and diversity in mine action. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 0 | 0 | It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 0 | 0 | Details of Eritrea's current information management system are not known. Its failure to submit annual Article 7 reports over the past ten years is also a violation of the Convention. Eritrea has also failed to provide other updates on the implementation of its mine action obligations under Article 5 in recent years. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 1 | 1 | Recent details on Eritrea's planning and tasking system are not available. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 3 | 3 | Eritrea is reported to have national mine action standards dating back to 2012. The EDA was responsible for the implementation of quality management activities. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 0 | 0 | Eritrea seemingly made no progress in land release to meet its obligations under its second, third, or fourth Article 5 deadline extension periods. Eritrea submitted a fifth extension request on 17 November 2024, seeking a three-year extension to 31 December 2027. The request was granted at the Fifth Review Conference. Eritrea remains in serious violation of the Convention for its failure to undertake demining as soon as possible. |
| **Average Score** | **1.6** | **1.6** | **Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Engineering units of the Eritrean Armed Forces (based on information from earlier years)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- None

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Eritrea is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) dating back to the Second World War, but largely as the result of the struggle for independence in 1962–91 and its armed conflict with Ethiopia in 1998–2000.

The last estimate of the extent of mined area in Eritrea dates back to the end of 2013, when Eritrea reported 434 mined areas covering an estimated 33.4km.[1] This was a two-thirds reduction on the earlier estimate of 99km$^2$ of June 2011,[2] and significantly lower than the 129km$^2$ identified by the 2004 landmine impact survey.[3] The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), which was terminated in 2008 due to restrictions imposed by Eritrea and the cutting-off of fuel supplies, affirmed that there are 995 "dangerous areas", 914 "mined areas", and 702 minefields in Eritrea. UNMEE estimated that some 250,000 landmines were scattered across the country, with the most common being anti-vehicle (AV) mines and blast and fragmentation AP mines.[4]

All contaminated areas in Eritrea are thought to be still classified as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). Eritrea has not reported on any plans to establish a more accurate baseline of contamination.

**Table 1: Mined area by region (at end 2013)[5]**

| Zoba (region) | SHAs | Estimated area (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Semienawi Keih Bahri | 166 | 9,462,537 |
| Anseba | 144 | 10,230,940 |
| Gash Barka | 63 | 6,252,951 |
| Debub | 29 | 3,894,036 |
| Maakel | 24 | 2,423,325 |
| Debubawi Keih Bahri | 8 | 1,169,029 |
| **Totals** | **434** | **33,432,818** |

## OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

UNMEE estimated that three million items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) are scattered across Eritrea, ranging from small arms ammunition to bombs dropped from aeroplanes.[6] Eritrea might be contaminated with cluster munition remnants as a result of the 1998–2000 war with Ethiopia.[7]

# NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

To the extent one exists, Eritrea's mine action programme is entirely nationally managed. The Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA), established in July 2002, is believed to be still responsible for policy development, regulation of mine action, and the conduct of mine clearance operations. The EDA is believed to report directly to the Office of the President.

In its fifth Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in November 2024, the situation reported by Eritrea remained virtually unchanged than from that outlined in its fourth extension request, submitted a year earlier. Eritrea stated again that the restructuring of the EDA was in progress. It also stated that the Government had been "conducting preliminary assessments involving key policy and operational stakeholders", with the aim of presenting a detailed work plan, but that it had been unable to submit its extension request in due time for consideration by the Fifth Review Conference, due to time constraints and "technical challenges".[8] No further details were provided of what this restructuring of the EDA may entail, nor of the "technical challenges" Eritrea refers to.

Eritrea has not responded to Mine Action Review's inquiries about its national mine action programme in the last three years.

1 2014 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7. This was despite finding 49 previously unrecorded suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in five regions across an estimated area of 9km$^2$ during NTS in 2013. Analysis of Eritrea's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 20 June 2014, p. 2.

2 Eritrea's reply to questions from the Article 5 Analysing Group about its Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 June 2011, p. 2.

3 Survey Action Center (SAC), "Landmine Impact Survey, Eritrea, Final Report", May 2005, p. 7.

4 United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), "UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea is withdrawn", accessed 5 June 2023 at: https://bit.ly/43K5Sl5.

5 2014 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

6 UNMEE, "UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea is withdrawn".

7 Cluster Munition Monitor, "Cluster Munition Ban Policy – Eritrea", accessed 13 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3yrdNtX.

8 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Eritrea projected that costs during its Article 5 deadline extension period to 1 February 2020 would amount to more than US$7 million, all to be raised nationally.[9] In 2011–13, Eritrea had managed to raise only $257,000 annually. Eritrea acknowledged at the time that its progress in clearing mines would be slow due to lack of resources, but it has never been clear how it intended to secure the funding for its survey and clearance, particularly in light of its policy of not accepting international technical assistance.[10] It is not known if Eritrea contributed any national resources to support the cost of the EDA or any survey or clearance of mined areas that might have been conducted in 2024, nor if Eritrea has made any progress towards developing a resource mobilisation strategy for Article 5 implementation.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

It is not known if Eritrea has policies in place relating to gender and diversity in mine action.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Eritrea in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Details on Eritrea's current information management system are not known. As at July 2025, Eritrea had yet to submit its latest Article 7 report covering 2024. Eritrea has not submitted an Article 7 transparency report since 2014, which is itself a violation of the Convention. It has also failed to provide an updated Article 5 work plan, pledging instead to provide one by 31 December 2027.[11]

In granting Eritrea's 2024 request for an extension to its Article 5 deadline, the Fifth review Conference noted that Eritrea had not acted in accordance with the agreed "process for the preparation, submission and consideration of requests for extensions to Article 5 deadlines", preventing the Committee on Article 5 Implementation from carrying out its mandate to "prepare and submit to the States Parties in advance of Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences an analysis of each request for an Article 5 extended deadline". In granting the 2024 request, the Conference welcomed Eritrea's commitment to adhere to the established process and submit a request by 31 March 2027 for consideration by the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of States Parties (24MSP).[12]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

There is no recent information available on whether Eritrea has a national mine action strategy or how Eritrea plans any demining operations it may conduct. Re-survey during the second extension period was planned to involve both technical survey and non-technical survey (NTS) of all remaining mined areas across six regions, and to run concurrently with clearance in priority areas in the Anseba, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri regions.[13] Eritrea's 2024 extension request did not contain any information on the extent of mined area remaining or on plans to address it. Eritrea plans to submit a detailed work plan by 31 March 2027.[14]

9 2014 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

10 Statement of Eritrea, APMBC Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 6 December 2013.

11 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.

12 "Decisions on the request submitted by Eritrea for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

13 Statement of Eritrea, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 9 April 2014.

14 "Decisions on the request submitted by Eritrea for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Eritrea reportedly has national mine action standards (NMAS) that date back at least to 2012. It is not known if any updates to the standards have been made in the 13 years since. It was previously reported that the EDA was responsible for quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of demining.[15] It is not known whether Eritrea still has national capacity for mine survey or clearance.

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In the past, demining has been primarily conducted by the engineering units of the Eritrean Defence Forces under the supervision of the EDA.[16] According to its 2014 Article 5 deadline extension request, Eritrea planned to deploy "at least" five demining teams during its second extension period.[17] No information is available as to whether any such capacity was deployed.

Since the expulsion of international NGOs in 2005, the authorities have not allowed international operators to conduct survey or clearance in Eritrea.

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under its 2014 extension request, Eritrea projected that up to 15.4km$^2$ of mined area could be cleared within five years. It reported that 67.3km$^2$ of contaminated area had been cancelled through NTS and that 5.7km$^2$ was cleared over 38 mined areas in 2011–13.[18]

Eritrea has not responded to Mine Action Review's requests in recent years for information on any mine action activities (including survey) undertaken since 2014. In 2013, Eritrea had reported release of 157 SHAs totalling 33.5km$^2$, leaving 385 mined areas covering close to 24.5km$^2$ to be surveyed.[19]

Forty-nine mined areas with a total size of 9km$^2$ were discovered in five of the country's six regions during NTS in 2013: Anseba, Debub, Gash Barka, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri.[20]

Likewise, Eritrea has not made public any information on any mine clearance that it has undertaken in more than a decade. In 2013, Eritrea seemingly cleared approximately 2.26km$^2$ of mined area, almost twice the amount cleared in 2012 (1.2km$^2$).[21] The number of AP and AV mines destroyed was not reported.

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

No land release outputs through survey or clearance were reported for 2024.

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ERITREA: 1 FEBRUARY 2002

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2012

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 FEBRUARY 2015

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 FEBRUARY 2020

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (11 MONTH INTERIM EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2020

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEAR INTERIM EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2024

↓

**FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2027**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

15 Article 7 Report (covering 2012), Form F, p. 5.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., Form F, p. 10.
18 Analysis of Eritrea's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June 2014, p. 2.
19 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 7.
20 Analysis of Eritrea's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June 2014, p. 2.
21 Article 7 Report (covering 2012), Form F, p. 10.

**Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (m²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | N/R |
| 2023 | N/R |
| 2022 | N/R |
| 2021* | N/R |
| 2020* | N/R |
| **Total** | **N/R** |

N/R = Not reported

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (in accordance with the three-year extension granted in 2024), Eritrea is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2027. It is highly unlikely to meet this deadline, especially given that Eritrea plans to submit a detailed work plan only by 31 March 2027, just eight months ahead of the deadline for completion.[22]

On 17 November 2024, only eight days ahead of the Fifth Review Conference, Eritrea submitted a fifth request to extend its clearance deadline. In this two-paragraph request, Eritrea stated that a restructuring of the EDA was underway, (as it had stated in its previous (fourth) extension request a year earlier)[23], and that the Government had been conducting "preliminary assessments involving key policy and operational stakeholders". Eritrea claimed that, due to time constraints and "technical challenges" it had not been able to submit its request earlier for consideration at the Fifth Review Conference. Eritrea pledged to submit a detailed work plan by 31 March 2027, and to continue engaging with the Presidency, the Chair of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, and the Implementation Support Unit (ISU).[24] In presenting its extension request to the Fifth Review Conference, Eritrea said it would be possible to make progress quickly "when there are better circumstances, and all the necessary tools and actions are aligned for a very specific objective". Eritrea highlighted, however, that persistent "security threats" and prolonged conflict in the region had necessitated readjustment of priorities, including the restructuring of the EDA to "better build national capacity". Eritrea also noted that "strengthening ownership and leadership of the mine action program will be critical to ensure its sustainability".[25]

No information was provided on the results of preliminary assessments or on any restructuring of the EDA to date. Eritrea has not provided information on the nature of the "security threats" to which it has referred nor on their impact on the outlook for survey and clearance. There were, however, reports in early 2025 of mounting tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia over maritime access. As at March 2025, Eritrea had reportedly been increasing efforts in military recruitment, and Ethiopia had deployed troops to border areas.[26]

In granting Eritrea's fifth extension request, the Fifth Review Conference noted its concern that Eritrea had not provided updated information on progress in implementation of its Article 5 obligations since the Fourth Review Conference; and that Eritrea has not complied with the decision of the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP) on Eritrea's request for extension. It further noted that Eritrea had not acted in accordance with the agreed process for the preparation, submission and consideration of requests for extensions to Article 5 deadlines, thus preventing the Committee on Article 5 Implementation from carrying out its mandate to prepare and submit to the States Parties in advance of Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences, an analysis of each request for an Article 5 extended deadline.

The Fifth Review Conference welcomed Eritrea's efforts to conduct and finalise preliminary assessments on the restructuring of the EDA, which will enable Eritrea to prepare and submit a detailed work plan by 31 March 2027, and would welcome Eritrea providing updated information to the States Parties in this regard by the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties (22MSP). The Conference also welcomed Eritrea's commitment to submit a request by 31 March 2027, for consideration by the 24MSP, which would "permit a cooperative dialogue with the Committee on Article 5 Implementation to take place, as envisaged by the extension request process". It noted that Eritrea would benefit from seeking assistance from the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in the preparation of its request, "including by inviting the ISU for an in-country visit, in order to ensure that Eritrea benefits from support in the development of its extension request". The Conference further noted the importance of Eritrea keeping the States Parties regularly apprised of implementation of its Article 5 obligations at intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties, as well as through its Article 7 reports.[27]

Prior to the submission of this fifth extension request, Eritrea was already in serious violation of the APMBC for several years, as it failed to request an extension to its third extended Article 5 mine clearance deadline which expired on 31 December 2020. However, on 16 November 2023, Eritrea submitted a long-overdue fourth request to extend its clearance deadline. This two-paragraph request was very similar in content to that submitted a year later. In the 2023 request, Eritrea stated that a restructuring of the EDA was underway and pledged to work with the President, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, and the ISU to submit a detailed extension request by 31 March 2024 for consideration by the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024.[28] The interim request was granted by the 21MSP and

22 "Decisions on the request submitted by Eritrea for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

23 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted on 16 November 2023.

24 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted on 17 November 2024.

25 Statement of Eritrea on its Article 5 Extension Request, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

26 "Are Ethiopia and Eritrea hurtling towards war?", Al Jazeera, 25 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3GIT9te; and "A dangerous frenemy: Averting a showdown between Eritrea and Ethiopia", Clingendael Institute, at: https://bit.ly/4loCQAP.

27 "Decisions on the request submitted by Eritrea for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

28 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted on 16 November 2023.

a new deadline set for 31 December 2024.[29] In granting the 2023 interim extension request, the 21MSP noted that Eritrea would benefit from seeking assistance from the ISU in the preparation of its next request, "including by inviting the ISU for an in-country visit, in order to ensure that Eritrea benefits from support in the development of its extension request". It did not do so. Eritrea did not participate in the intersessional meetings that took place in Geneva in June 2024.

Eritrea's extension request of November 2023 was a reversal of its position four months prior when, in July 2023, the President of the Twenty-First Meeting of the States Parties to the APMBC announced that Eritrea had announced its decision to withdraw from the Convention. On 9 June 2023, following the Decision of the Twentieth Meeting concerning the situation of non-compliance by Eritrea, a request for clarification from Eritrea through the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General had been launched in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Convention.[30] This was the first time in the history of the Convention that this formal procedure for the facilitation and clarification of compliance has been invoked. Subsequently, the President of 21MSP announced that, on 21 June 2023, Eritrea had responded to the request for clarification from the UN Secretary-General, indicating that the "Government of the State of Eritrea has decided to withdraw from the Convention in accordance with Article 20 of the Convention".[31] Eritrea cited its reason for withdrawal from the Convention as "experts on mission for the United Nations assigned to oversee the implementation process … engaged themselves in unlawful activities, for the purpose of gathering unauthorized information of the state, which could have compromised the state's classified intelligence and thereby threaten the national security."[32] But on 2 October 2023, Eritrea wrote to the UN Secretary-General stating its decision to rescind its notification of intent to withdraw from the APMBC.[33]

Eritrea has reported no progress in survey or clearance of mined areas or in the development of a national mine action programme in recent years. It has wilfully failed to comply with its obligation under Article 5 of the APMBC to complete clearance as soon as possible. There is no indication of any demining since the end of 2013, which, without exceptional justification, would itself amount to a serious violation of the Convention. None has been forthcoming. Eritrea has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2014. Moreover, Eritrea is already in serious violation of the Convention for its failure to work towards the completion of mine survey and clearance as soon as possible.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

As at July 2025, Eritrea had not provided any information on whether it has made any provision for a sustainable capacity to address previously unknown mined areas following completion.

29 Implementation Support Unit, "Eritrea", accessed 12 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3WEcvDT.

30 Email newsletter, "On the eve of the 2023 Intersessionals", ISU, 9 June 2023.

31 Letter from the President of the 21MSP regarding "Response from Eritrea to the Request for Clarification under Article 8.2", 3 July 2023.

32 Letter from Osman Saleh, Minister, Government of Eritrea, regarding "Decision for the withdrawal of the State of Eritrea from the Anti-Personal [sic] Mine Ban Convention" to the UN Secretary-General, 21 June 2023.

33 "Draft Review of the Operation and Status of the Convention of the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction: 2019–2024, Submitted by the President of the Fifth Review Conference", p. 37.

# ETHIOPIA



## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025

Not on track to meet deadline
Five-year extension requested to 31 December 2030

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 20KM²

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0.16 (National authority and operator data combined) | 0.24 (Operator data) |
| Technical Survey | 0.37 (National authority data) | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 599.67 (National authority data) | 0 |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | **2023** |
| AP Mines destroyed | 23 (National authority and operator data combined. Including 6 removed for disposal or reported to authorities by UNMAS) | 7 (Operator data, including 1 destroyed in a spot task) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Ethiopia Mine Action Office (EMAO) demining units
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Ethiopia reports that in 2024 a total of more than 600km² of anti-personnel (AP) mined area was released, all in a single mined area in the Somali region. The release was achieved almost entirely through cancellation. The HALO Trust (HALO) continued clearance in the Somali region of the country, but was requested to suspend operations there in March 2024. It has been tasked to work in Afar, where it has recruited and trained new staff, and has permanently redeployed most of the staff from its programme in the Somali region across the border to HALO Somaliland.[1] In 2024, Ethiopia issued 12 national mine action standards (NMAS) and "processed the desk accreditation for six international NGOs for field deployment", namely: DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Humanity & Inclusion (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and BBC Media Action[2] (all newly accredited), as well as for HALO.[3] Ethiopia submitted its third request for an extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline on 31 March 2025, with a revised request submitted on 7 August. Ethiopia has requested a five-year extension to 31 December 2030.

1 Somaliland is a self-proclaimed, though generally unrecognised, State in the north-west of Somalia.

2 BBC Media Action to be deployed for explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and victim assistance only. Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 43.

3 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Ethiopia should accelerate efforts to produce a national mine action strategy.**
- **Ethiopia should urgently elaborate a resource mobilisation plan to ensure its national mine action centre has sufficient resources to sustain an effective programme.**
- **Upon completion of the surveys planned for 2026–27, Ethiopia should produce a further updated work plan for AP mined areas, with revised estimates of contamination, annual survey and clearance targets, and a detailed budget.**
- **Following the chapters launched in 2024, Ethiopia should finalise and issue a complete set of NMAS to enable land release consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).**
- **Ethiopia should prioritise the urgent establishment of a functional Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, following efforts ongoing since early 2024.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Though significantly lowered, following substantial cancellation in 2024, Ethiopia's baseline of mined area still remains inflated with 94% of the total in suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in the Somali region. Ethiopia plans to conduct nationwide survey in 2026–27. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 4 | In 2024, the Ethiopia Mine Action Office (EMAO) continued working to strengthen its capacity to undertake a nationwide survey. The government has pledged almost US$3.1m to mine action, which is 10% of the estimated total cost of programme implementation, though it is unclear whether this is the cost of implementation for just the first two years of the extension period (2026–27) or all of the proposed period. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | EMAO received gender training from the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in 2024 and, as at August 2025, was collaborating with implementing partners to develop a Gender and Disability mainstreaming policy. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Ethiopia's forthcoming national mine action strategy, whose drafting began in April 2024, is expected to include environmental considerations. As at September 2025, a national mine action standard (NMAS) on the environment had been drafted, but not finalised. Operators are implementing a range of environmental protection measures during demining. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Ethiopia submitted a detailed Article 7 report covering 2023 on time but, as at August 2025, had not yet submitted one covering 2024. On 31 March 2025, Ethiopia submitted a third request, seeking an extension of its Article 5 deadline to 31 December 2030, to be considered by the 22MSP. The request included a two-year work plan for 2026–27, the first such plan provided since the decision taken by States Parties on Ethiopia's 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request. In 2024, Ethiopia continued efforts to develop a functioning national mine action database. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 3 | Ethiopia's 2025 extension request provides a costed, two-year work plan, including partial information on land release targets for 2026–30. It is stated that both the work plan and the targets for 2027–30 will be detailed after the nationwide survey is complete. In 2024, Ethiopia drafted a national Land Release Prioritization Matrix, to be tested with operators, and worked towards developing a functioning task management system. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 6 | In a long overdue update, EMAO issued 12 NMAS and 2 standard operating procedures in 2024, with these NMAS formally distributed in February 2025. EMAO processed the desk accreditation for international survey and clearance operators DCA, DRC, HI, and MAG, all newly present in Ethiopia, along with HALO, already present in the country, providing a significant expansion of demining capacity. |

**Assessment of National Programme Performance Continued**

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 5 | Although significant cancellation took place in 2024, limited land release has occurred in recent years, due to challenges around capacity, funding, and insecurity, especially following the outbreak of non-international armed conflict in Tigray in 2020. Conflict spread across northern regions, restricting access and demanding a focus on emergency clearance of explosive ordnance to support the humanitarian response. While desk accreditation of new operators in 2024 has improved long-term prospects for Article 5 implementation, whether Ethiopia will be able to meet its proposed 2030 deadline can only be fully assessed after nationwide survey has been conducted as planned in 2026–27. |
| **Average Score** | **5.0** | **4.4** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- Ethiopia Mine Action Office (EMAO)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- National Demining Companies (Ethiopian Armed Forces)
- Ethio Professionals Security Solution (EPSS)*
- Rehabilitation and Development Organisation (RaDO)*

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)*
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)*
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)*
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)*

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

*These operators were newly present in Ethiopia in 2024. Only HALO and HI conducted AP mine survey and clearance in 2024.

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

In its revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, Ethiopia states that, as at March 2024, a total of 147 hazardous areas remained covering 125km$^2$. This comprises 27 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) with a total area of just over 3.4km$^2$ and 114 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 121.7km$^2$.[4] Ethiopia records mine contamination in six of its twelve regional states (also referred to as regions), with 95% of contamination in the Somali region (see Table 1). Ethiopia adds that this latest estimate represents "the best available data" and "may not be definitive", adding that further operations could reveal additional contamination, especially as communities resettle post-conflict, and land use changes.[5]

**Table 1: AP mined area by region (at March 2024)[6]**

| Region | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total SHAs/ CHAs | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afar | 6 | 1,755,049 | 8 | 1,915,300 | 14 | 3,670,349 |
| Benishangul-Gumuz* | 2 | 45,000 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 45,000 |
| Gambela | 0 | 0 | 20 | 838,000 | 20 | 838,000 |
| Oromia | 0 | 0 | 13 | 1,121,105 | 13 | 1,121,105 |
| Somali | 16 | 956,600 | 79 | 117,854,604 | 95 | 118,811,204 |
| Tigray | 3 | 691,989 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 691,989 |
| **Totals** | **27** | **3,448,638** | **120** | **121,729,009** | **147** | **125,177,647** |

*Also called Benishangule Gumuze.

4 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

5 Ibid., pp. 7–8.

6 Ibid., p. 8.

This estimate of AP mined area as at March 2024 is substantially lower than the previous estimate in Ethiopia's Article 7 report for 2023. This set contamination a year earlier at 726km$^2$ across 152 hazardous areas.[7] The new estimate as shown in Table 1 is unchanged for the regions of Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, and Tigray. The most significant change by far is in the Somali region where the total of almost 719km$^2$ decreased massively to under 118km$^2$.[8] This follows huge cancellation by the Ethiopia Mine Action Office (EMAO) and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in a single minefield in 2024.[9] Ethiopia has not yet provided an estimate of contamination disaggregated between areas known or suspected to contain AP or anti-vehicle (AV) mines.

One of the key objectives of Ethiopia's proposed five-year extension period is to survey and clear the 147 hazardous areas shown in Table 1, focusing primarily on survey in 2026 and 2027, and then on clearing the confirmed contamination in 2028–30. That said, the survey plan is focused on assessing the extent of all explosive ordnance (EO) contamination in Tigray and Afar,[10] rather than on establishing an accurate baseline of mined area. The need for an evidence-based and complete baseline of AP mine contamination has been raised in the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) coordination meetings, but, as at May 2025, no timeline or strategy for this had been shared by EMAO.[11]

Ethiopia's need for nationwide survey and, where applicable, re-survey, is pressing as historical survey data are unreliable. Ethiopia's 2001–04 Landmine Impact survey (LIS) greatly over-estimated the number of both SHAs and impacted communities.[12] In 2019, Ethiopia requested international assistance to conduct a new baseline survey.[13] In 2019–24, however, survey was impeded by the need to focus on emergency EO clearance to facilitate the humanitarian response to non-international armed conflict in the north of the country.[14]

HALO reports that EMAO personnel were deployed to resurvey areas and reassess data from the original LIS in the Somali region in 2024, and that these resurvey efforts over six mined areas demonstrated that up to 96% of the polygons thought to be contaminated by the LIS may be cancelled following re-survey.[15] Mine Action Review has not, however, been able to verify this information with EMAO. HALO has cautioned that while high levels of cancellation are likely, unrecorded mined areas might be found in the Somali region that were not captured in the LIS.[16]

Ethiopia did not include any information about any areas of previously unrecorded contamination in its 2025 extension request, nor in its most recent Article 7 report (covering 2023). HI states that it identified 17,700m$^2$ of previously unrecorded legacy AP mined area in 2024, across an as-yet-unquantified number of SHAs in Tigray (see Table 11 below). However, as at May 2025, it had not yet reported these newly identified areas to EMAO as the national database was still under development.[17] Ethiopia says that no evidence has been found that AP mines were used during the recent conflict in the north.[18] EMAO does not expect to find any, though it believes it may record previously unrecorded legacy contamination in these areas.[19] HI has also seen no evidence to suggest recent use of AP mines while working in Tigray.[20]

Ethiopia and Eritrea have not fully demarcated their common border, presenting a further challenge to establishing an accurate baseline of contamination. In its 2025 extension request, Ethiopia says it is "actively seeking diplomatic engagement to obtain access into the minefields in northern part of the country, bordering Eritrea".[21] The likelihood of timely progress on this key issue was unclear in Ethiopia's 2019 extension request,[22] and remains so. In June 2024, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation repeated its call for updated information on progress between the two States regarding plans to address contamination in border areas.[23]

Following non-international armed conflict, which broke out in Tigray in November 2020, a permanent cessation of hostilities was agreed between the Federal Government and non-State armed groups (NSAGs) in the Tigray in November 2022.[24] Despite the ceasefire agreement, however, conflict and insecurity across the northern regions of Tigray, Amhara and Afar have continued to impede survey and clearance. It has also left behind significant contamination from explosive remnants of war (ERW),[25] increasing the strain on an already

7 Article 7 Reports (covering 2023 and January 2021–March 2022), Form C.

8 Ibid.; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

9 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6 and 25.

10 Ibid., p. 9.

11 Emails from international NGO mine action operators, May 2025.

12 In 2012, Ethiopia reported that subsequent technical survey (TS) and NTS of the SHAs identified during the LIS had confirmed mine contamination in only 136 areas. However, 60 previously unrecorded hazardous areas were also identified, which were confirmed as mined through TS, resulting in a total of 196 confirmed mined areas. Ethiopia also reported that 358 SHAs across an area of 1,200km$^2$ from the LIS data needed to be re-surveyed.

13 Statement of Ethiopia on its Article 5 deadline extension request, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.

14 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24.

15 Email from Pierrick Rouat, Country Director, HALO, 28 May 2025.

16 Emails from Ralph Legg, Ethiopia Programme Manager, HALO, 13 July and 25 August 2022.

17 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, Chief of Operations, Armed Violence Reduction Division, Ethiopia Mission, HI, 14 May 2025.

18 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24.

19 Interview with General Tadesse, Director, EMAO, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

20 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.

21 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

22 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8, 14 and 35. On p. 8, Ethiopia stated that "discussions will be ongoing" to establish a "joint border commission to allow for survey and clearance operations to take place". On p. 35, it states: "The Tigray border mine field is suspended due to the insecurity", but also that "it is possible to clear the mine fields by military humanitarian demining operations, because the peace agreement between the countries is on the way." On p. 14, the request highlights that insecurity remained along the border but that the "peace agreement in process will hopefully provide some scope for mine action on the border".

23 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings 18–20 June 2024, p. 3.

24 "After Agreement in Ethiopia's Tigray Region, What Stands in the Way of Lasting Peace?", International Peace Institute Global Observatory, 27 February 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3W30ab.

25 Email from Abel Tesfai, UNMAS, 17 August 2023.

under-resourced mine action capacity in Ethiopia. UNMAS was able to resume operations in the north to some extent in April 2023,[26] but reported renewed and intensified insecurity a year later in April 2024, with the 2022 peace agreement still not fully implemented.[27] EMAO reported in April 2024 that it had been waiting for stability in Tigray to resume clearance.[28] This situation has made establishing a baseline of contamination impossible. DRC highlights that the main explosive threat in Tigray is not from conventional minefields, but hundreds of items of UXO on people's properties, which prevents them from farming.[29]

In April 2025, EMAO noted that some insecurity remained in Amhara, and some assessment was needed of the situation at the border with Eritrea, in Tigray, but there was good accessibility elsewhere.[30] However, there are now fears of renewed international conflict. Ethiopian troops were mobilised to the border with Eritrea in early 2025, and there were political clashes and armed skirmishes in Mekelle and elsewhere in March.[31] There was also at least one report of Eritrean troop movements and military regrouping near the border in July.[32]

Ethiopia's legacy mine problem is a result of internal and international armed conflicts dating back to 1935, including the Italian occupation and subsequent East Africa campaigns (1935–41), a border war with Sudan (1980), the Ogaden war with Somalia (1977–78), internal conflict (1974–2000), and the Ethiopian-Eritrean war (1998–2000). It is unclear whether Ethiopia also has contamination from AP mines of an improvised nature. Ethiopia stated in November 2022 that it had previously deployed its Combat Engineering Units to clear landmines in Somali region, "due to the cause of international extremist Al Shabaab activity by using IEDs" [improved explosive devices].[33] Claims of improvised AP mines in the Afar and Amhara regions are unconfirmed.[34]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Ethiopia is also believed to have areas containing cluster munition remnants, though EMAO highlights that further survey is needed to ascertain the extent and location of any CMR.[35] See Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants* report on Ethiopia for further information. There is also significant contamination from other EO, which has increased substantially since the outbreak of conflict in the Tigray region in 2020, and which has since spread into the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara.[36]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

EMAO is still in the process of reorganising itself and strengthening its structure and capacity to undertake nationwide survey, continuing work it conducted in 2023.[37] This reorganisation, in progress with the support of UNMAS,[38] includes updating the NMAS, which Ethiopia made significant progress on in 2024, and ensuring that operational procedures, prioritisation strategies, and quality management (QM) systems are functioning correctly.[39]

EMAO was established in 2001 by Ethiopia's Council of Ministers, following the end of the conflict with Eritrea, as an autonomous civilian body responsible for mine clearance and risk education. It reported to the Office of the Prime Minister.[40] In 2019, after several institutional transitions, Ethiopia reported that the responsibility for the national mine action programme had been transferred back to the headquarters of the MoD.[41] Ethiopia has previously reported that existing legislation is sufficient for the national mine action programme.[42] But it has also been suggested that the lack of a consistent and enabling regulatory framework has undermined the sector's ability to scale up effectively.[43]

In absence of a fully established mine action sector in Ethiopia, UNMAS is mandated to support the Ethiopian government with capacity development to address EO contamination. It facilitates monthly meetings of the Mine

26 Ibid.; and Letter to Dr Catherine Sozi, UN Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator, from Col. Nizam Mudeser, General Acting Director, Foreign Relations and Military Cooperation Directorate, MoD, 27 April 2023.

27 "Mine Action in Ethiopia", presentation by UNMAS to the MASG, Geneva, 29 April 2024.

28 "Defense Ministry, UN coordinate to clear landmines affecting 7 million Ethiopians", The Reporter, 6 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3xElQ63.

29 Email from Christian Green, Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Operations Manager, DRC, 19 August 2025.

30 Interview with General Tadesse, EMAO, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

31 "Debretsion Faction Unleash Attacks Tigray; Many Casualties Reported in Mekelle", Borkena, 11 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4m8hAQg; "Rising Tensions in Tigray Risk Regional Conflict", Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 24 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3UMDOex; and "Power struggle leads to coup in Tigray as war looms between Ethiopia and Eritrea", The Guardian, 21 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4fprpXl.

32 "Tensions Flare in Ethiopia's Tigray as Fears of Renewed Conflict Grow", All East Africa, 17 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4lfPvVY.

33 Statement of Ethiopia on Article 5, APMBC Twentieth Meeting of States Parties (20MSP), Geneva, 21–25 November 2022.

34 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.

35 Interview with Brigadier-General Tadesse Amelo, Director, EMAO, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

36 UNMAS notes that, between January 2023 and September 2024, 1,500 victims of EO accidents were reported in northern Ethiopia. Though not all cases had been verified, UNMAS believes many more have gone unreported. "Ethiopia", UNMAS, accessed 11 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4liK6O1.

37 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 5.

38 Email from Nicholas Bray, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, Ethiopia, 8 October 2025.

39 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 5.

40 Council of Ministers Regulation No. 70/2001, 5 February 2001.

41 2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

42 Article 7 Report (situation as of 30 April 2017), Form A.

43 Email from INGO mine action operator, May 2025.

Action Area of Responsibility (MA-AoR), with sub-cluster meetings also held in Shire (Tigray), Mekelle (Tigray), and Semera (Afar); supports of the safe and secure delivery of humanitarian aid; and conducts EO threat assessments in the Afar and Tigray regions.[44] In 2024, UNMAS and EMAO collaborated on four key areas: QM systems, information management, mine action sector management, and overall capacity building in collaboration with other mine action operators.[45] The establishment of regional EMAO sub-offices was cited by UNMAS as a milestone activity for 2025.[46] Regional MACs could serve to enhance localised coordination and tasking and ensure more equitable access to mine action services and decision-making, which some suggest is lacking under the current structure that is overly centralised.[47]

Ethiopia is continuing efforts to build national capacity. HI provided training in non-technical survey (NTS) to EMAO staff in 2024, including on use of the Global Positioning System (GPS), in line with IMAS and GICHD guidelines.[48] HI's "train and equip" initiative aims to support the development of national explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity, through the donation of EOD equipment and the delivery of EOD Level 3 training,[49] though, as at October 2025, HI was yet to receive operational accreditation to conduct EOD.[50] EMAO also received some bilateral support from France for EOD training.[51] DCA seconded a staff member to EMAO to support the coordination of MA AoR meetings; facilitate engagement with donors and other stakeholders; and assist in planning and reporting.[52] MAG provided support to EMAO in early 2025 in several areas including organising a stakeholder workshop to prepare Ethiopia's Article 5 extension request; training for EMAO staff on NTS and QM; a project cycle management and strategic planning workshop; and provision of IT equipment. MAG also organised a learning and exchange visit for senior EMAO staff members and an MoD representative to the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre in March 2025.[53] As at May 2025, HALO planned to support EMAO with medical, NTS and EOD training, as well as with some IT hardware and travel support.[54] UNMAS has drafted a road map for capacity building in Ethiopia which covers the following areas: strategic frameworks and obligations; information management system; QM systems; human resource development; and cooperation and coordination.[55] UNMAS explains that the timing of these various areas will be dependent on the national strategy for mine action, under development as at the time of writing.[56]

Stakeholders met regularly in 2024. As well as the monthly UNMAS-coordinated MA AoR meetings, Ethiopia had three key working groups in place – on information management, risk education, and victim assistance.[57] Stakeholder meetings focused on preparing to deploy teams for NTS and EOD, and on improving information management (IM).[58] In light of the multiple stakeholders and operators now accredited and which will be operating in country, Ethiopia could strengthen national level coordination by establishing an appropriate National Mine Action Platform, in line with Action 42 of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan.

Under Ethiopia's national standard on accreditation launched in 2023, accreditation has been standardised, such that organisations do not seek accreditation for a specific activity, but broadly for all activities within the scope of mine action.[59] Each operator, following accreditation, is expected to sign a federal memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the MoD.[60] This federal level MoU is an important step as, according to HALO, it is necessary to have one in place in order to be able to import demining equipment.[61] HALO continued to work with other operators to campaign for this federal level MoU, which was finally signed in November 2024.[62] The need for a specific project agreement with the national authorities for each grant or operational package has also delayed certain activities.[63]

The expansion of operational capacity is intended to underpin the implementation of Ethiopia's plans as outlined in its third Article 5 deadline extension request. In this request, submitted on 31 March 2025, with a revised request providing some further information submitted on 7 August 2025,[64] Ethiopia seeks a five-year extension to the end of 2030. This third request follows limited progress between 2020 and 2024 during Ethiopia's current extension period, which was expiring at the end of 2025. Ethiopia states that progress in the last five years has been severely impeded by armed conflict and restricted access in the northern regions as well as by the COVID-19 pandemic.[65] Despite these challenges, notable areas of progress during 2024 included the collaborative development of the NMAS and consolidated accreditation of six international NGOs and two national NGOs.[66]

44 "Ethiopia", UNMAS, accessed 11 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4liK601.

45 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

46 Presentation by Francesca Chiaudani, UNMAS, National Directors Meeting (NDM), Geneva, 29 April–1 May 2024.

47 Emails from and interviews with INGO mine action operators, March to May 2025.

48 Emails from Francesca Chiaudani, Chief of Mine Action Programme Ethiopia, UNMAS, 7 June 2024; and Goran Knezevic, Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) Specialist and NTS Trainer, HI, 21 May 2024.

49 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.

50 Email from Nicholas Bray, UNMAS, 8 October 2025.

51 Interview with General Tadesse, EMAO, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

52 Email from Kibru Alemu Adinew, EORE Technical Lead, DCA, 21 August 2025.

53 Email from Cristy McLennan, Regional Programme Support Manager, MAG, 26 August 2025.

54 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

55 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 45 and Annex 1, p. 62.

56 Email from Nicholas Bray, UNMAS, 8 October 2025.

57 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 37–38.

58 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

59 Emails from Francesca Chiaudani, UNMAS, 7 and 26 June and 24 July 2024.

60 Emails from Toby Robinson, Programme Manager, HALO, 14 June 2024; and Francesca Chiaudani, UNMAS, 24 July 2024.

61 Email from Rob Syfret, Head of Region, HALO, 23 July 2024.

62 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

63 Emails from and interviews with international mine action operators, March to May 2025.

64 Both the March 2025 and August 2025 Extension Request documents are available at: https://bit.ly/3Ja38IO.

65 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 19-20.

66 Emails from and interviews with international NGO mine action operators, March to May 2025; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 37 and 43.

Some demining organisations have, however, experienced bureaucratic challenges and delays in the importation of essential equipment, such as EOD equipment, radios, satellite phones, GPS, and explosives,[67] though UNMAS highlights that it is essential for all operators to follow protocol and apply for an import license.[68] DCA explains that the main cause of delay in importing its equipment was the satellite phones and high frequency radios, necessary to remain compliant with its standard operating procedures (SOPs) in areas with poor mobile phone coverage. This communications equipment had to undergo a lengthy clearance process involving several government departments. As at August 2025, DRC believed it was the only international operator that had a full set of equipment (apart from explosives) in place. It points out that having a legal and government advisor in Addis Ababa has been essential in facilitating approvals. DRC's delay in importing explosives to conduct EOD remained ongoing as at September 2025. Continued political instability in Tigray was giving rise to concern over safe storage of explosives. UNMAS was working closely with the national authorities to try and resolve this challenge.[69] As at August 2025, HI had also received most of its clearance equipment, including detectors. Delays in importing restricted equipment can be challenging to resolve, as EMAO is not the final decision maker and ultimate authority rests with the MoD and other Federal Authorities, including the Information, Networking and Security Agency (INSA) of Ethiopia.[70] UNMAS notes that, as at early October 2025, no NGO had yet applied for an explosives licence or as yet undertaken EOD training of staff[71] – essential steps necessary for operational readiness.

Ethiopia was the first country in the world to introduce a ban on the importation of non-electric vehicles in January 2024. While a positive environmental step, the transition may prove challenging while charging infrastructure across the country is very limited and still developing.[72]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It is unclear how much national funding was made available for survey or clearance in 2024 or earlier years. According to Ethiopia's 2019 extension request, more than US$40 million was required to fulfil its Article 5 obligations by 2025.[73] The government pledged to cover 20% of the total,[74] but in its Article 7 report for January 2021 to March 2022, Ethiopia did not provide details of any government funding.[75] In June 2023, Ethiopia stated that the government had provided US$100,000 that year for rapid response to EO threats.[76]

In its 2025 extension request Ethiopia states that the estimated budget required to tackle both AP mine contamination and contamination from all other EO, combined, is US$30.9m. It is unclear, however, whether this cover only the first two years (2026–27) or the entire five-year extension period sought. Of this US$30.9m, the Government of Ethiopia will provide 10%, through "direct financial support, in-kind assistance, and institutional cost coverage". The remaining 90% is expected to come from donor funding.[77] Ethiopia expects fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations specifically, over the period 2026-2030, will require a budget of US$17.64m. It sets out annual budget requirements for multi-task teams (MTTs), co-ordination, equipment and capacity building. However, that estimated cost is based on two important and potentially heroic assumptions, namely; that only 4% of the total area of SHAs will prove to contain AP mines; and that Ethiopia can implement land release at a cost of US$2.12 per square metre.[78]

It is not stated in the extension request or revised request, how much of this donor funding, if any, has been secured and how much remains to be secured. Ethiopia does note the need for the successful agreement of international funding,[79] and also that the survey activities planned for the first two years are "contingent on funding being secured".[80] In its responses to questions and clarifications requested by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Ethiopia states that "the sector is undertaking rigorous resource mobilisation efforts" and "the pledged amount will be clarified at the beginning of the extension year".[81] In the extension request Ethiopia also states that an updated work plan, to be submitted either by the end of 2027, or in April 2028, will include a resource mobilisation strategy,[82] which it will also attach to its forthcoming national mine action strategy,[83] though no timeframe for the latter is given. Either way, given the lack of secured funds, a resource mobilisation plan should be developed as soon as possible, prior to Ethiopia's planned extension period.

67 Emails from and interviews with international NGO mine action operators, March to May 2025.

68 Email from Nicholas Bray, UNMAS, 8 October 2025.

69 Email from Christian Green, DRC, 19 August 2025.

70 Emails from Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 17 March 2025; and Nicholas Bray, UNMAS, 8 October 2025.

71 Email from Nicholas Bray, UNMAS, 8 October 2025.

72 See, for example: "Ethiopia, the first country in the world to ban the import of gasoline and diesel vehicles", *Le Monde*, 13 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/45jZF1J; and "EVs are starting to overtake gas-powered cars in a surprising place", CNN, 19 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4opoqlZ.

73 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 51.

74 Ibid., p. 11.

75 Article 7 Report (covering January 2021–March 2022), Form J.

76 Statement of Ethiopia on Article 5 Implementation, Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.

77 2025 revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 15 and 57. On p. 15 the grand total of US$30.9m is spread over five years, in 2026–30 (with US$20.8m allocated over 2026-2030). However, on p. 57, Ethiopia states that "the budget for mine action activities over 2026 and 2027 totals $30,908,157.50".

78 2025 revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14–15.

79 Ibid., p. 18.

80 Ibid., p. 40.

81 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Ethiopia Committee on Article 5 Implementation", p. 3, submitted with 2025 revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request.

82 2025 revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 42. Here the revised request states this updated work plan will be submitted in April 2028. However, on p. 9, it is stated that an updated work plan will be submitted by 31 December 2027.

83 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Ethiopia Committee on Article 5 Implementation", p. 4, submitted with 2025 revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request.

A summary of funding for those international operators that undertook survey and clearance during 2024 is provided in Table 2. Operators highlight that continued underfunding of the mine action sector in Ethiopia poses challenges. DCA for example has been unable to expand its interventions in the heavily contaminated regions of Tigray, Afar, and Amhara and has had limited ability to deploy expatriate EOD staff.[84] HALO highlights that "continued support from the international community will be essential to match the scale of need, especially as Ethiopia balances legacy contamination with newly affected areas".[85]

**Table 2: Funding for survey and clearance by international operators in Ethiopia (2024–25)[86]**

| Donor | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) | HI | HI (until 2026) |
| UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP) | HALO* | |
| French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs – Crisis and Support Centre (CDCS) | HI | HI (until 2026) |
| German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) | HALO*, HI | HALO, HI (until 2026) |
| Irish Aid | HALO* | |
| Norway (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)) | HALO* | |

*Following the temporary suspension of operations in Ethiopia in March 2024, these grants were transferred to the HALO Somaliland Programme.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Ethiopia provides brief information on its efforts in and intended approach to gender and diversity considerations in its 2025 extension request. EMAO received gender training from UNMAS in 2024, and is collaborating with the gender focal points of implementing partners to develop a "Gender and Disability mainstreaming policy". Ethiopia also states that a multi-stakeholder technical working group (TWG) on gender and diversity may be established,[87] though no time frame has been given for this to occur. UNMAS is providing technical assistance to increase EMAO's capability to collect and analyse data through an age, gender, and diversity lens.[88]

Ethiopia has said it plans further consultation to ensure that groups in mine-affected communities receive "the assistance that they deserve".[89] This commitment, along with that to develop a Gender and Disability policy and explore the possibility of a TWG, are welcome developments. However, Ethiopia should extend its policy to all aspects of diversity, including ethnicity. It should also make every effort to accelerate progress in these policy and working group initiatives, and facilitate meaningful inclusion of women and minority groups as early as possible, as it upscales its mine action programme.

UNMAS organised a gender and diversity perception survey in April 2024, distributed through members of the MA-AoR at the national (Addis Ababa) and regional (Tigray and Afar) levels. UNMAS concluded from survey results that, overall, gender and diversity are well mainstreamed across MA-AoR members, with most respondent organisations reporting to have relevant policies, mixed-gender field teams, and with women constituting a significant portion of their workforce, though mainly in operational and/or support or administration functions and not also supervisory or managerial roles.

84 Email from Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 17 March 2025.
85 "Statement on Ethiopia Article 5 Extension Request", HALO, Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025.
86 Emails from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025; and Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.
87 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 37.
88 UNMAS, "Ethiopia", accessed 11 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4liK601.
89 Statement of Ethiopia on Article 5, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024, p. 3.

However, the survey did indicate strongly that women and persons with disabilities do not have equal access to risk education or other community-led discussions to mitigate the threat of EO.[90] It also identified certain barriers to access to mine action employment for persons with disabilities.[91]

Both HI and HALO apply their global policies relevant to gender, diversity and inclusion in their country programmes in Ethiopia.[92] Both are also taking steps to increase female recruitment, but have faced challenges with this. HALO is committed to gender parity, aiming to employ a 50/50 ratio of men and women, and to create an inclusive and diverse working environment. However, HALO notes that cultural sensitivities, societal norms, and traditional gender roles bring challenges to implementation and to achieving gender balance in Ethiopia, and that these norms vary significantly between Ethiopia's different regions.[93] The proportion of women among total staff at HALO remained largely unchanged in 2024 (see Table 3)[94] compared to 2023.[95] HI, which began survey operations in 2024, also reports that, despite targeted outreach to attract female candidates into all types of roles in 2024, not as many women as they hoped for applied for vacancies.[96] It has also been reported that EMAO's practice of validating some applicant lists has led to pressure to recruit male candidates with institutional ties, and could serve to undermine, merit-based, inclusive recruitment.[97]

Increasing employment of women in operational demining roles has been especially challenging in Ethiopia. Collaborating with local community leaders to help overcome barriers, HALO did successfully recruit a significant number of female deminers for its first operational deployment in 2022.[98] HI notes that the potential for gender parity in clearance-related roles is limited by the scarcity of certified female EOD operators nationally. To address this, HI is investing in long-term capacity-building for women, including mentorship and access to EOD Level 3 training.[99] In its 2019 extension request, Ethiopia noted that no female deminers were employed in its national demining companies.[100] Mine Action Review has requested, but not received a recent update on this matter.

HI provided age, gender, and diversity and inclusion training to more than 40 staff in 2024, as well as strengthening data disaggregation to better inform adaptive, and inclusive programming.[101] HALO continued a number of established initiatives to support female employees, such as child stipends for new mothers.[102] Operators continue to make efforts to recruit and deploy inclusive, gender-balanced, and locally recruited teams, to facilitate access and participation by all groups, including women and children. HI notes, however, that in its area of operations in Tigray, representation of ethnic diversity is not a strong consideration.[103]

In its operations in the Somali region, HALO has developed clear messaging practices to support recruitment from marginalised communities and worked with community elders during the recruitment process.[104] As at May 2025, HALO was in the process of opening its new office in the Afar region and familiarising with the local language, laws and customs, to help inform its integration of gender and diversity considerations into its programme, and support the recruitment of gender-balanced and inclusive survey teams.[105]

**Table 3: Gender composition of operators in 2024**[106]

| Organisation* | Total staff | Women staff | Managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EMAO | N/K | N/K | N/K | N/K | N/K | N/K |
| National Demining Companies | N/K | N/K | N/K | N/K | N/K | N/K |
| HALO* | 103 | 30 (29%) | 22 | 4 (18%) | 86 | 26 (30%) |
| HI | 122 | 22 (18%) | 16 | 2 (13%) | 94 | 20 (21%) |

90 "Gender in Mine Action Perceptions from Mine Action actors in Ethiopia. Result of the survey conducted in April 2024", UNMAS, p. 1.

91 UNMAS, "Gender in Mine Action Perceptions from Mine Action actors in Ethiopia. Result of the survey conducted in April 2024", Report, p. 5.

92 Emails from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024; and Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.

93 Emails from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024; and Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 21 August 2025.

94 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

95 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 April 2023; and Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024.

96 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.

97 Email from INGO mine action operator, 2025.

98 Email from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024.

99 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.

100 Email from Col. Tadege Yohala, EMAO, 5 August 2019.

101 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.

102 Email from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024.

103 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.

104 Email from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024.

105 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

106 Emails from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 6 and 9 June 2025; Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025; Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024; and Nicholas Bray, UNMAS, 14 October 2025.

**Table 3 Continued**

| Organisation* | Total staff | Women staff | Managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNMAS | 10 | 5 (50%) | 4 | 2 (50%) | 4 | 1 (25%) |
| **Totals** | **235** | **57 (24%)** | **42** | **8 (19%)** | **184** | **47 (26%)** |

*HALO Ethiopia reduced to three permanent staff following suspension of operations in March 2024, and redeployed most staff to the HALO Somaliland programme.
**Some HALO supervisory positions are also operational.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Ethiopia's 2025 extension request does not provide information on how it plans to take into consideration—and where possible strive to mitigate—the environmental impact of its mine action programme, including during clearance operations. Ethiopia's forthcoming national mine action strategy, the drafting of which began in April 2024, is expected to include environmental considerations.[107] As at September 2025, an NMAS on the environment had been drafted through a process led by DRC, but was not finalised.[108]

**Table 4: Environmental policies and action**[109]

| Operator* | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance | Is there an environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| HALO | Yes | Yes | No |
| HI | No | No | No |

*Only those operators that undertook survey or clearance during 2024 have been included.

HALO has a global environmental management policy[110] and a global SOP for the environmental management of operations, which serves as a basis for programme-specific environmental management.[111] HI does not have a country-specific environmental management policy, though this was under discussion as at May 2025. HI states that environmental considerations are well integrated into its operations through its environmental management SOP and specific operational plans tailored to the Ethiopian context.[112] HALO continues to refine its pre-clearance environmental assessments to ensure they are tailored to local needs.[113] While HI does not currently conduct formal environmental impact assessments, it does integrate environmental risk considerations into operational planning.[114]

Both HI and HALO undertook specific measures and initiatives to reduce the environmental impact of their survey and clearance activities in Ethiopia in 2024 and into 2025. HALO, for example, has long-established clearance procedures that help mitigate the impact of operations on the environment. These includes limiting cutting of trees during clearance operations[115] and planting trees in field camps.[116] HALO's field camps on the Ethiopia-Somaliland border are solar powered.[117] HI has a phased plan to replace fossil fuel vehicles with hybrid and fully electric vehicles (EVs), with a battery-swap system to support EVs and electric field equipment in remote areas. HI also practices low-impact operational cycles, where teams operate on one- to two-week field rotations, staying in implementation areas overnight to significantly reduce fuel consumption.[118]

107 Email from Francesca Chiaudani, UNMAS, 7 June 2024.
108 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 21 August 2025.
109 Emails from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 and 15 May 2025; and Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.
110 Email from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024.
111 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 April 2023.
112 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.
113 Email from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024.
114 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 15 May 2025.
115 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 April 2023.
116 Email from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024.
117 Prior to the suspension of HALO's operations in the Somali region and the absorbing of HALO Ethiopia staff into the HALO Somaliland programme, teams from HALO Ethiopia and HALO Somaliland shared field camps. Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 April 2023; and Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.
118 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.

HALO has a Mine Action Conservation Project Manager for HALO's Horn of Africa programme, (Somalia, including Somaliland, and Ethiopia). As HALO extends its operations in Afar, it is working establish new partnerships with Semera university and the Ethiopian Ministry of Forestry, as well as to review the new HALO Afar Office's environmental compliance in areas such as waste management and power consumption.[119] As at August 2025, HI was recruiting a Livelihood Specialist who would support the mainstreaming of environmental considerations across all programme components.[120]

When planning and prioritising survey and clearance tasks, operators consider environment and climate-related risks. HI uses its ArcGIS [geographic information system]-based information management system, which includes topographic indices and seasonal rainfall layers to inform tasking and deployment. During survey, HI pays special attention to ravines, flood-prone areas, and natural water collection points, where EO movement may occur due to erosion or flooding. These measures ensure that environmental factors are embedded in decision-making, and HI intends to further formalize these practices as operations expand.[121]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

EMAO has been working with UNMAS, operators and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) towards the establishment of a functioning national mine action database and the implementation of Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core in Ethiopia.[122] EMAO stated in April 2025 that clean-up of data and on-site verification were ongoing.[123] It is not clear to what extent Ethiopia plans to disaggregate contamination by weapon type in the developing national database.

IM training has taken place in collaboration with UNMAS and other partners, addressing areas such as reporting and data validation.[124] HI states it is providing technical support, equipment, and capacity-building in information management,[125] and that it has seconded a HI Information Management Specialist to support EMAO.[126] Stakeholder coordination on IM took place in 2024 through the IM working group and bilateral exchanges, with the goal of building a centralised, transparent, and IMAS-aligned system to support national ownership.[127]

While a functional national database remains under development, operators have been taking measures to collect and maintain necessary data. HI, for example, maintains a detailed and IMSMA Core-compliant record of all operations and findings and is prepared to share this data with the national database as soon as it becomes functional.[128]

HALO uses data collection forms that are in line with IMAS, to collect data in a form compatible with IMSMA,[129] and states that it continues to share all its contamination and clearance data with EMAO.[130] It has also aligned its planned software and hardware to match EMAO's, in advance of the NTS scheduled to begin in the north of the country in September 2025. HALO highlights that there has been a coordinated effort among all stakeholders to align on data collection and estimated that a functional IMSMA Core database, with all operators aligned, could be in place by the fourth quarter of 2025.[131] EMAO's adoption of a national IM system, based on ArcGIS Pro and IMSMA Core, is a welcome step towards a modern, centralised IM platform, which was initiated following advocacy and support from mine action stakeholders.[132]

As at August 2025, Ethiopia had not yet submitted an Article 7 report covering 2024. In 2024, Ethiopia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2023 on time. Though somewhat more detailed than previously, the report repeated the information on contamination it provided in its previous Article 7 report.[133] Ethiopia did not submit an Article 7 report covering the period from April 2022 to the end of that year.

In the decision on Ethiopia's 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request, the States Parties requested that Ethiopia submit by 30 April 2021 an updated work plan for the period covered by the extension request. Ethiopia did not provide one. However, a two-year work plan for 2027-2027 is provided in Ethiopia's third Article 5 deadline extension request, which was due to be considered by the Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties in December 2025. A revised request, providing some further information, as requested,[134] was submitted on

119 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.
120 Emails from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May and 29 August 2025.
121 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 15 May 2025.
122 Emails from Francesca Chiaudani, UNMAS, 7 and 26 June 2024; and Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 33–34.
123 Interview with Brigadier-General Tadesse Amelo, EMAO, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.
124 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.
125 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 19 May 2025.
126 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.
127 Ibid.
128 Emails from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 4 April and 19 May 2025.
129 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 April 2023.
130 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.
131 Emails from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May and 21 August 2025.
132 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.
133 Article 7 Reports (covering 2023 and 1 January 2021 to 31 March 2022), Form C.
134 "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Ethiopia", Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.

7 August 2025. Ethiopia is seeking a five-year extension to the end of 2030.

Although the extension request would benefit from further information on Ethiopia's planned activities to strengthen areas such as mainstreaming of gender and diversity, and environmental protection, the extension request is reasonably comprehensive, including the detailed and costed initial two-year work plan. Ethiopia states that, based on the outcome of surveys, it will submit an updated work plan for the remaining period of its extension request, though two dates are provided for this to occur—31 December 2027 and April 2028—and it is unclear which is correct.[135] Ethiopia also says it will continuously update its clearance plan, based on survey findings, and provide information on this as part its annual Article 7 transparency reports.[136]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Ethiopia has yet to develop a national mine action strategy. In April 2024, the Research and Development Department of Ethiopia's MoD reportedly committed to drafting one, but no time frame was set.[137] In April 2025, EMAO said it hoped to have a national strategy ready by the end of 2025, drafted through multi-stakeholder collaboration. The strategy will cover the requested extension period of 2026–30.[138]

Ethiopia's 2025 extension request sets out a five-year plan, featuring an initial two years focused on NTS and EOD of new contamination in the northern regions, followed by three years of legacy mine clearance and continued survey efforts.[139] As noted, much new contamination in the northern regions is expected to come from single items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) as opposed to legacy minefields.[140] Ethiopia's two-year work plan also prioritises "institutional building, enhancing personnel and financial capacities" as a base for effective mine action. Key objectives include surveying all 147 hazardous areas (see Table 1) and performing "emergency clearance tasks based on community requests and humanitarian needs".[141] As previously noted, based on the outcome of surveys in 2026–27, Ethiopia plans to submit a further work plan for the remainder of the extension period, though there is a lack of clarity over whether it intends to submit this by 31 December 2027, or in April 2028.[142]

Ethiopia states that in 2028–30, efforts will focus on clearance of remaining areas, informed by the survey results, but that "limited rapid-response clearance may occur before then, based on urgent needs".[143] In early 2025, operators adapted their plans and submitted change requests to donors, in order to deploy NTS and EOD teams and align with the initial two-year phase of Ethiopia's five-year plan.[144] In the 2025 extension request, Ethiopia acknowledges that its work plan "does not seek to address mined areas located on the Ethiopia-Eritrea or Ethiopia-Somali border until a political agreement is in place to ensure the safety of demining teams". It pledges that EMAO will "continue to monitor and work with relevant bodies to ensure that as soon as areas become accessible, a survey capacity will be deployed".[145]

Ethiopia set overly ambitious land release targets for 2019–25 in its previous Article 5 deadline extension request, which it did not achieve. Expecting contamination to total over 1,050km$^2$, release of 173.4km$^2$ was envisaged in 2019, followed by 175.8km$^2$ annually until 2024, with only 3.9km$^2$ projected to be released in 2025. As much as 97% of the release was expected to occur through cancellation.[146] In fact, Ethiopia released 318km$^2$ by cancellation in 2019–20, along with 10.3km$^2$ through reduction and 1.76km$^2$ through clearance.[147] No further land release took place in 2021 to 2023, with EMAO focusing on emergency EOD to allow safe delivery of humanitarian aid, the resumption of essential public services, and release of essential roads, following the armed conflict that broke out in the Tigray region in 2020.[148] HALO did, however, undertake and report to Mine Action Review limited clearance totalling 0.63km$^2$ in 2022 (0.39km$^2$)[149] and 2023 (0.24km$^2$).[150]

During the first two years of the proposed new extension period, survey is planned on a regional, village-by-village basis, including resurvey of certain previously recorded hazardous areas.[151] A detailed, timebound survey plan for each relevant region is provided in the request, including

135 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request: On p. 9, it is stated that this work plan will be provided by 31 December 2027. Later, on pp. 41 and 42 of the revised request, Ethiopia says it aims to submit an updated work plan for the remaining period of the extension request by April 2028.

136 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

137 Email from Francesca Chiaudani, UNMAS, 7 June 2024.

138 Interview with General Tadesse, EMAO, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

139 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

140 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

141 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

142 On page 42 of the 2025 revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ethiopia says this updated work plan will be submitted in April 2028. But on page 9, it is stated that an updated work plan will be submitted by 31 December 2027.

143 Ibid., p. 9.

144 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

145 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 43.

146 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, p. 48; and Article 7 Report (covering January 2021–March 2022), Form C.

147 Ethiopia's Article 7 Report, in which this land release data was originally provided, spanned 2019 and 2020: Article 7 Report (covering 31 April 2019–31 April 2020), Form D. However, the 2025 Extension Request states that this land release took place in 2020. Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 22-23.

148 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24. In fact, Ethiopia did report, in its Article 7 report covering January 2021–March 2022, that 13,400m$^2$ was released through survey, though it is unclear whether this area was cancelled or reduced; and that 46,600m$^2$ was cleared, with the destruction of 46 TM-57 AV mines. Article 7 Report (covering January 2021–March 2022), Form C.

149 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 April 2023.

150 Email from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024.

151 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 44–45.

land release targets and the projected capacity and budget required for each region,[152] as well as the size of each of the 147 hazardous areas at the woreda (district) level.[153] HALO thinks this approach, with a focus on NTS and EOD spot tasks for the initial two years and a phased approach to clearance, is "grounded in operational reality", reflecting "a clear understanding of the country's evolving contamination profile and access challenges, particularly in the north".[154]

Though a full five-year work plan is not yet provided, Ethiopia's 2025 extension request does include a five-year cancellation targets for the 79 SHAs in the Somali region, measuring 117.85km$^2$[155] (see Table 5), which accounts for 94% of Ethiopia's total contamination.

**Table 5: Projected cancellation of SHAs in Somali region, 2026-2030**[156]

| Year | Size of SHAs to be cancelled (km²) | Percentage of total SHA area size to be cancelled |
|---|---|---|
| 2026 | 17.68 | 15% |
| 2027 | 15.03 | 13% |
| 2028 | 25.54 | 22% |
| 2029 | 23.84 | 20% |
| 2030 | 35.76 | 30% |
| **Totals** | **117.85** | **100%** |

Ethiopia expects to undertake demining all-year-round, taking advantage of the varying rainy season in the regions, and rotating teams through different areas of operations[157] (although elsewhere in the revised request it states that it expects one month of stand-down time during the peak rainy season).[158] During the initial two years, approximately 11 MTTs are planned for deployment in the northern regions of the country, with "the potential for incremental growth as operations expand".[159]

Ethiopia outlines the risks and assumptions that may impact implementation of the work plan contained in its 2025 extension request. The plan assumes that there will be sustained security and access to affected areas; the potential for identification of new mined areas though NTS; consistent funding; ongoing support broadly for mine action in Ethiopia; and diversified funding streams (i.e. national and international). With regard to the specific challenge of access to border areas, Ethiopia says it is "seeking diplomatic engagement" to obtain access minefields in northern areas, bordering Eritrea. It says that most other border areas are accessible, presenting no hindrance to mine action.[160]

Ethiopia has provided a Land Release Prioritization and Impact Classification Matrix in its 2025 extension request,[161] though this yet to be assessed by the sector.[162] While a national system of prioritisation and tasking is still under development, HALO has continued to use its own survey information to assess the impact of contamination and prioritise clearance tasks, prioritising areas with high numbers of beneficiaries and higher accident rates.[163] HALO also produces its own survey and task dossiers for all operations[164] – action that is normally the responsibility of the national authorities or the national mine action centre. Likewise, HI has developed and implemented its own prioritisation system which involves close collaboration with regional and local authorities, communities, and other stakeholders.[165] In Tigray, security of access most often dictates operations and all planning is subject to change, based on the ever-evolving security context. HALO does not face this same challenge to the same extent in Afar, although there can be challenges with security in parts of the Afar region bordering the Amhara and Tigray regions.[166]

152 Ibid., pp. 45–53.
153 Ibid., pp. 46–51.
154 "Statement on Ethiopia Article 5 Extension Request", HALO, Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025.
155 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid., p. 53.
158 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Ethiopia Committee on Article 5 Implementation", p. 2, submitted with the Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.
159 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 61.
160 Ibid., pp. 16 and 61.
161 Ibid., Annex 2, pp. 63–65.
162 Ibid., p. 33.
163 Email from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024.
164 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 April 2023.
165 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.
166 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

HI states that it has been supporting EMAO to develop the foundations for a functioning task management system, including standardised procedures; the format for task orders; task identification codes; and the responsibilities of implementing partners.[167]

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

EMAO issued twelve Ethiopian National Mine Action Standards (ENMAS) and two standard operating procedures (SOPs) in 2024, which serve as the basis for Ethiopia's quality management system.[168] Ethiopia states that the development process was consultative, including a multi-stakeholder workshop in mid-2024, and assignment of roles and responsibilities for different chapters to interested operators. Additionally, EMAO and implementing partner personnel participated in a regional training on NMAS in Nairobi organised by the GICHD. Ethiopia states that development and revision of the NMAS and SOPs is ongoing, with half of the NMAS completed as at March 2025.[169] UNMAS reports that the twelve NMAS were circulated by EMAO in February 2025, namely: Information Management, EORE, Investigation and Reporting of Accidents, Medical Support to Demining Operations, EOD, Manual Mine Clearance, Battle Area Clearance (BAC), Marking of Explosive Ordnance Hazards, NTS, Quality Management, Land Release, Storage and Transportation of Explosives, Post-Clearance Documentation, and Technical Survey.[170]

While international NGO mine action operators were significantly involved in drafting the documents, they disagree on the extent to which they feel that the process was sufficiently consultative and collaborative, and the degree to which a sufficient timeframe was allowed to produce technically sound drafts.[171] EMAO notes that periodic revision will be undertaken to align NMAS with IMAS and "fulfil commitments under the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029" and that EMAO will serve as the oversight body, responsible for approval and QA of the NMAS.[172] UNMAS adds that revision of NMAS is included in the 2026 work plan.[173]

In its 2025 extension request, Ethiopia states that, for the land release that took place in 2024, QA teams inspected TS teams and clearance units during and prior to completion of their tasks, to ensure compliance with national standards and EMAO SOPs. After task completion, a QC team managed the handover process with the local community and authorities.[174]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

A growing number of international survey and clearance operators have entered the mine action sector in Ethiopia in recent years, with several establishing a presence in-country for the first time in 2024. EMAO stated that in November 2024 it "processed the desk accreditation for six international NGOs for field deployment", namely for: BBC Media Action,[175] DCA, DRC, HALO, HI, and MAG.[176] HALO was already operational, having worked in the country since August 2022, clearing mined areas on the border with Somaliland.[177] As at September 2025, the Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) was still seeking registration and accreditation in Ethiopia.[178] It was developing plans to deploy survey staff, potentially for NTS in Afar, Amhara, and Tigray.[179] Ethiopia has assigned all operators[180] specific responsibilities and areas of operation (AoOs) in the 2026–27 plan for survey and clearance set out in its 2025 extension request (see Table 6). Several operators are prepared to expand operations to other parts of Ethiopia, beyond their assigned regions, if required, and if funding allows.[181]

167 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.

168 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7. The request states: "The NMAS cover the following areas: information management; technical surveys; non-technical surveys; manual mine clearance; land release; battle area clearance; marking explosive ordnance hazards; explosive ordnance risk education; EOD; quality management; medical support to demining operations; storage, transportation and handling of explosives; investigation and reporting of accidents and incidents; post-clearance inspections. Additionally there are two SOPs on Tasking and Prioritization".

169 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 32.

170 Emails from Nicholas Bray, UNMAS, 8 and 14 October 2025.

171 Emails from and interviews with INGO mine action operators in March to May 2025.

172 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 32.

173 Email from Nicholas Bray, UNMAS, 8 October 2025.

174 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

175 BBC Media Action to be deployed for explosive ordnance risk education and victim assistance only. Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 43.

176 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

177 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 2 July 2024.

178 Email from Michael Barry, Global Portfolio Co-ordinator, FSD, 19 August 2025.

179 Email from Matt Wilson, Head of Operations, FSD, 16 May 2024.

180 In August 2025 it was reported a new NGO, Unity Demining Solutions (UDS), staffed mostly by former EMAO and MoD retired officers, had also been accredited, though it was without grants or sub-grants at that time. Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 21 August 2025.

181 Emails from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025; and Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.

**Table 6: Assigned regions and functions of accredited NGOs in Ethiopia for 2026-2027**[182]

| Organisation | Operational launch date in Ethiopia | Assigned region(s) | Assigned activities | Planned capacity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EMAO | N/A | All regions. | Oversight and "mine action activities in all legacy minefields". | EMAO, HI, DRC and MAG to recruit and train 7 x MTTs between them, capable of EOD, survey, and clearance.[183] DRC: 3 x NTS teams ready to deploy from November 2024.[184] |
| DRC | NTS from Q2 2025.[185]<br>EOD planned from October 2025. | Tigray (North Western Zone focus) | EORE, NTS, TS, BAC, EOD, clearance. | |
| HI | NTS and limited EOD from November 2024. MTTs from March 2025.[186] | Tigray (focus in South Eastern and Central Zones).[187] | EORE, NTS, TS, BAC, EOD, clearance. | |
| MAG | Capacity support to EMAO from March 2025. Risk education from June 2025. | Tigray | EORE, NTS, TS, BAC, EOD, clearance | |
| HALO | 2022 (Somalia region).<br>August 2025 (Afar region).[188] | Afar | EORE, NTS, TS, BAC, EOD, clearance. | 2 x MTTs initially in Q2 and Q3 2025. 3 x MTTs in Q4 2025. Capable of EOD, NTS, and EORE.[189] |
| DCA | Victim assistance and risk education from January 2025. | Afar. Potential expansion to Amhara. | NTS, EOD. Expansion to TS and clearance, funding permitting.[190] | Not known |
| EPSS (national NGO) | 2021[191] | Afar and Tigray. | EORE, NTS. | Not known |
| RaDO (national NGO) | 1997[192] | Afar and Tigray. | EORE, NTS. | Not known |
| UNMAS | 2020 | Afar, Amhara, Tigray. | Capacity building of EMAO, information management, assessment, MA AoR coordination. | Capacity development team including: IMSMA support and QC Officer. |

In 2024, UNMAS deployed one team in each region of Afar, Amhara, and Tigray, totalling six personnel, to conduct woreda (district) assessments and emergency EORE and UXO assessments (see Table 7). UNMAS did not deploy any personnel for clearance.[193] This is approximately the same operational capacity as UNMAS deployed for explosive ordnance assessment in 2023.[194]

Apart from UNMAS, HALO and HI were the only two international operators that undertook survey and clearance of AP mined area in Ethiopia during 2024. HI conducted NTS and limited relocation of safe-to-move items of EO from November.[195] HALO continued survey and clearance in the Somali region in the first three months of the year, but was instructed in March to cease operations to renew its MoD accreditation. HALO followed MoD guidance to obtain a signed federal level MoU, which it received in November 2024 (along with MAG, HI, DRC, and DCA) setting the boundaries for its work in Ethiopia. Following this HALO received a tasking order from EMAO to work in the Afar region, in coordination with an MoD-vetted local NGO.[196] When operations were suspended in March 2024, HALO Ethiopia reduced to three permanent staff, permanently redeploying 80% of its personnel across the border to HALO Somaliland. HALO Ethiopia received authorisation to launch operations in Afar in

182 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 43 and 30–31; and emails from Christian Green, DRC, 19 August 2025; Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 21 August 2025; Cristy McLennan, MAG, 8 September 2025; and Nicholas Bray, UNMAS, 14 October 2025; and DCA, "From danger to dignity: Humanitarian mine action response in Ethiopia", accessed 11 September at: https://bit.ly/4ntUS5n.

183 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10.

184 Email from Christian Green, DRC, 20 March 2025; and online interview, 26 March 2025.

185 Ibid.

186 Emails from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 18 February and 19 May 2025.

187 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 19 May 2025.

188 Emails from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May and 21 August 2025.

189 Ibid.

190 Email from Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 17 March 2025.

191 EPSS website, accessed 15 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4lEkQC4.

192 RaDO website, accessed 15 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/41H1yEE.

193 Email from Nicholas Bray, UNMAS, 14 October 2025.

194 Email from Francesca Chiaudani, UNMAS, 7 June 2024.

195 Emails from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 18 February and 19 May 2025.

196 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

April 2025, recruiting new field teams from local communities in May and June, and deploying them in September.[197]

Prior to suspension of operations in the Somali region in March 2024, HALO saw a reduction in NTS capacity from six persons in 2023 to two in 2024, but maintained approximately the same technical survey (TS) and manual clearance capacity.[198] HALO intends to build up to three MTTs in the Afar region by the last quarter 2025. Overall, this represents a notable decrease from the eight manual clearance teams and two NTS teams deployed during 2024.[199] During 2024, HI converted a risk education team into a community liaison team (CLT), which also provides risk education and NTS. In 2025 it maintained this and increased capacity from one MTT to four MTTs.[200] As at August 2025, it had received most of its clearance equipment and planned to commence clearance operations in the near future, although NTS and EOD remained its priorities.[201]

Prior to HALO commencing operations in 2022, all survey and clearance in Ethiopia was conducted by the national demining companies of the Ethiopian Armed Forces. Ethiopia's precise current national capacity to survey and clear AP mines is not yet clear. EMAO has an EOD team, a clearance team, and a survey desk. EMAO is also supported by "other standby forces of the MoD Main Engineering department, that could provide surge support".[202]

At the time of writing, no update on current or planned national operational survey and clearance capacity had been provided by EMAO. However, as already outlined, work is underway to reorganise the sector and better define national capacity and resource requirements. EMAO explains that is deploys national capacity in border areas where there is insecurity, but aims to pass these areas to international NGO operators eventually.[203]

**Table 7: Operational survey capacities deployed in 2024**[204]

| Operator | Survey teams | Total personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| HALO | 2 | 2 | Deployed for NTS. See Table 8 for TS capacity. |
| HI | 1 | 0 | Risk education team transitioned to community liaison team during 2024 but also undertook NTS and provided risk education. Deploys multi-task teams (MTTs) for survey and clearance. See Table 8. |
| Ethiopia Armed Forces* | 2 | N/K | Deployed for TS in 2018. No recent data available. |
| UNMAS | 3 | 6 | Conducting woreda (district) assessments and Emergency EORE and UXO assessments. |
| **Totals** | **8** | **8** | |

*The most recent data available to Mine Action Review is from 2019 and states that two teams of an unknown number of personnel were deployed in 2018.

**Table 8: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024**[205]

| Operator | Manual clearance teams | Multi-task teams (MTTs) | Total deminers | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HALO | 8 | 0 | 62 | Deployed for clearance and TS. |
| HI | 0 | 1 | 32 | Capable of NTS, TS, clearance, and EOD. NTS and limited EO only in 2024. |
| Ethiopia Armed Forces | 2 | N/K | N/K | Data provided in 2019 for personnel deployed in 2018. No recent data available. Also deployed one EOD team. |
| **Totals** | **10** | **1** | **94** | |

197 Emails from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 9 June and 21 August 2025.

198 Emails from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024; and Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

199 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

200 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 29 August 2025.

201 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 19 August 2025.

202 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 28–29.

203 Remarks from Gen. Tadesse, EMAO, "HDP Nexus for Effective Mine Action", Side event, NDM, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

204 Emails from Col. Tadege Yohala, EMAO, 5 August 2019; Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025; and Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 29 August 2025.

205 Emails from Col. Tadege Yohala, EMAO, 5 August 2019; Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025; Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May and 29 August 2025; and Nicolas Bray, UNMAS, 14 October 2025.

Operators do not currently use mechanical demining assets in Ethiopia. HI, for example, explains that the topography and terrain in Tigray are not suitable for mechanical assets, such as flails or tillers. HI has however, identified technical survey dogs as the preferred and context-appropriate enhancement to land release operations.[206] Ethiopia reported in 2019 that it has six ground-preparation machines, but that these were not in use as all remaining hazardous areas are located in remote areas, which it claims are only suitable for manual clearance.[207] Ethiopia's second Article 5 deadline extension request states that manual demining is the most efficient and least costly method of clearance, and states that machines cannot be used due to the terrain of the remaining contaminated areas.[208]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 9: Summary of land release outputs in 2024 (National authority and operator data combined)**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) |
|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 0.16 |
| **Technical Survey** | 0.37 |
| **Non-Technical Survey** | 599.67 |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 23 (including 6 removed for disposal or reported to authorities by UNMAS) |

In its 2025 extension request Ethiopia states that in 2024, it released "over 600 million square meters of land in Aware woreda of the Somali region, in one single minefield".[209] Of the total release of 600.1km$^2$, just over 599.67km$^2$ was cancelled; 368,958m$^2$ was reduced, and 70,900m$^2$ was cleared, resulting in the destruction of 17 AP mines, 1 AV mine, and 80 items of UXO (see Tables 10 and 12). The number of SHAs or CHAs cancelled, reduced, or cleared is not provided.[210] Separately, HALO cleared 93,535m$^2$ in 2024. No AP mines were destroyed during this clearance, though items of UXO were found, and clearance of these CHAs was suspended (see Table 13).[211]

Ethiopia did not report discovering any new areas of previously unrecorded AP mine contamination during 2024. However, HI states that it identified 17,700m$^2$ of previously unrecorded legacy AP mined area across an as-yet-unquantified number of SHAs in Tigray (see Table 11). This had not been reported to EMAO as at May 2025, as Ethiopia was still in the process of developing a functioning national database.[212] UNMAS also reported separately that it discovered six AP mines in 2024, during assessment of 17 areas in the Tigray and Afar regions between January and September 2024. It is not clear from the information UNMAS provided if these AP mines were removed for disposal or only reported to authorities.[213]

## SURVEY IN 2024

Ethiopia states that released 599.71km$^2$ through survey in 2024, of which 599.67km$^2$ was cancelled, and 368,958m$^2$ was reduced. All of this release through survey took place in a single minefield in the Aware district of Bukodowa Kebele in Somali region (see Table 10).[214] The number of SHAs or CHAs cancelled was not reported.

Ethiopia explains that this substantial land release was the result of "extensive data cleaning" and "desk and site assessments of the non-technical survey processes" in collaboration between EMAO and UNMAS. As a part of this process, a joint EMAO-UNMAS team was deployed to Jigjiga, in the Somali region, to "engage with regional, zonal and woreda authorities, local communities, and other stakeholders". It is reported that "operational groundwork, including access to suspected areas" was also undertaken, though no further details of what this involved are provided. Ethiopia explains that of the 209 locations in the Somali region previously recorded as hazardous areas, one

206 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.
207 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 50.
208 Ibid., p. 51.
209 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.
210 Ibid., p. 25.
211 Emails from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May and 21 August 2025.
212 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.
213 UNMAS says that, among a list of items of EO discovered during assessments, including these six AP mines, "358 items have been removed for disposal, while 249 items were marked and reported to authorities". However, it is not stated which in the case of any specific items. UNMAS, "Ethiopia", accessed 11 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4liK601.
214 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.

particular woreda accounted for a little over 600.1km$^2$. One particular minefield in Aware District, in Bukodowa Kebele, was identified for data cleaning followed by on site assessment.[215] This explains the subsequent substantial land release in this location.

Prior to this, the last release of land through survey reported by Ethiopia was in its Article 7 Report covering January 2021–March 2022, which said 13,400m$^2$ had been released, though it is unclear whether this area was cancelled or reduced.[216]

UNMAS discovered six AP mines in 2024 during assessment of 17 areas in the Tigray and Afar regions between January and September 2024. A total of 913 EO items were discovered, of which 358 were removed for disposal and 249 were marked and reported to authorities.[217] It is not known where the AP mines were found or if they had been laid. UNMAS says that items found were either removed for disposal or marked and reported to the authorities, but it is not stated which items this concerned.[218]

Ethiopia did not report any areas of previously unrecorded contamination in 2024.[219] HI, though, states that it identified 17,700m$^2$ of previously unrecorded legacy AP mined area in 2024, across an as-yet-unquantified number of SHAs in Tigray (see Table 11). These were not reported to EMAO as at May 2025, as the IM system and national database were still under development.[220] In 2023, by comparison, HALO identified a substantially higher total of 979,004m$^2$ of previously unrecorded AP mine contamination across nine hazardous areas through NTS: 221,652m$^2$ in SHAs and 757,352m$^2$ in CHAs.[221]

**Table 10: Cancellation and Reduction by EMAO and UNMAS in 2024**[222]

| Region/zone/district (woreda) | Area cancelled (km²) | Area reduced (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Somali/Jarar/Aware | 599.67 | 0.37 |

**Table 11: Previously unrecorded AP mine contamination identified in 2024 (operator data)***[223]

| Operator | Region/district | SHAs identified** | Area identified (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| HI | Tigray / Saharti (Tsehafti) | Unknown | 5,000 |
| HI | Tigray / Tsaeda Emba | Unknown | 8,500 |
| HI | Tigray / Tsaeda Emba | Unknown | 4,200 |
| **Total** | | | **17,700** |

*Not reported to EMAO as national database still under development. **HI reported the number of SHAs identified to Mine Action Review as "unknown" in each instance.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

Ethiopia reports that in 2024 70,900m$^2$ was cleared in Aware woreda, in the Jarar Zone of Somali region, resulting in the destruction of 17 AP mines, 1 AV mine, and 80 items of UXO (see Table 12).[224] The last release of land through clearance reported by Ethiopia prior to this was in its Article 7 Report covering January 2021–March 2022, which states 46,600m$^2$ was cleared, with the destruction of 46 TM-57 AV mines.[225] As outlined above, UNMAS discovered six AP mines during assessment in the Tigray and Afar regions between January and September 2024, which were either removed or marked for disposal by the authorities.[226] If included, this brings the total number of AP mines destroyed in 2024 to 23.

HALO separately reported to Mine Action Review that it cleared 93,535m$^2$. No AP mines were destroyed during this clearance, though release of these CHAs was not complete as at the end of 2024, due to the suspension of HALO's operations in Somali region. Three items of UXO were destroyed (see Table 13).[227] Clearance by HALO represents a decrease on that undertaken in 2023, when it cleared 242,052m$^2$, destroying six AP mines, along with four AV mines and two other items of UXO.[228] This clearance by HALO was not reported in Ethiopia's Article 7 report covering 2024. As at the time of writing Mine Action Review had not been able to verify if EMAO had been made aware of this clearance by HALO.

215 Ibid.
216 Article 7 Report (covering January 2021–March 2022), Form C.
217 UNMAS, "Ethiopia", accessed 11 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4liK6O1.
218 In June 2024, UNMAS also informed Mine Action Review that it had discovered two AP mines during EO assessments in March 2024. These mines were not laid. UNMAS marked and reported the mines for disposal by local authorities. It is not clear if these AP mines were additional to or included within the six AP mines mentioned previously as discovered by UNMAS during January and September 2024. Email from Francesca Chiaudani, UNMAS, 7 June 2024.
219 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F.
220 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.
221 Email from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 2 July 2024.
222 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.
223 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.
224 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 25–26.
225 Article 7 Report (covering January 2021–March 2022), Form C.
226 UNMAS, "Ethiopia", accessed 11 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4liK6O1.
227 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.
228 Emails from Toby Robinson, HALO, 17 May and 14 June 2024.

**Table 12: AP mine clearance by EMAO and UNMAS in 2024**[229]

| Region/zone/district (woreda) | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Somali/Jarar/Aware | 70,900 | 17 | 1 | 80 |

**Table 13: AP mine clearance by international operators in 2024**[230]

| Operator | Region/Zone/ District (woreda) | CHAs cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HALO | Somali/Jarar/ Gashamo/ Khatumo | *0 | 43,029 | 0 | 0 |
| HALO | Somali/Jarar/ Gashamo/ Abigayle | *0 | 50,506 | 0 | 3 |
| **Totals** | | **0** | **93,535** | **0** | **3** |

*These tasks were suspended.

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ETHIOPIA: 1 JUNE 2005

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2015

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 JUNE 2020

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEAR, 7 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

**THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (5 YEAR): 31 DECEMBER 2030**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Ethiopia is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025.[231] At the 20MSP in November 2022 and again in June 2023, Ethiopia said it would not be in a position to complete clearance by 2025 given constrained "access, capacity and human and financial resources".[232] On 31 March 2025, Ethiopia submitted a third request to extend its Article 5 deadline for five years, with a revised request containing additional information on 7 August.

Ethiopia's projections and estimations for completion of survey and clearance in recent years have proved unrealistic and the primary assumptions set out in its second extension request of 2019 did not come to pass, namely: that donor funding would increase steadily; that old demining equipment would be replaced by "licensed" demining equipment; that one deminer would clear on average as much as 50 square metres per day, 22 days a month, and ten months a year; and that one additional demining company would be added, for a total of five deployed.[233] This average clearance rate per deminer appeared unrealistically high at the time.

Ethiopia's two-year work plan for 2026-2027, which includes survey/resurvey of all hazardous areas,[234] appears more realistic given Ethiopia's now significantly expanded capacity.[235] Whether Ethiopia can complete clearance of remaining hazardous areas between 2028 and the end of its proposed extension period in December 2030, depends on the survey results of the initial two-year period, which may yet reveal previously unrecorded legacy contamination from AP mines, as well as the extent to which Ethiopia can meet its ambitious fundraising targets.

Yet, conflict and insecurity persists in some parts of the north of the country, and the outlook for safe and secure access to all mined areas, including those along the parts of the border with Eritrea that are still to be demarcated,

229 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.

230 Emails from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May and 21 August 2025.

231 Ethiopia's original Article 5 deadline expired on 1 June 2015. In March 2015, Ethiopia submitted a request for an extension of five years until 1 June 2020 to complete survey and clearance of all remaining mined areas.

232 Statement of Ethiopia on Article 5, 20MSP, Geneva, 21–25 November 2022; and Statement of Ethiopia on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

233 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 42.

234 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

235 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

remains uncertain. Ethiopia also lacks a national mine action strategy –long awaited and still pending development as at August 2025 – and a resource mobilisation strategy is still urgently required. While achievements in 2024 merit recognition, Ethiopia will need to sustain and even accelerate intense reform and strengthening of its national mine action programme, through close and meaningful collaboration with stakeholders, if it is to meet its ambitious 2030 deadline.

**Table 14: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | *0.16 |
| 2023 | **0.24 |
| 2022 | **0.04 |
| 2021*** | 0 |
| 2020**** | 0 |
| **Total** | **0.44** |

*Sum of national authority data and data from HALO. **Clearance reported by HALO. ***Reporting year was January 2021 to March 2022. ****Reporting year was April–December 2020.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Ethiopia's 2025 extension request does not outline whether Ethiopia has a strategy for managing residual contamination after completion of large-scale clearance.

# GUINEA-BISSAU

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2027

Not on track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 1.1KM²

Light
(partial national estimate, but includes areas containing only UXO)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0 | 0 |
| Technical Survey | 44,234 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 5 SHAs cancelled (no initial estimate of area) | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 2 | 1 (spot task) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Humanitarian Aid (HUMAID)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- National Association for Local and Urban Development (NADEL)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

After a decade-long suspension, mine action operations resumed in 2023 and continued into 2024, focusing on survey and spot task destruction of explosive ordnance, including two anti-personnel (AP) mines. However, owing to a lack of sustained funding, and despite confirmation that two of the nine confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) contain AP mines, technical survey (TS) and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) ended in July 2024, followed by the suspension of non-technical survey (NTS) in December.

On 19 April 2024, Guinea-Bissau requested a new deadline of 31 December 2027 to meet its Article 5 clearance obligation under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). The three-year extension was granted at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024. The accompanying work plan aimed to complete national NTS by end 2026, with TS and clearance to follow. The extension period is also intended to develop a sustainable national capacity for survey and clearance, along with a strategy to address residual threats post-completion.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Guinea-Bissau should pursue resource mobilisation efforts, both nationally and internationally, to maintain operational momentum and avoid setbacks in 2025.**
- **The government should allocate consistent annual funding to the National Mine Action Coordination Centre (CAAMI) to ensure institutional continuity and avoid operational disruption.**
- **Guinea-Bissau should continue with survey to gain a clearer understanding of the nature and extent of the contamination. Preliminary findings suggest that AP mined areas may be few in number and extent, while explosive remnants of war (ERW) are more widespread.**

- **Guinea-Bissau should urgently conduct TS in all new areas identified through NTS in 2024.**
- **Guinea-Bissau should develop a residual risk management strategy and ensure that national capacities are adequately resources to address these risks in a sustainable manner.**
- **Guinea-Bissau should ensure that Article 7 reports provide comprehensive data on AP mined areas cancelled by NTS, reduced by TS, and cleared, specifying the number of AP mines destroyed.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | In 2024, NTS and TS activities resumed. By the end of the year, Guinea-Bissau had nine confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), including two reduced during the year, covering just over 1km$^2$. Of the 43 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), 5 were cancelled through NTS, while 13 were newly identified in the Oio and Cacheu regions in 2024, bringing the total to 51 SHAs: 13 areas covering 145,218m$^2$ and 38 whose size remains to be determined. Further survey is required to clarify the extent of AP mined area as opposed to areas with explosive remnants of war (ERW). |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | CAAMI's capacity to coordinate, plan, and prioritise mine action activities remains limited. With funding from Norway and the Netherlands and support from Mines Advisory Group (MAG), CAAMI was reactivated and led the resumption of mine action in 2023–24. However, with the end of this support and MAG's departure in January 2025, CAAMI faces potential suspension, especially as it remains outside the national budget. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | The 2024 extension request emphasised gender and diversity inclusion throughout the mine action programme. NTS conducted during the year was conducted by a gender-balanced team. However, no women currently have EOD qualifications. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 2 | 2 | Guinea-Bissau has no specific standards or policies on environmental protection in mine action. These considerations are missing from official documents, including the 2024 extension request and the latest Article 7 report covering 2024. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 3 | 4 | Due to limited internal capacity and technical resources, CAAMI is unable to deploy the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) or manage a comparable database system. In 2023 and 2024, data from MAG-supported operations was managed using Microsoft Excel. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Guinea-Bissau does not have a national strategy, but its fourth deadline extension request included a detailed 2025–27 work plan, though implementation is contingent on securing funding. In 2024, HUMAID's tasking for TS and spot tasks and NADEL's tasking for NTS were jointly defined with operators. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | In 2024, national mine action standards (developed with the support of MAG in 2023) were partly reviewed by operators. They were approved by the national mine action authority overseeing CAAMI in October. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | In 2024, Guinea-Bissau submitted its fourth Article 5 deadline extension request, which was approved at the Fifth Review Conference. However, with financial and technical support ending in late 2024, no funding has been secured to implement the 2025–27 action plan. The absence of government support further threatens the mine action programme. |
| **Average Score** | **5.3** | **5.4** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Council for Humanitarian Demining (Concelho Nacional de Desminagem Humánitaria, CNDH)
- The National Mine Action Coordination Centre (Centro Nacional de Coordenação da Acção Anti-Minas, CAAMI)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Humanitarian Aid (HUMAID)
- National Association for Local and Urban Development (NADEL) (NTS and risk education only)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of mined area in Guinea-Bissau remains only partially known. While it is believed to be light, mapping of both historical and recent evidence indicates that it is dispersed across much of the national territory. A comprehensive nationwide NTS is needed to clearly determine the extent of the threat posed by AP mines as opposed to ERW, which are thought to be more widespread.[1]

As at the end of 2024, Guinea-Bissau recorded nine CHAs across five regions, covering a total of 1,049,611m² (see Table 1). This includes two CHAs where AP mines were found in the Quebo sector, Tombali region in the South, which were re-surveyed in 2024 by HUMAID and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and their sizes slightly reduced. HUMAID identified the remaining seven CHAs, covering 925,045m², in 2014 but they still require survey.[2]

**Table 1: Confirmed mined areas (at end 2024)[3]**

| Province | Region | Sector | Community | CHAs | CHA areas (m²) | Year of latest survey |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North | Cacheu | São Domingos | Djequemondo | 1 | 15,000 | 2014 |
| North | Gabú | Pitche | Buruntuma | 1 | 116,700 | 2014 |
| North | Oio | Bissorã | Encheia | 1 | 600,000 | 2014 |
| North | Oio | Farim | Bricama | 1 | 90,000 | 2014 |
| North | Oio | Farim | Cuntima | 1 | 50,000 | 2014 |
| North | Oio | Farim | Demba Dabo | 1 | 51,000 | 2014 |
| South | Quinara | Empada | Gubia | 1 | 2,345 | 2014 |
| South | Tombali | Quebo | Imbai-Baila | 1 | *50,757 | 2024 |
| South | Tombali | Quebo | Medjo | 1 | *73,809 | 2024 |
| **Totals** | | | | **9** | **1,049,611** | |

*Imbai-Baila was reduced from 60,000m² and Medjo from 108,800m² following TS by HUMAID and MAG in 2024.

Guinea-Bissau also recorded 51 SHAs at the end of 2024, following the addition of 13 new SHAs in 2024 identified after NTS conducted by the National Association for Local and Urban Development (NADEL) in collaboration with MAG. These new SHAs are estimated to cover 145,218m² (see Table 2).[4] The remaining 43 SHAs were originally identified by HUMAID in 2014, with their size unknown. In 2024, five were cancelled following NTS, leaving 38 SHAs whose size remains to be determined.[5]

**Table 2: Suspected mined areas identified by NADEL and MAG in 2024[6]**

| Province | Region | Sector | Community | SHAs | SHA areas (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North | Cacheu | Sao Domingos | Badigue | 1 | 3 |
| North | Cacheu | Sao Domingos | Barraca Mandioca | 1 | 15,084 |
| North | Cacheu | Sao Domingos | Bunhaque | 1 | 41,836 |
| North | Cacheu | Sao Domingos | Jegue | 1 | 5,604 |

1 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 13; and APMBC Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meetings, 18 June 2025, p. 2.
2 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 3.
3 Ibid., Tables 2 and 3, p. 3; and email from Nautan Mancabu, National Director, CAAMI, 6 September 2025.
4 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, Regional Program Manager, West Africa, MAG, 25 April 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 4–5.
5 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 5–6.
6 Ibid; and email from François Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 30 August 2025.

**Table 2 Continued**

| Province | Region | Sector | Community | SHAs | SHA areas (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North | Cacheu | Sao Domingos | Ondongol | 1 | 19 |
| North | Oio | Farim | Canjanco | 1 | 155 |
| North | Oio | Farim | Dutato | 1 | 8,179 |
| North | Oio | Farim | Faquina Mandinga | 1 | 139 |
| North | Oio | Farim | Faquina Mandinga | 1 | 32 |
| North | Oio | Farim | Jumbembem | 1 | 44,729 |
| North | Oio | Farim | Lenquebato | 1 | 21,454 |
| North | Oio | Farim | Lenquebato | 1 | 7,969 |
| North | Oio | Farim | Ponta Duarte | 1 | 15 |
| **Totals** | | | | **13** | **145,218** |

The Article 7 report covering 2024 (pp. 4–5) has duplications, with Bunhaque and Canjanco areas counted twice. The number of SHAs is likely lower as several (Badigue, Ponta Duarte, and Ondongol) may be spot tasks considering their small size.

Between 2006 and 2011, Guinea-Bissau undertook several nationwide initiatives to assess mines and ERW,[7] culminating in a declaration of Article 5 completion in 2012 after clearing 50 mined areas (6.52 km$^2$) and destroying thousands of explosive devices.[8] However, subsequent incidents involving explosive ordnance—13 between 2012 and 2021, resulting in 73 deaths[9]—revealed that contamination persisted. In response, CAAMI tasked HUMAID to conduct a survey in 2014 that identified 1.09km$^2$ of contamination in CHAs and a further 43 SHAs in six regions.[10] This survey relied on community reports, lacked precise delimitation, and did not distinguish between types of threats. The presence of accidents in areas not previously marked as hazardous underscored the incompleteness of existing data and the urgent need for an evidence-based national survey.[11]

In June 2021, Guinea-Bissau officially informed States Parties at the Intersessional Meetings of the discovery of previously unknown mined areas.[12] Since then, the director of CAAMI appointed that year has worked closely with MAG, with three Article 5 deadline extension requests submitted and international funding sought to enable a national NTS. This survey finally began in 2024.

Mine contamination in Guinea-Bissau is a legacy of the independence war in 1963–74. More mines were laid during the 1998–99 civil war and then in the context of the Casamance conflict in neighbouring Senegal in 2006. Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) were found primarily in the north and east, close to the borders with Senegal and Guinea (Conakry). According to Guinea-Bissau, a faction of the Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MDFC) laid both factory-made and improvised AP mines in 2006 in the northern regions bordering Senegal.[13]

## OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

According to the national authorities, ERW are significantly more widespread than AP mines. However, the extent to which identified hazardous areas contain AP mines as opposed to other types of ordnance remains unclear.[14] Guinea-Bissau informed a meeting convened under the APMBC Individualised Approach in Geneva in June 2025 that a detonation of an ERW in March 2025 killed two children and injured a third.[15]

At the end of 2024, Guinea-Bissau recorded four battle areas totalling 402,304m$^2$. This reflects a decrease in the reported extent following battle area clearance (BAC) of 57,257m$^2$ at the Ilonde site in the Cacheu region (North province) between 2023 and 2024.[16] In 2024, 17 new alerts were reported as a result of NTS and awareness-raising efforts. The reporting mechanism established by CAAMI had already recorded 25 alerts between 2021 and 2023. The presence of explosive devices in these areas still needs to be confirmed through site visits. CAAMI lacks resources to maintain an operational explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team capable of responding to alerts.[17]

7 Article 7 Report (covering 2010–11), Form C.

8 Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5, 12MSP, Geneva, 3–7 December 2012, pp. 2–4.

9 Article 7 Report (covering 2022); Form H; 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.

10 Presentation of Guinea-Bissau, APMBC Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meetings, 22–24 June 2021; and 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9–12.

11 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11 and 30–31; and APMBC Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meetings, 22 June 2022, p. 5.

12 Statement of Guinea-Bissau on Article 5, Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meetings, 22–24 June 2021.

13 Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5, 12MSP, Geneva, 3–7 December 2012, p. 2.

14 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

15 Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meetings, 18 June 2025; and email from Nautan Mancabu, CAAMI, 6 September 2025.

16 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 6 and 7.

17 Ibid., pp. 7 and 8.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Guinea-Bissau has a national authority overseeing mine action—the National Council for Humanitarian Demining (CNDH)—and a national centre, CAAMI, which coordinates mine action at operational level. Both were established on 1 July 2002 following adherence of Guinea-Bissau to the APMBC, but remained mostly inactive between 2012 (after the declaration of completion of Article 5) and 2022, when international support was renewed.[18]

The role and functioning of the CNDH were originally defined in its founding decree issued in September 2001. It is responsible for setting the national mine action strategy and overseeing CAAMI. It comprises representatives from various ministries and is chaired by the Minister of Combatants for the Liberation of the Fatherland (Ministère des Combattants de la Liberté et de la Patrie).[19] Although mandated to meet quarterly, the CNDH convened only once in 2023, its first meeting since 2012.[20] In October 2024, a session was held, which was chaired by the Minister and co-chaired by the Deputy Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Guinea-Bissau. During this meeting, 13 national mine action standards were approved.[21]

The CAAMI had a staff of 16, of whom five were women, as at April 2024. It is organised in three departments: support, operations, and risk education. Its role involves planning, coordination of all mine action activities, resource mobilisation, and reporting. It is also in charge of quality control (QC) and land release to communities.[22] As in previous years, no specific funding was allocated by the government to CAAMI in 2024. CAAMI does not appear in the State's annual budget. However, several CAAMI staff members are government officials seconded from their respective ministries, which continue to cover their salaries. Additionally, CAAMI's offices are provided by the State free of charge.[23]

Between 2022 and 2024, thanks to financial support from Norway and the Netherlands, MAG has supported CAAMI's operations though monthly contributions to cover certain expenses. This support primarily covered costs related to internet connectivity, fuel supplies, and essential office consumables.[24] MAG elaborated a capacity-building plan for CAAMI in 2023 that included support for the establishment of a suitable information management system, the development of the national mine action standards (NMAS), and broader support to help reactivate operations through training, partnering with national operators, and supporting a national resource mobilisation strategy and reporting.[25] In 2024, a series of training sessions were organised on disarmament treaties (CCW, APMBC, and CCM) with a particular focus on the structure, mechanisms, and obligations under the APMBC. The session also included awareness-raising on the NMAS. Additional training covered the structuring of a national humanitarian demining programme in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 02.10. Support was also provided to the Director of CAAMI in drafting official reports, such as the 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request and Article 7 reports. Capacity-building efforts were undertaken to enhance CAAMI's international representation.[26]

Since the departure of MAG in January 2025, it has been unclear how CAAMI and national operators will continue to operate. An Individualised Approach was held on the margins of the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in Geneva in June 2025, during which the Minister pledged to allocate US$100,000 to CAAMI to support the implementation of its 2025–27 action plan. By early September 2025, however, CAAMI had still not received confirmation of this commitment.[27] UNDP reported receiving a request from the Minister to support the development of a national mine action strategy, an action plan, and a resource mobilisation strategy. Meanwhile, The HALO Trust—active in the country for several years during which time it focused on weapons and ammunition management—reported providing regular training to defence and security forces.[28]

The operating environment for mine action is generally permissive in Guinea-Bissau. There are no obstacles to obtaining visas for international staff. The main challenge lies in securing customs-duty exemptions for equipment imported for humanitarian work. Despite sustained efforts and the support of CAAMI and its supervising ministry, exemption certificates have not been granted by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Finance. This appears to be linked to past instances of abuse, where entities misrepresented themselves as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in order to obtain tax exemptions. In response, authorities have adopted a more restrictive approach, suspending exemptions for all organisations, including duly registered NGOs. Consequently, operators are required to cover customs clearance costs to ensure the timely delivery of essential equipment.[29]

No formal mine action working group is in place, although CAAMI has organised ad hoc meetings with stakeholders to address specific topics, such as the development of the NMAS in 2023–24.[30]

18 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 2.
22 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.
23 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025.
24 Ibid.
25 Email from François Fall, MAG, 7 May 2024.
26 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025.
27 Email from Nautan Mancabu, CAAMI, 6 September 2025.
28 Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meetings, 18 June 2025.
29 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025.
30 Ibid.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Guinea-Bissau's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request and work plan do not contain any measurable gender and diversity targets.[31] In its proposed action plan for 2025–27, however, the authorities claim to follow best practice by promoting gender and diversity inclusion in the programme.[32]

As at April 2024, five of the 16 CAAMI staff (31%) were women (see Table 3).[33] NADEL, which conducted community liaison, NTS, and risk education, had twelve staff in 2024 with a balanced gender composition among the NTS team.[34] Its risk education tools were updated to address gender and diversity considerations as well as particular at-risk groups.[35] HUMAID's staff, however, was exclusively male, and no EOD expertise existed among women.[36]

CAAMI does not have a designated gender focal point. Gender-related initiatives in 2024 included MAG's West Africa programme, which introduced a breastfeeding support policy. This enabled a community liaison supervisor from Guinea-Bissau—previously unable to attend due to maternity leave—to participate in a 2024 training in Mauritania, accompanied by her baby and a caregiver.[37]

**Table 3: Gender composition of CAAMI and operators in 2024**[38]

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAAMI | 16 | 5 (31%) | 5 | 2 (40%) | 3 | 0 (0%) |
| HUMAID | 12 | 0 (0%) | 3 | 0 (0%) | 6 | 0 (0%) |
| MAG | 7 | 2 (29%) | 2 | 1 (50%) | 4 | 1 (25%) |
| NADEL | 12 | 4 (33%) | 4 | 0 (0%) | 8 | 4 (50%) |
| **Totals** | **47** | **11 (23%)** | **14** | **3 (21%)** | **21** | **5 (24%)** |

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Guinea-Bissau currently lacks specific standards or policies addressing environmental protection in the context of mine action. Environmental considerations are also absent from official documents, including the most recent extension request submitted in 2024.[39] Environmental policy should include a description of how environmental considerations will be addressed during planning and tasking of survey and clearance in order to minimise potential harm from land release activities. In 2024, MAG did not have a policy or standing operating procedure (SOPs) on environmental management for Guinea-Bissau.[40]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Between 2001 and 2012, CAAMI operated the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Version 5 with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Following the 2012 declaration of completion, however, the physical server was no longer in use.[41] In 2023, MAG attempted to restore CAAMI's digital archives from 2001–12 but was unsuccessful, leaving only the physical records.[42] Although the GICHD conducted an assessment in 2022, no decision has been taken regarding the potential re-deployment of IMSMA.[43]

Due to a lack of internal capacity and technical resources, MAG concluded that CAAMI is unable to deploy IMSMA or manage a similarly advanced database system. Data from MAG-supported operations in 2023 and 2024 were managed on Microsoft Excel databases. To strengthen data quality and information management, MAG deployed its OMIS system, which is designed specifically for data collection, archiving, dissemination, and quality assurance (QA). While some forms were still completed manually and later digitised, several key improvements were made in 2024. These included the standardised revision and translation of data collection

31 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 21–25.
32 Ibid., p. 17.
33 Ibid., p. 14.
34 Ibid., p. 22.
35 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 7.
36 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025.
37 Ibid.
38 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14; online interview with Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 3 September 2025; and email from Nautan Mancabu, CAAMI, 6 September 2025.
39 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 18.
40 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025.
41 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10; and email from Nautan Mancabu, CAAMI, 28 March 2023.
42 Email from François Fall, MAG, 7 May 2024.
43 Ibid.

forms; CAAMI's active role in identifying priority data to be extracted in collaboration with field operators; and the establishment of a system for timely data extraction based on predefined schedules. Data collection forms covering risk education, NTS, TS, spot tasks, and BAC were developed jointly by MAG and CAAMI.[44]

Guinea-Bissau's 2024 extension request highlighted that a functional information management system is an essential component of its mine action strategy.[45] The first step set in the 2024–27 work plan was to define a suitable system. Should IMSMA be retained, CAAMI has said it will request support from the GICHD. Guinea-Bissau expected that to develop a fully functional system would take an initial six months. CAAMI also planned to develop, at an early stage, a monitoring and evaluation plan for the information management system.[46] In its planned 2024–27 budget, CAAMI allocated US$190,500 for the system's development.[47]

In recent years, government documents submitted under the APMBC have generally been timely, detailed, and comparable over time. Between 2021 and 2024, MAG supported Guinea-Bissau's Article 5 deadline extension requests, annual transparency reports, and presentations in international fora.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Guinea-Bissau does not have a national mine action strategy but its latest extension request, submitted to the Fifth Review Conference, included a work plan and budget for 2024–27 costed at US$7,648,392.[48] The transparency report submitted in May 2025 provided the annual breakdown, including US$1,716,117 spent in 2024.[49] The remaining US$5,932,274 for 2025–27 was still unfunded as of June 2025, as confirmed during the Individualised Approach organised at the margins of the Intersessional Meetings that month. However, the Minister pledged to allocate US$100,000 to CAAMI to support the implementation of its 2025–27 action plan.[50]

The operational priorities outlined in the request focused on completing the national NTS by the end of 2026, along with initial TS, marking, and spot tasks in the nine CHAs. Activities planned for 2026 and 2027 aimed to expand TS and clearance based on the results of the national survey.[51] The extension request also outlined a set of activities planned for 2024 and 2025, including: a) creation of an information management system; b) review and adoption of NMAS aligned with IMAS; c) expansion of national NTS capacity; d) preparation of technical activities (including marking and clearance); e) resumption of mine risk education; f) victim assistance; and g) resource mobilisation. In 2025–27, the request prioritised monitoring and evaluation, including QA and quality control (QC), capacity building for CAAMI and national operators; and the development of a residual risk management strategy.[52]

The previous 2022–24 work plan was only partially implemented. But with support from Norway and the Netherlands allied to MAG's efforts, CAAMI was reactivated after a 10-year hiatus to oversee the resumption of survey and EOD at the end of 2023. HUMAID was trained and accredited and began TS, BAC, and spot task EOD while NADEL conducted NTS and risk education.[53] A basic but sustainable Excel-based information management system was established, and the NMAS were developed and approved by the CNDH.

While Guinea-Bissau's 2024 extension request planned for the national NTS to be completed by the end of 2026 using a team of 60 staff, NADEL had only 10 staff involved in survey in 2024. The two-year period took into account the time for CAAMI to select and train additional national capacity, as well as the potential suspension of activities during the rainy season.[54]

The end of international financial support, MAG's departure in January 2025, and the lack of national funding for CAAMI risk jeopardising Guinea-Bissau's ability to implement its 2025–27 work plan. The authorities have indicated that, if resources remain insufficient, it may submit a new extension request by 2027.[55] During the Individualised Approach meeting in Geneva in June 2025, UNDP Guinea-Bissau reported receiving a request from the Minister to support the development of a national mine action strategy, an action plan, and a resource mobilisation strategy.[56]

44 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025.
45 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 21.
46 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 21.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., p. 26.
49 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 10.
50 APMBC Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meetings, 18 June 2025, p. 4.
51 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.
52 Ibid., pp. 21–25.
53 Ibid., p. 4.
54 Ibid., p. 22.
55 Ibid., p. 5.
56 Statement of UNDP Guinea-Bissau, Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meetings, 18 June 2025.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

CAAMI indicated that 13 NMAS were approved by the CNDH in October 2024.[57] The standards, which are said to be IMAS-compliant and tailored to the local context, were developed in 2023 by an EOD expert from MAG.[58] They include the glossary, land release, NTS, TS, accreditation, BAC, marking, incident and accident investigation, information management, risk education, and quality management, plus two annexes (skills for EOD and risk analysis).[59] In 2024, the mine action working group finalised the risk education standard.[60] In its 2024 extension request, Guinea-Bissau sought US$76,667 to finalise the development of the NMAS.[61]

Although the NMAS were officially approved by the CNDH, they were only partially reviewed by operators in 2023–24, mainly MAG and The HALO Trust.[62] Strengthening CAAMI staff's understanding and taking ownership of these standards is essential to ensure their effective implementation in Guinea-Bissau. The lessons learned from the implementation of NTS, TS, and BAC should be used to evaluate—and, if necessary, update—the relevant standards.

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

CAAMI's activities were largely limited between 2012 and 2022 due to lack of funding.[63] As of April 2024, it had 16 staff.[64] Operationally, it includes three EOD-trained personnel—the Operations Director, along with one QA and one QC manager—who received refresher training from MAG in June 2023 and are qualified to conduct TS, BAC, and EOD spot tasks. However, CAAMI lacks technical capacity in information management, including key roles such as a database manager and Geographic Information System (GIS) expert.[65]

Between 2022 and 2024, MAG secured funding from Norway and the Netherlands to support CAAMI's implementation of its work plan. This included staff salaries, supporting organisational accreditation, drafting the NMAS, help recruiting key staff, establishing internet connectivity, and donating equipment. MAG operated through two national partners: clearance operator HUMAID, which began BAC in 2023 and TS and EOD in early 2024; and NADEL for community liaison, NTS, and risk education. Together, CAAMI and MAG organised several workshops in 2023 and 2024 on hazardous area classification, NTS, information management, community liaison, and gender and diversity.[66] MAG's team comprised one international and six national staff, including two women, one of whom was in charge of risk education/NTS.[67] MAG's office closed in January 2025 due to lack of funding opportunities.[68]

HUMAID, a national clearance operator active since the early 2000s, had 61 trained staff by 2011. It received regular EOD training and refresher courses until 2012. It used to be funded by the government and international donors (including UNOPS) and conducted the 2014 survey that identified AP mines and ERW.[69] In 2023, it regained operational accreditation, and received refresher training from MAG covering TS, EOD Levels I–III, and QA/QC. Nine staff passed the training, including six deminers, one medic, and two drivers, enabling HUMAID to resume clearance, TS, BAC, and EOD spot tasks.[70] The organisation is equipped with vehicles, GPS devices, detectors, personal protective equipment, and explosives for destruction, with MAG providing new equipment to replace some outdated items.[71] With the end of financial support to Guinea-Bissau, it is not clear if HUMAID would continue operating in 2025.

National operator the National Association for Local and Urban Development (NADEL) has worked in partnership with MAG since June 2023 to conduct community liaison, NTS, and risk education. Between August and November 2023, ten investigators were trained on community liaison, first aid (with the support of the national Red Cross society), and NTS. MAG received the task order for community liaison at the end of February 2024 and NADEL teams were equipped and deployed in March until the end of the year.[72]

57 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 2.
58 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 21; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
59 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 21.
60 Email from François Fall, MAG, 30 August 2025.
61 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 21 and 26.
62 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025.
63 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
64 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14 and 15.
65 Ibid, p. 21; and email from François Fall, MAG, 7 May 2024.
66 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7 and 8.
67 Email from François Fall, MAG, 7 May 2024.
68 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025.
69 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 4 and 5.
70 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16; and email from François Fall, MAG, 7 May 2024.
71 Presentation of Guinea-Bissau, APMBC Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meeting, 22 June 2022; 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
72 Email from François Fall, MAG, 7 May 2024; 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 17 and 22; and presentation of Guinea-Bissau, APMBC Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meeting, 18 June 2025.

Table 4: Operational survey and clearance capacities deployed in 2024[73]

| Operators | NTS teams | NTS personnel | TS and manual clearance teams | TS and manual clearance personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NADEL | 2 | 8 | 0 | 0 | Plus two Team leaders. |
| HUMAID | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | Plus team leader, medic, and 3 drivers. |
| **Totals** | **2** | **8** | **1** | **5** | |

Before Guinea-Bissau declared completion of its Article 5 obligations, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) supported the mine action programme from 2010 to 2012 at the request of UNDP and CAAMI. In partnership with local operator LUTCAM, NPA conducted a national survey of mine and UXO contamination in 2010–11. Although concerns about possible residual contamination remained, the programme was closed in 2012 due to a lack of evidence of additional AP mine-contaminated areas.[74]

The HALO Trust has operated in Guinea-Bissau since November 2017. It is implementing a Weapons and Ammunition Safety Programme in support to the armed forces.[75]

Humanity & Inclusion (HI), which is not currently operating in the country, conducted an assessment mission in late June 2024. The objective was to evaluate national capacities, identify training needs, define strategic priorities for strengthening victim assistance, and explore opportunities for technical support. HI aimed to leverage its regional expertise and partnership with CPADD (a demining training center based in Benin) by renewing a France-funded project focused on building the capacity of mine-affected States through training and technical assistance. As at July 2025, the project had, however, not received funding.[76]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, for the first time since 2012, Guinea-Bissau reported land release outputs, although mainly survey, BAC and spot tasks, not manual clearance.[77] Regarding AP mined areas, HUMAID reduced 44,234m$^2$ in two of the nine CHAs it identified in 2014 through TS.[78] NADEL cancelled five areas from the list of 43 SHAs identified in 2014, and identified 13 new SHAs.[79]

Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2024

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m$^2$) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 0 | |
| **Technical survey** | 44,234 | Imbai-Baila was reduced by 9,243m$^2$ and Medjo by 34,991m$^2$. |
| **Non-technical survey** | 5 SHAs cancelled | No initial estimate. |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 2 | Two PMN AP mines were found and destroyed by HUMAID and MAG in the Medjo area, Quebo sector, Tombali region, in South province. |

## SURVEY IN 2024

HUMAID, the national clearance operator mentored by MAG, conducted TS in two of the nine CHAs, reducing Imbai-Baila by 9,243m$^2$ and Medjo by 34,991m$^2$ and destroying two AP mines in the Medjo area.[80] CAAMI said that the two confirmed areas also contain ERW.[81]

73 Online interview with Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 3 September 2025.

74 Email from Hans Risser, NPA, 10 August 2021; and Article 7 Report (covering 2010), pp. 5 and 6.

75 Email from Nautan Mancabu, CAAMI, 2 August 2024.

76 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Specialist in Armed Violence Reduction, HI, 17 March 2025; online interview with Emmanuel Sauvage, Interim Regional Director, HI, 8 May 2025.

77 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.

78 The area was calculated by comparing the size of the two CHAs reported in Guinea-Bissau's Article 7 reports for 2023 and 2024, following confirmation from MAG that both areas were reduced by TS, and not cancelled by NTS as incorrectly stated in the Article 7 report for 2024.

79 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.

80 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 4; Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 3; and online interview with Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 3 September 2025.

81 Email from Nautan Mancabu, CAAMI, 2 August 2024; and Response from Guinea-Bissau to questions from the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on its 2024 extension request, 2 August 2024, pp. 3 and 7.

NADEL, the national civil society organisation also trained by MAG, conducted community liaison, NTS as well as risk education activities in two regions of the North near the border with Senegal, Oio and Cacheu, where it identified 13 new SHAs, previously unrecorded, and covering 145,218m² (see Table 2 above).[82] Additionally, among the 43 SHAs initially identified in 2014, and whose size remains unknown, NADEL cancelled five areas by NTS in the same regions (see Table 6).[83]

**Table 6: Areas cancelled by NTS by NADEL and MAG in 2024**[84]

| Province | Region | Sector | Locality | SHAs | Area |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North | Cacheu | Sao Domingos | Djinhalcunda | 1 | Unknown |
| North | Cacheu | Sao Domingos | Nhambalam | 1 | Unknown |
| North | Oio | Farim | Sambuia | 1 | Unknown |
| North | Oio | Farim | Sara Mancama | 1 | Unknown |
| North | Oio | Mansaba | Gassanima | 1 | Unknown |
| **Total** | | | | **5** | |

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

No manual clearance of AP mined areas took place, only release through TS. In 2024, HUMAID conducted 15 spot tasks leading to the destruction of 227 explosive devices.[85] Guinea-Bissau also reported clearing one of its five battle areas between the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024: Ilonde site in the Cacheu region in the north, covering 57,257m².[86]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR GUINEA-BISSAU: 1 NOVEMBER 2001

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2011

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (2-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2012

↓

DECLARATION OF COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS: 5 DECEMBER 2012

↓

REPORTED DISCOVERY OF NEW MINED AREAS IN JUNE 2021

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2022

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (2 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2024

↓

**FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2027**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC and in accordance with the three-year extension granted by States Parties at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, Guinea-Bissau is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2027. As of June 2025, with no international funding secured and no government support for survey and clearance, the timeline projected in the extension was already facing considerable delays.

82 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 4 and 5; and email from François Fall, MAG, 30 August 2025.

83 Ibid., pp. 5 and 6.

84 Ibid.

85 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 4. The narrative states 14, but the table below lists 15 spot tasks.

86 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 6 and 7.

Guinea-Bissau became a State Party in November 2001. Its original Article 5 deadline of 1 November 2011 was first extended for two months, and, in December 2012, at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC (12MSP), Guinea-Bissau declared it had fulfilled its Article 5 obligations, having cleared 50 mined areas covering a total of 6.52km$^2$, and destroying in the process 3,973 AP mines, 207 AV mines, and 309,125 items of UXO.[87]

At the June 2021 Intersessional Meetings, however, it reported the discovery of 1.09km$^2$ of CHA and 43 SHAs of unknown size, containing both AP mines and ERW. However, it did not specify the proportion of AP mines versus other explosive ordnance.[88] Since then, Guinea-Bissau has submitted three Article 5 deadline extension requests, the most recent of which was granted at the November 2024 Meeting of States Parties. The 2024–27 work plan aimed to complete a national survey by the end of 2026 to define the exact perimeter of hazardous areas and establish an accurate, evidence-based baseline of contamination.

Between 2022 and 2024, with funding from Norway and the Netherlands channelled through MAG, Guinea-Bissau made notable progress. National operators were reactivated, national mine action standards were approved, and survey and EOD operations resumed, although no clearance took place. Initial efforts started to bring some clarity to the extent and nature of contamination. However, international funding was insufficient to fully implement the planned activities and, in a continued absence of national financial support to sustain the CAAMI, the programme risks halting again for an indefinite period.

**Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (m$^2$) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 0 |
| 2023 | 0 |
| 2022 | 0 |
| 2021 | 0 |
| 2020 | 0 |
| **Total** | **0** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

In its 2012 declaration of Article 5 completion, Guinea-Bissau acknowledged that potential residual contamination remained, which would be addressed by CAAMI.[89] It also committed to reporting any newly discovered mined areas under Article 7 of the Convention, ensuring civilian protection, and prioritising the destruction of AP mines as a matter of urgent priority, while seeking assistance from States Parties as appropriate.[90] But the declaration of compliance negatively impacted the national capacities, as no funding was allocated to the programme for the following 10 years, even as Guinea-Bissau identified previously unknown mined areas following incidents. A survey was conducted by HUMAID in 2014, but the findings were not formally reported to States Parties until 2021.

In its latest extension request (2024), Guinea-Bissau committed to developing a national residual risk management strategy and strengthening national capacity to address such risks, with related activities scheduled to begin in 2025.[91] The results of the national survey and subsequent clearance will be essential to establishing a sustainable demining capacity for post-completion contamination. HUMAID has the technical capacity to conduct NTS, TS, and EOD. However, it lacks the financial resources it needs to sustain its activities.[92]

Given the context, developing a strategy to address residual AP mine and ERW contamination—and ensuring that national capacity and resources are in place to manage these threats independently and sustainably—should be a priority.

87 Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5, 12MSP, Geneva, 3–7 December 2012, pp. 2–4.

88 Statement of Guinea-Bissau on Article 5, IM, 19 June 2023.

89 Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5, 12MSP, Geneva, 3–7 December 2012, p. 5.

90 Ibid., pp. 4–5.

91 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.

92 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025.

# IRAQ



## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2028

Not on track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 1,632KM²

Massive
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS (National Authority Data)

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 9.36 | 14.35 |
| Technical Survey | 11.88 | 19.61 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 128.31 | 106.86 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 16,644 (incl. 1,089 in spot tasks) | 16,590 (incl. 73 in spot tasks) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Ministry of Defence
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Shahreteah Humanitarian Organisation (SHO)
- Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Land release edged up in 2024 as a result of a big increase in cancellation through survey in Federal Iraq, but the amount of clearance dropped sharply. The Directorate for Mine Action (DMA)'s rapid turnover of management continued with the appointment of a new director in February 2025, also on a temporary basis. The DMA halted plans to upgrade its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database to Core but then reversed the decision. The Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) launched a new, tailor-made data management system in June 2024 after two years' preparation.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Iraqi government should provide the DMA with the legal authority, funding, and equipment to discharge its responsibilities as the national mine action authority (NMAA) and stabilise management.**
- **The Iraqi government and NMAA should provide clarity on national funding available for mine action and how the funds are allocated.**
- **The DMA should seek urgently to strengthen information management in the national programme by enhancing human capacity, modernising data-entry processes, updating the IMSMA database, and ensuring operators have access to up-to-date information required for planning.**
- **The DMA should consistently apply procedures for formal handover of cleared land to ensure its release to communities.**

- **The DMA should strengthen coordination of mine action through regular and substantive dialogue with all stakeholders, including donors.**
- **The DMA should release comprehensive annual data on the progress of survey and clearance disaggregated by operator, including State organisations, commercial companies, and NGOs.**
- **The DMA should streamline issuance of task orders to eliminate cumbersome procedures and lengthy delays obstructing efficient use of survey and clearance resources.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Iraq has a broad understanding of mine contamination but Federal Iraq continued to identify previously unrecorded areas of improvised and legacy mine contamination. The KRI estimate of contamination does not include border areas where insecurity has prevented survey. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | The Government of Iraq has not addressed constant changes of DMA senior management that result in policy flip-flops or provided any clarity on national funding for mine action at a time when donor support is shrinking. IKMAA provides a stable policy environment for mine action in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq but continues to face severe funding constraints. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Despite increased political sensitivity around gender issues, Iraq's mine action strategy continues to support diversity and operators have adapted recruitment and employment conditions to meet resistance posed by conservative social attitudes to women's employment in the sector. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Iraq does not have a national mine action standard on environmental management in mine action but mine action planning increasingly has to take account of climate extremes and operators continue to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) to manage the environmental impact of demining. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | DMA halted and then resumed plans to upgrade its database from IMSMA New Generation to Core. In a serious setback, iMMAP lost donor funding for its support to the DMA's information management unit, resulting in the loss of trained human resources. IKMAA launched a new, more versatile data management system and completed migration of 25 years of operating records. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | DMA management changes, delays in DMA issuance of task orders, and procedural obstacles continued to frustrate operators in Federal Iraq, although some reported improved access to visas for international staff. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | The DMA and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) have been systematically reviewing and updating national standards. A new national standard for Management of Human Remains in Mine Action were approved by the Ministry of Environment in September 2024. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 7 | Total area released increased slightly in 2024 but 87% of release by Federal Iraq (and 86% of the national total) was by cancellation through NTS conducted by an unidentified organisation in one governorate. Clearance dropped sharply. |
| **Average Score** | **5.3** | **5.5** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

**Federal Iraq:**

- Ministry of Environment
- Directorate for Mine Action (DMA)

**Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI):**

- Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

**State:**
- Ministry of Defence
- Ministry of Interior: Civil Defence, EOD Directorate
- Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)
- IKMAA

**NGOs:**
- Health and Social Care Organisation in Iraq (IHSCO)
- Shareteah Humanitarian Organisation (SHO)

**Commercial**:
- Ain Al Saker Demining Company
- Akad International Co. for Mines
- Baghdad for Clearance Organisation
- Al Basrah Demining Organisation
- Al Bayrac Demining Company
- Al Danube
- Al Fahad Co. for Demining
- Al Fayha
- Al Khebra Al Fania Demining Co.
- Al Safsafa
- Alsiraj Almudhia for Mine Removal
- Arabian Gulf Mine Action Co.
- Al Waha
- Al Watania Company for Demining
- AZSC
- Eagle Eye
- Insanyon Organisation for Demining
- Iraq Tadhamon Company for Mine Clearance
- Kanary Mine Action Company
- Nabaa Al-Hurya Company
- Ta'az Demining
- Wtorplast Demining

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- HAMAP-Humanitaire
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

### OTHER ACTORS
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- iMMAP
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Iraq reported a total of 1,632km$^2$ of contamination by AP mines, including improvised mines, at the end of 2024, a marginal decline from the previous end-year estimate of 1,636km$^2$.

**Table 1: AP mined area in Iraq (at end 2024)**[1]

| | CHA (km²) | SHA (km²) | Total area (km²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Federal Iraq | 1,191.8 | 224.1 | 1,415.9 |
| Kurdistan Region of Iraq | 184.0 | 31.8 | 215.8 |
| **Totals** | **1,375.8** | **255.9** | **1,631.7** |

### FEDERAL IRAQ

Legacy minefields make up more than three-quarters of Federal Iraq's mined areas (see Table 2) and while the total extent of contamination edged lower in 2024, significant changes occurred in its composition. The area affected by improvised mines dropped by 28%, reflecting the priority given by international donors to tackling devices placed during Islamic State occupation of large parts of Iraq between 2014 and 2017. Federal Iraq, however, raised its estimate of contamination by legacy AP mines by 12% in 2024.[2]

**Table 2: Mined area in Federal Iraq (at end 2024)**[3]

| Contamination type | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AP mines | 409 | 1,024,619,079 | 41 | 79,263,677 | 1,103,882,756 |
| Improvised mines | 1,225 | 167,204,267 | 469 | 144,815,666 | 312,019,933 |
| **Totals** | **1,634** | **1,191,823,346** | **510** | **224,079,343** | **1,415,902,689** |

1 Article 7 report (covering 2024), pp. 15–37.
2 Ibid., p. 15.
3 Ibid., pp. 15, 20.

Iraq's legacy mines, dating mainly from the Iran-Iraq war, are heavily concentrated in the south, where Basrah governorate alone accounts for nearly three-quarters of the total (see Table 3). But in 2024, surprisingly, the DMA raised its estimate of the legacy mined area in north-central Diyala governorate by more than five times – from 27km² at the end of 2023 to 153km², making it the second most heavily affected governorate.[4]

**Table 3: Legacy AP mined area by governorate in Federal Iraq (at end 2024)[5]**

| Governorate | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anbar | 3 | 32,168 | 0 | 0 | 32,168 |
| Basrah | 86 | 807,387,426 | 1 | 962,731 | 808,350,157 |
| Diyala | 13 | 75,623,111 | 32 | 77,763,309 | 153,386,420 |
| Kirkuk | 2 | 10,113 | 0 | 0 | 10,113 |
| Missan | 240 | 56,285,528 | 3 | 400,183 | 56,685,711 |
| Muthanna | 4 | 38,978,577 | 0 | 0 | 38,978,577 |
| Najaf | 1 | 1,754,329 | 0 | 0 | 1,754,329 |
| Ninewa | 4 | 413,397 | 4 | 132,792 | 546,189 |
| Salah al-Din | 7 | 113,723 | 1 | 4,663 | 118,386 |
| Wassit | 49 | 44,020,709 | 0 | 0 | 44,020,709 |
| **Totals** | **409** | **1,024,619,081** | **41** | **79,263,678** | **1,103,882,759** |

Federal Iraq's estimate of improvised mine contamination of 312km² at the end of 2024 (see Table 4) was 28% lower than the previous year's and nearly half the figure four years earlier. How that result was achieved is less clear. Official data suggests that 84% of the mined area released in 2024 was accounted for by the results of non-technical survey (NTS) in Salah al-Din governorate, an outcome at variance with results reported by international demining organisations.

**Table 4: IED/improvised mine contamination in Federal Iraq (at end 2024)[6]**

| Province | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anbar | 785 | 108,549,986 | 240 | 54,436,378 | 162,986,364 |
| Diyala | 28 | 7,679 | 13 | 69,667,438 | 69,675,117 |
| Kirkuk | 35 | 26,043,598 | 20 | 1,966,479 | 28,010,077 |
| Ninewa | 251 | 19,051,318 | 180 | 17,620,718 | 36,672,036 |
| Salah al-Din | 126 | 13,551,688 | 16 | 1,124,653 | 14,676,341 |
| **Totals** | **1,225** | **167,204,269** | **469** | **144,815,666** | **312,019,935** |

## KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ (KRI)

Mine contamination in the KRI is much smaller than in Federal Iraq but it still ranks among the world's most heavily mined regions. The KRI's overall estimate of mine contamination dropped by less than 1% in 2024, when an increase in the areas confirmed to be affected by legacy and improvised mines was offset by a 45% drop in SHAs.

**Table 5: AP mined area by governorate in the KRI (at end 2024)**

| Province | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Legacy mines** | | | | | |
| Dohuk | 396 | 19,399,933 | 0 | 0 | 19,399,933 |
| Erbil | 326 | 48,443,296 | 0 | 0 | 48,443,296 |

4 Ibid., p. 15.

5 Ibid.

6 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 20.

**Table 5 Continued**

| Province | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Slemani | 2,342 | 123,829,766 | 92 | 16,718,056 | 140,547,822 |
| **Subtotals** | **3,064** | **191,672,995** | **92** | **16,718,056** | **208,391,051** |
| **Improvised mines** | | | | | |
| Duhok | 16 | 3,396,926 | 20 | 725,144 | 4,122,070 |
| Erbil | 2 | 1,756,747 | 0 | 0 | 1,756,747 |
| Slemani | 6 | 8,105 | 0 | 0 | 8,105 |
| **Subtotals** | **24** | **5,161,778** | **20** | **725,144** | **5,886,922** |
| **Grand Totals** | **3,088** | **196,834,773** | **112** | **17,443,200** | **214,277,973** |

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Iraq also has extensive explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination. In Federal Iraq, this includes more than 200km² affected by cluster munition remnants (see *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025*) and a wide array of other unexploded ordnance (UXO), including air-dropped bombs and artillery shells. The KRI reported nearly 42km of ERW-contaminated area at the end of 2023, heavily concentrated in Garmyan governorate.[7]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The mine action programme in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The DMA has represented Iraq internationally and oversees mine action for humanitarian purposes in Federal Iraq, covering 15 of the country's 19 governorates. Mine action in the KRI's four governorates is overseen by IKMAA, which acts as both regulator and operator. The two bodies have functioned largely autonomously in the past, but a memorandum of understanding (MoU) drafted in 2022 to facilitate cooperation between them was signed in May 2024.[8]

The DMA and IKMAA collaborated in drawing up Iraq's draft National Mine Action Strategy 2023–28, the first produced jointly by the two authorities.[9] The strategy sets increasing national ownership as a key objective and says this will be achieved by strengthening both authorities and "ensuring these national entities are empowered, appropriately structured and sufficiently equipped and resourced to allow them to fulfil their responsibilities."[10]

In 2023, the government earmarked 20 billion Iraqi dinars (US$17 million) over three years to support implementation of the CCM[11] but the funding was not disbursed on mine action and appears to have been used by the Ministry of Environment for other projects. The DMA provided no information on funding in 2024.

### FEDERAL IRAQ

The inter-ministerial Higher Committee of Mine Action, which reports to the prime minister, oversees and approves mine action strategy, policies, and plans. The committee, which the prime minister chairs, includes representatives of the ministries of defence, interior, oil, and environment, as well as the National Security Council and IKMAA. The DMA "plans, coordinates, supervises, monitors and follows up all the activities of mine action". It draws up the national strategy and is responsible for setting national standards, accrediting, and approving the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of demining organisations, and certifying completion of clearance tasks.[12]

The DMA's authority over mine action is weakened by its status as a directorate of the Ministry of Environment ranking well below the powerful ministries of defence, interior, and oil, which are major actors in the sector. Its policy making and implementation has also suffered from a rapid turnover of directors. The DMA has had at least 20 directors general since 2003, including three in 2024. All but one were appointed on an acting basis, which also limited their authority.

Shawkat Tayeh Masoud, a former director of operations who had left the DMA in 2022, returned as acting director in September 2023 and retired in January 2025. His replacement, Eaktiffaa Mezher al-Hasnawi, the Deputy Minister of Environment, was reported as proactive and facilitating task order issuance, but was expected to leave the post in the second half of 2025 in order to run in parliamentary elections scheduled for November.

Director General Masoud conducted sweeping DMA management changes and restructuring in 2024. The DMA previously oversaw three Regional Mine Action Centres

7 Email from Niyazi Khalid, Deputy Director, IKMAA, 13 May 2024.

8 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 July 2025.

9 Interview with Ahmed Aljasem, Director of Information Management, DMA, Baghdad, 11 May 2023.

10 Iraq National Mine Action Strategy for 2023–28, p. 36.

11 Interviews with Bakr Sahib Ahmed, Deputy Head, DMA, in Baghdad, 11 May 2023.

12 "Document of roles and responsibilities", undated but 2019, received by email from the DMA, 13 May 2019.

(RMACs) for the North, the Middle Euphrates (MEU) region and the South,[13] but RMAC North and RMAC MEU were closed down in September 2023. RMAC South, located in Basra City, remained as the focal point for Federal Iraq's response to CMR contamination and overseeing mine action in four southern governorates: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar. It collects and uploads results of survey and clearance to Federal Iraq's IMSMA database and is responsible for tasking operators in its area of operations.[14]

The DMA convened only one official coordination meeting in September 2024 with UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) support which was attended by international donors, the ministries of defence and interior, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) (a paramilitary movement), some commercial companies and humanitarian mine action organisations. The meeting did not result in any concrete plans or follow-up action.

The government approved a national strategic plan for 2023–28 in June 2023,[15] which acknowledges the institutional issues, citing a "widespread belief" that the DMA should be strengthened to give it the authority commensurate with its mandate. The plan called for an external assessment of the DMA's legal mandate and institutional position that would provide recommendations to the Higher Council for Mine Action.[16] As of August 2025, the assessment had not been conducted.

The strategic plan calls for strengthened national ownership and more national funding, recognising the dependence on external donor support as a key risk to sustainability of Iraq's mine action programme.[17] To boost the capacity available for mine action the DMA says Iraq's PMF "have accepted to be involved" in mine action. The DMA reported the PMF had their own explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) directorate and a significant workforce in many governorates.[18]

## KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

IKMAA functions as both the regulator and an operator in the KRI. It reports directly to the Kurdistan Regional Government's Council of Ministers and is led by a director general who has ministerial rank. It coordinates four directorates in Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulaymaniyah (Slemani). IKMAA had a total staff of more than 900 personnel in 2024, including 432 in operations, largely unchanged from the previous year, but a budgetary crisis in the KRI in recent years has imposed severe constraints on the mine action sector.[19]

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) opened an additional mine action centre in Halabja governorate with UNMAS support in 2024 in what IKMAA said was a response to heavy explosive ordnance contamination in the area, with a view to accelerating clearance.[20]

## OTHER ACTORS

UNMAS established a presence in Iraq in 2015 to assess the explosive ordnance hazard threat in areas liberated from Islamic State and set three priorities: explosive hazard management to support stabilisation and recovery; delivery of risk education; and technical support to build capacity of government entities to manage, regulate, and coordinate Iraq's response to explosive ordnance contamination. Since 2021, UNMAS has shifted its focus from explosive hazard management to providing technical support to the mine action authorities and their implementing partners. The UNMAS mission in Iraq employed 100 people with 43 international staff in 2019. By the start of 2025, UNMAS had a staff of 23, including three internationals.[21]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

International donors provided most of the funding for mine action in Iraq following the defeat of Islamic State, but priorities have changed. The number of donors funding operations in Iraq through UNMAS has dropped from a peak of 21 in 2019 to 8 in 2024,[22] and the volume of donor funding channelled through UNMAS dropped from its high point of US$77 million in 2019 to around $6 million in 2024.[23] Donors focused aid on clearing areas occupied by Islamic State in western and northern governorates mainly contaminated by improvised mines.[24] Funding cuts by the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) significantly impacted operations by FSD, HALO, and MAG in early 2025, resulting in the loss of a number of clearance teams.[25]

13 RMAC North covered the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah ad-Din; RMAC MEU included Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiya, and Wassit; while RMAC South comprised Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi Qar.

14 Interview with Gus Guthrie, Country Director, NPA, in Geneva, 12 February 2020.

15 Email from Ahmed Aljasem, DMA, 8 August 2023.

16 Iraq National Mine Action Strategy 2023–28, pp. 37–38.

17 Ibid., pp. 17 and 22.

18 Interview with Bakr Sahib Ahmed, DMA, Baghdad, 11 May 2023.

19 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, Planning Manager, IKMAA, 3 May 2023.

20 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 July 2025.

21 Emails from Shinobu Mashima, Programme Team Lead, UNMAS, 4 May 2019, 6 April 2020, 11 May 2023, and 16 May 2025.

22 Interview with Pehr Lodhammar, Chief Mine Action Programme Iraq, UNMAS, in Geneva, 23 June 2023; and emails from Ban Yaseen, Programme Management Specialist, UNMAS, 23 June 2024; and Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 16 May 2025.

23 Emails from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 11 May 2023 and 16 May 2025.

24 Donors funding mine action through UNMAS in 2024 included Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Italy, New Zealand, South Korea, and Sweden. Donors funding operators bilaterally included Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway. and the United States.

25 Emails from Peter Smethers, Country Director FSD, 20 April 2025; Asad Ali Husain, Programme Manager, HALO, 29 May 2025; and Lisa Jean, Country Director, MAG, 1 May 2025.

Iraq negotiated for years over a $400 million UK export credit for demining which the government approved in 2023. The funding was included in a $15 billion trade and investment agreement announced by both governments in January 2025.[26] As of September 2025, the DMA said no agreement had been signed on the draw-down and disbursement of the credit. The DMA reported government funding was provided through expenditure by the ministries of defence, electricity, oil, transport, water resources and construction, and housing and municipalities, but provided no details. It said no funding was available in 2024 for survey or clearance of Iraq's legacy minefields.[27]

IKMAA did not receive any funding from Iraq's federal budget in 2024 and said it did not expect any in 2025. Since 2022, it has received support from Slovenia which provided €165,000 through ITF Enhancing Human Security in 2024, financing the hire of vehicles used to deploy deminers. This was the only funding from international donors. IKMAA has received ID 750 million (approximately US$569,000) from the KRG for vehicle rentals in 2024 and 2025.[28]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Iraq's 2023–28 strategic plan recognises that the impact of contamination varies according to gender, age, and ethnic or religious affiliations, and requires specific activities targeting those needs, for which disaggregated data is a prerequisite.[29] Gender issues became politically sensitive in 2023 amid heated public debate over LGBTQ issues, which led the DMA to drop reference to gender mainstreaming and saw the Communications and Media Commission issue a directive in August 2023 banning use of the term "gender" in public communications.[30]

Amendments to a Personal Status Law in 2025 drew criticism as a setback for women's rights but the government has supported women's employment through a National Strategy for Iraqi Women 2023–30 focused on improving workplace conditions for women and a 2023 Social Security Law providing maternity benefits intended to encourage women's workforce participation but conservative societal norms, particularly in the south, keep female employment low.[31] UNMAS conducted workshops in Baghdad and Erbil on the role of women in mine action in 2024, which drew participation by official from the DMA, IKMAA and the Ministry of Interior as well as from national and international NGOs.[32] IKMAA says it is committed to gender mainstreaming in mine action and employs a number of women in technical roles such as information management, risk education, and community liaison. It reports that plans for creating an all-female operational team remains a priority but face challenges from social norms and practical constraints on training and accommodation for women and career development opportunities.[33]

Women's employment in mine action as a percentage of the total declined to 17% in 2024 from 19% a year earlier (see Table 6). Among demining NGOs the number of female staff fell in line with the decline in overall staffing but edged up in percentage terms, accounting for 21% of their staffing in 2024, up from 19% a year earlier, and with a percentage point increase in the number of women in operations. National operator Shahreteah Humanitarian Organisation (SHO) led the sector with women making up close to 40% of its total and operations staff, reporting it reannounced vacancies to attract qualifies men and provided tailored training to help women advance to leadership roles.[34]

International operators reported continuing efforts to engage and retain more women in the face of some resistance from conservative social norms. HALO provided childcare support for all female staff with children, helping to ensure they were able to stay in full-time employment.[35] MAG increased the number of women in leadership positions and for the first time had three national women staff in its senior management team. It introduced new recruitment SOPs in 2024 to facilitate entry of under-represented groups and addresses religious diversity by accommodating observances of Christian, Yazidi, and Muslim staff as well as providing separate rest areas for men and women.[36] NPA has increased outreach and advocacy to local communities and stakeholders to meet the enduring challenge to recruiting women in socially conservative communities and in had a gender focal point position to promote mainstreaming in a position funded until 2025. Of a total workforce of 493 in Iraq at the end of 2024, it employed 114 women.[37]

26 J. Lee, "UK, Iraq announce$15 billion trade and investment partnership", *Iraq Business News*, 15 January 2025.

27 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 15 September 2025.

28 Emails from Niyazi Khalid, Deputy Head of IKMAA, 15 April and 13 May 2024, 31 July and 30 September 2025.

29 Iraq National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2028, p. 15.

30 T. Alkuhadry, "As Iraq backslides on gender equality where are its women MPs?", *Al Jazeera*, 9 September 2023.

31 Emails from Safa Jamal, Senior Officer – Programme Management, UNMAS, 27 May 2024; and Chimwemwe Tembo, Programme Manager, NPA, and Chris Ramsden, Deputy Programme Manager, South Iraq, NPA, 27 April 2025.

32 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 16 May 2024.

33 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 July 2025.

34 Email from Ismat Selevany, Director, SHO, 12 May 2025.

35 Email from Asad Ali Husain, HALO, 29 May 2025.

36 Email from Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025.

37 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025.

Table 6: Gender composition of operators in 2024[38]

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operations staff | Women operations staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FSD | 86 | 9 (10%) | 20 | 0 (0%) | 77 | 7 (9%) |
| HALO | 73 | 14 (19%) | 8 | 5 (63%) | 49 | 6 (12%) |
| HI | 68 | 18 (26%) | 11 | 1 (9%) | 57 | 17 (30%) |
| IHSCO | 56 | 18 (32%) | 13 | 3 (23%) | 46 | 5 (11%) |
| IKMAA | 991 | 123 (12%) | 15 | 10 (67%) | 623 | 9 (1%) |
| MAG | 519 | 67 (13%) | 88 | 7 (8%) | 449 | 48 (11%) |
| NPA | 493 | 114 (23%) | 103 | 13 (13%) | 382 | 78 (20%) |
| SHO | 137 | 54 (39%) | 12 | 3 (25%) | 88 | 33 (38%) |
| **Totals** | **2,423** | **417 (17%)** | **270** | **42 (16%)** | **1,771** | **203 (11%)** |

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Iraq does not have a policy on environmental management in mine action. The DMA and IKMAA were reportedly in the process of preparing a national mine action standard (NMAS) in 2022 but had not released it by August 2025. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Ministry of Environment conducted a workshop in 2024 to develop approaches to environmental management in mine action, which also discussed adding environmental factors as criteria in its task prioritisation matrix.[39]

IKMAA, in line with policies of the KRG cabinet's Environment Board, said it seeks to minimise any environmental harm from demining operations, aligns its procedures with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS 07.13) and integrates principles promoted by UNMAS and the GICHD. Pre-clearance task assessments take account of environmental factors; operations prioritise manual or low-impact mechanical clearance; and teams are trained to dispose of explosive remnants and waste in environmentally safe ways. IKMAA reports it also coordinates with local authorities and landowners on post-clearance land use and rehabilitation.[40]

Demining organisations mostly apply their own SOPs for managing the environment and minimising harm from operations. NPA appointed an environmental advisor for the Iraq programme in August 2024 to develop the organisation's global environmental policy and the in-country approaches to environmental management, including an IMAS-aligned SOP for land release operations. NPA's measures include on-site environmental impact assessments starting in 2025; minimising machinery use and restricting movement to defined areas to limit soil disturbance; and enhancing waste management at operational sites.[41]

Iraq ranks among the five most vulnerable nations to effects of climate change, including drought, water scarcity, flash floods, frequent sand and dust storms, and extreme heat, all of which pose a growing operational challenge.[42] In the KRI, IKMAA said it had not formally adopted climate resilience measures but planning increasingly had to take account of extreme weather events, including flooding, forest fires, and damage to infrastructure, and it said it was exploring mitigation strategies, including early warning systems.[43] Operators increasingly factoring climate impacts into operational planning, including by adapting working hours to deal with extreme heat and drawing up sandstorm contingency plans that may pause operations in conditions of reduced visibility.[44]

38 Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 20 April 2025; Asad Ali Husain, HALO, 29 May 2025; Roger Eid, Chief of Operations, HI, 20 May 2025; IHSCO, 11 June 2025; Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 July 2025; Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025; Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025; and Ismat Selevany, SHO, 12 May 2025.

39 Email from Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025; and Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 4 May 2025.

40 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 July 2025.

41 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025.

42 Emails from Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025; and Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 16 May 2025.

43 Emails from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 13 May 2024 and 31 July 2025.

44 Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 20 April 2025; Asad Ali Husain, Programme Manager, HALO, 29 May 2025; Roger Reid, HI, 20 May 2025; Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025; Roger Eid, HI, 20 May 2025; and Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The DMA and IKMAA have separate databases which operate different information management systems. The DMA database is located at its Baghdad headquarters. It operates IMSMA New Generation but in 2022 started preparing to upgrade to IMSMA Core with support from the GICHD and iMMAP, a commercial service provider working under contract to PM/WRA. It installed an IMSMA Core server in December 2022, started field testing reporting forms in 2023, and was due to launch the system by December 2023.[45] In March 2024, however, the DMA informed the GICHD it had decided to halt the upgrade and continue working with IMSMA NG before reversing that decision later in the year.

The policy flip-flop added to concerns about an information management system which implementing partners say suffers from significant data gaps and long delays uploading operating results. This means that the database is not up to date, does not accurately reflect the results of survey or clearance, and can also delay issuance of task orders. The DMA attributes delays to the need to correct reporting errors and apply quality control.[46] Implementing partners point to cumbersome procedures that require them to submit operational data in hard copy and on CD-ROMs to be uploaded manually into the database.[47] Data verification and correction can add further significant delays.[48]

The limited number and high turnover of the DMA's data processing staff has further contributed to the DMA's information management challenges. In 2023, iMMAP reduced the number of its staff working in the DMA from five to two,[49] and in August 2024 the PM/WRA stopped funding iMMAP's support.[50]

IKMAA previously operated an IMSMA New Generation Version 6 database but with funding from PM/WRA and technical support from iMMAP it has replaced it with a tailor-made Open-Source database for Mine Action (OSMA) database using open-source software, including PostgreSQL and PHP, which went into operation in 2024. The new system's GIS capabilities also allow it to display and analyse spatial data related to contaminated areas, clearance efforts, and field reports.[51]

Operators said IKMAA has provided them with accounts that would permit direct entry of their operating results and the system would include dashboards facilitating dissemination of data. IKMAA conducted a workshop in August 2024 providing operators with training in use of the system and reviewing and updating reporting formats and procedures. IKMAA said active involvement of implementing partners in data entry improved accuracy and accountability. IKMAA's quality assurance staff also have unrestricted access to all survey forms, task records, and supporting documentation.[52]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Iraq's National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2028, officially approved in July 2023, sets broad goals for both the DMA and IKMAA, the first time the two authorities have cooperated in drawing up a national plan.[53] These include as a strategic priority the development of "a prioritisation system based on clear and transparent criteria" to inform all planning and tasking decisions. The DMA and IKMAA signed a Memorandum of Understanding in May 2024 designed to strengthen coordination of clearance, EORE and victim assistance.[54]

Issuance of task orders in Federal Iraq remained a source of significant frustration among operators, who cited DMA senior management changes leading to policy and procedural changes. The DMA ruled in 2023 that operators who conducted NTS could not apply for clearance of the same task unless they were the only organisation operational in that area or conducted a joint visit to it with the DMA. Joint visits, however, proved difficult and slow to arrange due to the DMA's lack of budget for such activities. Additionally, as part of its planning for use of UK export finance, the DMA froze access to a significant proportion of the hazardous areas recorded in IMSMA in 2024 which left operators having to apply for lower priority tasks.[55]

Administrative procedures generally proved time consuming and unpredictable. Although some operators reported improvements in issuance of visas to international staff and permits for importing equipment, others experienced delays that held up project planning and implementation.[56]

45 Statement of Iraq, CCM Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2023.
46 Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, RMAC South, DMA, in Basrah, 8 May 2023.
47 Interviews with mine action operators in Iraq, 7–20 May 2023.
48 NPA reported receiving a request in 2022 to verify data relating to a task completed in 2019.
49 Interviews with Clare Pritchard, Country Representative, iMMAP, in Erbil, 15 May 2023, and in Geneva, 1 May 2024.
50 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025.
Email from Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025.
51 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 13 May 2024; Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 40–42.
52 Emails from Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025 and Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 July 2025.
53 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 15 April 2022.
54 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 May 2025.
55 Emails from implementing partners, April-July, 2025.
56 Emails from Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025; and Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Federal Iraq started working with UNMAS in 2021 on updating the NMAS on mine and battle area clearance (BAC), NTS, and technical survey (TS). The standards were written in 2004–05 and existed in Arabic only. Since 2021, 23 of the 35 NMAS have been revised, approved by the Ministry of Environment, and officially released. Some of the revised standards are reportedly only available in Arabic.

A workshop on NMAS organised by UNMAS with the DMA and IKMAA in Erbil in 2024 reviewed and updated 11 standards. These included the NMAS on NTS, TS, manual clearance, BAC, building clearance, IEDs, mechanical clearance, marking and accreditation.[57] The DMA said a total of 26 standards have been updated.[58]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Federal Iraq has not provided details of mine action capacity deployed by the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior (Civil Defence and the Directorate for Explosives Control), the PMF, and the commercial companies contracted by the Ministry of Oil. In 2023, the DMA reported 28 commercial companies were accredited for demining and IKMAA accredited seven companies for clearance, but it was unclear how many were active.[59] IKMAA continued to employ 35 manual demining teams in 2024 but expressed concern that it will lose experienced labour in the coming years as many of its deminers are approaching retirement age.[60]

International and national demining NGOs deployed more manual demining teams in 2024 but the number of deminers dropped 10% and faced further reductions in 2025 as a result of PM/WRA and other donor funding cuts and the resulting loss of some operators. DRC ceased operating at the end of July 2024 and finally closed its Basrah programme in April 2025.[61] FSD, after receiving a stop work order from the PM/WRA in January 2025, issued termination notices to its national staff at the end of February 2025 and suspended all operations at the end of April 2025.[62] The HALO Trust retained three demining teams but the number of personnel employed in them dropped from 24 to 14. Its PM/WRA-funded teams ceased operations in March 2025, but it resumed work with reduced capacity later in the year with Dutch funding.[63] Humanity & Inclusion (HI), which like HALO is operating in Salah al-Din governorate, worked with two clearance teams funded until the end of March 2026. HI acquired 25 drones to support survey and mapping but found their operational roll-out held up by lengthy import procedures and complex approval processes applied by national and regional authorities.[64] NPA worked with 19 demining teams and 130 deminers in 2024, down from 27 teams and 144 deminers in 2023.[65]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG), the only NGO working in both Federal Iraq and the KRI, operated a total of 19 manual clearance teams with 191 deminers in 2024 (see Table 7), down from 30 manual teams with 214 deminers the previous year. For greater operational efficiency, MAG merged two bases serving Tel Afar district of Ninewa into a single base and in the KRI closed a base in Dohuk governorate. MAG's mechanical resources expanded with the acquisition of an excavator and eight other vehicles under a Right of Use agreement with UNMAS. As part of a programme of developing national capacity and programme sustainability, MAG nationalised a number of management positions, including those of the technical field manager and managers of finance, logistics and human resources.[66]

MAG trialled Vallon VMR 3G Dual Sensor detectors which employ ground penetrating radar with positive results particularly in detecting the sub-surface plastic main charges of improvised mines. With support from the US Department of Defense's Humanitarian Mine Action Program, MAG also introduced a Hydro-Magnet which it planned to deploy after developing SOPs for use in areas of high metal contamination.[67]

**Table 7: Operational clearance capacities deployed in Iraq in 2024**[68]

| Operator | Manual teams | Total deminers | Dogs and handlers | Machines/ personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IKMAA | 35 | 350 | 0/0 | 6/34 | Also 4 EOD teams with 16 technicians, and 5 NTS teams with 13 staff. |

57 Email from Shinobu Mashima, Programme Team Lead, UNMAS, 16 May 2025.

58 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 38.

59 Email from Ahmed Aljasem, DMA, 6 June 2023 and Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 July 2025.

60 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 July 2025.

61 Emails from Mohammed Qassim Abdulridha, Basrah Manager, DRC, 23 March and 14 May 2025.

62 Interview with Peter Smethers, FSD, in Geneva 11 April 2025 and emails, 20 April and 22 August 2025.

63 Email from Asad Ali Hussain, Programme Manager, HALO, 29 May 2025.

64 Emails from Roger Eid, HI, 20 May and 16 September 2025.

65 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025.

66 Email from Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025.

67 Ibid.

68 Emails from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 July 2025; Peter Smethers, FSD, 20 April 2025; Asad Ali Hussain, HALO, 29 May 2025; Roger Eid, HI, 20 May 2025; Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025; Khalid Ahmed, Project Manager, IHSCO, 11 June 2025; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 16 April 2025; Ismat Selevany, SHO, 12 May 2025.

**Table 7 Continued**

| Operator | Manual teams | Total deminers | Dogs and handlers | Machines/ personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FSD | 7 | 42 | 0/0 | 0 | Also one 4-person NTS team and one community liaison team. |
| HALO | 3 | 14 | 0/0 | 3/14 | |
| HI | 2 | 14 | 0/0 | 0/0 | Multi-task teams conducting NTS, TS clearance and EOD |
| IHSCO | 4 | 16 | 0/0 | 1/7 | |
| MAG (Federal Iraq) | 13 | 136 | 6/4 | 3/12 | |
| MAG (KRI) | 6 | 55 | 4/4 | 1/9 | |
| NPA | 19 | 130 | 5/10 | 9/9 | |
| SHO | 8 | 48 | 0/0 | 2/10 | |
| **Totals** | **97** | **805** | **15/18** | **25/95** | |

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 8: Summary of land release outputs in 2024 (official data)[69]**

| | Release in 2024 (km²) | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Release of AP mined area** | **Federal Iraq** | **KRI** | **Comments** |
| **Clearance** | 7.48 | 1.88 | |
| **Technical survey** | 11.08 | 0.8 | |
| **Non-technical survey** | 128.31 | 0 | |
| **AP mines destroyed during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **Federal Iraq** | **KRI** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 11,200 | 3,444 | including 1,089 AP and improvised mines destroyed in spot tasks. |

Federal Iraq and the KRI reported release of a total of 150km$^2$ in 2024, up from the 146km$^2$ they reported in 2023, but the reliability of this result is open to question. Federal Iraq reported it released almost 146.9km$^2$, slightly more than in 2023, but it attributed 84% of the total to cancellation through NTS in one governorate, Diyala, and official data differed significantly from humanitarian operators' results. The KRI said it released a total of 2.1km$^2$, 43% more than in 2023.[70]

Federal Iraq and the KRI combined destroyed 14,644 AP mines, 12% less than in the previous year. In Federal Iraq, the army is responsible for all mine destruction and humanitarian demining operators reported on 16 mines destroyed as a result of spot tasks. MAG destroyed 55 legacy mines in the KRI's Slemani governorate.[71] The KRI reported destroying 1,015 AP mines and three improvised mines in EOD tasks.[72]

69 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 21–37; email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 30 September 2025.

70 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 24 and 37.

71 Email from Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025.

72 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 30 September 2025.

## FEDERAL IRAQ

The focus of Federal Iraq's mine action in 2024 remained on areas contaminated by improvised mines concentrated in western and northern governorates, reflecting the priority of international donors. The DMA has sought to attract funding for survey and clearance in the south where legacy mine contamination is concentrated and the government is pursuing major infrastructure development projects but land release of areas affected by legacy mines dropped 40% in 2024.[73]

**Table 9: Federal Iraq land release results for 2024 (official data)[74]**

| Device type | Area cancelled (m²) | Area reduced (m²) | Area cleared (m²) | Total area released (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Legacy AP mines | 0 | 11,084,354 | 2,470,987 | 13,555,341 |
| Improvised mines | 128,312,887 | 0 | 5,006,498 | 133,319,387 |
| **Totals** | **128,312,887** | **11,084,354** | **7,477,485** | **146,874,728** |

## SURVEY IN 2024

Official data suggests a 10% rise in the total area released through survey amounting to 139km² in 2024 (see Table 9) but major inconsistencies between official and operator results create uncertainty about the outcomes. The DMA reported that NTS in Diyala by an unidentified operator resulted in cancellation of 122.8km². The area cancelled by all other operators amounted to 5.6km², according to official figures. Demining NGOs, however, reported cancelling 15.3km², mostly in Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din (see Table 10).[75]

The DMA also reported that release through TS amounting to 11.08km² occurred only in legacy mined areas in the south, more than 80% of it by the military in Basrah governorate. NGO's recorded reducing 14.7km² of areas affected by improvised mines in the centre and north, roughly two-thirds of it conducted by NPA in Anbar governorate.[76]

**Table 10: Release of mined area through survey in 2024 (NGO data)[77]**

| Operator | Governorate | Area cancelled (m²) | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| FSD | Ninewa, Kirkuk | 0 | 2,451,447 |
| HALO | Salah-al-Din | 3,275,522 | 904, 698 |
| HI | Salah-al-Din | 0 | 863,525 |
| MAG | Ninewa | 4,444,729 | 778,899 |
| NPA | Anbar | 7,529,642 | 10,084,835 |
| SHO | Ninewa | 18,899 | 482,686 |
| **Totals** | | **15,268,792** | **14,661,392** |

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

Similar discrepancies overshadow the reporting on clearance. The DMA recorded clearance of 5km² of improvised mined area in 2024, little more than one third of the 13.5km² cleared the previous year (see table 11). It also reported clearance of legacy mines covering 2.5km², mostly (83%) in Missan governorate, down from 3km² in 2023. The DMA does not identify which organisations conduct clearance but the absence of donor funding for legacy mine clearance by humanitarian demining organisations in Federal Iraq means it is conducted by the military, civil defence, or the PMF (or by commercial companies).

**Table 11: Mine clearance in Federal Iraq in 2024 (official data)[78]**

| Improvised mine clearance | Area (m²) | Improvised mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|
| Anbar | 1,730,255 | 2,182 |
| Kirkuk | 384,702 | 62 |

73 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 24.

74 Ibid., pp. 24 and 37.

75 Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 20 April 2025; Asad Ali Hussain, HALO, 29 May 2025; Roger Eid, HI, 20 May 2025; Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025; Khalid Ahmed, Project Manager, IHSCO, 11 June 2025; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 16 April 2025; and Ismat Selevany, SHO, 12 May 2025.

76 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 16 April 2025.

77 Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 20 April 2025; Asad Ali Hussain, HALO, 29 May 2025; Roger Eid, HI, 20 May 2025; Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025; Khalid Ahmed, Project Manager, IHSCO, 11 June 2025; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 16 April 2025; and Ismat Selevany, SHO, 12 May 2025.

78 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 24 and 37.

**Table 11 Continued**

| Improvised mine clearance | Area (m²) | Improvised mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|
| Ninewa | 1,894,334 | 1,728 |
| Salah al-Din | 997,207 | 2,135 |
| **Subtotals** | **5,006,498** | **6,107** |
| **Legacy mine clearance** | **Area (m²)** | **AP mines destroyed** |
| Basrah | 391,347 | 4,119 |
| Diyala | 8,431 | 0 |
| Missan | 2,057,288 | 974 |
| Salah al-Din | 13,921 | 0 |
| **Subtotals** | **2,470,987** | **5,093** |
| **Totals** | **7,477,485** | **11,200** |

NGOs, working almost entirely on clearance of improvised mines in Federal Iraq, reported clearing 7.6km² (see Table 11), 15% less than the 8.9km² they reported clearing in the previous year, but this was still 50% more than the total reported by DMA. NGOs also reported their clearance resulted in destruction of 8,733 improvised mines, marginally more than the DMA recorded (8,698) and also a slight increase from the 8,551 they reported clearing in 2023.[79]

**Table 12: Mine clearance in Federal Iraq in 2024 (NGO data)[80]**

| Operator | Governorate | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed (including improvised mines) | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DRC | Basrah | 47,013 | 4 | 0 |
| FSD | Ninewa, Kirkuk | 1,350,890 | 648 | 237 |
| HALO | Salah-al-Din | 900, 221 | 3,077 | 1,995 |
| HI | Salah-al-Din | 1,204,330 | 1,162 | 17 |
| IHSCO | Ninewa | 118,729 | 807 | 0 |
| MAG | Ninewa | 1,915,962 | 407 | 194 |
| NPA | Anbar | 1,656,230 | 2,459 | 160 |
| SHO | Ninewa | 1,275,210 | 169 | 2,766 |
| **Totals** | | **7,568,364** | **8,733** | **5,369** |

## KRI

The KRI said it released 43% more mined area through reduction and clearance in 2024 compared with the previous year, notably increasing output in Slemani governorate, but the number of mines destroyed dropped by more than 20% to 2,411 (see Table 14).

IKMAA does not conduct NTS and reported area reduction through TS of 0.8km² in 2024 (see Table 13), more than double the area reduced in 2023. Operations focused on Slemani governorate, which accounted for 87% of the total.

**Table 13: Area released through survey in KRI in 2024[81]**

| Governorate | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|
| Duhok | 53,937 |
| Erbil | 47,158 |
| Slemani | 662,534 |
| **Total** | **763,629** |

79 Emails from Mohammed Qassim Abdulridha, HMA Project manager, DRC, 14 May 2025; Peter Smethers, FSD, 20 April 2025; Asad Ali Hussain, HALO, 29 May 2025; Roger Eid, HI, 20 May 2025; Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025; Khalid Ahmed, Project Manager, IHSCO, 11 June 2025; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 16 April 2025; and Ismat Selevany, SHO, 12 May 2025.

80 Emails from Mohammed Qassim Abdulridha, HMA Project manager, DRC, 14 May 2025; Peter Smethers, FSD, 20 April 2025; Asad Ali Hussain, HALO, 29 May 2025; Roger Eid, HI, 20 May 2025; Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025; Khalid Ahmed, Project Manager, IHSCO, 11 June 2025; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 16 April 2025; and Ismat Selevany, SHO, 12 May 2025.

81 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 25.

IKMAA does not appear to have cleared any areas contaminated by improvised mines in 2024 but maintained its clearance of legacy mined areas. However, land release data also showed discrepancies between official and NGO results. MAG, the only international NGO working in the KRI, reported clearing 347,748m² and destroying 66 AP mines in Dohuk in 2024, more than double the area IKMAA recorded in that governorate.[82]

**Table 14: Legacy AP mine clearance in KRI in 2024 (official data)[83]**

| Region | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|
| Dohuk | 174,497 | 95 |
| Erbil | 377,643 | 681 |
| Slemani | 1,331,030 | 1,635 |
| **Totals** | **1,883,170** | **2,411** |

## DEMINER SAFETY

An IHSCO deminer was killed in Tel-Kaif district of Ninewa governorate on 30 April 2024 as he was conducting render-safe procedures on a known type of improvised mine. The accident led DMA to suspend all IHSCO operations. After the accident, IHSCO conducted refresher training of its staff.[84]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR IRAQ: 1 FEBRUARY 2008

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2018

↓

**FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10 YEARS): 1 FEBRUARY 2028**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2017), Iraq is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2028. Iraq will not meet the deadline given the scale of remaining contamination and the resources available to mine action.

Donor support for Iraq, an oil exporting nation, was shrinking even before the overseas aid cuts announced by the Trump administration in 2025. One international operator, DRC, ceased work in 2024; a second, FSD, ceased work in 2025; and the future of some others looked uncertain. As a result, Iraq's prospects for progress in mine action increasingly depend on national funding and resources. Iraq has nascent humanitarian demining NGOs but no mechanism for government to fund them.

Iraq has significant national demining capacity available from the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior's Civil Defence, the Popular Mobilisation Forces and commercial companies contacted by the Ministry of Oil but it provides minimal information on what they do and no transparency on either government budget support for mine action or DMA plans for spending it.

**Table 15: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 9.4 |
| 2023 | *14.4 |
| 2022 | *17.0 |
| 2021 | 11.6 |
| 2020 | 7.7 |
| **Total** | **60.1** |

*Mine Action Review estimate.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Iraq's 2023–28 national strategy commits to "develop a strategy on the management of residual contamination, specifying appropriate processes, roles and responsibilities, in line with Oslo Action Plan's Action #26" but says it would be developed by 2025.[85] Iraqi Security Forces and the Ministry of Interior's Civil Defence are well placed to provide a long-term demining and EOD capacity but no further action on developing the strategy was reported in 2024.

82 Email from Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025.

83 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 30 September 2025.

84 Emails from Khalid Amed, IHSCO, 11 June 2025; and Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 16 May 2025.

85 Iraq National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2028, pp. 23, 26.

# MALI



## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009 (deadline expired)

New extended deadline needed to assess extent of Article 5 obligations and ensure compliance

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Light, but extent unknown

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Not reported | Not reported |
| Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |
| Non-Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Not reported | Not reported |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Military Engineering Directorate EOD teams

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Efforts to establish a Mine Action Unit within the National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLPAL) were not successful in 2024, although institutional progress has been made. The draft proposal was expected to be adopted by the Council of Ministers by the end of August, but has not been approved as at early September 2025. For the first time since 2005, Mali submitted an Article 7 report in 2024, acknowledging contamination from improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including mines of an improvised nature, and explosive remnants of war (ERW). At the June 2025 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) intersessional meetings, Mali announced plans to submit an Article 5 deadline extension request by March 2026, which is a positive development.

The military coups in 2020 and 2021, followed by a reshuffling of Mali's regional and international alliances, led to the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2023 and an end to United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) peacekeeping operations after a decade operating in the country. At the request of Mali, UNMAS returned in October 2024, but was forced to shut down in April 2025 due to lack of funding. Since MINUSMA's exit, only the Malian Armed Forces' explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams have been authorised to detect and neutralise explosive threats. Amid escalating conflict, humanitarian actors are prohibited from conducting non-technical survey (NTS) or clearance and are limited to community liaison, ERW marking (when security permits), risk education, and victim assistance.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Mali should follow through on its plans and seek a new Article 5 deadline in order to return to compliance with the APMBC.**
- **Mali should proceed with establishing a national mine action authority (NMAA) and a national structure to coordinate mine action operations.**

- **Mali should resume operation of its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and ensure systematic collection of data and reporting on explosive ordnance incidents and casualties, disaggregating anti-personnel (AP) mines of an improvised nature from other types of improvised explosive devices. An improvised anti-vehicle (AV) mine sensitive enough to be detonated by a person should be recorded as an improvised AP mine.**
- **When circumstances allow, Mali should develop a civilian mine clearance capacity in addition to the military counter-IED operations.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No NMAA, but the Permanent Secretary of the National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons ("Commission National de Lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères et Petits Calibres", CNLPAL) has been acting as national focal point for mine action.
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations Coordination Centre (CCO-NEDEX) at the Military Engineering Directorate.

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Military Engineering Directorate EOD teams, part of the Malian armed forces (Forces Armées Maliennes, FAMa).
- National Police units (intervention teams for metropolitan areas and urban centres)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- International non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in community liaison, risk education and/or victim assistance include DanChurchAid (DCA), which also leads the Working Group; Humanity & Inclusion (HI); Mines Advisory Group (MAG).
- National NGOs engaged in similar activities include Association d'Appui aux Populations Rurales du Mali (AAPPOR); Association Jeunesse et Développement du Mali (ADJM); Association Malienne pour La Survie au Sahel (AMSS); AVENIR; and TASSAGHT.
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) (from October 2024 to April 2025)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mine contamination in Mali is not known. In its Article 7 reports submitted in 2024 and 2025, Mali stated that no conventional mines have been laid on its territory and no minefields are under its jurisdiction or control. Nevertheless, it acknowledged that, while it lacks information on the number and size of mined areas, as well as the exact number and type of mines present, it is aware that Bandiagara, Menaka, Mopti (specifically the Bankass Cercle and Koro), Nara, and Sikasso are among the areas most affected by explosive ordnance contamination. In its 2025 Article 7 report, Mali also identified Djenne (Mopti region) and Yorosso (Sikasso region) as impacted areas.[1]

A decade of conflict between multiple armed actors and deepening political turmoil has left Mali facing a rising threat from IEDs.[2] The upsurge in conflict since 2012 initially resulted in use of AV mines by non-State armed groups (NSAG) and later in use of IEDs, including many that are victim-activated and qualify as AP mines under the APMBC. IEDs are planted along roads and near villages, targeting security forces, especially the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their bilateral partner, but with serious consequences also for the civilian population. Mali experienced persistent conflict throughout 2024, and violence escalated sharply in early 2025.[3] In June 2025 alone, an al-Qaeda affiliate emplaced many IEDs and conducted drone strikes in Kidal, Mopti, Koulikoro, and Segou. Another NSAG reportedly used landmines and ambushed a military convoy in the Kidal region, with the assault supported by airstrikes.[4]

Contamination is believed to be scattered and sparse, and community liaison activities have not identified any minefields. The threat has, though, increased steadily, particularly in the central and northern regions, and the problem is gradually spreading towards the south and west of the country.[5] Limited capacity to conduct technical investigations—such as post-blast analysis, device examination, or detailed risk mapping—makes it difficult to accurately assess the full scale of contamination. While some incidents are still caused by ERW, especially in former conflict zones, data from 2024 indicate that most accidents and casualties are now linked to improvised mines.[6]

1 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form C, p. 7; and Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form C, p. 4.

2 Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.

3 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025, "Mali: Events of 2024", at: https://bit.ly/41kZbat.

4 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Africa Overview: July 2025, "Mali: A violent transition takes place as Africa Corps replaces the Wagner Group", at: https://bit.ly/4lcBsjL.

5 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, CNLPAL, 4 July 2025.

6 Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, Humanitarian Mine Action Programme Manager, DCA, 25 June 2025.

UNMAS was able to produce an explosive threat overview for 2024, as well as for January and February 2025. However, it noted that unlike in previous years—when data was collected in coordination with national defence and security forces and MINUSMA—the 2024 figures are based exclusively on secondary sources. These were consolidated with the support of DanChurchAid (DCA), which currently leads the Mine Action Working Group. The secondary sources include members of the Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group (GT-LAMH), the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and international NGOs specialised in conflict analysis.[7]

In total, 333 incidents were recorded in 2024, across 15 regions (see Table 1), including so-called "finds" (cases in which IEDs, ERWs, or mines were discovered and safely disposed of by the defence and security forces). This marks a 67% increase compared to 2023, when 199 incidents were recorded. These incidents resulted in 351 victims, with the majority reported in Bandiagara, Mopti and Segou regions.[8] UNMAS and DCA cautioned that, given the current circumstances, many incidents likely went unreported. They acknowledged that the data capture only a fraction of cases, resulting in incomplete and approximate reporting. They were also unable to disaggregate the data by type of devices.[9] Between 2013 and 2023, UNMAS recorded a total of 1,630 IEDs incidents that killed 1,132 and injured 2,556 others.[10]

**Table 1: Explosive ordnance incidents by region in 2024[11]**

| Regions | No. of incidents recorded |
|---|---|
| Bandiagara | 74 |
| Dioila | 2 |
| Douentza | 13 |
| Gao | 14 |
| Kidal | 26 |
| Koulikoro | 3 |
| Koutiala | 9 |
| Ménaka | 3 |
| Mopti | 37 |
| Nara | 31 |
| Nioro | 8 |
| San | 11 |
| Ségou | 70 |
| Sikasso | 6 |
| Tombouctou | 26 |
| **Total** | **333** |

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Mali is also contaminated by ERW, although the exact extent remains unknown.[12] Airstrikes and artillery fire have led to contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) across the north, centre, and south of the country. Items include hand grenades, mortars, rockets, shells, and aircraft bombs.[13]

The number of incidents involving IEDs and improvised mines surpasses those involving ERW.[14] Between 2013 and 2023, UNMAS recorded 357 civilian victims of ERW, including 11 (five civilians killed and six other injured) in the first half of 2023. In addition to supporting MINUSMA peacekeepers with IED threat mitigation and clearance, UNMAS reported destruction of 16,691 items of ERW and 112,127 small arms and light weapons (SALW) in collaboration with national authorities.[15]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Although the government agreed in principle several years ago to establish a Mine Action Unit (*Unité en charge de la lutte antimines*) within the CNLPAL, its formalisation is still pending. In the meantime, the Permanent Secretary—serving as the National Focal Point on Mine Action—has made progress. Over the past year, all relevant ministries have agreed on the text of the draft law for the creation of the Mine Action Unit within the Commission.[16] The text was under review at the Interministerial Meeting and was expected to be adopted by the Council of Ministers before the end of August 2025. However, it was not approved as at early September.[17]

Until now, the CNLPAL has lacked a clear mandate, resources, and capacities to coordinate mine action. According to the Permanent Secretary, the Mine Action Unit will be tasked with defining and implementing a mine action

7 Email from Iveta Havlickova, Chief of the Mine Action Programme in Mali, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

8 Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form I, p. 11; email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025; and Presentation of Mali, UN National Directors Meeting (NDM-UN28), Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.

9 Online interview with Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 27 March 2025.

10 UNMAS Mali Explosive Threat Overview, 30 July 2023.

11 Emails from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025; and Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.

12 Article 7 Report (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form J, p. 16.

13 Landmine Monitor, "Mali", accessed 1 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/40LZA5J.

14 Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.

15 UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4bJSeSJ.

16 Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

17 Emails from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 4 July and 10 September 2025.

strategy and work plan, as well as coordinating operations, thereby assuming the role that UNMAS had played for several years. The unit will be composed of personnel for risk education, victim assistance, information management, reporting, and operational accreditation. Operationally, it will focus on risk education and victim assistance.[18]

Mali is seeking to strengthen regional cooperation on mine action with Burkina Faso and Niger. While efforts are underway in Mali, Burkina Faso has made much greater progress, with a mandated National Commission, a National Demining Training Centre, and a 2023–2027 counter-IED strategy, and it has already submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request to December 2028, supported by a work plan and 30% national funding.[19]

UNMAS, which had operated for ten years under MINUSMA's mandate and closed operations following the UN Security Council's decision to terminate MINUSMA at the request of Mali's Transitional Government,[20] returned to Mali in October 2024 under US Agency of International Development (USAID) funding to further assist CNLPAL on mine action. Its mandate covered capacity building and support to national authorities; leading the GT-LAMH within the Protection Cluster; coordinating mine action activities with national counterparts; supporting information management and data collection on explosive ordnance incidents and casualties; providing risk education; and offering technical support to the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, the UN Country Team, and the Humanitarian Country Team. UNMAS also aimed to support Mali in preparing its Article 5 deadline extension request. However, due to a lack of funding, UNMAS was forced to cease operations in April 2025.[21]

DCA assumed leadership of the GT-LAMH when MINUSMA (and therefore UNMAS) ceased operations. UNMAS led during its short return, and DCA took it over in May 2025, with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) as co-lead. In 2024, the group comprised three international NGOs (DCA, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), and Mines Advisory Group (MAG)), and seven national NGOs, as well as observers such as UNICEF, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). A representative from the Permanent Secretariat is always present and his involvement is expected to increase once the Mine Action Unit is established. Monthly meetings are held to discuss progress and challenges. GT-LAMH's mandate is limited to risk education and victim assistance; it does not include survey or clearance.[22]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The CNLPAL, whose Permanent Secretary serves as the National Focal Point for mine action, is funded through the national budget, including support to its regional branches.[23] Beyond this, Mali has not disclosed specific details on the national funding allocated to EOD operations conducted by military engineering units and police intervention teams.

Despite strong fundraising efforts, UNMAS was unable to secure continued support for its presence in Mali following the end of US funding in 2025. Amid multiple global crises, mine action in the Sahel has not been considered a leading priority for funding. In Mali, mine action funding was historically linked to MINUSMA, and in the current political and operational environment mobilising voluntary donor contributions is increasingly challenging.[24] In 2025, ECHO, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) will be the main donors for mine action.[25]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Mali, which lacks a functioning mine action programme, has yet to integrate gender considerations into mine action. Unlike its 2024 Article 7 report, however, the 2025 report covering May 2024 to April 2025 included gender-, age-, and disability-disaggregated data on risk education and victim assistance beneficiaries. Mali noted that risk education activities are hindered not only by limited access to affected areas, weak telecommunications, and insecurity, but also by low literacy rates and limited linguistic diversity. While remote tools like radio and phone messaging can help, they are not enough to drive behaviour change.

In the Malian context, effective risk education depends on community-based approaches that build trust through engagement and dialogue. Involving teachers, health workers, and local teams can broaden outreach and strengthen the impact of these efforts.[26]

Operators indicated that their teams are gender-balanced and that risk education sessions are tailored to the specific audiences.[27] Mali did not mention possible efforts to establish a baseline of contamination through inclusive dialogue with community members.

18 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 11 June 2024; and Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.
19 Presentation of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, NDM-UN28, Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.
20 UN Security Council Resolution 2100, 25 April 2013; and UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4bJSeSJ.
21 Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.
22 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 4 July 2025.
23 Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.
24 Online interview with Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 27 March 2025.
25 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 4 July 2025.
26 Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form I, p. 11.
27 Emails from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025; and François Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 6 August 2024.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Mali's earlier Article 7 report (covering 2004 to 2005) had mentioned environmental protection measures during clearance.[28] The Permanent Secretary of the CNLPAL indicated that EOD operations always take consideration of the environment.[29]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Between 2013 and 2023, UNMAS recorded all known explosions and verified mine or IED incidents, and made available an explosive hazard threat overview. UNMAS operated an IMSMA database which was upgraded to IMSMA Core in 2022.[30] With MINUSMA and UNMAS ceasing operations, the database was no longer in use and operators no longer had access to IMSMA Core data and dashboards. It was not handed over to a Malian counterpart or mine action operator, creating an information vacuum.[31]

In the meantime, to maintain a minimal information management system, the offline versions of the IMSMA Core forms provided by UNMAS are still being used by GT-LAMH members to collect data on incidents and victims related to explosive devices, as well as SALW, and to track participants in risk education sessions.[32] The offline data collection and sharing mechanism was established by DCA in coordination with humanitarian actors, particularly GT-LAMH members, which supports data triangulation. While this set-up enables a basic level of information management, especially regarding hazard threats, it does not constitute a comprehensive reporting system like IMSMA. This system remained in use as at August 2025.[33]

In February 2025, a delegation from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), including the Chief of the Mine Action Programme, Valon Kumnova, visited Mali and Burkina Faso to engage with national mine action authorities and stakeholders, including UNMAS and DCA.[34] Discussions focused on the potential revival of IMSMA. While the database has not disappeared, it remains inactive, and migrating the data is feasible but would require several months for the national commission to assume full ownership. To manage the process effectively, a dedicated focal point within the commission would be needed.[35] At present, the CNLPAL lacks the capacity, expertise, and systems required to maintain a central database. There is no mechanism in place to consolidate information from humanitarian actors, and data sharing from military engineers on EOD activities has been limited. At the time of writing, it was unclear whether the GICHD would be supporting CNLPAL's information management system. If such support does materialise, it is unlikely to be implemented before the Mine Action Unit is formally established and adequately staffed.

For the first time since July 2005, Mali submitted an Article 7 transparency report in May 2024, covering May 2023 to April 2024. In 2025, a second report was submitted for the following 12 months (May 2024 to April 2025). While these reports provide some basic information, particularly in with regard to risk education and victim assistance, they lack critical data. The reports do not provide specific information on the location of hazardous areas beyond a general list of affected regions. Mali has not identified any suspected or confirmed hazardous areas and is not able to disaggregate incident data by type of device. Most notably, there is no reporting on EOD activities.

Mali expressed its intention to submit an Article 5 deadline extension request under the APMBC. UNMAS initiated support for the preparation of the request and accompanied the Permanent Secretary to the Fifth Review Conference in Cambodia. However, progress was hindered by delays in establishing the Mine Action Unit and the departure of UNMAS. As a result, Mali informed States Parties at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025 that it plans to submit a request by March 2026.[36] The preparation process is currently being supported by MAG, in coordination with the Implementation Support Unit (ISU).

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Mali does not have a national mine action programme, but the CNLPAL plans to develop its mine action strategy and work plan.[37] A road map was developed with the support of UNMAS,[38] but it has not been formally endorsed by the authorities and UNMAS has since ceased its operations in the country.[39] The proposed work plan would focus on the following priority actions: i) reducing the impact of mines, ERW, and IEDs on the population; ii) setting up awareness-raising activities through risk education in communities; iii) coordinating victim assistance; iv) establishing a process for data collection and analysis; v) mobilising resources for victim assistance; and vi) monitoring agreements and treaties to which Mali is a State Party.[40] As it stands, the work plan does not cover land release.

28 Article 7 Report (covering May 2004–April 2005), p. 8.
29 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 20 August 2024.
30 Email from Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 10 August 2023.
31 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 4 July 2025.
32 Ibid.
33 Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.
34 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 4 July 2025.
35 Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.
36 Statement of Mali on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
37 Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.
38 Email from Lauren Cobham, Programme Management Officer, Team Lead, Department of Peace Operations, UNMAS, 18 August 2025.
39 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 10 September 2025.
40 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 11 June 2024.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In May 2023, GT-LAMH members reviewed and endorsed the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) covering risk education, victim assistance, and quality management.[41] Since then, however, no updates or reviews have taken place. In 2025, HI planned to support the review of the standard on victim assistance.[42] DCA has also proposed to support the future Mine Action Unit in revising and further developing the NTSG. While a draft NTSG for NTS was developed, it was not formally approved, and NTS—as defined by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)—is not currently being conducted in Mali.[43]

The ending of UNMAS activities effectively suspended the accreditation process for operators. All accreditations issued by UNMAS expired on 31 December 2023.[44] There has been no operational system in place for quality assurance or for accrediting actors and organizations involved in mine action since then. The gap comprises both operational and organisational accreditation. As a result, challenges persist in ensuring quality control and in harmonising approaches and interventions across the sector.[45] In January 2025, UNMAS received an official request to resume accreditations in collaboration with the national authorities. However, due to its departure, there is no capacity to conduct accreditations for NGOs until the National Mine Action Unit is operational and its staff suitably trained.[46]

Due to the ongoing conflict and the widespread presence of explosive threats in Mali, NGOs are not allowed to conduct land release operations, not even NTS. NGOs must focus on community liaison, risk education, and victim assistance.[47] In the current operational environment, marking of hazardous areas contaminated by IEDs, including improvised mines, is also not permitted because of the presence of NSAGs who place the devices and could therefore retaliate against communities reporting contamination. The only type of marking considered safe concerns visible ERW, and even then only when the security situation permits. This threat is, however, less frequently encountered than are IEDs.[48] When a suspicious item is found, community members are encouraged to inform trusted figures—such as local authorities or community leaders—who then pass the alert to the Malian defence and security forces. This system is designed to enable a quick and secure response to potential dangers.[49]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Malian and international security forces serving with MINUSMA were the only entities clearing mines and IEDs until June 2023. A national EOD response capacity had been developed with the support of UNMAS, through the establishment of an EOD Operations Coordination Centre (CCO-NEDEX) in the Military Engineering Directorate.[50] As in 2023, the CCO conducted a number of EOD tasks in 2024 in different conflict-affected areas, particularly in the centre and south of the country. The role of the CCO is to advise the Malian command on action against the threat of mines, ERW, and IEDs; to coordinate and lead the use of specialist EOD teams; and to coordinate action against IEDs by the Malian armed forces.[51] The EOD Operations Centre operates in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedure on Explosive Ordnance Disposal[52] mentioned in Mali's Article 7 report covering 2024.[53]

In 2024, three international NGOs (INGOs) and five local NGOs (LNGOs) were present in the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR). The most active organisation in the mine action sector was DCA. DCA implemented mine action projects in partnership with AAPPOR and AVENIR in Mopti and Timbuktu, with 6 DCA staff and 35 national partner staff, including 15 women. Key activities included community liaison, risk education, data collection on incidents and casualties, victim assistance and referral mechanisms, and capacity development of national stakeholder. The projects were funded by the United States Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), ECHO, SDC, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and later UNMAS. While the DANIDA-funded project ended in December 2024, BHA and UNMAS funding ceased in 2025 following the US government's decision to withdraw support.[54]

HI provided emergency victim assistance by covering health-related expenses. HI operated offices in Mopti and Timbuktu, in addition to Bamako.[55]

Since 2017, MAG has been supporting the development of national capacities through two Malian NGOs, TASSAGHT and the Association Malienne pour la Survie au Sahel (AMSS) in risk education. Both NGOs received their operational accreditation in 2022 and managed to secure funds from UNMAS in 2023, with MAG as a subrecipient.

41 Email from Nora Achkar, UNMAS, 10 August 2023.
42 Online interview with Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 17 March 2025.
43 Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.
44 Email from Elisa Benevelli, then Country Director, DCA, 13 May 2024.
45 Presentation of Mali, NDM-UN28, Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.
46 Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.
47 Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.
48 Emails from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 11 June 2024.
49 Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.
50 UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4bJSeSJ.
51 Emails from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 11 June 2024 and 10 September 2025.
52 POP NEDEX GENIE 06-02-NP-NOV 16.
53 Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form A, p. 2.
54 Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.
55 Online interview with Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 17 March 2025.

In addition to funding from MAG to conduct risk education in Timbuktu, AMSS received funding from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) via the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide risk education and conduct peacebuilding activities.[56]

Between 2023 and 2024, MAG delivered risk education with the financial support of Norway as part of a subregional project covering Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger aiming to strengthen community resilience and reducing the threat from explosive ordnance. MAG also secured funding from Canada through its Peace and Stabilization Operations Program for a multi-country project that includes selected nations in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as Burkina Faso and Mali (with the exception of Niger). This project focuses on mine action and related thematic areas, notably: (i) risk education, (ii) victim assistance, (iii) and initiatives addressing weapons and ammunition management and the prevention of small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation.[57]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, no survey of mined area was reported.[58] Clearance was limited to counter-IED operations and largely restricted to areas where Malian and allied forces are operational. No data have been made available regarding EOD operations.

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MALI: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

**ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009**

**NEW ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE REQUIRED**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Mali was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control no later than 1 March 2009. In its Article 7 transparency report, submitted in May 2024, the first such report in nine years, Mali declared it had no mined areas containing conventional AP mines, but recognised that it is confronted with new AP mine contamination, in particular mines of an improvised nature, laid by NSAGs.[59]

Under the Convention's agreed framework, in the event mined areas are discovered after the expiry of a State Party's Article 5 clearance deadline, it must immediately inform all other States Parties of this discovery and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all AP mines as soon as possible. If the State believes it will be unable to complete destruction before the next Meeting of States Parties, it should submit a request for an extended deadline, which should be as short as possible and no more than ten years.[60] The request should include provision for survey and assessment of the extent of AP mined areas, including with AP mines of an improvised nature. Mali must also fulfil its reporting obligations under the APMBC, including by reporting annually on the location of all suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for the destruction of all AP mines therein.[61]

The Article 7 reports mention specifically "IEDs/mines and ERW".[62] For an IED to meet the definition of an AP mine, the device must be victim-activated by a person and not command detonated or set to detonate after a time delay. An improvised AV mine that is sensitive enough to be detonated by a person should be recorded as an AP mine. Mali should seek to identify the extent to which it has mined areas that it cannot clear immediately and issue plans to survey, mark, and clear this contamination. Of course, this aim is highly challenging given the nature and extent of ongoing armed conflict.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Mali does not have plans in place to address residual contamination once its Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

56 Email from François Fall, MAG, 6 August 2024.
57 Email from Stéphane Lombela, Regional Programme Manager, MAG, 8 September 2025.
58 Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025).
59 Article 7 Report (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form F, p. 7.
60 Final Report of the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 January 2013, p. 10.
61 Ibid.; and Committee on Article 5 implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
62 Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form C, p. 7.

# MAURITANIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2026

Not on track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 17.83KM²

Medium
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 15,574 | 185,914 |
| Technical Survey | 42,104 | 351,797 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 17 | 170 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- HAMAP-Humanitaire (HAMAP)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Seconded staff from the National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (PNDHD)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, Mauritania released 57,678m² through technical survey (TS) and clearance conducted by the international NGO HAMAP-Humanitaire (HAMAP), with staff seconded from the National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (PNDHD), at the Lewej-2 minefield in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region. During these operations, 17 anti-personnel (AP) mines were destroyed. Due to a lack of secured co-funding, operations were suspended in August, leaving 272,151m² to be released. In the same region, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted a baseline assessment of contamination in 46 localities. Of this total, 21 were assessed as "highly" suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), including five identified by the PNDHD in 2023 and already recorded in the national database as confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). Their polygons have now been confirmed, and the neighbouring population received risk education. Mauritania remains significantly behind schedule on both its 2021 extension request work plan and its revised 2023–26 plan and will need to submit a new Article 5 deadline extension request in 2026.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Mauritania should work to accelerate the pace of survey and clearance.**
- **Mauritania should put in place a national coalition forum to support its resource mobilisation strategy and serve as a strategic avenue to engage potential donors.**
- **Mauritania should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for its mine action programme as per the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).**
- **Mauritania should revise its national standard on environmental protection, ensuring alignment with the new IMAS 07:13.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Mauritania has a reasonable understanding of its mine contamination. In 2024, MAG conducted a contamination baseline assessment in Dakhlet Nouadhibou, identifying 21 *highly* suspected hazardous areas. This included confirming polygons for five areas identified in 2023. MAG also "declassified" 20 SHAs, although these had not been listed as such in earlier Article 7 reports. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 5 | National funding to the PNDHD increased by $50,000 to $180,000 in 2024, but it needs more operational, financial, and technical support in order for Mauritania to fulfil its Article 5 obligations. In 2024, it received support from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs via HAMAP, though the donor did not commit to a second phase, resulting in the project interruption mid-year. Norway and the United Kingdom also supported MAG for capacity building support and contamination baseline assessment. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Mauritania's 2023–26 mine action plan recognised that it has still to develop a specific gender and diversity policy. No women are members of the demining teams. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Mauritania has a short environmental protection national standard, drafted at the end of 2024 and which was under review in 2025. Environmental considerations were not, however, referenced in the latest Article 5 deadline extension request (submitted in 2021) or Article 7 report. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 4 | No major developments on information management were reported in 2024. In 2025, however, the PNDHD and the Geneva International Centre of Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) began migrating data to IMSMA Core. Mauritania's reporting under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention is generally consistent and timely. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Mauritania did not meet the targets set in its updated 2023–26 mine action plan. Despite HAMAP being tasked to clear a minefield in 2024, and MAG conducting a contamination baseline assessment in 46 localities in Dakhlet Nouadhibou, Mauritania remains significantly behind schedule. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | National standards were reviewed in 2024 by the interministerial steering committee that oversees the PNDHD. In 2025, several standards, including TS and both mine and battle area clearance, were under review with the support of MAG. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 5 | 6 | The PNDHD has released some AP mined areas in recent years, using national resources and financial support from France, but progress has been slow. Based on current land release outputs, Mauritania will not meet its Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2026. |
| **Average Score** | **5.3** | **5.3** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- PNDHD Battle Area Clearance teams
- Army Engineer Corps

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- HAMAP-Humanitaire
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre of Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Mauritania is assessed as having a medium level of mine contamination. As at the end of 2024, it had recorded 20 CHAs covering 17.83km$^2$ with AP mines, including 18 areas with mixed AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines.[1] Nearly 17.5km$^2$ of this total is located in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region. In its successive Article 7 reports, Mauritania also includes two areas contaminated solely with AV mines, totalling 4.84km$^2$, as part of its national baseline. However, since these are not covered under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Mine Action Review excludes them from its estimate of contamination (see Table 1).[2] Moreover, the actual mined area requiring full clearance (as opposed to release through survey) is expected to be much smaller than the areas currently recorded in the PNDHD database. Further survey is needed to determine more accurately the size and extent of the final CHA requiring clearance.[3]

In June 2020, two years after declaring it had fulfilled its Article 5 clearance obligations,[4] Mauritania reported discovering previously unknown mined areas in the regions of Dakhlet Nouadhibou (in the north-west of the country), Tiris Zemmour (in the north), and Adrar (in the centre).[5] In 2021, the PNDHD and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) conducted a joint assessment that identified just over 15.47km$^2$ of mined area. Of this, 15.36km$^2$ was located in the Nouadhibou region, 11.53km$^2$ of which was previously known but which had been considered "politically" inaccessible. The remaining 114,565m$^2$ was found north of Bir Moghrein, in the Tiris Zemmour region.[6] An NPA consultant visited all the locations identified, confirming access and the accuracy of the turning points of the polygons recorded in the PNDHD database. The only exception was Task ID "Bouchon55", where the northern boundary could not be verified due to a lack of visible marking. Direct evidence of contamination was found at every site visited.[7]

The western side of the Nouadhibou Peninsula, contaminated with both AP and AV mines, was excluded from Mauritania's 2018 declaration of completion on the basis that it lay outside national jurisdiction. However, with a new government in place and changing political circumstances, the area was now considered under Mauritanian control – as evidenced by the presence of police, military posts, and a State-administered wildlife reserve. As of 2021, clearance was deemed feasible using civilian capacity.[8] In its 2021 assessment report, NPA indicated that hazardous areas in and around Mauritania could be classified in four categories, as follows:[9]

- Category 1: Areas within Mauritanian jurisdiction and control (Bir Moghrein and the north-western portion of Nouadhibou);
- Category 2: Areas outside Mauritanian jurisdiction but within its control (Nouadhibou peninsula);
- Category 3: Areas within Mauritania jurisdiction but outside its control (the area where the Morocco defence line crosses into Mauritania);
- Category 4: Areas outside Mauritanian jurisdiction and control (close to the Morocco defence line outside Mauritania's border and within Western Sahara).

Based on the findings of the joint-assessment, Mauritania was granted a fourth Article 5 deadline extension in 2021, extending its clearance deadline to the end of 2026. In its request, Mauritania acknowledged that certain areas on the Nouadhibou Peninsula had previously been politically inaccessible but were now considered under its jurisdiction or control.[10] Mauritania included maps showing minefields extending outside Mauritania's borders,[11] and it stated that it would coordinate with relevant authorities, to the extent possible, "on areas that lie outside its formal jurisdiction but remain under its de facto control".[12] The request listed 20 contaminated areas—double the total identified in NPA's report—including one area (Zirezargue) that was subdivided into eight separate tasks. Of these, one was listed by NPA as a cluster munition strike and two were not visited by NPA (in Mayaateg and Wettat Lechyakh).[13]

In 2022, the PNDHD cleared two minefields (Guemgoum and PK 173-Part 1) while one hazardous area, Guneive, was reclassified as containing cluster munition remnants (CMR).[14] In 2023, three further minefields (Bouchon 24-Part 1, Boukhzame, and Rbeit Lachar-1) were cleared by the PNDHD and HAMAP. Since then, Mauritania's Article 7 reports have not listed any mined areas remaining in Tiris Zemmour.[15] In 2023, the PNDHD reported the discovery of previously unknown mined areas: five in Dakhlet Nouadhibou and one in Adrar, covering a total of 6.9km$^2$, following reports from local authorities.[16]

In 2024, MAG assessed the five areas in Dakhlet Nouadhibou (marked with two asterisks in Table 1 below), as part of its contamination baseline assessment, along with 41 other localities, and confirmed the accuracy of the polygons.[17] Contamination in Adrar is not widespread. Of the two mined

1 Mauritania refers to anti-tank (AT) mines in its reporting.
2 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 3.
3 NPA, Mauritania Assessment Report, 12 April 2021, p. 3.
4 Mauritania Declaration of Compliance with APMBC Article 5, submitted on 29 November 2018.
5 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 2.
6 NPA, "Mauritania Assessment Report", 12 April 2021, p. 2.
7 Ibid., p. 3.
8 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
9 Ibid., p. 4.
10 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 3 and 4.
11 Ibid., maps 1 and 2, pp. 5–6.
12 Ibid., p. 13.
13 Ibid., p. 5.
14 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), p. 4.
15 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), pp. 3–4; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 3.
16 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 4.
17 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, Regional Programme Manager, West Africa, MAG, 3 June 2025.

areas recorded in the national database for the region, one (Mayaateg) was reduced by 0.35km² by the PNDHD in 2023. The other (Emdel) was discovered and added to the database in 2023.[18]

**Table 1: Mined area by region (at end 2024)[19]**

| Region | Location ID | CHAs | CHA with AP mines only or mixed mines (m²) | CHA with AV mines only (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adrar | Emdel | 1 | 176,633 | 0 |
| Adrar | Mayaateg | 1 | 186,752 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Berwaga ** | 1 | 207,136 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Bouchon 24 | 1 | 780,125 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Bouchon 55 | 1 | 9,147,780 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Eguedet El Ghamboul2 ** | 1 | 398,422 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Gherd El Angra ** | 1 | 5,693,715 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Guergara 1 | 1 | 0 | 1,203,880 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Guerguerat ** | 1 | 62,817 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Lewej-2 | 1 | *272,151 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Oued Emghewess ** | 1 | 364,701 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | PK 126 | 1 | 132,585 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | PK 173-Part 2 | 1 | 0 | 3,280,805 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Wettat Lechyakh | 1 | 126,578 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Zirezargue 1 | 1 | 28,794 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Zirezargue 2 | 1 | 16,257 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Zirezargue 3 | 1 | 23,638 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Zirezargue 4 | 1 | 14,696 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Zirezargue 5 | 1 | 75,375 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Zirezargue 6 | 1 | 25,565 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Zirezargue 7 | 1 | 26,654 | 0 |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Zirezargue 8 | 1 | 66,987 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **22** | **17,827,361** | **4,484,685** |

*Remaining surface after clearance of one part of Lewej-2 by HAMAP in 2024. **Areas assessed by MAG in 2024 as part of a baseline assessment. These areas were discovered and added to the database by the PNDHD in 2023.

Mauritania's mine contamination is a legacy of the conflict over Western Sahara in 1976–78, which was characterised by large-scale, haphazard, use of mines without recording and mapping.[20]

18 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), pp. 3–4.

19 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 3.

20 2010 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 3 and 6; and 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Mauritania is also affected by the presence of explosive remnants of war, including CMR. After declaring compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2014, Mauritania reported discovery of additional cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2019 in Tiris Zemmour, near Bir Moghrein, along the border with Western Sahara.[21]

Subsequent surveys have identified more contaminated areas in the same region.[22] At the end of 2024, contamination was estimated to cover 15.17km$^2$ across 10 hazardous areas.[23] See Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Mauritania for more information.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD) is responsible for coordinating mine action operations in Mauritania.[24] It also provides the framework for Mauritania's national mine action strategic plan, the latest of which covers the period 2023–26.[25]

Since 2007, the PNDHD has been the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, Decentralisation and Local Development, with oversight from an interministerial steering committee composed of representatives from key ministries (defence, foreign affairs, and finance); civil society organisations; and international observers (the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP).[26] It works in close collaboration with the Military Engineering Department.[27]

The PNDHD has its headquarters in the capital, Nouakchott, with a regional mine action centre in Nouadhibou. The PNDHD plans to open a field office in the Tiris Zemmour region, which is essential for clearing areas contaminated by CMR and for addressing any newly discovered minefields.[28] The PNDHD is composed of five departments: operations (including information management and quality control, QC); small arms and light weapons; risk education/victim assistance; the secretariat; and administration and finance.[29] In 2024, it employed 26 staff, of whom 10 were women, and oversaw eight battle area clearance (BAC) teams.[30]

In 2024, the PNDHD received capacity-building support from two international organisations. HAMAP, with renewed funding from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2024, provided explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 1 training to 21 deminers, along with demining equipment (six detectors and eight sets of PPE) and an ambulance. This added to the five vehicles donated in 2023. HAMAP also supplied IT equipment and furniture for the deminers' camp.[31] MAG, through United Kingdom (UK) and Norwegian grants, contributed to capacity development through training on disarmament conventions, IMAS 2.10 (Guide for the Establishment of National Mine Action Standards), and project and budget management. MAG also organised a training on NTS in July 2024 and supported the acquisition of a Land Cruiser.[32]

There is currently no mine action working group in place. In 2024, the only meeting bringing together all operators took place in April, during the visit of a member of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) responsible for victim assistance. No further inter-operator meetings were organised thereafter. However, regular and improved communication was maintained between operators and the PNDHD coordinator and chief of operations.[33]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The PNDHD is funded by the Mauritanian government, which allocated approximately US$180,000 in 2024, an increase on the US$130,000 provided a year earlier.[34] This amount covers salaries and per diem of the PNDHD personnel and army engineers, as well as a small amount of operational costs. In addition, in-kind contributions, such as infrastructure and vehicles, are made available free of charge by the government.[35] The national budget is not specifically earmarked for addressing AP mines and is insufficient to sustain large-scale clearance. Mauritania reported a need for international funding to strengthen the capacities of the PNDHD in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou, as

21 Declaration of Compliance with Article 5 of the APMBC, submitted by Mauritania on 29 November 2018 at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties; and 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.

22 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F; APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 4; and NPA, Mauritania Assessment Report, 12 April 2021.

23 CCM Article 7 Reports (covering 2023 and 2024), Form F; and email from Commander Sarr, Head of Operations, PNDHD, 23 April 2025.

24 Decree No. 1960/MDAT/MDN establishing the PNDHD, 14 August 2007; 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

25 "Plan d'Action Déminage 2023–2026", PNDHD, submitted on 15 August 2023 and to the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC (hereafter, "Updated Article 5 Work Plan 2023–2026").

26 Decree No. 001358/MDAT establishing the Steering Committee of the PNDHD, 3 September 2007.

27 2023 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 3.

28 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 6; and 2025 CCM Updated Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

29 Presentation of Mauritania, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.

30 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 1 September 2024.

31 Email from Julien Kempeneers, Head of Mine Action, HAMAP, 15 April 2025.

32 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2025.

33 Remote interview with Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 17 April 2025; and email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2025.

34 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form I; and emails from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 24 May 2024 and 23 April 2025.

35 Interview with Colonel Baham, National Coordinator, PNDHD, Geneva, 9 April 2025; and Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 13 (footnote).

well as for marking, clearance, and risk education.[36] To meet its obligations by 2026, Mauritania had requested US$3.7 million in external funding in its updated work plan submitted in August 2023.[37]

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially supported HAMAP with funding covering the period from October 2022 to February 2024,[38] and renewed its support in 2024. However, due to lack of co-funding, the project was discontinued, and no further funding could be secured for 2025.[39] Norway and the United Kingdom supported Mauritania through MAG, contributing NOK2.3 million (equivalent to US$222,800) and £75,000 (equivalent to US$100,000), respectively, for capacity support, the contamination baseline assessment and risk education.[40]

In its successive extension requests, Mauritania has expressed its intention to establish a national coalition that would bring together the PNDHD, specialised operators and organisations, and donors, including States Parties to the Convention willing to support Mauritania's efforts.[41] Although this coalition has not yet materialised, HAMAP has offered its support to convene a meeting in 2025, and Mauritania's updated CCM Article 4 deadline extension request of 2025 confirmed that a fundraising roundtable will be organised with potential donors.[42] Mauritania also clarified that "it is fully open to receiving funding through an international NGO, provided that it retains a leadership role and that national capacities are mobilised".[43]

France supported Mauritania's mine action programme in 2023 and 2024 through HAMAP, and expressed its backing during intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties for the resource mobilisation efforts of several affected States, including Mauritania, noting the importance of not forgetting States with low levels of contamination that are nearing completion.[44] Mauritania actively participates in the Convention meetings where it reports on both progress and challenges, and advocates for more cooperation and assistance.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The 2023–26 mine action plan acknowledges that Mauritania still needs to develop a dedicated gender and diversity policy. As of June 2025, none had been adopted. In the interim, the PNDHD said it adheres to national policy promoting gender equality and encouraging women's participation in traditionally male-dominated roles.[45]

By the end of 2024, women made up around 38% of the PNDHD's 26 staff, with four women in managerial or supervisory positions (see Table 2), including the risk education and victim assistance department director.[46] The programme has a gender focal point, who is tasked with promoting greater inclusion, particularly in management and risk education.[47]

Mauritania said it consistently highlights inclusivity, gender sensitivity, and diversity as priorities in the design and implementation of its programmes in its extension requests.[48] However, the reality is that women are primarily involved in support functions than in more technical or operational roles. The PNDHD acknowledged that achieving gender balance in survey and BAC teams can be challenging "due to limitations in the composition of seconded personnel from the Corps of Engineers".[49]

**Table 2: Composition by gender in the PNDHD and operators at the end of 2024**[50]

| Operator | Staff | Women staff | Managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HAMAP | 28 | 2 (7%) | 4 | 0 (0%) | 22 | 0 (0%) |
| MAG | 11 | 2 (18%) | 3 | 0 (0%) | 6 | 2 (33%) |
| PNDHD | 26 | 10 (39%) | 8 | 4 (50%) | 18 | 6 (33%) |
| **Totals** | **65** | **14 (22%)** | **15** | **4 (27%)** | **46** | **8 (17%)** |

36 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), pp. 8–9; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), pp. 7–8; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 6.
37 Mauritania, Updated Article 5 Work Plan 2023–2026, p. 11.
38 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 5 August 2024.
39 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 15 April 2025.
40 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2025.
41 2023 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 13; and Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
42 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 15 April 2025; and Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
43 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
44 Statement of France, Cooperation and Assistance, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
45 Mauritania, Updated Article 5 Work Plan 2023–2026, p. 6.
46 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025.
47 Mauritania, Updated Article 5 Work Plan 2023–2026, p. 6.
48 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 12; and Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 18.
49 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 18.
50 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025.

In 2024, two female staff—a nurse and a cook—were deployed to support HAMAP clearance operations in Nouadhibou.[51] Despite efforts to diversify the composition of survey and clearance teams, all operational personnel seconded to HAMAP were men.[52] The contamination baseline assessment was conducted by a community liaison team supported by MAG comprising four men and two women.[53] MAG also introduced a breastfeeding support policy in 2024, covering the costs associated with supporting breastfeeding mothers and their infants during field deployments.[54]

Operators have emphasised the need to enhance gender inclusion in mine action programming, noting that prevailing stereotypes in the country may suggest that women are not suited to cope with physical demands such as walking long distances or enduring heat. Promoting change in current practices regarding gender inclusion in Mauritania will require sustained effort. Targeted advocacy and high-level awareness-raising will be essential to help drive progress, potentially leading to the development of a dedicated gender and diversity mine action strategy.[55]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

In late 2024, Mauritania developed a draft national mine action standard focused on environmental protection, which was under review in 2025.[56] The objective of the standard is to ensure that areas targeted for clearance are not environmentally degraded and that their intended post-clearance use is preserved. It references IMAS 07.13 and outlines specific mitigation measures to reduce environmental impact during EOD and other clearance operations. These include provisions for handling hazardous and toxic substances, protecting water sources, and managing waste. The standard also requires operators to adapt their standard operating procedures (SOPs) accordingly.[57]

The PNDHD is responsible for ensuring the standard is applied and promoted among operators, but it does not have a dedicated environmental focal point.[58] In the meantime, the head of operations is responsible for ensuring that environmental considerations are integrated into the process, including during the preparation phase (when guidance and training are provided) and through on-site monitoring.[59] Environmental management was not, though, referenced in Mauritania's Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2021 or its latest Article 7 report (covering 2024).

HAMAP has an environmental protection policy for demining operations set out in SOPs and implements measures to minimise environmental impacts.[60] MAG does not have a dedicated policy.[61]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The PNDHD hosts and manages the national mine action database. From 2017 to 2021, it used an old version (New Generation) of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).[62] In 2022, the PNDHD created its own database.[63] Due to lack of resources to cover the hosting costs, this database is offline and not directly accessible to operators.[64] In early 2025, the PNDHD said it had started migrating data to IMSMA Core with the help of the GICHD.[65]

In 2024, work on harmonising data collection tools and survey and clearance data output was conducted with support from HAMAP and MAG; MAG also provided direct support to information management personnel.[66]

Mauritania submits its transparency report every year, and submitted its Article 7 report covering 2024 on 29 April 2025. Mauritania does not disaggregate AP mined areas (including those with mixed contamination) from purely AV mined areas in line with international best practice and IMAS in either its Article 7 reports or latest Article 5 deadline extension request (of 2021).

51 Ibid.
52 Emails from Gourdo Bocoum and Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 10 April and 5 August 2024.
53 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025.
54 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2025.
55 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 15 April 2025.
56 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 16 June 2025.
57 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025. The draft was shared with Mine Action Review.
58 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025.
59 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 16 June 2025.
60 Email from Gourdo Bocoum, HAMAP, 5 August 2024.
61 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2025.
62 Article 7 Reports (covering 2017), Form D, p. 3; (covering 2019), p. 9; and (covering 2020), p. 9.
63 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), p. 5.
64 Emails from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 12 and 25 June 2024.
65 Emails from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025; and Jérémy Repond, Programme Officer, GICHD, 27 May 2025.
66 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 15 April 2025; and Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2025.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Mauritania submitted an updated strategic mine action plan for 2023–26 to the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC in November 2023.[67] In the plan, the PNDHD aimed to release the then estimated 15.5km$^2$ of contamination (including those areas containing only AV mines) by the end of 2026, with a four-year budget of US$3.7 million. This is much less than Mauritania sought in its 2021 extension request, which included a five-year budget of US$9.65 million.[68]

Mauritania stated that the government would continue funding the mine action programme "to the extent possible given the economic situation", but that a large part of its needs would be asked from the international community.[69] In 2024, the government contributed US$180,000 to mine action and some international funding was provided through HAMAP by France, and to MAG by Norway and the United Kingdom, but funding was not renewed in 2025.[70]

Mauritania's updated work plan for 2023–26 expected the PNDHD to release 3.7km$^2$ in 2023; 5.5km$^2$ in 2024; 4.1km$^2$ in 2025; and 2.2km$^2$ in 2026, but acknowledged that this was ambitious considering past performance and noting that it would require substantial additional technical and financial support to do so.[71] However, Mauritania only released 0.54km$^2$ in 2023 and less than 0.06km$^2$ in 2024, falling far short of the targets. Mauritania had also been working on the flawed assumption that no, or only limited contamination would be discovered during the extension period,[72] whereas it discovered and added 6.9km$^2$ of CHA to the baseline in 2023.[73]

In its 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, Mauritania required eight clearance teams each with ten deminers for five years for TS and clearance of all the mined areas. The teams were expected to work 250 days a year and each was predicted to clear an average of 250m$^2$ a day.[74] Mauritania also said it will consider using mine detection dogs (MDDs) in Nouadhibou where it may be difficult to detect deeply buried mines.[75]

In 2026, Mauritania will need to submit a new Article 5 deadline extension request, providing an opportunity to redefine its work plan with a more realistic and context-driven approach. The country currently operates eight clearance teams, four assigned to cluster munition-contaminated areas in Tiris Zemmour and four focused on AP mined areas in Dakhlet Nouadhibou, where civilian demining is prioritised. The revised plan should be grounded in this existing capacity and supported by international organisations already familiar with the operational context. It should also outline clear annual clearance targets, specify which minefields will be addressed each year, and include a transparent prioritisation system.

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Survey and clearance are conducted in accordance with the Mauritanian national mine action standards (NMAS, known nationally as les Normes Mauritaniennes de l'Action Antimines). The NMAS are said to align with the IMAS, while being customised to the country's specific geographical and equipment-related conditions. The NMAS, which include standards on NTS, TS, mine clearance, and QC were first developed by the PNDHD with support from the GICHD, and approved by the government in 2007. They are said to undergo regular updates, incorporating insights gained from field experiences.[76]

At the request of the PNDHD, the GICHD visited Mauritania in 2022 and subsequently drafted NMAS for clearance, marking, quality management, and accreditation.[77] According to its 2024 deadline extension request under the CCM, the national standards were reviewed in 2024 by the interministerial steering committee, which oversees the PNDHD. In early 2025, the PNDHD said it was revising the NMAS and was planning to share the new drafts with a partner for further refinement.[78] It later clarified that the standards under review were NTS, TS, demining and clearance, environmental protection, accreditation, and quality assurance (QA)/QC, with MAG supporting the review process.[79] In 2024, operators had no access to the NMAS and were not involved in any revision.[80]

67 Mauritania, Updated Article 5 Work Plan 2023–2026.
68 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11–12.
69 Mauritania, Updated Article 5 Work Plan 2023–2026, p. 13.
70 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025.
71 Mauritania, Updated Article 5 Work Plan 2023–2026, p. 11.
72 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 3.
73 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 4.
74 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10; NPA, Mauritania Assessment Report, 12 April 2021, p. 11; and email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 26 April 2021.
75 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 13.
76 Ibid., p. 9.
77 Emails from Jérémy Repond, GICHD, 28 May 2024 and 27 May 2025.
78 2025 CCM Updated Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
79 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 16 June 2025; and Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
80 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 15 April 2025; and Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2025.

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The PNDHD's operational capacity consists of eight TS/clearance teams, each comprising four deminers and one team leader from the Military Engineering Corps, for a total of 40 personnel. When necessary and subject to available funding, the PNDHD can call on the Military Engineering Corps to provide additional specialists.[81] In 2024, 20 personnel were seconded to HAMAP for the clearance of Lewej-2 minefield, while two personnel were seconded to MAG to take part in the contamination baseline assessment. Additionally, 20 deminers and 7 other personnel were deployed directly by the PNDHD to Tiris Zemmour to conduct TS of and clear two cluster munition-contaminated areas (see *Clearing the Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* for more details).

HAMAP was the only international clearance operator active in Mauritania from April 2023 to August 2024. In 2024, it operated with 28 personnel, including 16 deminers and four team leaders seconded from the PNDHD. The organisation cleared two minefields in 2023—Bouchon24-Part 1 and Rbeit l'Echar1—and partially cleared a third (Lewej-2) in 2024. HAMAP provided EOD Level 1 training, mine detection and personal protective equipment, as well as transportation (an ambulance). In 2024, HAMAP conducted a KAP (Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices) survey on explosive ordnance risk education in the Nouadhibou Peninsula, which helped identify key risk behaviours and inform targeted awareness messaging. However, public communication on explosive ordnance risks remains sensitive in areas like Nouadhibou, where concerns about discouraging potential private investors influence how such risks are communicated.[82]

In the summer of 2024, HAMAP suspended operations due to lack of co-funding and then officially closed its programme in March 2025, while maintaining an indirect presence in another region through a water-related project. HAMAP offered to support the PNDHD in organising a roundtable with potential donors and partners to strengthen the country's resource mobilisation efforts.[83]

MAG has been active in Mauritania since November 2017, supporting the safe storage of arms and ammunition and training national security and defence personnel. Since the end of 2022 and until 2025, MAG implemented a project involving capacity support, the contamination baseline assessment, and the provision of risk education in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region using two mixed MAG–PNDHD teams (four staff and two support staff). A task order received in April 2024 covered 53 localities suspected of explosive ordnance contamination.[84] After excluding seven that were located outside the region, the mixed teams visited 46 localities, classifying 21 of them as *highly* suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) (see the survey component of the land release section for the results). MAG also collaborated with the PNDHD to ensure accurate integration of survey data into the national database, and delivered NTS training in July 2024 for MAG staff and eight PNDHD personnel.[85]

**Table 3: Operational demining capacities deployed in 2024 (Dakhlet Nouadhibou region)[86]**

| Operators | NTS teams | NTS personnel | TS and clearance teams | TS and clearance personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PNDHD and HAMAP | 0 | 0 | 4 | 20 | In addition to 20 seconded staff (16 deminers and 4 team leaders), HAMAP deployed four personnel at the base camp—a section leader, two medics, and an EOD expert—while four staff were based in Nouakchott (an operations room chief, a gender officer, a head of operations, and an expert advisor). |
| PNDHD and MAG | 2 | 7 | 0 | 0 | The PNDHD seconded two team members to join MAG's community liaison team, composed of one supervisor and four officers (two women and two men), bringing the total to seven staff conducting the contamination baseline assessment. It also seconded two drivers to support MAG's operations in Nouadhibou. |
| **Totals** | **2** | **7** | **4** | **20** | |

NPA supported Mauritania's mine action programme from 2011 to 2015 under a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Interior. Operations began around Bir Moghrein and expanded in 2012 to cover Tiris Zemmour and Adrar, both of which were cleared by 2013. In 2014–15, NPA focused on survey and clearance in Nouadhibou, completing all known areas on the eastern side of the peninsula as requested by the PNDHD. By the end of 2015, having fulfilled all assigned tasks, NPA closed its programme. Following discovery of new contamination and revising its understanding of

81 Email from Commander Sarr Mamadou, PNDHD, 1 September 2024; and Interview with Colonel Baham, PNDHD, Geneva, 9 April 2025.

82 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 15 April 2025.

83 Ibid.

84 Emails from François Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 7 May, 7 June, and 29 July 2024.

85 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2025.

86 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 15 April 2025; Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2025; and Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 16 June 2025.

jurisdiction over contaminated areas on the Nouadhibou Peninsula in 2019, the PNDHD requested NPA's support for a reassessment, but the 2020 mission was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. NPA finally conducted a one-month assessment in 2021, establishing a more accurate estimate of the remaining contamination in the country, but has not resumed operations in Mauritania since.[87]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, Mauritania reported releasing 57,678m² of mined area at Lewej-2 in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region through TS and manual clearance, all conducted by HAMAP. During the operation, 17 AP mines were destroyed. However, due to a lack of secured co-funding, the second part of operations were suspended in August 2024, leaving the Lewej-2 site open with 272,151m² still to be addressed. According to HAMAP, the remaining area for clearance is likely the most contaminated, as initial operations prioritised areas for reduction in accordance with the land release methodology.[88]

**Table 4: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 15,574 | By HAMAP |
| **Technical survey** | 42,104 | By HAMAP |
| **Non-technical survey** | 0 | |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 17 | 12 ID 51 AP mines; and 5 VS-50 AP mines |

## SURVEY IN 2024

HAMAP was tasked to clear Lewej-2 minefield. It reduced 42,104m² of the mined area through TS.[89]

As part of a contamination baseline assessment, MAG visited 46 localities and concluded that 21 areas had a *high* probability of contamination, 2 had a *low* probability, 20 were *declassified* due to absence of evidence, and 2 were *non-conclusive* due to lack of information. Among the 21 highly suspected areas, five had been discovered by the PNDHD in 2023 and had their polygons confirmed by the assessment (see Table 5 below).[90] These results should follow the PNDHD's process and are expected to be included in the next official reports to the Convention.[91]

Evidence was collected of contamination, such as old accident reports, explosive ordnance identified in the area, visible detours to alternative paths, and old explosive ordnance markings. The ranking of surveyed areas took into consideration the analysis of informant credibility, level of land use, presence of marking signs and clues, the value of the abandoned land, and the proximity and frequency community members enter and use nearby safe areas.[92]

**Table 5: Mined areas discovered in 2023 and assessed by MAG in 2024**[93]

| Region | Location ID | CHAs | Area (m²) | Contamination type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Berwaga | 1 | 207,136 | AV and AP mines |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Eguedet El Ghamboul 2 | 1 | 398,422 | AV and AP mines |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Gherd El Angra | 1 | 5,693,715 | AV and AP mines and other ordnance. |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Guerguerat | 1 | 62,817 | PT Mi-K AV mines, reportedly with anti-lift devices incorporated that, if removed, can function as AP mines. |
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Oued Emghewess | 1 | 364,701 | AV and AP mines |
| **Totals** | | **5** | **6,726,791** | |

87 Interview with Hans Risser, Head Office Management Team, and Melissa Andersson, NPA, 19 April 2021; and NPA, Mauritania Assessment Report, 12 April 2021.
88 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 15 April 2025; and remote interview, 17 April 2025.
89 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 3.
90 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2025.
91 Interview with Colonel Baham, PNDHD, Geneva, 9 April 2025.
92 Email from François Fall, MAG, 31 July 2025.
93 Emails from François Fall, MAG, 31 July 2025; and Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 17 August 2025.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

HAMAP manually cleared 15,574m² at Lewej-2 minefield, leaving the site open for future clearance.

HAMAP cleared an additional 66,977m² outside the polygon, corresponding to the area processed during preparatory work, due to the size of the minefield and the need to relocate the administrative area as operations progressed. Several other areas surrounding the hazardous zone were inspected prior to team deployment. These areas were also reported to the authority but were not deducted from the national contamination estimates.[94]

The PNDHD did not address any AP mined areas in 2024. However, following reports from MAG's community liaison teams, three isolated explosive devices were identified in three villages. These included a mortar shell, a box containing 14 abandoned artillery shells of various types, and a single unexploded artillery shell. All three spot tasks were subsequently undertaken by the PNDHD.[95]

**Table 6: Mine clearance in 2024**

| Region | Minefield name | Operator | AP mined area (m²) | AP mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dakhlet Nouadhibou | Lewej-2 | HAMAP | 15,574 | 17 |
| **Totals** | | | **15,574** | **17** |

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MAURITANIA: 1 JANUARY 2001

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2011

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2016

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2021

↓

DECLARATION OF COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS: 29 NOVEMBER 2018

↓

REPORTED DISCOVERY OF NEW MINED AREAS IN JUNE 2021

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (1 YEAR, 1 MONTH INTERIM EXTENSION): 31 JANUARY 2022

↓

**FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS, 11 MONTHS EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2026**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the latest extension granted by States Parties in 2021), Mauritania is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than its extended deadline of 31 December 2026. Based on current land release outputs, Mauritania is not on track to meet this deadline.

Mauritania became a State Party on 1 January 2001. At the end of its initial 10-year deadline, it requested a first extension until 1 January 2016, during which, thanks to support from Norway, it reported the release of all known AP mined areas. At the end of 2015, however, Mauritania requested a second Article 5 deadline extension of five years as it "suspected that the security system along the border with Western Sahara, which comprises fortifications and minefields, may be located in some instances in Mauritanian territory".[96] On 29 November 2018, at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, Mauritania announced that it had fulfilled its obligations under Article 5,[97] having cleared an overall area of 130.7km² with the identification and destruction of 8,080 AP mines, 891 AV mines, and 15,119 items of unexploded ordnance.[98]

Following the discovery of further AP mined area which it reported in 2019, Mauritania submitted two deadline extension requests, first through to 31 January 2022 and then a second to December 2026. However, it has since been unable to meet its Article 5 obligations, primarily due to lack of funding, limited international support, and further contamination discovered in 2023 and confirmed by MAG in 2024. The PNDHD has managed to release some AP mined areas (see Table 7), using national resources and financial support from France, although progress has been very slow.

94 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 28 May 2025.

95 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2025.

96 2015 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4; and Analysis of Mauritania's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request submitted to the APMBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, 17 November 2015, p. 2.

97 Statement of Mauritania, Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, 29 November 2018.

98 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 2; and 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

**Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (m²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 15,574 |
| 2023 | 185,914 |
| 2022 | *50,769 |
| 2021 | 0 |
| 2020 | 0 |
| **Total** | **252,257** |

*This does not include 81,559m² of purely AV mined area cleared in 2022.[99]

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

In its 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, Mauritania reported that it will "continue to strengthen and maintain a capacity in-country that is equipped to deal with residual risk", and that in the event of discovering new contamination after the newly proposed deadline, Mauritania will "as soon as possible take action to accurately identify the extent of the contaminated areas identified and destroy all mines found in accordance with international and national standards".[100] Mauritania's updated work plan for 2023–26 includes several months each year for strengthening of the national capacity to address residual contamination.[101]

NPA had cautioned that even after newly identified areas are cleared, residual risk remains and further contamination may still be discovered. This is particularly so in Tiris Zemmour, due to the region's vast, remote, and sparsely populated terrain. This highlights the need for a clear residual risk management strategy and a strong national clearance capacity.[102]

99 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), p. 4.

100 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11.

101 Mauritania, Updated Article 5 Work Plan 2023–2026, pp. 14 and 15.

102 NPA, Mauritania Assessment Report, 12 April 2021, pp. 5–6.

# NIGER



## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2029

Not on track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 177,760M²

Light
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Not reported | 0 |
| Technical Survey | Not reported | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | Not reported | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Not reported | 0 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Military Engineer EOD Teams

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

At the Fifth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in November 2024, Niger was granted a five-year extension until the end of 2029 to clear Madama military base, in Bilma department of Agadez region (bordering Libya), where there is legacy contamination from conventional anti-personnel (AP) mines. Niger has yet to submit an Article 7 report in 2025, but its statement at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025 suggested that no progress was made in 2024.

The July 2023 military coup reshaped Niger's regional and international alliances, and many donors have since suspended their support to the national authorities, casting doubt on the limited prospects for mine clearance. The security situation remained highly volatile in 2024, with armed groups using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against the national defence and security forces, and causing numerous civilian casualties, although the exact number is unknown in the absence of a functioning system of data collection. Some of the IEDs are AP mines of an improvised nature that fall within the scope of the APMBC, which Niger also needs to clear.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Niger should make every effort to resume survey and clearance at its remaining mined area in Agadez region, the release of which has been pending for five years.**
- **Niger should assess and map hazardous areas contaminated with improvised mines in its conflict-affected regions of Tillabéri (bordering Burkina Faso and Mali) and Diffa (bordering Chad and Nigeria), and plan clearance accordingly.**
- **Niger should put in place monitoring capacity and a database to support systematic collection of data and reporting on explosive ordnance incidents and victims.**
- **Niger should clarify its resource mobilisation strategy and its proposed engagement with international donors and international organisations.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 5 | 6 | Niger has one confirmed hazardous area in the northern Agadez region, estimated to cover 177,760m$^2$. Increased use of IEDs, including improvised AP mines, has been reported in Tillabéri and Diffa, but Niger did not include plans to map or address this contamination in either its latest Article 7 report or its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Niger does not have a dedicated mine action authority, but the mandate of the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI) has gradually expanded to cover mine action. In its 2024 extension request, Niger indicated an annual national contribution of US$100,000 to CNCCAI for the duration of the extension period (to 2029), although it is unclear whether this amount was actually allocated in 2024. As in 2023, no operators provided support to build national mine action capacities in 2024. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 2 | 2 | Niger's official reports make no reference to gender or diversity. Niger did not address gender or diversity in its successive Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 transparency reports. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 2 | 2 | Niger does not have a policy or a standard on environmental management in mine action and official reports do not make reference to the environmental impact. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 2 | 3 | Niger does not have a national information management system for mine action in place. No progress was reported in 2024, although the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) visited Burkina Faso and Mali to support their mine action information management capacity. As at September 2025, Niger still had to submit its Article 7 report covering 2024. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | The 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request included a five-year work plan, but it only covers demining of contamination at Madama and not the areas with improvised mine contamination. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 5 | Niger's national mine action standards were last updated in 2022, with no revisions since. No demining operations are currently underway; only counter-IED activities are conducted by the defence and security forces. Niger does not report on the number of spot explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks, and no international NGO reported engaging with the CNCCAI on land release in 2024. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 3 | 3 | No survey or clearance took place in 2024, just IED disposal. The last clearance operations were conducted between July 2019 and March 2020 putting into serious doubt Niger's compliance with Article 5. In November, Niger was granted a fifth Article 5 extension deadline to December 2029. |
| **Average Score** | **3.4** | **3.8** | **Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites (CNCCAI)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- CNCCAI
- Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists from the Central Directorate of Military Engineering and Infrastructure (Direction Centrale du Génie Militaire et des Infrastructures, DCGMI)
- Security and Defence forces (Forces de Défence et de Sécurité, FDS)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI) (only risk education)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Niger is believed to have only a small amount of mined area located at a military base in the Agadez region,[1] but with the spread of armed conflicts in the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad regions, armed attacks in the western and eastern regions of Niger have intensified.[2] Non-State armed groups have made increasing use of IEDs, some of which are victim-activated and constitute AP mines of an improvised nature under the APMBC. In its provisional action plan for 2022–26, Niger indicated only that "an enormous amount of work remains to be done in the regions of Diffa, Tahoua and Tillabéri to determine the hazardous areas and the type of devices and activation modes".[3]

In the Agadez region, remaining contamination appears to consist of a single confirmed hazardous area (CHA) near Madama, a military base, in Bilma department. In its Article 7 report covering 2023 and 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, Niger reported that the mined area amounted to 177,760m$^2$.[4] The area is characterised by the absence of settled population, though Agadez is a transit route for migration with people heading to the Mediterranean and Europe or fleeing Libya (or more recently deported from Algeria).[5]

**Table 1: AP mined area (at end 2024)**

| Region | Name | CHAs | Area (m²) | AP mines |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agadez | Madama | 1 | 177,161 | Unknown |

Niger's 2024 Article 7 report and Article 5 deadline extension request, omit up-to-date information on incidents and victims. The CNCCAI informed Mine Action Review that it has not been able to compile incident data for 2023, and the CNCCAI did not submit its Article 7 report covering 2024 (as at mid-September 2025). According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview, Niger recorded a total of 76 mine-related incidents in 2024: 24 in Diffa (in the south-east bordering Chad and Nigeria) and 52 in Tillabéri (in the south-west bordering Burkina Faso and Mali).[6] Agadez and Tahoua have also recorded incidents, although the number is unknown.[7] Niger lacks a systematic data collection mechanism, and the reported figures are likely to underestimate the number of detonations.

For 2025 (between January and 15 September), the CNCCAI reported to *Mine Action Review* a total of 22 IED-related incidents and interventions in the Tillabéri, Diffa, and Dosso regions: eight radio-commanded IEDs (that are not mines) and 14 victim-operated IEDs (which area). These devices injured one civilian and two deminers, and killed one deminer. Two people were injured while emplacing an IED.[8]

From 2016 to the end of 2022, Niger recorded 183 explosive ordnance incidents that killed 203 people and injured 204 others. The incidents were in six of the eight regions, though 80% of the incidents occurred in Tillabéri and Diffa.[9] During its short presence in Niger, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) recorded 55 explosive ordnance incidents in 2022, all of which were road-emplaced IEDs. The incidents were concentrated in the Tillabéri region, and, to a lesser extent, Diffa. Twelve of the devices were victim-activated.[10]

The Tillabéri region is located within the Liptako-Gourma, also known as the "three-border area," which spans the borderlands of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In this area, Jamaa Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) is the most active group and makes extensive use of IEDs, including victim-activated devices, although other groups such as the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) have also adopted their use.[11] Since 2019, Niger has reported a predominant emergence of improvised mines in Tillabéri, primarily targeting military vehicles. Inevitably, however, civilians have also been affected.[12] For example, on 5 January 2024, a cyclist was killed by the detonation of an IED near Tchelol Befi, and on 31 March 2024, one civilian was killed and three others were injured when their vehicle detonated an IED in Ouro Gueladjo Foulbe, Tillabéri region.[13]

In Diffa, Boko Haram, an armed Islamist group, expanded its activity from Nigeria, and continued to emplace both remotely controlled IEDs and mines of an improvised nature. Although the data suggest sporadic rather than widespread use, these devices have mainly targeted defence and security forces and have been widely employed to ambush military convoys.[14] Civilians, however, have also been casualties. On 4 March

1 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

2 Ibid., p. 6.

3 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026 for the implementation of the components: risk education – victim assistance – humanitarian demining of mine action (hereafter, Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026), p. 18.

4 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 8; Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8; Statement of Niger, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2023; and 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

5 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, pp. 10 and 11. See also: UNHCR Niger, "Operational update", February 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3XU4oFi, p. 5; "Niger: Migrants return to the route towards the Mediterranean", *Info Migrant*, 17 January 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3XU4g8M; and "Agadez has begun to live again", *Aljazeera*, 12 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3z9fVWV.

6 OCHA, Niger: Humanitarian Needs Overview and Response Plan, 11 July 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4n1XFTk, p. 76.

7 Ibid., p. 10.

8 Email from Lt. Sidi Sadou, Chief of Humanitarian Demining Operations, CNCCAI, 17 September 2025.

9 Email from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 9 August 2023.

10 Email from Philippe Renard, UNMAS, 10 August 2023.

11 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Project, "Filters: 01/01/2024-31/12/2024, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger", accessed 22 August 2025 at: www.acleddata.com; and ACLED "Actor Profile: The Islamic State Sahel Province", 13 January 2023.

12 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, p. 10.

13 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2024-31/12/2024, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger", accessed 22 August 2025.

14 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, p. 11.

2024, for instance, an IED killed a girl in N'Guigmi (Diffa). Around 25 March 2024, a civilian was killed by an IED while fishing on the banks of Lake Chad, in the commune of Diffa. On 17 December 2024, armed militants used an IED to target a hydraulic infrastructure construction site near Tam (Maine Soroa, Diffa), killing one worker and injuring three others.[15] On 8 May 2025, a civilian vehicle struck an IED on the road between Baroua and Bosso. The explosion killed 7 civilians –all women and girls- and injured 11 others.[16]

Following the military *coup* in August 2023, Niger requested the withdrawal of Western troops engaged in counter-jihadist operations in the Sahel – beginning with France, whose forces left at the end of 2023, and followed by the departure of United States forces in 2024. That same year, Niger began hosting instructors from Africa Corps, the new designation for Russia's presence in the Sahel. At the end of March 2025, Niger announced its withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a regional framework that had previously ensured collaboration between the armed forces of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon in the fight against Boko Haram. This move risks creating a security vacuum and further escalating insurgent activity.[17]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national mine action programme is managed by National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons, which was set up in 1994 and whose mandate was later extended to include mine action. The CNCCAI is an interministerial body reporting to the Civil Cabinet of the President, and is composed of up to 30 members of ministries concerned with defence and security, the customary chieftainship, and civil society actors (NGOs), along with other entities working on peace and development. The CNCCAI has a Permanent Secretariat under the authority of the president of the Commission. It serves as a focal point for the implementation of disarmament treaties.[18]

In 2024, the Permanent Secretary of the CNCCAI was on leave for military training,[19] and various representatives spoke on behalf of Niger at meetings related to the Convention. In April 2025, during the International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors & UN Advisors in Geneva (NDM-UN28), Niger participated in a side event with Burkina Faso and Mali, where it presented plans to strengthen mines and counter-IEDs strategy.[20] However, no official documents has been shared with the Convention machinery in that regard.

UNMAS established a presence in the country in 2021 but left at the end of 2022 due to lack of funding. At the end of 2023, the CNCCAI announced a relaunch of the mine action working group meetings, bringing together government bodies and development and humanitarian organisations to exchange information and best practices.[21] After UNMAS's departure, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and international NGOs supported this process. However, only two meetings were held between January and August 2024.[22] The CNCCAI has struggled to create a cooperative environment for mine action. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Humanity & Inclusion (HI) did not engage with the CNCCAI throughout 2024 due to a lack of personnel.[23]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The APMBC's Committee on Article 5 implementation asked Niger to provide information on how implementation efforts consider the different needs and perspectives of women, girls, boys, and men, and the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities.[24] However, successive Article 5 deadline extension requests submitted in 2016, 2020, and 2024 have made no reference to gender or diversity. Niger reported that women made up eight of the forty deminers deployed in June 2019 when clearance operations briefly resumed.[25] Niger has trained women as deminers, but indicated that "their employment poses challenges and constraints" and that women are only engaged in implementing other aspects of the mine action programme, such as risk education and victim assistance.[26] The CNCCAI includes two women in secretariat functions (see Table 2).

15 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2024-31/12/2024, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger".

16 Ibid.

17 "Niger's junta withdraws from Lake Chad", *The Guardian*, 1 April 2025, at: http://bit.ly/45MXILp.

18 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3; and Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 11.

19 Discussion with the Niger delegation, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

20 Presentation of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, NDM-UN28, Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.

21 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3.

22 Email from Stéphane Lombela, Regional Programme Manager, MAG, 1 August 2024.

23 Online interviews with Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 17 March 2025, and François Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 13 February 2025.

24 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

25 Statement of Niger, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, 27 November 2019.

26 Response from Niger to questions from the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, August 2024.

Table 2: Gender composition of CNCCAI in 2024[27]

| Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20 | 2 | N/R | N/R | N/R | N/R |

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Niger does not have a policy or a standard on environmental management in mine action and official reports do not make reference to environmental impact.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Niger does not have a national information management system in place. In 2022, UNMAS was providing support with information management. In 2023, HI had planned to support the CNCCAI on information management, including through training on the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), in partnership with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Due to the political context, however, this did not occur.[28] Niger's work plan in its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request included implementation of IMSMA with the support of experts and the GICHD, for which it budgeted US$117,000.[29]

Niger has submitted its Article 7 reports on a regular basis for the past three years (2022, 2023, and 2024). However, as at September 2025, it had still to submit its Article 7 report covering 2024. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation has repeatedly noted that Niger's Article 7 reports are not compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and lack detail on a range of issues including detailed work plans with annual adjusted milestones, financial commitments to implementation of the Article 5 deadline extension request, and information management.[30] Niger delivered statements at the Fifth Review Conference and then the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025, merely highlighting the lack of progress in mine action.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Niger's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request included a five-year work plan, but it only covers the demining of the Madama area (177,760m$^2$), and not the areas with improvised mine contamination, and did not provide annual clearance targets or a detailed work plan. It projected the cost of completion at US$2.87 million, almost quadrupling the amount budgeted in the previous extension request (2020–24). It included US$2.2 million for allowances for deminers, section chiefs, site supervisors, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians, and quality inspectors. Niger said it would contribute a total of US$500,000 over the extension period (US$100,000 per year).[31]

Clearance was scheduled to begin in 2025 and to be organised in five phases over the course of the extension period.[32] Niger said at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025 that, as in previous years, no operations had taken place in 2024. The country cited several challenges, including insufficient financial resources and limited external assistance for demining operations. Compounding these difficulties is the growing terrorist threat in several regions, which not only restricts access to contaminated areas but also poses serious risks to the safety of clearance teams. In addition, logistical and environmental constraints—such as the remoteness of contaminated sites and harsh climatic conditions—make each intervention particularly complex and hazardous.[33]

Niger also has an unknown amount of contamination from improvised mines in the south-west region of Tillabéri bordering Burkina Faso and Mali (also known as the three-border areas); and the south-east region of Diffa, bordering Chad and Nigeria. In its provisional action plan for 2022–26, drafted in October 2021, Niger indicated that "an enormous amount of work remains to be done in the regions of Diffa, Tahoua, and Tillabéri to determine the hazardous areas and the type of devices".[34] The plan, drafted with the support of HI, did not include specific objectives for land

27 Interview with Lt. Sidi Sadou, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 17 September 2025.
28 Email from Marwan Nadim, Regional HMA Specialist, HI, 19 July 2024.
29 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 13.
30 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 20–22 June 2022 and 18–20 June 2024.
31 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 12–14.
32 Ibid., p. 13.
33 Statement of Niger on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
34 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, p. 18.

release beyond a more general goal that demining would occur by December 2026.[35] It is unclear if this plan has even been finalised and endorsed. Additionally, Niger's 2024 extension request did not clarify whether it plans to survey or address contamination by improvised mines, aside from the delivery of risk education.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

With the support of UNMAS and HI, Niger updated in 2022 its national mine action standards (NMAS) on clearance, non-technical survey (NTS), risk education, and community liaison. It also drafted new NMAS on tasking procedures and the accreditation of mine action organisations.[36] Niger did not, however, provide further information on the proposed timeline and process of approval of these new standards.[37]

Niger reported that between 2020 and 2024, it drafted standard operating procedures (SOPs), trained deminers on EOD in-country and abroad, provided logistics support, deployed community focal points, and acquired additional technical equipment for mine clearance.[38] At the June 2025 Intersessional Meetings, Niger reported that since its last update to States Parties, it had revised its NMAS in line with IMAS guidelines, strengthened the operational capacities of its deminers, conducted community risk education on the danger from IEDs, and acquired additional technical equipment.[39]

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) visited Madama in December 2017 and noted that manual clearance was the main tool of demining by Niger's army engineers but highlighted the operational challenges. The M-51 mines mostly found in the area were largely undetectable by conventional detectors and sufficiently small as to make detection by ground penetrating radar (GPR)-based detectors unreliable. This means that full manual excavation may be the only effective methodology. The process is slow and the sandy environment, prone to subsidence and back-filling, makes it difficult to maintain consistent excavation depths. Mechanical excavation using sifting and screening equipment would significantly improve the speed of technical survey (TS) and clearance but faces severe logistical challenges because of the long distances, absence of roads, limited provisions for maintenance and cost. Mine detection dogs have also been deemed unsuitable because of the extreme climate and the potential for deeply buried mines.[40]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Clearance operations in 2019–20 were carried out by a "humanitarian demining cell" established by the CNCCAI and composed of 60 trained deminers, including ten women.[41] These have not been deployed since then due to lack of resources.[42] Niger's 2024 extension request outlined a five-year work plan, indicating that 60 deminers will be required to clear the Madama military base. At present, no international operators are active in survey and clearance operations in Niger. Disposal of IEDs is conducted exclusively by units of the army engineers and defence and security forces.[43]

In 2022, a total of 88 members of the Nigerien Defence and Security Forces were trained in IED Threat Mitigation with the support of UNMAS and HI.[44] In 2023, HI supported the training of eight additional personnel at the Centre for Advanced Training in Post-Conflict Demining and Depollution (CPADD) in Benin. Five were trained on IED monitoring and threat mitigation, two received "Training of Trainers" capacity building for EOD, and the eighth was trained on Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) Level 2.[45] No training was provided in 2024.[46]

HI has been present in Niger since 2007 and worked in 2014–21 in partnership with the CNCCAI on weapons and ammunition management (WAM). Since 2021, HI has been implementing risk education and armed violence reduction projects in the regions of Tillabéri and Diffa. The projects were still running in 2024 and continued in 2025. HI noted that strengthening or expanding its activities in Niger is challenging, as humanitarian access is becoming increasingly limited and collecting the information needed to engage donors remains extremely difficult.[47]

In 2023, the Comité International pour l'Aide d'Urgence et le Développement (CIAUD) provided risk education in the Tillabéri region and capacity-building for the Security and Defence Forces in other regions, such as Maradi. In the past,

35 Ibid., p. 21.

36 Emails from Philippe Renard, UNMAS, 10 August 2023; and Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 16 August 2024.

37 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

38 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 14.

39 Statement of Niger on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

40 NPA, "End of Mission Report: CTA-HMA Inputs", undated but 2018.

41 Email from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 9 August 2023; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3; and interview with Lt. Sidi Sadou, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 17 September 2025.

42 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7 and 10.

43 Emails from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 28 August 2023 and 16 August 2024.

44 Emails from Philippe Renard, UNMAS, 10 August 2023; and Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 9 August 2023.

45 Email from Marwan Nadim, HI, 19 July 2024.

46 Interview with Lt. Sidi Sadou, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 17 September 2025.

47 Online interview with Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 17 March 2025.

the CIAUD also supported the training of community relays, and the national assessment of the explosive threat carried out in 2020, with support from the UNHCR.[48] No information was made available on CIAUD mine action-related activities in Niger in 2024.

MAG implemented WAM activities in Niger in 2018 and piloted small arms and light weapons (SALW) risk education in 2022. In 2023–24, MAG carried out a small regional project covering Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, aimed at reducing the threat posed by explosive ordnance through risk education in the Maradi region. The project, funded by Norway, was implemented by a national partner.[49] MAG suspended its operations in Niger in the middle of 2024, upon completion of the Norwegian-funded project.[50]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

No clearance of mined areas occurred in Niger in 2024. The last clearance operations took place between July 2019 and March 2020 in the Madama area, during which 18,483m$^2$ of the hazardous areas were cleared and 323 AP mines were destroyed.[51]

For 2025 (between January and 15 September), the CNCCAI reported to *Mine Action Review* that 12 devices were destroyed in situ and another was neutralised.[52]

## DEMINER SAFETY

The CNCCAI recorded the deaths of 30 soldiers between 2019 and mid-2025 as a result of attacks involving IEDs. Additionally, 16 personnel were reported injured, either during on-site reconnaissance or when their vehicles struck explosive devices on the roads, including two in 2023, seven in 2024, and five in 2025 (with two cases for which the year was not specified).[53]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGER: 1 SEPTEMBER 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 SEPTEMBER 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR, 4-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2015

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (1 YEAR): 31 DECEMBER 2016

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2020

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2024

↓

**FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2029**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension request granted by States Parties in 2024), Niger is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2029.

Niger has cleared less than 0.01km$^2$ of mined area over the past five years (see Table 3). The last clearance took place at Madama during a nine-month period ending in March 2020, with 9,081m$^2$ cleared between July and November 2019 and a further 9,403m$^2$ between December 2019 and February 2020. This limited progress raises serious concerns regarding Niger's compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

Niger said it had made no progress since 2020 due to a lack of resources, both national and international, and conflicting priorities, mainly the fight against terrorism and weapons proliferation.[54] It also cited a range of other factors hampering progress of the mined areas near Madama: sandstorms, intense heat and cold, and a lack of security

48 Email from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 16 August 2024.

49 Online interview with Stéphane Lombela, MAG, 24 April 2024; and email, 1 August 2024.

50 Email from Stéphane Lombela, MAG, 8 September 2025.

51 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

52 Email from Lt. Sidi Sadou, CNCCAI, 17 September 2025.

53 Ibid.

54 Statement of Niger, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 9; and Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14 and 15.

necessitating a military escort for the 2,000km-long journey from the capital Niamey to Madama. Niger said it cannot guarantee clearance of its mine contamination by 2029 without external donor support.[55] It needs US$2.37 million in international funding to meet Article 5 obligations.[56]

Considering the current political and security situation, the lack of mine clearance progress over the past five years, and the need for US$2.37 million in international funding to meet Article 5 obligations, the prospects for clearance look bleak.

**Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (m²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 0 |
| 2023 | 0 |
| 2022 | 0 |
| 2021 | 0 |
| 2020 | 9,403 |
| **Total** | **9,403** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Niger does not have plans in place to address residual contamination once its Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

55 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14 and 15.

56 Ibid., p. 14.

# NIGERIA



## KEY DATA

### ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025

Not on track to meet deadline
Three-year extension to 31 December 2028 requested

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Extent unknown, light
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0 | 0 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 0 | 0 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Nigerian Army and Nigerian Police Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Nigeria's mine action programme remains in its early stages, although significant progress was made in 2024 and in the first half of 2025. A national coordinator was appointed in 2024 to lead the newly established National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), which is mandated to manage and coordinate all mine action activities in the country. In June 2025, Nigeria submitted its third Article 5 deadline extension request under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), which included a work plan developed with the help of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). Funding has been secured to train two survey and clearance teams composed of seconded officers from the Nigerian Police Force and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), although additional resources are still needed to fully equip them for operations. Nigeria is also developing national mine action legislation with support from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). A draft law, prepared in 2024, was under review by the Ministry of Defence at the time of writing.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Nigeria should accelerate development of its national mine action strategy and not wait until 2027.**
- **Nigeria should maximise in-country capacity by enabling qualified international and national mine action organisations to support survey, particularly non-technical survey (NTS), even if restrictions on handling explosives remain in place.**
- **Nigeria should develop a dedicated resource mobilisation strategy to guide funding with clear targets and plans for partner engagement, including a framework for coordination with donors.**
- **Nigeria should adopt and implement a gender and diversity policy for its mine action programme, supported by an action plan for mainstreaming into survey, clearance, and risk education.**
- **Nigeria should consider the environmental impacts of clearance and outline mitigation measures.**

- **Nigeria should improve the consistency and timeliness of its reporting under Article 7 of the APMBC, including by submitting outstanding reports covering 2023 and 2024.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 3 | 3 | Significant areas of contamination are suspected in Nigeria with Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states considered the worst affected, but insecurity has severely restricted access and the ability to conduct survey. The scale of the mine threat is currently measured in the number of explosive incidents rather than the size of suspected or confirmed hazardous areas. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | In 2024, a National Coordinator was appointed to NMAC whose mandate is the management of the national mine action programme in Nigeria. While NMAC works to build its capacity, it has asked UNMAS to continue to undertake key functions. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Nigeria does not yet have a gender policy and implementation plan, but it is planned that NMAC will appoint a gender focal point and its personnel will undergo training on gender and mine action. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 2 | 2 | Nigeria does not have a national mine action standard or a policy on environmental management. The main operators follow their own environmental policies and procedures and have started implementing mitigation measures. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | UNMAS operates an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database, collating and inputting data on explosive incidents reported by operators and communities. Nigeria submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request in June 2025, but at the time of writing, it had still to submit Article 7 reports covering 2023 and 2024. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 4 | Nigeria submitted a work plan as part of its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, which includes development of a national mine action strategy as one of its targets for 2027 and 2028. Nigeria's mine action sector lacks any coordinated tasking process or criteria for prioritising survey. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Nigeria reported that it follows the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and will develop its own national mine action standards (NMAS) and standard operating procedures (SOPs) in 2025 and 2026. NMAC is in the process of establishing survey and clearance teams composed of officers seconded from the police and security forces. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 3 | 2 | Nigeria has not reported on any survey and clearance conducted in 2024. Nigeria's Article 5 deadline extension request is more substantive than the previous request. If funding, capacity and access obstacles can be overcome, Nigeria should be able to make progress in building a mine action programme and conducting survey and clearance of mined areas. |
| **Average Score** | **3.8** | **3.5** | **Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army
- Nigerian Police Force EOD units
- The Big Smile Foundation (TBSF)
- Centre for Social Cohesion, Peace and Empowerment (CENSCOPE)
- Child Protection and Women Empowerment Initiative (CPWEI)
- Jireh Doo Foundation (JDF)
- Youth Awaken Foundation (YAF)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mined area in Nigeria remains unknown due to ongoing conflict and insecurity in the northeast, which continue to prevent comprehensive survey activities. Based on available data from mine action organisations, humanitarian and development actors, and IMSMA, the states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (BAY) are believed to be significantly affected by explosive ordnance. However, no hazardous areas have yet been formally identified or defined, and information on contamination is limited to the number of explosive incidents recorded (see Table 1). Casualties from improvised explosive devices (IEDs), particularly victim-activated mines of an improvised nature, remain high.[1] These devices have been widely used by Boko Haram and other jihadist groups in the BAY states.[2] In addition, Nigeria has reported a growing threat of contamination in the north-western states of Sokoto, Zamfara, and Kebbi, linked to the emergence of a new non-State armed group.[3]

The main explosive threat is from improvised mines placed on roads, with UNMAS recording 174 such incidents in 2024 involving 210 devices (see Table 1). However, it is important to note that this assessment is based solely on incident descriptions, with accurate information and thorough post-blast investigations lacking. The figures should therefore be considered indicative rather than definitive. Of these 210 devices, UNMAS and partners identified 88 victim-operated devices, 118 with unknown or unreported trigger mechanisms, and 4 that were command-activated.[4] The few pressure-plate devices that have been inspected were capable of being detonated by the weight of a person, meaning that they are also covered—and prohibited—under the APMBC.[5]

**Table 1: Explosive ordnance incidents in north-east Nigeria (2017–24)[6]**

| Year | Road-emplaced IEDs | Body-borne IEDs | Vehicle-borne IEDs | Other IEDs | ERW | Total Incidents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | 165 | 211 | 4 | 1 | 0 | **381** |
| 2018 | 149 | 99 | 10 | 0 | 9 | **267** |
| 2019 | 117 | 32 | 4 | 4 | 32 | **189** |
| 2020 | 187 | 23 | 6 | 2 | 31 | **249** |
| 2021 | 228 | 5 | 10 | 23 | 15 | **281** |
| 2022 | 160 | 0 | 9 | 5 | 11 | **185** |
| 2023 | 161 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 23 | **191** |
| 2024 | 174 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 0 | **191** |

ERW = explosive remnants of war

NMAC plans to deploy mine action teams that will be trained by UNMAS and staffed with officers seconded from the Nigerian Police Force and the NSCDC to conduct surveys in priority areas identified by the government.[7] Initial survey operations are expected to begin in late 2025 or early 2026 and to continue through 2027. The data collected enable a better understanding of the extent and type of contamination, informing and guiding survey and clearance in 2027–29.[8]

1 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

2 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 4; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

3 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

4 Email from Edwin Faigmane, Chief Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, 17 September 2025.

5 Emails from Lionel Pechera, Programme Coordinator, UNMAS, Nigeria, 11 March and 20 July 2020.

6 Emails from Emeka Nwadike, UNMAS, 21 August and 24 September 2024; Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 8 August 2023 and 17 September 2025; Harshi Gunawardana, UNMAS, 7 May 2021; and Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, 22 May 2022; 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

7 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

8 Ibid., p. 17 and Annex 4 Work plan.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In 2019, Nigeria established an Inter-Ministerial Committee on the APMBC under the Ministry of Defence to lead the set-up of a national mine action authority.[9] In 2022, then President Muhammadu Buhari directed the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs to create a civilian-led coordination body that would address the problem of explosive ordnance. This led to the inauguration of the National Humanitarian Mine Action Committee (NHMAC) in October 2022.[10] Both bodies claimed a mandate to establish the national mine action centre, creating both overlap and confusion.[11]

In 2022, the APMBC Inter-Ministerial Committee submitted an interim report to the Federal Government via the Minister of Defence that recommended that an NMAC be created. In April 2024, a building in Maiduguri was donated by the Borno state government for the centre.[12] In June, Khalifa M. Lawan was appointed as its first coordinator.[13] NMAC convened its first stakeholder meeting in July. UNMAS has confirmed that NMAC is now the sole authority for mine action coordination in Nigeria, with members of the previous committees to be integrated under its structure.[14]

NMAC is thus mandated to plan, coordinate, implement, and oversee all mine action activities in Nigeria. This includes quality assurance (QA) and accreditation of mine action operators—whether government, international, non-governmental, or commercial—as well as the development and implementation of national strategies, annual plans, and mine action policies and standards.[15] With support from UNMAS, NMAC now chairs and coordinates the Mine Action Sub-Working Group (MASWG), which brings together mine action organisations and government agencies to strengthen coordination and implementation of activities.[16] Separate monthly Mine Action Area of Responsibility (AoR) meetings led by operators are held for implementing partners within each local government area (LGA).[17]

In September 2024, NMAC formally requested UNMAS to continue delivering key functions in partnership with NMAC while it develops its capacity to assume and fulfil these responsibilities. These functions include accreditation of mine action organisations operating in Nigeria; tasking and QA of mine action activities; development of context-specific standard operating procedures (SOPs) and work plans; planning and implementation of risk education, survey, and clearance within the humanitarian-development-peace nexus; support to national security institutions on IED clearance; management of mine action data through the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA); and support to Nigeria in meeting its obligations under the APMBC.[18]

In 2024, an UNMAS Threat Mitigation Advisory Team (TMAT) and Mobile Training Team conducted an operational capacity assessment of the Nigerian Police's Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit. Depending on funding, this assessment could pave the way for further specialised training for the EOD unit.[19] In 2025, NMAC was intending to focus on recruiting qualified staff and conducting a training needs assessment. This will guide the development of a capacity enhancement plan to ensure NMAC can implement its mandated functions independently of international assistance.[20]

Nigeria is also in the process of developing national mine action legislation with support from the ICRC. A draft law prepared in 2024 to align with NMAC's mandate is under review by the Ministry of Defence. As of June 2025, the draft was awaiting its submission to Parliament.[21]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE ACTION

Until mine action legislation is passed, NMAC is expected to receive its funding through the Ministry of Defence. Once the legislation is enacted, NMAC will be in a position to receive funding directly from the Federal Government.[22] In parallel, NMAC will work to identify key partners and donors and seek financial support to complement counterpart funding from the Nigerian government.[23]

In 2024, UNMAS received more than US$3 million for mine action from Japan, the European Union ECHO, the United Kingdom FCDO, UNICEF, the UN Internal Displacement Solutions Fund (IDSF), and USAID.[24] There was no change in donors in 2025.[25]

In 2024, MAG's mine action operations in Nigeria were funded by the World Without Mines Foundation (WWMF), a new donor, following the loss of Netherlands and OCHA funding at the end of 2023. In 2025, WWMF support ended in June, but additional funding was received from Global Affairs Canada (Peace and Stabilization Operations Programs – PSOPs).[26]

9 Statement of Nigeria, APMBC Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties, 15 November 2021.
10 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form A.
11 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 29 September 2023.
12 Statement of Nigeria, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.
13 Ibid.
14 Email from Emeka Nwadike, UNMAS, 24 September 2024.
15 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.
16 Ibid., p. 14.
17 Emails from François Fall, MAG, 28 May 2024; and Samson Uchenna Ugwu, Humanitarian Mine Action Manager, DRC, 28 May 2024.
18 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
19 Email from Emeka Nwadike, UNMAS, 21 August 2024.
20 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 17.
21 Ibid., p. 11.
22 Ibid., p. 18.
23 Ibid., p. 17.
24 Ibid., p. 13, Table 3.
25 Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 17 September 2025.
26 Email from Emilie Mbaye, Regional Programmes Manager – Gulf of Guinea, MAG, 17 September 2025.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Nigeria does not yet have a gender policy and implementation plan in place.[27] However, as part of a broader strategy to develop national capacity, NMAC will appoint a gender focal person and plans for its personnel undergo training on gender and mine action.[28] UNMAS has reported that the Nigeria Police Force has a gender policy in place while the NSCDC was in the process of finalising its own policy.[29] Mines Advisory Group (MAG) notes that the NSCDC has staff dedicated to gender issues.[30]

In 2021, UNMAS commissioned a gender baseline assessment for the Nigerian Police Force and NSCDC in north-east Nigeria to identify ways of strengthening women's roles and EOD capabilities. Conducted from August 2020 to February 2021, the assessment identified a lack of gender mainstreaming in the security services and recommended increasing the number of female officers, updating recruitment practices, and repealing discriminatory regulations. It further recommended that UNMAS engage with both organisations on gender parity.[31] In response, UNMAS prioritised gender inclusivity in the 2022 IED Disposal Training of Trainers and Advanced Medical First Aid courses, where five of the sixteen graduates were female police officers.[32]

**Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2024**[33]

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNMAS | 9 | 6 (67%) | 3 | 1 (33%) | 3 | 3 (100%) |
| MAG | *9 | 2 (22%) | 2 | 1 (50%) | 3 | 1 (33%) |
| DRC** | 16 | 5 (31%) | 4 | 1 (25%) | 10 | 3 (30%) |
| **Totals** | **34** | **13 (38%)** | **9** | **3 (33%)** | **16** | **7 (44%)** |

*Including two sub-regional staff supporting Nigeria. **Data are from 2023.

In 2024, UNMAS Nigeria advocated for women's inclusion in the first-ever Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) training for the NSCDC and Nigerian Police Force (NPF), raising women's participation from 13% in the first round to 36% in the second. UNMAS deployed an all-female training team for EORE and increased gender representation in field operations with women making up 90% of field staff. UNMAS prioritised women's recruitment within implementing partners, particularly for community liaison roles, increasing women's participation in EORE with 52% of EORE beneficiaries being women and girls. A gender focal point was appointed, and partnerships with women-led NGOs were expanded with 50% of implementing partners being women-led organisations and 50% of funding allocated to local NGOs also went to women-led organisations. Gender analysis was also integrated into assessments of explosive ordnance impacts, with data on victims disaggregated by gender and age where possible.[34] MAG deployed male–female Community Liaison teams, selected gender-balanced Community Focal Points, and delivered EORE sessions that included women, youth, persons with disabilities, and marginalised groups.[35]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Nigeria does not have a national mine action standard or a policy on environmental management. It is therefore not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of AP mines in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

Danish Refugee Council (DRC) has an environmental standard operating procedure (SOP) in place for its mine action arm, which is implemented by its management team in Nigeria.[36] UNMAS reports having an environmental management policy in place and says that, where required, measures are implemented to prevent or minimise environmental harm. No details were, though, provided.[37]

27 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form E.
28 Email from Emeka Nwadike, UNMAS, 24 September 2024.
29 Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 8 August 2023.
30 Email from François Fall, MAG, 6 September 2024.
31 UNMAS, "Summary of Gender Baseline Assessment", May 2021.
32 Email from Emeka Nwadike, UNMAS, 21 August 2024.
33 Emails from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 17 September 2025; Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 September 2025; and Samson Uchenna Ugwu, DRC, 28 May 2024.
34 Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 17 September 2025.
35 Email from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 September 2025.
36 Email from Goran Knezevic, DRC, 17 July 2023.
37 Email from Emeka Nwadike, UNMAS, 21 August 2024.

In 2024 and 2025, MAG Nigeria reduced fuel use and emissions by improving field movement scheduling and cutting generator reliance through solar alternatives. It also promoted paperless reporting and digital data collection, alongside better waste management through disposal, re-use, and recycling.[38]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

UNMAS manages an IMSMA Core database that collects data from mine action stakeholders and humanitarian organisations on explosive incidents, the results of survey, and risk education beneficiary data.[39]

In 2022, UNMAS provided IMSMA training to government personnel, including staff from the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs. These individuals could serve as a resource to NMAC should they be assigned to work there.[40] UNMAS also provided training to its partners on essential data collection mechanisms, and developed and shared IMSMA data collection forms.[41] MAG and DRC both reported that the monthly AoR meetings have improved data sharing between stakeholders.[42]

In 2023, Nigeria submitted an Article 7 report covering 2022, its first for more than 10 years. It did not contain data on the extent of contamination or on survey and clearance. As at August 2025, Nigeria had not submitted an Article 7 report covering 2023 or 2024. In June 2025, Nigeria submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request, though, which reflects improvement in the clarity and detail of its reporting under the APMBC.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

The development of a national mine action strategy is included in Nigeria's work plan under its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request. The strategy is dependent on increased capacity and progress in information collection. Once sufficient data have been gathered and analysed, work on the strategy is expected to begin in 2027 and continue into 2028.[43]

Nigeria's mine action sector lacks any coordinated tasking process or criteria for prioritising survey, although UNMAS has drafted a prioritisation criterion geared towards risk education and survey.[44] In 2022, MAG reported that its teams undertook focus group discussions with communities whose members travelled through areas suspected to be contaminated with explosive ordnance.[45] DRC said it conducted NTS through internal desk assessments, information from UNMAS, and reports of possible explosive ordnance locations by other agencies.[46]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

As NMAC builds its capacity, it plans to develop national mine action standards, SOPs, and other relevant guidelines. Currently, Nigeria follows the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[47] According to the work plan, development of national standards and SOPs is scheduled for 2025 and 2026.[48] In 2022, NMAS drafted a national standard for NTS, which was published in January 2023.[49]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The Nigerian military conducts clearance to support military operations and movement along key supply routes through IED disposal. The Nigerian Police Force EOD units also carry out limited survey and clearance and IED disposal. However, records of these operations are not currently shared. NMAC will advocate for improved information-sharing, particularly regarding explosive ordnance incidents. At present, national and international mine action organisations are restricted to delivering risk education. In the BAY states, this is delivered face-to-face in priority areas and through radio broadcasts targeting communities in hard-to-reach areas.[50]

38 Email from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 September 2025.
39 Emails from Harshi Gunawardana, UNMAS, 7 May 2021; and John Sorbo, DRC, 3 July 2021.
40 Email from Emeka Nwadike, UNMAS, 24 September 2024.
41 Email from Emeka Nwadike, UNMAS, 21 August 2024.
42 Emails from François Fall, MAG, 28 May 2024; and Samson Uchenna Ugwu, DRC, 28 May 2024.
43 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16 and Annex 4.
44 Interview with Edwin Faigmane, UN NDM, Geneva, 29 April–1 May 2024.
45 Email from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 2 June 2022.
46 Email from Goran Knezevic, DRC, 23 September 2022.
47 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 17.
48 Ibid., Annex 4.
49 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D; and email from Francesca Batault, MAG, 27 July 2023.
50 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

As noted above, NMAC is establishing mine action teams with officers seconded from the Nigerian Police Force and the NSCDC. Once trained, these will be the first civilian mine action teams in Nigeria, capable of conducting technical survey (TS) and clearance.[51] While UNMAS has secured funding to train two teams, additional resources are still required to fully equip them for operations.[52] The Nigerian Police Force EOD unit has some capacity for EOD and risk education, though this remains limited. The NSCDC has a relevant mandate and human resources but is significantly constrained by other operational commitments. The Nigerian military, while better resourced, primarily conducts EOD and IED disposal in support of military objectives rather than as part of mine action.[53]

International mine action organisations active in Nigeria include MAG, DRC, and The HALO Trust, as well as the ICRC. National organisations include The Big Smile Foundation (TBSF), the Centre for Social Cohesion, Peace and Empowerment (CENSCOPE), the Child Protection and Women Empowerment Initiative (CPWEI), the Jireh Doo Foundation (JDF), and the Youth Awaken Foundation (YAF), among others.[54]

MAG has been engaged in mine action in Nigeria since 2017. In 2024, its capacity was nine staff and MAG deployed one community liaison team of two personnel. MAG was prioritising risk education in 2024, specifically Training-of-Trainer courses for school teachers, and risk education for humanitarian workers and service drivers.[55] This is a decrease from the previous year when MAG's capacity was 21 staff deployed in seven community liaison teams with two team leaders with the teams conducting remote contamination baseline assessments and risk education.[56]

In 2023, DRC's mine action programme employed 16 staff. There were five NTS/community liaison teams consisting of one team leader and two officers per team working in Borno and Adamawa states. DRC conducted one training course on risk education and two refresher courses for community focal points. In 2024, DRC was prioritising integration of mine action interventions into broader protection activities, including child protection and women's empowerment initiatives. DRC also focused on strengthening local capacity in mine action by training national NGOs, community focal points, and at-risk groups, aiming to build communal resilience to the effects of explosive ordnance.[57]

HALO's current work in Nigeria is limited to Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM). While discussions are ongoing with the NMAC on potential future support, current projects focus on WAM-related capacity building. In 2025, HALO assessed the capacity of Nigerian law enforcement agencies in explosive ordnance management and delivered trainings on ammunition stockpile management and IED recognition and response.[58]

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

### SURVEY IN 2024

Survey in Nigeria is severely restricted by the continuing conflict, which limits NTS to community assessments of the location of explosive ordnance. Operators work on an ad hoc basis, responding to community reports of the presence of explosive items when security makes it possible to visit the area.[59] DRC conducted 42 non-technical community surveys in 2023 across seven LGAs in Borno state and two LGAs in Adamawa state, identifying 30 items of explosive ordnance (projectiles, rockets, mortar shells, grenades, and IEDs) which it passed on to the Nigerian security forces for action.[60]

MAG did not conduct any survey or remote contamination baseline assessments in 2024.[61] In 2023, MAG conducted 130 remote contamination baseline assessments.[62] For these assessments, MAG organised focus group discussions with key informants, gathering data on the location of contamination, the history of conflict, types of contamination, and casualties. Participants drew maps to indicate the areas affected.[63]

### CLEARANCE IN 2024

Clearance is conducted exclusively by the Nigerian security forces. All explosive ordnance items identified in the course of surveys and community assessments are reported to national authorities for removal but there is no record of the items cleared in the course of EOD and IEDD operations.

51 Ibid., p. 11.
52 Ibid., p. 16.
53 Ibid., p. 11.
54 Ibid., p. 12.
55 Email from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 September 2025.
56 Emails from François Fall, MAG, 28 May and 6 September 2024.
57 Email from Samson Uchenna Ugwu, DRC, 28 May 2024.
58 Email from Iina Kuuttila, Country Director Nigeria, HALO, 12 September 2025.
59 Email from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 2 June 2022.
60 Email from Samson Uchenna Ugwu, DRC, 28 May 2024.
61 Email from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 September 2025.
62 Email from François Fall, MAG, 28 May 2024.
63 Email from Francesca Batault, MAG, 27 July 2023.

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGERIA: 1 MARCH 2002

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012

↓

FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (1 YEAR): 31 DECEMBER 2021

↓

SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

**THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (3 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2028**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the four-year extension granted by States Parties in 2021), Nigeria is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. Nigeria will not meet this deadline and has requested a further three-year extension to 31 December 2028.

In 2011, at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Nigeria had declared it had cleared all known AP mined areas from its territory three months in advance of its original Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2012.[64] In November 2020, however, in response to the rise in jihadist violence and the widespread use of improvised AP mines in the northern states, Nigeria submitted a one-year extension request to reassess contamination and develop a response plan. UNMAS, in consultation with MAG, DRC, and the Youths Awaken Foundation, helped prepare an initial draft, which was reviewed by the APMBC Implementation Support Unit and then forwarded to the Ministry of Defence for input.[65] In May 2021, Nigeria submitted a further request for a four-year extension to 31 December 2025, which was granted at the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties.

The 2021 extension request outlined key milestones including the establishment of an NMAC, the strengthening of risk education, improved coordination of activities, evidence-based survey to determine contamination, the development of national standards, and the drafting of a national mine action strategy and work plan. While an NMAC was eventually established in 2024 and a 2025 work plan was drafted, operational progress during the last extension period remained limited. Conflict and insecurity in the north-east hindered access and prevented comprehensive surveys. No hazardous areas were formally identified, and clearance by the military and police in support of their own operations were not reported. Humanitarian organisations were limited to delivering risk education.

In addition, progress was hampered by institutional confusion with two separate entities—the Inter-Ministerial Committee under the Ministry of Defence and the NHMAC under the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs—with both entities claiming the mandate to act as the sole national mine action authority. This situation has now been resolved and, with support from UNMAS, NMAC has begun to build its structure, develop a national work plan, and draft mine action legislation, although the centre remains underfunded and under-resourced. Plans to deploy mine action teams were initiated, but training and operational readiness are still pending.

In June 2025, Nigeria submitted a third Article 5 deadline extension request, outlining plans for survey and clearance in secure areas, pending funding from the government and sustained international support. The request also assumes that NMAC will build sufficient capacity to lead and coordinate national mine action efforts. However, significant obstacles remain, including the need to train and equip national survey and clearance teams; the potential for continued limited access to contaminated areas due to security constraints; and for further contamination due to intensifying conflict.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Nigeria does not have plans in place to address residual contamination once its Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

64 Statement of Nigeria, Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 2011.

65 Email from Harshi Gunawardana, UNMAS, 7 May 2021.

# OMAN



## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2025

Article 5 obligations fulfilled and deadline met

### NO AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Only possible residual contamination

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 85,600 | 106,400 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 8,800 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 0 | 0 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Executive mine clearance unit

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Oman completed its anti-personnel (AP) mine clearance at the end of 2024, meeting its 1 February 2025 deadline under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). Oman made an official statement of fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025.

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score) | 9 | 7 | Oman made a statement on 18 June 2025 at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings that it had completed clearance of all known mined areas, although a residual threat may remain. |
| NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | Oman's mine action programme is fully nationally owned and is under the purview of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). |
| GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score) | 5 | 3 | Oman's armed forces had a phased plan to involve women in demining support roles while prioritising health and safety, citing the demanding conditions of contaminated areas. The Ministry of Defence said in 2024 that the strategy balances women's right to participate with the duty "to protect personnel", and planned to expand operational roles once women were fully trained and qualified. |

**Assessment of National Programme Performance Continued**

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 5 | Oman's mine action operations adhere to its environmental protection law (Royal Decree 114/2001). The Law mandates environmental assessments and assigns responsibility to the MoD to regulate the disposal of munitions, including mines. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Oman has an integrated mine action database. The system allows real-time data updates, management, and analysis, and includes data on mine contamination and emergency response systems. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | In its Article 7 report covering 2023, Oman planned to clear all suspected mined areas by July 2024. In fact, it took until the end of 2024 for clearance to be completed. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 5 | Oman has national mine action standards that it says conform to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Oman said that it applies non-technical survey and technical survey methodologies in land release and clearance is only performed when necessary. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 9 | 8 | In 2024, Oman cleared 85,600m$^2$ without finding any AP mines. In June 2025, Oman declared that it had met its Article 5 deadline. |
| **Average Score** | **7.5** | **6.5** | **Overall Programme Performance: GOOD** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Ministry of Defence (MoD)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Royal Army of Oman (RAO)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- None

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Oman declared at the June 2025 Intersessional Meetings that it had addressed all known AP mined area by its Article 5 deadline and was now free of all known AP mines.[1] The remaining AP mined area of 85,600m$^2$ had been across eight suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in the regions of Tawi Atir and Wadi Thent in Dhofar governorate, the most southern of the nation's 11 governorates.[2]

Contamination from AP mines, anti-vehicle (AV) mines, and unexploded ordnance (UXO) dates back to the 1964–75 conflict in Dhofar region between the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOG) and the Royal Army of Oman (RAO).[3] Oman's initial Article 7 report, submitted in 2015, declared no confirmed mined areas but reported "many" suspected mined areas in the south, particularly in Dhofar.[4] This position was reiterated at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2018 and in subsequent Article 7 reports, with Oman noting that no mine casualties had been recorded for more than 20 years, but referencing that a number of mined areas required "re-search" or "re-clearance" in order to confirm they were free of AP mines.[5]

Immediately following the end of military operations in 1976, State armed forces had cleared a minefield they had laid and the and the armed forces' engineering unit started clearing areas suspected to have been mined by the militants.[6] Oman acknowledged, however, that clearance of all AP mined area could not be guaranteed due to the vast, mountainous terrain, the lack of mapping, and environmental factors, such as rainfall, displacing mines.[7] As at the end of 2020, Oman reported a total of 0.5km$^2$ across seven SHAs, with re-clearance planned between 2021 and 2024.[8]

1 Statement of the Sultanate of Oman, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 18 June 2025.

2 Article 7 Report (covering 2023) as sent by email to Mine Action Review by the Oman Ministry of Defence (MoD), 17 September 2024, Annex A.

3 "Humanitarian Demining", *Journal of Mine Action*, 2001, p. 49. See also: Arabian Gulf Digital Archives, "Military Operations in Dhofar State in Oman", 1 January 1973, pp. 92–100, at: https://bit.ly/47yRwH9.

4 Initial Article 7 Report, 2015, pp. 4–5.

5 Statement of Oman, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7–8 June 2018; and Article 7 Reports (covering 2018 and 2019, and 2023).

6 Initial Article 7 Report, submitted in 2015.

7 Initial Article 7 Report, 2015, pp. 4–5.

8 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 14.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Oman's mine action programme is fully nationally owned.[9] Before 2021, clearance was performed by the Executive Operational Unit of the army engineers.[10] In 2021–22, Oman's armed forces underwent a restructuring process and the national mine action programme was put under the purview of the Ministry of Defence.[11] Oman has reiterated that the Ministry had the qualified expertise and resources to conduct and oversee national demining.[12]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Oman reports that its national programmes, including that of mine action, follow clear guidelines that consider the needs of diverse groups, including those of different genders.[13] Women have been permitted to serve in the Oman Army for a decade.[14] Women participated in several areas of mine action, including first-line medical support to demining teams; operational planning, coordination, and management; field support and logistics; risk education and community outreach; and training and capacity development.

In 2024, however, Oman reported that its armed forces had developed a plan that would enable Omani women to support demining operations in line with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), with due consideration for women's health and safety. Oman's gender plan is multi-phased and ensures increased women's participation in support roles such as in planning, administration, training, medical care, and public awareness. The plan was based on reports that mines are often found in rugged terrain and high-risk environments. The army was said to be endeavouring to incorporate women into operational roles more and more in the future, but only after ensuring they are adequately trained and qualified and their safety is assured.[15]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Oman has a national environmental plan that applies to mine clearance operations and ensures environmental protection and safety. The plan is underpinned by an environmental protection law,[16] which mandates environmental assessments and assigns responsibility to the Ministry of Defence to regulate the disposal of munitions and explosives, including mines. Any mines discovered near water springs are removed and dismantled, either manually or mechanically, and disposed of in designated areas away from these natural, protected reserves in accordance with Oman's environmental standards. Detonations at these sites are strictly prohibited due to environmental and geological considerations, in alignment with Ministry of Defence standards and national environmental regulations.[17]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Before 2021, Oman did not have a national information management database, but the Executive Operational Unit generated monthly operational reports. Maps of the cleared areas were then produced and retained both digitally and on paper.[18]

Following the restructuring of its armed forces in 2021–22, Oman introduced an integrated mine action database. The system allows real-time data updates, management, and analysis, and eliminates the reliance on the previously used paper-based monthly reports. The integrated database included elements on landmine data, contamination zones, and clearance methods; geo-mapped locations of contamination and analysis of terrain; and emergency response systems: teams' details, capabilities, and plans.

Oman's most recent Article 7 report (covering 2024) provided land release data by location and method of release.

9 Email from Oman MoD, 23 June 2021; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), sent by email from MoD, p. 2.
10 Article 7 Report (covering 2018).
11 Email from MoD, 10 October 2024.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 "Women officers set to join army in Oman", *Khaleej Times*, 21 December 2011, at: http://bit.ly/3dYcDaH.
15 Email from MoD, 10 October 2024.
16 Royal Decree No. 114/2001.
17 Email from MoD, 10 October 2024.
18 Emails from Oman MoD, 23 June 2021 and 3 April 2022.

# PLANNING AND TASKING

In its Article 7 report covering 2023, Oman provided a work plan that foresaw release of all remaining mined area by July 2024.[19] In fact, Oman completed clearance by the end of the year.[20]

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Oman has national mine action standards (NMAS) that, it says, are compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Non-technical survey (NTS) and technical survey (TS) are systematically applied in land release, and clearance is only performed where necessary.[21] Oman said in its latest Article 7 report that its NMAS are "largely compliant with the IMAS, with focus on the humanitarian aspects".[22]

Since 2020, no AP mines were discovered during re-clearance.[23] Oman said the absence of AP mines "confirms the areas had previously been cleared".[24]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2023, Oman's executive mine clearance unit comprised 85 personnel of various ranks and specialities.[25]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

From January to September 2024, Oman army engineers re-cleared 32,800m$^2$ in Tawi Atir region across 3 SHAs, and then from September to December 2024, 52,800m$^2$ were cleared in South Wadi Thant region across 4 SHAs. No AP mines were found during clearance.[26]

In 2023, Omani army engineers re-cleared 106,400m$^2$ across 32 SHAs in Ain Gharnut and Sarfit & Wadi Siek (Dalkut State) areas of Dhofar governorate. No AP mines were found during the clearance.[27] Oman also cancelled 8,800m$^2$ through NTS across four AP mined areas in Sarfit and Wadi Siek in Dalkut state, in Dhofar governorate.[28]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR OMAN: 1 FEBRUARY 2015

↓

**ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2025**

**FULFILLED ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS AT THE END OF 2024**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Oman was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2025. Oman completed clearance at the end of 2024 and then at the June 2025 APMBC intersessional meetings made a statement that it had successfully met its Article 5 deadline and was in full compliance with the provisions of the Convention.[29]

19 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), sent by email from MoD, Annex D.
20 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Annex A.
21 Email from MoD, 10 October 2024.
22 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Annex D.
23 Oman did not report on whether it found AP mines in 2021.
24 Article 7 Report (covering 2019).
25 Email from Oman MoD, 10 October 2024.
26 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Annex A and B.
27 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), sent by MoD, 17 September 2024, Annex C.
28 Ibid., Annex B.
29 Statement of the Sultanate of Oman, Intersessional Meetings, 18 June 2025.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Oman's mine action programme is fully nationally owned and the Executive Operational Unit has the capacity to address any previously unknown mined areas discovered following completion.[30] In its statement at the June 2025 intersessional meetings, Oman recognised that "natural and geographical conditions may sometimes affect the ability to fully detect all mines, [but that] the Sultanate of Oman remains fully prepared and ready, through its specialised teams, to deal with any future discoveries, in close coordination with concerned regional and international parties".[31]

30 Email from Oman MoD, 23 June 2021.

31 Statement of the Sultanate of Oman, Intersessional Meetings, 18 June 2025.

# PALESTINE

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028

Not on track to meet deadline
(lack of effective control)

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 5KM²

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 29,710 | 5,975 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 1,455 | 32 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, The HALO Trust (HALO) continued with Phase 2 of its operations in the Jordan Valley, which began in 2023. In the middle of 2024, having cleared anti-vehicle (AV) minefields in Sokot and Taysir, HALO began clearing the Sokot anti-personnel (AP) minefield in the Jordan Valley.

In the Gaza Strip (Gaza), which was not known to be mined before 7 October 2023, a number of open-source reports suggested possible new use of AP and AV mines. The reports remain unconfirmed, and demining organisations working in Gaza have not reported discovering any AP mines.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Israel should clear all remaining mined areas under its control on Palestinian territory without delay.**
- **Where international donors are supporting mine clearance, Israel should bear the cost of the external quality assurance (QA) that are required.**
- **Palestine should give permission for all remaining mined areas on Palestinian territory to be cleared without delay.**
- **Palestine should ensure passage and implementation of the national mine action law without further delay.**

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Higher Committee for Mine Action
- Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of AP mined area in Palestine is not known. All mined areas are in territory under Israeli control.[1] In its initial Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency report, submitted in 2018, Palestine reported 69 areas suspected to contain AP mines on the border with Jordan, covering a total area of 18.5km$^2$. In the last Article 7 report it had submitted at the time of writing, which pertains to 2023, the Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC) stated that 16 areas were confirmed to contain AP mines covering a total of 604,634m$^2$ while another 65 areas covering 18,510,899m$^2$ on the border with Jordan were suspected to contain AP mines.[2]

In its initial Article 7 transparency report after becoming a State Party to the APMBC, and in its subsequent annual Article 7 reports, Palestine has stated that it does not know whether mined areas are located in East Jerusalem or in other areas of Palestine under Israeli control, including in the region of Israeli settlements or closed military zones.[3] However, Mine Action Review believes that remaining minefields in East Jerusalem were cleared prior to Palestine's accession to the APMBC in 2017, and Mine Action Review is not aware of any AP mined areas in East Jerusalem. The Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) has confirmed that there are no remaining mined areas in East Jerusalem.[4]

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) informed HALO in 2012 about the presence of 90 minefields in the West Bank, of which 13 were laid by the Jordanian military in 1948–67, while the remaining 77 were laid by the Israeli military along the Jordan River after the 1967 war. The minefields are located east of the security fence, inside a military buffer zone, and do not immediately threaten civilians.[5]

There have been occasional unconfirmed reports of mine use by Al-Quds Brigades in the West Bank since 2023, but it is unclear whether the mines, most likely improvised explosive devices (IEDs), were victim-activated.[6]

Israel does not authorise PMAC to conduct clearance in the West Bank. In 2013, however, the INMAA gave HALO formal authorisation to clear two minefields in the West Bank which PMAC deemed high priority (in Qalqiliya governorate), and HALO began clearance there on 2 April 2014. Under Phase 1 of its activities, HALO continued to clear nine high priority Jordanian-laid minefields in the West Bank,[7] working with the support of the INMAA and PMAC, and clearing the last two sites in early June 2023.[8] All HALO's minefield clearance in the West Bank was approved by both PMAC and INMAA, military area orders on the land were cancelled, and the land was returned for use by its Palestinian owners.[9]

INMAA has in the past overseen other demining operations in the West Bank undertaken by private companies,[10] while the IDF conduct their own clearance operations, as reported in Israel's annual Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 reports.[11]

In 2022, PMAC gave approval for HALO to clear three of the four minefields in the Jordan Valley: the Taysir and Sokot AV minefields, and the AP minefield at Sokot,[12] INMAA also gave its approval. Clearance of these Jordan Valley sites form "Phase 2" of HALO's operations.[13] The Taysir AV minefield was cleared in 2023[14] while the Sokot AV minefield was cleared in 2023–24.[15] Clearance of the Sokot AP minefield began in the middle of 2024.[16]

1 Initial Article 7 Report, dated 26 November 2018, Form D and Annex 2; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
2 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D and Appendix 1, pp. 16–19.
3 Initial Article 7 Report, Form D, p. 3.
4 Email from Shahar Back, Head of INMAA, 7 September 2025.
5 Emails from Tom Meredith, Desk Officer, HALO, 24 June and 23 October 2015; Sonia Pezier, Junior Programme Officer, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 14 April 2015; and Ronen Shimoni, Programme Manager, HALO, 13 June 2021.
6 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Palestine", accessed 9 July 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4lnGCdP.
7 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 2 August 2023.
8 Ibid.
9 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 21 August 2025.
10 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 10 April 2019.
11 See the CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Reports (covering 2019–24), Form B.
12 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 5 August 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.
13 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Appendix 5, pp. 44–45.
14 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2023.
15 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2023 and 5 August 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.
16 Email from Ronen Shimoni, 5 August 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.

In addition to the AP minefield at Sokot, at the end of 2024 there was another minefield at Shadmot Mehola, thought to contain a mix of AP and AV mines. As at the time of writing, approval for HALO to clear this minefield had been given by the INMAA, but PMAC had yet to authorise clearance.[17] The minefield crosses Route 90, close to the Shadmot Mehola settlement. Due to its proximity to the settlement, PMAC had requested to postpone its response regarding clearance of the site. HALO and its donors are to revisit the issue prior to the planned clearance date.[18]

Furthermore, there are two other Jordanian-laid minefields (Yalo and Canada Park) that remain in the West Bank (excluding the Jordan Valley). The minefields are to the west of the separation barrier between the West Bank and Israel, in so-called "No Man's Land", and extend across a combined 0.19km$^2$ of confirmed hazardous area (CHA).[19] The Yalo and Canada Park sites are fenced and marked with minefield warning signs. Owing to their location, it was determined that HALO would not clear them, but INMAA reportedly intends to clear them in the future.[20]

**Table 1: Mined area (at end 2024)**[21]

| Governorate | Minefield Task | Contamination | CHA | Area (m$^2$) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jordan Valley | Sokot | AP mines | *1 | 227,300 |
| | Shadmot Mehola | AP and AV mines | 1 | 65,000 |
| Ramallah | No Man's Land Yalo | AV and AP mines | 1 | 104,226 |
| | No Man's Land – Canada Park | AV and AP mines | 1 | 85,708 |
| **Totals** | | | **4** | **482,234** |

*There were 31 polygons and an estimated 19,000 AP mines at the Sokot AP minefield before clearance began in 2024.[22]

Mine action is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commonly known as the Oslo II accord, under which the West Bank is divided into three areas. Area A is under full Palestinian civil and security control; Area B is under full Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C refers to areas where Israel has full civil and security control.[23] Most mined areas are located in Area C of the West Bank, along the border with Jordan. Area C covers approximately 60% of the West Bank.[24]

## GAZA

Following the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, and the subsequent armed conflicts, there have been unconfirmed reports that Hamas has laid mines in the Gaza Strip, which was not previously known to be mined. The Fenix Insight database suggests that Hamas used AP and AV mines in Gaza in 2024 and 2025. The reports specifying incidents of AP mine use are infrequent (about 20 times between 1 January 2024 and 30 June 2025), and involve the use of IEDs/locally manufactured mines, including the Thunder Charge AP mine; "TV shaped" AP mines; and the Al-Qaffaza bounding AP mine.[25] Similarly, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) database lists 13 occasions in 2024 in which either Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad are reported to have used AP mines or IEDs.[26] Furthermore, there have been reports of IED use by the Al-Qassam Brigades with its affiliated media outlets stating that their fighters have used mines in Gaza, including AP mines. These have been referenced in the Landmine Monitor.[27] In May 2025, it was reported that nine Israeli soldiers had been injured by a landmine in Gaza City.[28] There is little information in the various reports alleging mine-use as to whether the devices have been victim-activated (meaning they would likely be AP mines) or remotely detonated (in which case they are not).[29] There have also been reports that Hamas has harvested unexploded ordnance (UXO) for use against Israel.[30]

Following the 7 October 2023 attack, there were also unverified claims that the IDF had laid mines on the border of Gaza and Israel. According to online media sources, in the immediate aftermath of the attack, Israel was reported to have used mines to seal the border with Gaza which was breached in the attack.[31] However, it is not clear which types of mines were alleged to have been used, or if the mines extended

17 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2023, 5 August and 21 August 2024, and 22 August 2025.

18 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 2 September 2025.

19 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 23 April 2021, 17 May 2022, 26 March 2023, and 2 September 2025.

20 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 2 September 2025.

21 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025 and 31 July 2025.

22 Email from Ronen Shimoni, 30 June 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.

23 Email from Celine Francois, Programme Officer, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 July 2012.

24 Ibid.; and "UNMAS 2013 Annual Report".

25 Fenix Insight database, "Filters:01/01/2024-30/06/2025, mines", accessed 14 July 2025, at: https://fenix-insight.online/.

26 ACLED "Filters: 01/01/2024 -31/12/2024, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Middle_East-Palestine", accessed 14 July 2025.

27 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Palestine", accessed 9 July 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3IkUnLA.

28 "Nine Israeli soldiers injured in landmine attack in Gaza City: Israeli army", *Middle East Eye*, 10 May 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4lj3tqL. See also "Hamas Is Reconstituting Itself In The Gaza Strip", *The Times of Israel*, 10 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3zEBajJ; "First Israeli grandfather to fall in active duty in Gaza becomes a symbol of hope", *The Jerusalem Post*, http://bit.ly/4kv15w2; "Hamas Uses Israeli 'Unexploded Missiles, Mines' To Attack IDF; Claim Of Killing Troops In Fresh Trap", *Hindustan Times*, 29 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3xTw9Dm; and "More than 1,000 craters: satellite images show destruction of northern Gaza Strip", *The Guardian*, 4 November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4eW5TZP.

29 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Palestine", accessed 9 July 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3IkUnLA.

30 "Gaza Strip 'uninhabitable due to undetonated explosives, US says", *Jerusalem Post*, 18 April 2025, at: http://bit.ly/40amP99.

31 "IDF says Gaza border finally sealed, bodies of 1,500 terrorists found inside Israel, *The Times of Israel*, 10 October 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3XYrT08; and H. Sullivan and M. Belam, "Hamas and Israel at war: what we know on day 4", *The Guardian*, 10 October 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4cVKlL3.

into Gazan territory. In January 2024, it was reported that Israel was preparing to create a buffer zone, encroaching on territory in Gaza, using AP mines.[32] INMAA, however, has categorically denied that Israel has emplaced any mines in Gaza or on the border with Gaza since 7 October 2023,[33] and no further reports alleging that Israel has emplaced AP mines at the border with Gaza have been identified.

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Palestine is also contaminated with ERW. PMAC had identified 46 ERW-contaminated areas in the West Bank prior to the recent armed conflicts, which were either military training sites or areas where armed confrontation and demonstrations had occurred on a regular basis.[34] In 2020, UNMAS conducted an ERW impact survey in some locations close to these areas to better understand the impact of the contamination on the residents.[35]

Reports of use of explosive ordnance (EO) in the West Bank have increased in recent years, mainly in its northern governorates. A 2025 update from the Protection Cluster oPt attests to an increased threat from EO contamination in some areas of the West Bank since October 2023.[36] The increase is due to escalating military operations, including use of explosive munitions by Israeli forces, as well as by the Palestinian Security Forces, during fighting against Palestinian non-State armed groups (NSAGs) which have also used explosive munitions.[37] According to PMAC, the number of items of EO identified in the West Bank in 2024 increased to more than 2,200 (compared with 250 in 2023), and the number of missions conducted by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Police in the West Bank in response to EO threats more than doubled in 2024 compared with the previous year.[38]

#### GAZA

Following the 7 October 2023 attack, the EO situation changed very significantly in Gaza. According to a UN assessment released in January 2025, Israel's bombardment of the Strip had left behind 50 million tonnes of rubble.[39] UNMAS has estimated that between 5 to 10 per cent of weapons fired into Gaza have failed to detonate.[40]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

PMAC was established in accordance with Palestinian Minister of Interior decision in 2012,[41] which appointed a director and created a Higher Committee for Mine Action as an interministerial body. The Higher Committee for Mine Action, which serves as the national mine action authority, is tasked with developing mine action legislation and allocating resources for the sector.[42] PMAC, which is located in the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah, is mandated to coordinate all aspects of mine action in the West Bank. It receives technical advice from UNMAS, which acts as an advisory partner to the national authorities in the West Bank, and provides technical support to the PMAC and the EOD police.[43] PMAC has established a number of subcommittees to deal with technical issues, risk education, legal affairs, foreign affairs, and health and safety.[44] In January 2025, the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) for the Occupied Palestinian

32 "Hamas blasts Israel's plan to create buffer zone in Gaza as a 'crime'", *Al Jazeera*, 25 January 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3W4Ga8Z.

33 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.

34 Landmine Monitor, "Palestine – Impact", accessed 4 September 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4lYiWvW.

35 Email from Soula Kreitem, Programme Support Officer, UNMAS, 30 June 2021.

36 Protection Cluster OPT, Protection Analysis Update, March 2025, pp.6-7, at: https://bit.ly/4m3a5Jw.

37 Ibid; and International Crisis Group, "Israel's West Bank Incursions Highlight the Dilemmas of Palestinian Politics", 4 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mTOQes; "With Gaza rule at stake, Palestinian forces struggle to make their case", *The Washington Post*, 20 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mPkD0d; and "The IED threat: Terrorism in the West Bank is fast becoming more sophisticated, deadly", *The Times of Israel*, 5 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/461H0Ip.

38 UNMAS presentation to the Mine Action Support Group (MASG), "HMA in OPT: the EO threat and sector-wide response", Geneva, 11 April 2025, at: http://bit.ly/40Phd5lq.

39 "Rebuilding Gaza: Why reconstruction is a multi-billion dollar challenge", *Reuters*, 5 February 2025, at: http://bit.ly/44VNBER.

40 UN News, "Aid efforts in Gaza escalate, as risk from deadly unexploded ordnance grows", 29 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4eQLVjF.

41 Minister of Interior Decision No. 69, 25 March 2012.

42 Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 19 July 2012; and Imad Mohareb, Planning Department, PMAC, 31 March 2013.

43 Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 and 19 July 2012; and UN, "2012 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects", New York, 2013; and UNMAS, "Occupied Palestinian Territory", accessed 14 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/46ICel5.

44 Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.

Territory (oPt), co-chaired by UNMAS and Humanity & Inclusion (HI), which already covered Gaza, began to cover the West Bank as well.[45] In 2016, Palestine announced it was seeking to enact a mine action law. Palestine was hopeful of completing the legal procedures within a year and then presenting the draft law to the legislative council for endorsement, followed by signature by the President.[46] In March 2023, PMAC reported that the legislation was in its final stages prior to adoption,[47] and in April 2024, PMAC expected the legislation would be adopted by ministers "within a matter of months".[48] However, due to competing priorities, as at April 2025, the legislation still had not passed into law.[49] The primacy of the APMBC in domestic law has, however, been established: in 2017, Palestine's constitutional court ruled that, should there ever be any contradiction, obligations in international treaties, including the APMBC, override national legislation.[50]

At the start of 2023, PMAC, had 14 employees,[51] and was staffed with personnel from the Palestinian National Security Forces, Civil Police, and Civil Defence. In 2013, 36 PMAC personnel were trained by UNMAS for demining but were not subsequently authorised by Israel to conduct clearance.[52] The Civil Police has an EOD unit, which had 42 personnel, in Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Tulkarem, who conduct rapid response to locate and remove items of UXO; it is not known whether the number of staff has changed. The EOD unit is only permitted to work in Area A of the West Bank.[53] All West Bank Police EOD Units were poorly equipped and lacked EOD training. Due to poor information technology systems, none of the EOD teams shares information with PMAC, although this was reported to be changing in 2022 and 2023.[54] In 2022, UNMAS and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted preparatory work to support PMAC to upgrade to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core.[55]

Clearance must be coordinated with the Israeli authorities and PMAC, and, under Israeli law, must be quality assured by an Israeli company.[56] HALO, the only international NGO conducting mine clearance in the West Bank, coordinates its activities with the Israeli authorities (the INMAA) and PMAC. It has an unwritten understanding with both authorities regarding the division of responsibilities,[57] and both the INMAA and PMAC support HALO's activities and provide the necessary coordination and involvement.[58]

## GAZA

In Gaza, in the absence of a functioning national mine authority, UNMAS has served as the official mine action coordination and tasking body since April 2024, and it co-chairs the MA AoR oPt with HI in Gaza.[59] ERW clearance is not currently possible and therefore mine action has focused on supporting interagency missions, assessing explosive hazards, and risk education. International NGOs have worked with UNMAS, including on explosive hazard assessments, as and when security allows. HALO, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), HI, and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) have all collaborated with UNMAS in Gaza,[60] and as at March 2025, DRC was planning to set up an EOD response team in Gaza.[61]

The extent to which demining actors can engage in the activities listed varies according to the conflict. Furthermore, international efforts to clear ERW have been hampered by the restrictions on imports of mine action equipment imposed by Israel.[62] That said, UNMAS, working with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), has been facilitating debris management following a pilot project in the last four months of 2024. Efforts have focused on priority buildings for civilians and identifying and assessing other priority sites.[63] International demining NGOs have also provided risk education in Gaza, often working through local partners. These include HI (which also delivers risk education in the West Bank);[64] MAG, which has worked with local partner Save Lives Future;[65]

45 Kateryna Templeton, Co-Chair, MA AoR oPt, 29 July 2025.

46 Statement of Palestine, APMBC Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016.

47 Email from Maj. Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 23 March 2023.

48 Interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.

49 Interview with General Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 9 April 2025.

50 Initial Article 7 Report, Form A.

51 Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 23 March 2023.

52 Initial Article 7 Report, Form D.

53 Email from staff member in the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018.

54 Emails from Patrick McCabe, Chief of Operations, UNMAS Palestine, 22 August 2022; and Tess Bresnan, Head of Project Unit/Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS Palestine, 25 April 2023.

55 Email from Tess Bresnan, UNMAS Palestine, 25 April 2023.

56 Email from Soula Kreitem, UNMAS, 30 June 2021.

57 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024.

58 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 24 July 2022 and 3 June 2025.

59 UNMAS presentation to Mine Action Support Group, *Latest Timelines: UNMAS in Gaza*, 29 April 2024 (Geneva), at: https://bit.ly/3Y4GabL; and UNMAS, "Occupied Palestinian Territory", accessed 14 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/46ICel5.

60 Online interview with Luke Irving, Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS oPT, 15 May 2025; UNMAS oPT Explosive Threat Factsheet January 2025, 30 January 2025; Statement by Darren McCormack, Chief Executive Officer, MAG, "Statement from MAG CEO following an incident in Deir al Balah, Gaza, that injured MAG staff member", 19 March 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4404tfs; interview with Simon Elmont, HI, at the UN National Directors Meeting & UN Advisers (NDM28), Geneva, 11 April 2025; and email from Nick Vovk, HMA Coordinator, DRC, 17 July 2025.

61 Email from Nick Vovk, DRC, 20 March 2025.

62 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "Today's top news: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Haiti, Mozambique", 14 March 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3LlWdKI; OCHA, "Gaza Humanitarian Response Update: 10–23 June 2024", 26 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3XZWc6p; "Gaza Strip 'uninhabitable' due to undetonated explosives, US says", *Jerusalem Post*, 18 April 2025, at: http://bit.ly/40amP99; and "Gazans survive among the bombs", *Reuters*, 17 April 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3IlncYo.

63 Presentation by Luke Irving, UNMAS oPT, "Mine Action in Gaza – saving lives, enabling humanitarian response and early recovery", NDM28, Geneva, 11 April 2025.

64 HI, "Gaza: HI runs risk awareness campaigns to protect the population", 23 January 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3TG3d9d.

65 MAG, "Returning home in Gaza: Life-saving messages for communities", 23 January 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3TZJLo2, and "Saving Lives in Gaza", 28 February 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3IARjLp.

DanChurchAid (DCA) and Norwegian Church Aid, which have worked with local partner, MA'AN Development Center;[66] and DRC, which has worked directly and through local partners in Gaza and the West Bank.[67]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

PMAC does not have its own budget, and the Palestinian Authority only provides funding for the salaries of PMAC employees and the costs of the PMAC office.[68]

HALO's clearance operations in the West Bank and Jordan Valley have not been funded by either the Palestinian or the Israeli governments, and it faced significant challenges raising funds from international donors for Phase 1 of its operations in the West Bank.[69] HALO's activities in the Jordan Valley were funded by the United States (US) Department of State in 2024. In 2025, the US Department of State has continued to fund HALO's clearance operations in the Jordan Valley, and the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also providing financial support.[70]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

PMAC has said that it has a gender policy and implementation plan; that it disaggregates data by sex and age;[71] and that qualified women and men have equal access to employment.[72] As a result of a one-year grant from UNMAS to mainstream gender in its risk education, in 2021 the number of women working and volunteering at PMAC increased.[73] No detailed updated gender breakdown data have been disclosed by PMAC, but at April 2024, it suggested that between 40% and 50% of its staff were female.[74]

HALO has a global policy on gender and diversity. The representation of female employees varies according to the operation. HALO's Palestine programme deploys a team of Armenian deminers. For managerial positions within HALO's West Bank office team, there is said to be equal access to employment for qualified women and men,[75] though the distribution of roles in the operation is said to be a result of traditional practices and the environment in which it operates. At the end of 2024, HALO reported that just two of its thirty staff in the West Bank were women.[76]

**Table 2 Gender composition of HALO in the West Bank (at end 2024)[77]**

| Total staff | Total women staff | Total managerial and supervisory staff | Total women managerial and supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Total women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 30 | 2 (7%) | 5 | 1 (20%) | 20 | 1 (5%) |

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

In the West Bank, HALO follows its global environmental management policy and standard operating procedures (SOPs) on the environmental impact of clearance and mitigation measures to be taken. All clearance operations are planned and conducted so as to minimise environmental impact.[78] The requirements for environmental assessments are set out in its environment policy and relevant SOP, although in practice, assessments may not be undertaken for every task.[79] Where impact cannot be avoided, plans are made to mitigate this and to make good any damage caused, for example by replacing soil, replanting vegetation, and conducting full remediation following mechanical clearance. Landowners and communities are included in the development of clearance plans and mitigation and remedial measures.[80]

66 Email from Noe Falk Nielsen, EORE/NTS Advisor, DCA & Norwegian Church Aid; and DCA, "Handling Explosive Threats", accessed 9 July 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4lL0Gqn.

67 Email from Nick Vovk, HMA Coordinator, DRC, 20 March 2025.

68 Interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 7 February 2019; email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 23 March 2023; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023); Form D.

69 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 23 April 2021 and 26 March 2023.

70 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

71 Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 24 May 2020.

72 Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 12 May 2021.

73 Emails from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 15 June 2022 and 23 March 2023.

74 Interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.

75 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022 and 3 June 2025.

76 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

77 Ibid.

78 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022, 26 March 2023, and 3 June 2025.

79 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

80 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022 and 26 March 2023.

**Table 3: Environmental policies and action**[81]

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| HALO | No* | Yes | No** |

*HALO's West Bank programme adheres to its global environmental policy and SOPs. **HALO does not have an environmental focal point as such. Its West Bank team is small, and the Programme Manager acts as the *de facto* focal point.

HALO's operations are accredited to ISO 14001 on environmental management and comply with the environmental standards set by the authorities in the West Bank, which have robust mechanisms to prevent environmental harm.[82] An annual assessment and review is conducted to ensure that the programme operates according to all required procedures.[83] Standards are monitored by an external quality assurance (QA) company and the Israeli Standards Institute.[84] In accordance with national specifications and laws, the relevant authorities approve HALO's activities in advance of any new activities, and HALO takes into account any comments or objections including environmental issues. Clearance plans are submitted for approval and include a risk management table. Weather conditions are addressed as part of the national specification requirements, including weather hazards (extreme heat, rain, and flooding). The weather forecast is monitored daily and the team in the field is notified of any risks, as needed.[85]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

PMAC uses an old version of IMSMA.[86] The Police EOD systems are also old and EOD teams have not been inputting information into the IMSMA database.[87] In 2022, as planned, UNMAS and the GICHD supported PMAC in preparations to install IMSMA Core. In 2023, this was to be taken forward with in-person facilitation and training in the West Bank.[88] As at April 2024, the transition was reported to be ongoing, and it was noted that PMAC staff still required training.[89] The process had still not been completed as at April 2025.[90]

HALO rolled out its global database, the Global Operations Information Management System (GO-IMS) to its West Bank programme in 2024, and all data accumulated since 2014 have been transferred to the database.[91] HALO follows the INMAA's national standards and, when undertaking operations in the West Bank, provides daily and weekly reports as well as completion reports for every task. The information is shared with PMAC weekly, along with completion reports and geographic information system (GIS) data for every completed task.[92] As a result, all three entities are in possession of HALO survey and clearance data relating to the West Bank.

Palestine submitted an initial Article 7 report in 2018, as required by the APMBC.[93] No Article 7 reports were submitted for 2020 or 2021. Palestine did, however, submit an Article 7 report covering 2022 in June 2023 (although much of the information it contained pre-dated 2022).[94] An annual report covering 2023 was duly submitted in 2024, though as at July 2025, no report had been submitted covering 2024.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

PMAC had a Strategic Plan for 2017–20[95] in which the primary objectives were the clearance of the Nur a-Shams, Qabatiya, and Yabad minefields in the West Bank,[96] which have now been completed.[97] In April 2024, PMAC reported that a delayed new strategic plan was being reviewed to take into account developments in Gaza since October 2023.[98] As at April 2025, PMAC reported that two strategies were in place, one for the West Bank and another for Gaza, and that work

81 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
82 Ibid.
83 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024.
84 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 26 March 2023.
85 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024.
86 Emails from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 15 June 2022, and 23 March 2023.
87 Email from Patrick McCabe, UNMAS Palestine, 17 August 2022.
88 Email from Tess Bresnan, UNMAS Palestine, 25 April 2023.
89 Interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.
90 Interview with General Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 9 April 2025.
91 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024 and 3 June 2025.
92 Ibid.
93 Initial Article 7 Report, Form D.
94 Article 7 Report (covering 2022).
95 The Article 7 report covering 2017 indicated that the strategic plan covered 2017–22.
96 PMAC, "Strategic Plan 2017–2020", undated.
97 Emails from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 15 June 2022 and 23 March 2023.
98 Emails from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 15 June 2022 and 23 March 2023; and interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.

had started on their implementation.[99] No further details were provided. According to PMAC, there were no annual work plans in place between 2020 and 2024, with operations determined by the situation on the ground.[100]

HALO's survey and clearance schedule in the West Bank is agreed with PMAC, INMAA, and its international donors,[101] and clearance is conducted in an order approved by both national mine action authorities.[102] Since completion of Phase 1 of its operations in the West Bank in 2023, HALO has turned its attention to Phase 2 of its operations and clearance of minefields in the Jordan Valley. In 2024, all efforts focused on clearing the Sokot AP minefield in the Jordan Valley, and HALO was planning to continue this focus in 2025.[103]

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

HALO's SOPs are approved by INMAA,[104] and INMAA extended their approval in 2024.[105] HALO's SOPs were last submitted and approved in June 2020, and have not been amended since.[106] HALO's work in the West Bank complies with the Israeli Institute for Standards, and in particular with ISO 9001, ISO 14001, and ISO 18001. INMAA regularly visits sites and monitors operations against national standards and clearance plans. There is daily contact between INMAA and HALO.[107]

HALO conducted mechanical clearance of AP mines in 2024 and 2025.[108] It also uses a drone for survey and mapping, with the maps generated shared with all parties involved for planning and follow-up.[109] It has its own internal quality control (QC), which is conducted by senior programme staff, and which complies with the ISO standards and HALO's own SOPs. In addition, the INMAA requires external INMAA-certified Israeli companies to undertake QA/QC of HALO's clearance operations in line with Israeli law.[110]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, HALO deployed two teams and a total of 12 deminers at the Sokot AP minefield to undertake mechanical clearance, though exact numbers varied during the year.[111] This compares with 2023 when, during the year, HALO deployed one demining team, with between 10 and 12 deminers, along with two front-loaders, two excavators, and two screeners.[112]

**Table 4: HALO clearance capacities deployed in the West Bank in 2024**[113]

| Governorate | Manual teams | Total deminers | Dogs and dog handlers | Mechanical assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jordan Valley | 2 | 12 | 0 | 3 |
| **Totals** | **5** | **12** | **0** | **3** |

In the five months to February 2024, a HALO team was manually clearing AV mines at the Sokot AV minefield. HALO indicated a need to increase the number of clearance personnel due to the shift to mechanical AP mine clearance and the support requirements for this.[114] HALO expected to procure additional mechanical assets in 2025 that would, in effect, double the capacity of the programme. Personnel numbers will increase slightly as a result.[115]

99 Interview with General Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.
100 Emails from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 24 May 2020, 12 May 2021, and 15 June 2022; and interview with General Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.
101 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 18 June 2020 and 26 March 2023.
102 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024.
103 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
104 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 14 May 2018.
105 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
106 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022.
107 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024.
108 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 31 July 2025.
109 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 10 April 2019.
110 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022.
111 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
112 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024 and 3 June 2025.
113 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, HALO cleared 29,710m² of CHA and destroyed 1,455 AP mines in the Jordan Valley.[116] HALO does not release hazardous area through survey in the West Bank or the Jordan Valley.[117]

**Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**[118]

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 29,710 | |
| **Technical survey** | 0 | In the West Bank, HALO does not release mined area through survey, but only through clearance. |
| **Non-technical survey** | 0 | As above. |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 1,455 | 3 items of UXO were also destroyed. |

## SURVEY IN 2024

HALO did not release any AP mined area through survey in the West Bank in 2024 or in 2023.[119]

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, HALO cleared 29,710m² of confirmed AP mined area at the Sokot AP minefield in the Jordan Valley, destroying 1,455 AP mines and three UXO. This is a significant increase on clearance in 2023 when HALO cleared 5,975m² of confirmed AP and AV mined area in the West Bank, and destroyed 32 AP mines and 26 AV mines during clearance operations. Another estimated 15,945m² of AV mined area was cleared in the Jordan Valley by HALO in 2023 (in the Sokot AV minefield, HALO cleared 94,947m² between 26 September 2023 and 28 February 2024, including an estimated 87,237m² cleared in January and February 2024).[120]

**Table 6: AP mine clearance by HALO in the West Bank in 2024**[121]

| Operator | Governorate | Task Name | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HALO | Jordan Valley | Sokot | 29,710 | *1,455 |
| **Totals** | | | **29,710** | **1,455** |

*Three items of UXO were also destroyed.

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PALESTINE: 1 JUNE 2018

↓

**ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE. COMPLETION IS CONTINGENT ON POLITICAL FACTORS, AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, AND DEMINING PROGRESS MADE BY ISRAEL AND HALO, AS PALESTINE DOES NOT HAVE CONTROL OF MINED AREAS UNDER ITS JURISDICTION.**

116 Ibid.
117 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June and 31 July 2025.
118 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
119 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025; and online interview, 5 August 2024.
120 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June and 5 August 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.
121 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Palestine is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2028. It will not meet this deadline.

Clearance in the West Bank is constrained by available funding[122] and affected by political factors, including the lack of authorisation granted by Israel for Palestine to conduct mine clearance.[123] PMAC had reported that concluding clearance and meeting the 2025 deadline is dependent on the facilitation of the Israeli authorities and the availability of funds.[124] PMAC stated in 2024 that with the necessary support, it could complete Phase 2 of its clearance operations by 2027, and that it could provide a detailed project proposal to those interested in supporting its clearance work.[125] In its most recent Article 7 report (covering 2023), Palestine listed other challenges it faced in meeting its Article 5 obligations, including a lack of human resources to conduct survey and clearance, a lack of equipment for clearance operations, and the "Israeli occupation", which prevents the Palestinian government from conducting demining.[126]

The nine high priority AP minefields in the West Bank, release of which started in 2014, were all cleared by the middle of 2023.[127] In 2019, INMAA had originally hoped that the Yalo and Canada Park minefields would be cleared with other mined areas in the West Bank, and that this would be finished in two years. However, according to humanitarian prioritisation, and noting that the minefields are fenced and marked, INMAA claimed that the Yalo and Canada Park sites have little humanitarian impact, and these have not been cleared.[128]

Progress did, however, continue in 2024 when HALO began to clear the Sokot AP minefield in the Jordan Valley.[129] INMAA began surveying the Jordan Valley minefields in the West Bank in 2017, where it identified significant potential for cancellation and reduction of land, and used various technologies and scientific tools to assess the likelihood of mine drift.[130] Once the Sokot AP minefield is cleared, this will leave only the Shadmot Mehola AP and AV site (covering a total of 65,000m$^2$) to be cleared in the Jordan Valley in Phase 2 of HALO's operations, but authority has yet to be given for clearance at the site.[131]

**Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (m²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 29,710 |
| 2023 | 5,975 |
| 2022 | 31,854 |
| 2021 | 0 |
| 2020 | 18,269 |
| **Total** | **85,808** |

### GAZA

Any AP mine contamination in the Gaza Strip has yet to be confirmed.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Palestine does not have plans in place to address residual contamination once its Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

122 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022.
123 Initial Article 7 Report, Form D; and interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.
124 Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 12 May 2021.
125 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
126 Ibid., Form H.
127 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
128 Interview with Marcel Aviv, INMAA, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.
129 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
130 Interview with Michael Heiman, INMAA, in Geneva, 15 February 2018; and emails, 23 July and 10 August 2017; and, after leaving INMAA, 26 May 2018.
131 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 27 July 2023 and 30 June 2024.

# PERU



## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2029

On track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 279,388M²

Light
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 22,625 | 48,065 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 746 | 2,136 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- General Directorate for Humanitarian Demining of the Peruvian Army (DIGEDEHUME)
- Mine Action Division of the Peruvian National Police (DIVCOMIN)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In November 2024, at the Fifth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Peru was granted an extension to its Article 5 deadline. This was Peru's third—and likely final—extension request, which aims to clear all 46 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) remaining and to destroy some 4,000 anti-personnel (AP) mines, by the end of 2029. These CHAs are located across three mountainous remote "sectors" in the Cordillera del Cóndor (sacred mountains), within the Amazonas department, along the border with Ecuador.

Between June and November 2024, Peru cleared 22,625m² of mined area and destroyed 746 AP mines in 14 CHAs of the Santiago sector. In March 2025, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), which had signed a five-year memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Peru's Ministry of Defence in early 2023, launched a new project to support Peru's national authorities and the army demining unit in fulfilling its Article 5 obligations.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Peru should continue to collaborate with international partners to strengthen land release methodology, including by further reviewing its national mine action standards (NMAS).**
- **Peru should apply all land release methods, including technical survey (TS), to address the remaining CHAs.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 4 | In December 2023, NPA assessed that Peru had gained a complete understanding of its landmine contamination. Its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request included maps and GPS data for all areas, classified as CHAs, totalling 280,000m$^2$ and around 4,000 AP mines, mostly in remote areas along the border with Ecuador. While most CHAs are small–under 1,000m$^2$—one newly added area in Peru's 2024 extension request and latest Article 7 report, PV Gutiérrez, accounts for 2,000 AP mines alone. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | In 2024, the Peruvian Mine Action Centre (CONTRAMINAS) continued to coordinate Peru's demining with annual government funding of approximately US$761,000. Peru also stepped up its resource mobilisation, noting that with an additional US$1.5 million in international support, it could complete demining by end 2027. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Peru lacks a mine action-specific gender policy, but CONTRAMINAS operates under the 2019 National Gender Equality Policy. A designated gender focal point, who is also the centre's Deputy Director, ensures gender integration in demining. Despite this, women remain under-represented: only 11 of 105 staff are women (eight deminers, two instructors, and one manager). |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 4 | Peru is seeking to minimise the environmental impact of demining in the Cordillera del Cóndor, aligning operations with the Master Plan for the Ichigkat National Park (2019–23). In 2024, the programme appointed an environmental focal point within CONTRAMINAS and began reviewing national mine action standards to align with IMAS 07.13 on environmental management. Its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request underscored the growing impact of climate change, with heavy rains frequently delaying operations and affecting the accuracy of CHA locations, prompting use of a 600-metre buffer zone during land release. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 5 | Peru uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and worked in 2024 to improve data quality. This included coordination with Ecuador to verify historical records and maps of mined areas that were laid by Ecuadorian forces. Peru also updated its geographic referencing system to improve accuracy. Peru remains actively engaged in APMBC processes and consistently submits timely transparency reports. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 6 | The 2024 extension request included a National Action Plan for 2025–29, outlining clear annual clearance targets and prioritisation criteria. The plan is based solely on national funding, estimated at US$3.8 million. To accelerate the process and complete clearance within three years, though, Peru appealed for international support. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 7 | In 2024, CONTRAMINAS began updating Peru's national standards, building on experience from jungle operations to optimise detection and clearance. This follows recommendations by NPA in December 2023 to clarify land release procedures and incorporate international best practices. Despite having national standards for NTS and TS, Peru only reports land release through full clearance, without mentioning the survey methods used to cancel or reduce mined areas. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | At the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, Peru was granted a third extension to its Article 5 deadline until the end of 2029. The mined area to be covered in 2025–29 totals 279,388m$^2$ and is believed to contain 3,997 AP mines. Peru remains on track to meet this new deadline. In 2024, Peru cleared a total of 22,625m$^2$ in Santiago sector, destroying 746 AP mines. |
| **Average Score** | **6.4** | **5.5** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Peruvian Mine Action Center (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- General Directorate for Humanitarian Demining of the Peruvian Army (Dirección General de Desminado Humanitario del Ejército, DIGEDEHUME)

- Mine Action Division of the Peruvian National Police (División Contraminas de la Policía Nacional del Perú, DIVCOMIN)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Organization of American States (OAS) Comprehensive Action Against Anti-Personnel Mines Program (OAS-AICMA)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

According to the Peruvian Mine Action Centre (CONTRAMINAS), Peru's current baseline of AP mine contamination is reasonably accurate.[1] At the end of 2024, Peru reported that AP mined area covered a total of 279,388m$^2$ across 46 CHAs located in three "sectors" of the Amazonas department, along the border with Ecuador (see Table 1).[2] The overwhelming majority of the 46 CHAs are relatively small in size: 35 each cover less than 1,000m$^2$ and contain an average of 30 AP mines. The smallest covers just 5m$^2$ and contains 3 AP mines, while the largest spans 160,000m$^2$ and is said to have 147 AP mines.[3]

In December 2023, NPA conducted an assessment mission that concluded that "the Peruvian Mine Action programme now has a complete overview of the extent of its contamination".[4] It further noted that the mined areas still to be cleared are in remote mountainous terrains on the Ecuadorian boarder and were predominantly laid by Ecuadorian forces. These areas are sparsely populated, lack local knowledge, and have few, if any, identifiable landmarks or features to assist in locating the minefields.[5]

No new mined areas were identified during 2024. However, as reported by Peru at the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC in 2022,[6] a previously unrecorded site, Puesto de Vigilancia Gutiérrez (PV Gutiérrez), was formally included in Peru's 2024 Article 7 report covering 2023 and its last deadline extension request. This hazardous area is estimated to cover 10,182m$^2$ and is believed to contain 2,000 AP mines that were laid by Peru around 1996 to protect the surveillance post.[7] PV Gutiérrez lies along the border, where, despite the boundary having been legally established by the Rio de Janeiro Protocol signed in 1942, its physical demarcation is still ongoing. Peru said this is currently managed under the framework of the Peru-Ecuador Permanent Border Commission (Comisión Permanente de Fronteras Perú-Ecuador, COMPEFEP).[8] CONTRAMINAS informed Mine Action Review that alternative methodologies for collecting geospatial information are being explored with a view to developing a joint methodology.[9]

Until recently, Peru classified areas as "suspected or confirmed to contain" AP mines. However, its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request and related statements refer to CHAs, providing a list of all contaminated areas, complete with maps and GPS coordinates.[10] Despite this, most of the remaining areas were originally transferred by Ecuador to Peru without defined polygons to accurately delineate the hazardous zones. According to CONTRAMINAS, use of geospatial polygons remains highly constrained due to the challenging mountainous terrain, which complicates identification and verification of reference points or coordinates recorded in the original sketch maps.[11] Peru has not confirmed whether additional survey is required to define the precise perimeters of mined areas and only applies a full clearance methodology to release contaminated areas.

Peru also warned of the possibility to discover of new, previously unrecorded areas contaminated with AP mines – a key lesson highlighted in its 2024 extension request. Over the years, eight previously unrecorded CHAs have been identified, underscoring the likelihood that more areas may still be found in these regions.[12]

**Table 1: AP mined area by sector (at end 2024)[13]**

| Sector | CHAs | Area (m$^2$) | AP mines |
|---|---|---|---|
| Achuime | 18 | 180,965 | 392 |
| Cenepa I, II, III | 27 | 88,241 | 1,605 |
| Santiago/PV Gutiérrez | 1 | 10,182 | 2,000 |
| **Totals** | **46** | **279,388** | **3,997** |

1 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, First Secretary SDR, Deputy Director CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.
2 Statement of Peru on Article 5, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F(2).
3 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 82–84.
4 NPA Assessment Mission Report, December 2023, p. 4.
5 Ibid., p. 10.
6 Statement of Peru, Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, 21–25 November 2022.
7 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 45, 49 and 84; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F(2).
8 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 2, 2 August 2024; and Decision on the extension request, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.
9 Emails from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025; and Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, Deputy Technical Secretary, CONTRAMINAS, 17 July 2025.
10 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 35–36 and 82–84.
11 Emails from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 6 September 2023; and Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 October 2024.
12 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 31.
13 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F(2); and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 35–36 and 82–84.

The mine threat in Peru results from a 1995 border conflict with Ecuador. The mined section of the border was predominantly in the Condor mountain range which was at the centre of the dispute. In October 2024, Peru and Ecuador were commemorating 26 years of signing the Brasilia Peace Accords which ended the armed conflict between the two States.[14]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

CONTRAMINAS, established in 2002 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), serves as the national authority for demining. It is responsible for setting the national mine action strategy and priorities, as well as for coordinating related activities with implementing bodies, namely the General Directorate for Humanitarian Demining of the Peruvian Army (DIGEDEHUME) and the Mine Action Division of the Peruvian National Police (DIVCOMIN). CONTRAMINAS is composed of two bodies: an Interministerial Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat. The Executive Council is chaired by a MoFA representative and includes members from other key ministries (defence, education, interior, and health) and from the National Council for integration of persons with disabilities.[15]

Peru has a Humanitarian Demining School, established with support from United States (US)-based Ronco in 2009–2010, which has been the main training centre for the demining programme. It has offered a range of courses, including demining, EOD Levels 1 and 2, battle area clearance, mine detection dog (MDD) handler training, and medical support. Now renamed the School for Mines and Explosive Ordnance Disposal, it has transitioned to serve as the Army's official training institution for Military Engineers in explosive ordnance, including improvised explosive devices, and is fully managed by the Army.[16]

In 2024, Peru and Ecuador continued to collaborate on demining through regular bilateral meetings, including the 25th Meeting of National Mine Action Authorities held in October in Quito, which brought together the Ecuadorian Mine Action Center (CENDESMI) and CONTRAMINAS. During the meeting, the authorities reviewed the progress of demining in their respective nations and developed joint strategies for international cooperation. In 2023–24, Peru and Ecuador received international support for their demining. This included advisory visits from the Convention's Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), as well as equipment donations and training from Italy via the Italo-Latin American Institute (IILA).[17]

Peru also received international support from Italy, Norway, and Spain in 2024 to strengthen institutional and operational capacities. It focused on training and refreshing the Army's demining units, including courses in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), increasing the number of personnel assigned to demining, implementing the use of dogs for external quality control, and incorporating mine detectors donated by Italy. These donations included eight CEIA CMD compact surface metal detectors, three deep metal detectors, and four demining training kits (GSMD – TPS).[18]

In 2024, NPA, which signed a five-year MoU with the Ministry of Defence in February 2023, focused on supporting the Ministry and Armed Forces in strengthening ammunition safety management. The project, scheduled to run to July 2026, involves capacity-building and technical assistance. It also includes a component dedicated to destruction of obsolete stockpiles.[19] In 2025, Peru expected to receive continued support from Norway through NPA, including training, provision of personal protective equipment (PPE), and mine detection equipment. NPA plans to support CONTRAMINAS in reviewing and implementing national standards, and to provide advice for operational planning to the army demining units.[20]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Peru allocates an annual budget to support demining operations, ensuring the continuity of mine clearance, training, and capacity-building activities led by CONTRAMINAS. In 2024, the government allocated 2,893,348 soles (approximately US$761,407) for clearance and related activities.[21] Peru has indicated that it will continue providing an annual contribution of 2.09 million soles—approximately US$760,000 depending on exchange rate fluctuations—through to 2029 to complete demining. Notably, nearly 45% of this budget is spent on helicopter flight hours, which are essential for accessing remote operations sites.[22] In its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, Peru estimated that US$3.8 million is required to fulfil its clearance obligations by the end of 2029. With international financial support of US$1.5 million, however, it could complete the work in three years – by the end of 2027. Without this support, and relying solely on national funding, completion would take five years.[23]

14 "Peru commemorates 26th anniversary of Brasilia Peace Accords signing", *Andina*, 28 October 2024, at: https://bit.ly/43pBVtp.

15 Article 7 Report (covering 2024) Form A; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 19–20.

16 NPA Assessment Mission Report, December 2023, p. 10.

17 Joint Statement of Peru and Ecuador on Cooperation and Assistance, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024.

18 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 3; and email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.

19 Email from Francesca Maria Clara Scardeoni, Country Director, NPA, 22 March 2025.

20 Ibid.; and email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.

21 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.

22 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 42-43.

23 Ibid., Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 3.

In 2024, Peru intensified its resource mobilisation efforts to secure materials and supplies for demining. These efforts have taken place both bilaterally and within various international forums, including through an "Individualised Approach" presented during the 2024 APMBC intersessional meetings.[24] Peru has engaged in bilateral discussions with potential donors such as Germany, Italy, Slovenia, and Spain.[25] In November 2023, the OAS-AICMA had organised an event in Washington, DC, entitled "In Support of the Completion of Demining Efforts: Reaching the Goal of a Mine-Free Ecuador and Peru." The aim was to attract new donors and strengthen support for the final phase of demining.[26]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Peru does not have a specific gender and diversity policy for its mine action programme, but says it complies with the gender equality legislation set down in a decree issued by Peru's Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations in April 2019, which formally established the National Gender Equality Policy (Política Nacional de Igualdad de Género, PNIG).[27] The PNIG provides a regulatory framework within which all state entities, including CONTRAMINAS, must operate to ensure gender equality.

CONTRAMINAS has a designated gender focal point, who serves as the centre's Deputy Director, responsible for ensuring that gender considerations are effectively integrated into demining policies and activities.[28] CONTRAMINAS has actively promoted gender and diversity integration, which is reflected in the increasing participation of women in demining over time. In its 2024 extension request, Peru highlighted the key roles women have in demining operations. Between 2017 and 2023, 31 women worked as deminers, with several receiving specialised training in programmes such as MDD handling and Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS).[29] Women have also held various leadership and operational roles, including Deputy Director for Mine Action, area supervisors, dog handlers, trainers involved in external QC, and instructors at the Army's Humanitarian Demining School.[30]

At the annual meetings convened by CONTRAMINAS, the Army's DIGEDEHUME and the Police's DIVCOMIN are encouraged to actively promote the participation of women in demining, as well as their inclusion in key areas such as training, instruction, and planning.[31] Despite an inclusive environment, however, only 11 of the 105 staff at CONTRAMINAS—just over 10%—are women. Among them, eight work as deminers in operational roles, representing 13% of the 60 deminers, two serve as instructors at the Demining School, and one holds a management position (see Table 2).[32]

**Table 2: Gender composition of CONTRAMINAS in 2024**[33]

| Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 105 | 11 (10%) | 6 | 1 (17%) | 99 | 10 (10%) |

The needs of women, children, and ethnic minority groups in communities affected by mined areas are said to be carefully considered when prioritising, planning, and assigning survey and clearance tasks. Factors such as proximity to mined areas, the number of people affected (disaggregated by gender and age), and information from local authorities guide these decisions, with a commitment to respecting their customs, beliefs, and ways of life, ensuring that interventions are culturally appropriate.[34]

The 2024 extension request noted that mine risk education campaigns are planned and coordinated with local authorities and actively include participation from indigenous communities.[35] In the past, CONTRAMINAS reported consulting the National Service for Protected Natural Areas (SERNANP) to consider the needs of ethnic and minority groups when planning demining.[36] Victim data and risk education beneficiary data are disaggregated by sex and age.[37]

24 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, pp. 3–4.
25 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 23.
26 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 October 2024.
27 Supreme Decree No. 008-2019-MIMP, available at: https://bit.ly/4dJRBuX.
28 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.
29 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.
30 Ibid., Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 7.
31 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.
32 Emails from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 October 2024 and 4 April 2025.
33 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.
34 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.
35 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26–27.
36 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 26 May 2020.
37 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26–27.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Peru does not have a national mine action standard (NMAS) dedicated to environmental management. However, CONTRAMINAS has indicated that it is reviewing its NMAS to align with the latest International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 and adapting it to Peru's specific context. Additionally, CONTRAMINAS has a designated environmental focal point in 2024 responsible for ensuring that demining is conducted while respecting the environment and in compliance with environmental regulations.[38]

Until now, demining was undertaken in accordance with the Master Plan of the Ichigkat National Park – Cordillera del Cóndor 2019–2023. The Master Plan sets environmental regulations to minimise the impact of the activities, ensuring that demining takes special care to protect the area during clearance. The plan also permits the use of existing trails within the Ichigkat Muja Cordillera del Cóndor National Park to access mined sites. Additionally, it emphasises respect for the ancestral rights of the Awajun and Wampis native communities bordering the park, allowing them free passage through these areas to carry out essential activities previously hindered by the presence of mines.[39] During demining, particularly within the Ichigkat Muja National Park Reserve, controlled burning is carefully planned and implemented to reduce toxic gas emissions and minimise ecological impact. Efficient resource use is also promoted in demining camps through proper waste management and use of solar panels.[40]

CONTRAMINAS considers environmental impact and extreme weather risks when planning and prioritising survey and clearance; for example, constant assessments detect possible displacements of AP mines caused by floods or other natural events. Additionally, safe collection and disposal of unexploded ordnance and other hazardous devices prevent residual risks to the ecosystem. Clearance techniques are also employed to minimise soil disturbance, reducing impact on surrounding flora and fauna while preserving vegetation cover.[41]

In its 2024 extension request, Peru highlighted the significant impact of climate and environmental conditions on its demining. The 46 CHAs scheduled for clearance between 2025 and 2029 are in the Santiago, Achuime, and Cenepa sectors, all of which are subject to challenging weather conditions that complicate operations. The Cordillera del Cóndor, shaped by the convergence of the Andes and the Amazon, features a variety of subtropical climate zones ranging from humid to rainy. Heavy rains at the start of the workday can prevent air medical evacuations, leading weather-monitoring personnel to withhold the "green light" necessary to begin operations and sometimes causing delays of up to a week.[42] At the intersessional meetings in June 2024, Peru highlighted that these conditions "have intensified due to climate change".[43]

Environmental conditions also influence the land release methodology. The location of the CHAs can shift due to the time elapsed (29 years) and the effect of rain, landslides, animal activity, and other regional characteristics. Therefore, a buffer zone of up to 600 metres around the reference point is considered when defining the CHA.[44]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

CONTRAMINAS uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.[45] In 2024, Peru undertook efforts to improve the quality of its mine action database. This included technical meetings with Ecuador because the records and maps of mined areas pertain to mines it had originally laid. When data are incomplete or unclear, support is requested from the Ecuadorian Demining Command to verify and enhance accuracy. Peru has also strengthened its validation and information update mechanisms to ensure the database reliably reflects the status of mined areas in its territory.[46] Additionally, the 2024 extension request indicated that the geographic referencing system was changed from PASAT-56 to WGS-84, ensuring greater accuracy in locating the CHA.[47]

Peru consistently attends APMBC meetings, including the Fifth Review Conference in Cambodia in 2024. It submits its Article 7 transparency reports on a timely basis and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation at intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties.

38 Emails from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025; and Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 17 July 2025.
39 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 4.
40 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.
41 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.
42 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8–9.
43 Statement of Peru, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.
44 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 2.
45 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 42.
46 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.
47 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 2.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Peru's 2024 Article 5 extension request is structured in three parts, the last of which is the National Action Plan for Comprehensive Anti-Personnel Mine Action 2025–2029 ("Plan Nacional de Accion Integral contra la Minas Antipersonal 2025-2029").[48] Peru estimated that a total of US$3.8 million is needed to carry out its mine action programme and presented a five-year plan (2025–29) based on use of national funding only, with detailed annual clearance targets (see Table 3 below).[49]

Peru says prioritisation of mine clearance is based on several key criteria. One major factor is the proximity of minefields to the helicopter supply base in the town of Urakuza. For example, the Achuime sector, planned for 2025, is about 56km from Urakuza (distance measured using Google Earth), whereas the Cenepa I II and III sectors, planned for 2026, 2027, and 2028 are located between 95 and 133km away. The most remote area, PV Gutiérrez, planned for 2029, lies at about 150km from the base.[50] Other prioritisation criteria include the concentration of minefields within each work zone and the distance between them, the number of mines present in each CHA, the regional geographical and meteorological conditions, and the proximity of Indigenous communities to the CHAs.[51]

**Table 3: Planned mine clearance with national funding in 2025–29**[52]

| Year | Sector | Mined areas | Area (m²) | AP mines |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Achuime | 18 | 180,965 | 392 |
| 2026 | Cenepa I | 8 | 1,331 | 203 |
| 2027 | Cenepa II | 11 | 15,630 | 743 |
| 2028 | Cenepa III | 8 | 71,280 | 659 |
| 2029 | Santiago (PV Gutiérrez) | 1 | 10,182 | 2,000 |
| **Totals** | | **46** | **279,388** | **3,997** |

Peru has presented a second plan to complete mine clearance in three years (2025–27) relying on a combination of national and international funding.[53] If international support is secured—specifically, the requested US$1.5 million for personal protective equipment (PPE), 90 mine detectors, camp infrastructure, and IT and communications equipment—clearance could be completed within three years. In 2026, operations will target minefields initially scheduled for 2026 and 2027 (8 and 11 areas, respectively). In 2027, efforts would shift to the minefields originally planned for 2028 and 2029 (8 and 1 areas, respectively).[54]

While supporting the extension request, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, asked Peru to provide, by April 2027 an updated, detailed, costed, and multi-year work plan for the remaining extension period with information on progress made, survey results, and an updated list of all areas known or suspected to contain AP mines.[55]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Peru's mine action programme operated directly under the IMAS until April 2023, when CONTRAMINAS adopted the first version of Peru's own National Standards for Humanitarian Demining (las Normas Nacionales para el proceso de desminado humanitario del Perú, NNPDHP). These standards are organised in nine chapters and cover a total of 224 pages. Chapters include the land release process, quality management, risk education, and cleared ground inspection, with guidelines for the use of sampling procedures.[56]

During its assessment mission in December 2023, NPA advised Peru to further strengthen the NMAS. NPA highlighted the need for clearer definitions and application of the land release process; the inclusion of procedures for handling missing mines; and more detailed guidance on phasing out requirements during clearance operations.[57] Specifically, NPA recommended to CONTRAMINAS that if all mines are found and accounted for as per the minefield record, clearance should stop and all remaining areas be released without further clearance. Where no mines are

48 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 56–85.

49 Ibid, pp. 59–63.

50 Presentation of Peru on Article 5, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024.

51 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 1.

52 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 12; Presentation of Peru on Article 5, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

53 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

54 Ibid., p. 75; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 3.

55 Analysis of the extension request, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 8 October 2024, p. 4.

56 NPA Assessment Mission Report, December 2023, pp. 5–6.

57 NPA Assessment Mission Report, December 2023, p. 6.

found, only 20% of the area should be cleared and, if nothing else is found, the remainder should be released. If parts of the minefield are missing after clearance, a 20% TS of the remaining area should be conducted. This is stated in Peru's NMAS, but has not been applied in practice.[58]

In 2024, CONTRAMINAS began reviewing and updating its NMAS, based on the experience gained from demining operations in jungle areas. Once the standards have been updated, CONTRAMINAS will convene its Executive Council to approve them.[59]

Mined areas in the Peruvian jungle, located up to 2,700 metres above sea level, are extremely difficult to access due to rugged, densely forested terrain and lack of transport and communication infrastructure.[60] The absence of roads and navigable rivers means helicopters are the only viable transport, significantly increasing operational costs. Heavy rainfall in the subtropical climate further delays demining by preventing medical evacuations by air.[61] Locating CHAs requires long treks through dense vegetation and ravines, with clearing vegetation taking hours. The rugged, mineralised terrain and the use of old equipment also hamper the effectiveness of mine detectors.[62]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Demining operations are conducted by the Army's DIGEDEHUME and the Police's DIVCOMIN.[63] In 2024, DIGEDEHUME deployed personnel from its EOD Companies 111 and 116, which included two NTS teams, six TS and clearance teams, and two MDDs and their individual handler. In total, these deployments involved 72 personnel (see Table 4 below).[64] In the National Humanitarian Plan 2025–2029, the budget for PPE is based on 90 deminers.[65] Peru indicated that efforts are underway to secure an increased budget for 2026. If approved, this would significantly boost productivity by allowing the hiring of additional demining personnel and extended workdays, ultimately enabling clearance of more areas within a shorter timeframe.[66]

Peru has a dedicated school for mines and EOD that is managed by the army. This facility also houses the country's MDD capacity, which, in December 2023, consisted of eight dogs. These MDDs are used exclusively for post-clearance quality control (QC), which is coordinated by CONTRAMINAS. Four of the dogs were donated by NPA in October 2020, while the remaining four were provided earlier by Ronco. However, all eight dogs are now aging. While they still demonstrate basic obedience, they no longer meet the discipline standards required for effective long-leash drills.[67] Two MDDs will be replaced in 2025 for short-leash QC only.[68]

**Table 4: Operational survey and clearance capacities deployed in 2024**[69]

| Operators | NTS teams | NTS personnel | TS and manual clearance teams | TS and manual clearance personnel | Dogs and handlers |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DIGEDEHUME (Compañía de Desactivación de Explosivos 111) | 1 | 5 | 3 | 30 | 1 |
| DIGEDEHUME (Compañía de Desactivación de Explosivos 116) | 1 | 5 | 3 | 30 | 1 |
| **Totals** | **2** | **10** | **6** | **60** | **2** |

DIVCOMIN, which is responsible for supporting DIGEDEHUME with demining, has 40 police officers trained in demining.[70] In 2024, DIVCOMIN participated in humanitarian demining operations. It conducted six work periods of 20 days each, deploying six personnel in every period.[71]

Between 2015 and 2018, an Ecuador-Peru Binational Demining Unit, under the leadership of military demining authorities of both nations, has been deployed to areas that were at the centre of the conflict between the two nations. The Unit conducted operations in a shared area at the "square kilometre of Tiwinza".[72]

58 Ibid., p. 11.

59 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, pp. 1-2.

60 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8–9; and Presentation of Peru on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

61 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8–9.

62 Ibid., p. 30; and email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 17 July 2025.

63 Ibid., pp. 19–20; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024) Form A.

64 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.

65 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 75.

66 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.

67 NPA Assessment Mission Report, December 2023, p. 6.

68 Email from Jonathan Richard Guthrie, Global Operations Manager, NPA, 20 June 2025.

69 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.

70 Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, pp. 10 and 12.

71 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 9 September 2025.

72 Ecuador Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27.

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, Peru released a total of 22,625m² of mined area through manual clearance, destroying in the process 746 AP mines.[73]

**Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 22,625 | 14 CHAs in the Santiago sector |
| **Technical survey** | 0 | |
| **Non-technical survey** | 0 | |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 746 | All mines destroyed were TAB-1 |

At the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, in November 2022, Peru reported a previously unrecorded mined area.[74] In its 2024 Article 7 report covering 2023 and its latest Article 5 deadline extension request, Peru formally included the site that it identified as the vigilance post "PV Gutiérrez". The area is estimated to cover 10,182m² and to contain approximately 2,000 AP mines laid by Peru around 1996.[75] In July 2022, Peru's DIGEDEHUME and Ecuador's Army Engineers (Cuerpo de Ingenieros del Ejercito del Ecuador, CEE) agreed to coordinate efforts to address the issue through the Permanent Mixed Borders Commission (Comisión Permanente de Fronteras Perú-Ecuador, COMPEFEP).[76] Although the legal border is established, the physical demarcation in the PV Gutiérrez area remains incomplete and is being addressed under the COMPEFEP framework.[77]

## SURVEY IN 2024

Peru did not report any cancellation of mined area through NTS or reduction through TS in its latest Article 7 report (covering 2024), despite reporting that operations followed IMAS 08.20 on Land Release.[78] NPA has emphasised the opportunity Peru has to improve efficiency of land release.[79] It is likely that some mined area could be released through survey without having to resort to full clearance.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, Peru cleared a total of 22,625m², all in Santiago Sector, destroying 746 TAB-1 AP mines.[80] Clearance output was less than half the area cleared the previous year (48,065m² in 2023).

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PERU: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2017

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (7 YEARS, 9-MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2024

↓

**THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2029**

**ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

73 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F(2).

74 Statement of Peru, Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, 21–25 November 2022.

75 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 45, 49, and 84; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F(2).

76 Binational Act No. 27 between the Director General of the CEE and the DIGEDEHUME, 26 July 2022 "Acta de Entendimiento No. 27, para la Realización de Desminado Humanitario en la Frontera Terrestre Común Ecuador - Perú", Third Agreement, 26 July 2022.

77 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 2, 2 August 2024; and Decision on the extension request submitted by Peru, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024.

78 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F, p. 11.

79 NPA Assessment Mission Report, December 2023, p. 11.

80 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F(2).

Under Article 5 of the APMBC and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, Peru is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2029. Peru remains on track to meet this new deadline and has indicated it could complete clearance by 2027 if additional international financial and technical support were provided.

Peru became a State Party in March 1999. Following its initial 10-year deadline, Peru requested a first eight-year extension. Progress during this period was hindered by new information received from Ecuador between November 2012 and March 2015, on the existence of 138 additional mined areas within Peruvian territory.[81] In 2016, Peru submitted a second extension request, to 31 December 2024. This second period faced several challenges, including extreme weather resulting from El Niño in 2017, suspension of operations due to COVID-19 in 2020 and part of 2021, budget reallocations, and difficult terrain.[82] From 2017 to 2023, Peru cleared 77 CHAs measuring 216,463m$^2$ and destroyed 6,867 AP mines. In 2024, an additional 14 CHAs covering 22,625m$^2$ were cleared and 746 AP mines destroyed.[83]

Peru's close bilateral ties with Ecuador play a key role in its compliance, given that all remaining mined areas are situated on the border. In a joint statement at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, both nations highlighted their mutual trust and cooperation, which has enabled significant progress in demining, especially along their shared border. Regular annual meetings between their national mine action authorities and high-level political support have been essential in coordinating technical efforts and advancing the implementation of the Convention.[84]

**Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (m$^2$) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 22,625 |
| 2023 | 48,065 |
| 2022 | 21,408 |
| 2021* | 7,769 |
| 2020* | 0 |
| **Total** | **99,867** |

*Operations were suspended in 2020 and the first half of 2021 due to COVID-19.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Peru's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request did not outline specific plans or strategies to ensure a sustainable national capacity to address previously unknown or newly identified mined areas after completion. However, CONTRAMINAS, as the national authority for demining, under MoFA, indicated that its implementing bodies—DIGEDEHUME and DIVCOMIN—will be responsible for managing residual or newly discovered contamination.[85]

81 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 57.

82 Ibid., pp. 44–45.

83 Ibid., p. 17.

84 Joint Statement of Peru and Ecuador on Cooperation and Assistance, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024.

85 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 7.

# SENEGAL

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026

Not on track to meet deadline
Three-year extension requested, but Senegal was only granted a one-year extension to 1 March 2027 due to late submission of its Article 5 deadline extension request.
Compliance with the APMBC in doubt

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 1.3KM$^2$

Light
(Government estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS (OPERATOR DATA)

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m$^2$) | Release in 2023 (m$^2$) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 5,508 | 25,465 |
| Technical Survey | 114,825 | 1,035 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 15,687 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 19 | 13 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Mined area released by Humanity & Inclusion (HI) nearly tripled to 0.12km$^2$ in 2024 compared to the previous year. The Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (CNAMS) started upgrading its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database from New Generation to Core. Senegal will not meet its current Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance deadline and in November 2025, at a very late stage, it requested a further three years until 2029 to complete clearance of little more than 1km$^2$ of known contamination. Senegal informally presented its request at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025 but formally submitted the request only in early November 2025. But the request does not address the issue of reported contamination around one or more military bases, putting Senegal's compliance with the APMBC in serious doubt.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Senegal should state definitively whether anti-personnel (AP) mines remain around the Djirak or other military bases or face censure for non-compliance with the APMBC.**
- **CNAMS should establish a national mine action platform to provide a forum for discussion and improved coordination among all stakeholders.**
- **CNAMS should approve and put into use the revised reporting forms already agreed with implementing partners.**
- **CNAMS should provide details on the progress of its review of national mine action standards.**
- **Senegal should prioritise development of national capacity and provide details of the arrangements for tackling current and residual contamination identified after completion.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 5 | 4 | A fivefold increase in recorded confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in 2024 shows Senegal's improved understanding of contamination but 23 years after adhering to the APMBC it still has a number of areas to investigate. Senegal has also repeatedly failed to answer questions about whether border military bases are contaminated with AP mines. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Senegal has a well-established structure for managing mine action but remains largely dependent on international donors. CNAMS lacks a platform for regular engagement with stakeholders and delays accrediting operators and issuing task orders are an obstacle to progress. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | CNAMS says there is equal opportunity for men and women in mine action, and that it encourages women to seek employment in the sector. HI recruited a clearance team composed mainly of women in 2024. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Senegal has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management. HI, the only operator conducting clearance in 2024, has its own standard operating procedures on environmental management and engages with water and forestry authorities in planning operations. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | CNAMS is upgrading its IMSMA database from New Generation to Core but personnel changes may slow implementation. CNAMS and operators reviewed and agreed on improved reporting forms but CNAMS has been slow to formally approve them and bring them into service. Senegal finally submitted its fourth Article 5 deadline extension request in early November 2025. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Senegal's fourth Article 5 extension request aims to complete its clearance obligations but the work plan it includes reflects uncertainties about the precise extent of the remaining mine contamination. Better coordination and follow-up by CNAMS could accelerate progress. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | CNAMS introduced NMAS in 2009 and updated them in 2013. It started another revision in 2021 to strengthen standards on survey, clearance, accreditation, risk education, and marking. The Article 5 deadline extension request indicates this process is still under way but gave no details. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | The absence of a clear statement by Senegal on whether it has completed clearance of mined areas around military installations calls into serious question its compliance with the duty to clear AP mines and even the prohibition on use of AP mines in Article 1 of the APMBC. |
| **Average Score** | **4.7** | **4.5** | **Overall Programme Performance: POOR** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention
- Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (CNAMS)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- APIT Humanitaire Développement (APIT)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- HAMAP-Humanitaire
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

### OTHER ACTORS

- APOPO

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Senegal improved its understanding of its mine contamination in 2024 but has yet to establish a comprehensive baseline estimate. Senegal reduced its overall estimate of mined area from about 1.5km² in 2023 to 1.28km² at the end of 2024 (see Table 1). More significantly, it quadrupled the size of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) to 1.2km² making up 92% of the total contamination, compared with 0.3km² representing only about 20% of the total at the end of 2023.[1] In June 2025, CNAMS reported 262,302m² had already been released from this total, indicating the known remaining contamination covered about 1km².[2]

Senegal has less clarity on other possible contamination. It identified eight suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) totalling 0.1km² in Bignona governorate and five SHAs in Ziguinchor whose size is not known. But it also reports a total of 17 areas of possible mine contamination, including 13 areas which it says were abandoned at the time of survey and four areas where access was prevented by reforestation.[3] It also still needs to address persistent questions about possible contamination around the military base at Djirak on the border with Guinea-Bissau.

**Table 1: AP mined area by region (at end 2024)[4]**

| Region | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bignona | 34 | 747,064 | 8 | 107,975 | 855,039 |
| Goudomp | 4 | 46,651 | 0 | 0 | 46,651 |
| Oussouye | 12 | 241,240 | 0 | 0 | 241,240 |
| Ziguinchor | 12 | 139,057 | 5 | 0 | 139,057 |
| **Totals** | **62** | **1,174,012** | **13** | **107,975** | **1,281,987** |

HI has reported encountering a mixture of AP mine types, including Belgian PRBM 35, Portuguese M969 and M441, Russian POMZ and PMN, Chinese Type 59s, as well as Soviet TMN-46 and TM-57 anti-vehicle (AV) mines, and two improvised explosive devices (IEDs). All the mines found by HI in the Casamance region were on roads or tracks.[5] It has also encountered a small number of improvised mines. In 2024, for instance, it discovered an old improvised device designed to function as an AP mine that it believes dates back to between 1990 and 2000.[6]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention, created in 2005, serves as the national mine action authority (NMAA) for Senegal, charged with developing a mine action strategy, promoting economic rehabilitation of mine-affected areas, and overseeing the work of the national mine action centre. The commission, which is chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, includes representatives of the presidency and prime minister's office and several government ministries. Senegal has said the Commission's effectiveness had suffered from high turnover of ministerial representatives, resulting in delays in decision-making and even from a lack of rules on decision-making.[7]

Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by CNAMS (Centre national d'action antimine au Sénégal), which was set up by decree in August 2006. CNAMS has three departments: Operations and information management; Risk education; and Administration, finance and logistics.[8] Regional mine action coordination committees have been established in Kolda, Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor departments.

CNAMS is responsible for promoting the national mine action programme; mobilising resources; coordinating survey and conducting demining; designing and implementing a victim assistance programme; accrediting demining organisations; and monitoring and evaluating activities.[9]

CNAMS is led by a diplomat with the rank of ambassador who was appointed director of CNAMS in February 2023. Changes of personnel and policy in 2024–25 are said to have weakened communication and coordination with mine action operators. Senegal does not have an established platform for convening mine action stakeholders although CNAMS has participated in ad hoc meetings and a technical information management workshop convened by MAG and implementing partners in April 2024.[10] The Governor of Ziguinchor and the National Agency for the Revival of Economic and Social Activities in Casamance (ANRAC) have also proposed establishing a framework for coordinating mine action. The Swiss Embassy in Dakar regularly convenes meetings between mine action stakeholders including officials, operators, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[11]

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
2 Senegal statement to the APMBC Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 18 June 2025.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
4 Ibid.; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension request, p. 5.
5 Emails from Emmanuel Sauvage, Programme Director, HI, 24 April 2023 and 3 July 2024.
6 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 1 July 2025.
7 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 29.
8 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 29–30.
9 Presentation by CNAMS, "National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a Mine-Free Senegal" workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.
10 Emails from Emilie Sauvanet, Country Director (Senegal and Mauritania), MAG, 18 July and 17 September 2025.
11 Emails from Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Manager, HI, 1 July 2025; and Emmanuel Sauvage, Programme Director, HI, 3 July 2024.

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Senegal is largely dependent on international donors and has repeatedly stated that lack of funds is a major constraint on mine action progress. Senegal has reported that mine action in the course of the current extension (since 1 March 2021) received a total of US$9.3 million, two thirds of which was from international donors with the other third ($3.3 million) from the Government of Senegal. In 2024, donors included the European Union (EU), France, India, Japan, Norway, and Sweden.[12] HI's mine action operations in 2024 were funded by the EU and the Netherlands but it was uncertain whether that support would continue beyond 2025. MAG's 2024 operations were funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD).[13] At the end of 2024, Senegal announced that it had allocated CFA1.5 billion (approximately US$3.3 million) for mine action through the "Plan Diomaye Faye pour la Casamance 2024-25" but it has provided no information on how or when the funds would be disbursed.[14]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

CNAMS has stated there is no gender discrimination in Senegal's mine action programme and staff are recruited on the basis of competence.[15] The new CNAMS director affirmed in 2024 that women are encouraged to work in mine action in line with equal opportunity criteria and cultural conventions.[16] CNAMS did not provide any information on its own employment of women in 2024 but the percentage of female staff employed by the two international demining organisations (see Table 2) ranks among the highest anywhere. HI recruited a demining team in 2024 in which 90% were women.[17]

Senegal's Article 5 deadline extension request, however, does not mention gender. Senegal also has not provided any indication of whether existing estimates of contamination take account of the perspectives of women and girls as well as men and boys and the Committee on Article 5 Implementation has requested information on this point in successive intersessional meetings.[18]

**Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2024**

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HI | 25 | 10 (40%) | 5 | 1 (20%) | 10 | 9 (90%) |
| MAG | 9 | 6 (67%) | 6 | 1 (17%) | 9 | 2 (22%) |
| **Totals** | **34** | **16 (47%)** | **11** | **2 (18%)** | **19** | **11 (58%)** |

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Senegal passed a law on management and protection of the environment in 2001. National mine action standards (NOSAM) adopted in 2009 and reviewed in 2021–22 included a standard on environment—NOSAM 05.30—which provides guidelines on minimum environmental protection measures.[19] Senegal's Article 5 deadline extension request identifies a threat from explosive ordnance to biodiversity and the loss of protected animal species.[20]

HI implements several measures to protect the environment. As most areas of work are agricultural or protected, no burning of vegetation is permitted. HI involves the water and forestry department when preparing to deploy teams. HI does not cut any shrub with a diameter greater than 10cm and any tree cutting in cleared areas must be authorised by the water and forestry department.[21] MAG said it follows the organisation's Global Strategic Framework 2024–2028, which seeks to cut carbon transmissions by 45% by 2030.[22]

12 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16; Statement of Senegal, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025.
13 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 18 July 2025.
14 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16; and email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 18 July 2025.
15 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 21 May 2020.
16 Email from Papa Maguèye Diop, Director, CNAMS, 21 July 2024.
17 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 1 July 2025.
18 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 21–23 June 2023 and 18–20 June 2024.
19 Email from François Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 26 June 2024.
20 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.
21 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 1 July 2025.
22 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 18 July 2025.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

CNAMS operates an IMSMA database that is in the process of being upgraded from the ageing New Generation version to Core. The GICHD conducted a workshop on migrating data to the new system in December 2023 and several meetings on the process were held with information officers of operators in 2024. The new system allows each operator access to the database to input, update, and download data independently.[23] The resignation of CNAMS's head of information management in 2025 raised concern that the process of activating IMSMA Core could suffer delays. In the meantime, however, operators continue to submit hard copy reports.[24] The process of migrating data to Core is expected to be accompanied by an automated data clean up.[25]

MAG held a two-day workshop in Ziguinchor with CNAMS and other implementing partners in April 2024 to review and update the information management tools used in land release. The workshop led to revision of 10 data collection forms and the creation of flow diagrams to clarify who does what at each stage of the process but CNAMS has not yet formally approved the changes so the improvements are not in use.[26]

Senegal informally presented its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025,[27] and provided Mine Action Review with a draft of the extension request in mid-July, but did not formally submit it until early November 2025. This is despite the 31 March 2025 deadline for submission of extension requests that was set in order to give the Committee on Article 5 implementation and States Parties sufficient time to analyse and consider the request.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Senegal's latest Article 7 report set targets for technical survey (TS) in 11 districts of Ziguinchor covering 185,708m$^2$ in 2025 and 24 districts of Bignona covering 834,949m$^2$ in 2026.[28] Its fourth Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in 2025, aims to complete clearance of all mined areas and provides a detailed timeline for release of 1,162,146m$^2$ (see Table 3). The request states mined areas identified in the course of non-technical survey (NTS) will be addressed in 2028.[29] The total area is less than the end-2024 contamination estimate of 1.28km$^2$ but more than the 1km$^2$ of outstanding contamination indicated in the June 2025 Intersessionals, where Senegal said 262,302m$^2$ had already been released.[30]

CNAMS does not provide annual work plans. It issues task files to implementing partners defining the area of intervention, but the priority for implementation is then decided in consultation with local authorities and communities, reflecting the sensitive security environment in a region emerging from decades-long insurgency. Operators identified delays in CNAMS issuing task orders or following up on actions agreed in workshops as a significant obstacle slowing the progress of mine action. They cited the unexpected departure from CNAMS of its director of operations in February 2024 as a serious loss of expertise and institutional knowledge that also represented a setback for the mine action programme more broadly.[31]

**Table 3: Land release targets**[32]

| Year | Department | Area (m$^2$) | Cost (US$) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Ziguinchor | 85,957 | 1,055,490 |
| 2027 | Bignona | 834,949 | 10,019,387 |
| 2028 | Oussouye | 241,240 | 2,894,881 |
| **Totals** | | **1,162,146** | **13,969,758** |

23 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 18 July 2025.
24 Emails from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 1 July 2025; and Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 18 July 2025.
25 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 18 July 2025.
26 Ibid.
27 Presentation by Senegal, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025, available at: https://bit.ly/49CE3Bq.
28 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), #20.
29 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26–28.
30 Senegal statement to the APMBC Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 18 June2025.
31 Emails from implementing partners, July 2024 and July 2025.
32 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26–28.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Senegal's national mine action standards were developed in 2009 and partially revised in 2013.[33] CNAMS started another revision in December 2021, focusing on standards for NTS and TS, clearance, accreditation, risk education, and marking.[34] Senegal's Article 5 deadline extension request states that national standards are again being updated but provided no details on the process or the standards.[35]

# OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

HI continues to be the only international operator conducting mine clearance in Senegal operating from a main office and operating base in Ziguinchor. Its 40-strong staff in 2024 included two multi-task demining teams with 12 personnel, up from a single team in 2023. HI also had one community liaison/NTS team and a two-person mechanical team doing site preparation. HI's demining work was funded by the EU and the Netherlands but uncertainty around funding in 2025 meant HI faced the possibility of downsizing.[36]

HI was supported by two APOPO dog handlers with four technical survey dogs which it credited with sharply improving productivity. In areas of moderate vegetation without prior brush cutting or preparation enabling them to achieve daily productivity of 1,000m$^2$ to 1,200m$^2$ a day, much higher than a 12-person manual team with a digger.[37] It was unclear if funding was available to continue their deployment beyond 2025.

MAG has conducted a weapons and ammunition management programme in Senegal since 2020, but in 2022 it received organisational accreditation for a mine action project which initially focused on providing technical support to CNAMS, particularly in information management. In August 2023, MAG received operational accreditation for NTS and risk education allowing it to start community liaison activities in October 2023 and conduct contamination baseline assessments. MAG was tasked to investigate 24 locations in 2023 and started NTS in 2024.[38] MAG's Dakar office served as a base for regional management and technical staff serving West Africa and the Sahel, but in 2024 it also operated with a five-person community liaison team and an information management staff member based in the Casamance.[39]

HAMAP Humanitaire started a project in Senegal in December 2023 with a local partner, APIT Humanitaire Développement, which received accreditation from CNAMS for NTS and risk education in July 2024 and was working in four communes of Bignona department. HAMAP had two international staff, a coordinator and EOD-qualified technical adviser, while APIT had 17 staff, including an NTS/risk education manager and 10 NTS/risk education personnel working in two teams. Due to the conclusion of French Ministry of Foreign Affairs funding, APIT suspended operations at the end of February 2025.[40]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 4: Summary of land release outputs in 2024 (HI data)**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) |
|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 5,508 |
| **Technical survey** | 114,825 |
| **Non-technical survey** | 0 |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 19 |

33 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 21 May 2020.

34 Emails from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 23 May 2022; and Roxana Bobolicu, MAG, 29 September 2022.

35 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 23.

36 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 1 July 2025.

37 Email from Emmanuel Sauvage, HI, 2 September 2024.

38 Emails from Melanie Broquet, Regional Programme Manager, Sahel & West Africa, MAG, 24 April 2023; and François Fall, Regional Mine Action Programme Manager, MAG, 26 June and 27 August 2024.

39 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 18 July 2025.

40 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, Mine Action Unit Manager, HAMAP, and Francois Ropars, Head of Project, HAMAP, 15 September 2025.

Land released by HI, the sole operator conducting clearance in Senegal, nearly tripled in 2024, rising to a total of 120,333m$^2$ in 2024 from 42,187m$^2$ in 2023. HI's output, conducted in Ziguinchor, was achieved largely through TS. Operations involved destruction of 19 AP mines.[41] Senegal's official data, however, does not indicate any area released through survey and shows clearance of 105,515m$^2$.[42] At the 2025 Intersessional Meetings, Senegal reported clearance of 111,056m$^2$ in 2024 and the destruction of 21 mines.[43]

## SURVEY AND CLEARANCE IN 2024

CNAMS only assigned NTS tasks to MAG and HAMAP in 2024. MAG said it conducted NTS in areas that had been surveyed previously but without any proper recording of the outcomes.

APIT teams visited 87 localities between July 2024 and the end of January 2025 and reported identifying 21 CHAs and 8 SHAs in four communes covering a total of 913,702m².[44]

**Table 5: NTS by MAG in 2024**[45]

| Department | No. of surveys | Area surveyed (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Bignona | 8 | 3,437,883 |
| Oussouye | 3 | 5,801,521 |
| Ziguinchor | 12 | 7,256,010 |
| **Totals** | **23** | **16,495,414** |

TS was the main component of land release in 2024, with HI releasing nearly 115,000m$^2$ compared with little more than 1,000m$^2$ the previous year.[46] The higher output reflected the contribution of TS dogs provided by APOPO which said they searched 98,822m$^2$ in 2024 of mined area, making a significant contribution to Senegal's progress.[47]

By contrast, HI reported clearance of 5,508m$^2$ in 2024 (see Table 6), one fifth of the area cleared in 2023, although it destroyed more mines: 19 in 2024 compared with 13 in 2023.

Security issues contributed to the result. HI said its survey and demining teams were unable to visit two of 10 locations assigned for clearance because of security concerns.[48]

**Table 6: Mine clearance in 2024 (HI data)**

| Department | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ziguinchor | Kouring 6 | 100 | 4 | 0 |
| Ziguinchor | Darsalam 3 | 3,232 | 15 | 0 |
| Ziguinchor | Darsalam 1 | 2,176 | 0 | 1 |
| **Totals** | | **5,508** | **19** | **1** |

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SENEGAL: 1 MARCH 19999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (7 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2016

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2021

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2026

↓

**FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED: SENEGAL REQUESTED A 3-YEAR EXTENSION, BUT WAS ONLY GRANTED ONLY A 1-YEAR EXTENSION TO 1 MARCH 2027 DUE TO LATE SUBMISSION OF ITS ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE EXTENSION REQUEST**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)**

41 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 1 July 2025.
42 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), #19.
43 Statement of Senegal, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025.
44 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, and Francois Ropars, HAMAP, 15 September 2025.
45 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 18 July 2025.
46 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 1 July 2025.
47 APOPO Annual Report 2024, p. 36.
48 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 1 July 2025.

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2020), Senegal was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026. Senegal informally presented its fourth extension request at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025, and provided Mine Action Review with a draft copy of the request in mid-July, but did not formally submit it until early November (well after the 31 March deadline for submission of extension requests). It is seeking a three-year extension through to March 2029.

Senegal affirmed that with an extension of three years it "will certainly be able to fulfil its obligations under Article 5"[49] but faces a number of constraints that have slowed mine action progress and still pose a potential obstacle to completion:

- **Security**. Senegal has achieved considerable progress in negotiating with different factions of the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) to end a four-decades-old rebellion, but local security sensitivities still have the potential to delay demining operations needed to allow the return of communities displaced by conflict.
- **Funding**. Senegal extension request estimates the cost of land release operations at almost $14 million,[50] but provides no indication of how much the government will commit to demining and how they will be funded.
- **Capacity**. The uncertainty over funding extends to the capacity available for survey and clearance. Senegal's extension request notes a general intention to develop local capacity to take over demining from international operators, including setting up a local mine detection dog (MDD) unit, but provides no information about how or when it expects this to take place.[51]
- **Extent of contamination:** Release of Senegal's known remaining contamination amounting to around 1km$^2$ should not present a problem if funding sustains or expands existing capacity but timelines for completion remain vulnerable to identification of previously unrecorded hazardous areas as well as the potential loss of donor funding and/or capacity. Senegal has said that areas of its borders with Gambia and Guinea-Bissau are still experiencing armed clashes and are heavily contaminated with mines and explosive devices and the areas are difficult for demining organisations to access.[52]

Senegal needs to provide a definitive statement detailing the presence or absence of mines around military bases, including particularly the base at Djirak, or risk being found in serious violation of the Convention.

**Table 7: Five-year summary of mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (m$^2$) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 5,508 |
| 2023 | 25,465 |
| 2022 | 2,095 |
| 2021 | 0 |
| 2020 | 0 |
| **Total** | **33,068** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Senegal has reaffirmed that any residual mine threats will be dealt with by a specialised unit of Senegal's military engineers, but has not provided details of this capacity.[53] The Committee on Article 5 Implementation received the same information but has repeatedly requested more details.[54]

49 Statement of Senegal, APMBC Intersessionals, Geneva, 18 June 2025.

50 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26–28.

51 Ibid., pp. 7 and 9.

52 Ibid., p. 18.

53 Email from Papa Maguèye Diop, CNAMS, 21 July 2024.

54 "Clarifications du Sénégal aux questions du comité d'examen de la 3Eme demande d'extension", 22 September 2020; Preliminary Observations, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

# SERBIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2026

Not on track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: AROUND 1KM²

Light
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0 | 0 |
| Technical Survey | 0.12 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 0 | 0 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Stop Mines and IN Demining

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, Serbia reduced one third of its known mined area through technical survey (TS). However, it had planned to complete clearance of all remaining known mined area during the year and conduct non-technical survey (NTS) of previously unrecorded mined areas by January 2025. Serbia did not meet this target, which is partly due to a shift in donor priorities towards clearance of cluster munition remnants (CMR). The NTS was initially scheduled for 2023 and Serbia aimed to develop a work plan for completion of survey and clearance based on the results of the NTS by October 2025, allowing TS and clearance to begin in November. As at October 2025, an NTS team had started conducting desk assessments and was set to undergo training, with planned accreditation in November.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Serbia should consider inviting demining NGOs to help meet its treaty obligations.**
- **Serbia should, as a matter of priority and without further delay, survey the suspected contamination identified in 2019 and 2021 to determine the size of the mined areas and plan for their release.**
- **SMAC should undertake NTS and TS rather than full clearance in instances where survey represents the most efficient means to release part or all of mined areas.**
- **SMAC should seek to develop additional national mine action standards and adopt the new mine action decree.**
- **Serbia should clarify whether suspected improvised devices around Jamena village, which remain from the 1991–95 conflicts, meet the definition of an anti-personnel (AP) mine.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | As at April 2025, Serbia had less than 0.27km$^2$ of known mined area remaining. However, NTS is still required to determine the extent of mined areas discovered due to fires in 2019 and 2021. The NTS project was initially scheduled for 2023. As at October 2025, an NTS team was undergoing training and awaiting accreditation. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Serbia demonstrates strong national ownership of its mine action programme, with SMAC entirely nationally funded. In 2024, Serbia maintained its State budget allocation for SMAC and committed €260,000 annually for survey and clearance through 2025. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 4 | SMAC does not have a gender policy in place and does not disaggregate relevant mine action data by sex and age, although data disaggregation is planned. SMAC hired two new female staff in 2024 and three of the five of the newly recruited NTS team are women. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Serbia does not have an environmental management policy or national standards on the environment in place. Clearance operators must, however, include environmental and fire protection in their task execution plans. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Serbia submits accurate and consistent annual Article 7 reports on progress in demining and provides regular updates at treaty meetings. SMAC and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) are in the process of implementing the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 7 | Serbia included annual projections for land release in its latest Article 5 deadline extension request. In 2024, Serbia aimed to clear 268,100m$^2$ of known mine contamination and deploy NTS teams to identify and confirm previously unknown mined areas. In fact, only TS was conducted. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Serbia is planning to issue a new decree on protection against explosive remnants of war, which will introduce the concept of land release. As at October 2025, this was under review by the Ministry of Interior. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 4 | 5 | From December 2023 to February 2024, Serbia conducted TS but again failed to meet its land release targets, neither releasing area through clearance nor conducting the planned NTS of previously unknown mined areas. |
| **Average Score** | **5.4** | **5.6** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Sector for Emergency Management, under the Ministry of Interior (acts as the national mine action authority)
- Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- PMC Engineering

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- In 2024, 11 companies/organisations were accredited for demining, but only two NGOs engaged in demining:
  - In Demining
  - Stop Mines

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at April 2025, one area in Bujanovac municipality covering 0.27km² was suspected to contain AP mines (see Table 1).[1] This is a reduction from the 0.39km² of AP mined area as at the end of 2023.[2] Previous surveys found insufficient evidence for mined areas to be classified as confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), so they officially remain as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).[3]

**Table 1: AP mined area (at April 2025)[4]**

| Municipality | Village | SHAs | Area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bujanovac | Ravno Bučje | 1 | 268,100 |
| **Totals** | | **1** | **268,100** |

Table 1 does not, however, include the contamination identified because of fires in Bujanovac municipality. On 2–3 October 2019, in response to a request from local authorities, the Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) visited the villages of Đorđevac, Končulj, Lučane, Ravno Bučje, and Veliki Trnovac where fires had recently occurred and members of the local community had reported hearing explosions in several places, indicating the presence of mines. The discovered mined areas were marked with signs in both Serbian and Albanian, as the population in this area is multi-ethnic. Fires also occurred in August 2021 in a different area of the municipality of Bujanovac, during which there were similar reports of explosions.[5]

An NTS project in this area was expected to begin in 2023, but has been delayed. In Serbia's latest Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in March 2024, Serbia said this was due to "security concerns". The project area is within the Ground Safety Zone along the administrative line with Kosovo and Metohija. Serbia reported that NTS of the estimated 4.37–4.47km² of areas prioritised for NTS based on some evidence of explosive ordnance contamination, would be conducted in 2024 and 2025. Of the area expected to be surveyed, SMAC expected that nearly 2.37km² would be cancelled, 1.5km² reduced, and only 0.5km² cleared.[6] According to SMAC, remaining contamination is from mines of an unknown origin and type emplaced without a pattern and for which no minefield records exist.[7] As at October 2025, SMAC had established an NTS team in Bujanovac which had started desk assessments alongside ongoing NTS training. The team was expected to complete accreditation in November. From their office in Bujanovac, donated by local authorities, they had also started receiving visits from informants providing information on contamination.[8]

Furthermore, in its revised Article 5 deadline extension request, Serbia has noted that: "It is suspected that in the Sava River, in the area of the Jamena village [in the municipality of Šid], there are improvised mines remaining from the 1991–1995 conflicts. SMAC will continue to monitor the situation closely and carry out all necessary actions."[9] If these devices meet the definition of an AP mine, then they fall within Serbia's obligations under the treaty and must be destroyed. However, some uncertainty remains and, as at October 2025, SMAC had conducted a document review, with a field visit planned towards the end of 2025 or early 2026.[10]

Historically, mine contamination in Serbia can be divided into two phases. The first exists as a legacy of the armed conflicts associated with the break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The second concerned use of mines in 2000–01 in the municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo by a non-State armed group, the Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (OVPBM). The contamination remaining in Serbia is a result of this later phase.[11] Contamination also exists within Kosovo (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Kosovo for further information). SMAC requests that it be noted that all references to Kosovo should be understood to be in the context of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).[12]

## OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

SMAC does not possess data on explosive ordnance contamination of military areas in Serbia as it is only in charge of explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in civilian areas in Serbia.[13] It is suspected, however, that following the fires and explosions at military depots in Grdelica, Kragujevac, Kraljevo, Novi Sad, Paraćin, Požarevac, Raška, Smederevo, Valjevo, and Vranje, approximately 18km² may be contaminated with ERW.[14] SMAC is also receiving an increasing number of requests from the Ministry of Construction, Transport, and Infrastructure to clear former military compounds of ERW, as these sites are being transitioned from Ministry of Defence (MoD) control to civilian use.[15]

1 Email from Slađana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integrations, SMAC, 8 May 2025 and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
2 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form D.
4 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 8 May 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
5 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 21 May 2024.
6 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6, 39 and 40; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 21 May 2024.
7 Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6 and 34; Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form C; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 23 April 2020.
8 Email from Helen Gray, Consultant, 2 October 2025.
9 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 17; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 8 May 2025.
10 Email from Helen Gray, 2 October 2025.
11 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 5; and Article 7 Report (covering 2014), Form C.
12 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 11 May 2021.
13 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 25 April 2023 and 20 August 2024.
14 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 17.
15 Ibid., p. 23.

Serbia is also contaminated with CMR and other ERW from the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign, or which remain from previous conflicts[16] (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Serbia for further information).

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

According to a 2013 Government Decree on Protection against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for Emergency Management, under the Ministry of Interior, acts as the national mine action authority (NMAA).[17] The NMAA is responsible for developing standard operating procedures (SOPs), accrediting demining operators, and supervising the work of SMAC.[18]

SMAC was established in 2002, with a 2004 law making it responsible for coordinating survey and clearance, collecting and managing mine action information (including casualty data), and surveying SHAs. It also has a mandate to plan demining projects, conduct quality control (QC) and monitor operations, ensure implementation of international standards, and undertake risk education.[19] As from 1 January 2014, according to the 2013 Government Decree, the Sector for Emergency Management, under the Ministry of Interior, was made responsible for accrediting demining operators. Previously, SMAC was responsible for doing so.[20]

The current director of SMAC was appointed by the Serbian government in July 2019.[21] As at April 2025, 17 people were employed at SMAC: the Director, two assistant directors, and 14 other employees.[22]

In 2020, SMAC and the MoD signed an agreement on cooperation in demining and removal of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other ERW. The agreement foresees joint training and certification of personnel, joint survey, data collection on ERW-contaminated areas, and ERW removal projects, all to be implemented in conformity with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[23] The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is supporting SMAC to set up the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)—IMSMA Core—and with quality management.[24]

No formal in-country national platform for dialogue exists, but SMAC cooperates closely with the Bujanovac national authorities and other relevant stakeholders, including the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and MoD, as well as donors to discuss progress, challenges and support for Article 5 implementation in Serbia.[25]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

SMAC is fully funded by Serbia, including salaries and running costs, as well as for survey activities, development of project tasks for demining and clearance of contaminated areas, follow-up on implementation of project tasks, and quality assurance (QA) and QC of demining. In 2024, Serbia reported that around €590,000 per annum was allocated from the State budget for SMAC's work, an increase on the €450,000 provided in 2023.[26] The UXO disposal work of the Sector for Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Interior is also State-funded.[27]

National funding for survey and clearance remained at €260,000 in 2024,[28] a level that was expected to be maintained in 2025. Support was matched with donor funds for the United States and the Republic of Korea through ITF Enhancing Human Security.[29] In 2024, funding was split between one AP mined area TS task and two CMR clearance tasks. Serbia expected the donors to continue funding in 2025.[30] Serbia estimated it would need €1.5 million in international funding for survey and clearance of mined area in 2024–26.[31]

SMAC reports having a resource mobilisation strategy for Article 5 implementation.[32]

16 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

17 Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 70/13.

18 Emails from Darvin Lisica, Regional Programme Manager, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 6 May and 12 June 2016.

19 Law of Alterations and Supplementations of the Law of Ministries, Official Gazette, 84/04, August 2004; interview with Petar Mihajlović and Slađana Košutić, SMAC, Belgrade, 26 April 2010; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.

20 APMBC 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.

21 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 23 April 2020.

22 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.

23 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 26 March 2021.

24 Ibid.; SMAC, "GICHD Workshop on IMSMA Core for Mine Action Actors in the Republic of Serbia", 27 March 2023, at: https://bit.ly/42PgTC7; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.

25 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 8 May 2025.

26 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025 and 7 May 2024.

27 SMAC, "Mine situation", 21 April 2023.

28 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.

29 Statement of Serbia on Clearance, APMBC Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties (virtual meeting), 15–19 November 2021; and 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 34; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.

30 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.

31 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 12 and 38.

32 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 23 April 2020.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

SMAC does not have a gender policy in place and does not disaggregate relevant mine action data by sex and age. However, data disaggregation will be introduced through the new Survey123 and IMSMA Core forms.[33] SMAC ensures women and children are consulted during survey and community liaison and that ethnic or minority groups are consulted.[34] Serbia claims that qualified women have equal access to survey and clearance positions.[35]

At SMAC, nine of the 17 employees (53%) are women, who hold two of the three managerial/supervisory level positions (67%) and one of the nine operations positions (11%). SMAC hired two new female staff in 2024.[36]

The NTS team recruited to conduct survey of the newly identified mined areas consists of three female and two male ethnic Serbian and ethnic Albanian personnel.[37]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

SMAC is committed to taking environmental aspects into account in its work and to minimising environmental harm from demining. For each survey or clearance task, the contractor (i.e. the demining operator) is required to include in its execution plan an environmental protection and a fire protection plan, together with a plan for health and safety at work. Illustrative examples on environmental protection during CMR clearance include clearance in Kopaonik National Park, which demanded a special regime to protect certain trees and plants.[38] SMAC reported to Mine Action Review in 2024 that it was planning to develop a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in mine action, a process that was not complete at the time of writing.[39]

Serbia's latest Article 5 deadline extension request briefly mentions the environmental implications of the extension but does not elaborate on the increased risk of forest fires, which in 2019 and 2021 led to the discovery of previously unknown AP mined areas. Serbia does note that the presence of mines hinders the construction of solar power plants.[40]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

SMAC had its own information management system until SMAC decided to solicit GICHD support to implement IMSMA Core.[41] In February 2024, the GICHD and SMAC began working on a first version of the new database.[42] They worked together to build and test the system, focusing on data migration, data cleaning, and new data entry forms.[43] All new NTS information will be collected through Survey123 and uploaded to IMSMA Core, where it will be validated by SMAC. The associated forms and dashboards have been developed and, as at October 2025, were undergoing testing.[44]

Serbia submits timely and accurate annual Article 7 transparency reports and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation at the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

The Government of Serbia adopts SMAC's annual work plans.[45] SMAC had annual work plans in place for 2024 and 2025.[46]

Serbia's latest revised Article 5 deadline extension request included annual projections of mined area to be addressed. In the course of 2024, Serbia planned to release the remaining known mine contamination in the village of Ravno Bučje in Bujanovac municipality, covering 268,100m$^2$, through TS and clearance. In August 2024 to January 2025, SMAC planned to deploy NTS teams to the previously unknown mined areas in Bujanovac.[47] The results of the NTS analysed in the period

33 Email from Helen Gray, 2 October 2025.
34 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 23 April 2020, 26 March 2021, and 11 April 2023.
35 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 23 April 2020 and 11 April 2023.
36 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
37 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 8 May 2025.
38 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024.
39 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024 and 4 April 2025.
40 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 36.
41 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 11 April 2023; and GICHD, 26 May 2023.
42 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024.
43 Emails from Kinda Samra, GICHD, 27 June 2024 and Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
44 Email from Helen Gray, 2 October 2025.
45 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7–8, 18, and 21; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 13 April 2022.
46 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
47 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 23.

through to June 2025, and then between August and October 2025, would enable SMAC to develop a TS and clearance plan for the remaining mined area.[48] However, this timeline had been delayed, and as at October 2025, the priority was to complete the NTS to enable effective planning of subsequent TS. A flexible, targeted TS project is tentatively planned to follow the ongoing NTS project from mid-2026, aiming to quickly confirm the presence or absence of explosive ordnance and determine whether larger TS or no further action is required.[49]

As a general rule, Serbia prioritises demining of areas that directly affect the local population, such as those close to settlements where local people have abandoned their houses and stopped cultivating land due to fear of landmines. Prioritisation takes place between Serbia, SMAC, and donors. SMAC noted that donors themselves sometimes also influence the choice of the areas which will be demined first, depending on availability and amount of their funds.[50] Serbia has said that if it cannot secure international support for demining, clearance will be further delayed.[51]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

According to SMAC, and despite problems with land release methodology, survey and clearance are conducted in accordance with the IMAS.[52] SMAC, in cooperation with a consultant from Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), developed three new NMAS in 2023 on the glossary of terms, land release, and quality management. SMAC reported to Mine Action Review in 2024 that subject to funding, further NMAS would be developed, starting with an NMAS on information management, a process ongoing as at April 2025.[53] A new NTS SOP was developed in 2025 in line with IMAS and the new NTS competencies. The SOP enables village administrative areas with no evidence of explosive ordnance to officially declare, following NTS, that no contamination has been identified, allowing the area to transition to residual risk management. The NTS will cover the entire municipality of Bujanovac.[54]

Serbia plans to issue a new decree on protection against ERW. The draft decree, which is being developed by SMAC and the Ministry of Interior, will include a definition of land release (not defined in the former decree), and support the development of NMAS.[55] As at October 2025, the draft remained under review within the Ministry of Interior.[56]

Under new directorship, SMAC reassessed its land release methodology in 2015 in order to prioritise full clearance over TS of hazardous areas.[57] This does not correspond to international best practice and is an inefficient use of scarce clearance assets. In 2016, SMAC reported to Mine Action Review that while SMAC supports the use of high-quality NTS to identify mined areas it will fully clear them rather than using TS to identify the boundaries of contamination more accurately.[58] While SMAC's position on land release remains the same, there is still said to be a willingness to conduct TS in a form "adjusted to the context of Serbia", in response to the stated preference of international donors for TS over clearance as and where appropriate.[59]

SMAC's previous reluctance to apply TS to delineate confirmed mined area was due to its lack of confidence that such survey can effectively identify groups of unrecorded mines, not planted in specific patterns.[60] According to SMAC, incidents involving people or animals have occurred in most of these suspected areas or else mines have been accidentally detected.[61] In its latest Article 5 deadline extension request, Serbia said that "the size of the area to be cleared is determined on the basis of processed data which have been collected by a non-technical survey",[62] indicating that TS is not typically deployed to reduce mined areas. However, with support from the ITF, SMAC now plans to integrate targeted TS as a follow-on to the current NTS project to better define requirements for future TS and clearance. NTS teams are being trained to delineate suspected areas as accurately as possible, allowing TS to be deployed more strategically and, where new evidence is found, to expand areas for further investigation or clearance.[63]

SMAC has reported that the results of the initial survey data are analysed and then further NTS is conducted to assess conditions in the field, and to gather statements by

48 Ibid., p. 44.

49 Email from Helen Gray, 2 October 2025.

50 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 12 April 2018 and 25 March 2022; Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form D; and Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26 and 41.

51 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 23 April 2020 and 26 March 2021; Statements on Clearance, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019 and Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties (virtual meeting), 16–20 November 2020; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form D.

52 SMAC, "Mine Situation", 21 April 2023; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Section 4.

53 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024 and 4 April 2025.

54 Email from Helen Gray, 2 October 2025.

55 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.

56 Email from Helen Gray, 2 October 2025.

57 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, in Geneva, 18 February 2016.

58 Ibid.

59 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 30; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.

60 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, Belgrade, 16 May 2017; and 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information received 28 June 2018.

61 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form D; and Statement on Clearance, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.

62 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.

63 Email from Helen Gray, 2 October 2025.

the local population, hunters, foresters, representatives of Civil Protection, and the police, among others. Data on mine incidents constitute another significant indicator.[64] Also, in the context of Serbia, there is reportedly limited potential to obtain additional information on the location of mined areas from those who laid the mines during the conflict.[65] TS is employed "to additionally collect information by technical methods on a suspected area and in case when the data collected by NTS are not sufficient for suspected areas to be declared hazardous or safe".[66]

Clearance is reported to be conducted in accordance with IMAS, and to a depth of 20 centimetres.[67]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

SMAC does not itself conduct clearance or employ clearance personnel but does conduct survey of areas suspected to contain mines, CMR, or other ERW. Clearance is conducted by commercial companies and, potentially, NGOs, which are selected through public tender procedures executed by ITF, supported by international funding.[68] Serbia said clearance productivity per deminer, depending on the mine situation, terrain configuration, land characteristics and vegetation, was up to 150m$^2$ per deminer per day.[69] This is a remarkably high rate – one of the highest in the world.

The Ministry of Interior issues accreditation to mine action operators that is valid for one year. In 2024, 11 companies/organisations were accredited for demining but only two were operational (see Table 2).[70]

**Table 2: Operational TS capacities deployed in 2024**[71]

| Operator | No. of TS teams | No. of personnel |
|---|---|---|
| IN Demining: contractor<br>Stop Mines: subcontractor | 2 | 20 |

No clearance personnel were deployed in 2024. Serbia expected an increase in survey and clearance personnel in 2025.[72]

SMAC and the Academy of Technical and Educational Vocational Studies are working together to advance the use of drones in survey. The "Integrated Navigation System for Inspection of Minefield" uses robotics, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and sensors to improve efficiency and reduce personnel risk.[73]

In 2024, the Serbian Mine Action Centre Innovation and Educational Park was opened at the former "Velika Moštanica" military complex. With government and donor support, the site was renovated to host mine action training in accordance with IMAS. SMAC and UK-based DRAKON Group also co-organised EOD Level 1, 2, 3, and 3+ courses for 52 trainees from 24 countries.[74]

The Serbian Armed Forces maintain a capability to detect, clear, and destroy landmines. This capability includes many types of detection equipment, mechanical clearance assets, disposal expertise, and specialist search and clearance teams.[75] An explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) department within the Sector for Emergency Management in the Ministry of Interior responds to call-outs for individual items of ERW and is also responsible for demolition of items found by SMAC survey teams and by contractors/operators during clearance.[76]

TS and clearance in Serbia are primarily conducted manually. Mine detection dogs (MDDs) were used in TS and clearance operations in 2018 to release land,[77] but according to the authorities most of the mines are in mountainous areas with challenging terrain and thick vegetation and are not appropriate for the use of MDDs or machines.[78] Owing to the suspected presence of mines, these areas have not been accessed since the end of the conflict (2001) means that the land is unmanaged, making it even less accessible.[79] Serbian armed forces use their machines and vehicles (e.g. excavators, trucks, etc.) to improve the quality of access roads, ahead of clearance by contracted companies.[80]

SMAC uses data from UAVs to monitor clearance and TS.[81] It is also cooperating with academic partners to enhance the NTS project through the use of UAV/UAS technology where this can add value to decision-making. Imagery has already been collected from two suspected areas and is currently being processed. SMAC is fully licensed and authorised to operate UAVs.[82]

64 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, Belgrade, 16 May 2017; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form C.
65 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, Belgrade, 16 May 2017.
66 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.
67 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form C.
68 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request (2018), p. 18.
69 Serbia, "Replies to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Questions Concerning the Requisition Submitted by Serbia", 3 August 2022.
70 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
71 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 8 May 2025.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form J.
76 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, Belgrade, 16 May 2017; 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 18; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 3 June 2022.
77 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 26 March 2019.
78 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, Belgrade, 16 May 2017; Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 23; and Serbia, "Replies to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Questions Concerning the Requisition Submitted by Serbia", 3 August 2022.
79 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 26 March 2019; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Section 4.
80 Serbia, "Replies to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Questions Concerning the Requisition Submitted by Serbia", 3 August 2022; and Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 37.
81 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 26 March 2019.
82 Email from Helen Gray, 2 October 2025.

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Only TS was conducted in 2024, releasing 0.12km$^2$ of mined area (see Table 3).

**Table 3: Summary of land release outputs in 2024 (national authority data)**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km$^2$) |
|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 0 |
| **Technical survey** | 0.12 |
| **Non-technical survey** | 0 |
| **AP mines destroyed during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 0 |

## SURVEY IN 2024

A total of 122,200m$^2$ of mined area was reduced through TS from December 2023 to February 2024 with one item of UXO found and destroyed. No mined area was cancelled through NTS in 2024 or 2023.[83]

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024 as in the previous year, no mined area was released through clearance.[84] SMAC did not have available data on the number of mines destroyed by the EOD department within the Sector for Emergency Management during clearance or spot tasks in 2024.[85]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SERBIA: 1 MARCH 2004

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2014

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2019

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2023

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (22 MONTHS, INTERIM): 31 DECEMBER 2024

↓

**FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (2 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2026**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

83 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 8 May 2025 and 21 May 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

84 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 21 May 2024 and 8 May 2025.

85 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 37.

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Serbia is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2026.

Serbia's overall land release output increased from 2023 to 2024, due to reduction through TS, but no clearance took place. Serbia had planned to release all known mined area (covering 561,800m$^2$) in 2022 and conduct NTS of the previously unknown mined area in the Bujanovac municipality in 2023. This did not happen, and Serbia instead planned to clear the remaining 268,100m$^2$ of previously known SHA in 2024 and conduct the requisite NTS by January 2025. This again did not happen even though funding had been secured. The persistent delays are partially explained by a shift in donor preferences, with more funding allocated to CMR clearance, and by security concerns in Bujanovac.[86] As at October 2025, the NTS team were conducting desk assessments with accreditation expected in November. From mid-2026, once the NTS has been completed, targeted TS is planned before further TS or clearance.[87]

The 2024 extension request indicates that a work plan for completion of survey and clearance of the previously unknown mined area in the Bujanovac municipality will be completed by October 2025. This would allow TS and clearance to begin in November 2025 and continue until 31 December 2026 although Serbia has not explicitly stated that it will do this in its extension request.[88] Serbia suggests it might complete clearance ahead of the deadline if certain conditions are met and it states that TS and land release projects will be developed for the assessed areas.[89]

In the last five years Serbia has cleared a total of 0.73km$^2$ of mined area (see Table 4).

**Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 0 |
| 2023 | 0 |
| 2022 | 0.17 |
| 2021 | 0.29 |
| 2020 | 0.27 |
| **Total** | **0.73** |

In addition, Serbia's claim to continued jurisdiction over Kosovo entails legal responsibility for remaining mined areas under Article 5 of the APMBC.[90] However, Serbia did not include such areas in either its first or second extension request, estimates of remaining contamination or plans for the extension periods. In its 2022 and 2024 Article 5 deadline extension requests, however, Serbia stated that: "In the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, there are mined areas, as well as areas contaminated with cluster bombs remaining after the armed conflicts. Pursuant to Resolution 1244 of the United Nations Security Council (Annex II, item 6), it is envisaged that after the withdrawal, an agreed number of the Republic of Serbia personnel will be allowed to return to perform certain functions, including marking and clearing minefields. As this provision of Annex II has not been implemented, this issue is still within the competence of UNMIK in accordance with Resolution 1244."[91]

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

SMAC expects to need both national and international capacity to deal with any residual contamination that may be discovered following completion of planned mine clearance.[92] SMAC has been cooperating with the Ministry of Interior and the MoD to plan for sustainable national capacity to address previously unknown mined areas post fulfilment of its Article 5 clearance obligations.[93] There is no mention of a plan for the management of residual contamination in Serbia's latest Article 5 deadline extension request.

86 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
87 Email from Helen Gray, 2 October 2025.
88 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 42–43.
89 Ibid., pp. 37 and 39.
90 See also in this regard UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).
91 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.
92 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 23 April 2020.
93 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 26 March 2021.

# SOMALIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2027

Not on track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 9KM$^2$

Light
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km$^2$) | Release in 2023 (km$^2$) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 2.17 | 1.81 |
| Technical Survey | 0.17 | 0.87 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0.37 | 0.29 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 151 (incl. 14 during spot tasks) | 96 (incl. 17 during spot tasks) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) sub-contractors: Ukroboronservice (UOS) and Demineco Human services (DHS)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Mine survey and clearance were again severely impeded by armed conflict and insecurity in 2024, preventing safe access to many areas. The number of anti-personnel (AP) mines found and destroyed in Somalia increased compared to 2023, but remained extremely low. Somalia revised the national mine action standards (NMAS) for non-technical survey (NTS) and risk education with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), a process that had been stalled since 2018. Full transition to Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core was further delayed, but work continued in 2024 and was expected to be finalised by the end of 2025. On 1 June 2024, following halting progress since 2016, the Office of the Prime Minister finally submitted Somalia's Mine Action Bill to the Federal Parliament for its approval. However, the Bill remained pending at the time of writing, and the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) was not optimistic that it would pass before the end of 2025.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Somalia should ensure that land release standards, policies, and methodologies conform with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and should only clear mined areas where contamination was confirmed by evidence.**
- **The status of SEMA should be recognised in law and national resources budgeted annually to meet its operating costs.**
- **Somalia should finalise a new national mine action strategy.**
- **Somalia should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and associated work plan for the programme.**
- **Somalia should elaborate an environmental policy and associated work plan for the programme.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | There is no accurate baseline of AP mined area in Somalia. The authorities provided an updated estimate of mine contamination for the end of 2024, though this includes areas with only anti-vehicle (AV) mines and other explosive ordnance. According to the updated work plan for 2022–27, nationwide NTS is a priority. But while some survey continued, insecurity continued to prevent safe access to many areas. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | The Federal Government of Somalia has still not formally recognised SEMA as a government institution nor has mine action legislation been adopted. As a consequence, SEMA cannot access State funding. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | The National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 included provisions on gender and diversity and work has begun on an updated multi-year strategy. SEMA advocates action on gender and diversity within survey and community liaison teams and has a dedicated gender, diversity and inclusion officer. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 4 | The NMAS have a section on environmental management, though HALO reports it has not seen it. Somalia does not have an environmental policy or plan for mine action but was continuing to develop these documents as at April 2025. HALO has measures in place to protect the environment during survey and clearance and has been rehabilitating cleared land to improve water catchment and prevent soil erosion. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 4 | SEMA's upgrade to IMSMA Core, launched in 2022, was almost complete as at April 2025 and work began on an NMAS for information management in 2024. Somalia submitted a detailed Article 7 report covering 2024 in June 2025. As at the time of writing, Somalia had still to submit Article 7 reports covering 2021 and 2022. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | SEMA expected to launch an updated strategy in late 2025 to replace Somalia's 2018–20 strategic plan. Somalia submitted a costed, detailed work plan for 2022–27 in June 2023, which is based on Somalia's national strategy, as "approved by the Minister of Internal Security". SEMA has repeatedly stressed how chronic underfunding makes planning of operations difficult. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 5 | Current NMAS are generally not fit for purpose although the standards for NTS and risk education were revised in 2024. The number of AP and AV mines found in Somalia continues to be low relative to the size of areas cleared. Somalia has a limited national explosive ordnance disposal capacity. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Somalia will not meet its 2027 Article 5 clearance deadline. Overall land release decreased slightly in 2024 compared to the previous year, and release through cancellation remains low. The successful conduct of nationwide NTS is needed but this will not be possible until access and security improve. |
| **Average Score** | **5.0** | **4.7** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
- Mine Action Department within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Ukroboronservice (UOS) (contracted by UNMAS until June 2024)
- Demineco Human Services (DHS) (contracted by UNMAS from July 2024 to January 2025)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- iMMAP

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Somalia lacks an accurate baseline of contamination, although it has provided an updated estimate for contamination as at the end of 2024 "to the extent possible" (see Table 1).[1] Somalia currently reports AP mined areas in four of its five Federal Member States—all except Jubaland (although that may change, as noted below)—as well as in the regional administration of SSC Katumo state in northern Somalia.[2] There are also mines in Somaliland, a de facto authority in the north-west, which continues to be excluded from the national authority's baseline estimate of contamination.

As at the end of 2024, Somalia estimated that outside Somaliland it had a total of almost 123km$^2$ of mined area – 230 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering 110.7km$^2$ and 232 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 12.2km$^2$ (see Table 1).[3] This is up from the estimate a year earlier of 109km$^2$, again excluding Somaliland.[4] The increase is largely explained by new CHAs identified in SSC Katumo state.[5] Somalia reports cancelling 60.3km$^2$ and clearing 115,028m$^2$ in Jubaland in 2024 (see Tables 9 and 12),[6] though this does not account for all of the 0.46km$^2$ in CHAs reported for December 2023.[7] Somalia has also clarified that the previously contaminated areas in Jubaland contained anti-vehicle (AV) mines and other explosive ordnance (EO), not AP mines.[8]

Mined areas are concentrated along Somalia's border with Ethiopia.[9] Somalia restated in 2023 that most of the contamination along the border is from AV mines, which continue to significantly affect the civilian population.[10] Contamination data in Somalia's national database are said to be disaggregated by weapon type, including improvised mines and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[11]

**Table 1: Estimated mined area, excluding Somaliland (at December 2024) (national authority data)**[12]

| State | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Puntland | 12 | 2,316,566 | 176 | 4,833,052 |
| Galmudug | 73 | 22,767,076 | 13 | 2,360,690 |
| Hirshabelle | 56 | 14,032,775 | 0 | 0 |
| South West | 26 | 4,905,190 | 39 | 3,013,169 |
| SSC Katumo | 63 | 66,696,565 | 4 | 1,976,179 |
| **Totals** | **230** | **110,718,172** | **232** | **12,183,090** |

It remains unclear how many of the hazardous areas reported as at the end of 2024 are contaminated with AP mines as opposed to other ordnance, particularly AV mines. In this regard, data from past surveys indicate that most recorded minefields were contaminated with AV mines or they did not identify the type of contamination.[13] HALO expects that the number of mixed AP and AV mined areas and of areas containing only AP mines to remain small.[14] Moreover, Somalia expects to cancel a sizable portion of existing mined area (though previously unrecorded contamination is also likely to be found).[15] Given available information, Mine Action Review believes that AP mine contamination in Somalia is light (totalling less than 10km$^2$).[16]

An ongoing NTS project aims to produce an accurate estimate of total contamination across the country (excluding Somaliland) and to disaggregate Somalia's contamination by weapon type. This project is the primary focus of Somalia's work plan for 2022–27.[17] But lack of safe access continues to be a major obstacle to the completion of survey. That said, SEMA declared in April 2025 that "most" mined areas were accessible for land release.[18] In any event, Somalia has promised to continue to update the States Parties on changes to the security situation and accessibility.[19] It has also pledged that, if funding is secured, NTS will be conducted in South West, Hirshabelle, and Jubaland states "to identify the

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 2.
2 "SSC" refers to the three regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 2.
4 Ibid., p. 6.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 8.
7 Ibid., p. 6.
8 Ibid., p. 8.
9 "The Federal Republic of Somalia Summary of updated Article 5 Work Plan", Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.
10 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 16.
11 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, Director, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.
12 Ibid., p. 7.
13 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, Senior Information Management Officer, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 17 March 2020; and Claus Nielsen, Country Director, NPA, 23 July 2020.
14 Emails from Rob Syfret, Head of Region, Horn of Africa, HALO, 7 July 2023; and Chris Teasdale, Country Director, HALO, 17 July 2024.
15 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, 30 April 2023, p. 16.
16 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, Country Director, HALO, 14 June 2020.
17 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, pp. 27–28.
18 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.
19 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 16.

exact contaminated areas".[20] As such, it may be that Jubaland will be again included in Somalia's reports of mined area, having been removed from the list in 2024, as noted above.[21]

In Somaliland, conflict in the eastern regions proved a barrier to survey in 2024 and into 2025, preventing deployment of HALO Somaliland's teams into a number of villages and further disrupting its major village-by-village "Mine-Impact Free" survey project. Phase I of this project (Rapid Assessment) was completed, as far as security allowed, in November 2023, covering a total of 1,870 villages since 2014, though 338 remained inaccessible. But the conflict in Laas Canood in Sool, which broke out in February 2023,[22] coupled with the overall security situation in the east of Somaliland, has further hampered progress and reduced HALO Somaliland's operational area in the eastern regions of Sool and Sanaag. Phase II of the survey project (Mine-Impacted Follow Up) has been underway since late 2023. As at October 2025, 32 villages requiring follow-up remained out of reach, and 90 remained to be visited. HALO operates in the Sool region under the HALO Somalia programme and hopes to hand over the baseline data to HALO Somalia teams to complete survey by the end of 2026, subject to both secure access and the availability of funding for NTS teams.[23] HALO Somaliland cleared 1.31km$^2$ of mined area in 2024 and estimates remaining contamination in Somaliland to comprise 5km$^2$ of minefields plus 7km$^2$ of road tasks.[24]

Somalia's mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination is a result of wars with Ethiopia in 1964 and 1977–78 (also known as the Ogaden war), and decades of internal armed conflict. According to reports received by the United Nations (UN), conventional mines were laid most recently in 2012 in south-central Somalia in the disputed Sool and Sanaag regions.[25] But according to SEMA, Somalia has seen an increase in the use of mines of an improvised nature in recent years. Somalia does recognise that victim-operated improvised explosive devices (VOIEDs) that are detonated by a person are AP mines within the scope of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)[26] and has committed to addressing this threat, in accordance with its international legal obligations.[27] Though improvised AP mines are not yet included in Somalia's baseline of mine contamination, the Government has a Counter-IED Strategy, covering 2025–2030, approved by the Council of Ministers and ready for implementation.[28]

SEMA believes, though, that improvised mines are not widespread in the country.[29] NPA has reported that non-State actors have used mines of an improvised nature in areas of northern Puntland, and this has been confirmed by the Puntland Ministry of Security.[30] Islamic State has established a strong presence in that area, which may explain the new contamination. HALO is also aware that IEDs of various sizes have been used by Al Shabaab against the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and Somalia's armed forces, but no improvised AP mines have been reported in any of its areas of operations, including Somaliland, in recent years.[31] However, UNMAS stated that in 2024 there were "19 IED incidents where UNMAS-trained international and Somali security forces destroyed 27 VOIED devices".[32] Also in 2024, HALO identified two victim-operated fuzes for TM-46 AV mines in Hirshabelle.[33]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Somalia is contaminated with ERW, which are estimated to cover almost 170km$^2$.[34] Somalia also has limited contamination from cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Somalia for further information).

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action management in Somalia is the responsibility of SEMA, which is under the Ministry of Internal Security (MoIS).[35] There is a separate mine action department within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in Somaliland. SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its other five federal states, with state offices in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Puntland, and South West. Each of these state offices has a director and one staff member.[36]

20 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 6.

21 Statement of Somalia on Clearance, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

22 Clashes broke out between Somaliland security forces and clan members in Laas Canood, in the Sool region in early February 2023. See Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Somalia: UN expert deplores high death toll in Laas Canood clashes", Press release, 23 February 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3SoKdfl.

23 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 22 July 2024; and 19 May and 10 October 2025.

24 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.

25 UNMAS, "Annual Report 2012", New York, 2013, p. 21. Sovereignty over these territories is claimed both by the self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland and by Puntland.

26 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 45.

27 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 7.

28 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 14 October 2025.

29 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

30 Email from Liberty T. Hombe, NPA, 24 March 2023.

31 Emails from Chris Teasdale, HALO, 17 July 2024; Rob Syfret, HALO, 22 July 2024 and 19 May 2025; and Katherine Ayres, HALO, 12 May 2025.

32 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025.

33 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.

34 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 11.

35 Updated 2025 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 10.

36 Ibid., p. 5; and interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

SEMA serves as the de facto mine action authority for Somalia. However, hopes for full implementation of mine action legislation in Somalia and formal recognition of SEMA as the national mine action authority remain unfulfilled. On 1 June 2024, the Mine Action Bill was finally submitted by the Office of the Prime Minister to the Federal Parliament for approval.[37] SEMA was not optimistic that it would be passed before the end of 2025. SEMA remained hopeful that once the law has been adopted, the federal budget will fund SEMA's core costs.[38] No such funding has been provided since SEMA's government grant expired in 2015.[39] SEMA has, though, submitted a proposed budget to MoIS.[40]

A chronic lack of funding has resulted in significant operational challenges for SEMA and contributed to weak capacity to plan and execute mine action activities.[41] Capacity-building efforts have, however, continued. UNMAS trains and equips explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams in Somalia's armed forces, and provides technical and policy advice to the Somali government, including support to meet its international treaty obligations.[42] UNMAS also supports capacity development of SEMA through HALO, with training, mentoring, and NMAS review, which were resourced until end-March 2025.[43] As at June, UNMAS planned to prioritise its capacity development support in key areas such as risk education; information management; NMAS development; and strategic planning and coordination.[44] As part of a transition plan, UNMAS operations shifted to the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) by 1 July 2025, with UNSOS continuing operational and technical support.[45] As at September 2025, no mine action activities had been conducted through UNMAS beyond 30 January 2025, due to funding challenges.[46]

Operators participate in key decision-making by the national authorities. They also describe an enabling environment for mine action in Somalia.[47] In June 2025, Somalia reported that a formal coordination structure had been established between SEMA and international partners, HALO, GICHD, iMMAP,[48] and UNMAS, with a view to prevent duplication of efforts and resources in mine action capacity development.[49] SEMA reports convening quarterly coordination meetings.[50] The UN led a Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) in Somalia in 2023.[51] As at October 2025, HALO reported that UNMAS offers regular engagement, and that a SEMA coordination meeting took place in September 2025.[52]

SEMA's strategic planning is guided by the 2024–29 strategic plan of MoIS, which in turn is guided by national policies and Somalia's National Transformation Plan (NTP) for 2025–29.[53] Somalia's NTP aims to address persistent threats to national security from non-State armed groups as well as other key challenges (such as resource mobilisation, capacity gaps, and the need to strengthen institutional frameworks).[54] Somalia pledged to formulate an updated national mine action strategy in 2025, to replace its long-expired 2018–20 strategic plan. The new strategy will include the "time and resources required for Somalia to be landmine free".[55]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In its 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, Somalia estimated the cost of implementing the operational work plan through to 2027 at US$6.4 million per year.[56] But there was no information on where this funding would come from and how much the Federal Government would contribute. In its updated work plan for 2022–27, Somalia restated that there was no State budget for mine action. The government has, though, provided land for SEMA's offices and covers the utility bills of SEMA's national office in Mogadishu and some of its regional offices.[57] Indeed, of the US$23 million needed for the work plan, only US$6.2 million had been secured by June 2023.[58] The work plan itself recognises "a strong need" to develop a resource mobilisation strategy for Article 5 implementation.[59] Somalia initiated an Individualised Approach to the Twenty-First Meeting of the States Parties in November 2023,[60] but this had not resulted in further donor support as at June 2025.[61]

37 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 5; Statement of Somalia on Clearance, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2025; and email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 14 October 2025.

38 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 20 June 2025.

39 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016; and Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

40 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

41 Ibid., pp. 4–5.

42 "Somalia's IED crisis escalates as nearly 600 attacks kill 1,400 and UNMAS increases support", *Hiiraan Online*, 2 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/42sGtib.

43 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 6.

44 Ibid., p. 4.

45 Ibid., p. 12.

46 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025.

47 Emails from Clemence Nyamandi, UNMAS, 30 May 2023; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 1 June 2023 and 5 June 2024.

48 iMMAP is an international non-profit organisation that provides information management services to humanitarian and development organisations.

49 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request (June 2025), p. 9.

50 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 1.

51 Email from Clemence Nyamandi, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.

52 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.

53 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

54 Ibid., p. 1.

55 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 2.

56 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 47.

57 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, pp. 39–40.

58 Somalia Summary of updated Article5 Work Plan, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023; and Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, 30 April 2023, p. 7.

59 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 40.

60 "Somalia's Mine Action Programme: Overview of Remaining Challenges and Needs", Individualised Approach Meeting, Twenty-First Meeting of the States Parties, Geneva, 23 November 2023.

61 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 13.

In the absence of national funding since 2015, SEMA has relied on mine action partners and donor nations to support its work.[62] In 2024, the People's Republic of China (PRC) donated RMB 1 million (approximately US$141,000) to SEMA,[63] with funding secured from the PRC until the end of 2027 for risk education, capacity building, and NTS.[64] The Federal Government intends to approach China for continued funding after 2027.[65] UNMAS funded some capacity development of SEMA through HALO, and provided additional funding to the end of March 2025. HALO continued providing financial support for SEMA personnel and coordination in 2024.[66] Beyond the end of March 2025, UNMAS did not have resources available to continue capacity development. At the time of writing, UNMAS was seeking to mobilise resources to sustain support for SEMA.[67]

Somalia has not shared a resource mobilisation strategy though it has stated the need for international support.[68] In June 2025, Somalia stated again that "resource mobilisation will remain our top priority."[69] SEMA cautions that funding for all mine action in Somalia beyond 2025 is uncertain[70] and that the persistent lack of funds presents an urgent challenge to effective mine action.[71] It expected a reduction in capacity for international operators and limited clearance teams to be deployed from July 2025 due to insufficient funding.[72] Table 2 summarises the funding provided to HALO for survey and clearance during 2024, and its forecast for 2025. Unless otherwise indicated, this represents funding for operations across all areas of Somalia, including Somaliland.

**Table 2: Funding for survey and clearance by international operators in Somalia (2024–25)[73]**

| Donor | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Finland (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)) | HALO | None |
| German Federal Foreign office (GFFO) | HALO | HALO |
| Ireland (Irish Aid) | HALO | HALO |
| The Netherlands (MFA) | HALO | HALO* |
| Norway (MFA) | HALO** | HALO |
| UK, Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP) | HALO | HALO |

*As at May 2025, the Dutch MFA had confirmed three months of gap funding, with a further proposal from HALO awaiting a response as at October 2025.
**Norwegian funding transferred to HALO Somaliland from HALO Ethiopia.

## SOMALILAND

Mine Action in Somaliland is the responsibility of the Somaliland Mine Action Department (MAD). HALO describes the environment in Somaliland as "one of the best in the world for enabling the conduct of humanitarian mine action", with its ministries of defence and planning facilitating the duty-free importation of demining equipment and the government issuing visas for international staff as needed. In addition, HALO works closely with the Somaliland MoD and other decision-makers to inform and guide policy and prioritisation.[74]

62 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.
63 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 7.
64 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025; and Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
65 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7–8.
66 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 13.
67 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025.
68 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, 30 April 2023, p. 25.
69 Statement of Somalia on Article 5 Implementation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
70 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 6.
71 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 4–5; and Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.
72 Statement of Somalia on Clearance, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2025.
73 Emails from Katherine Ayres, HALO, 12 May 2025; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May and 10 October 2025.
74 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 16 May 2023, 22 July 2024, and 19 May 2025.

No funding was provided by the Somaliland authorities for survey or clearance of AP mined area in 2023[75] and none was reported to have been provided in 2024.[76] The Somaliland government had been working on an Explosive Hazard Management National Action Plan for 2023–27.[77] However, HALO Somaliland says this has not progressed and the change in government and associated change of Ministers at the end of 2024 may affect any continued work on this plan.[78]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 recognised gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for the national programme, in line with Somalia's National Development Plan objectives to "implement gender equality in education and mainstream gender in all of its programmes with a focus on adolescent girls".[79] Somalia pledged to develop a new national mine action strategy in 2025, which would include information on how Somalia works with "different gender and diverse groups".[80] But Somalia has not yet developed a gender policy for mine action despite having pledged to do so by October 2022.[81]

Somalia's updated work plan for 2022–27 does commit to ensuring that gender and diversity are integrated into plans for a nationwide NTS.[82] In addition, SEMA has a dedicated gender, diversity, and inclusion officer.[83] But the authority also stresses that challenges to mainstreaming gender remain significant due to the patriarchal nature of Somali society. Clan affiliation has also to be considered.[84] Operators have noted that this is an important consideration when recruiting and deploying operational staff.[85] HALO Somaliland notes that local women who work as deminers can more easily move across clan lines without fear of reprisals, as women are not seen as participants in inter-clan conflicts.[86]

While the overall representation of women in HALO Somalia's workforce is well below its 50/50 target (see Table 3), efforts are intensifying to increase the current percentage while remaining sensitive to local cultural contexts. Measures to recruit and retain female staff include childcare stipends, maternity leave, and the provision of "baby boxes" for women with young children.[87] HALO Somalia ensures that survey and community liaison teams are mixed gender; an important prerequisite in a largely traditional Muslim society where it is not permissible for men to approach women alone in rural areas. HALO recruits teams from the areas in which they will be working to ensure participation from the affected groups. Particular care is taken to ensure that, if an area has more marginalised clans, they are recruited into teams. HALO understands that, in many communities, the voices of women and girls can be marginalised and uses household surveys to provide them with an opportunity to share their insights.[88]

HALO Somaliland has a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan[89] and remains committed to being an equal opportunities employer.[90] In 2024, HALO saw a slight increase of 3% in the proportion of both management or supervisory and operational roles occupied by women.[91] HALO Somaliland's Community Outreach and Risk Education (CORE) teams remained gender-balanced in 2024, and female staff were introduced into survey teams for the first time.[92] To encourage recruitment of women, HALO Somaliland has collaborated with local communities to increase acceptance of women spending time away from their communities and families to work as deminers.[93] In 2024, it conducted a project with female staff to develop vocational skills in areas such as driving, needlework, and professional make-up.[94]

HALO Somaliland highlights that its operations often take place near marginalised, rural communities. It maintains complete operational independence to prioritise tasks based on humanitarian need, regardless of any pressure that majority communities may try to exert in order to have clearance conducted for other reasons.[95]

UNMAS Somalia, which contracted operational capacity until March 2025,[96] had earlier introduced gender and diversity provisions into project proposals, including on the recruitment of women, youth and, where relevant, clan-affiliated personnel, into field and community liaison teams.[97] Demineco Human services (DHS) personnel, sub-contracted by UNMAS from July 2024 until the end of January 2025, were required to complete the GICHD online gender and diversity course, as is usual for UNMAS sub-contractors. Gender and diversity are emphasised in both the proposal and the contract agreement, with specific reference to recruitment, quality management, field operations, reporting, and case studies.[98]

75 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 22 July 2024.
76 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.
77 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 16 May 2023.
78 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.
79 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
80 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 2.
81 Revised 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 50.
82 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, 30 April 2023, p. 31.
83 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
84 Ibid., p. 10.
85 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO, 14 June 2020.
86 "The Sustainable Development Outcomes of Mine Action in Somalia", GICHD and UNDP, June 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4djBvXy.
87 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 5 June 2024.
88 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 7 July 2023.
89 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 16 May 2023.
90 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 22 July 2024.
91 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 17 and 22 July 2024 and 19 May 2025.
92 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.
93 Emails from Tobias Hewitt, HALO, 21 May 2022; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 22 July 2024 and 19 May 2025.
94 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.
95 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 16 May 2023.
96 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.
97 Email from Clemence Nyamandi, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.
98 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025.

**Table 3: Gender composition of SEMA and operators in 2024**[99]

| Entity | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEMA Head Office | 22 | 4* (18%) | 3 | 2 | 15 | 2 |
| SEMA Regional offices | 10 (2 per office) | 1 (10%) | 5 | 0 | 5 | 1 |
| HALO Somalia | 339 | 66 (19%) | 27 | 5 (19%) | 288 | 28 (10%) |
| HALO Somaliland** | 462 | 81 (18%) | 71 | 8 (11%) | 380 | 64 (17%) |
| **Totals** | **833** | **152 (18%)** | **106** | **15 (14%)** | **688** | **95 (14%)** |

*These four female staff, as reported by SEMA, exclude operational staff (see separate column) and include one woman in a legal position, a second with a gender role, a third assisting information management, and a fourth working as a cleaner.[100] **Staff numbers include those made redundant during 2024, with their notice period ending on 31 December 2024.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

SEMA had made little progress on environmental matters in mine action in earlier years, but did take notable steps on this issue in 2024 and into 2025. As at April 2025, SEMA was working with HALO to develop an environmental policy and plan.[101] Somalia's NMAS include a chapter on environmental health and safety that requires implementing partners to consider procedures to mitigate the impact of mine action activities on the environment,[102] though HALO reports it has not seen this.[103] In its most recent Article 7 report (covering 2024), Somalia stated that SEMA was exploring the possibility of developing an NMAS on environmental management, "to ensure a cohesive and sustainable national approach".[104]

**Table 4: Environmental policies and action**[105]

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| HALO Somalia | No | No | No |
| HALO Somaliland | No | No | Yes |

While HALO does not have a country-specific environmental policy in place, its global standard operating procedure (SOP) for Environmental Management in Operations requires country programmes to have an environmental management plan – under development for HALO Somalia and Somaliland as at October 2025. HALO also has a regional environment strategy for the Horn of Africa.[106] HALO continues to consult closely with mine-impacted communities in the pre-clearance phase to outline the extent of vegetation removal necessary to conduct clearance and to understand any concerns, with the community ultimately deciding whether clearance should go ahead. HALO Somalia has also continued to expand its installation of solar panels at permanent operational facilities across the country, cutting programme emissions. It has SOPs for vegetation cutting and has integrated environmental concerns into manual clearance SOPs as well as NTS and risk education.[107]

HALO continues to work at a regional (Horn of Africa) level to develop a community-centred, participatory approach to pre-clearance environmental assessment of minefields. This will include identifying climate-related risks and specific mitigation measures to be incorporated into clearance planning, and implemented throughout all phases of operations. HALO expects this approach to complement other environmental screening tools available to the sector[108] and planned to finalise its tool in Q4 2025, ready for trial. HALO also planned to trial the Green Field Tool, developed by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and The Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS).[109]

99 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025; and emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May and 10 October 2025; Chris Teasdale, HALO, 17 July 2024; and Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 14 October 2025.

100 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 20 June 2025; and email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 14 October 2025.

101 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

102 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

103 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.

104 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 6.

105 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 5 June and 22 July 2024, and 19 May and 10 October 2025.

106 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.

107 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 5 June 2024.

108 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.

109 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.

In its separate operations in Somaliland, environmental measures are incorporated into its SOPs[110] and a full-time environment officer was recruited in 2023.[111] In 2024, HALO Somaliland provided all operational staff with enhanced guidance on vegetation cutting to preserve mature trees and other plants, but without compromising operational safety. Waste management guidelines have also been developed to support improved treatment of solid waste streams in remote demining camps and reduce stress on local communities. A context-specific environmental awareness training package was designed for the Somaliland programme, with a first cohort of staff receiving training in 2024 and all operational and support staff receiving it in early 2025. HALO plans to incorporate this training into on-boarding for all new staff.[112]

HALO Somaliland also took measures not only to protect but also to enhance the environment in 2024. Rehabilitation activities for rangeland (open country used for grazing animals) were performed in collaboration with national NGO partners across four pastoralist communities, in areas where HALO had previously undertaken mine clearance. Activities included the construction of soil bunds for water catchment, the re-seeding of native grass species, the placement of stone gabions[113] to prevent soil erosion, and the erection of fencing to provide protection from grazing livestock. Approximately 63 hectares of rangeland underwent some form of rehabilitation. HALO intends to use lessons learned from these activities to improve pre- and post-clearance mitigation measures to reduce environmental impact and help restore cleared land to its original state.[114]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

SEMA, with the support of the GICHD, has been transitioning from IMSMA New Generation to IMSMA Core. As at April 2025, the process was almost complete, though migration of historical data on NTS, clearance, and completion reports was still needed.[115] SEMA expected to complete this work by the end of 2025.[116] UNMAS said in 2024 that the SEMA information management team's capacity to manage the system has improved.[117] In addition, SEMA began work on an NMAS for information management during the year.[118]

Mine action operators collect data using standardised protocols and forms, which are submitted to the IMSMA database.[119] Operators report that data collection forms are consistent and enable collection of the necessary data.[120] SEMA states that information in the database is disaggregated by weapon type.[121]

In 2023, before exiting Puntland, NPA handed over the IMSMA NG dataset for Puntland to the SEMA regional office there, though SEMA said this dataset was not functioning as at October 2025 and that efforts to migrate historical data from implementing partners into the national IMSMA Core database were ongoing.[122] UNMAS had migrated all datasets, except for NTS, and was awaiting finalisation of the data migration structure from SEMA and the GICHD.[123]

In May 2025, HALO Somaliland reported that the separate IMSMA database used by the Somaliland MAD was no longer in use, with access to it lost following a change of leadership at the department. However, HALO has been working with the MAD information management team to develop an Excel dashboard populated with operational data from HALO Somaliland's 25-year operational history in the region.

HALO delivered an initial training on its use in 2024, as well as providing some information technology and global positioning system (GPS) equipment.[124] HALO Somaliland creates its own data collection forms, which are reviewed regularly.

Somalia submitted a detailed Article 7 report covering 2024 in June 2025. As at October 2025, however, it had still to submit Article 7 reports covering 2021 and 2022. In April 2021, SEMA submitted Somalia's Article 5 deadline extension request, seeking a new deadline of October 2027, but it was poorly formulated and required significant revisions as it lacked sufficient detail and precision. Somalia acted upon the decisions of the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties by submitting a detailed and costed, updated work plan for the implementation of Article 5 of the APMBC on 2 June 2023.[125]

110 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 16 May 2023.
111 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 22 July 2024.
112 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May and 10 October 2025.
113 A stone gabion is a wire container (basket or cage) filled with stones or rocks.
114 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.
115 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.
116 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.
117 Email from Ghirmay Kiros, Operations and QA Officer, UNSOM, 20 May 2024.
118 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.
119 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.
120 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 1 June 2023; and Clemence Nyamandi, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.
121 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.
122 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 14 October 2025.
123 Email from Ahmed Hussein Ibrahim, Project Manager, Humanitarian Explosive Management (HEM), UNMAS, 22 September 2025.
124 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.
125 APMBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), "Somalia", accessed 22 July 2023 at: https://bit.ly/3rHSaBO.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Somalia has yet to launch an updated strategy to replace the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020. It was reported in both 2022[126] and 2024[127] that the strategy had been developed but that it was pending approval from the MoIS. As at October 2025, an updated strategy was being developed, though SEMA was still "expecting support from GICHD" and did not have a known timeline for when it may be finalised.[128]

According to the conditions of the granting of Somalia's extension request until October 2027, an updated work plan was to be provided.[129] The work plan submitted in June 2023 was detailed in certain areas but lacking in others. The main focus is comprehensive NTS across the country, which has not yet been conducted.[130] Somalia says that annual land release targets for the period covered by the work plan will depend upon the results of the NTS. However, it estimates that, given the available combined capacity of all operators, working at an average manual mine clearance rate of—an ambitious—35.5m$^2$ per deminer per day, it can clear just over 1.51km$^2$ per year, or almost 7.57km$^2$ over the five-year period. This assumes a total capacity of 22 manual clearance teams with 148 deminers in total.[131]

The work plan includes a detailed breakdown by operator and year of operational capacity and equipment for survey, clearance, and spot tasks. It also clearly outlines the annual funding secured and yet to be secured for each area of activity and by operator.[132] To date, Somalia has exceeded its expected average rate of annual clearance, with 2.05km$^2$ of AP mined area cleared in 2022,[133] 1.81km$^2$ cleared in 2023,[134] and 2.17km$^2$ cleared in 2024.[135]

Tasking by SEMA was introduced in 2023 following challenges around coordination of tasking between SEMA and operators reported in previous years. HALO says tasking has been working well and has demonstrated SEMA's capability to manage and issue tasks effectively.[136] HALO reported in June 2024 that, once SEMA has fully migrated to IMSMA Core, SEMA will produce task dossiers from the database.[137]

HALO Somaliland, working in accordance with IMAS, conducts prioritisation and associated planning and tasking internally, as prioritisation mechanisms have not yet been put in place by the Somaliland government.[138] NTS teams assign priority levels to a task (low, medium, high) based on information collected in the field, including reported accidents (animal or human), land use, and infrastructure or resource blockages.[139] HALO Somaliland conducts regular meetings with the MAD, keeping it duly informed on where HALO is working.[140]

Prior to ceasing survey and EOD operations in March 2025, UNMAS and its implementing partners proposed survey and clearance tasks based on considerations of security; site accessibility; level of accident risk to the community; and other community impact, such as whether a hazard blocks access to facilities. Proposed tasks were shared with SEMA for their endorsement and record-keeping.[141]

In its most recent Article 7 report (covering 2024), Somalia provided details of key areas of work planned for 2025 (though not for Somaliland). HALO Somalia was set to clear 428,005m$^2$ as well as conduct NTS with the aim of cancelling 35,689m$^2$ across Galmudug and Puntland. In Hirshabelle, it was planned that HALO would undertake NTS with the aim of cancelling 370,246m$^2$. The report also states that the Jubaland Mine Action Network (or JUMAN, the regional mine action centre in Jubaland), would work to strengthen its incident reporting system, and establish "community-trusted EO [explosive ordnance] reporting channels", with monthly analytical reports to inform clearance and advocacy.[142]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Somalia has NMAS that were published in 2018, and which were, at the time, aligned with the IMAS. The NMAS are split into four parts covering land release, information management (IMSMA), risk education, and quality assurance (QA).[143] Since 2018, however, a lack of funding to undertake stakeholder consultation, political instability, and a paucity of international technical experts to assist in the review process have all delayed "finalisation" of the NMAS.[144] Progress

126 Article 7 Report (covering 2020 and 2021), Form A.
127 Email from Ghirmay Kiros, UNMAS, 20 May 2024.
128 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 14 October 2025.
129 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 7.
130 Ibid., p. 35.
131 Ibid., p. 33 and Annex III, p. 49.
132 Ibid., pp. 34–39.
133 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 16 May, 7 July, and 15 September 2023.
134 Email from Chris Teasdale, HALO, 17 July 2024.
135 Emails from Katherine Ayres, HALO, 12 May 2025; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.
136 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 1 June 2023.
137 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 5 June 2024.
138 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.
139 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 22 July 2024.
140 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.
141 Emails from Ghirmay Kiros, UNSOM, 20 May and 7 August 2024; and Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025.
142 Article 7 report (covering 2024), p. 3.
143 Revised 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 38.
144 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 10.

was made in 2024, however, with standards for NTS and risk education revised with GICHD support[145] and "officially approved."[146] Revision of the information management standard was underway as at April 2025.[147] SEMA says it has a functioning quality management system and that it regularly inspects activities and assesses mine action outputs.[148]

UNMAS notes that the 2018 NMAS are sufficient to serve as a guide for the SOPs of implementing partners to deal with legacy contamination, subject to amends that may be made during government review.[149] HALO, though, says that the NMAS need to be adapted to support implementation in the context of local threats.[150] UNMAS suggested that, considering the significance of the IED-related threats affecting the civilian population, the NMAS should address procedures to deal with improvised mines and VOIEDs.[151] In its updated work plan for 2022–27, Somalia pledges to consider developing specific standards for risk education on IEDs.[152] This is now integrated into a revised Chapter 21 of the NMAS.[153]

The number of AP and AV mines found and destroyed in Somalia continues to be low relative to the size of areas cleared (see Table 11). As such, it is possible that, in some cases, more areas could be released through NTS or TS rather than full clearance. This in turn indicates a need for stricter application of robust land release methodology. In 2024, HALO Somalia cleared ten AP mined areas, covering a total area of 0.65km$^2$, which proved to contain no AP mines (see Table 14).[154] This is an increase on the 0.14km$^2$ cleared without finding AP mines in 2023.[155] Somalia suggests that "the effectiveness and efficiency of clearance operations must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, rather than through generalized national assumptions".[156] This does not obviate the need for better survey before full clearance is undertaken.

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, HALO, continued to conduct operations in Somalia, with separate operations in Somaliland. Survey and EOD undertaken through UNMAS in Somalia formally ceased in January 2025, due to a lack of funding.[157] UNMAS contracted Ukroboronservice (UOS) teams until June 2024[158] for mine survey and clearance and EOD,[159] then contracted DHS from July 2024 to the end of January 2025 to undertake EORE, NTS, and EOD spot tasks, including in AP mined areas. DHS placed two multi-skilled teams in each of the federal member states of Galmudug, Southwest, Hirshabelle, and Jubaland.[160]

**Table 5: Operational NTS capacities deployed in 2024**[161]

| Operator | NTS teams | Total NTS personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| HALO Somalia | 1 | 4 | Started 2024 with 4 teams totalling 16 personnel. Reduced to one team totalling 4 personnel from February 2024. NTS teams also conduct community liaison. Clearance teams conduct TS. |
| HALO Somaliland | 4 | 18 | Started 2024 with 2 teams totalling 10 personnel. Increased in May 2024 to 4 teams totalling 18 personnel when HALO Somaliland absorbed HALO Ethiopia staff. Clearance teams conduct TS. |
| UOS/DHS (contracted by UNMAS) | 4 | 8 | UOS until June 2024 only with 4 teams of 8 total personnel. Clearance teams also conduct TS.<br>DHS July 2024 to January 2025 with a higher capacity of 8 multi-skilled teams (see Table 6) |
| **Totals** | **9** | **30** | |

145 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.
146 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.
147 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.
148 Ibid., p. 10.
149 Email from Clemence Nyamandi, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.
150 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 1 June 2023.
151 Email from Clemence Nyamandi, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.
152 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 45.
153 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025.
154 Email from Katherine Ayres, HALO, 12 May 2025.
155 Email from Chris Teasdale, HALO, 17 July 2024.
156 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.
157 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 4; and email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025.
158 Email from Ghirmay Kiros, UNSOM, 20 May 2024.
159 Email from Chris Teasdale, HALO, 17 July 2024.
160 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025.
161 Emails from Rob Syfret, 17 and 22 July 2024 and 19 May and 10 October 2025; Chris Teasdale, HALO, 17 July 2024; and Ghirmay Kiros, UNSOM, 20 May 2024; Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025; and interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

**Table 6: Operational clearance capacities deployed in Somalia in 2024**[162]

| Operator | Manual teams | Total deminers | Mechanical teams | Mechanical deminers | Mechanical assets | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HALO Somalia | 14 | 140 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Started 2024 with 20 manual demining teams totalling 200 staff, dropping to 14 teams 140 manual deminers by June 2024, then to 11 teams in December. Deployed for clearance and TS. |
| HALO Somaliland | 30 | 185 | 1 | 6 | 1 (JCB excavator) | 22 manual demining teams totalling 182 staff, rising to 30 teams after absorption of 185 HALO Ethiopia staff in May 2024. Reduced again to 18 teams (totalling 101 manual deminers) following redundancies in November 2024. Deployed for clearance and TS. |
| UOS/DHS (contracted by UNMAS) | 4 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 0 | UOS until June 2024 only with 4 teams of 40 total personnel. Deployed for clearance and TS Also had 2 EOD teams of 10 personnel.<br>DHS from July 2024 to January 2025 with 8 multi-skilled teams totalling 40 deminers. |
| **Totals** | **48** | **365** | **1** | **6** | **1** | |

HALO Somaliland experienced several changes to survey and clearance capacity in 2024 (see Tables 5 and 6). In May 2024, it absorbed teams from across the border in Ethiopia's Somali region from HALO Ethiopia. In November, however, it was forced to make redundancies due to lack of funding.[163] HALO Somaliland did not expect an increase in the number of teams deployed in 2025, unless additional funding becomes available. It has planned for capacity in line with available funding, aiming to prevent fluctuation of team numbers over the course of the year.[164] HALO Somalia experienced a notable drop in capacity in 2024 due to funding restraints, decreasing from four NTS teams to one (see Table 5) and starting the year with 20 manual demining teams totalling 200 staff, dropping steadily to 11 teams by the end of the year (see Table 6).[165]

No nationally funded survey or clearance teams operate directly under SEMA,[166] although Somalia has taken steps to develop national capacity to deal with the range of explosive threats it faces. Since 2021, UNMAS has trained and equipped 51 Somali National Army EOD teams. The Somali Police Force has also benefited from similar training programmes funded by the Government of Japan, and 21 police EOD teams have been established, which can respond to explosive threats in urban areas. UNMAS cautions, though, that despite significant progress, much more is needed to ensure a sustainable, Somali-led EOD capacity.[167] Somalia also has several local NGO consortiums, including the Central Somalia Mine Action Centre (CESMAC) and South West State/Hirshabelle Mine Action Centre (SHAHMAC), both of which have EOD capabilities, having been trained by international NGOs.[168] It is not yet clear how these national operators will conduct survey and clearance of AP mines in the future.

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 7: Summary of land release outputs in 2024 (operator data)**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 2.17 | |
| **Technical Survey** | 0.17 | |
| **Non-Technical Survey** | 0.37 | |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 151 | Includes 14 destroyed in spot tasks |

162 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 17 and 22 July 2024; and 19 May and 10 October 2025; Rebecca Wicks, Programme Manager, HALO Somaliland, 8 August 2024; Chris Teasdale, HALO, 17 July 2024; Ghirmay Kiros, UNSOM, 20 May 2024; and Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025.

163 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.

164 Ibid.

165 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.

166 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.

167 "Somalia's IED crisis escalates as nearly 600 attacks kill 1,400 and UNMAS increases support", *Hiiraan Online*, 2 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/42sGtib.

168 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 4.

According to HALO data, a total of 2.71km$^2$ of AP mined area was released in 2024 across Somalia, including Somaliland, most through clearance. Thus, of the total, 2.17km$^2$ (80%) was cleared, with a further 0.37km$^2$ cancelled through NTS and 0.17km$^2$ reduced through technical survey (TS). A total of 151 AP mines were found and destroyed of which 14 were destroyed in spot tasks.[169] A total of 20 AV mines were also destroyed during clearance, along with one destroyed during a spot task.[170]

In its most recent Article 7 report, covering 2024, Somalia reported that, in 2024, it cancelled 62.93km$^2$ and cleared 4.25km$^2$ (see Tables 9 and 12), but no land was released through TS.[171] However, as outlined in detail below, the vast majority of this land release was of areas containing AV mines or other explosive ordnance.

In 2024, HALO Somalia cleared ten AP mined areas covering an area of 0.65km$^2$, but which proved to contain no AP mines.[172]

## SURVEY IN 2024

As noted above, according to HALO data, a total of just over 0.54km$^2$ of AP mined area was released through survey in 2024: 0.37km$^2$ cancelled through NTS and 0.17km$^2$ reduced through TS, all by HALO Somalia[173] (see Tables 8 and 10). This is a notable decrease compared to 2023, when a total of just over 1.16km$^2$ of AP mined area was released through survey, likewise all by HALO Somalia.[174]

In its most recent Article 7 report (covering 2024), Somalia reports cancelling a far larger total of 62.9km$^2$. Of this total, however, only 855,955m$^2$, all in Galmudug, was suspected to contain any AP mines. The vast majority of the cancelled area (60.34km$^2$) was in. Jubaland state, with the contamination type stated as AV mines and other EO (see Table 9).[175] According to UNMAS, this cancellation was carried out by its sub-contractor, DHS.[176] Somalia reports no release of land through TS in its Article 7 report (covering 2024),[177] though, as previously stated, some was undertaken by HALO (see Table 10).

In 2024, HALO Somaliland surveyed 2.1km$^2$ of minefields across 23 tasks, and re-surveyed 76,804m$^2$ in one task.[178] As a result, 1.37km$^2$ of mined area, typically containing a mixed threat of AP and AV mines, was added to the database.[179] By comparison, in 2023, previously unrecorded AP mine contamination was recorded in Somalia by HALO Somaliland only, covering an area of 0.28km$^2$.[180]

HALO Somalia experienced a significant drop in land reduced in 2024 compared to the 897,957m$^2$ reduced in 2023, as its TS capacity was down by almost half, due to funding constraints.[181]

**Table 8: Release of mined area through NTS in 2024 (operator data)[182]**

| State/Region/District | Operator | CHAs cancelled | SHAs cancelled | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Galmudug, Galgadud, Abudwaq | HALO Somalia | 0 | 1 | 370,846 |
| **Totals** | | **0** | **1** | **370,846** |

**Table 9: Release of areas with mines and other explosive ordnance through NTS in 2024, excluding Somaliland (national authority data)[183]**

| State | Operator | CHAs cancelled | SHAs cancelled | Contamination type in areas cleared | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Galmudug | DHS | N/K | N/K | AP mines, AV mines, ERW | 855,955 |
| Hirshabelle | DHS | N/K | N/K | AV mines, ERW | 1,089,612 |
| Jubaland | DHS | N/K | N/K | AV mines, ERW | 60,340,000 |
| South West | DHS | N/K | N/K | None | 642,135 |
| **Totals** | | **N/K** | **N/K** | | **62,927,702** |

170 Emails from Katherine Ayres, HALO, 12 May 2025; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May and 10 October 2025.
171 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 8.
172 Email from Katherine Ayres, HALO Somalia, 12 May 2025.
173 Email from Chris Teasdale, HALO, 17 July 2024.
174 Ibid.
175 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 8.
176 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025.
177 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 8.
178 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May and 10 October 2025.
179 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025; and Rebecca Wocks, HALO, 15 October 2025.
180 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 22 July 2024.
181 Email from Katherine Ayres, HALO Somalia, 12 May 2025.
182 Emails from Katherine Ayres, HALO Somalia, 12 May 2025; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.
183 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 8; and email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025.

**Table 10: Release of mined area through TS in 2024 (operator data)[184]**

| State/Region/District | Operator | CHA/SHAs reduced | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Galmudug, Mudug, Galkayo | HALO Somalia | 3 | 4,035 |
| Puntland, Mudug, Galdogob | HALO Somalia | 2 | 31,454 |
| Hirshabelle, Hiran, Belet Weyne | HALO Somalia | 1 | 137,066 |
| **Totals** | | **6** | **172,555** |

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, a total of just over 2.17km² of AP mined area was cleared by HALO. Of this, 866,867m² was cleared by HALO Somalia, with five AP mines destroyed (along with 14 AV mines and 658 items of unexploded ordnance, UXO), and just under 1.31km² was cleared by HALO Somaliland, with 132 AP mines destroyed (along with six AV mines and two items of UXO) (see Table 11). A further 14 AP mines in total were destroyed in spot tasks (13 by HALO Somaliland and 1 by HALO Somalia) bringing the total of AP mines destroyed in 2024 to 151. One AV mine was also destroyed in a spot task, bringing the total of AV mines destroyed by HALO to 14 (see Table 13). HALO Somaliland undertook 190 spot tasks in 2024, destroying 667 items of UXO along with these AP and AV mines.[185] HALO Somalia also identified two victim-operated fuzes for TM-46 AV mines in Hirshabelle.[186]

Clearance of AP mined area in 2024 by HALO is slightly lower than the 2.39km² cleared in 2023.[187] HALO Somalia experienced a drop in clearance output compared to 806,531m² cleared in 2023, due to reduced funding and capacity.[188] HALO Somaliland, however, increased clearance from 822,899m² in 2023 to almost 1.31km² in 2024. This was because 2023 operations were suspended for a short time following two security incidents at HALO camps.[189]

In 2024, as noted above, HALO Somalia cleared ten AP mined areas without finding AP mines.[190]

In its latest Article 7 report (covering 2024), Somalia states that 4.25km² of areas containing mines and other EO was cleared in Somalia, excluding Somaliland (see Table 12).[191] Somalia also stated at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025 that, since its last update on Article 5 Implementation, it had "cleared more than 600,000m² of minefields" and close to 4km² of battle areas.[192] This indicates that most of the clearance of 4.25km² shown in Table 12 represents battle area clearance (BAC), with only 679,897m² of mine clearance. Indeed, SEMA confirms that the 2.89km² cleared in SSC Khatumo, for example (almost 70% of all clearance of areas with mines and other EO, reported by Somalia), represents BAC.[193] AP mines were destroyed only in Galmudug and Puntland (see Table 12).[194]

**Table 11: Mine clearance in 2024 (operator data)[195]**

| State, District, village | Operator | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Galmudug, Mudug, Galkayo | HALO Somalia | 7 | 320,723 | 4 | 9 | 0 |
| Puntland, Mudug, Galdogob | HALO Somalia | 4 | 107,282 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| SSC, Sool, Las Anod | HALO Somalia | 7 | 282,046 | 0 | 0 | 656 |
| Hirshabelle, Hiran, Belet Weyne | HALO Somalia | 3 | 131,843 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| Southwest, Bakol. El Barde | HALO Somalia | 1 | 24,973 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

184 Email from Katherine Ayres, HALO Somalia, 12 May 2025.

185 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025; and Katherine Ayres, HALO Somalia, 12 May 2025.

186 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.

187 Emails from Chris Teasdale, HALO, 17 July 2024; Ghirmay Kiros, UNSOM, 22 May 2024; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 22 July 2024.

188 Email from Katherine Ayres, HALO Somalia, 12 May 2025.

189 These incidents were: an armed attack on HALO's camp in August 2023, and one at a HALO task near the community of Hindaysa in September 2023, due to unfounded suspicions that HALO was mining gold in the local community. Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.

190 Email from Katherine Ayres, HALO Somalia, 12 May 2025.

191 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 8.

192 Statement of Somalia on Article 5 Implementation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

193 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 15 October 2025.

194 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 8.

195 Emails from Katherine Ayres, HALO, 12 May 2025; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May and 10 October 2025.

Table 11 Continued

| State, District, village | Operator | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maroodi Jeex, Balli gubadle, Balli-cabane | HALO Somaliland | *0 | 82,612 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| Maroodi Jeex, Gabiley, Cabudla | HALO Somaliland | 1 | 99,682 | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| Maroodi Jeex, Gabiley, Caro-yanbo | HALO Somaliland | 1 | 206,695 | 32 | 2 | 0 |
| Maroodi Jeex, Sallaxley, Ina guuxaa | HALO Somaliland | *0 | 196,473 | 39 | 0 | 0 |
| Togdheer, Oodweyne, Daba-goroyaale | HALO Somaliland | *0 | 455,220 | 16 | 4 | 2 |
| Togdheer, Oodweyne, Raydab khaatumo | HALO Somaliland | *0 | 265,134 | 27 | 0 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **24** | **2,172,683** | **137** | **20** | **660** |

*Of the tasks undertaken by HALO Somaliland in 2024, two were completed, one was suspended, and five were ongoing at the time of writing.

**Table 12: Clearance of areas with mines and other explosive ordnance in 2024, excluding Somaliland (national authority data)**[196]

| State/Region* | Operator (as stated by SEMA) | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Banadir* | UNMAS | N/K | 40,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Galmudug | UNMAS/HALO | N/K | 572,597 | 3 | 14 | 96 |
| Hirshabelle | UNMAS/HALO | N/K | 374,110 | 0 | 4 | 53 |
| Jubaland | UNMAS | N/K | 115,028 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| Puntland | HALO | N/K | 107,282 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| SSC Khatumo | HALO** | N/K | 2,894,884 | 0 | 0 | 656 |
| South West | UNMAS/HALO | N/K | 151,423 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **N/K** | **4,253,324** | **4** | **21** | **809** |

*Banadir is an official Regional Administration, which encompasses Somalia's capital, Mogadishu. **SEMA confirms that this clearance, conducted by HALO, was BAC.[197] Hence it is of a much larger area than the clearance of mined area in SSC reported by HALO, as stated in Table 11.

**Table 13: AP and AV mines destroyed during EOD spot tasks in 2024 (operator data)**[198]

| State, District, village | Operator | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Puntland, Mudug, Galdogob | HALO Somalia | 1 | 1 |
| Southwest, Bakol. El Barde | HALO Somalia | 0 | 0 |
| Sahil, Berbera, Biyo guure | HALO Somaliland | 1 | 0 |
| Maroodi Jeex, Gabiley, Cabuda | HALO Somaliland | 6 | 0 |
| Maroodi Jeex, Balli gubadle, Habaasweyn | HALO Somaliland | 1 | 0 |
| Awdal, Baki | HALO Somaliland | 1 | 0 |
| Awdal, Saylac, Xariirad | HALO Somaliland | 1 | 0 |
| Togdheer, Oodweyne, Mulaaxo | HALO Somaliland | 2 | 0 |
| Maroodi Jeex, Hargeysa | HALO Somaliland | 1 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **14** | **1** |

196 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 8; and email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 14 October 2025.

197 Emails from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 14 and 15 October 2025.

198 Emails from Katherine Ayres, HALO, 12 May 2025; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.

**Table 14: AP mine clearance tasks in 2024, which proved to contain no AP mines (operator data)[199]**

| Operator | Area cleared (m²) |
|---|---|
| HALO Somalia | 651,661 |
| **Total** | **651,661** |

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOMALIA: 1 OCTOBER 2012

↓

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022

↓

**FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 OCTOBER 2027**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Somalia is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2027. It will not meet this deadline.

In its latest Article 7 report covering 2024, Somalia details the challenges it is facing, namely; the possibility of either an increase or decrease in hazardous areas following NTS; continued difficulty in safely accessing some areas due to attacks by Al Shabaab; the risk to personnel of threats from armed groups when conducting field visits and surveys; and a pressing humanitarian need for Somalia to address the risk from ordnance other than AP mines, which pose a significant threat to the population. Somalia adds that the occasional practice by some civilians of lifting AV mines for their explosive material has "further complicated the accuracy of the previously recorded hazards". Finally, a severe lack of international funding is restated as a major difficulty.[200]

Despite these significant challenges, SEMA has consistently collaborated with partners in recent years to continue capacity building, NMAS revision, and information management, and it should be commended for this. Efforts underway to finalise an updated national mine action strategy by the end of 2025 and to revise further key chapters of the NMAS will represent important progress, if achieved. However, approval of Somalia's mine action legislation by the nation's parliament, a prerequisite for SEMA to secure national funding, remains outstanding. It is critical that this matter be resolved and that Somalia secures further funding, both national and international, in order to maintain an effective mine action programme capable of meeting its Article 5 obligations in any foreseeable timeframe.

Somalia made the decision to not include Somaliland in its plans within the extension request or within its updated 2022–27 work plan, submitted in June 2023, despite the fact that Somaliland remains part of Somalia *de jure* and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government for the purpose of the APMBC.

**Table 15: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (operator data)**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 2.17 |
| 2023 | 1.81 |
| 2022 | 2.05 |
| 2021 | 2.52 |
| 2020 | 2.32 |
| **Total** | **10.87** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Somalia has established EOD/IED-trained police teams in every federal member state, which will be available to respond to community call-outs once Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.[201]

199 Email from Katherine Ayres, HALO, 12 May 2025.

200 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 13.

201 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

# SOUTH SUDAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2026

Not on track to meet deadline
Four-year extension to 9 July 2030 requested

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 4.9KM²

Medium
(UNMAS estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0.58 | 0.58 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0.19 | 0.02 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 159 (9 in spot tasks) | 100 (14 in spot tasks) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- SafeLane Global (SLG)
- The Development Initiative (TDI)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, South Sudan reported clearing almost 0.58km² of anti-personnel (AP) mined area, almost the same output as the previous year. In contrast, 159 AP mines were destroyed in 2024, an increase of more than one half on 2023. South Sudan will not clear all AP mined areas by its first Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 extended deadline of 9 July 2026. In May 2025, it requested a four-year extension to 9 July 2030, and it revised its request in August 2025. The request was due to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025. Implementation of the South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–28 has been slow given competing priorities and a drop in funding.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **South Sudan should ensure consistent financial support for the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and start to fund mine action operations directly.**
- **South Sudan and its mine action partners should continue to support the NMAA to take on greater responsibilities and increase the number of national deminers.**
- **South Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy.**
- **South Sudan should continue to work towards establishing an evidence-based baseline of AP contamination, and ensure that it consistently disaggregates AP mine contamination and release data from other mined areas and explosive remnants of war (ERW).**
- **South Sudan should continue to strengthen gender mainstreaming across its mine action programme, also an aim of the new National Mine Action Strategy, and support marginalised groups to participate in its mine action programme.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | Access to some suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) has continued to be restricted by lack of security, seasonal rains, and flooding. There was no progress in preparing for planned baseline surveys of contamination in 2024. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | The NMAA continues to face serious financial and technical limitations, preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively, with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) still assuming that function. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 6 | A Gender Equality and Diversity Policy for Mine Action was completed in 2024 and adopted in 2025, though mainstreaming gender in the programme remains a work in progress. Diversity of ethnic identity is considered to a limited extent in both survey and clearance teams. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Environmental considerations are incorporated into mine action operations and technical guidelines. Environmental assessments are conducted for planning purposes, and UNMAS and international NGOs continue to work to improve their environmental policies and action. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | South Sudan reports on progress at APMBC intersessional meetings and Meetings of States Parties. In its revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, South Sudan generally disaggregated contamination and release data on AP mined areas from anti-vehicle (AV) mines and other types of contamination. As at August 2025, South Sudan had not submitted an Article 7 report covering 2024. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Progress with some aspects of the five-year national mine action strategy launched in April 2024 has been slow. South Sudan included a detailed work plan for July 2026–July 2030 as part of its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | South Sudan's reviews its technical guidelines annually. A request to allow qualified community liaison teams to undertake non-technical survey (NTS) has not yet been agreed. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Clearance of AP mines fell slightly in 2024 to just under 0.58km$^2$, well below the average annual clearance target of 1.46km$^2$ set out in South Sudan's work plan of March 2024, when it was aiming to complete clearance by June 2027. The number of AP mines destroyed in 2024 did, however, increase by more than 50%. South Sudan has requested a four-year extension of its Article 5 deadline to 9 July 2030. |
| **Average Score** | **6.9** | **6.8** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)*
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- The Development Initiative (TDI)
- SafeLane Global (SLG)

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

*APOPO supported G4S with eight dogs until 30 April 2024.

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2024, South Sudan reported a total of 114 AP recorded mined areas, of which 71 were confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 43 were suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), covering a total of more than 4.9km$^2$ (see Table 1).[1] This is a decrease from the 5.3km$^2$ of recorded contamination in 2023, when there were also 114 AP mined areas (69 CHAs covering just under 3km$^2$ and 45 SHAs covering over 2.3km$^2$).[2] Eight of South Sudan's ten states contain areas suspected to contain AP mines, as Table 1 records, with contamination concentrated in Jonglei, followed by Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria in the south of the country.[3]

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) explains that, despite clearance of 0.58km$^2$ of AP mine contaminated area in 2024, recorded contamination remained as high as 4.9km$^2$ at the end of the year because new hazards continue to be discovered, and resurvey of SHAs and remaining areas from land release added to the total contamination figure.[4]

**Table 1: AP mined area by state (at end 2024)[5]**

| State | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total SHA/CHA | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central Equatoria | 43 | 1,489,322 | 27 | 209,945 | 70 | 1,699,267 |
| Eastern Equatoria | 16 | 644,668 | 3 | 12,150 | 19 | 656,818 |
| Jonglei | 3 | 208,802 | 7 | 1,618,763 | 10 | 1,827,565 |
| Northern Bahr El Ghazal | 2 | 56,466 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 56,466 |
| Upper Nile | 5 | 105,543 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 105,543 |
| Warrap | 0 | 0 | 1 | 40,000 | 1 | 40,000 |
| West Bahr El Ghazal | 1 | 58,680 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 58,680 |
| Western Equatoria | 1 | 99,398 | 5 | 399,824 | 6 | 499,222 |
| **Totals** | **71** | **2,662,879** | **43** | **2,280,682** | **114** | **4,943,561** |

At the end of 2024, South Sudan had also recorded a total of 77 suspected and confirmed anti-vehicle (AV) mined areas covering more than 6.2km$^2$ (see Table 2).[6] The record of AV mined area has significantly increased since 2023, when South Sudan had registered a total of 76 hazardous areas covering under 4.7km$^2$ (50 CHAs covering just under 2.5km$^2$ and another 26 SHAs also covering under 2.5 km$^2$).[7]

**Table 2: AV mined area only (at end 2024)[8]**

| CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total CHA/SHA | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 52 | 3,688,396 | 25 | 2,561,027 | 77 | 6,249,423 |

1 Email from Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer Mine/Action AoR Coordinator, UNMAS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 8 April 2025.
2 Email from Deborah Asikeit, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS, UNMISS, 30 April 2024.
3 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
4 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 5 August 2025.
5 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
6 Ibid.
7 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 30 April 2024.
8 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

The only comprehensive, countrywide mine survey to be conducted in South Sudan was a Landmine Impact Survey between 2003 and 2006.[9] In 2017, UNMAS initiated a review of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which concluded that the extent of much of the AP mined area had been overestimated. UNMAS consequently initiated a process of targeted re-survey aimed at better defining the size of SHAs, and re-survey continues.[10] In 2024, 84,892m$^2$ of previously unrecorded AP mined area (six hazardous areas) was identified and added to the database.[11]

UNMAS and the NMAA believe that contamination data are "reasonably accurate and certainly evidence-based".[12] However, the picture is incomplete as AP mines are suspected in a number of currently inaccessible areas. The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–28 states that "South Sudan will continue its efforts to better define the boundaries of the AP mine and cluster munition remnant (CMR) contamination to gain clarity on the remaining contamination. This will be achieved through continued analysis of historical land release data, ongoing database clean-up, continuous survey and clearance activities and the implementation of a baseline survey (BLS) in line with South Sudan's Technical Note."[13]

In 2024, UNMAS confirmed the plan to conduct a national baseline survey in the future.[14] A list of prioritised "payams" (administrative divisions within counties), where baseline studies would be conducted, was to be drafted before the end of 2024. In fact, the list was not drawn up and no other progress was made towards establishing a baseline of contamination in South Sudan in 2024.[15] The security situation across much of the country deteriorated at the end of 2024 and further worsened in the first half of 2025, meaning that some areas could not be accessed due to insecurity.[16] Some mined areas remain inaccessible because of insecurity,[17] and seasonal rains and flooding are further obstacles to access.[18]

Mines were used during five decades of Sudanese civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 led to the secession and independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Following two years of independence and relative peace in South Sudan, heavy fighting erupted in the capital, Juba, in December 2013, initiating new armed conflict across the country. With the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018, the security situation across the country improved, and access was possible to many areas that security issues previously rendered inaccessible.[19]

### ABYEI (REGION WHOSE SOVEREIGNTY IS CONTESTED WITH SUDAN)

Since South Sudan's independence in 2011, the status of Abyei has been a contentious issue between South Sudan and Sudan.[20] In the disputed area (known as the "Abyei Box") and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone between Sudan and South Sudan, the extent of mine and ERW contamination is unknown as a result of security and political disputes.[21] At the end of 2024, however, UNMAS UNISFA had recorded eight SHAs containing a mix of AP and AV mines in the Abyei Administrative Area totalling 457,700m$^2$.[22] In 2023, 436,474m$^2$ was added to the database – SHA defined from previous data on the presence of AP mines.[23] UNMAS UNISFA reports that AP mined areas have been resurveyed, resulting in changes to the recorded contamination.[24]

In 2024, 26,192m$^2$ of SHA was cancelled in Abyei (a partial cancellation of an SHA in Luki), while three SHAs of 224,455m$^2$ were cleared (one in Luki and two in Muli), though no AP mines were found.[25] In 2023, 599,957m$^2$ of AP mined area was reportedly cleared in Abyei.[26]

## OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

South Sudan is also contaminated by ERW, including CMR.[27] See Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2024* for further information on CMR.

9 Email from Matt Williams, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
10 Email from Fran O'Grady, Chief of Mine Action, UNMISS, 9 March 2022.
11 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
12 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 30 April 2024.
13 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 19.
14 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
15 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, Acting Director General, NMAA, 23 April 2025; Statement of South Sudan, 12MSP, Geneva, 11–13 September 2024; 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 44; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 46.
19 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 52.
20 United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), "Abyei", last updated May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3VGdLai.
21 UNMAS, "2019 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Sudan".
22 Email from Nico Bosman, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
23 Email from Jes Luckett, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.
24 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 10 July 2025.
25 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
26 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.
27 On 4 August 2023, South Sudan acceded to the CCM becoming a State Party on 1 February 2024. South Sudan's Article 4 deadline to clear and destroy CMR is 1 February 2034.

### ABYEI

In 2023, inter-tribal fighting and the involvement of armed forces within the Abyei Box led to increased ERW contamination (mostly of unexploded rocket-propelled and hand grenades) around central and southern Abyei.[28] Abyei continues to be affected by episodic intercommunal violence.[29]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The NMAA, established by presidential decree in 2006 as the South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA), is the national agency for planning, coordination, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.[30]

In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening the capacity of the NMAA, and UNMAS derives its current responsibilities from the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate.[31] Together, UNMAS and the NMAA oversee mine action across the country. The NMAA and UNMAS both have offices in Juba, UNMAS has sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau, while the NMAA also has offices in Wau and Yei (although the office in Yei was not operational as at April 2025, having closed in 2021 for security reasons).[32]

The NMAA has expanded its responsibilities gradually but continues to face serious financial and technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively and UNMAS and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) continue to support the authority.[33] According to reports from the mine action sector, NMAA staff have not received salaries for many months, and many have stopped going to work. The Authority is, though, said to play a significant role in facilitating mine action operations.[34] It chairs monthly coordination meetings with all operators, while UNMAS has monthly operations meetings with its commercial contractors.[35]

There has, however, been little progress with the national mine action strategy outcome on strengthening national survey and clearance capacities, including the target of having one national NGO fully funded by the government to implement land release by the end of 2025, and an "Annual increase of formalised capacity enhancement projects between national and international partners".[36] The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is, however, funding a project to support NMAA capacity building.[37] From June 2025 to 2030, under a project funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) will work with the NMAA to strengthen its management capacity.[38]

There is no regular in-country platform for dialogue among all stakeholders (national authorities, clearance operators, and donors) to discuss progress, challenges and support for Article 5 implementation in South Sudan,[39] though the national mine action strategy set the target of holding one mine action donor coordination meeting per year in 2024–28.[40] Stakeholder meetings are held as needed, most recently for the Article 5 deadline extension request workshop convened by the NMAA and the APMBC Implementation Support Unit in February 2025.[41]

International NGOs reported close collaboration between different demining actors, UNMAS, and the NMAA, including in identifying and prioritising areas for AP mine and CMR clearance at monthly coordination meetings.[42] In 2024, UNMAS and MAG were the co-coordinators of the Mine Action Sub-Cluster.[43]

Since 2023, mine action infrastructure in South Sudan has strengthened by virtue of three key developments. In August 2023, South Sudan acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), becoming a State Party on 1 February 2024. On 27 July 2023, the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) Act became law, providing a clear legal framework for the mine action programme in domestic law for the first time. April 2024 saw the launch of the South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028, which was developed by the NMAA with the support of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[44] For details of the Strategy see the section below, "Planning and Tasking".

Together, these positive developments should provide a platform for increasing national ownership of the mine action programme, but progress is slow, and UNMAS continues to take a leading role in mine action in South Sudan.

28 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.

29 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "South Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025", December 2024, p. 34.

30 "South Sudan De-Mining Authority", undated, at: http://bit.ly/2Y5Eb4o.

31 Remarks by Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, at a meeting with UNMAS, Juba, 30 May 2023.

32 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

33 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

34 Remarks by Fran O'Grady, UNMAS at a meeting with UNMAS, Juba, 30 May 2023.

35 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 8.

36 Ibid., p. 21.

37 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025.

38 Representative of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Individualised Approach Meeting for South Sudan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025.

39 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

40 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 16.

41 Ibid.; and email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

42 Emails from Leah Grace, Programme Officer, MAG, 9 April 2024; John Sorbo, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), 30 April 2024; and Ida Marie Højgaard Jørgensen, Programme Manager – Humanitarian Response and Mine Action, DanChurchAid (DCA), 8 May 2024.

43 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

44 Ibid.

The NMAA Act governs the powers, functions, and operations of the NMAA.[45] South Sudan does not have a separate mine action centre and, pursuant to the Act, the NMAA's structure was to include an interministerial board with oversight responsibilities.[46] This would require a budget allocation from government, and it is possible that these provisions will not be taken forward.[47]

There has generally been an enabling environment for mine action operations in South Sudan in recent years,[48] but an increase in administrative requirements and costs since the start of 2024 have negatively affected mine action operations. These include the cost of essential work-related documentation, with fees for some permits increasing by up to 300% under new Ministry of Finance regulations. In addition, the validity period for visas issued to international mine action staff has become increasingly inconsistent. Visas were previously issued for 12 months, but by the start of 2025, were issued for three to six months, resulting in an increased administrative burden as organisations are compelled to process renewals and associated payments at more regular intervals.[49]

Movement of assets and equipment is also challenging as the relevant permits, which come from the Joint Border Verification, Monitoring Mechanism and Peace Keeping Department under the Ministry of Defence, are only issued for three months at a time.[50] Furthermore, the processing time for tax exemptions has extended significantly, affecting importations of critical demining equipment. As at late 2024, the approval process was taking up to eight weeks, causing considerable disruption to operational timelines and increasing costs. The loss of documents during inter-ministerial transfers, has meant organisations have had to restart the application processes on multiple occasions, compounding delays and undermining the efficiency of mine action across the country.[51]

In terms of capacity building, UNMAS continued to provide a range of support to the NMAA, including training on IMSMA. UNMAS provided the NMAA with on-the-job training on national standards reviews, quality management (QM) systems, and operational planning and reporting. MAG, in collaboration with UNMAS, also provided on-the-job training for an NMAA information and management system officer.[52] MAG continued to accept NMAA secondees and to ring-fence places for NMAA staff on MAG training, and it supported NMAA visa and travel costs for international conferences.[53] JICA, through its South-South Initiative, supported the NMAA with an exchange programme with the Cambodian Mine Action Centre, Ethiopia Mine Action Centre, and Zambia Mine Action Centre in early 2025.[54]

No progress with developing a resource mobilisation strategy for mine action has been made, although according to the national mine action strategy, this was due to be completed by the middle of 2025.[55] South Sudan did, however, hold an Individualised Approach Meeting on 19 June 2025, on the margins of the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in Geneva.

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The mine action sector in South Sudan has seen a drop in funding in recent years, which was exacerbated by the United States (US) "stop-work" order in February 2025. The Government of South Sudan has given little financial support to the NMAA, and provides none for survey or clearance.[56] NMAA personnel and other civil servants had not yet received their salaries for 2024 at the time of writing. In 2023, they did not receive their salaries for many months.[57] JICA was reported to be in negotiations with the NMAA in April 2025 to support the refurbishment of office structures and operational equipment.[58]

UNMISS is the largest funder of mine action in South Sudan, providing $27.3 million of the $33 million (83%) of the total costs in 2024,[59] with US$19.9 million paid via UNMAS to 21 commercial demining teams.[60] This is a drop on the $20.7 million UNMAS spent contracting 24 commercial demining teams in 2023 for explosive ordnance (EO) clearance, survey, and risk education.[61] As at August 2025, the budget for financial year 2025/26 had yet to be confirmed and in any event, allocations for mine action will depend on the receipt of funding from UN Member States.[62]

45 Ibid.

46 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 7.

47 Email from Teddy Okello, Programme Director, NMAA, 27 August 2025; and interviews with Jurkuch Barach, Chairperson, South Sudan NMAA, in Geneva, 9 and 10 April 2025.

48 Email from Lisa Müller-Dormann, Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding Programme Manager, DRC, 27 March 2023.

49 Email from Eric Okoth, Country Director, MAG, 15 April 2025.

50 Email from Akena Christopher, Information Management Officer, DRC, 12 June 2025.

51 Ibid.

52 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, 23 April 2025.

53 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; Leah Grace, MAG, 9 April 2024; and Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025.

54 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

55 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 17; and emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025; and Teddy Akello, NMAA, 10 July 2025.

56 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

57 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 23.

58 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

59 2025 Article 5 Extension deadline Request, pp. 9 and 55; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 56.

60 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025.

61 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

62 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 5 August 2025.

The international NGOs do not currently have UNMAS contracts. They have indicated that the requirements of UNMAS contracts make it difficult for them to tender,[63] and they largely rely on bilateral donor support. In 2024, the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Irish Aid, German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), funded MAG.[64] Until July 2024, the GFFO funded two DRC multi-task teams (MTTs), but since then have only funded one team, while DANIDA funded DRC's explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team.[65]

In 2025, DANIDA and GFFO have continued to fund MAG and DRC, while FCDO and Irish Aid have continued to fund MAG.[66] PM/WRA halted funding following the US stop-work order in February 2025, resulting in MAG having to disband two MTTs and one community liaison team.[67] DRC had indicated its GFFO funding was ending in July 2025 and its DANIDA funding was ending in December 2025. This meant that the DRC demining programme was facing closure. From June 2025, however, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced funding for demining in South Sudan over five years amounting to more than €14 million (the exact amount was not known at the time of writing). Most of the funding is allocated to DanChurchAid (DCA) and DRC for clearance and risk education (DRC will also undertake some livelihoods activities), with €1.7 million for NPA to strengthen the NMAA.[68] The South Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025 calls for $7 million to be used to clear high-impact contamination and provide risk education for high-risk groups.[69]

As noted, South Sudan does not have a resource mobilisation strategy.[70] The NMAA plans, however, to take various steps to address the funding challenge. These include engaging with line ministries for budget integration; engaging with JICA via the South-to-South Cooperation Initiative, which aims to build technical and operational mine action capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa; engaging other humanitarian actors to embed mine clearance teams to support their broader humanitarian responses; and expanding its donor base by engaging non-traditional partners, including Gulf States.[71]

### ABYEI

UNMAS, as part of UNISFA, has a Security Council-mandated role in Abyei, which includes identification and clearance of mines and route assessment in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone between Sudan and South Sudan and in Abyei. It operates through an implementing partner, The Development Initiative (TDI), and acts in support of peacekeeping operations, delivery of humanitarian aid, safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the nomadic migration of animals.[72]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

UNMAS is funded through UNISFA. There has been a continuous drop in funding received by UNMAS in recent years. From 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025, UNMAS received funding of $6.75 million to cover its activities in Abyei,[73] a drop of almost 30% on the $9.59 million it received for its work for the previous 12 months.[74]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

A National Gender Equality and Diversity Policy for Mine Action, developed by the GICHD in partnership with UNMAS and NGOs, was completed in 2024, adopted by the Government in March 2025, and formally adopted in August 2025. An associated work plan was in development as at June 2025.[75] The policy is said to provide "a framework to strengthen the mainstreaming of gender, diversity, and inclusion within all mine action activities and aligns closely with the National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028".[76] It sets out policy commitments at the institutional and operational level, with the former including the establishment of a unit or committee within the NMAA that has responsibility for supporting and monitoring gender and diversity mainstreaming in the mine action sector.[77]

The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 outlines how South Sudan will ensure that gender and diversity are considered in all mine action projects.[78] The NMAA Act stipulates that, in line with national employment requirements, at least 35% of the NMAA positions (Board and

63 Interviews with Andrew Steele, Logistics Manager, MAG, 20 May 2023; Lisa Müller-Dormann, Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding Programme Manager, DRC, 21 May 2023; and Janardhan Rao, Country Director, DCA, 26 May 2023.

64 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

65 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, HMA Operations Manager, DRC, 25 March 2025.

66 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025; and Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.

67 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025.

68 Representative of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Individualised Approach Meeting for South Sudan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025; and emails from Catherine Subandrio, Grants Management Coordinator, DRC, 4 July 2025; and Eric Okoth, MAG, 11 July 2025.

69 OCHA, "South Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025", December 2024, p. 30.

70 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

71 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 58.

72 UNMAS, "Where we work: Abyei", accessed 30 June 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3waA8Fr.

73 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

74 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.

75 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024 and 4 June 2025; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 77.

76 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 77.

77 "The Republic of South Sudan National Mine Action Gender Equality and Diversity Policy 2025-2030", undated, NMAA, at: http://bit.ly/4lmtJ2L.

78 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 10.

Management) must be filled by women, a requirement it has reportedly achieved in management positions (see Table 3 below).[79] UNMAS has indicated that, in theory, employment opportunities for qualified men and women in survey and clearance teams across the organisations operating in South Sudan are equal. Redressing the gender balance is, however, a long-term challenge.[80]

To this end, a workshop was held in February 2024, facilitated by the Mine Action Area of Responsibility coordinators (UNMAS and MAG) and with GICHD participation, to promote the inclusion of women in mine action. This led to the creation of a female deminers WhatsApp platform for exchange of learning ideas and peer support, which will contribute to the establishment of the Women in Mine Action Network in South Sudan (aimed at women deminers and community liaison officers), which was officially launched on 1 August 2025.[81] UNMAS reviewed and strengthened its Protection from Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment (PSEAH) safeguarding mechanisms in 2024. While gender and diversity considerations are not integrated into the NMAA's annual operational plan, UNMAS does have a gender work plan in its annual work plan.[82]

MAG continues to ring-fence spaces on all trainings for female staff.[83] Through strengthened data collection practices and post-clearance impact assessments, MAG found that 55% of the beneficiaries of land release in 2024 were women, while 40% of beneficiaries targeted in household surveys live in female-headed households.[84] DRC sent a female staff member to take an EOD Level 3 training course in Lebanon to prepare her for a management position.[85]

**Table 3: Gender composition of the NMAA, UNMAS, and operators (at end 2024)[86]**

| | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Total women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NMAA | 138 | 36 (26%) | 8 | 3 (38%) | 35 | 4 (11%) |
| UNMAS | 43 | 14 (33%) | 10 | 6 (60%) | 14 | 3 (21%) |
| CTG | 17 | 1 (6%) | 6 | 1 (17%) | 16 | 0 (0) |
| G4S | 334 | 57 (17%) | 35 | 1 (3%) | 267 | 57 (21%) |
| SLG | 172 | 45 (26%) | 32 | 2 (6%) | 135 | 43 (32%) |
| TDI | 122 | 18 (15%) | 15 | 1 (7%) | 89 | 14 (16%) |
| MAG | 180 | 59 (33%) | 22 | 5 (23%) | 154 | 50 (32%) |
| DRC* | 41 | 17 (41%) | 5 | 2 (40%) | 37 | 14 (38%) |
| **Totals** | **1,047** | **247 (24%)** | **133** | **21 (16%)** | **747** | **185 (25%)** |

*The number of DRC deminers reduced by 12 in July 2024 following a reduction in GFFO funding.[87]

There were limited significant changes in female representation in demining personnel in 2024, though G4S increased the number of women in operational positions from 13% to 21%, and DRC increased the proportion of female personnel from 25% to 41% between 2023 and 2024. Moreover, 40% of DRC's management/supervisory staff were women (a significant increase from 14% in 2023), although the proportion of women operational staff fell to 16% from 26% a year earlier.[88]

Ethnic identity is considered in the composition of survey and clearance teams to ensure safe access and acceptance by local communities.[89] However, UNMAS has indicated that the participation of different ethnic minority groups in survey and clearance continues to be limited in extent.[90] UNMAS has also acknowledged that task prioritisation is predominantly dependent on security and that resources are concentrated on tasks within limited geographical areas.[91]

79 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
80 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.
81 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025; and Teddy Akello, NMAA, 27 August 2025.
82 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
83 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025; and Leah Grace, MAG, 9 April 2024.
84 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025.
85 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.
86 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025; and Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025.
87 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.
88 Ibid.
89 Email from Richard Boulter, Senior Programme Manager, UNMAS, 8 July 2020.
90 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
91 Emails from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019; and Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

### ABYEI

UNMAS UNISFA remains committed to its Gender and Diversity Work Plan 2019–2023, which includes a focus on staffing by a diverse workforce. UNMAS is an active participant in UNISFA's Gender and Diversity Working Group.[92] UNMAS headquarters used the UNMAS UNISFA programme to pilot a transition away from UNOPS implementation to a programme implemented by the UN Secretariat. This resulted in a reduction of UNOPS staff, affecting gender and diversity ratios.[93] In 2024, UNMAS UNISFA deployed only one female staff member, whereas in the previous year, six women (40% of total personnel) were deployed.[94]

**Table 4: Gender composition of UNMAS and its operator in Abyei (at end 2024)**

| UNMAS/ operator | Total staff | Total women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Total women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Total women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNMAS | 8 | 1 (13%) | 4 | 1 (25%) | 3 | 0 (0%) |
| TDI | 131 | 3 (2%) | 28 | 1 (4%) | 102 | 2 (2%) |
| **Totals** | **139** | **4 (3%)** | **32** | **2 (6%)** | **105** | **2 (2%)** |

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 highlights that South Sudan ranks as the second most vulnerable country to natural hazards globally, though there is little explicit focus on the environment in the strategy itself.[95] UNMAS has incorporated environmental considerations into mine action operations in collaboration with the NMAA, integrating issues in work plans and providing guidance in the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs).[96] The NTSG on Health and Safety, Social and Environment (HSSE) is updated annually, and was due to be reviewed and brought into line with the revised IMAS 07.13 on Environmental Management in Mine Action.[97] The NMAA does not have an environmental focal point and within UNMAS, the coordination and compliance officers and support services manager function as environmental focal points.[98]

Environmental assessments are conducted for planning to determine the impact of different demining assets in line with the national environment policy.[99] South Sudan's Article 7 report covering 2023 describes the adverse effects of climate change on operations over the previous five years, including limiting access due to extreme flooding; displacement of ordnance; longer rainy seasons which shorten the window for mine action operations; and seasons becoming more irregular, posing challenges to planning. There were no plans to study topsoil in demolition sites to assess the impact of cluster munitions on the soil, even though the Article 7 report for 2024 notes the potential for some leakage of explosive material into the ground, topsoil damage, wild fires, and the killing and injury of animals. Post-clearance remediation is, however, undertaken, in line with the NTSGs.[100]

**Table 5: Environmental policies and action**[101]

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level? |
|---|---|---|---|
| DRC | Yes | Yes | No |
| MAG | No | Yes | Yes |
| UNMAS | Yes | Yes | No |

DRC has a health, safety, and environmental management protocol which aligns with the mine action NTSG.[102] MAG has a global environmental policy (reviewed in 2024) to which the South Sudan programme adheres, and aims to develop a policy tailored to South Sudan by the end of 2025. MAG is also piloting the Green Field Tool for Mine Action.[103]

92 Emails from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

93 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

94 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024.

95 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 4.

96 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

97 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

98 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

99 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

100 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form B.

101 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025; and J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, Senior Programme Officer, MAG, 29 May 2025.

102 Email from Akena Christopher, DRC, 12 June 2025.

103 Email from J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, MAG, 29 May 2025.

Implementing partners in South Sudan establish their own standard operating procedures (SOPs) and policies based on the relevant NTSG, embedding environmental considerations in their operations. When survey and clearance are completed, an area should be restored in accordance with the wishes of the local community. At a minimum, restoration should include the removal of large items of scrap metal, the filling-in of any pits or craters due to EOD, and the fencing-off of any areas where there may be residual non-explosive hazardous materials left in the ground.[104] UNMAS continues to sensitise mine action operators on environmental considerations in planning demolitions as well as in post-demolition procedures, during mechanical operations, and when conducting vegetation clearance.[105]

### ABYEI

UNMAS complies with UNISFA's environmental management policy, which is tailored to mine action in the UNISFA Mine Action Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), and with the old IMAS 07.13 on environmental management in mine action, which it is to review and bring in line with the new version.[106] UNMAS, in collaboration with the UNISFA Facilities and Environmental Management Unit, conducts environmental assessments to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance. During the rainy season, raised water levels can restrict access and lead to the migration of mines.[107]

The environmental management of operational work sites is governed by the implementing partner's SOPs, which are tailored to the UNISFA Mine Action TSGs and IMAS 07.13. In 2024, UNISFA worked with implementing partners to integrate mission-provided power and water supplies to reduce emissions and fuel consumption, including converting coal fired cooking units to electrical units.[108]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

UNMAS continues to lead on information management for mine action in South Sudan. Since the 2017 comprehensive review of data on the IMSMA database, along with re-survey of recorded SHAs and CHAs, have resulted in significant improvement in the understanding of mine and ERW contamination.

South Sudan upgraded to IMSMA Core in 2021,[109] and in 2022 the major transition of IMSMA information to Survey123 was completed.[110] UNMAS has indicated that, wherever possible, the database disaggregates mined areas, CMR-contaminated areas, and other ERW-contaminated areas, including spot tasks.[111] In its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request made in May 2025, however, South Sudan did not consistently disaggregate AP mines from other EO, in particular from AV mines, but largely rectified this in its revised extension request submitted in August 2025.

Some doubts have, however, been raised about data accuracy, with inconsistencies and verification challenges connected with the database. Certain records have not been verified due to limited access or resource constraints; there are possible inaccuracies in global positioning system (GPS) coordinates; some data submissions are incomplete, and reliance on secondary sources such as community reports, are all reported to reduce accuracy. It has also been suggested that funding cuts could disrupt data collection and system maintenance.[112]

South Sudan has submitted an Article 7 report every year since 2012. As at July 2025, however, South Sudan had not yet submitted an Article 7 report covering 2024.

### ABYEI

UNMAS UNISFA continues to use IMSMA Core, and using mission resources, it monitors, verifies, and evaluates the data entered on the database. UNMAS UNISFA provides monthly reports to NMAC Sudan, which includes information about hazardous areas identified. Following the transition of responsibility for the UNMAS UNISFA programme to the UN Secretariat, there has been engagement with stakeholders on how to streamline the process while ensuring data accuracy.[113]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

In April 2024, the South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 was formally endorsed by the Office of the President.[114] Developed with the support of the GICHD,[115] the new strategy lists clear outcomes under three headings: national ownership; land release; and risk education and victim assistance. Each has corresponding indicators, baselines, and targets.[116]

104 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form B.
105 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
106 Emails from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March and 10 July 2025.
107 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
108 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
109 Emails from Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, 9 March 2022; and Sasha Logie, GICHD, 21 April 2022.
110 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
111 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
112 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.
113 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
114 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
115 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 13.
116 Ibid., pp. 16–24.

South Sudan submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request in May 2025, which it revised in August 2025, seeking another four years to complete AP mine clearance, with a completion deadline of 9 July 2030.[117] It plans to address all EO during this time. South Sudan had already acknowledged that it would not meet its Article 5 deadline of 9 July 2026, and has now acknowledged that it will not meet the deadline of June 2027 that it proposed in a revised work plan in 2024.[118]

The extension request and work plan are detailed, setting out the assumptions on which the request is based and attendant risk factors. The assumptions are that there is access to contaminated areas and no resumption of fighting; funding is sustained or increased; few additional areas of contamination are discovered; most remaining hazardous areas are resurveyed and cancelled or reduced where possible; there is no global or regional shock affecting the mobility of personnel (such as COVID-19); and clearance rates can be maintained.[119]

There is also an emphasis on enhancing national capacity including that of the NMAA, and improving operational efficiencies and clearance capacity in meeting the proposed July 2030 deadline.[120] Given the assumptions and risks involved, South Sudan's plan to complete clearance of AP mined areas, alongside significant other types of contamination, within the four-year extension sought, may be overly-ambitious. Although South Sudan appears to assume that it will be able to cancel a large proportion of some of the largest AP mined areas in the Greater Upper Nile region—where six minefields make up 40% of all minefields in the region—as well as other mined areas in the Greater Equatoria region, the resources and timeline in the work plan appear to have been calculated on the assumption that all re-survey areas will be subject to full clearance.[121]

Tables 6 and Table 7 below set out manual and mechanical clearance projections for AP mines. South Sudan indicates it will need to reconfigure all manual demining teams to 15-lane teams in order to deliver the required clearance capacity.[122]

**Table 6: Projected Manual AP Mine Clearance 2025–2030***[123]

| Year | Area (m²) | Teams | Area cleared (m²) | Tasks cleared** | Contaminated area at year end (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 2,839,026 | 2 | 132,000 | 4 | 2,707,026 |
| 2026 | 2,707,026 | 10 | 660,000 | 19 | 2,047,026 |
| 2027 | 2,047,026 | 10 | 660,000 | 19 | 1,387,026 |
| 2028 | 1,387,026 | 10 | 660,000 | 19 | 727,026 |
| 2029 | 727,026 | 8 | 528,000 | 15 | 199,026 |
| 2030 | 199,026 | 5 | 330,000 | 10 | 0 |

*The projection incorporates surplus capacity to address any unknown tasks. **Rounded to the nearest whole number.

South Sudan also highlights that it will need to significantly increase its mechanical assets to clear all AP mines by the 2030 deadline.[124] It has claimed that remaining AP mine contamination is "best tackled using mechanical clearance assets", indicating that on average a medium-sized mechanical asset clears about 2,000m$^2$ day, while on average a manual deminer clears 20m$^2$. The annual cost of a mechanical demining team is reported to be much better value-for-money, at $2.2 million per year (again, for a medium-sized machine), while a 15-person demining team costs $1.14million per year.[125] The NMAA has also asserted that if the nine MineWolf assets currently in country were operational (six are currently out of use due to a lack of funding) it could potentially clear all minefields in two years.[126] In the work plan set out in the APMBC Article 5 extension request, South Sudan puts the cost of all demining between 2024 and 2030 at $183.55 million. Of this $51.3 million is for manual AP mine clearance, and $15.4 million is for mechanical AP mine clearance, with another $8 million needed for all survey tasks.[127]

117 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 58–67; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9 and 12.
118 Updated Work Plan for January 2024 to June 2026, 31 March 2024, p. 5.
119 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8, 9–10, and 54–57; Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11, and 55–58.
120 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9–11; and Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11 and 26.
121 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 44, 55, and 64; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 45–46, 56, and 68.
122 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 57 and 70; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 59 and 74.
123 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 78.
124 Ibid., p. 81.
125 Presentation by South Sudan, "Request for the Second Extension of the Article 5 for South Sudan", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
126 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 73.
127 Ibid., p. 81.

**Table 7: Projected mechanical AP mine clearance 2025–30***[128]

| Year | Area (m²) | Teams | Area cleared (m²) | Area remaining (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 2,104,535 | 4 | 1,232,000 | 872,535 |
| 2026 | 872,535 | 3 | 924,000 | 0 |
| 2027 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2028 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2029 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2030 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

*The projection incorporates surplus capacity to address any unknown tasks. In a presentation at the APMBC Intersessional meetings in June 2025, South Sudan provided different data, and indicated that clearance using the proposed mechanical clearance would not be completed until 2028.[129] Data rounded to the nearest whole number.

South Sudan intends to be "pragmatic" in the sequencing of tasks for clearance, balancing security, logistical requirements, and concentration of effort in the deployment of teams. South Sudan believes that this combination will allow for the most efficient clearance plan that allows for optimal supervision and monitoring of clearance efforts.[130] Task dossiers continue to be issued in a timely and effective manner in South Sudan, according to international NGOs.[131]

South Sudan's plan to develop a regionally based coordination mechanism to address reports of hazardous items and undertake survey of newly identified hazardous areas, as elaborated in its work plan of 31 March 2024, has not yet been taken forward due to a lack of funding.[132]

### ABYEI

Annual work plans are taken from the UNISFA dry-season deployment plan that identifies priority areas and roads. When the dry-season deployment plan is completed, resources are focused on SHAs. In 2024, UNMAS UNISFA continued to work on identified mined areas with an "integrated" approach.[133]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

South Sudan's NTSGs, which outline the technical requirements expected of all demining operators working in South Sudan, are adapted from the IMAS. The NTSGs are annually reviewed and revised by UNMAS and implementing partners and then approved by the NMAA,[134] taking into account any lessons learned during the year and addressing any changes in the IMAS.[135] In 2024, only minor changes were made to the NTSGs to clarify areas or standards that were unclear.[136] MAG continues to advocate for the revision of NTS requirements in South Sudan, which currently require deployment of technical staff and equipment, precluding its community liaison teams, which have received the requisite training, from conducting NTS.[137]

UNMAS has noted that the NTSGs require all mine action teams to conduct regular internal quality assurance (QA), along with quality control sampling of 10% of each area cleared.[138] The minimum frequency for the organisational senior management internal QA visits to each team was set at one per month in 2021, and UNMAS/NMAA teams now also undertake monthly visits,[139] and a standardised scoring matrix was introduced for the EOD written examination.[140] The QA requirement for manual mine clearance was changed to 100% in 2021.[141]

### ABYEI

Abyei's Mine Action TSGs/SOPs are reviewed as required. No changes were made in 2024.[142]

128 Ibid., p. 79; and email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 29 August 2025.
129 Presentation by South Sudan, "Request for the Second Extension of the Article 5 for South Sudan", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
130 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 74; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 80.
131 Emails from Leah Grace, MAG, 9 April 2024, Ida Marie Højgaard Jørgensen, DCA, 8 May 2024; and John Sorbo, DRC, 30 April 2024.
132 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
133 Emails from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025 and 10 July 2025.
134 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form 4; and email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS UNMISS, 16 July 2024.
135 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
136 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
137 Emails from Leah Grace, MAG, 9 April 2024; and Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025.
138 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.
139 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 23; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24.
140 Email from Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, 9 March 2022.
141 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS UNMISS, 16 July 2024.
142 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Clearance teams are normally accredited for and deployed to a variety of tasks in South Sudan, including AP and AV mine clearance, CMR, and EOD. None is exclusively allocated to AP mine activities.[143] All teams are accredited to conduct multiple activities, including clearance (see Table 8).

UNMAS reported that a total of 26 teams in three commercial companies (G4S, TDI, and SLG) and two international NGOs (DRC, and MAG) conducted survey and clearance in 2024, a decrease from 31 teams in 2023.[144] In fact, however, DRC did not conduct any clearance of AP mined area in 2024. The total number of operational personal involved in technical survey (TS) and clearance during 2023 was 372 by the end of 2024, down from 390 personnel at the end of 2023.[145]

DCA which closed its demining operations in South Sudan in July 2023 due to a lack of funding, had hoped to restart in 2024, but in early 2025, was still seeking new funding.[146] Funding from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announced in June 2025, will allow DCA to restart its demining operations under its "From Hazard to Harvest" programme. DCA will deploy one mechanical clearance team (which includes 12 deminers), an EOD spot task team (including four clearance personnel), and will collaborate with its local partner, Support for Peace and Education Development Programme (SPEDF), to undertake risk education.[147]

The decision by PM/WRA to stop funding demining in South Sudan means the number of demining personnel will reduce, and MAG had already lost two demining teams in early 2025 due to the US funding cuts. As noted, DRC, which had faced the prospect of demobilising its demining team by 31 July 2025 when its GFFO funding ended, has now secured Dutch funding, enabling it to continue.[148]

UNMAS has been working on reconfiguring demining teams among its contracted commercial operators. From 2023, the minimum number of deminers required in clearance teams was increased from 10 deminers to 15, providing greater flexibility and efficiency as teams can split and work independently for prolonged periods of time.[149] It also increased the number of Integrated Clearance Capacity (ICC) teams from two to four,[150] and considered its mechanical assets for required outputs and "deployability". A mechanical asset dedicated to AP mine clearance, GCS100, was introduced in 2024. The machine is small and lightweight, and easier to transport to hard-to-reach areas.[151]

**Table 8: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2024 (UNMAS data)[152]**

| Operator | Manual teams | Total deminers | Dogs and dog handlers | Mechanical assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| G4S Emergency Response Team (ERT) | 6 | 102 | *7/2 (2 Mine Detection dog - MDD teams) | 2 (Robocut vegetation cutting machines) |
| G4S Multi-task Team (MTT) | 4 | 53 | 0 | |
| G4S Road Clearance Capacity (RCC) | 1 | 15 | 3/6 | 1 (Robocut vegetation cutting machine) |
| SLG | 5 | 76 | 0 | 0 |
| TDI | 4 | 54 | 0 | 4 (1 MW 330, 2 MineWolf 240, 1 GCS100) |
| MAG | 5 | **55 | 0 | 2 (2 Bozenas, for ground preparation) |
| DRC | 1/2 | ***17/29 | 0 | 0 |
| **Totals** | **26/27** | **372/384** | **10 dogs and 8 handlers** | **9 (including 2 Bozenas)** |

*Until 30 April 2024, APOPO supported G4S with 8 dogs.[153] **Data for clearance and EOD teams. ***The number of DRC deminers reduced by 12 in July 2024 following a reduction in GFFO funding.[154]

143 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

144 Emails Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

145 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023; and Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

146 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and Ida Marie Højgaard Jørgensen, DCA, 28 February 2025.

147 Emails from Rama Hansraj Country Director, DCA, South Sudan, 19 June 2025; and Ida Marie Højgaard Jørgensen, Consortium Manager, DCA, 19 June 2025.

148 Representative of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Individualised Approach Meeting for South Sudan, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025; and email from Catherine Subandrio, DRC, 4 July 2025.

149 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 30 April 2024; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS UNMISS, 16 July 2024.

150 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 30 April 2024; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS UNMISS, 16 July 2024 and 5 August 2025.

151 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 30 April 2024; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS UNMISS, 16 July 2024.

152 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

153 Email from Mikael Bold, Programme Manager, APOPO Dogs, 11 April 2025.

154 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.

It has been suggested that South Sudan should make use of innovative clearance technologies, such as mechanical assets or drones, to improve efficiency in difficult terrain.[155]

### ABYEI

TDI, an international commercial company, is the only organisation conducting survey and clearance of mines in Abyei. UNMAS UNISFA operates with integrated teams that have survey, community liaison, and clearance capacities.[156]

**Table 9: Operational NTS and TS capacities deployed in Abyei in 2024**[157]

| Operator | NTS teams | NTS personnel | TS teams | Total TS personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TDI | 2 | 20 | 2 | 20 | NTS teams are part of Integrated Route Assessment and Clearance Teams |
| **Totals** | **2** | **20** | **2** | **20** | |

**Table 10: Mine clearance capacities deployed in Abyei in 2024**[158]

| Operator | Manual clearance teams | Total deminers | Mechanical assets/ machines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TDI | 2 | 20 | 2 | Integrated route assessment and clearance teams |
| **Totals** | **2** | **20** | **2** | |

The number of survey and clearance personnel remained the same in 2024. No major changes in survey or clearance personnel were expected in 2025. That said, if the ongoing UN funding crisis for 2024–25, which is generally restricting UNISFA budgeted activities, continues into 2025–26, this is likely to result in a drop in UNMAS UNISFA capacity.[159] A MineWolf 370, which is intended for large-area mine clearance, replaced a MineWolf 240, as planned, with the aim of improving daily clearance output.[160]

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

According to UNMAS, a total of just under 0.8km$^2$ of AP mined area was released through survey and clearance in 2024. Of this, just under 0.2km$^2$ was cancelled through NTS and just under 5.8km$^2$ was cleared; no contaminated area was released through TS. A total of 159 AP mines were destroyed, including 9 as spot tasks.[161] More than 0.08km$^2$ of previously unrecorded AP mined area was discovered and added to the database.[162]

**Table 11: Land release outputs in 2024**[163]

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m$^2$) |
|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 578,219 |
| **Technical survey** | 0 |
| **Non-technical survey** | 189,441 |
| **AP mines destroyed in clearance and spot tasks** | **2024** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 159 (9 during spot tasks) |

155 Ibid.
156 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024.
157 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
161 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.

### ABYEI

In 2024, UNMAS UNISFA reported that less than 0.3km$^2$ of AP mined area was released in Abyei and no mines were discovered or destroyed. Almost 0.03km$^2$ was cancelled through NTS and more than 0.2km$^2$ was cleared. No hazardous area was released through TS. No previously unrecorded contamination was added to the database.[164]

**Table 12: Summary of land release outputs in Abyei in 2024**[165]

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 224,455 | No AP or AV mines were found but 1 item of UXO was destroyed |
| **Technical survey** | 0 | |
| **Non-technical survey** | 26,192 | |

## SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, 189,441m$^2$ of mined area was cancelled through NTS in three states in South Sudan (see Table 13),[166] a considerable increase on the 20,527m$^2$ of mined area cancelled though NTS in 2023 in Upper Nile.[167]

In 2024, no hazardous AP mined area was released through TS.[168] No AP mined area has been released through TS since 2020, when South Sudan indicated that it had updated its NTSGs to recognise that guidance around TS is not applicable in South Sudan as most minefields are characterised by nuisance minelaying rather than the more predictable minelaying that is required for "targeted" survey to be successful.[169] Six hazardous areas covering a total of 84,892m$^2$ of previously unrecorded AP mined area was added to the database in 2024.[170]

**Table 13: Release of mined area through NTS in 2024**[171]

| State | Operator | SHAs cancelled | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Central Equatoria | G4S | *0 | 123,838 |
| Central Equatoria | SLG | *0 | 1,314 |
| Jonglei | TDI | 1 | 3,252 |
| Western Bahr El Ghazal | TDI | *0 | 61,037 |
| **Totals** | | **1** | **189,441** |

*Partial cancellations of SHAs.

### ABYEI

A total of 26,192m$^2$ of SHA was released in 2024 in Abyei through NTS and no AP mined area was released through TS.[172] This compares with 2023, when no AP mined area was reported as released in Abyei through NTS or TS.[173]

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

A total of just under 0.58km$^2$ of mined area was cleared in South Sudan in 2024 (see Table 14), slightly less than in 2023, when just over 0.58km$^2$ of mined area was cleared.[174]

164 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
165 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
166 Ibid.
167 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 30 April 2024.
168 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS,UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
169 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 5.
170 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
171 Ibid.
172 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
173 Email from Johan Maree, Chief of Operations, UNMAS UNISFA, 27 July 2023.
174 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 30 April 2024.

**Table 14: Mine clearance in 2024**[175]

| State | Operator | AP mined areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed during clearance | AP mines destroyed as spot tasks | AV mines destroyed during clearance | AV mines destroyed as spot tasks | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central Equatoria | G4S | 0 | 30,256 | 8 | 4 | 15 | 5 | 12 |
| Central Equatoria | TDI | 1 | 41,331 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Central Equatoria | SLG | 1 | 30,968 | 42 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| Eastern Equatoria | G4S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Eastern Equatoria | MAG* | 2 | 14,120 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Eastern Equatoria | TDI | 0 | 2,174 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Jonglei | DRC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Jonglei | TDI | 1 | 51,351 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Lakes | G4S | 0 | 19,772 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Northern Bahr El Ghazal | TDI | 0 | 32,841 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Upper Nile | G4S | 0 | 1,988 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Upper Nile | SLG | 1 | 22,743 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Upper Nile | TDI | 0 | 83,407 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Western Bahr El Ghazal | SLG | 1 | 2,698 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Western Bahr El Ghazal | TDI | 0 | 244,570 | 59 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 68 |
| Western Equatoria | TDI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **7** | **578,219** | **150** | **9** | **16** | **10** | **101** |

*MAG reported that it cleared three HAs covering 24,355m² and destroyed 1 AP mine. For an explanation of the difference, see the paragraph below.

MAG reported clearing three AP mined areas covering 24,355m² and destroying 1 AP mine. One of the areas cleared was recorded as a cluster munition strike area in the UNMAS database. However, due to its proximity to a previously mechanically cleared AP minefield, and as a precautionary measure, initial clearance of 6,278m² was undertaken using manual mine clearance drills. After finding no evidence of AP mines, clearance switched to battle area clearance drills.

This explains why MAG reported clearing an additional AP minefield, and 6,278m² of the difference in the area reported as mine cleared.[176] The remaining difference in the area cleared (3,937m²) is likely, at least in part, to be explained by the fact that UNMAS only counts area within the polygon as cleared whereas MAG also counts clearance of access and control points.[177]

175 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

176 Emails from J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, MAG, 18 July 2025; Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 5 August 2025; Ayuath Moses Noel, ICT/IM Officer, UNMAS, UNMISS, 14 August 2025; and Dennis Felah, Coordination and Compliance Officer, UNMAS, UNMISS, 14 August 2025.

177 Email J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, MAG, 29 May 2025.

UNMAS reported that 7 AP mine clearance tasks were completed in 2024, covering 11,919m$^2$, which contained no AP mines.[178] MAG said it cleared two areas in 2024 where no AP mines were found covering a total of 16,287m$^2$. The reason for the apparent discrepancy arises for the same reason as explained in the paragraph above, in particular because MAG recorded 6,278m$^2$ of clearance as AP mine clearance that UNMAS recorded as cluster munition clearance.[179]

### ABYEI

In Abyei in 2024, three hazardous areas covering a total of 224,455m$^2$ were cleared with no AP mines destroyed, though one item of UXO was found and destroyed.[180] This compares with 2023, when one hazardous area covering 599,957m$^2$ was cleared with one AP mine and one AV mine destroyed.[181]

**Table 15: Mine clearance in Abyei in 2024**[182]

| Area | Operator | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Luki | TDI | 163,355 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Makir | TDI | 52,141 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Makir | TDI | 8,959 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **224,455** | **0** | **0** | **1** |

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOUTH SUDAN: 9 JULY 2011

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021

↓

FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 9 JULY 2026

↓

**SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (4 YEARS): 9 JULY 2030**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2020, South Sudan is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2026. In 2024, South Sudan acknowledged that it would not meet this deadline and proposed a new a deadline of June 2027,[183] but has since made an Article 5 extension request seeking a new deadline of 9 July 2030. A range of logistical challenges remain that could further delay the projected AP mine clearance timeline. In 2025, South Sudan identified six risk factors to meeting its proposed extended AP mine clearance deadline of 9 July 2030, and the chances of these all remaining in South Sudan's favour are slim. Of these, the greatest risk is insecurity, with the possibility that fighting could resume in areas of operation. The continued deterioration in the economy, resulting in high inflation and fuel shortages, was seen as another potential disrupter, with environmental changes leading to unexpected extreme weather, climatic changes contributing to extended periods of flooding, and further reductions in funding for demining, posing further risks to clearance.[184]

Flooding already affects access and is exacerbated by poor infrastructure. In some parts of the country access to AP mined areas is impossible for more than six months each year due to rains and flooding—some contaminated areas still remain under water from severe flooding in 2020—while other areas cannot be accessed throughout the year due to intercommunal violence or conflict.[185] In addition, the sector has faced competing priorities from UNMISS, which divert demining capacities from planned survey and clearance. In 2024, these included the need to release land for people displaced from Sudan and by new flooding.[186] Furthermore, with no evidence-based national AP mine baseline, it is likely that new hazardous areas will continue be identified in the future, while the NMAA remains in need of significant capacity support.

178 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 5 August 2025.

179 Email from J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, MAG, 29 May 2025.

180 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

181 Email from Johan Maree, UNMAS UNISFA, 27 July 2023.

182 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

183 Updated Work Plan for January 2024 to June 2026, 31 March 2024, p. 5.

184 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 56–57; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 57–58.

185 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025; Statement of South Sudan, 12MSP, Geneva, 11–13 September 2024; and Article 7 Reports (covering 2023 and 2024), Form F.

186 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

Increased political unrest at the end of 2024 and start of 2025 had the potential for large conflict escalation, threatening all humanitarian access, though as at April 2025, fighting was mainly in the north and west of the country, while demining has to date generally focused on the south.[187]

South Sudan has estimated that it will need to clear up to 7.3km² of AP mined area (3.6km through manual clearance and 3.7km² through mechanical clearance) between 2025 and 9 July 2030.[188] Even if South Sudan receives the required funding, reconfigures its demining teams, and increases use of mechanical assets, and its work plans are not scotched by insecurity, extreme weather, or existing flooding, clearing 7.3km² of AP mined area by 2030 is highly ambitious given that it has cleared just 2.4km² in the last five years.

**Table 16: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 0.58 |
| 2023 | 0.58 |
| 2022 | 0.28 |
| 2021 | 0.25 |
| 2020 | 0.71 |
| **Total** | **2.40** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

While there is no independent national capacity for clearing residual contamination, an EOD mobile team within the national authority was trained and accredited during an eight-month project that concluded in 2022.[189] South Sudan indicated in 2024 that it would seek funding to enable an independent entity—potentially an international NGO—to train and equip the NMAA in taking the lead in coordinating the response to new reports of hazardous items, and said it would need international assistance to prepare for residual contamination.[190] It reiterated this position in its 2025 work plan.[191]

The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 has a specific target regarding the development of a strategy to manage residual contamination by 2028,[192] though as of April 2025 there had been no progress on this issue, reportedly due to lack of funding.[193] The success of the 2025 work plan is contingent on sufficient support for the NMAA to establish themselves as the long-term response and management capacity to address residual contamination that will inevitably remain beyond release of all currently known hazardous areas.[194]

187 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
188 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 73; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 72 and 74..
189 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
190 Updated Work Plan for January 2024 to June 2026, 31 March 2024, p. 23; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form G.
191 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9, and 68; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 72.
192 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 21.
193 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
194 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 76; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 82.

# SRI LANKA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028

Not on track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 22.2KM²

Heavy
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023* (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 5.98 | 5.34 |
| Technical Survey | 1.00 | 0.89 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0.20 | 0.22 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023* |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 16,510 (incl. 45 destroyed in spot tasks) | 22,141 (incl. 113 destroyed in spot tasks) |

*In October 2025, Sri Lanka reported revised land release data for 2023. Previously in last year's Clearing the Mines report, Sri Lanka had reported that 4.83km² was cleared in 2023, 0.78km² was reduced through technical survey, 0.02km² was cancelled through non-technical survey, and a total of 19,288 AP mines had been destroyed in 2023, including 76 destroyed in spot tasks).

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Sri Lanka Army Humanitarian Demining Unit (SLA HDU)
- DASH
- SHARP
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, Sri Lanka's survey and clearance output remained broadly the same as the previous year (based on revised 2023 data provided by Sri Lanka in October 2025), but the contamination baseline rose as the National Completion Survey uncovered previously unknown mined areas. A mid-term review of the Completion Strategy in 2025 confirmed that meeting Sri Lanka's original Article 5 deadline of June 2028 is no longer feasible, citing newly identified contamination, larger-than-expected minefields, reduced capacity, funding shortfalls, and high staff turnover. Sri Lanka is therefore expected to request an extension to its Article 5 deadline, with any realistic new deadline dependent on securing sustained funding and resources.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Sri Lanka should set a realistic Article 5 deadline by reassessing remaining contamination levels and operational capacity and engaging international partners for sustained funding and other support.**
- **Sri Lanka should ensure all of its national mine action standards (NMAS) are brought up to date and review all operator Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in line with the updated NMAS without further delay, as was supposed to have occurred in 2023 according to its Completion Strategy 2023–2027.**
- **Greater efforts should be made to ensure that the national database is up to date and accurate.**
- **Sri Lanka should finalise and publish its long-awaited resource mobilisation strategy, with clear funding targets to at least the end of 2027.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Sri Lanka's baseline of AP mined area increased in 2024, with the discovery of over 6km$^2$ of contamination during survey conducted as part of the National Completion Survey Process. As at June 2025, 59% of the surveyed areas were declared mine free with the rest undergoing follow-up. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Sri Lanka's national mine action programme is nationally owned, with committed funding from the government to the mine action programme. Sri Lanka had planned to adopt a resource mobilisation strategy in 2023 to increase both national and international funding, but as at June 2025 the strategy was still under development. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Sri Lanka's National Mine Action Completion Strategy for 2023–2027 includes gender and diversity as a cross-cutting issue for all mine action. There was no significant change in the proportion of women employed by operators from 2023 to 2024. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Sri Lanka does not have a dedicated national mine action standard (NMAS) or policy on environmental management. While seasonal and climate-related risks are factored into operational planning, increasingly severe rainfall has already disrupted clearance, highlighting the need to integrate mine action more explicitly into national climate and disaster frameworks. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Sri Lanka uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core and IMSMA New Generation in parallel as it was decided a full migration to IMSMA Core was not an efficient use of resources. Sri Lanka submitted a detailed Article 7 report covering 2024. However, some of the data were found to be incorrect and the NMAC confirmed to Mine Action Review in October 2025, that it would amend its Article 7 report with corrected survey and clearance data. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | In 2025, Sri Lanka conducted a mid-term review of its Completion Strategy. The findings, presented at a high-level donor event, reaffirmed Sri Lanka's commitment to partnership. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | As at August 2025, Sri Lanka had still not adopted its revised NMAS nor updated the standards for technical survey, mechanical clearance, and quality management. This had been planned to be done by the end of 2023. Sri Lanka's demining capacity reduced from 2023 to 2024 due to a drop in funding. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Sri Lanka increased its survey and clearance output from 2023 to 2024 but was not able to meet its land release target for the year. It is now understood that meeting the 1 June 2028 Article 5 deadline is no longer feasible. |
| **Average Score** | **6.6** | **6.6** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
- National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH)
- Skavita Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Project (SHARP)
- Sri Lankan Army (SLA) Humanitarian Demining Units (HDUs)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2024, the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) reported total mined area in Sri Lanka at almost 23.2km$^2$ across 840 mined areas: 17.6km$^2$ across 634 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 5.5km$^2$ across 206 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) (see Table 1).[1] This is an increase from the almost 21.6km$^2$ across 825 mined areas reported at the end of 2023.[2] Contamination levels continue to vary due to the discovery of previously unknown mined areas, and as at October 2025 the amount of mined area stood at 22.2km$^2$.[3]

**Table 1: Mined area (at end 2024)[4]**

| Province | District | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total SHAs and CHAs | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northern | Jaffna | 16 | 570,451 | 3 | 127,505 | 19 | 697,956 |
| | Kilinochchi | 76 | 1,602,024 | 9 | 361,724 | 85 | 1,963,748 |
| | Mannar | 166 | 2,078,014 | 48 | 794,420 | 214 | 2,872,434 |
| | Mullaitivu | 298 | 12,296,966 | 48 | 1,897,434 | 346 | 14,194,400 |
| | Vavuniya | 41 | 553,350 | 33 | 1,314,788 | 74 | 1,868,138 |
| North Central | Anuradhapura | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Polonnaruwa | 1 | 3,103 | 4 | 40,926 | 5 | 44,029 |
| North Western | Puttalam | 0 | 0 | 1 | 25,265 | 1 | 25,265 |
| Eastern | Ampara | 2 | 11,135 | 15 | 296,992 | 17 | 308,127 |
| | Batticaloa | 19 | 242,360 | 24 | 531,990 | 43 | 774,350 |
| | Trincomalee | 15 | 289,201 | 21 | 157,440 | 36 | 446,641 |
| **Totals** | | **634** | **17,646,604** | **206** | **5,548,484** | **840** | **23,195,088** |

The increase in the contamination baseline is largely due to the government-mandated National Completion Survey Process, which involves operators conducting survey at each Grama Niladhari Division (GND) – the smallest administrative unit at the village level in Sri Lanka.[5] The National Completion Survey process was launched in the second half of 2023, with first visits to all GNDs completed by December 2024. The survey covered both the Northern and Eastern provinces, with a total of 1,405 GNDs visited.[6] As at June 2025, 59% of the GNDs were declared mine free, with the remainder undergoing follow-up visits and technical verification.[7]

In 2024, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted completion surveys across 703 GNDs, of which 433 were recommended for declaration as mine-impact-free and 270 required follow-up.[8] SHARP implemented completion surveys in 19 GNDs within the Mullaitivu district.[9] HALO completed field visits to its remaining 462 GNDs during 2024, with 344 recommended for declaration and 118 requiring follow-up. Across all verified data, HALO had surveyed all 611 GNDs allocated by NMAC by the end of the year, with 457 GNs (75%) recommended for declaration and 154 (25%) for follow-up.[10]

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D. Based on reported figures, end-2024 contamination would be expected to total 22.25km$^2$ (21.6km$^2$ at end 2023 minus 6.05km$^2$ released plus 6.7km$^2$ newly identified). The official baseline reported by NMAC, however, is 23.2km$^2$.

2 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 6.

3 Email from Sri Mallikarachchi, IM Specialist, GICHD/NMAC, 21 October 2025.

4 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

5 Email from Philippa Coates, Donor Relations Manager, HALO, 13 June 2024.

6 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D. Of this, SHARP identified 0.18km$^2$, The HALO Trust 1.46km$^2$, and MAG 1.77km$^2$ (of which 0.58km$^2$ was in CHAs and 1.19km$^2$ in SHAs).

7 Statement of Sri Lanka on Article 5 implementation, APMBC Intersessional Meeting, 17 June 2025.

8 Email from Ziggy Garewal, Country Director, MAG, 23 June 2025.

9 Email from Sarath Jayawardhana, Director, SHARP, 23 June 2025.

10 Email from Hugh Baker, Programme Manager, HALO, 21 June 2025.

Sri Lanka has long been extensively contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). After a major clearance operation, most remaining contamination is located in Sri Lanka's five northern districts, the focus of almost three decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which ended in May 2009. Both sides made extensive use of mines, including belts of P4 Mk I and Mk II AP blast mines laid by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), and long defensive lines with a mixture of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including AP mines of an improvised nature, laid by the LTTE.[11] Indian peacekeeping forces also used mines during their presence from July 1987 to January 1990.[12]

The SLA used both AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines. Previously it was thought that all its minelaying had been recorded[13] and made available to the national mine action programme.[14] However, operators are continuing to find previously unrecorded minefields laid by the SLA, as both memories and records have diminished.[15] In Jaffna, where minefields were laid by the SLA, the extent of contamination is well understood.[16] HALO, in coordination with NMAC and its Regional Mine Action Office (the RMAO), has now cleared most of the accessible SLA-laid minefields in Jaffna district. The bulk of the remaining contamination is in the Jaffna High Security Zone, which is currently only accessible to the SLA. In February 2023, the Sri Lankan government announced they would make 0.65km$^2$ of the contamination accessible for clearance, with HALO tasked for the work.[17]

Minefield maps and information on mine-laying strategy are not readily available for the LTTE-laid minefields, which therefore pose more of a challenge to clear.[18] Typically, LTTE minelaying was less predictable and more sporadic, and many of the minefields are in jungle areas with limited human activity.[19] Operators have encountered a wide range of LTTE devices, including AP mines with anti-tilt and anti-lift mechanisms. Tripwire-activated Claymore-type mines and, to a lesser extent, AV mines have been found, along with a number of forms of improvised devices to act as fragmentation mines, bar mines, electrical and magnetically initiated explosive devices, and mines connected to detonating cord to mortar and artillery shells.[20] The LTTE manufactured almost all the mines their forces used.[21]

While estimates of total contamination have been rising since 2021, they have fallen sharply from a high of 506km$^2$ at the end of 2010. A district-by-district re-survey in 2015–17 of all registered SHAs in the national database resulted in cancellation of more than 42km$^2$ of mined area and helped provide greater clarity on the extent of remaining contamination.[22] In September 2021, NMAC initiated comprehensive non-technical survey (NTS) across all conflict-affected districts to identify previously unknown mined and ERW-contaminated areas.[23] This survey has led to the discovery of significant mined area that had not previously been detected. Past NTS had gaps in coverage, and recent efforts tended to be only reactive, particularly in areas with limited human interaction such as the Mullaitivu jungle.[24] The newly found mined areas are often in forests, in areas to which communities have only recently returned. Additionally, some previously registered CHAs were found to be larger than expected.[25] The survey's findings have contributed to the development of Sri Lanka's National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027.[26]

NMAC said the current baseline of AP mine contamination has been established through inclusive consultation with women, girls, boys, and men, including, where relevant, from minority groups.[27] According to Sri Lanka, all areas known or suspected to contain AP mines have been marked and warning signs in Sinhala, Tamil, and English prominently displayed.[28]

## OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Aside from mines, Sri Lanka remains contaminated with a wide range of ERW, including unexploded air-dropped bombs (although these are very rarely discovered), artillery shells and missiles, mortar bombs, hand-held anti-tank projectiles, and rifle and hand grenades. Large caches of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) also exist, particularly in the north.[29] These are being tackled at the same time as mined areas.[30]

11 Interviews with demining operators, Colombo, 29 March–2 April 2010; and with Maj. Pradeep Gamage, Officer-in-Charge, North Jaffna Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU), Jaffna, 3 April 2007.

12 Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement, and Hindu Religious Affairs, Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020, May 2016, p. 6; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form 1.

13 Ibid.; and interview with Rob Syfret, Operations Manager, HALO, in Kilinochchi, 12 September 2016.

14 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form 1.

15 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 8 October 2025.

16 Email from Belinda Vause, HALO, 3 April 2020.

17 Email from Nadine Lainer, Deputy Programme Manager, HALO, 13 April 2023.

18 Email from Belinda Vause, HALO, 3 April 2020; and Statement of Sri Lanka, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2020.

19 Email from Belinda Vause, HALO, 3 April 2020.

20 Email from Valon Kumnova, HALO, 11 April 2014; and Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020, May 2016, p. 6.

21 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form 1.

22 Emails from Belinda Vause, HALO, 3 April 2020; Valentina Stivanello, MAG, 6 April 2020; and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 13 May 2020.

23 Statement of Sri Lanka on clearance, Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties (19MSP) (virtual meeting), 15–19 November 2021; emails from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 2 August 2022; and the GICHD, 13 April 2022; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form C.

24 Email from Stephen Hall, Programme Manager, HALO, 5 September 2022.

25 Email from Asa Massleberg, GICHD, 30 August 2022.

26 Statement of Sri Lanka on clearance, 19MSP (virtual meeting), 15–19 November 2021; emails from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 2 August 2022; and the GICHD, 13 April 2022; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form C.

27 Email from V. Premachanthiran, NMAC, 25 August 2020.

28 Statement of Sri Lanka on clearance, 19MSP (virtual meeting), 15–19 November 2021.

29 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020, p. 6; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form 1.

30 Email from Matthew Hovell, Regional Director, HALO, 30 September 2018.

# NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

NMAC has responsibility for priority setting, information management, quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC), coordination with demining organisations and cooperation partners, and the establishment of policy and standards.[31] NMAC suffers from frequent leadership and institutional changes, including under which ministry within the Sri Lankan government the centre sits, while the Director of NMAC is a political appointee and the secretary of the ministry in question. Lack of consistent leadership can impede good management and reduce effectiveness. NMAC currently sits within the Ministry of Urban Development, Construction and Housing, after a re-shuffle in August 2022.[32] Prior to this, NMAC had undergone near-yearly changes to its ministry affiliation.

Clearance operations are coordinated, tasked, and quality managed by an RMAO in Kilinochchi, working in consultation with District Steering Committees for Mine Action. The Committees are chaired by government agents heading district authorities.[33] The RMAO also suffers from high turnover of staff with many military personnel, who are seconded, rotating at regular intervals.[34]

The Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines Act (No. 3 of 2022), which focuses on the prohibitions in Article 1 of the APMBC rather than on regulation of the mine action programme, was certified in 2022.[35]

Operators reported a generally supportive and enabling environment for mine action in Sri Lanka.[36] HALO noted that the relationship between the Sri Lankan government and the mine action sector has been strengthened following the launch of the National Mine Action Completion Strategy in March 2023.[37] The appointment of a dynamic new NMAC director by the incoming government in November 2024 has reinvigorated high-level political engagement and interest in mine action.[38] Both MAG and HALO reported improvements in the process of importing demining equipment, including heavy machinery.[39]

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has worked very closely with NMAC since early 2015. The GICHD supported the development of Sri Lanka's National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2037 and continues to support implementation of the strategy through facilitation of meetings and workshops.[40]

In 2024, HALO delivered coordinate-conversion training to NMAC staff, which aimed to strengthen the Centre's technical capacity in geospatial data management and improve the accuracy of mapping and reporting across the mine action sector.[41] MAG planned to conduct training in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) for NMAC staff in 2026.[42]

In its National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, NMAC commits to ensuring regular and structured coordination and information sharing with Sri Lanka government representatives, international donors, operators, and other partners, and says it will, in close collaboration with partners, organise bi-annual donor coordination meetings and quarterly operations meetings.[43] In 2024, several coordination and operations meetings were held with the RMAO and operators, led by NMAC and often in collaboration with the GICHD. These covered topics such as the completion survey, task allocation, operational progress, review of the national mine action strategy, review of land release SOPs, and resource mobilisation.[44] The NMAC also established a National Steering Committee bringing together representatives from key ministries to strengthen coordination on setting priorities, resettlement, and development of released land.[45]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2024, the total budget for land release operations in Sri Lanka was US$18,515,130. The Government of Sri Lanka contributed approx. US$200,000 (LKR 60.9 million), of which 65% was used by the Sri Lanka Army Humanitarian Demining Unit (SLA HDU) for demining.[46] As at April 2025, the mine action programme was operating with only 45% of its 2024 funding level.[47]

31 Article 7 Report, submitted in 2019, p. 12.

32 Emails from Asa Massleberg, GICHD, 30 August 2022; and Stephen Hall, HALO, 5 September 2022.

33 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020, p. 9.

34 Email from the GICHD, 13 May 2020.

35 Statement of Sri Lanka on cooperative compliance, 19MSP (virtual meeting), 15–19 November 2021; Associated Press, "Sri Lanka approves law implementing anti-land mine treaty", *AP News*, 10 February 2022; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form A.

36 Emails from Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 6 June 2024; Anil Udaya Kumara Kuruwita Arachchige, DASH, 5 October 2025; Cristy McLennan, MAG, 11 June 2024; and Philippa Coates, HALO, 13 June 2024.

37 Email from Philippa Coates, HALO, 13 June 2024.

38 Email from Hugh Baker, HALO, 10 October 2025.

39 Emails from Philippa Coates, HALO, 13 June 2024; and Cristy McLennan, MAG, 11 June 2024.

40 Email from the GICHD, 2 May 2023; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 16.

41 Email from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025.

42 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 8 October 2025.

43 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, p. 25.

44 Emails from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025; and Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.

45 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.

46 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I.

47 Statement of Sri Lanka on Article 5 implementation, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 17 June 2025.

Sri Lanka seeks to increase national funding for its mine action programme, expand its international donor base, and explore other sources of funding. NMAC will develop a resource mobilisation strategy in line with Oslo Action Plan Action Point 43, providing clear funding targets until the end of 2027. The strategy was expected to be approved by the middle of 2023, but as at June 2025, it was said to be still under development.[48]

In 2024, MAG was funded by the US Department of State (PM/WRA), the US Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining R&D, the United Kingdom's Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), the Government of Japan's Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP), the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), Global Affairs Canada's Peace and Stabilization Operations Programme (PSOP). MAG also received funding from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) to support national coordination and staff capacity development, but not for survey or clearance.[49] In 2025, MAG continued to receive support from those donors, with the exception of CSSF and PSOP, both of which ceased funding.[50] SHARP received funding in 2024 and 2025 from GGP and PM/WRA.[51] HALO was supported in 2024 by PM/WRA, the United Kingdom's Integrated Security Fund (ISF), the NMFA, the GFFO, GGP, the Government of Switzerland, Global Affairs Canada, and US Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining R&D. In 2025, HALO remained funded by those donors though the ISF funding ended in March. While US funding underwent a 90-day review in 2025, it has since resumed with a 15-month cost extension, although overall funding levels were expected to decrease in the second half of 2025.[52]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The National Mine Action Completion Strategy for 2023–2027 contains a specific section on gender and diversity. The Strategy recognises that mine action need to reflect the distinct needs of age and gender as people are affected differently by explosive ordnance contamination due to their varying roles and responsibilities. Sri Lanka commits to ensuring that all mine action activities are sensitive to gender and diversity and to continue efforts to mainstream these issues across mine action. It recognises that mine action should be tied to the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5 on Gender Equality. Noting the benefits and importance of offering employment opportunities in mine action to women, it includes the findings from a 2020 GICHD study which revealed that half of all female deminers were the sole income earners in their households, and that more than one third of women employed as deminers had no prior income. This contrasts starkly with the one in twenty men in such a situation.

When recruiting for survey and community liaison teams, NMAC recruits personnel to represent ethnic or minority groups in each area.[53]

**Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2024**[54]

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SHARP | 199 | 38 (19%) | 16 | 6 (38%) | 164 | 31 (19%) |
| DASH | 429 | 84 (20%) | 87 | 16 (18%) | 342 | 68 (20%) |
| HALO | 1042 | 396 (38%) | 101 | 14 (14%) | 829 | 362 (35%) |
| MAG | 771 | 185 (24%) | 138 | 13 (9%) | 704 | 153 (22%) |
| **Totals** | **2,441** | **703 (29%)** | **342** | **49 (14%)** | **2,039** | **614 (30%)** |

48 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, p. 25; and Statement of Sri Lanka on Article 5 implementation, APMBC Intersessional Meeting, 17 June 2025.

49 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 8 October 2025.

50 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.

51 Email from Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.

52 Email from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025.

53 Statement of Sri Lanka on Victim Assistance, 19MSP (virtual meeting), 15–19 November 2021.

54 Emails from Hugh Baker, HALO, 10 October 2025; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025; Anil Udaya Kumara Kuruwita Arachchige, DASH, 5 October 2025; and Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.

NMAC has not provided figures for 2024 but in 2022 only 5% of its total employees were female, with no women in managerial or operational positions. The SLA HDU trained and deployed two female demining teams for the first time in 2022.[55]

International operators HALO and MAG have gender policies in place, but it is not known if this is also the case with national operators SHARP and DASH.[56] In 2024, MAG provided maternal aprons for expectant mothers and overcoats for all female community liaison personnel, providing lighter duties for expectant mothers, equipping washrooms with menstrual products, and preparing the roll-out of menstruation leave in 2025. Awareness sessions and training on gender and menstrual health were delivered, alongside the establishment of an Equity, Diversity, and Inclusivity working group, and a storytelling campaign on inclusivity and diversity.[57] MAG also has a safeguarding framework with policies that set standards of behaviour, supported by a dedicated Safeguarding Unit responsible for handling concerns and complaints.[58] SHARP focused on increasing female representation during regular recruitment drives.[59] As HALO implements its staff livelihood transition strategy it has supported female staff participation in leadership and empowerment training. To support working mothers HALO provides a monthly childcare stipend baby boxes containing essential supplies for newborns, hygiene kits, and nutritional packs for pregnant and breastfeeding women. HALO has also strengthened its safeguarding protocols and partnered with Days for Girls to distribute reusable menstrual health kits to over 200 female staff.[60]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Sri Lanka does not have a dedicated national standard or policy on environmental management. Operators reported that when working in contaminated forest, permissions must be obtained from the National Forestry and Wildlife Commissions and the Archaeology Department, which conduct routine visits to help ensure no harm is done to wildlife, forests, and land of archaeological value.[61] In 2022, HALO, on behalf of NMAC and other operators, organised a Wildlife & Forestry Commission Technical Working Group to establish a collaborative, efficient, and environmentally sensitive approach to jungle/forest clearance, including the use of small mechanised assets. HALO and MAG have since received ad-hoc authorisation to use mechanised assets for certain forested tasks.[62]

Sri Lanka is vulnerable to climate change-induced hazards, including tropical cyclones and flooding, which will impact the mine action programme and operational planning. Despite facing moderate disaster risk levels, climate change projections predict long-term alterations to the monsoon pattern and ecological regions. In response, Sri Lanka has a detailed normative framework, including national policies, strategies, and action plans on climate change and sustainable development, aligned with its obligations as a State Party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and signatory to the Paris Agreement.[63] However, it is unclear whether mine action is explicitly mentioned in any of these documents.

Operators and NMAC consider seasonal weather changes and associated climate-related risks when planning and prioritising survey and clearance.[64] For instance, HALO prioritises areas prone to flooding or waterlogging to minimise disruption, reduce the risk of landmine movement, and ensure the safety of staff and affected communities.[65] Such areas are scheduled for clearance outside the rainy season wherever possible, guided by historical weather patterns and local knowledge. Clearance of flood-prone sites is generally advanced into the drier months when ground conditions allow safer and more efficient operations. If ground saturation occurs unexpectedly, work may be paused until conditions improve. In some cases, specialist assets such as HALO's US HD R&D amphibious excavator—adapted for soft or saturated ground—are deployed, though certain tasks may still need to be suspended during the wet season. This planning approach ensures timely clearance of high-risk areas while reducing the risk of wasted effort or re-contamination caused by soil or mine movement during heavy rains.[66] MAG reported that the impact of climate change on seasonal rains has become increasingly evident; in both January 2024 and January 2025, heavy rainfall caused near-total suspension of operations.[67]

55 Email from Jayalath Rohana, NMAC, 6 July 2023.

56 Emails from Belinda Vause, HALO, 9 August 2019 and 3 April 2020; Beth Lomas, MAG, 26 July 2019; and Valentina Stivanello, MAG, 6 April 2020.

57 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.

58 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 8 October 2025.

59 Email from Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.

60 Email from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025.

61 Emails from Ananda Chandrasiri, DASH, 11 April 2023; Cristy McLennan, MAG, 12 April 2023; Nadine Lainer, HALO, 13 April 2023; and Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 30 April 2023.

62 Emails from Nadine Lainer, HALO, 13 April 2023; and Cristy McLennan, MAG, 16 August 2023.

63 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, p. 16.

64 Emails from Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 6 June 2024; Anil Udaya Kumara Kuruwita Arachchige, DASH, 10 June 2024; Cristy McLennan, MAG, 11 June 2024; and Philippa Coates, HALO, 13 June 2024.

65 Email from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025.

66 Email from Hugh Baker, HALO, 12 September 2025.

67 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.

**Table 3: Environmental policies and action**[68]

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| MAG | No – SOP in place | Yes | No – Head of Support Services leads environment activities |
| SHARP | No | Yes | No |
| HALO | No – environmental action plan in place | Yes – environmental screening checklist; environmental impact assessment | No – planned recruitment in 2025 |
| DASH | No – SOP in place | Yes | N/R |

N/R = Not reported

In 2024, HALO developed and implemented an Environmental Action Plan outlining steps to minimise environmental impact during clearance, restore land after clearance, and integrate environmental awareness into its vocational training. In 2025, HALO commissioned the Lanka Environment Fund to deliver an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and workshops. The EIA surveyed sites in Muhamalai, Kokkuthoduwai, and the Jaffna Bay islands – the three most environmentally diverse areas within HALO's area of operations, where both manual and mechanical clearance is underway. While tailored to these sites, many of the lessons identified have broader relevance across clearance tasks.[69] The EIA surveyed potential risks and opportunities related to clearance activities, with a series of recommendations that will inform operational practices going forward. HALO plans to recruit two environmental focal points to support the implementation of the Environmental Action Plan and strengthen environmental oversight.[70]

MAG has explored recycling and upcycling opportunities, and although there is a lack of capacity in the country it has engaged with a local recycling provider. It has secured funding for solar panels for its Colombo office and has begun sourcing more energy-efficient rental vehicles.[71] MAG has committed to reducing its global emissions in line with the Paris Agreement and, in 2025, calculated its carbon footprint across all country programmes to establish a baseline. The results were expected in early 2026.[72] SHARP emphasises environmental protection during clearance, with staff regularly briefed on minimising environmental harm during operations.[73]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

With support from the GICHD, a full migration of Sri Lanka's IMSMA database to IMSMA Core had been scheduled to take place in 2023. But it was decided that, rather than a full migration, IMSMA NG and IMSMA Core will be used in parallel, with Survey123 being used for Sri Lanka's completion survey. This is in recognition of Sri Lanka's limited resources and the time and effort a full migration would require.[74]

Sri Lanka has long suffered from poor-quality data, with significant differences in reported land release between operators and NMAC. Challenges to information management and the establishment of a sustainable national IM capacity stem in part from a lack of resources but also from the high level of staff turnover at NMAC and the RMAO.[75]

A significant database clean-up took place in 2022 and 2023. In 2023, the GICHD, with funding from the US Department of State, was recruiting an information management (IM) advisor who will be based in Sri Lanka and provide IM support to NMAC and RMAO.[76] It is expected that the data clean-up and IM advisor will improve data quality and reduce the disparities between operator and national authority data. As at October 2025, the IM specialist had been assigned, data clean-up was ongoing, all identified polygon errors had been spatially corrected to ensure data accuracy and consistency, and the focus was on the migration process to IMSMA Core, with the Survey123 forms in testing. These efforts aim to strengthen data quality and operational reliability within the national mine action information management system.[77]

68 Emails from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025; and Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.
69 Email from Hugh Baker, HALO, 12 September 2025.
70 Email from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025.
71 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.
72 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 8 October 2025.
73 Email from Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.
74 Email from the GICHD, 2 May 2023.
75 Email from the GICHD, 13 May 2020.
76 Email from the GICHD, 2 May 2023.
77 Email from Sri Mallikarachchi, GICHD/NMAC, 21 October 2025.

Sri Lanka submitted an Article 7 report covering 2024 which included AP mine contamination disaggregated by CHAs and SHAs, and the survey and clearance output for the year. However, some of the figures were later found to be incorrect, and as at October 2025, the NMAC was in the process of submitting an amended Article 7 report with the corrected survey and clearance data.[78]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

In March 2023, Sri Lanka launched its National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, developed with the support of the GICHD. It outlines the mine action programme's strategic orientation to 2027, building on past achievements and incorporating lessons from previous strategies. The strategy reinforces Sri Lanka's commitment to fulfil its APMBC obligations in alignment with the SDGs.[79]
The strategy sets four main goals:

1. Land release and EORE (explosive ordnance risk education)
2. Coordination and national ownership
3. Management of residual contamination
4. Staff transition.[80]

As part of the land release and risk education strategic objective, NMAC, with the support of the GICHD and in collaboration with the operators, has developed a "completion process" – the framework for the Sri Lankan government to document and demonstrate compliance with Article 5. This involves NTS to identify previously unknown contamination, ongoing survey and clearance of recorded hazardous areas, and the completion survey. The completion survey allows the government to declare GNDs as "complete", confirming its confidence that, at the time of signing the completion documents, there is no further evidence of mines in the GND. Each village officer in a district has to confirm they are not aware of any explosive ordnance contamination. When all GNDs within a district are complete, the district authority signs it off as "mine free".[81]

Sri Lanka planned to release 17km$^2$ of mined area across 11 districts from 2023 to 2027, with a land release target for 2023 of 4.5km$^2$ and four districts declared completed.[82] However, as the amount of contaminated area has gone up, Sri Lanka has formulated new land release targets for 2024 to 2027 for 23.44km$^2$ (see Table 4).[83]

**Table 4: Planned land release 2023–27**[84]

| Year | Land release target (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 7.02 |
| 2025 | 5.89 |
| 2026 | 5.85 |
| 2027 | 4.68 |

In 2025, Sri Lanka conducted a mid-term review of its Completion Strategy, supported by the GICHD and accompanied by a national completion survey stock-taking workshop. The review assessed progress and analysed how different funding scenarios would affect the clearance timeline. It concluded that completion by 2028 was technically feasible if sufficient resources were mobilised promptly, but that current funding levels constrained implementation. Findings were presented at a donor coordination event held in May 2025, attended by the Prime Minister and senior donor representatives, which reaffirmed Sri Lanka's national ownership and commitment to partnership with the international community. In light of the review and funding outlook, the Government will consider whether an Article 5 extension request is required.[85]

Sri Lanka's mine action programme has a well-developed prioritisation system, outlined in NMAC's National Mine Action Strategy 2016–20. The primary priority is clearance of land for resettlement, particularly the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Contaminated areas planned for livelihood activities (mostly agricultural land), access to public services, or large-scale infrastructure are also prioritised.[86] According to NMAC, despite marking of contaminated areas and sustained risk education, returnees are likely to enter contaminated areas, especially agricultural areas, to meet their basic livelihood needs. As such, socio-economic pressures and livelihood activities are vital considerations in the prioritisation process in relation to resettlement plans.[87] With Sri Lanka approaching completion, all known remaining tasks have now been allocated to operators.[88]

78 Email from Sri Mallikarachchi, GICHD/NMAC, 21 October 2025.
79 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, pp. 1 and 5.
80 Ibid., p. 18.
81 Ibid., p. 20.
82 Ibid., pp. 20 and 23.
83 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 8.
84 Ibid.
85 Statement of Sri Lanka on Article 5 implementation, APMBC Intersessional Meeting, 17 June 2025.
86 Email from Belinda Vause, HALO, 3 April 2020.
87 Article 7 Report, submitted in 2019, p. 3.
88 Email from Asa Massleberg, GICHD, 29 August 2023.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

A review of Sri Lanka's National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), taking into account the local context, was carried out in 2017 with the input of all operators and support from the GICHD. But the NMAS were never approved. An NMAC Board of Inquiry (BoI) investigation, following a fatal incident in Trincomalee at the end of 2021 on land that had been released, made recommendations that included the updating of SLNMAS 04.10: Non-Technical Survey; SLNMAS 04: Land Release; and SLNMAS 08: Quality Management.[89] Updating and approving these standards by the end of 2023 was one of the targets of the Completion Strategy 2023–2027. The GICHD was planning to support this effort from 2023. Alongside this, all operator SOPs were to be reviewed in line with the updated NMAS by the end of 2023.[90] As at October 2025, this had not yet happened.[91]

In 2024, the land release SOP was reviewed and finalised with support from GICHD, including review of the land release criteria. The NMAC agreed to expand the use of TS and reduce the requirements for full clearance, enabling operators to focus clearance on confirmed contamination. In 2025, MAG expected NMAC to give the go-ahead to a re-survey of the SHAs mapped in 2022 and 2023, with the aim of cancelling uncontaminated land in coordination with the RMAO. The Rake Excavation Detection Drills (REDDs) SOP was also revised following a demining accident involving MAG staff. Findings from the accident investigation and the resulting SOP changes were fully debriefed with all operators.[92]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, demining operations were again conducted by the SLA HDU; national NGOs, DASH and SHARP; and international NGOs, HALO and MAG. The local and international NGOs are entirely funded by international donors.

**Table 5: Operational NTS capacities deployed in 2024[93]**

| Operator | NTS teams | NTS personnel |
|---|---|---|
| MAG | 6 | 18 |
| SHARP | 0 | 0 |
| HALO | 4 | 8 |
| DASH | 1 | 5 |
| **Totals** | **11** | **31** |

**Table 6: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024[94]**

| Operator | Manual teams | Total deminers | Dogs and handlers | Machines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DASH | 12 | 282 | 0 | 0 | Clearance teams also conduct TS. |
| HALO* | 60 | 480 | 0 | 28 | Plus 40 mechanical teams (total 240 deminers). Clearance teams also conduct TS. |
| MAG* | 48 | 633 | 0 | 24 | Clearance teams also conduct TS. |
| SHARP | 7 | 120 | 0 | 0 | Clearance teams also conduct TS. Also 2 QA/Survey Teams totalling 5 personnel |
| SLA HDU | N/K | N/K | N/K | N/K | |
| **Totals** | **127** | **1,515** | **0** | **52** | |

*Average numbers for the year.

89 Email from Stephen Hall, HALO, 16 May 2022.

90 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, p. 22.

91 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 8 October 2025.

92 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.

93 Emails from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025; Anil Udaya Kumara Kuruwita Arachchige, DASH, 5 October 2025; and Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.

94 Emails from Anil Udaya Kumara Kuruwita Arachchige, DASH, 5 October 2025; Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June and 10 October 2025; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025; and Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.

From 2023 to 2024, MAG, SHARP, and HALO experienced reductions in survey and clearance capacity. MAG reported a decrease in personnel due to reduced funding combined with high turnover, with 10 to 12 staff leaving each month to seek opportunities overseas or alternative employment in response to difficult economic conditions.[95] SHARP similarly reduced personnel as a result of funding cuts.[96] HALO also faced a decline in clearance capacity, driven by funding constraints and natural attrition, including staff moving overseas, changing employment, or retiring.[97]

In 2025, MAG was set to reduce its clearance capacity by 250 staff and HALO also expected that its staff numbers would reduce due to the loss of UK funding and reduction from other donors.[98] SHARP did not anticipate a change in capacity in 2025.[99]

In October 2024, HALO received a first-of-its-kind amphibious excavator from the US Department of Defense HD R&D programme to support clearance in flooded terrain, including a semi-submerged minefield in a lagoon. The excavator is fitted with a wet-soil bucket and specifically designed to operate in submerged and lagoon environments.[100] MAG also received equipment from the US Department of Defense HD R&D programme, including the Stingray remotely operated demining platform, Trimble GPS mapping and survey system, and modified John Deere machinery for mechanical clearance.[101]

### DEMINER SAFETY

In September 2024, five MAG deminers were injured when conducting clearance using the REDDS methodology. The deminers were working one metre apart on ground previously prepared by mechanical assets when a deminer struck an unseen item of explosive ordnance with a rake head, resulting in an uncontrolled explosion. Three deminers sustained penetrating fragmentation injuries to the left side of their bodies, one deminer went into shock, and one was suspected of having a broken arm. All five were hospitalised, and the three fragmentation casualties required surgery. The item of unexploded ordnance was identified as an S 411 40mm launched grenade. The accident was investigated by the Standards and Training Manager with significant input from the Technical Operations Manager and MAG's Programmes Quality Team. The full report and lessons learned were shared with all donors, the NMAC, RMAO, and other clearance operators in Sri Lanka, and a copy of the report is available on request.[102]

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 7: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 5,977,566 | National authority data |
| **Technical survey** | 999,384 | National authority data |
| **Non-technical survey** | 204,809 | National authority data |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 16,510 | (Including 45 during spot tasks) National authority data |

### SURVEY IN 2024

According to NMAC data, a total of 1.2km² was released through survey in 2024, of which 0.22km² was cancelled through NTS (see Table 8) and 1km² was reduced through TS (see Table 9).[103] This is a slight increase on the nearly 1.1km² reported as released through survey in 2023 (based on revised data provided in October 2025), of which 0.22km² was cancelled through NTS and 0.89km² was reduced through TS.[104]

In addition, NMAC reported adding 6.7km² of previously unrecorded mined area to the database in 2024 across 230 tasks.[105]

95 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.
96 Email from Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.
97 Email from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025.
98 Emails from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025; and Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 8 October 2025.
99 Email from Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.
100 Email from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025.
101 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 8 October 2025.
102 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.
103 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
104 Email from Sri Mallikarachchi, GICHD/NMAC, 21 October 2025.
105 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D. Of this, SHARP identified 0.18km², HALO 1.46km², and MAG 1.77km² (of which 0.58km² was CHAs and 1.19km² SHAs).

**Table 8: Area cancelled through NTS in 2024 (national authority data)[106]**

| District | Operator | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Jaffna | SLA | 161,185 |
| Mannar | MAG | 5,400 |
| Mullaitivu | HALO | 9,872 |
| | MAG | 27,245 |
| Trincomalee | MAG | 1,107 |
| **Total** | | **204,809** |

**Table 9: Area reduced through TS in 2024 (national authority data)[107]**

| District | Operator | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Batticaloa | MAG | 49,149 |
| Jaffna | HALO | 24,954 |
| | SLA HDU | 44,245 |
| Kilinochchi | HALO | 11,263 |
| | MAG | 2,080 |
| | SHARP | 30,588 |
| Mannar | MAG | 19,111 |
| Mullaitivu | DASH | 148,288 |
| | HALO | 20,870 |
| | MAG | 437,929 |
| | SHARP | 46,972 |
| Polonnaruwa | MAG | 2,790 |
| Trincomalee | MAG | 3,180 |
| | SLA HDU | 965 |
| Vavuniya | MAG | 157,000 |
| **Total** | | **999,384** |

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

According to NMAC, a total of almost 5.98km² of mined area was cleared in 2024, with the destruction of 16,510 AP mines, 24 AV mines, and 2,955 items of UXO (see Table 10).[108] This is a 12% increase from the almost 5.34km² of clearance in 2023, based on revised data reported by NMAC in October 2025.[109] In 2024, MAG, SHARP, and HALO reported clearing over 3.82km² and destroying 12,846 AP mines (see Table 11).[110] This is a decrease from the 4.66km² they reported clearing in 2023 with 14,130 AP mines destroyed.[111]

The most common AP mine types (P4, Rangan and Type-72) can be lifted by operators and destroyed at central disposal sites through burning. All other AP mines are destroyed by the SLA HDU. As per national standards, humanitarian demining operators are not authorised to conduct EOD in Sri Lanka.[112]

106 Email from Sri Mallikarachchi, GICHD/NMAC, 21 October 2025.
107 Email from Sri Mallikarachchi, GICHD/NMAC, 21 October 2025.
108 Ibid.
109 Email from Sri Mallikarachchi, GICHD/NMAC, 21 October 2025.
110 Emails from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025; and Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.
111 Emails from Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 6 June 2024; Cristy McLennan, MAG, 11 June 2024; and Philippa Coates, HALO, 13 June 2024.
112 Emails from Valentina Stivanello, MAG, 6 April 2020; and Hugh Baker, HALO, 10 October 2025.

**Table 10: Mine clearance in 2024 (national authority data)**[113]

| District | Operator | Clearance (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ampara | MAG | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Batticaloa | MAG | 490,991 | 333 | 0 | 39 |
| Jaffna | DASH | 17,629 | 23 | 0 | 1 |
| | HALO | 22,475 | 13 | 1 | 11 |
| | MAG | 11,016 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| | SLA HDU | 107,295 | 234 | 0 | 31 |
| Kilinochchi | DASH | 87,608 | 168 | 0 | 140 |
| | HALO | 768,072 | 7,074 | 11 | 1,113 |
| | MAG | 579,532 | 61 | 0 | 275 |
| | SHARP | 58,737 | 343 | 0 | 144 |
| | SLA HDU | 24,879 | 0 | 0 | 24 |
| Mannar | MAG | 265,208 | 509 | 9 | 41 |
| Mullaitivu | DASH | 559,418 | 2,692 | 1 | 263 |
| | HALO | 994,504 | 3,627 | 0 | 226 |
| | MAG | 814,189 | 322 | 2 | 97 |
| | SHARP | 336,936 | 636 | 0 | 221 |
| | SLA HDU | 57,230 | 280 | 0 | 26 |
| Polonnaruwa | MAG | 45,594 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Trincomalee | MAG | 102,283 | 39 | 0 | 3 |
| | SLA HDU | 38,554 | 60 | 0 | 8 |
| Vavuniya | DASH | 98,491 | 0 | 0 | 177 |
| | HALO | 854 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | MAG | 350,277 | 95 | 0 | 40 |
| | SLA HDU | 145,794 | 0 | 0 | 69 |
| **Totals** | | **5,977,566** | **16,510** | **24** | **2,955** |

**Table 11: Mine clearance in 2024 (MAG, SHARP, and HALO data)**[114]

| District | Operator | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jaffna | MAG | 1 | 4,791 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Kilinochchi | MAG | 6 | 331,997 | 65 | 0 | 268 |
| Polanaruwa | MAG | 3 | 25,324 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Trincomalee | MAG | 11 | 53,931 | 35 | 0 | 1 |
| Mannar | MAG | 8 | 216,053 | 523 | 9 | 15 |
| Vavuniya | MAG | 12 | 207,965 | 78 | 0 | 25 |
| Mullaitivu | MAG | 31 | 557,168 | 349 | 2 | 88 |
| Batticaloa | MAG | 30 | 331,901 | 334 | 0 | 30 |
| Kilinochchi | SHARP | 5 | 46,491 | 343 | 0 | 55 |

113 Email from Sri Mallikarachchi, GICHD/NMAC, 3 November 2025.

114 Emails from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025; and Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.

**Table 11 Continued**

| District | Operator | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kilinochchi | SHARP | 5 | 46,491 | 343 | 0 | 55 |
| Mullaitivu | SHARP | 13 | 203,393 | 625 | 0 | 72 |
| Jaffna | HALO | 5 | 24,189 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Kilinochchi | HALO | 47 | 822,023 | 6,881 | 5 | 946 |
| Mullaitivu | HALO | 69 | 997,257 | 3,609 | 0 | 218 |
| **Totals** | | **241** | **3,822,483** | **12,846** | **17** | **1,722** |

A total of 45 AP mines and 3 AV mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks. These figures are included in Table 10.[115]

In 2024, of the AP mines destroyed by MAG, 728 were of an improvised nature, while HALO destroyed 56 improvised mines.[116]

**Table 12: Area cleared in 2024 in which no AP mines were found[117]**

| Operator | Tasks cleared | Area cleared (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| MAG | 10 | 44,862 |
| SHARP | 1 | 4,947 |
| **Totals** | **11** | **49,809** |

MAG and HALO both reported a decrease in land release output from 2023 to 2024. For MAG, this was due to two periods of heavy rain that disrupted operations and a reduction in capacity.[118] HALO attributed the decrease to a 17% reduction in capacity caused by funding cuts and natural attrition.[119] In contrast, SHARP reported an increase in output, linked to tasks being located in sandy, more open areas.[120]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SRI LANKA: 1 JUNE 2018

↓

**ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Sri Lanka is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2028. Sri Lanka is not on track to meet this deadline.

Sri Lanka's original target to complete mine clearance by the end of 2020 was overly ambitious and contingent on significantly increasing funding and capacity. The hoped-for increase in capacity of the SLA HDU did not materialise,[121] with expansion hindered by the army's focus on responding to the Easter Sunday terrorist attacks in April 2019 and by the subsequent COVID-19 pandemic. Progress towards the 2020 target was also hampered by the continued discovery of previously unknown mined area, adding substantially to the contamination baseline.

**Table 13: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 5.98 |
| 2023 | *5.34 |
| 2022 | 5.27 |
| 2021 | 4.37 |
| 2020 | 4.59 |
| **Total** | **25.55** |

*Revised 2023 data reported to Mine Action Review in October 2025. Previously reported as 4.83km².

115 Email from Sri Mallikarachchi, GICHD/NMAC, 21 October 2025.
116 Emails from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025; and Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.
117 Emails from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025; and Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.
118 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.
119 Email from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025.
120 Email from Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.
121 Email from Belinda Vause, HALO, 9 August 2019.

Sri Lanka did not meet its land release target for 2024 due to a reduction in capacity for operators leading to decreased output. Despite releasing over 7km$^2$ of land in 2024 the AP mine contamination baseline increased due to the continued discovery of large areas of previously unknown AP mine contamination during the completion surveys.

Sri Lanka had been confident in its ability to identify and clear all AP mined areas by the end of 2027, in line with its national completion strategy.[122] However, a mid-term review of the strategy concluded that meeting the June 2028 original Article 5 deadline is no longer feasible, citing several factors: the discovery of new contamination identified through the Completion Survey and efforts by operators to further define the actual contamination, and larger-than-expected minefields, with operators finding that for every two square metres cleared an additional square metre of mined land was identified; the financial crisis and impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, including operational stand-downs and higher fuel costs; exchange rate fluctuations affecting NGOs reliant on foreign currency; a progressive decline in donor funding over the past five years, which fell by 9% in 2024 compared to 2023; reduced funding to the SLA HDU, limiting the deployment of teams and the purchase of essential equipment; and persistent staff retention challenges as many workers migrate or leave due to financial pressures and job uncertainty.[123] Sri Lanka plans to submit an Article 5 extension request in March 2027, closer to its deadline, to ensure the most accurate information is available on remaining contamination, including areas reduced or newly identified, as well as on operator capacity and budgets.[124] Operators project that completion of clearance is not realistically possible before 2030, with the end of 2031 considered a more realistic timeframe, though this will depend heavily on the level of sustained funding available to support operations.[125]

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027 includes management of residual contamination and staff transition as strategic objectives. Residual contamination will be managed by the SLA HDU, supported by the Police Special Task Force Bomb Disposal Unit for some EOD call-outs, with a staged transfer of the national database and IMSMA Core training to facilitate a smooth transition.[126]

The approach to staff transition is based on MAG's model developed in its "Skills Acquisition and Post-demining Livelihood Transition Strategy", supporting staff to move into alternative economic activities after redundancy, incorporating a staged transition process into high-demand occupations. The National Strategy also aims to integrate gender dimensions effectively for non-discriminatory and sustainable outcomes. While several activities are underway the formal transition platform is still under development and timelines will need adjustment.[127]

To support this process, an MoU was signed in 2023 between NMAC, the Northern Provincial Council, and relevant ministries, with further MoUs in 2024 with the University of Vavuniya and Eastern University Sri Lanka to deliver training in employability, ICT, and personal finance. Additional awareness sessions and exposure visits on agriculture, animal production, and rural industries were also provided to help prepare staff for livelihood opportunities.[128]

122 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, p. 19.

123 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form J.

124 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 8 October 2025.

125 Emails from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025; and Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025.

126 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, pp. 28–29.

127 Email from Cristy McLennan, MAG, 20 September 2024.
Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.

128 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.

# SUDAN



## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2027

Not on track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 10KM²

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0 | 0.01 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 0 | 5 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- None

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Extensive use of explosive weapons has been reported since the outbreak of the ongoing conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April 2023, adding more unexploded ordnance (UXO) to existing contamination. New anti-personnel (AP) mine contamination was confirmed at the end of July 2025, with mine use first identified in the Mogran area of Khartoum. It is not known who laid the mines. Meanwhile, mine survey and clearance all but halted when the conflict broke out, restarting a year later in April 2024 and focusing on clearing items of UXO. No AP mines were destroyed in 2024.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **As soon as circumstances permit, Sudan should finalise and issue the new strategic plan, planned for the end of 2025, taking into account the impact of the armed conflict that started in 2023.**
- **Resurvey of any suspected contaminated areas from the ongoing armed conflict should be conducted as soon as possible, along with resurvey of legacy contamination.**
- **Sudan should only clear land where firm evidence of mines exists, and it should continue to improve land release practices to ensure more targeted and efficient clearance.**
- **Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy increasing its international advocacy to attract new and former donors.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Sudan initiated non-technical survey (NTS) towards the end of 2019 to establish a national baseline of AP mined area. Although completion was planned by the end of 2021, insecurity obstructed access to most affected communities. As a result of the conflict that started in 2023, resurvey of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) will be needed when access is possible. New AP mine contamination was confirmed in July 2025. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 7 | The mine action programme is entirely nationally owned. It has benefitted from experienced national mine action centre (NMAC) staff and national mine action operators, although the 2023 conflict continues to interrupt activities. In 2024, despite the conflict, the government contributed US$1,425,000 to the mine action programme through NMAC. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | A gender and diversity policy was adopted in 2021, and gender concerns are reflected in the national mine action strategic plan 2019–23 (which was never formally adopted) and in its national standards. The policy, which emphasises the employment of women, is in the course of being implemented in the national programme. Sudan acknowledges the difficulties in employing women in operational roles due to local customs. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | NMAC has a policy on environmental management and a dedicated national standard that includes environmental impact assessments, although these may not have been conducted consistently. NMAC plans to reactivate the policy and review it at least once a year. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Efforts to retrieve data lost from the mine action database at the start of the conflict continued, with only data from calendar year 2023 still to be recovered. A plan to rebuild and upgrade Sudan's Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is to be agreed, and data migration to IMSMA Core, which began in 2022, will resume once all data are recovered. Sudan provides regular updates on progress in Article 5 implementation at the annual meetings of States Parties and has submitted an Article 7 report covering 2024. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | A new mine action strategy was under development in 2025. The previous strategic plan for 2019–23 was never formally adopted. Sudan provided a two-phase work plan in its 2022 Article 5 deadline extension request, but did not meet the targets in its extension request to 1 April 2023, and the 2023 conflict thwarted plans set out in the extension request for 2023–27. It is currently working on the basis of an emergency plan. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Sudan revised its national mine action standards (NMAS) in 2021. In 2024, changes were made to the NMAS to introduce "NTS+" teams, and changes were also made to standing operating procedures (SOPs). There were provisional plans to conduct to conduct a comprehensive review of standards in 2025, and in May 2025, a new chapter was added on building clearance in response to the increasingly urban nature of explosive ordnance contamination. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 5 | 7 | No release of AP mined area occurred in 2024, with only minimal release in 2023 due to the outbreak of the conflict. Completion of clearance by the Article 5 deadline of 1 April 2027 is not possible given the ongoing hostilities. Since clearance restarted in April 2024, the priority has been to address explosive remnants of war in accessible areas of Khartoum and South Kordofan states. |
| **Average Score** | ***6.0** | ***6.3** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

*This is a nominal score given the armed conflict that has been ongoing since April 2023, which brought the national mine action programme almost to a standstill in 2023 and continued to severely hinder it in 2024.

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
- Sudan National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)
- JASMAR for Human Security

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, Sudan estimated it had a total of almost 13.33km$^2$ of AP mined area across 108 hazardous areas: 3.37km$^2$ across 65 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 9.96km$^2$ across 42 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).[1] Release of AP mined area was last reported in 2023, when a total of 6,110m$^2$ was reported cleared.[2] Access to data in the mine action database was lost when the National Mine Action Centre's (NMAC)'s offices were ransacked early in the conflict,[3] which accounts for why NMAC has not been able to provide comprehensive AP mine contamination data in recent years. Most data have now been retrieved, but efforts to recover those from 2023 were ongoing at April 2025,[4] and NMAC has since indicated that following a further data update and recovery of substantial lost data, significant changes will need to be made in the database.[5]

**Table 1: AP mined area by state (at end 2024)[6]**

| State | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total SHAs/CHAs | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Blue Nile* | 10 | 1,005,767 | 9 | 118,432 | 19 | 1,124,199 |
| South Kordofan | 56 | 2,362,947 | 30 | 9,822,666 | 86 | 12,185,613 |
| West Kordofan | 0 | 0 | 3 | 21,991 | 3 | 21,991 |
| **Totals**** | **66** | **3,368,714** | **42** | **9,963,089** | **108** | **13,331,803** |

*Contamination data for Blue Nile provided to Mine Action Review for 2024 differ slightly from those in Sudan's Article 7 report covering 2024, where it reported 1,006,217m$^2$ of CHA, for a total contamination area of 1,124,649m$^2$ in Blue Nile. **As a result of the higher amount of Blue Nile CHA reported, the Article 7 report indicates total CHA of 3,369,164m$^2$, giving a total mined area of 13,332,253m$^2$.

**Table 2: AV mined area (at end 2024)[7]**

| CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total SHA/CHA | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 21 | 964,561 | 29 | 11,606,334 | 51 | 12,570,895 |

In addition to AP mined area, Sudan is also contaminated with anti-vehicle (AV) mines. At the end of 2024, 12.57km$^2$ of AV mined area was reported across the country (21 CHAs covering a total of 964,561m$^2$ and 29 SHAs covering 11,606,184m$^2$; see Table 2 for details).[8] This is a reduction on the 13,539,837m$^2$ of contaminated area reported at the end of 2021 – the last date for which data were available.[9]

Sudan's mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination results from decades-long conflict since the country's independence in 1956. Twenty years of civil war, during which mines and other munitions were widely used by all parties to the conflicts, resulted in widespread contamination that has claimed thousands of victims.[10] In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ostensibly ended the civil war. A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in 2007–09 covering Blue Nile, Gedaref, Kassala, Red Sea, and South Kordofan states, before armed conflict erupted again in 2011, which continued until 2016. More contaminated areas, including with AP mines, were expected to be found as a result.

Some "ad hoc" reports have concerned additional mined and ERW-contaminated areas being registered as "dangerous areas" in the national database. This caused the LIS baseline of 221 hazards to expand significantly, including by encompassing areas not originally surveyed.[11] Sudan claimed in 2022 that mines were still being laid by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA),[12] although this has not been independently reported or verified. NMAC has asserted that

1 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, Director General, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
2 Email from Sediq Rashid, Chief Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, 16 July 2024.
3 Interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, in Geneva, 30 April 2024; and email from Robert Thompson, Head of Project Unit (HPU)/Chief of Operations (COO), UNMAS, 4 June 2024.
4 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and APMBC Article 7 report (covering 2024), Form F.
5 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 16 August 2025.
6 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April and 16 and 25 August 2025.
7 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
8 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
9 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, Technical Adviser, NMAC, 31 March 2022.
10 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, Chief of Operations, NMAC, 9 May 2016.
11 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, pp. 2–3.
12 Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 71.

the RSF has laid mines since the conflict broke out in April 2023,[13] and stated that news and other reports suggest this, indicating that it will seek to verify this when the security situation allows.[14] A few open source reports have also suggested the use of AP mines since April 2023.[15] One report referred to alleged use of mines by both the SAF and the RSF, stating that NMAC had received more than 830 reports of mines and UXO in the first six months of 2025, but noting that a response was only possible in government-controlled areas.[16] Other media reports indicate that 42 people were killed in a mine blast in Sinnar state in December 2024,[17] along with reports of AP mine use and explosions in other states.[18]

At the end of May 2025, the Sudan NMAC continued to report that in areas controlled by the government, there were no indications of newly laid AP mines.[19] Towards the end of July 2025, however, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) discovered newly laid AP mines in Khartoum, and in early August, it confirmed that it had identified three AP minefields and three AV minefields in Khartoum. The AP mines were emplaced irregularly in the Mogran area, a residential neighbourhood of Khartoum. UNMAS reported surveying and marking the new mined areas.[20] It is not known who laid the mines.

NMAC previously reported the need for significant additional survey to determine the extent of AP mined area in Sudan.[21] It had initiated non-technical survey (NTS) in 2019 across Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and West Kordofan states and the five federal Darfur states with a view to establishing evidence-based, accurate baselines of contamination for all explosive ordnance (EO).[22] NMAC had planned to complete survey by the end of 2021, but insecurity and lack of access prevented this from occurring, with most affected communities in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Jebel Marra in Darfur remaining out of reach.[23] In 2022, access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile states did improve, and many roads were reported as verified or cleared and opened for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and allowing access for local communities.[24] But Sudan also reported that insecurity had prevented the survey from covering all localities and villages.[25]

### ABYEI (A REGION WHOSE SOVEREIGNTY IS CONTESTED WITH SOUTH SUDAN)

Since South Sudan's independence in 2011, the status of the Abyei Administrative Area (Abyei) has been a contentious issue between Sudan and South Sudan.[26] In the disputed area (known as the "Abyei Box") and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) between Sudan and South Sudan, the extent of mine and ERW contamination is unknown as a result of poor security and political disputes.[27] At the end of 2024, however, UNMAS, within the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), had recorded eight SHAs containing a mix of AP and AV mines in the Abyei Administrative Area totalling 457,700m$^2$.[28] In 2023, 436,474m$^2$ was added to the database – SHA defined from previous data on the presence of AP mines.[29] UNMAS UNISFA reports that AP mined areas have been resurveyed, resulting in changes to recorded contamination.[30]

In 2024, 26,192m$^2$ of SHA was cancelled (partial cancellation of an SHA in Luki) in Abyei while three hazardous areas of 224,455m$^2$ were cleared (one in Luki and two in Muli), though no AP mines were found.[31] In 2023, 599,957m$^2$ of AP mined area was reported cleared in Abyei.[32]

13 Statement of Sudan on Cooperative Compliance, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

14 Statement of Sudan (unofficial translation), Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

15 See, for example, "Sudan conflict raises familiar specter of a landmine-contaminated wasteland", *Arab News*, 31 January 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3VIOxqH; James Madison University, "Growing Threat of Landmines in Sudan Amid Ongoing Conflict", 3 February 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4aXC7AN.

16 "Sudan reports 51 mine explosions, 23 deaths since war began", *Sudan Tribune*, 12 July 20025, at: http://bit.ly/45e0MBh.

17 "42 killed in landmine explosion, paramilitary attacks in C. Sudan: volunteer groups", *CGTN Africa*, 14 December 2024, at: https://bit.ly/44dX48W.

18 "Sudan records 40 mine explosions, 66 casualties since start of conflict in April 2023", *The Eastleigh Voice*, 25 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3HRClk0; "Sudan People's lives in jeopardy over landmines, explosives", *Kuwait News Agency*, 8 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3IaPaG0; and "UXO 'a Silent Killer' in War-Torn Sudan", *Africa Defense Forum*, 8 July 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4o4rKCY.

19 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 May 2025.

20 Remarks of Luca Renda, Sudan Resident Representative, United Nations Development Programme, (UNDP), at the UN Geneva press briefing, 25 July 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/3r99wnah; and Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, at the UN Geneva press briefing on 8 August 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/wpm6fttt.

21 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020.

22 Ibid.; and Sudan Multiyear Operational Plan 2020 to 2023, p. 17.

23 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.

24 Draft Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

25 Ibid., Form J.

26 United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), "Abyei", at: https://bit.ly/3VGdLai.

27 UNMAS, "2019 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Sudan".

28 Email from Nico Bosman, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

29 Email from Jes Luckett, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.

30 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 10 July 2025.

31 Ibid.

32 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Sudan also has a significant problem with ERW, including limited contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR), which was primarily a result of the long civil war that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and South Sudan's independence in July 2011 (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Sudan for further information on CMR contamination). ERW was estimated to cover 6.1km$^2$ across 99 CHAs and 98 SHAs in 2022,[33] contributing to the total EO-contaminated area, which was estimated at 32.9km$^2$ (in 182 CHAs and 169 SHAs).[34] The conflict that started in April 2023 has added further ERW, particularly in urban areas.[35] By the end of 2024, most conflict-affected areas had become heavily contaminated with EO,[36] with Khartoum, Darfur, Al Jazirah, North Kordofan, and Sennar reportedly the worst affected.[37]

#### ABYEI

In 2023, inter-tribal fighting and the involvement of the armed forces within the Abyei Box led to increased ERW contamination (mostly of unexploded rocket-propelled and hand grenades) around the central and southern Abyei.[38] Abyei continues to be affected by episodic intercommunal violence.[39]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

NMAC has managed Sudan's mine action programme since 2005, and has functioned as the executive mechanism for the national mine action authority (NMAA) since 2011. Its key responsibilities are overseeing the planning, supervision, accreditation, and monitoring of all mine action.[40] Sudan has national mine action legislation – the 2010 Mine Action Act.[41]

UNMAS began working in Sudan in 2002, and has since had a key advisory role in building Sudan's humanitarian demining infrastructure. Working with NMAC, UNMAS mobilises funds for the programme and supports land release, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), victim assistance, and information management.[42]

The April 2023 conflict scattered NMAC staff around the country and its Khartoum offices were looted. UNMAS, which had been based in the same building as NMAC in Khartoum, withdrew its international staff from Sudan in April 2023, setting up an office in Port Sudan in July.[43] All operations were suspended, although UNMAS sub-offices in Damazin in Blue Nile state and in Kadugli in South Kordofan state remained open.[44] By April 2024, NMAC, with UNMAS support, had re-established its head office in Port Sudan.[45] UNMAS also supported NMAC to resume its core functions, including conducting accreditation and quality assurance (QA) of operators.[46] By the end of April 2025, NMAC had another six operational sub-offices in Kassala, Madani, Khartoum, Damazine, Kadugli and El-Fasher.[47]

Neither NMAC or UNMAS had access to the mine action database for a year, until April 2024 when access was restored.[48] Survey and clearance all but ceased in April 2023, except for limited NTS, which was conducted by Danish Refugee Council (DRC).[49] When small-scale clearance resumed in April 2024, starting in the Omdurman area of Khartoum state, the focus was on clearing ERW.[50]

33 Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 42.

34 Ibid., p. 7. Sudan INGO Forum, "INGOs working in Sudan sound alarm on increasing use of explosive weapons in heavily populated civilian areas", 8 November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3TE9JgD.

35 "Unexploded weapons in cities create new danger zone in Sudan", *UN News,* 4 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4clytSk.

36 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan – Executive Summary, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2025, Issued December 2024, p. 9; and Sudan INGO Forum, "INGOs working in Sudan sound alarm on increasing use of explosive weapons in heavily populated civilian areas", 8 November 2024".

37 OCHA, "Explosive hazards pose deadly risk to millions of people", *Humanitarian Update*, January 2025.

38 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.

39 OCHA, "South Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025", December 2024, p. 34.

40 Presentation by Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, "Mine Action in Sudan: Challenges and Commitments", at the UN National Directors Meeting & UN Advisers (NDM28), Geneva, 10 April 2025.

41 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), "Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Sudan", March 2012; and APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form A.

42 UNMAS webpage on Sudan, accessed 8 May 2025, at https://bit.ly/43ShIdk.

43 Emails from Robert Thompson, and Matt Williams, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

44 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

45 Interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, Director General, NMAC, in Geneva, 30 April 2024.

46 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

47 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

48 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNITAMS, 5 and 18 May 2023; and interview (as UNMAS Sudan), in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 14 May 2024.

49 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

50 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has supported NMAC in the past, including through training and remote support for implementation of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core in 2021.[51] Implementation of IMSMA Core has been on hold since April 2023, but this effort will resume when all the data have been retrieved.[52]

The last annual meeting of the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) was held on 14 March 2023 in Khartoum, chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan and Head of UNITAMS, the Ambassador of Italy (the Global MASG Chair for 2023), and the Secretary-General of the Sudan Ministry of Defence. Key stakeholders, including donors, discussed Sudan's mine action efforts,[53] but the events of 15 April 2023 have overtaken the earlier progress.

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2024, the Sudanese government contributed US$1,425,000 to its mine action programme through NMAC,[54] an increase on the $500,000 provided in 2021 and 2022 (when the value of Sudan's allocation had fallen from $2million in 2019 and 2020 with the devaluation of the local currency).[55] The budget remains small given the level of need, but the government is confronted with an ailing economy and competing humanitarian emergencies.[56]

The Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SHF), which is administered by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), funded survey and clearance in Khartoum state in 2024, and the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) funded an EORE project. In 2024, UNMAS's operations were funded by the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), the Government of Japan, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), the FCDO, the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF) and, as in-kind support, by the Government of Switzerland. The MPTF and the CERF were new donors for UNMAS, while funding from AICS and USAID ended on 31 December 2024.[57] Funding from Japan ended on 31 March 2025.[58]

At DRC, NTS and risk education were funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs;[59] its UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) EORE project was funded by the UN MPTF, the FCDO, AICS, the Government of Japan, and USAID. UNOPS also funded an NTS land release project while the SHF funded a battle area clearance (BAC) project, and the US Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs funded risk education as part of a larger multi-sector humanitarian response project.[60]

The US foreign aid cuts at the beginning of 2025 left the UNMAS programme facing a fiscal cliff edge on 31 March 2025. However, the Government of Canada, the FCDO, the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), and CERF have since confirmed allocations for 2025, which will allow UNMAS to expand its programme, including for survey and clearance.[61]

While Sudan does not currently have a resource mobilisation strategy, NMAC has organised side events during meetings and conferences to attract donors, uses meetings of States Parties to appeal for funding,[62] though many are reluctant to provide support to the NMAA due to its status as a government entity, and some funders ceased to fund mine action following the outbreak of armed conflict.[63] Sudan had calculated that it required $32.6 million for all land release in 2022–27[64] but all plans and costings will have to be revisited as a result of the conflict. NMAC is developing plans to diversify its funding sources as part of its strategic framework, which was expected to be finalised by the end of 2025, and has considered the possibility of seeking funding from private donors.[65] UNMAS Sudan continues to seek new funding with a key focus on donor diversification.[66]

### ABYEI

UNMAS, as part of as part of UNISFA, has a Security Council-mandated role in Abyei, which includes identification and clearance of mines and route assessment in the Safe Demilitarized Buffer Zone (SDBZ) between Sudan and South Sudan and Abyei. It operates through an implementing partner, The Development Initiative (TDI), and acts in support of peacekeeping operations, the delivery of humanitarian aid, the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the nomadic migration of animals.[67]

51 Emails from Henrik Rydberg, Country Focal Point, GICHD, 13 April, 3 June, and 10 August 2022.
52 Emails from Henrik Rydberg, GICHD, 8 August 2023; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
53 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 4 June 2024.
54 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
55 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.
56 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
57 Ibid.
58 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.
59 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, Humanitarian Mine Action and Peacebuilding Manager DRC, 9 July 2025.
60 Emails from Ra'ed Salameh, Operations Manager, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 29 May 2025.
61 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
62 See, for example, Statement of Sudan on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, 17-20 June 2025.
63 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
64 APMBC 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 30.
65 Online interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 12 March 2025; and email, 30 April 2025.
66 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
67 UNMAS, "Where we work: Abyei", accessed 30 June 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3waA8Fr.

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

UNMAS is funded through UNISFA. There has been a continuous drop in funding received by UNMAS in recent years. From 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025, UNMAS received funding of $6.75 million to cover its activities in Abyei, a drop of almost 30% on the $9.59 million it received for the previous 12 months.[68]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

A new gender and diversity (GDI) policy was developed and endorsed in 2021, and gender was mainstreamed in the draft national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 (the strategic plan was to be issued in February 2023[69] but was never formally approved due to the outbreak of the conflict[70]). Gender is also reflected in the NMAS for risk education, survey, clearance, and victim assistance.[71] The GDI policy is said to be in the course of being implemented.[72] All survey and community liaison teams should be gender balanced. Gender is also said to be considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance, as per the NMAS and the new standard IMSMA forms.[73]

NMAC created a dedicated Gender Focal Point (GFP).[74] It says it always encourages women to apply for employment in the national programme, whether at the office level or in the field. A group of 28 women from different states and ethnic groups completed basic demining training in 2021 and have since been integrated into various teams in their localities.[75] In response to the conflict, UNMAS launched emergency EORE in 2024, using gender- and age-sensitive materials that target risky behaviours.[76]

**Table 3: Gender composition of NMAC and operators (at end 2024)[77]**

| NMAC/ Operator | Total staff | Total women staff | Total managerial and supervisory staff | Total women managerial and supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Total women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NMAC | 54 | 17 (31%) | 20 | 5 (25%) | 12 | 4 (33%) |
| UNMAS | 14 | 5 (36%) | 4 | 0 (0%) | 8 | 2 (25%) |
| DRC | 18 | 6 (33%) | 6 | 3 (50%) | 14 | 3 (21%) |
| JASMAR | 87 | 19 (22%) | 8 | 2 (25%) | 79 | 14(18%) |
| NUMAD | 120 | 23 (19%) | 10 | 3 (30%) | 86 | 19 (22%) |
| **Totals** | **293** | **70 (24%)** | **48** | **13 (27%)** | **199** | **42 (21%)** |

Before the 2023 conflict, NMAC reported that ethnic minority groups in affected communities were consulted during survey and considered during the planning of mine action activities. Survey teams are also structured to address all affected groups within a community, including ethnic minorities.[78] In 2021, 21 former fighters from a Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction completed explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 1 training and were integrated into mine action operations in their home areas of Bau/Ulu and the Ingasana mountains.[79]

### ABYEI

UNMAS UNISFA remains committed to its Gender and Diversity Work Plan 2019–2023, which includes a focus on staffing by a diverse workforce. UNMAS is an active participant in UNISFA's Gender and Diversity Working Group.[80] UNMAS headquarters used the UNMAS UNISFA programme to pilot a transition away from UNOPS implementation to a programme implemented by the UN Secretariat. This resulted in a reduction of UNOPS staff, affecting gender and diversity ratios.[81] In 2024, UNMAS UNISFA deployed only one female staff member, whereas the previous year six women (40% of total personnel) were deployed.[82]

68 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
69 2022 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.
70 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.
71 Email from Aimal Safi, UNMAS, 27 March 2022.
72 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
73 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.
74 Email from the GICHD, 29 June 2021.
75 Emails from Aimal Safi, UNMAS, 27 March 2022; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
76 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
77 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023 and 30 April 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 9 July 2025.
78 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.
79 2022 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 22.
80 Emails from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
81 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
82 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024.

**Table 4: Gender composition of UNMAS and its operator in Abyei at the end of 2024**[83]

| UNMAS/ operator | Total staff | Total women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Total women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Total women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNMAS | 8 | 1 (13%) | 4 | 1 (25%) | 3 | 0 (0%) |
| TDI | 131 | 3 (2%) | 28 | 1 (4%) | 102 | 2 (2%) |
| **Totals** | **139** | **4 (3%)** | **32** | **2 (6%)** | **105** | **2 (2%)** |

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

In 2022, Sudan had a policy on environmental management in mine action.[84] There is also a dedicated NMAS on environmental management, and environmental impact assessments are integral to Sudan's NMAS, but assessments have not always been conducted to support the planning and conduct of survey and clearance.[85] However, NMAC plans to reactivate the environmental policy, which will be reviewed at least annually.[86] It has indicated that it already takes account of the environment and climate-related risks when setting priorities and determining the timing of operations.[87]

UNMAS is working with NMAC to introduce enhanced environmental protocols as projects move to more field-related activity for land release. There is a focus on minimising the impact of demolitions on the environment; clearance of waste at sites; and measures to mitigate contamination from spills and waste. UNMAS, with UNOPS management support, encourages implementing partners to adopt environmentally responsible practices and includes environmental requirements in its requests for proposals.[88] UNMAS does not have a dedicated environmental focal point, but key UNOPS operational and support management personnel act as organisational focal points.[89] UNOPS support personnel are designated as formal focal points for the Environmental Inventory, for collecting and reporting relevant non-operational environmental data from the office, in line with organisational policies to achieve climate-related goals.[90]

**Table 5: Environmental policies and action**[91]

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| DRC | No* | No | No |
| NMAC | Yes | No | No |
| UNMAS | Yes | No** | Yes*** |

*DRC has a global SOP on environmental management but not one specific to Sudan. **In the future, environmental assessments for survey and clearance will be incorporated into external QA and health and safety, social and environment reporting. ***At UNMAS, certain UNOPS operational management and support personnel serve as focal points.[92]

### ABYEI

UNMAS complies with UNISFA's environmental management policy, which is tailored to mine action in the UNISFA Mine Action Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs) and with the old International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 on environmental management in mine action, which it is to review and bring in line with the new version.[93] UNMAS, in collaboration with the UNISFA Facilities and Environmental Management Unit, conducts environmental assessments to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance. During the rainy season, raised water levels can restrict access and lead to the migration of mines.[94]

83 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
84 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.
85 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.
86 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
87 Ibid.
88 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 14 July 2025.
89 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.
90 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.
91 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 29 May 2025.
92 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.
93 Emails from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March and 10 July 2025.
94 Emails from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

The environmental management of operational work sites is governed by the implementing partner's SOPs, which are said to be tailored to the UNISFA Mine Action TSGs and IMAS 07.13. In 2024, UNISFA worked with implementing partners to integrate mission-provided power and water supplies to reduce emissions and fuel consumption, including converting coal-fired cooking units to electrical units.[95]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Neither NMAC nor UNMAS had access to the mine action database following the ransacking of their offices (co-located in Khartoum) between April 2023 and April 2024. NMAC, UNMAS and the GICHD (which hosts NMAC's data) have worked together to retrieve the data,[96] and NMAC has confirmed that its IMSMA department has recovered all data except for those covering 2023, but that efforts continue to retrieve these missing data.[97] A plan was put in place in June 2025 for the rebuilding and upgrading of IMSMA, and implementation has started. Under the plan, IMSMA Core content will be expanded and enhanced; data transfer from IMSMA New Generation will be completed; and new NMAC staff and implementing partners will be trained in the use of system.[98]

The migration of data to IMSMA Core, which was ongoing before the outbreak of the conflict, will resume when the missing data are all recovered, but staff training on IMSMA Core has already started. NMAC has held training workshops for field partners, focusing on report quality.[99] In addition, UNMAS has drafted new reporting templates for land release operations and new workflows to improve data validation. When used in the field, these will strengthen data flow and enhance quality.[100]

Sudan had, until April 2023, submitted regular Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 reports, and given regular statements on progress at the meetings of States Parties. While Sudan provided its Article 7 report covering 2022 to Mine Action Review, it did not formally submit it to the United Nations for publication, and it did not submit an Article 7 report in 2024 (covering 2023). It did, however, submit an Article 7 report in 2025 (covering 2024). Sudan continues to participate in meetings of States Parties.

### ABYEI

UNMAS UNISFA continues to use IMSMA Core, and through UNISFA mission resources, monitors, verifies, and evaluates the data entered on the database. UNMAS UNISFA provides monthly reports to NMAC Sudan that include information about hazardous areas identified. In addition, UNMAS UNISFA provides monthly achievement reports to NMAC and to UNMAS Sudan. Following the transition of the UNMAS UNISFA programme from UNOPS to the UN Secretariat, there has been engagement with stakeholders on how to streamline the process while ensuring data accuracy.[101]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

A new mine action strategy was under development in 2025 with support from the GICHD, taking into account the impact of the conflict, and NMAC expected to finalise it before the year's end.[102] The previous national mine action strategic plan, for 2019–23, had been awaiting approval since March 2022,[103] and was to be issued in February 2023.[104] This was never formally approved as a result of conflict,[105] although a final version of the strategy was shared with stakeholders.[106]

Sudan had been working towards a two-phase work plan prior to the conflict, providing annual land release targets for all explosive ordnance to 2027,[107] but this was blown off course by the 2023 conflict. In 2022, Sudan's request for a four-year extension to its Article 5 deadline was granted with the new deadline set at 1 April 2027. Sudan was asked to submit annual updates on progress and a detailed updated work plan by 30 April 2025, covering the remaining period of the extension. In April 2023, just before the outbreak of hostilities, Sudan reported plans to undertake survey and assessment mainly in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Darfur states during the operational year 2023–24,[108] but the conflict intervened, and all operations ceased for a year. In its most recent Article 7 report, Sudan recommends changes to its work plan to 2027, but does not disaggregate the plan by different types of EO.[109]

95 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

96 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 5 and 18 May 2023; and interview in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 14 May 2024; and Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

97 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

98 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 14 July 2025.

99 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

100 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

101 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

102 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023 and 30 April 2025.

103 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

104 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.

105 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

106 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 24 July 2023.

107 Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 48–58.

108 Draft Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

109 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

Prior to the 2023 conflict, it was already unlikely that Sudan would meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 April 2027. Sudan had indicated that it aimed to improve its land release process and methodology and its resource mobilisation strategy.[110] However, plans in the extension request assumed that security in all regions contaminated by mines and ERW would improve and that the funds would be secured for implementation of programme activities.[111]

In 2021, a systematic prioritisation system was introduced as part of the new NMAS, linked with IMSMA, with each SHA and CHA classified as high, medium, or low impact and prioritised accordingly.[112] All previously identified hazardous areas were to be resurveyed through NTS, then released through technical survey (TS) and clearance as required.[113] The prioritisation methodology is to be reviewed to ensure it aligns with evolving threats and challenges.[114]

NMAC resumed ERW clearance operations in April 2024, using government-funded NUMAD rapid response teams in the Omdurman area of Khartoum state.[115] As at April 2025, NMAC and its partners were working to an emergency work plan which prioritises clearing institutions and service facilities in war-affected areas, particularly those where there is a high rate of voluntary return (this had not, at the time of writing, included any AP mine clearance).[116] However, frequent shelling poses significant challenges to the planning and execution of clearance in many locations, which combine with administrative barriers to access, including delayed visa issuance for international staff and authorisation to travel to conflict-affected areas.[117]

In addition, NMAC, supported by UNMAS, implemented a hotline providing a response to reports of UXO.[118] In late 2024, UNMAS also supported resumption of survey and clearance of ERW by DRC and JASMAR in accessible areas of Khartoum state, with plans to scale up in 2025.[119] UNMAS deployed a Mine Action Advisory Team to provide technical advice on explosive hazards to the humanitarian community; reactivated the Mine Action Area of Responsibility coordination forum; and distributed EO contamination maps and monthly analyses to support the wider humanitarian response.[120]

### ABYEI

Annual work plans are taken from the UNISFA dry-season deployment plan which stipulates priority areas and roads. When the dry-season deployment plan is completed, resources are focused on SHAs. In 2024, UNMAS UNISFA continued to work on identified mined areas with an "integrated" approach.[121]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2024, an amendment was made to the NMAS section on team composition to introduce EORE+ and NTS+ teams. The aim is to enhance operational flexibility by enabling a more cost-efficient and effective approach, allowing teams to perform dual functions (EORE and NTS, or NTS and EOD) based on the operational context and nature of contamination.[122] A comprehensive programme-level review of national standards has been discussed by NMAC and UNMAS, with provisional plans to implement this in the course of 2025. The review will focus on aligning standards with the evolving operational context and ensuring compliance with IMAS.[123] In May 2025, Chapter 05.05 on Building Clearance was added to the NMAS as a response to the urban nature of recent EO contamination.

NMAC made two changes to its SOPs in 2024 and early 2025, incorporating medical support into each chapter of the national mine action standards to ensure this issue is not missed when chapters are written independently, and adjusting team composition due to a lack of personnel qualified to EOD Level 3. The adjustment to team composition involved merging two multi-task teams each with an EOD Level 2 team leader under the supervision of a single EOD Level 3 team supervisor. This will increase the number of deminers, but this approach does reduce operational flexibility by allocating many deminers to a single area and decreasing the ability to react at short notice to priority tasks.[124]

110 Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 44–45.

111 Draft Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

112 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

113 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2022, pp. 34 and 36; and draft APMBC Article 7 report (covering 2022), Form F, pp. 16–17, received by email from Badreldin Elguaifri, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Sudan to the UN in Geneva, 22 June 2023.

114 Presentation by Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, "Mine Action in Emergency Humanitarian Relief, Peacebuilding and Recovery efforts: Global Lessons from Sudan and Other Emergency Contexts", Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25 November 2024.

115 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

116 Ibid.

117 Emails from Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025; and Abigail Steven, UNMAS Sudan, 14 August 2025.

118 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

119 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 30 May 2025.

120 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

121 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

122 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.

123 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

124 Ibid.

### ABYEI

Abyei's Mine Action TSGs are reviewed as required. No changes were made in 2024.[125]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, the number of NMAC's survey staff increased, with trained personnel from different organisations who had been displaced by the conflict able to return to work.[126] However, none were deployed to AP mine survey or clearance but worked only on BAC. NMAC expected to further increase its staff in 2025 as more personnel returned to work, and was training 23 young men and women to conduct EORE and survey at the time of writing.[127] UNMAS also expects a steady increase in personnel.[128]

DRC had anticipated that a budget freeze and termination of US government funding and the shrinking of donor overseas aid budgets could lead to a reduction in survey and clearance personnel in 2025,[129] although by April 2025, the Sudan mine action programme had attracted further funding, as outlined above.[130] DRC was considering whether to initiate CMR and AP mine clearance operations, based on Sudan's humanitarian priorities, "in the near future".[131]

**Table 6: NTS survey capacities deployed for BAC in 2024**[132]

| Operator | State | NTS teams | NTS personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DRC | South Kordofan | 1 | 3 | January–July and August–October. |
| JASMAR | Khartoum (Karari) | 4 | 12 | 1 December 2024–6 February 2025, working with DRC. |
| **Totals** | | **5** | **15** | |

**Table 7: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed for BAC in 2024**[133]

| Operator | State | Manual teams | Total deminers | Dogs and dog handlers | Mechanical assets | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NUMAD | Khartoum (Omdurman) | 1 | *16 | 0/5 | 3 | Deminers also conducted survey. |
| JASMAR | Khartoum (Omdurman) | 4 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 1 December 2024–6 February 2025 |
| **Totals** | | **5** | **32** | **0/5** | **3** | |

*NUMAD had 12 deminers, which increased to 16 in April 2024 when it began BAC in Omdurman; five dog handlers but no dogs; and three mechanical assets which were not deployed in 2024.[134] NUMAD deployed five rapid-response teams in Omdurman, but they operated as one team working on one task.[135]

### ABYEI

TDI, an international commercial company, is the only organisation conducting survey and clearance of mines in Abyei. UNMAS UNISFA operates with integrated teams that have survey, community liaison, and clearance capacities.[136]

125 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
126 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023 and 30 April 2025.
127 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
128 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
129 Email from Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025.
130 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
131 Emails from Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 9 July 2025.
132 Emails from Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
133 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 29 May 2025.
134 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023.
135 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 24 June 2025.
136 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024.

**Table 8: Operational NTS and TS capacities deployed in Abyei in 2024**[137]

| Operator | NTS teams | NTS personnel | TS teams | Total TS personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TDI | 2 | 20 | 2 | 20 | NTS teams are part of Integrated Route Assessment and Clearance Teams |
| **Totals** | **2** | **20** | **2** | **20** | |

**Table 9: Mine clearance capacities deployed in Abyei in 2024**[138]

| Operator | Manual clearance teams | Total deminers | Mechanical assets/machines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TDI | 2 | 20 | 2 | Integrated route assessment and clearance teams |
| **Totals** | **2** | **20** | **2** | |

The number of survey and clearance personnel remained the same in 2024. No major changes in survey or clearance personnel were expected in 2025. That said, if the ongoing UN funding crisis for 2024–25, which is generally restricting UNISFA budgeted activities, continues into 2025–26, this is likely to result in a drop in UNMAS UNISFA capacity.[139] A MineWolf 370 replaced a MineWolf 240 as planned in 2023, with the aim of improving daily clearance rates.[140]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, no survey or clearance of AP mined area occurred in Sudan.[141]

### ABYEI

In 2024, UNMAS UNISFA reported that less than 0.3km$^2$ of AP mined area was released in Abyei and no mines were discovered or destroyed. Under 0.03km$^2$ was cancelled through NTS and over 0.2km$^2$ was cleared. No hazardous area was released through TS. No previously unrecorded contamination was added to the database.[142]

**Table 10: Summary of land release outputs in Abyei in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 224,455 | No AP or AV mines found but 1 item of UXO destroyed |
| **Technical Survey** | 0 | |
| **Non-Technical Survey** | 26,192 | |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 0 | |

## SURVEY IN 2024

No AP mined area was released through survey in Sudan in 2024[143] or in 2023.

### ABYEI

A total of 26,192m$^2$ was released in 2024 through NTS in Abyei, and no AP mined area was released through TS.[144] This compares with 2023, when no AP mined area was reported as released in Abyei through NTS or TS.[145]

137 Emails from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March and 21 July 2025.

138 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid.

141 Interviews with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, in Geneva, 29 April 2024; and Robert Thompson, UNMAS, in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

142 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

143 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

144 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

145 Email from Johan Maree, Chief of Operations, UNMAS UNISFA, 27 July 2023.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, there was no clearance of AP mines in Sudan, although some BAC was undertaken. In 2023, JASMAR cleared a total of 6,110m$^2$ of AP mined area in Blue Nile state at the start of the year, destroying in the process 5 AP mines, 68 AV mines, and 625 items of UXO.[146]

### ABYEI

In Abyei in 2024, three hazardous areas covering a total of 224,455m$^2$ were cleared with no AP mines destroyed, though one item of UXO was found and destroyed.[147] This compares with 2023, when one hazardous area covering 599,957m$^2$ was cleared with one AP mine and one AV mine destroyed.[148]

**Table 11: Mine clearance in Abyei in 2024[149]**

| Area | Operator | Area cleared (m$^2$) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Luki | TDI | 163,355 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Makir | TDI | 52,141 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Makir | TDI | 8,959 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **224,455** | **0** | **0** | **1** |

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SUDAN: 1 APRIL 2004

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2014

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 APRIL 2019

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 1 APRIL 2023

↓

**THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 1 APRIL 2027**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the four-year extension granted by States Parties in 2022), Sudan is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2027. It will not meet this deadline.

Prior to the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023, there had been some positive developments, including a preliminary peace deal between Sudan's transitional government and one of the two factions of the SPLM-N rebel group in 2020, which meant NMAC, in cooperation with UNMAS, deployed teams to clear roads to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Blue Nile state.[150] In 2020, Sudan had reported a joint initiative with Chad to clear the border areas between the two nations, although this was reported as on hold due to the political and security situation in 2022,[151] and in 2025, NMAC reported that the border with Chad remains free of AP mines.[152] In June 2021, humanitarian agencies were able to access conflict-affected communities in the five areas controlled by the SPLM-N El Hilu in South Kordofan and Blue Niles states for the first time in ten years.[153]

146 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 4 June 2024.

147 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

148 Email from Johan Maree, UNMAS UNISFA, 27 July 2023.

149 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

150 Statement of Sudan on Article 5, Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, 16–20 November 2020; and Statement by Sudan on Cooperation and Assistance, 20MSP, Geneva, 21–25 November 2022.

151 Statement of Sudan on Cooperation and Assistance, Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, 16–20 November 2020; and email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

152 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 16 August 2025.

153 Joint UN Press Release, "UN agencies in Sudan reach conflict-affected communities in non-government-controlled areas for first time in a decade", 13 June 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3j7wMiP.

However, poor security continued to hamper demining efforts and in 2022, full access to most known affected communities in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states was still not possible. Other obstacles to completion included inadequate funding and lack of sufficient demining equipment, rising inflation, newly discovered contamination, and climatic factors and geographical conditions, including extended rainy seasons.[154] Prior to the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023, it was already unlikely that Sudan would meet its new treaty clearance deadline of 1 April 2027. The conflict has since exacerbated the situation, preventing survey and clearance and leading to further EO contamination, and new AP mine contamination has been confirmed. Clearance efforts resumed in April 2024, but this centred on UXO resulting from the ongoing conflict. There was no survey or clearance of AP mined area during the year, and given the ongoing conflict, it remains unclear when demining will resume.

**Table 12: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 0 |
| 2023 | 0.01 |
| 2022 | 0.08 |
| 2021 | 0.03 |
| 2020 | 0.35 |
| **Total** | **0.47** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Sudan previously had a plan in place to deal with residual risk and liability post-completion.[155] The aim was that ultimately Sudan would establish a national capacity within the military or police.[156] Before the 2023 conflict, Sudan had undertaken to provide annual updates to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on its capacity to respond to residual contamination,[157] but this appears to have fallen into abeyance.

154 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021; and Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 4–5.

155 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020.

156 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.

157 Statement by the Chair of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on the Analysis of the Request for extension by Sudan, August 2022, 20MSP, Geneva, 21–25 November 2022; and Informal presentation by Sudan on its Article 5 deadline extension request, 20MSP, Geneva, 21–25 November 2022.

# TAJIKISTAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025

Not on track to meet deadline
Seven-year extension requested, but Tajikistan was only granted a one-year extension to 31 December 2026 due to late submission of its Article 5 deadline extension request.

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 6KM²

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0.42 | 0.41 |
| Technical Survey | 0.64 | 0.40 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0.64 | 0.45 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 2,795 (incl. 18 during spot tasks) | 1,127 (incl. 18 during spot tasks) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Ministry of Defence Humanitarian Demining Company (MoD HDC)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Tajikistan will not meet its current Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance deadline and in October 2025, at a very late stage, it requested a further seven-year extension to 2032. Tajikistan informally presented its request at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025 and formally submitted the request only in mid-October 2025. There was progress in border relations with Uzbekistan and discussions on border delineation, a necessary step towards securing access to all areas still requiring survey, with protocols on the issue signed by both States first in May and then in August 2024. In March 2025, a trilateral agreement, dubbed the Khujand Declaration, was also signed between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, demarcating the tri-state border.

Tajikistan had planned to complete all necessary survey in order to establish a baseline of contamination by the end of 2025, having previously committed to doing so by end of 2023. However, Tajikistan now plans to complete survey/re-survey of 44 CHAs in the Central Region and the Tajik-Afghan border region by the end of 2027. Previously unrecorded areas of contamination continued to be found. Overall land release in Tajikistan increased slightly in 2024 compared to 2023, but clearance remained almost the same.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) should continue to prioritise accelerated survey to reach a clear national baseline estimate of mined area.**
- **Tajikistan should explore all possible ways to increase national demining capacity to the levels needed to fulfil its Article 5 commitments as soon as possible, and within its proposed seven-year extension period.**
- **Tajikistan should continue working with key stakeholders to address shortfalls in funding.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 5 | Tajikistan has comprehensive information on all remaining known mined areas and has completed survey of all mined areas from its 2018 extension request. However, it still lacks a comprehensive baseline of contamination and new AP mined areas continue to be added to the database. It plans to complete survey/re-survey of the 44 CHAs in the Central Region and in the Tajik-Afghan border region by the end of 2027. In 2024, TNMAC conducted an assessment and monitoring on the Tajik-Uzbek border, which resulted in it determining that mined areas are located on the Uzbek side of the border, and removing the 54 SHAs totalling 3.25km$^2$ from its contamination baseline. A further final assessment of some extremely high and hard-to-reach mountainous areas on the Tajik-Uzbek will be conducted only after the final delimitation and demarcation of the border. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Tajikistan has strong national ownership of mine action, led by TNMAC. It has political will and provides an enabling environment for Article 5 implementation but is heavily reliant on funding from a limited number of international donors. Tajikistan faced significant shortfalls in the funding required to meet its 2019 extension request targets. It initiated an Individualised Approach to the APMBC Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21 MSP) in November 2023, but, as at mid-2025, this had not yielded new donor support. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Tajikistan's mine action programme has a gender strategy but few women are employed in mine action and there are none in the Ministry of Defence Humanitarian Demining Company (MoD HDC), the largest operator. A gender and diversity working group reconvened in 2024, having not met since 2022, and a multi-stakeholder training was held. International operators are making efforts to increase female staff. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Tajikistan has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in mine action and environmental assessments are said to be conducted. Operators have measures in place to minimise environmental harm during survey and clearance. A multi-stakeholder working group on climate change and the environment was established and held its first meeting in 2024. Changes to weather patterns negatively impact the nine-month window for demining operations. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 6 | TNMAC uses Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core. TNMAC and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) collaborated in 2024 to strengthen data communication by aligning reporting formats and improving internal data validation. Tajikistan finally submitted its third Article 5 deadline extension request in mid-October 2025, but the request itself was comprehensive. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Tajikistan had to revise its work plan for 2023–2025 having failed to meet its earlier land release targets. It now plans to complete survey/re-survey in the Central Region and in the Tajik-Afghan border region by the end of 2027.Tajikistan has provided updated annual targets, including a comprehensive work plan, in its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension request to end of 2032. The extension request work also includes three different options, each based on different assumptions. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Tajikistan has NMAS that are compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The standards are available in Russian and English. Tajikistan last updated the NMAS in 2023, revising the standards on marking, medical support, land release, battle area clearance, safety, and quality management. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | Clearance in 2024, at nearly 0.42km$^2$, remained almost the same as in 2023. Overall demining capacity decreased slightly in 2024. It is somewhat unclear if the extended requested deadline of end of 2032 is based on current capacity (151 deminers as at June 2025), or if it contingent of increased capacity of 261, for which funding has yet to be secured. The request assumes no previously unknown mined areas will be discovered. If new contamination is added to the database, which seems likely, Tajikistan foresees it can still meet the deadline if it adopts operational efficiencies in land release activities. |
| **Average Score** | **6.5** | **6.2** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL)
- Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Ministry of Defence Humanitarian Demining Company (MoD HDC)
- Border Guard Forces of Tajikistan*
- Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence (CoES)*
- National Guard*
- Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

*The National Guard provide staff to form the MoD HDC. Border Guard personnel are also seconded into NPA multi-task teams (MTTs).

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan still lacks a clear fully comprehensive baseline estimate of mined areas, though it has now surveyed all hazardous areas planned in its 2018 extension request and planned to survey/resurvey by the end of 2027, the 44 previously unknown confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) (without minefield records) discovered in the Tajik-Afghan border region and in the Central Region.[1] In addition, some extremely high and hard-to-reach mountainous areas on the Tajik-Uzbek, which are not yet delimitated or which were inaccessible, will only be assessed and surveyed after the final delimitation and demarcation of the border.[2] In its Article 7 report (covering 2024) and in its reporting to Mine Action Review, Tajikistan reported 6.75km$^2$ of anti-personnel (AP) mined area at the end of 2024, consisting of 109 CHAs measuring 6.13km$^2$ and two suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering an estimated 0.62km$^2$ (see Table 1).[3] This is down from the 7.54km$^2$ across 125 CHAs and 9 SHAs a year earlier.[4] Tajikistan's 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request included detailed information on the remaining CHAs in each province, but did not include the 0.61km$^2$ of SHA from its Article 7 report.[5] The reason for this is not known.

Of the total 6,132,708m$^2$ of CHA detailed in Table 1, 100 CHAs measuring 5,082,228m$^2$ are in the Tajik-Afghan border region and 9 CHAs measuring 1,050,480m$^2$ are in the Central Region.[6]

**Table 1: AP mined area by district (at end 2024), excluding the Tajik-Uzbek border[7]**

| Region | District | | CHAs | | SHAs | | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | No. | Area (m²) | No. | Area (m²) | |
| Region of Republican Subordination (DRS) | Sangvor | | 2 | 150,000 | 0 | 0 | 150,000 |
| **Subtotals** | | **1** | **2** | **150,000** | **0** | **0** | **150,000** |
| Badakhshan (also known as GBAO or VMKB) | Darvoz | | 9 | 986,280 | 2 | 621,000 | 1,607,280 |
| | Vanj | | 6 | 908,119 | 0 | 0 | 908,119 |
| | Shughnon | | 3 | 56,000 | 0 | 0 | 56,000 |
| | Ishkoshim | | 1 | 250,000 | 0 | 0 | 250,000 |
| **Subtotals** | | **4** | **19** | **2,200,399** | **2** | **621,000** | **2,821,399** |

1 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26, 78, and 108.
2 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10, 21, 25, 26, 31, 79, 97, 112, and 150.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
4 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.
5 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 15–20 and pp. 78–80.
6 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 78 and 108.
7 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D; email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 2 July, 2025; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 78–80.

**Table 1 Continued**

| Region | District | CHAs | | SHAs | | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No. | Area (m²) | No. | Area (m²) | |
| Khatlon | Farkhor | 1 | 5,000 | 0 | 0 | 5,000 |
| | Hamadoni | 3 | 135,000 | 0 | 0 | 135,000 |
| | Panj | 12 | 792,338 | 0 | 0 | 792,338 |
| | Jayhun | 10 | 164,005 | 0 | 0 | 164,005 |
| | Sh. Shohin | 61 | 2,680,782 | 0 | 0 | 2,680,782 |
| | Qabodiyon | 1 | 5,184 | 0 | 0 | 5,184 |
| **Subtotals** | **6** | **88** | **3,782,309** | **0** | **0** | **3,782,309** |
| **Totals** | **11** | **109** | **6,132,708** | **2** | **621,000** | **6,753,708** |

AP mined areas are located in three of Tajikistan's administrative regions, also referred to as provinces. The highly mountainous regions of Khatlon and Badakhshan (also known as Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), or VMKB) contain significant contamination;[8] 56% and 42% of the total, respectively, while the smallest remaining proportion (2%) is in the Region of Republican Subordination (also known as the Districts of Republican Subordination or DRS). Contamination data are disaggregated by weapon type in the national database.[9] Tajikistan notes in its 2025 extension request, however, that both in the more densely contaminated Tajik-Afghan border region (Khatlon and parts of Badakhshan), as well as in the central region (DRS, and other parts of Badakhshan), there remains a high possibility of re-classification of minefields to battle areas and vice versa, as some areas contain both mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).[10]

As already mentioned, building a fully comprehensive baseline of contamination depends on the completion of delineation of the border with Uzbekistan. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled most of their 1,283km-long border dispute following the collapse of the Soviet Union but certain areas have not yet been delineated. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan agreed in 2018 to set up a joint commission to investigate mined areas along the border.[11] As at July 2025, Tajikistan had yet to report on any follow-up action regarding this proposed joint commission. However, online media sources indicate that delineation talks between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were ongoing throughout 2023[12] and two meetings of the working groups of the Joint Tajik-Uzbek Demarcation Commission took place during 2024 – one from 29 April to 4 May, in Dushanbe, and a second in Termez, Uzbekistan, from 22 to 28 August. On both occasions, protocols were signed by both States. A further meeting was planned in Tajikistan.[13] However, no date was given and it is not known whether it had yet gone ahead as at September 2025. As at the time of writing, the delimitation and demarcation process of the Tajik-Uzbek Border was ongoing.[14]

Previously, information about mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border had been limited and based on the non-technical survey (NTS) conducted in 2011–15 by The Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) and a needs assessment survey by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2013–15. However, the FSD survey only covered one part of the border in Sughd province, and although survey teams recorded 82 incidents they did not have access to the border and relied mainly on incident forms. As a result, records lack detail on the exact location where mine incidents occurred.[15] Recent progress has been made, however, and in 2024, TNMAC conducted a joint assessment and monitoring with other

8 Statement of Tajikistan on Article 5 Implementation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

9 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 16 June 2023.

10 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 78–79.

11 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

12 "Demining Mountains: Tajikistan's Struggle Against Landmine Contamination", *NCT CBNW*, 7 February 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4d5WdKY.

13 "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan discussed border demarcation – a protocol signed", *Central Asian Light*, 6 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3LKBbpc; "Uzbek-Tajik demarcation commission held a meeting in Dushanbe", *KUN.UZ*, 4 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3LMkSbx; and "Tajik-Uzbek demarcation commission holds next meeting", *Turkic World*, 28 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/480Mo13.

14 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 150.

15 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018; Statement of Tajikistan, 16MSP, Vienna, 20 December 2017; and 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.

relevant Tajik Government entities, local authorities and communities, and implementing partners to determine the level of threat of mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border.[16]

Tajikistan reported that: "During that visit, local communities and local authorities informed that there was no information regarding existence of the hazard areas on the Tajik side of the border."[17] As a result of the assessment and monitoring, Tajikistan affirmed that the mined areas are located on the Uzbek side of the border.[18] Tajikistan further clarified that the 54 suspected mined areas previously reported as totalling 3,25km$^2$, and previously included in Tajikistan's November 2023 work plan,[19] was an approximate estimation based on "distance survey" methodology, as there was no access to conduct NTS/technical survey (TS) at that time. TNMAC has subsequently repealed this figure, believing it to be a result of incorrect estimates.[20] As such, and as Tajikistan believes mined areas are located on the Uzbek side of the border, this region is not included in Tajikistan's baseline of mined area (Table 1). However, it is important to note that a further final assessment of some of the extremely high and hard-to-reach mountainous areas on the Tajik-Uzbek, which have not yet been delimitated or which were inaccessible, will be conducted only after the final delimitation and demarcation of the border.[21] Tajikistan has pledged to continue to monitor the progress of high-level discussions on border demarcation and to keep the States Parties updated through its Article 7 reports and at Meetings of the States Parties.[22]

Tajikistan is also delimiting and demarcating its border with Kyrgyzstan, a process that has been ongoing since 2022.[23] FSD cautions that there may be unrecorded contamination along the border with Kyrgyzstan.[24] In August 2024, FSD reported deploying teams along the Tajik-Kyrgyz border that had identified one battle area clearance (BAC) task. FSD expects unexploded ordnance (UXO) rather than AP mines to be the main contamination type[25] and is engaged in ongoing survey and re-survey efforts with TNMAC to identify hazardous areas.[26] Progress was made on the border issue on 13 March 2025, when the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed an agreement to demarcate their shared border.[27]

Additional progress towards fully delimiting and demarcating Tajikistan's borders both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was also made when, on 31 March 2025, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan gathered to discuss cooperation, an unprecedented event following decades of strained relations.[28] A trilateral agreement, dubbed the Khujand Declaration, was signed, demarcating the tri-state border and making a formal declaration of friendship.[29] It is not yet clear if this move towards cooperation will increase the opportunity to release any mined border areas remaining.

The majority of remaining mined areas is in the Tajik-Afghan border region. This includes mined areas on two islands in the Panj river on the Tajik-Afghan border. The islands were created by a change in the flow of the river, and have historically been inaccessible. TNMAC noted in 2022 that the river may again change its path and re-connect the islands with the Tajik riverbank in the future.[30] Though they remained "non-executable" during 2022,[31] one of these areas, measuring 30,000m$^2$ and located in Ayvoj, in the Shahrituz district of Khatlon, was cancelled during resurvey in 2023. TNMAC planned to resurvey the other in the course of 2024,[32] but, as at July 2025, it remained inaccessible.[33]

In 2024, six new CHAs, with a total of 959,200m$^2$ were added to Tajikistan's information management database.[34] Tajikistan has been consistently adding new areas to the database in recent years, and cites the discovery of new minefields for which no records existed (as well as some inaccurate minefield records) as one of the primary reasons that necessitates a third Article 5 deadline extension request.[35] The total amount of newly recorded AP mined area in 2024 was down from the 607,807m$^2$ of CHAs added in 2023.[36]

Tajikistan needs technical support and expertise in order to complete the baseline survey,[37] with TNMAC suggesting a regional training and learning exchange event on survey would be helpful. In July 2025, TNMAC pushed back its timeline for completing survey in the Central Region and in the Afghan-Tajik border region once again, and now plans to complete survey of the 44 CHAs only by the end of 2027, noting that previously unrecorded areas of contamination

16 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10, 21, 25, 31, 37, and 79.

17 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 150.

18 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10, 21, 25, 31, 37, and 79.

19 General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, 2023, p. 14.

20 General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, 2023, pp. 14 and 31.

21 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10, 21, 25, 26, 31, 79, 97, 112, and 150.

22 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 37, 97, 108, 112, and 150.

23 "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan discussed border demarcation – a protocol signed", *Central Asian Light*, 6 May 2024.

24 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, Country Director, FSD, 11 April 2024.

25 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 16 August 2024.

26 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 26 September 2025.

27 "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan discussed border demarcation – a protocol signed", *Central Asian Light*, 6 May 2024; and "Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sign deal to end long-running border dispute", *Reuters*, 13 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4lWftij.

28 "Central Asian Presidents Meet, Seeking to Defuse Decades of Tensions in the Ferghana Valley", Foreign Policy Research Institute, 16 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4m0CK2R.

29 "Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan sign deal on junction point of state borders", *AA*, 31 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4leX5jA; and "Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan's Leaders Signed a Historical Agreement in Khujand", *SpecialEurasia*, 31 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4fw0v07.

30 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018.

31 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 11 April 2023.

32 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April and 3 October 2024.

33 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

34 Ibid.

35 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 96–97.

36 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 3 October 2024.

37 Tajikistan's Mine Action Programme: Overview of Remaining Challenges and Needs', Individualised Approach Meeting, 21MSP, Geneva, 21 November 2023, p. 3.

continued to be found.[38] Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) believes that significant progress with survey and survey methodology was made in 2024, but stresses the need to maintain a strong focus on both survey and re-survey.[39] FSD noted the particular need for re-survey in mountainous locations, where some minefield tasks have remained suspended for a long time.[40]

Mine contamination in Tajikistan dates from conflicts in the 1990s. Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan was mined by Russian forces in 1992–98; the border with Uzbekistan was mined by Uzbek forces in 1999–2001; and the Central Region was contaminated during the 1992–97 civil war. As the Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST), recalls, and as detailed in Afghanistan's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request,[41] some AP mines were used without being recorded, particularly during the civil war. As such, NTS teams are trying to find former military personnel and other informants who were involved in the civil war and who can help survey teams build a picture of likely contamination.[42] In Khatlon region, which borders Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, mines were laid in and around military positions on hilltops overlooking the Panj river valley, mostly delivered remotely by helicopter or laid by troops who were moved in and out by helicopter. There are no established roads or tracks to access the minefields for survey or clearance.[43] Tajikistan's terrain can also present further challenges to determining an accurate baseline of contamination in a given area, as mudslides, landslides, avalanches, and rockfalls can cause mines to move or become more deeply buried.[44] This can sometimes result in the suspension of tasks.[45]

Neither TNMAC nor operators report mines of an improvised nature in Tajikistan. However, booby-traps in minefields were recorded by FSD along the Tajik-Afghan border between 2008 and 2014. These included a PMN-2 AP mine placed on top of an ML-7 mine that serves as an anti-handling device and 200g of TNT; an OZM-72 AP mine placed on top of an ML-7; and a stone placed on top of an ML-7.[46] The only reported demining accident in Tajikistan in 2023 involved a PMN-2 AP mine emplaced with an ML-7.[47]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan also has cluster munition remnants (CMR) remaining on its territory (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants* report on Tajikistan for further information).

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), which is chaired by the First Deputy Prime Minister and comprises senior representatives from relevant line ministries, acts as Tajikistan's national mine action authority. The CIIHL is also responsible for mainstreaming mine action in the government's socio-economic development policies.[48]

TNMAC is the executive arm of CIIHL and the body coordinating mine action, responsible for accreditation, risk management, issuing task orders, information management, quality assurance (QA), and quality control (QC).[49] It was set up by government decree in 2014, replacing the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre and assuming responsibility for the transition to a fully nationally-owed programme.[50] Tajikistan's Parliament adopted a Law on Humanitarian Mine Action in 2016.[51] The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plays a significant role in the mine actor sector through its Humanitarian Deming Company (HDC), the biggest demining operator.[52]

The Government of Tajikistan and TNMAC are enabling and highly supportive of mine action. This includes the ready granting of visas, conclusion of memoranda of understanding with operators and facilitating imports, granting access to border-detached areas that require special permissions, and involving operators in decisions as needed.[53]

38 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.
39 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, Senior Operations Officer/Acting Country Director, NPA, 20 March 2025.
40 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, Country Director for Tajikistan/ Programme Manager for Central Asia, FSD, 13 May 2025.
41 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.
42 Email from Saynurridin Kalandarov, Director, UST, 14 April 2023.
43 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018; and Statement of Tajikistan, 16MSP, Vienna, 20 December 2017.
44 Presentation by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 22 June 2022; email from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9, 25, and 35.
45 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 35.
46 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 11 April 2024.
47 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024; and Statement of Tajikistan on Victim Assistance, 21MSP, Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.
48 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.
49 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 20–21; and General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, p. 9.
50 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.
51 Ibid., pp. 20–21.
52 Ibid., p. 23.
53 Emails from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, Country Director, NPA, 6 May 2024; Saodat Asadova, National Programme Officer, OSCE, 24 March 2025; and Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 24 March 2023.

TNMAC regularly receives support on topics such as information management from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[54] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also continued to provide support to the national programme in 2024, including training of MoD explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel through the OSCE-funded Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre (REHTC).[55] Military medical specialists from Tajikistan also received medical training in support of EOD in Kazakhstan, co-organised by the OSCE.[56] NPA does not have a formal capacity development agreement with TNMAC but assists informally with activities upon request.[57] Tajikistan has highlighted a need for capacity development in the areas of survey, information management, quality management (QM), priority setting, risk assessment, and post-clearance assessment.[58]

Monthly technical co-ordination meetings between TNMAC, operators, and implementing partners continued in 2024.[59] These meetings typically have representation from operators, management staff of the engineering units of the MoD, Border Troops, the State Committee for National Security, the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence (CoES), and the National Guard.[60] A key topic discussed during 2024 was the pressing need to undertake thorough surveys, to better understand the exact extent of remaining contaminated areas, and contribute to improved planning and prioritisation. An annual meeting of stakeholders under the auspices of the CIIHL also took place as usual, to review the achievements and challenges of 2024 and, critically, to discuss Tajikistan's new 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request.[61] It has been suggested that more discussion on funding at these meetings would be beneficial given the relatively small number of donors to the programme.[62]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

National funding for humanitarian demining has remained modest but consistent. A total of US$480,000 was allocated from the government for 2024, the same amount as in earlier years.[63] This is designated for "technical and non-technical assistance" and to facilitate the implementation of Tajikistan's obligations under the APMBC. An additional US$66,020 was allocated "to support humanitarian mine action in the country,"[64] though no details were given about which mine action activities this was for. HDC is funded by the United States (US),[65] which provided almost US$1.7 million in 2024, and the OSCE, which provided $201,175 in 2024.[66] Following the US review of funding to mine action globally in early 2025, continued US funding of TNMAC and of OSCE's implementation of the REHTC was approved.[67] TNMAC anticipated that the donors to Tajikistan's national mine action programme in 2025 would be the same ones that provided support in 2024.[68]

It has been suggested that, given that Tajikistan's mine action programme has only a few donors, more effective efforts are needed in donor engagement.[69] TNMAC notes that Tajikistan's National Strategy on Humanitarian Mine Action for 2021–30 foresees resource mobilisation.[70] Tajikistan had budgeted US$36 million for mine action for 2019–2024, but secured just under US$20 million.[71] Tajikistan initiated an Individualised Approach at the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP) in November 2023,[72] but, as at July 2025, this had not yielded any new donor support.[73]

In its 2025 extension request Tajikistan states that "preliminary calculations" suggest that implementation of its 2026–32 plan will require US$42 million. This amount is based on an assumption of US$6.60 on average per square meter of manual clearance, also taking into account an expected decrease of the "clearance ratio" given that much remaining contamination is in high altitude and/or hard-to-reach mountainous terrain.[74] Although the request is inconsistent on the demining capacity needed to meet the 2032 deadline, it seems to assume a huge increase in demining capacity from the current capacity of 151 deminers to 261. It is not stated how much of the required US$42 million had already been secured.

A summary of information from international humanitarian operators on their funding for survey and clearance in 2024 and forecast for 2025 is provided in Table 2. Both FSD and NPA were significantly impacted by the suspension of funding by the US State Department Bureau of Political-Military

54 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.
55 Email from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 24 March 2025; and OSCE, "The first-ever Tajik-led explosive ordnance disposal course kicks off at OSCE-supported Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre", 16 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4hnV9Uj.
56 OSCE, "OSCE-led regional medical training course for specialists from Central Asia concludes in Kazakhstan", 28 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4g5BtDS.
57 Emails from Melissa Andersson, Country Director, NPA, 21 May 2022 and 29 March 2023.
58 Tajikistan's Mine Action Programme: Overview of Remaining Challenges and Needs', Individualised Approach Meeting, 21MSP, 21 November 2023.
59 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
60 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024.
61 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
62 Email from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024.
63 Statement of Tajikistan on Political Commitment, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024, p. 4.
64 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.
65 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 23.
66 Article 7 report (covering 2024), Form F.
67 Interview with Saodat Asadova, OSCE, Geneva, 9 April 2025.
68 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.
69 Email from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024.
70 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024.
71 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 47.
72 "Tajikistan's Mine Action Programme: Overview of Remaining Challenges and Needs", Individualised Approach Meeting, 21MSP, 21 November 2023.
73 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.
74 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension request, p. 11.

Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) in January 2025. NPA's funding was withdrawn in February 2025, forcing it to reduce capacity and begin operations later in the year than planned.[75] PM/WRA funded one demining team for FSD Tajikistan and the project terminated in February 2025. The operational impact was somewhat mitigated by other funding. However, FSD would welcome the restarting of US funds in order to expedite clearance along the Tajik-Afghan border, where UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) funding was allowing FSD operations to resume from October 2025.[76]

**Table 2: Funding for survey and clearance by international operators in Tajikistan (2024–25)[77]**

| Donor | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Norway (Norad[78]/Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)) | NPA | NPA |
| PATRIP Foundation | FSD | FSD |
| Private donors (unspecified) | FSD | FSD |
| UK (FCDO) | FSD | FSD |
| US PM/WRA | NPA, FSD | Withdrawn from NPA in January 2025. FSD funding terminated in February 2025. |

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Gender and diversity considerations were integrated into Tajikistan's national mine action strategy for 2021 to 2030, with annual plans also addressing these issues.[79] TNMAC says that gender is mainstreamed in all aspects of its mine action programme,[80] which is underpinned by Tajikistan's legislation on gender equality, its National Development Strategy to 2030, and other key national programme and strategy documents.[81]

**Table 3: Gender composition of operators in 2024[82]**

| Organisation | Total staff | Total women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Total women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Total women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TNMAC* | 26 | 7 (27%) | 10 | 3 (30%) | 14 | 0 (0%) |
| NPA | 64 | 14 (22%) | 6 | 2 (33%) | 50 | 10 (20%) |
| FSD | 59 | 18 (31%) | 16 | 8 (50%) | 49 | 15 (31%) |
| UST* | 54 | 0 (0%) | 5 | 0 (0%) | 54 | 0 (0%) |
| MoD HDC** | 117 | 0 (0%) | 15 | 0 (0%) | 84 | 0 (0%) |
| **Totals** | **320** | **39 (12%)** | **52** | **13 (25%)** | **251** | **25 (10%)** |

*As per data for gender composition at end 2023. Information on 2024 was requested but not provided. **No women employed in MoD HDC in 2024. Staff numbers are as at end of 2023.

75 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 26 June 2025.

76 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 26 September 2025.

77 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May and 26 September 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

78 Norad is the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, under Norway's MFA. See www.norad.no.

79 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 May 2022; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022.

80 Committee on the Implementation of Article 5, Preliminary Observations on Tajikistan, Intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20–22 June 2022.

81 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.

82 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April and 23 July 2024; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

The Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (TMAP) Gender and Diversity Working Group (GDWG) reconvened with renewed focus in Q2 2024,[83] having previously not met since 2022.[84] Participants included TNMAC, the MoD, operators, and OSCE. Key items discussed in 2024 included gender and diversity analysis and assessments and monitoring and evaluation of efforts by the GDWG members.[85] In its 2025 extension request Tajikistan emphasises that the GDWG will "guide and support the integration of gender considerations into all aspects of the TMAP's policies and practices by the mine action partners, provide technical expertise, strategic advice, and coordination on gender related issues". The extension request also reiterates that development of a gender and diversity policy for humanitarian mine action is included in planned activities by 2030, as part of Tajikistan's national mine action strategy.[86] In support of the re-established GDWG, the OSCE held a training workshop, covering effective mainstreaming of gender and diversity into mine action, including relevant aspects of Tajikistan's national strategic documents and international commitments.[87] The basic demining course in Tajikistan includes content on gender and human rights.[88]

TNMAC asserts that men and women with relevant work experience and qualifications in demining have equal access to employment in the sector in Tajikistan.[89] It acknowledges, however, that in view of the predominance of men in the military, where service is compulsory for men and voluntary for women, it is challenging to achieve gender balance.[90] No women were employed in MoD's HDC in 2024 or recent years.[91]

NPA, FSD, and national operator UST all report having a gender and diversity policy.[92] FSD and NPA deploy gender-mixed teams.[93] Although UST supports equal access to employment in theory, it had not yet employed any women as at May 2024.[94] NPA saw a notable drop in the proportion of managerial or supervisory positions occupied by women, from 50% in 2023 to 33% in 2024 (see Table 3). This was due to a 50% drop in all management and supervisory staff, leaving only six staff, including two women, in these positions.[95] It did, however, continue collaborating with local women's associations to actively recruit and train female deminers in 2024, with all candidates for the basic demining course successfully gaining employment with NPA.[96]

In 2024, FSD launched a socio-economic baseline assessment (SEBA) to map gender disparities and identify the specific needs of women and men in surveyed areas along the Kyrgyz border. This is intended to inform future interventions, such as expanding employment and vocational training, and improving gender-sensitive mine action.[97] FSD also employed a Gender Officer to oversee SEBA, risk education, and community engagement.[98]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

**Table 4: Environmental policies and action[99]**

| Operator name | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| FSD | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| NPA | Yes | Yes (from June 2025) | Yes |
| UST* | Yes | Not known | Not known |
| MoD HDC* | Not known | Not known | Not known |

*Updated information requested in March 2025 but not provided at the time of writing.

83 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
84 Email Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 31 March 2023.
85 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
86 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension request, p. 38.
87 Emails from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 24 March and 18 June 2025.
88 Email from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 18 June 2025.
89 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.
90 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information received 3 August 2019.
91 Emails from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 3 June 2022; Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 16 June 2023, 23 July 2024, and 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
92 Emails from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 15 April 2024; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023 and 7 May 2024; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
93 Email from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024; and "Activity Report 2024", FSD, pp. 18–19, at: https://bit.ly/4384LOE.
94 Emails from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023 and 7 May 2024. A more recent update was requested from UST but not provided.
95 Emails from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 26 June 2025.
96 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
97 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and "Activity Report 2024", FSD, at: https://bit.ly/4384LOE, pp. 18–19.
98 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.
99 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; online interview with Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 3 April 2025; emails from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 15 April 2024; and Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 26 September 2025; and "Activity Report 2024", FSD, p. 19.

Tajikistan has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in mine action, though, as at September 2025, this had not yet been updated to be in line with the revised 2024 edition of International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13.[100] The NMAS covers issues such as safeguarding of the environment during the establishment and removal of worksites and accommodation, waste disposal, air quality, and water supply.[101] Based on this Standard, TNMAC monitors demining by all operators to assess the environmental implications and environmental protection requirements.[102] Tajikistan does not have an environmental management policy for mine action but a 2011 law on environmental protection and other regulatory documents define the legal basis for all State policy on the environment.[103] It states that, in line with these documents, all mine action actors seek to minimize the negative impact of mine action, for example, avoiding cutting down trees as much as possible, and removing all large fragments of mines and UXO following operations.[104]

In 2024, a mine action working group on the Climate Change and the Environment was established, which includes participation from NPA, FSD, OSCE, MoD HDU, UST, and the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan.[105] A representative from the Committee for Environmental Protection of the Government of Tajikistan will participate, to ensure "the planned activities are well negotiated and agreed". The working group is intended to provide technical expertise, strategic advice, and coordination on climate change and environment-related issues. The first of planned bi-annual meetings was held in June 2024 to identify possible steps on how the mine action community can contribute to the environment protection.[106]

FSD, NPA, and UST all have an environmental standard operating procedure (SOP),[107] and undertook various specific measures to prevent or minimise environmental harm in 2024. FSD has an environmental policy at its headquarters and consolidated its environmental management system by the end of 2024. FSD is also undergoing the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 14001 accreditation process, though this was progressing a little slower than expected, mainly due to challenges resulting from reduced US funding.[108] FSD also conducts environmental assessments to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance.[109] It undertakes refresher training each year on the environmental SOP and FSD's commitments to sound environmental practices, with all management and operational staff.[110] NPA Tajikistan has an annual environmental action plan linked to its environmental policy,[111] and, from June 2025, was implementing NPA's global Green Field Tool, in order to conduct environmental screening of the areas where it works and analyse its environmental impact.[112] NPA replaced two vehicles with electric cars and improved travel planning to reduce emissions. It also introduced use of solar panels in the field, including in some remote locations.[113] Going forward, NPA planned to extend recycling from its offices to its field bases, though it highlights that government recycling facilities in the districts outside Dushanbe are variable and limit the extent to which recycling is possible.[114] UST reports that, after leaving field camps or completing operations, UST buries waste, excluding metal and plastic materials.[115]

In 2024, operators and TNMAC also continued collective tree-planting efforts, planting over 1,000 trees in total. Alongside its demining activities, FSD is continuing a separate project to remediate polluted soil in areas contaminated by Soviet-era toxic pesticides (persistent organic pollutants, or POPs),[116] focusing in 2024 on phytoremediation (the use of plants to remove pollutants), including large-scale tree planting.[117]

Environmental concerns and climate resilience are becoming increasingly pertinent for mine action in Tajikistan as changes to weather patterns, including extreme heat, early snow, and heavy rainfall, continue to negatively impact the nine-month window for demining operations.[118]

100 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 18 September 2025.

101 Emails from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 3 and 9 June 2022; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022; and NMAS Chapter 20: "Environment, Health and Safety".

102 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.

103 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023 and 15 April 2024; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 38-39, which lists these regulatory documents as: "Law of the RT [Republic of Tajikistan] on environment protection; State environmental program of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2023–2028; Climate change adaptation Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan up to 2030; State program for the study and protection of glaciers of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2010–2030; Comprehensive state program for the development of environmental education of the population of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2021–2025; Land Code; Water Code; etc."

104 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 39.

105 Email from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 24 March 2025; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 39.

106 Article 5 Extension Request of Tajikistan, 16 October 2025, p. 39.

107 Emails from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024; Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 29 May 2024; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

108 Emails from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 29 May 2024; and Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 26 September 2025.

109 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 24 March 2023.

110 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 24 March 2023.

111 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 May 2022.

112 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview, 3 April 2025.

113 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview, 3 April 2025.

114 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview, 3 April 2025.

115 Email from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024.

116 "Tajikistan", FSD website, accessed 25 March 2024 at: https://bit.ly/3Ozn7hh.

117 "Activity Report 2024", FSD, p. 19.

118 Interview with Faiz Mohammad Paktian, Tajikistan, NPA, Geneva, 21 November 2023.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

TNMAC uses the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA Core) for its national mine action database.[119] Data are disaggregated by weapon type and method of land release in the national database.[120] Data collection forms are reported to enable efficient collection of the requisite data[121] and both the database and information management by TNMAC more generally are said to be functioning well, with progress and other reports from the field received daily and cross-checking of the data by TNMAC.[122] Tajikistan's General Land Release Operations Plan sets out clear guidelines for operators on the required content and timelines for all types of operational reports to be sent to TNMAC on a daily, weekly, monthly and as-needed basis.[123] TNMAC regularly receives support on information management through online consultations with the GICHD. NPA took steps in 2024 to strengthen its data communication with TNMAC, including regular coordination meetings to align reporting formats and timelines; the introduction of improved internal data validation procedures prior to submission; and more consistent sharing of operational updates and clearance statistics.[124]

In recent years, Tajikistan has submitted detailed Article 7 reports of generally good quality. In November 2023, Tajikistan acted upon the decision at the Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC by submitting an updated plan for 2023–2025.[125]

Tajikistan informally presented its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025,[126] but did not formally submit it until mid-October. This is despite the 31 March 2025 deadline for submission of extension requests in order to give the Committee on Article 5 implementation and States Parties sufficient time to analyse and consider the request.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

TNMAC's activities are guided by the National Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan on Humanitarian Mine Action for 2021–2030.[127] An annual work plan was in place for 2024[128] and one had been prepared for 2025.[129]

Tajikistan had previously set a target to release almost 8.85km$^2$ during its current extension period of 2019–25. It fact, it managed to release almost 8.24km$^2$ in 113 hazardous areas between 2019 and 2024, 89% of its target for this period. In the course of this, Tajikistan destroyed 17,598 mines and 7,693 ERW. However, between 2019 and 2024, Tajikistan also identified new areas of AP mine contamination amounting to a little over 5.14km$^2$ in 44 CHAs. TNMAC cites these discoveries as one of the key reasons for not fulfilling its obligations during its current extension period.[130]

In its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Tajikistan has provided a comprehensive work plan for 2025–2032, including its plan for survey/re-survey of 44 CHAs currently totalling 2.56km$^2$ in the Tajik-Afghan border region and Central Region,[131] a clear rationale for projected annual land release targets; anticipated challenges and measures to mitigate against these; personnel required; QM measures; and detailed lists of minefields to be surveyed, re-surveyed, or cleared.[132]

Tajikistan outlines three work plan options within its 2025 extension request, although the rationale for the projections and assumptions is not always evident. The Option 1 work plan foresees the release of the 109 CHAs totalling 6.13km$^2$ by end of 2032, based on current capacity.[133] Furthermore, elsewhere in the extension request, is says "To meet its projected 2032 deadline Tajikistan will need to increase its current capacity from 151 deminers to 261,"[134] which appears at odds with Option 1. The Option 2 work plan assumes discovery of an additional 2.78km$^2$ of previously unrecorded mined areas (based on practical field experience). This would bring the total amount of mined areas needing to be addressed during the extension period to 9km$^2$. This

119 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 28 May 2020; and Committee on the Implementation of Article 5, Preliminary Observations on Tajikistan, Intersessional meetings, 20–22 June 2022.

120 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 16 June 2023.

121 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 May 2022 and 29 March 2023.

122 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024; and Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024.

123 Tajikistan Mine Action Programme General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, pp. 4–5.

124 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 26 June 2025.

125 Implementation Support Unit, "Tajikistan", accessed 1 August 2024 at: https://bit.ly/4c4tJjf.

126 "Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032", Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025.

127 Statement of Tajikistan on Political Commitment, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024, p. 2.

128 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024.

129 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

130 "Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032", Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025.

131 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 121.

132 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 126 and 117–136.

133 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 28 and 129–131.

134 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 108, and 112–113).

second option assumes completion by end of 2032, with existing capacity, which will be achieved through increasing the operational efficiency of land release and survey operations.[135] Again, however, this is at odds with elsewhere in Tajikistan's extension request where it says a demining capacity of 261 deminers is needed in order to achieve completion by 2032.[136] The Option 3 work plan foresees the release of the 109 CHAs totalling 6.13km$^2$ by end of 2030 (rather than 2032), based on the assumption funding levels are doubled and no previously unknown mined areas is added to the baseline.[137] All three options only include CHAs, and exclude the 0.62km$^2$ of SHA contained in Tajikistan's Article 7 report covering 2024.

During the upcoming extension request period, Tajikistan plans to undertake the following key activities:

- Complete re-survey of all hazardous areas in the central region and in Tajik-Afghan border areas, by the end of 2027;
- Conduct detailed survey and assessment of minefields and battle areas, as some of them are contaminated with both landmines and UXOs;
- Establish multi-task teams to increase operational efficiency;
- Complete land release of the "remaining hazardous areas"[138] identified as measuring a little over 6.13km$^2$.[139]

In order to implement these activities and meet its proposed 2032 deadline, Tajikistan states that it needs to increase its current capacity from 151 deminers to 261 deminers,[140] although elsewhere in the report it suggests that completion by 2032 is possible with existing capacity if no additional mined area is found, or if operational efficiencies are made if new area is discovered.[141]

Tajikistan said it will also need to deploy mechanical assets in order to meet its proposed 2032 deadline.[142] It estimates that 10–20% of total remaining contaminated areas are in lowlands with an altitude less than 800m above sea level, which could be processed using mechanical demining machines, particularly in flat areas with a high concentration of metal fragments and high levels of vegetation. It provides a detailed list of hazardous areas that are likely to be suited to mechanical clearance, which are located almost entirely in the Khatlon region.[143] TMAC said that at present it is impossible to use the mechanical demining machines available in Tajikistan, as they require funding for the purchase of spare parts and technical maintenance.[144] TNMAC planned to involve donors for the support of the mechanical demining during the Third Extension Request period of 2026–2032.[145]

Tajikistan also plans for the operators to establish sufficient multi-task teams (MTTs), to increase operational efficiency. MTTs are intended to work in hard-to-reach remote mountainous areas, camping in the field to reduce transportation time, and capable of conducting NTS/TS, clearance, EOD, EORE, and completion and handover of the released hazardous area to TNMAC. Subject to the availability of funding, TNMAC planned to establish 10 MTTs.[146] Such teams are planned to be deployed within Tajikistan's prioritisation and district-by-district land release approach.[147]

Tajikistan's annual land release targets for 2025–32 are summarised in Table 5, with 52% forecast to be released through clearance, 27% reduced through TS, and 21% cancelled through NTS. These targets provide for the release of just over 6.13km$^2$ remaining in 109 CHAs, but do not provide for the 0.62km$^2$ that remains in two SHAs in the DRS region and reported in Tajikistan's Article 7 report (see Table 1).[148] As noted earlier, TNMAC concluded in 2024 that AP mine contamination along the border with Uzbekistan is on the Uzbek side, but that a final assessment would be conducted upon completion of the delimitation and demarcation of the border.[149]

Tajikistan provides a detailed explanation of its planned land release methods for the proposed extension period, and expects to undertake a combination of NTS, TS, and clearance.[150] It will make use of NTS/TS with technical intervention, also referred to as Targeted Technical Survey, i.e. physical intervention with appropriate equipment while conducting survey, which has already been used extensively in Tajikistan to improve the efficiency of operations by more precisely identifying the extend of hazardous areas.[151]

136 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 108, and 112–113).

137 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 28 and 134–136.

138 Though Tajikistan states "remaining hazardous areas", the figure given of 6.13km$^2$ accounts for only land contained in CHAs, and excludes the 0.62km$^2$ contained in SHAs.

139 "Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032", Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11

140 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 108, and 112–113).

141 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 28 and 129–131 (see Option 1 and Option 3 work plans).

142 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

143 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 89 and 114.

144 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11 and 27.

145 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27.

146 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 90–92, and 120–121.

147 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 52, 69, 91, 112, 121, and 149.

148 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

149 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July, 2025; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10, 21, 25, 26, 31, 79, 97, 112, and 150.

150 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 53–58.

151 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 55–68.

**Table 5: Annual land release targets for 2025–32**[152]

| Year | CHAs to be released | Manual clearance (m²) | Reduction (m²) | Cancellation (m²) | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 20 | 368,171 | 208,155 | 73,729 | 650,055 |
| 2026 | 7 | 137,800 | 105,000 | 576,500 | 819,300 |
| 2027 | 13 | 382,855 | 255,000 | 126,038 | 763,893 |
| 2028 | 17 | 391,498 | 201,500 | 98,907 | 691,905 |
| 2029 | 19 | 516,000 | 242,900 | 106,500 | 865,400 |
| 2030 | 17 | 433,500 | 238,500 | 151,755 | 823,755 |
| 2031 | 6 | 480,000 | 206,500 | 77,900 | 764,400 |
| 2032 | 10 | 452,000 | 205,000 | 97,000 | 754,000 |
| 2032 | 10 | 452,000 | 205,000 | 97,000 | 754,000 |
| **Totals** | **109** | **3,161,824** | **1,662,555** | **1,308,329** | **6,132,708** |

Aside from a lack of required demining capacity to fully implement planned land release, ongoing security challenges along the border with Afghanistan, where access is regulated by the Border Guard Forces of Tajikistan, have intermittently impeded access to some of Tajikistan's most heavily mined districts in recent years and made full implementation of plans here impossible.[153] This said, some improvement in conditions occurred in both 2023 and 2024. In 2024, NPA teams operating in border areas of the Panj district lost only three working days due to security concerns,[154] and no such concerns hindered operations in 2023.[155] FSD states that security concerns did not prove a barrier to its operations along the border with Afghanistan during 2024.[156] TNMAC cautions, however, that insecurity may still affect implementation here in the future.[157]

Land release tasks are prioritised by TNMAC through application of Tajikistan's SOP 1.2 (Planning and Tasking of Mine Action Operations), taking into consideration the following criteria, reiterated in Tajikistan's 2025 Article 5 extension request:[158]

- Government and local authority requests
- The area's status in relation to the district-by-district approach
- Distance of the task site from populated areas
- The need to complete any previously suspended areas
- Altitude of the task site
- The local security situation (permission from the Border Forces)[159]

According to Tajikistan's Article 5 extension request, TNMAC, in conjunction with the Government of Tajikistan and Border Forces, will prioritise land release activities using a district-by-district approach, based on the following criteria:

- Mined areas with high socio-economic and infrastructure impacts (i.e. agriculture lands, pastures, rice plantations, reconstruction and strengthening of river banks etc.).
- Survey tasks: clarify the type and categories of the contamination for those hazard areas contaminated both with landmines and UXOs, adjust the borders and real size of the hazard areas.
- Clearance tasks: districts that have less remaining contamination area will be cleared first.
- Requests for clearance of the hazardous areas from the local population and local authorities, governmental structures, and production and business structures.
- Establishing MTTs, which will increase operational efficiency and reduce time and resources for the clearance of minefields.[160]

Operators report that task dossiers are issued in a timely matter by TNMAC.[161] NPA highlights that seasonal access constraints present a major ongoing challenge to planning and tasking, particularly in remote areas, which are often impacted by harsh weather. NPA has, however, made significant progress to improve logistical coordination and deploy teams as effectively as possible when conditions are optimal.[162]

152 "Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032", Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025; Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 80.

153 Presentation by Tajikistan on Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Geneva, 23 May 2019; and email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022.

154 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

155 Email from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 8 May 2024.

156 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

157 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024.

158 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 69 and 149.

159 Tajikistan Mine Action Programme General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, pp. 6–7; email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 69.

160 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 149.

161 Emails from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024; Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 15 April 2024; and Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024.

162 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Tajikistan's NMAS are reviewed annually, and SOPs are reviewed in accordance with the designated accreditation period, both in consultation with clearance operators.[163] No updates were made to Tajikistan's NMAS in 2024, but updates were made to the protocol documentation for marking and safety procedures. This was done through a technical working group and in consultation with operators.[164] Operators report that Tajikistan's NMAS are appropriately adapted to the local threat and enable effective, efficient, and safe survey and clearance work.[165]

In 2024, NPA focused on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of operations by prioritising targeted technical surveys (TTS) over systematic technical surveys (STS). While STS involves surveying larger, 10x10 metre grid areas, TTS allows for a more focused approach.[166]

A total of 30,719m$^2$ was cleared in 2024, which proved to contain no AP mines: 15,619m$^2$ by NPA that contained small arms ammunition but no AP mines;[167] and 15,100m$^2$ by FSD[168] (see Table 13).

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

All FSD and NPA teams deployed in Tajikistan are MTTs, capable of survey and clearance (see Table 6).[169] NPA continues to cooperate with Tajikistan's Border Guard Forces, with ten officers seconded into NPA's teams in 2024. This collaboration serves to build capacity, with secondees typically trained in both demining and BAC.[170] NPA reduced its capacity from five to four MTTs in 2024 due to an overall drop in funding, and reduced it further to three teams at the start of 2025, due to the withdrawal of US funding, which was formally terminated in February.[171] NPA also experienced a two-month delay in the start of 2025 demining operations, starting in June instead of April, due to this reduced funding and capacity.[172]

FSD expanded from one to four teams in 2024[173] but had to stand down one team in early 2025 when PM/WRA funding for this team was terminated.[174] The MoD HDC was able to add 26 deminers in 2024,[175] having also added one team in 2023.[176] Since 2020 MoD HDC's demining teams have drawn personnel from several bodies, including the MoD, CoEs, National Guard, and Border Troops.[177]

**Table 6: Operational survey and clearance capacities deployed in Tajikistan 2024**[178]

| Operator | No. of teams | Total deminers | Mechanical assets/machines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FSD | 3 MTTs | 23 | 0 | EOD quick response team in place within MTTs. |
| UST[179] | 4 NTS/TS teams | 18 | 0 | |
| NPA | 4 MTTs | 36 | 0 | |
| MoD HDC | 8 manual clearance teams | 89 | 0 | A Mini MineWolf is available but was not used for survey or clearance. |
| **Totals** | **19** | **166** | **0** | |

163 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022; and Committee on the Implementation of Article 5, Preliminary Observations on Tajikistan, Intersessional meetings, 20–22 June 2022.

164 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

165 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 29 March 2023; and Dr Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 24 March 2023.

166 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

167 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview on 3 April 2025.

168 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

169 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

170 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 23 May 2023; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

171 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 26 June 2025.

172 Online interview with Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 3 April 2025.

173 "Activity Report 2024", FSD, p. 18.

174 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 26 September 2025.

175 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

176 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024.

177 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 43.

178 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 40.

179 Based on data contained in Tajikistan's 2025 Article 5 extension request, pp. 40 and 43.

Tajikistan's 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request set an ambitious target of doubling the number of deminers from 90 to 180[180] but it has made only halting progress towards this, with numbers increasing early in the extension period, but then fluctuating. Personnel across the combined survey and clearance teams of all operators had increased to 150 by 2021, then to 169 in 2022[181] but dropped again to 149 in 2023.[182] Current capacity, as reported in Tajikistan's 2025 Article 5 extension request, stood at 151 deminers.[183] All relevant State armed forces (such as MoD, National Guard, Committee of the Emergency Situations and Civil Defence, Border Guard (Border Troops), and other implementing partners FSD, NPA, and UST are ready to increase the number of deminers if funding becomes available.[184]

UST teams report directly to TNMAC, which funds UST's survey and clearance operations.[185] UST was still in the process of obtaining a licence for the use of explosive materials and devices from the relevant authorities as at May 2025,[186] an issue that has been ongoing for several years.[187]

HDC MoD has a Mini MineWolf, which is also available for use also by NPA. However, this was not deployed for clearance in 2024 or in recent years.[188] NPA has pointed out that this machine cannot be used to its full capacity due to a lack of funding.[189] Deployment of mechanical assets is one of the 2026–32 activities Tajikistan is seeking funding for.[190]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 7: Summary of land release outputs in 2024 (national authority data)**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) |
|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 415,853 |
| **Technical Survey** | 643,212 |
| **Non-Technical Survey** | 640,961 |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 2,795 (including 18 destroyed in spot tasks) |

TNMAC and operators reported land release totalling just over 1.7km² in 2024, of which 0.64km² was cancelled through NTS, a little over 0.64km² was reduced through technical survey (TS), and over 0.41km² was cleared. A total of 2,777 AP mines and 120 items of UXO were destroyed during clearance and technical survey.[191] A further 18 AP mines and three anti-vehicle (AV) mines were destroyed during spot tasks in 2024.[192] Tajikistan added 959,200m² of CHAs to the national database in 2024.[193]

## SURVEY IN 2024

A total of 1.28km² was released through survey in 2023, of which 640,961m² was cancelled through NTS and 643,212m² was reduced through TS (see Tables 8 and 9).[194] Overall, the amount released through survey is an increase on the 854,267m²

180 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

181 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 and 24 June 2022.

182 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024; Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 11 April 2024; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May and 6 August 2024; and Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024.

183 2025 Article 5 extension request, pp. 11, 108–109, 111–112, and 119.

184 2025 Article 5 extension request, pp. 113.

185 Emails from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 16 May 2023 and 7 May 2024.

186 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

187 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023; and Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023 and 7 May 2024.

188 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023; Melissa Andersson, NPA, 23 May 2023; Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 29 May 2024; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

189 Interview with Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, Geneva, 21 November 2023.

190 "Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032", Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27.

191 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

192 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

193 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

194 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

released through survey in 2023,[195] partly due to a notable increase in land released through reduction by NPA, compared to 2023, through greater use of targeted technical surveys, which it says proved highly efficient.[196]

Tajikistan added 959,200m² of CHAs to the national database in 2024 (see Table 10),[197] an increase on the 607,807m² of CHAs added in 2023.[198]

**Table 8: Release of mined area through NTS in 2024**[199]

| Region | District | Operator | SHAs cancelled | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GBAO | Darvoz | TBC | 1 | *350,000 |
| | Darvoz | NPA | 1 | 33,000 |
| Khatlon | Farkhor | TBC | 5 | 63,300 |
| | Hamadoni | FSD | 1 | 860 |
| | Jaykhun | TBC | 1 | 120,000 |
| | Sh. Shohin | TBC | 4 | 73,000 |
| | Panj | NPA | 1 | **801 |
| **Totals** | | | **14** | **640,961** |

*Tajikistan's Article 7 report (covering 2024) gives a figure of 383,000m². However, Mine Action Review has used the figure of 350,000m² provided separately to Mine Action Review by TNMAC on 2 July 2025, as this corresponds with the total area cancelled during 2024, as stated both by TNMAC and in the Article 7 report. **This area of 801m² was cancelled during a clearance task and represents an adjustment to the size of the clearance polygon.

**Table 9: Release of mined area through TS in 2024**[200]

| Region | District | Operator | Areas reduced | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Khatlon | Panj | MoD HDC | 3 | 136,861 |
| | Panj | NPA | 4 | 79,586 |
| | Hamadoni | FSD | 2 | 106,802 |
| | Sh. Shohin | MoD HDC | 2 | 31,900 |
| | Sh. Shohin | NPA | 2 | 65,090 |
| GBAO | Darvoz | MoD HDC | 1 | 25,275 |
| | Darvoz | NPA | 1 | 197,698 |
| **Totals** | | | **15** | **643,212** |

**Table 10: AP mined area newly recorded in 2024**[201]

| Region | District | Operator | CHAs recorded | Area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GBAO | Darvoz | NPA | 1 | 298,875 |
| | Darvoz | Not reported | 2 | 616,805 |
| Khatlon | Farkhor | Not reported | 1 | 5,000 |
| | Jaihun | Not reported | 1 | 4,000 |
| | Sh. Shohin | NPA | 1 | 34,520 |
| **Totals** | | | **6** | **959,200** |

195 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April and 3 October 2024; Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 8 May and 18 August 2024; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May and 6 August 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F.

196 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

197 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

198 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May and 6 August 2024; and Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 18 August 2024.

199 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

200 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

201 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

Tajikistan cleared 415,853m² in 2024,[202] a marginal increase on the 413,791m² cleared in 2023.[203] TNMAC and operators reported that clearance resulted in the destruction of 2,777 AP mines and 120 items of UXO. Of this clearance, 238,174m² was undertaken by MoD HDC; 92,919m² by NPA; and 84,760m² by FSD (see Table 11).[204] A further 18 AP mines and three AV mines were destroyed in spot tasks by NPA (see Table 12).[205]

Though overall clearance in Tajikistan remained steady compared to a year earlier, FSD was able to increase clearance in 2024 substantially compared to the 16,570m² it cleared in 2023,[206] due to the nature of the sites allocated and a longer operational window in the demining season.[207]

NPA reported that it cleared two tasks in Khatlon, in the Panj District (Gulobod MF-13 and Gulobod MF-14) with a total area of 15,619m² that were found to contain some small arms ammunition, but no AP mines.[208] FSD cleared one area of 15,100m² in Hamadoni, also in the Khatlon region, that proved to contain no mines, but did contain 20 items of UXO[209] (see Table 13). Along with minefield clearance in 2024, Tajikistan cleared three battle areas covering 577,321m².[210]

**Table 11: AP mine clearance in 2024**[211]

| Region | District | Operator | CHAs cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GBAO | Darvoz | MoD HDC | 1 | 6,040 | 15 | 83 |
| | Darvoz | NPA | 1 | 37,305 | 106 | 0 |
| Khatlon | Hamadoni | FSD | 1 | 15,100 | 0 | 20 |
| | Hamadoni | FSD | 1 | 69,660 | 513 | 3 |
| | Panj | MoD HDC | 1 | 53,188 | 838 | 0 |
| | Panj | MoD HDC | 1 | 3,720 | 135 | 0 |
| | Panj | MoD HDC | 1 | 20,872 | 932 | 0 |
| | Sh. Shohin | MoD HDC | 1 | 4,140 | 2 | 3 |
| | Sh. Shohin | MoD HDC | 1 | 22,760 | 36 | 4 |
| | Sh. Shohin | MoD HDC | 1 | 17,120 | 21 | 2 |
| | Panj | MoD HDC | 1 | 18,120 | 0 | 0 |
| | Panj | MoD HDC | 1 | 5,450 | 0 | 0 |
| | Panj | MoD HDC | 1 | 86,764 | 33 | 0 |
| | Panj | NPA | 1 | 3,689 | 0 | 2 |
| | Panj | NPA | 1 | 1,929 | 0 | 1 |
| | Panj | NPA | 1 | 6,099 | 3 | 0 |
| | Sh. Shohin | NPA | 1 | 10,140 | 0 | 0 |
| | Sh. Shohin | NPA | 1 | 18,678 | 142 | 2 |
| | Panj | NPA | 1 | 15,079 | 1 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | | **19** | **415,853** | **2,777** | **120** |

**Table 12: AP and AV mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks in 2024**[212]

| Operator | Region | District | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NPA | Khatlon | Sh. Shohin | 4 | 0 |
| NPA | GBAO | Darvoz | 14 | 3 |
| **Totals** | | | **18** | **3** |

202 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

203 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 3 October 2024.

204 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

205 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

206 Emails from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 11 April and 16 August 2024.

207 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

208 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview with Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, on 3 April 2025.

209 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

210 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

211 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

212 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

**Table 13: Area cleared in 2024 in which no AP mines were found (operator data)[213]**

| Operator | Region | District | Area cleared (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NPA | Khatlon | Panj | 15,619 | Contained small arms ammunition. |
| FSD | Khatlon | Hamadoni | 15,100 | Contained 20 items of UXO. |
| **Total** | | | **30,719** | |

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR TAJIKISTAN: 1 APRIL 2000

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2010

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10 YEARS): 1 APRIL 2020

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS, 9 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

**THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED: TAJIKISTAN REQUESTED A 7-YEAR EXTENSION, BUT WAS ONLY GRANTED A 1-YEAR EXTENSION TO 31 DECEMBER 2026 DUE TO LATE SUBMISSION OF ITS ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE EXTENSION REQUEST**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the latest extension granted by States Parties in 2019), Tajikistan is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It will not meet this deadline.

Tajikistan stated at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024 that it was preparing its third request to extend its Article 5 deadline to 31 December 2032.[214] Tajikistan then informally presented its request at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025,[215] but did not formally submit it until mid-October (well after the 31 March deadline for submission of extension requests), despite the extension request cover page being dated 31 March 2025.[216]

Tajikistan is to be commended for having a well-coordinated and planned programme with strong national ownership, and for its comprehensive 2025 Article 5 extension request (albeit submitted very date and with some inconsistencies regarding the demining capacity needed to achieve the 2032 deadline requested). However, as it moves towards a new proposed extension period, the challenges that have severely impeded Tajikistan's capacity to fulfil its commitments under its Article 5 deadline of the end of 2025 still remain and are reiterated in its 2025 extension request,[217] in summary: the pressing need to upscale and complete survey/re-survey; discovery of previously unrecorded minefields, in CHAs where there were no minefield records or other information; lack of additional funding, despite the need and capabilities to increase demining capacity/MTTs; challenging access to remote terrain; short demining season due to weather conditions; natural phenomena, such as rock falls and landslides which can cause the migration of mines; and intermittent insecurity along the Tajik-Afghan border. The extent to which Tajikistan can overcome these challenges to meet its new goal of completion by the end of 2032, will need to be reassessed after Tajikistan has implemented at least the initial couple of years of its 2026–32 plan.

**Table 14: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 0.42 |
| 2023 | 0.41 |
| 2022 | 0.58 |
| 2021 | 0.21 |
| 2020 | 0.67 |
| **Total** | **2.29** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan produced a technical manual on the management of residual contamination in 2023, though as at June 2025, TNMAC had not provided any further update on the formalisation of these guidelines. TNMAC is developing the operational capacity of UST and plans that UST will deal with residual risk of mines upon completion of area clearance.[218]

213 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

214 Statement of Tajikistan on Renewing Political Commitment, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024.

215 "Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032", Maj.-Gen. Muhabbat Ibrohimzod, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025.

216 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, cover page.

217 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 96–97, 119.

218 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.

# THAILAND

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2026

Not on track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 17KM²

Medium
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0.31 | 0.55 |
| Technical Survey | 4.77 | 7.82 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0.14 | 0.39 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 17,600 (incl. 56 in spot tasks) | 15,085 (incl. 56 in spot tasks) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

TMAC released more than 5km² of mined area in 2024, mostly through technical survey (TS). The Thai and Cambodia prime ministers met in February 2024 and agreed in principle on expediting border mine clearance but the two nations' defence ministers who met in the Joint Border Committee did not reach agreement on areas for clearance. Escalating border tensions erupted into heavy cross-border fighting in July 2025. In submissions to the president of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Thailand accused Cambodia of having recently placed anti-personnel (AP) mines that Thailand found in Ubon Ratchathani and Si Sa Ket provinces.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Thailand should prioritise mine clearance in its political, diplomatic, and military engagement with Cambodia on resolving conflict on their border.**
- **Thailand and Cambodia should precisely define the border area where demining cannot proceed pending agreed demarcation and expedite clearance of the rest.**
- **The Thai Mine Action Centre (TMAC) should complete its review of national mine action standards and expedite their implementation.**
- **Thailand should develop and disclose plans for the management of residual contamination.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | Areas for demarcation on the disputed border with Cambodia made up 84% of Thailand's remaining mined area at the end of 2024. They include some suspected hazardous areas that still require survey. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | Thailand has consistently demonstrated strong national ownership of mine action, which is largely funded from the budget of the armed forces. TMAC's military personnel conduct survey and clearance, supported by, and in good collaboration with, NGOs on TS and non-technical survey (NTS). |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | TMAC has no policy on gender. Its humanitarian mine action units, which the armed forces classify as combat units, do not employ women, but female staff make up about 30% of its headquarters personnel. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Thailand has had a national standard on environmental management in place since 2010, which is in need of revision and updating. In the meantime, TMAC says it works closely with NPA and its global "Green Field Tool" approach to environmental management. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | TMAC used the Arc geographic information system (GIS) to manage data which allows demining units to submit information online, enabling TMAC to verify data and make corrections. Thailand submits detailed Article 7 reports every year and has regularly updated States Parties to the APMBC on its progress. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | Thailand sets out detailed work plans in Article 5 deadline extension requests. It falls short of implementing them because border tensions prevent progress in tackling the "Areas for Demarcation" that make up most of its remaining contamination. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | TMAC made strides in reducing mined areas through efficient use of NTS, and is now focused on TS and clearance to achieve completion. TMAC is revising its outdated national mine action standards but has been slow to complete the process. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 6 | 7 | Thailand's plan for completing clearance by the end of 2026 stalled over failure to reach agreement with Cambodia on demining disputed border areas. Cross-border conflict in 2025 has torpedoed prospects for early progress and Thailand recognises it will need to request a fourth extension of its Article 5 deadline, which expires at the end of 2026. |
| **Average Score** | **7.2** | **7.4** | **Overall Programme Performance: GOOD** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action (NMAC)
- Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Humanitarian Mine Action Units (HMAU 1–4) and HMAU TMAC
- Thai Civilian Deminer Association (TDA)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (Golden West)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Thailand continues to report AP mines in six provinces bordering Cambodia but reduced its contamination estimate by 22% to 17km$^2$ in 2024 (see Table 1) despite identifying 476,047m$^2$ of previously unrecorded mined area.[1]

Most of the reduction occurred in north-eastern Si Sa Ket province, where the number of hazardous areas (HAs) dropped from 37 to 25 in 2024 and the area affected from 5.7km$^2$ to 4.3km$^2$, as well as in eastern Trat province where estimated contamination dropped 43% from 5.2km$^2$ to 2.2km$^2$. The previously unrecorded HAs identified during the year were also in Si Sa Ket (465,591$^2$) and Trat (10,456m$^2$).[2]

**Table 1: AP mined area by province (at end 2024)[3]**

| Region | Province | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North-east | Ubon Ratchathani | 3 | 587,121 | 0 | 0 | 587,121 |
| | Si Sa Ket | 23 | 2,550,992 | 2 | 1,793,853 | 4,344,845 |
| | Surin | 20 | 2,868,702 | 1 | 1,072,000 | 3,940,702 |
| | Buri Ram | 5 | 267,275 | 0 | 0 | 267,275 |
| East | Sa Kaeo | 1 | 342,452 | 5 | 4,588,121 | 4,930,573 |
| | Trat | 12 | 2,971,046 | 0 | 0 | 2,971,046 |
| **Totals** | | **64** | **9,587,588** | **8** | **7,453,974** | **17,041,562** |

Thailand estimated that 14.3km$^2$ (84%) of its remaining AP mined area as at the end of 2024 was located in undemarcated border areas where political tensions and intermittent conflict with Cambodia have prevented demining.[4] Thailand accused Cambodia in July and August 2025 of emplacing AP mines in the Chong Bok district of Ubol Ratchathani province and in Si Sa Ket province, resulting in four accidents to patrolling soldiers.[5]

## OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Thailand has a relatively small problem of explosive remnants of war (ERW). This is largely being addressed in the course of releasing mined areas.

# NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action is nominally overseen by the National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action (NMAC) created in 2000 under the chairmanship of the prime minister. The engagement of national leadership in the Committee was seen as important in facilitating policy direction and progress on issues affecting national security, notably regarding cooperation with neighbouring countries on clearing border areas.[6] NMAC is tasked with developing policy guidance and mobilising resources from all sectors to support mine action to be able to complete clearance in the allotted timeframe.[7] The committee has not been convened since 2017.[8]

TMAC was established in 1999 under the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters to coordinate, monitor, and conduct mine/ERW survey and clearance, risk education, and victim assistance coordination throughout Thailand.[9] TMAC's roles and responsibilities within the sector are clear and coherent but it has had to contend with limited funding and, as a military organisation, with regular rotation of personnel at all levels.[10] TMAC's current director general, Saksit Sangchanintara, took office in 2024 as the 15th director in TMAC's 26-year existence.

TMAC has faced some challenges with the command structure of the Humanitarian Mine Action Units (HMAUs). With the exception of one of the HMAUs ("HMAU-TMAC"), personnel come from the Division-Level Force of the Royal Thai Army and the Royal Thai Navy, which means they must report both to TMAC and to their respective divisional command.[11] TMAC has worked to inform the HMAUs, high-ranking generals, and the Chief of Defence Forces about the importance of mine action.[12]

1 Email from General Saksit Sangchanintara, Director General, TMAC, 5 August 2025.

2 Ibid.

3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form 4, Table 4-2.

4 Email from General Saksit Sangchanintara, TMAC, 5 August 2025.

5 Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Briefing for the Diplomatic Corps on the Thailand-Cambodia Border Situation", 23 July 2025; "Statement on Protest Against the 3rd Incidence of the Use of Anti-Personnel Mines", 9 August 2025; and "Thailand says another soldier injured by landmine near Cambodia," *Reuters*, 12 August 2025.

6 Interview with Lt.-Gen. Prasopchai Kongburan, Director General, TMAC, in Geneva, 8 June 2017.

7 Five-Year Humanitarian Mine Action Plan, 1 November 2018–31 October 2023, p. 49.

8 Email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich, TMAC, 18 August 2021.

9 2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.

10 Interview with Col. Terdsak Trirattanagool, Assistant Director General, TMAC, Bangkok, 15 May 2017.

11 Email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich, TMAC, 15 August 2019.

12 Interviews with Shushira Chonhenchob, NPA; and Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan, TMAC, in Bangkok, 9 April 2019.

Thailand's mine action programme, including TMAC personnel, equipment, HMAU operations, meetings, workshops, and training, is largely funded by the government through the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters.[13] In 2024, the government allocated THB 260.25 million, (approximately US$7.62 million), a slight increase on the THB 250.6 million (approximately US$ 6.8 million) allocated the previous year.[14]

TMAC has also received training and equipment from the United States (US) Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) under the US Department of Defense's Humanitarian Mine Action Program. Training previously included a course for HMAU team leaders and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 1 and 2 courses delivered in 2023.[15]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

TMAC does not have a policy or guidelines on gender and diversity. TMAC's HMAUs are considered combat units by Thailand's armed forces which do not admit female combatants.[16] Thailand reported that more than 20% of TMAC staff working on policy, planning, and coordination, though, are female.[17] Additionally, TMAC reported two women were deployed in TMAC's HMAU in 2023 when, for the first time, female staff were selected for the demining course and the EOD course in the military's Ratchaburi centre.[18] TMAC headquarters' staff of 52 included 24 women (42%) at the end of 2024, with female staff in 9 (38%) of the 24 managerial staff.[19]

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) follows an organisational gender and diversity policy. Its survey teams are gender balanced and during NTS and community liaison activities they invite participation by all local people, including children.[20] The number of female staff employed by NPA increased by one in 2024, but the number of women in operations dropped from seven in 2023 to three (see Table 2).

**Table 2: Gender composition of NPA Thailand in 2024**[21]

| Total staff | Total women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Total women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Total women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 32 | 11 (34%) | 4 | 3 (75%) | 24 | 3 (13%) |

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Thailand has had a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in place since 2010 which is in need of revision and updating. The standard sets requirements for protecting the environment against the adverse impact of demining, stipulating that clearance operations must leave land in a condition suitable for its intended use and any non-contaminated areas affected by operations are left in a condition similar to their pre-operational state. It does not address the need to include climate action policy in mine action or provide for environmental impact assessments.[22] TMAC said its demining units work closely with NPA's teams when conducting environmental assessments of tasks.[23]

NPA developed a Green Field Tool for managing environmental impacts of mine action globally and planned to roll out a revised version in 2025. In 2024, NPA piloted environmentally responsible planning of clearance operations in Phanom Dong Rak Wildlife Sanctuary and took new measures to manage waste in its head office and field operations and reduce vehicle emissions. NPA also held a seminar on climate awareness for NPA and TMAC staff and co-hosted a regional workshop on tackling the environmental impact of explosive remnants of war.[24]

13 Email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich, TMAC, 27 February 2020.
14 Article 7 Reports (covering 2023 and 2024), Form 4.
15 Email from John Kelsch, Thailand Country Director/Technical Advisor, Golden West, 13 July 2024.
16 Email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich (on behalf of the Director General), TMAC, 1 July 2021.
17 Additional information for Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 11 August 2022, p. 4.
18 Interview with Gen. Nattawut Sabyeroop, Director General, TMAC, in Bangkok, 29 May 2024; and email from TMAC, 21 August 2024.
19 Email from General Saksit Sangchanintara, TMAC, 5 August 2025.
20 Email from Aksel Steen-Nilsen, Country Director, NPA, 19 May 2024.
21 Email from Jan Erik Stoa, Country Director, NPA, 24 July 2025.
22 TMAC, National Mine Action Standards, Chapter 27, 21 December 2010.
23 Email from General Saksit Sangchanintara, TMAC, 5 August 2025.
24 Email from Jan Erik Stoa, NPA, 24 July 2025.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

TMAC's data centre uses ArcGIS Online as part of a support package provided by the Department of Survey of the Royal Thai Armed Forces to collect and disseminate data and to map hazardous areas.[25] HMAUs submit information to TMAC via the online system every 15 days, which allows for verification of progress and rectification of errors.[26]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Thailand is continuously adjusting its work plans in response to tensions with Cambodia over demarcation of their common border which is obstructing clearance of "Areas for Demarcation" (ADs). Under the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2022, Thailand had planned to complete the release of all hazardous areas except in ADs by October 2023 but it has not achieved this objective. As at the end of 2024, Thailand still had 2.74km$^2$ to clear within its demarcated territory and has not set out a work plan for clearing these areas.[27]

Thailand's 2022 extension request also set a three-year timeline for demining ADs by the end of 2026 and in June 2024 it set out a new clearance schedule (see Table 3), but implementation remains stalled by lack of agreement with Cambodia on border clearance. Thailand reported "various positive development(s)" in high-level contacts with Cambodia in the early part of 2024[28] but continuing tensions escalated into cross-border fighting in July 2025.

**Table 3: Thailand Updated Work Plan for mined area release 2023–26 (m²)[29]**

| Province | Nov. 2023 to Oct. 2024 | Nov. 2024 to Oct. 2025 | Nov. 2025 to end 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ubon Ratchathani | 0 | 0 | 587,121 |
| Si Sa Ket | 1,735,077 | 1,512,047 | 2,458,127 |
| Surin | 816,602 | 2,399,792 | 957,832 |
| Buri Ram | 267,275 | 0 | 0 |
| Sa Kaeo | 2,134,646 | 1,203,082 | 2,540,516 |
| Trat | 2,355,274 | 2,244,534 | 573,625 |
| **Totals** | **7,308,874** | **7,359,455** | **7,117,221** |

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

TMAC embarked on a review of Thailand's NMAS in 2020 but has not set a date for completing the process and in 2024 said it did not regard the issue as a priority.[30] TMAC said discussions on the issue in committee had made progress but not reached a conclusion.[31]

TMAC drafted its first NMAS with NPA's support in 2010, formally adopting the 32 chapters in June 2012, the year Thailand initiated a land release process.[32] TMAC made modest revisions to the NMAS in 2015 and 2018 to support Thailand's shift towards using the full toolbox of land release methodologies rather than solely relying on TS and full clearance.[33] The main change in 2018 was the release of a new standard on the "Cancellation of SHAs by Evidence Based Survey", which made it easier to cancel previously inflated, largely uncontaminated SHAs.[34]

In 2020, TMAC, with the assistance of Golden West, began revising both the NMAS and associated standard operating procedures (SOPs) in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). TMAC's director general wanted to replace 32 NMAS chapters with more concise standards in 12 chapters and to transfer operational requirements to national SOPs.[35]

26 Ibid.; and email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich (on behalf of the Director General), TMAC, 27 February 2020.
27 Email from General Saksit Sangchanintara, TMAC, 5 August 2025.
28 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form 4.
29 Presentation of Thailand on updated work plan, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024.
30 Interview with Gen. Nattawut Sabyeroop, TMAC, in Bangkok, 29 May 2024.
31 Email from General Saksit Sangchanintara, TMAC, 5 August 2025.
32 Thai National Mine Action Standards, 1 April 2015.
33 Email from Shushira Chonhenchob, NPA (on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan, TMAC), 8 April 2019.
34 Emails from Aksel Steen-Nilsen, NPA, 28 March 2019; and Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich (on behalf of the Director General), TMAC, 15 August 2019.
35 Emails from John Kelsch, Golden West, 17 August and 15 September 2022 and 13 July 2024.

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

All clearance in Thailand is conducted by the military due to national regulations on who can handle explosives and operate demining equipment. TMAC deploys five HMAUs staffed by personnel from the Royal Thai Army and Royal Thai Navy (see Table 4). TMAC is supported by an international operator, NPA, which carries out survey in cooperation with the HMAUs and has received intermittent support from a national operator, TDA, subject to the availability of donor funding.[36]

**Table 4: TMAC operational capacity in 2024**[37]

| | HMAU 1 | | HMAU 2 | | HMAU 3 | | HMAU 4 | | HMAU TMAC | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Teams | Personnel | Teams | Personnel | Teams | Personnel | Teams | Personnel | Teams | Personnel |
| NTS | 1 | 9 | 2 | 14 | 2 | 13 | 1 | 9 | | 56 |
| TS | | | 2 | 18 | | | | | 7 | |
| Clearance | | | 3 | 24 | 4 | 40 | | | | |
| EOD | | | 1 | 4 | 1 | 5 | | | 1 | 6 |
| MDD | | | 2 | 5 | 3 | 6 | | | 4 | 6 |
| Mechanical | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | 1 | 6 |
| **Totals** | **1** | **9** | **10** | **65** | **10** | **64** | **1** | **9** | **13** | **74** |

NPA supports TMAC with one three-person NTS team and three TS/clearance teams with 16 people. It worked with two mine detection dogs (MDD) and handlers until September 2024 when Thai military authorities barred access to the border by the Cambodian team leader and handlers. NPA has worked with TMAC and the military dog centre in 2025 to train MDD and handlers for TMAC's HMAUs and expected these to become operational in late 2025.[38]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**[39]

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 0.3 | |
| **Technical Survey** | 4.8 | |
| **Non-Technical Survey** | 0.1 | |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 17,600 | (including 56 during spot tasks) |

Thailand released a total of 5.2km² through survey and clearance in 2024, continuing a steady downturn as it gets closer to completing clearance. It had released 8.8km² in 2023 and 10.4km² in 2022. The 2024 total was 29% less than the planned release of 7.3km², a shortfall Thailand attributed to problems accessing disputed border areas.[40]

As the area released declined, the number of mines destroyed has continued a steady rise, underscoring the increasing mine density in remaining tasks concentrated along the border with Cambodia. TMAC destroyed 17,600 AP mines in 2024 compared with 15,032 in 2023 and 11,421 in 2022.[41]

36 Five-Year Mine Action Plan, p. 11; and email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich (on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan), TMAC, 27 February 2020.
37 Email from General Saksit Sangchanintara, TMAC, 5 August 2025.
38 Email from Jan Erik Stoa, NPA, 24 July 2025.
39 Email from General Saksit Sangchanintara, TMAC, 5 August 2025.
40 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form 4.
41 Email from General Saksit Sangchanintara, TMAC, 5 August 2025.
42 Email from General Saksit Sangchanintara, TMAC, 5 August 2025.
43 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form 4. NPA reported reducing 518,637m² in Si Sa Ket. Email from Jan Erik Stoa, NPA, 24 July 2025.

## SURVEY IN 2024

TMAC reported cancelling 143,286m$^2$ through NTS in 2024, little more than one third of the area cancelled the previous year. TMAC said the drop reflected that it had already completed NTS of existing suspected hazardous areas and that its operational focus has instead been on TS and clearance. All areas of land release have slowed, however, and the 4.8km$^2$ Thailand reduced through TS also represented a sharp drop of nearly 40% from the previous year.[42] TMAC data showed it included 0.4km$^2$ reduced by NPA in Si Sa Ket province.[43]

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

TMAC cleared a modest 310,023m$^2$ in 2024, 43% less than the previous year, but some of it densely mined. In Si Sa Ket's Phu Sing district, where TMAC released 687,781m$^2$ through TS and 90,526m$^2$ through clearance, destroying in the process 10,658 mines. In Trat province, TMAC cleared 106,745m$^2$ destroying 3,511 mines. EOD spot tasks, which involved the destruction of 56 AP mines, were in Surin and Sa Kaeo provinces.[44]

TMAC planned greater clearance in 2024 but reported Cambodian forces intervened with requests to halt operations on 13 occasions, including twice in Trat province in January 2024 and the other 11 interventions in Ta Phraya district of Sa Kaeo province, seven of which were in December 2024.[45]

## DEMINER SAFETY

TMAC reported a deminer was slightly injured by a PMN mine detonated during operations in Kantharalak district of Si Sa Ket but gave no further details.[46]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THAILAND: 1 MAY 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (9 YEARS AND 6 MONTHS): 1 NOVEMBER 2018

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 31 OCTOBER 2023

↓

**THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS AND 2 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2026**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the third extension granted by States Parties in 2022), Thailand is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2026. By 2025, halfway through its third extension period, it indicated it would need to submit a fourth request.[47]

Thailand has made consistent progress reducing the extent of AP mined area but has fallen behind the ambitious land release targets of its last extension request. This projected completing clearance of all mined areas that were clearly within its own territory before the start of 2024,[48] but Thailand still had 7.5km$^2$ of these hazardous areas at the end of 2023 and 2.7km$^2$ at the end of 2024.[49]

The main obstacle to fulfilment of Thailand's Article 5 obligations is its inability to move forward with clearance of areas for demarcation on the border with Cambodia. TMAC and the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) conducted a pilot project on the border in March–April 2020 which released 9,500m$^2$. In October 2022, TMAC provided details, including polygon maps, of 10 sites, proposed for joint action. TMAC said five of the sites were on its territory and five in un-demarcated parts of the border.[50] TMAC and CMAC had previously visited the sites.[51] No further operations have followed.

44 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form 4.
45 Email from General Saksit Sangchanintara, TMAC, 5 August 2025.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
49 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form 4; and email from General Saksit Sangchanintara, TMAC, 5 August 2025.
50 Interview with Gen. Nattawut Sabyeroop, TMAC, in Bangkok, 29 May 2024.
51 Interview with international observer, 1 May 2024.

The prime ministers of Thailand and Cambodia meeting in Bangkok in February 2024 reportedly agreed to expedite border mine clearance.[52] Discussions between TMAC and CMAC appeared to be moving forward towards agreement on starting clearance in border areas in the course of the year.[53] Yet, despite these positive indicators, TMAC said Cambodian border forces intervened to halt its operations on 13 occasions in 2024. A meeting of the General Border Committee (GBC) attended by the Thai and Cambodian defence ministers in May 2024 reportedly agreed that CMAC and TMAC should establish a framework for border clearance.[54] Two subsequent meetings of the GBC on 1 May and 7 August 2025 did not discuss mine action.

Relations deteriorated sharply in 2025 halting mine action on both sides of the border and ending any prospect of early progress: border clashes in May 2025 resulted in the death of a Cambodian soldier; Thailand reported 12 soldiers injured by AP mine detonations in four incidents in July and August 2025[55]; Thailand said the mine detonations involved Russian PMN2 mines recently emplaced by Cambodia, an accusation rejected by Cambodia. On 24–27 July 2025, there were heavy cross-border exchanges of artillery fire and Thai air strikes on Cambodia, which included use of cluster munitions. Thailand lodged a protest with the APMBC presidency and called for investigation into its allegations that Cambodia had used AP mines.[56]

**Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (m²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 310,023 |
| 2023 | 548,082 |
| 2022 | 330,866 |
| 2021 | 525,847 |
| 2020 | 917,924 |
| **Total** | **2,632,742** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

TMAC has worked with the GICHD and Golden West over the past two years developing a plan for residual contamination management (RCM). The GICHD submitted the draft of a working paper in June 2025 for feedback from TMAC with a view to finalising it in 2025. The paper set out the roles and responsibilities of TMAC, the HMAUs, police, health departments, local authorities and community leaders, including channels for reporting and responding to explosive ordnance and arrangements for information management. The plan required government endorsement before coming into operation.[57]

TMAC previously noted its mandate covers only formal SHAs and CHAs. It said disposal of mines and other explosive ordnance found after completion of Thailand's Article 5 obligations is the responsibility of police or, in areas under military jurisdiction, of army engineers.[58] The RCM working paper drew on long-running consultations and the experience of a pilot programme conducted in Thailand's central province of Petchabun since 2023. TMAC had visited the GICHD in 2023 to consider the experience of Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, and Canada in the management of residual contamination. The GICHD convened two workshops in Thailand in April and September 2024 and a third in March 2025 involving TMAC and its HMAUs, the police, other relevant government agencies, and community leaders.[59]

52 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form 4.

53 Interview with Heng Rattana, Director General, CMAC, in Phnom Penh, 27 May 2024.

54 Interviews with CMAC, in Phnom Penh, 27 May 2024; and General Nattawut Sabyeroop, TMAC, in Bangkok, 29 May 2024.

55 Thailand reported mine incidents on 16 July (three soldiers injured), 23 July (five injured), 9 August (three injured), and 12 August (one injured).

56 Thai government Public Relations Department, "Thailand's Responses under the Ottawa Convention to the Landmine Incidents Involving Thai Military Personnel", Press release, Bangkok, 10 August 2025; and "Thailand says another soldier injured by landmine near Cambodia," *Reuters*, 12 August 2025.

57 Interview with Abdullah Alkhasawneh, Advisor, Operations Management, GICHD, 27 August 2025.

58 Email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich (on behalf of the Director General), TMAC, 27 February 2020.

59 Interview with Abdullah Alkhasawneh, GICHD, 27 August 2025.

# TÜRKIYE

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025

Not on track to meet deadline
Five-year extension to 31 December 2030 requested

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 220KM²

Massive
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0.68 | 0.92 |
| Technical Survey | 0.04 | 0.35 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 5.03 | 4.69 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 179 | 33,443 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

**Turkish Armed Forces including:**

- Land Forces Military Demining Units (ÖMAT)
- Gendarmerie Forces Military Demining Units (JÖMAT)
- Military Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED)/ Mine teams

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The main focus of Türkiye's 2021 interim Article 5 deadline extension request was to allow completion of non-technical survey (NTS), with the resulting estimate of contamination to form the basis for another request to extend Türkiye's deadline and setting out plans to complete clearance. Türkiye completed the NTS project as planned in 2023 and, in March 2025, submitted its third extension request, with additional information also provided in July. In 2024, Türkiye continued to seek donor funding for implementation of Phase IV of its major Eastern Borders Mine Clearance Project (EBMCP), but with none secured as at August 2025. In July 2025 Türkiye stated that the outlook for land release activities in Mardin province, along the border with Syria—severely impeded due to insecurity—has improved. This is the result of the decision by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) to lay down its arms and disband in May 2025, following a call from its leader to do so in February. The amount of land released through survey and clearance remained steady in 2024, compared to 2023. However, the number of anti-personnel (AP) mines destroyed decreased dramatically – from 33,443 in 2023 to 179 in 2024. Türkiye claims this decrease was due to it deploying only military (and not contracted civilian) capacity during 2024, as well as "material deterioration" of mines, originally laid in the 1950s, over time. These explanations alone do not appear to fully account for the difference in the number of AP mines discovered.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Alongside extensive NTS and expectations of substantial cancellation of hazardous areas, Türkiye should increase capacity and accelerate clearance, which remains low.**
- **Türkiye should provide further details of its plans to address contamination in non-border areas.**

- **Türkiye's obligations under the APMBC require it to implement and report on mine clearance in territory it controls in northern Cyprus. Türkiye likely also has an obligation under Article 5 of the APMBC to clear AP mines in Syria, since mined areas are thought to remain under its control in the north of the country. This is because Article 5 of the Convention obligates every State Party to survey and clear all areas under its jurisdiction "or control".The DMA should accelerate action to upgrade and update its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and the resources supporting information management.**
- **Türkiye should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for the programme.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | Türkiye now has a detailed understanding of the extent of its mine contamination, following completion of an extensive NTS project in 2023. But survey of some mined areas remains to be conducted. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Türkiye's institutional framework for mine action is under the control of the military. Since 2018, there been a significant and steady expansion of operational capacity. The Government of Türkiye consistently funds survey and clearance by its armed forces. In 2024, Türkiye continued to seek donor funding towards Phase IV of its major Eastern Borders Mine Clearance Project (EBMCP). |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Türkiye provided some information on gender and diversity in its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request. Türkiye claims to consider gender in all aspects of mine action. Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC) staff receive gender awareness training. Türkiye's first civilian demining dog handlers, trained during the EBMCP, were female. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Türkiye has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management, which it updated in line with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) in August 2025, and which establishes its measures to minimise environmental harm during survey and clearance. As this development took place in 2025, not 2024, the relevant change in scoring will be reflected in next year's report. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 7 | TURMAC operates an older version of an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. Türkiye submits detailed and timely Article 7 reports and met its requirement to submit an updated, detailed work plan by 30 April 2023. Türkiye submitted a detailed Article 5 deadline extension request in March 2025, and provided additional information in July. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | In its 2025 extension request, Türkiye provided a detailed work plan for survey and clearance for its proposed extension period of 2026–30. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 7 | Following updates in 2022, Türkiye published four new NMAS chapters in 2024, three of which covered animal detection systems. Türkiye has pledged to continue to update the NMAS regularly. Expansion of operational capacity in recent years has included adoption of and growth in mine detection dog capacity, and an increase in the number of Turkish-developed Mechanical Mine Clearing Equipment (MEMATT) units. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 4 | 5 | Türkiye's slow pace of land release saw a slight decrease in 2023 and again in 2024. Most of the release in Türkiye in 2024 was through cancellation, as it had been for the three previous years. The meagre clearance in 2024 was slightly down on 2023. Türkiye has requested a further five-year extension to 31 December 2030, during which it plans to complete clearance. However, this possibility remains a long way off unless clearance can be accelerated dramatically. |
| **Average Score** | **6.1** | **6.1** | **Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE** |

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Ministry of National Defence (MoND)
- Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Turkish Armed Forces including: Land Forces Military Demining Units (ÖMAT), Gendarmerie Forces Military Demining Units (JÖMAT) and Military Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED)/Mine teams.

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None in 2024–25*

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

*TDI Altay (a joint venture between The Development Initiative and national operator, Altay Software Defence and Industrial Inc.) concluded operations in 2023.

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Türkiye reported 3,656 mined areas on its territory at the end of 2024: 2,000 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 1,656 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). Together, they covered almost 220km$^2$ (see Table 1).[1] This is a 5km$^2$ decrease on the total a year earlier when contamination was in 1,980 CHAs and 1,679 SHAs.[2]

As requested by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation in June 2022,[3] Türkiye provided detailed information on the remaining challenges, disaggregated by SHA and CHA and their relative sizes, as well as by type of contamination in its Article 7 Report covering 2023.[4] This followed completion of Türkiye's major NTS project in November 2023 (as planned), which Türkiye declares has resulted in identification of the "precise perimeter of all mined areas in Türkiye."[5]

More than 40% of Türkiye's mined area is along its 911km-long border with Syria where land release accounted for a little over 87% of land released in 2024, as well as 80% of the small area added following NTS in 2024. Türkiye also has contamination along its borders with Iraq (accounting for 22% of contaminated area), and Iran (16% of contaminated areas), as well as in unspecified non-border areas (19% of contaminated area).[6]

Türkiye added almost 276,998m$^2$ of contaminated area to its database in 2024 (see Table 9),[7] all of which was recorded in SHAs,[8] though the number of SHAs was not specified. New area added in 2024 is substantially lower than the almost 98km$^2$ of contaminated area to the database in 2023,[9] concentrated along the border with Iraq, and again, in an unspecified number of hazardous areas and not disaggregated by SHAs and CHAs.[10] The much higher cancellation in 2023, compared to 2024, reflects completion of Türkiye's major NTS project in 2023, noted previously.[11]

**Table 1: Mined area by region (at end 2024)**[12]

| Region | CHAs | Area (m²) | A/P mines* | SHAs | Area (m²) | A/P mines* | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Syrian border | 1,102 | 58,003,013 | 354,217 | 332 | 38,280,663 | 49,133 | 96,283,676 |
| Iraqi border | 422 | 20,227,566 | 63,682 | 401 | 27,170,163 | 12,448 | 47,397,729 |
| Iranian border | 222 | 7,516,537 | 32,048 | 340 | 27,080,552 | 12,073 | 34,597,089 |
| Non-border areas | 254 | 7,442,501 | 25,640 | 583 | 34,182,465 | 20,202 | 41,624,966 |
| **Totals** | **2,000** | **93,189,617** | **475,587** | **1,656** | **126,713,843** | **93,856** | **219,903,460** |

*In its Article 7 report for 2023, Türkiye also reports the presence of 129,287 anti-vehicle (AV) mines in CHAs along the Syrian border and 32,187 AV mines in SHAs along the Syrian border and 20 AV mines in CHAs along the Iraqi border.

1 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.
2 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the United Nations (UN) Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
3 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations on the implementation of Article 5 by Türkiye", Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Intersessional Meetings, 19–21 June 2023.
4 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
5 Statement of Türkiye on Clearance, Twenty-First Meeting of the States Parties to the APMBC (21MSP), 20–24 November 2023, Geneva, p. 2.
6 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.
7 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
8 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.
9 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024.
10 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
11 Türkiye's Article 7 report covering 2023 notes that some of the progress in identifying mined areas through NTS in 2022 was only reported in Türkiye's Article 7 report for 2023. This is because the QM process for all mined areas had not been completed and not all data had been uploaded to the IMSMA database at the time of reporting. Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
12 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.

In its 2025 extension request, Türkiye explains in detail how it came to identify a large amount of suspected contamination as a result of its NTS project. This includes the following – reclassification of several CHAs and SHAs; identification of new SHAs in areas previously inaccessible due to security concerns; and identification of new SHAs through access to additional indirect evidence and "non-standard" records.[13] Türkiye's work plan for its proposed extension period includes plans for NTS in 2026–29 of 211 mined areas still to be surveyed in the provinces of Mardin (bordering Syria) and Bingöl (a non-border province).[14]

Türkiye reports that mines were first laid along the Syrian border in the 1950s to prevent smuggling and later in the south-east for security.[15] According to Türkiye's 2021 Extension Request, AP mines were laid along the borders "and certain areas outside borders from 1955 until 1998", in order to reinforce security of the borders during the Cold War. After the 1990s, AP mines were emplaced to "reinforce military bases in the fight against separatist terror organization".[16] This refers to the 1984–99 armed conflict with the PKK in the south-east of the country.[17] This occurred mostly in the provinces of Ardahan, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Şırnak, Siirt, and Tunceli.[18] According to Türkiye, these mines, which were marked and fenced, have been progressively cleared since 1998.[19] The mines on Türkiye's other borders were mostly laid in 1955–59 and on some sections of the border with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq in 1992–95.[20] Türkiye says its western borders with Bulgaria and Greece as well as the border with Georgia are all mine-free.[21] Clearance along the border with Armenia was completed in 2022.[22]

In its Article 5 deadline extension request of 2021, Türkiye reported that, prior to the establishment of the Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC) in 2015, demining conducted solely by military units only cleared areas with a 90–95% reliability rate and without quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC).[23] For this reason, the minefields in question are included in the TURMAC database as hazardous areas. In addition, NTS of these minefields was conducted within the NTS Project as a part of EBMCP.[24]

In its Article 7 report for 2023, Türkiye cited the presence of improvised AP mines, stating that ten of the 11 mine victims during the year were injured by improvised AP mines.[25] Türkiye explains that no IEDs were used by military units during or after the creation of minefields, but that they are used by non-State armed groups to target military personnel. Such IEDs are not found in any particular area, but are generally found in military operational zones in border areas. When detected, IEDs are neutralised by military C-IED teams.[26] As such, Türkiye states there are "no known areas" containing improvised AP mines.[27]

## NORTHERN CYPRUS

Türkiye's original Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 March 2014. In 2013, States Parties granted Türkiye an eight-year extension until 1 March 2022, for clearance of mines in Türkiye, and in 2021, States Parties granted a further extension of Türkiye's Article 5 deadline until 31 December 2025. Türkiye has not requested additional time for clearance of the areas it controls in northern Cyprus[28] and none of its extension requests, including the one submitted in 2025, made reference to northern Cyprus[29] (see the report on Cyprus for further information). This puts into question Türkiye's compliance with Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).

In May 2024, Türkiye stated that it does not have any plans in place to meet its Article 5 obligations in areas under its control in northern Cyprus, stating that "the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a sovereign country recognized by the Republic of Türkiye and not under Türkiye's control, and that responsibility for mined areas does not sit with Türkiye."[30] This is not an accurate interpretation and application of Türkiye's obligations under Articles 1 and 5 of the APMBC, which has no territorial limitations. Article 5 obligates a State Party to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction "or control". Consonant with international law, Article 5 applies to any mined areas containing AP mines in territory over which a State Party exercises effective control outside its sovereign jurisdiction for a period of several months or more.

13 Türkiye explains that standard records have been created in line with Turkish Air Force Manuals, which comply with relevant North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreements (STANAGs). Non-standard records accessed during NTS included records obtained on-site from the archives of regional state institutions, such as governorates, courts, law enforcement agencies, and military units. Newly obtained records and indirect evidence included: newly obtained historical military mine survey and military clearance records, historical military obstacle plans; information obtained from interviews with civilians; and records of natural disasters (e.g. floods or landslides) that "disrupt the integrity of minefields and cause new possible contamination". 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 12.

14 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 37.

15 Ministry of National Defence (MoND) Mine Action Centre, Strategic Plan 2020–2025, undated but 2020, p. 1.

16 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 3.

17 The PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the European Union, and by a number of other States.

18 Email from the Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC), 24 June 2020.

19 Email from TURMAC, 11 July 2019.

20 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form D; 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. A-1 and A-5.

21 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

22 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

23 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

24 Information provided by TURMAC, 4 September 2024.

25 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form H.

26 Information provided by TURMAC, 4 September 2024.

27 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) website on 30 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3V9tdKQ, p. 1.

28 See the reference to Türkiye's jurisdiction in northern Cyprus under the European Convention on Human Rights in European Court of Human Rights, *Güzelyurtlu and others v. Cyprus and Turkey*, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 29 January 2019, para. 193.

29 2013 and 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Requests.

30 Emails from TURMAC, 17 August 2023; and Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024 and 9 October 2025.

Türkiye reiterated at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025 that the "Turkish Cypriot side has put forward comprehensive proposals in 2014, 2015 and 2018 ... with the sole purpose of clearance of all remaining minefields on the island of Cyprus". Türkiye also reminded States Parties that, on 8 July 2022, President Ersin Tatar "put forward a new proposal for a mine-free island, in line with the understanding outlined in the previous proposals for the clearance of all remaining minefields on the island and pursuant to the calls by the Secretary-General in his reports for cooperation between the two sides". Türkiye declared that "the Greek Cypriot side has ignored all these proposals, despite readiness of the Turkish Cypriot side to discuss the start of demining activities in the whole island provided that these activities will be conducted simultaneously, proportionally and on the principle of reciprocity".[31] Türkiye disputes "the Greek Cypriot side's long-standing claim that it cannot fulfil its obligations stemming from Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention"[32], denying that "the only impediment to clear all the minefields throughout the island is its lack of access to the Turkish Cypriot side".[33]

## NORTHERN SYRIA

Since the change of regime in Syria in December 2024, Türkiye has maintained a strong presence in northern Syria and has "started providing military training and consultancy services, while taking steps to increase Syria's defence capacity", under an MoU between the two countries.[34] On October 7, 2025, the Syrian Defence Minister and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander agreed to a comprehensive ceasefire on all fronts in northern and northeastern Syria. The deal reportedly paves the way for Kurdish-led forces that hold a quarter of Syria to merge with Damascus, along with regional Kurdish governing bodies.[35] Following the ceasefire, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan urged Syrian Kurds to integrate with the Syrian government.[36]

While the situation continues to be fluid, Türkiye likely still has an obligation under Article 5 of the APMBC to clear AP mines in Syria, since mined areas are thought to remain under its control in the north of the country. Consonant with international law, Article 5 applies to any mined areas containing AP mines in territory over which a State Party exercises effective control outside its sovereign jurisdiction for a period of several months or more. However, Türkiye has stated that Syria is a sovereign country, not under the control of Türkiye, and claimed that as "Türkiye has no obligation to clear AP mines on another country's territory, responsibility for releasing mined areas does not sit with Türkiye."[37]

The precise extent to which Türkiye is implementing its obligations under Article 5 in northern Syria is not clear. In its Article 7 report covering 2022, Türkiye stated that it found/neutralised 121 mines, 1,837 IEDs, and 26,770 other munitions in Syria, Iraq, and Libya,[38] but without specific reference to locations in northern Syria. TURMAC also states that Türkiye conducts counterterrorism operations to ensure the security of its borders and that the Turkish Armed Forces have neutralised "thousands of mines and hand-made explosives" as part of cross-border military operations.[39] However, Türkiye refers only to the location of the "Syrian border" when providing land release data in its Article 7 reports[40], so it is not clear whether it is clearing AP mines on the Syrian side of the border in territory it controls.

## OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

In addition to landmines, Türkiye has limited contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO) on its territory.

31 Statement by Türkiye, Check Against delivery", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17 – 20 June, 2025, p. 1.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., p. 2.

34 "Exclusive: Turkey backing Syria's military and has no immediate withdrawal plans, defence minister says", *Reuters*, 4 June 2025 at: http://bit.ly/433qfvM; "Turkey-Syria defence deal covers training and weapons supply", *Middle East Eye*, 14 August 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4qkELJR; and "Turkey begins training Syrian forces under new security deal', *Middle East Eye*, 9 September 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4gZIY12.

35 "Syrian defence minister and SDF commander agree to ceasefire in north and northeastern Syria", *Reuters*, 7 October 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3J2yukS.

36 "Erdogan demands SDF complete integration with Syrian government", 8 October 2025, Foundation for Defence of Democracies (FDD), at: http://bit.ly/4oadZ4L.

37 Emails from TURMAC, 17 August 2023; and Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024 and 9 October 2025.

38 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

39 Email from TURMAC, 17 August 2023.

40 See, e.g., Article 7 Reports (covering 2024), Form D; and (covering 2023), Form D.

# NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Türkiye adopted Law No. 6586 establishing a national mine action centre under the Ministry of National Defence (MoND) in February 2015.[41] The law gave the centre, now known as the Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC), responsibility for clearing to humanitarian standards mines and UXO.[42] TURMAC's Director reports to the Minister and Deputy Minister of the MoND.[43] TURMAC's activities are regulated by two presidential decrees.[44] TURMAC is responsible for elaborating policies for clearance; planning and steering related activities and monitoring their implementation; and coordinating and cooperating with domestic and foreign institutions.[45] Türkiye noted in its 2025 extension request that TURMAC "is still in the process of strengthening its internal capacity to ensure full functioning."[46]

Türkiye regards clearance of mined areas as an "indispensable part of the modern integrated border management (IBM) of Türkiye" as well as a humanitarian matter. As such, mine action has been included in the strategic planning of other governmental and non-governmental institutions and partners nationally.[47] Türkiye states that meetings are held twice a year with relevant ministries to plan mine action activities. In line with the decisions taken in these meetings and the mine clearance requests of relevant ministries, institutions and other organisations, annual mine clearance plans and the National Mine Action Plan are prepared and updated. In addition, mine clearance in Türkiye is directly aligned with 12th National Development Plan, which attributes importance to improving the technical and physical infrastructure of border security.[48]

In 2024, Türkiye continued to build the capacity of TURMAC and its military demining units. TURMAC personnel received training in humanitarian demining and NTS; personnel from military demining units received training in mine detection dog (MDD) accreditation; and 545 personnel from General Command of Gendarmerie received training in NTS, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), IED disposal, MDD handling, humanitarian demining; and risk education.[49] Further training in these areas and others, including the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), was planned for 2025.[50] Türkiye requested funding from the European Union (EU) to support expansion and capacity building of its military demining units, including training additional MDDs in order to accelerate clearance,[51] but was notified in 2024 that its €1.5m project proposal had not been approved.[52]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Mine action in Türkiye is mostly financed by the State and both TURMAC and the Turkish Armed Forces demining units are financed entirely by the government.[53] Türkiye committed TRY80 million (approx. €1.7 million as at August 2025[54]) to mine action between 2023 and 2025, including TRY5 million for capacity building of military demining units and TRY75 million for demining.[55] In 2024, Türkiye allocated TRY397 million (approx. €8.3 million) from the national budget for capacity development of military demining units and mine action.[56]

Türkiye's 2025 extension request states that, for 2025, the higher sum of TRY490.5 million (approx. €10.3 million) has been allocated to "mine clearance activities" (see Table 2).[57] Türkiye's 2025 extension request contains a detailed budget for implementation during the proposed extension period of 2026–30, including details of resources committed by the State.[58] Türkiye has pledged TRY4.6 billion (€97.1 million) for "mine clearance activities", including the cost of funding TURMAC and 50 military demining units between 2025 and 2030.[59]

41 Article 7 Report (covering 2014), "Workplan for mine clearance activities", Annex 1; and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form A, 2015. Law No. 6586 was then nullified with the legislative decree No. 703 on 9 July 2018, after the introduction of a new Presidential System of Government. Article No. 342 of Presidential Decree No. 1, almost identical to (the nullified) Law No. 6586 entered into force on 10 July 2018. 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 3.

42 Article 7 Report (covering 2014), "Workplan for mine clearance activities", Annex 1; and CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form A, 2015.

43 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

44 Presidential Decree dated 18 April 2019; and Presidential Decree No. 32, amending the Presidential Decree on General Staff and Procedure. MoND, "Turkish Mine Action Center", accessed 7 March 2023 at: https://bit.ly/44hgNDN.

45 Article 7 Report (covering 2014), "Workplan for mine clearance activities", Annex 1; and Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form A, 2015.

46 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 3.

47 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

48 Information provided by TURMAC, 4 September 2024; 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 30; and Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 5.

49 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

50 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

51 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 35.

52 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

53 Email from TURMAC, 21 June 2017.

54 This compares, for example, to a year earlier in August 2024, when TRY80 million was equivalent to the notably higher amount of approximately €2.2 million.

55 Article 5 implementation Work Plan, 30 April 2023, p. 9.

56 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

57 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 28.

58 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 3.

59 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 40.

**Table 2: National resources allocated to mine clearance activities in Türkiye 2024-2025***[60]

| Source of Funds | Allocated for 2024 (TRY)** | Allocated for 2024 (€ million) | Allocated for 2025 (TRY)** | Allocated for 2025 (€ million) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TURMAC and MoND budget | 104,874,158 | 2.2 | 130,465,800 | 2.7 |
| Cost of 50 military demining teams | 292,072,742 | 6.1 | 360,075,800 | 7.6 |
| **Totals** | **396,946,900** | **8.3** | **490,541,600** | **10.3** |

*Excludes information provided on additional funds allocated for risk education. **Turkish Lira conversion to euros based on average exchange rate as at August 2025.

Türkiye continued to mobilise resources and engage donors in 2024, in particular to fund the coming Phase IV of the EBMCP, which aims to clear an area of approximately 4km$^2$ in Van province, which borders Iran. Türkiye stated in November 2023 that the government had allocated €1.7 million to Phase IV of the EBMCP project, as well as requesting an estimated €15 million to be funded by external sources.[61] As at July 2025, Phase IV was yet to be supported by any donor. In its 2025 extension request Türkiye pledges that, "if sufficient funds are still not found, the areas specified in the project will be cleared by national military units and resources".[62]

Türkiye initiated an Individualised Approach event in the margins of the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP) in November 2023.[63] TURMAC also initiated contact with the Delegation of the EU, the Japanese Embassy, and the Kuwaiti Embassy in 2023.[64] Furthermore, Türkiye has submitted a €20 million request to the EU's Post-FRiT[65] fund for clearance of mined areas in the provinces of Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Kilis, along its southern borders.[66]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Türkiye did not address gender and diversity in its 2021–25 strategy or in the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in February 2021, but has provided further information subsequently. In 2023, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted that Türkiye had reported on having established their baseline through "inclusive consultations" and had employed a gender focal point and female deminers."[67] Türkiye also disaggregates mine incident data by age and sex.[68]

Türkiye claims that gender and diversity are taken into consideration in all mine action. It also says that gender-sensitive recruitment procedures help provide equal employment opportunities to women and men from diverse groups.[69] TURMAC says that employment contracts signed under Phase III of the EPBMC ensure that women and men are paid equally for equal work and that TURMAC and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have encouraged employment of women in "various positions, such as trainer and administrative jobs". During Phase III, 14 women were employed by implementing partners, including the UNDP and clearance and NTS contractors.[70] Türkiye's first two female demining dog handlers were also trained and certified during that phase.[71] Within the scope of the EBMCP, Gender Awareness Training was provided to 25 TURMAC

60 Ibid., p. 28.

61 "Türkiye Mine Action Programme: Project for Completion, Wednesday, 22 November 2023", pp. 3–4.

62 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 3.

63 CCW Amended Protocol II Report (covering 2023), Form B.

64 Information received from TURMAC, 4 September 2024.

65 The Post-FRIT fund is the financial mechanism established by the EU in 2021 after the end of the FRIT (Facility for Refugees in Turkey).

66 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 5.

67 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

68 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Forms E and H.

69 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form I; and email from TURMAC, 18 April 2023.

70 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form I; and email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024.

71 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form I; and email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024; and UNDP, "UNDP and EU conclude three-year demining project to improve security along Türkiye's eastern frontier" 12 December 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4emIGQ8.

personnel in 2023.[72] In April 2025, TURMAC's Gender Focal Point participated in a gender workshop at Türkiye's Center of Excellence [for] Defence Against Terrorism and updated participants on TURMAC's work to integrate considerations into planned projects.[73]

Türkiye reported that, as at September 2025, 22% of TURMAC's employees were women, including six female explosive ordnance risk education trainers, working in field units. There was also one female map specialist, a non-commissioned officer, working in the Gendarmerie Special Mine Search and Clearance team.[74] This compares to figures as at the end of 2023, when 22% of TURMAC's personnel were female, including a head of department and two branch chiefs,[75] increasing to 25% by the end of 2024.[76] Female personnel carry out a range of roles including "technical, expert and trainer, in all activities carried out by TURMAC".[77] Mine Action Review specifically requested information from TURMAC in 2023, 2024, and in April 2025 on the total number of male and female staff and the proportions of supervisory or managerial and operational positions occupied by women in TURMAC but this information was not provided. There was also no response to the enquiry as to whether Türkiye's military demining units still did not include any women. Türkiye did report that "in terms of staff and task diversity, efforts are ongoing to increase the number of female personnel in the coming periods.[78] Türkiye also states that, should its Southern Borders Mine Clearance Project proposal, submitted to the European Commission in July 2025, be financed by the EU, vocational training will be provided for women resident locally, and for Syrians under temporary protection.[79]

Türkiye's 2025 extension request provides relatively detailed information on how gender and diversity is integrated into risk education,[80] but Türkiye has yet to provide a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan covering all areas of mine action, including mine survey and clearance. In the extension request, when outlining progress in female employment under Phase III of the EBMCP, Türkiye notes that, although they are encouraged to apply, "women in Türkiye generally do not prefer the profession of mine clearance".[81] If such efforts are not already underway, it would be beneficial to investigate why this is the case and identify barriers to employment. These findings, alongside other relevant wider data, should inform a comprehensive and strategic approach to gender and diversity in all aspects of mine action as Türkiye embarks on its proposed extension period.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Türkiye has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management (MMFS 07.13), which it updated in accordance with the latest International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) in August 2025. Türkiye asserts that the updated standard provides comprehensive provisions to mitigate the negative environmental impact of mine action, for example, the protection of vegetation where feasible, and the rehabilitation of cleared land for productive civilian use.[82] Türkiye's 2025 extension request contains information on the positive impact of mine clearance on the environment—for example, through the removal of polluting explosive compounds contained in mines from soil[83]—but provides only limited information on how Türkiye intends to mitigate environmental harm during survey and clearance in practice. In additional information provided in July 2025, Türkiye did state that Phase-IV of the EBMCP and other clearance activities will "take measures to rehabilitate cleared lands" and that some of the released land will be used for renewable energy.[84] Türkiye highlights that the subsequent publication of MMFS 07.13 will now ensure that Türkiye's mine action activities are implemented in line with internationally recognised principles of environmental management, and that clearance activities under Phase-IV of the EBMCP and other operations will be carried out in full compliance with this standard. Türkiye further highlights that TURMAC will regularly monitor the implementation of MMFS 07.13 and provide updates on environmental protection measures to national and international stakeholders. This includes information on the rehabilitation of cleared lands and the promotion of safe use of released areas for agriculture, livestock, or renewable energy production.[85]

72 Information provided by TURMAC, 4 September 2024.

73 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

74 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

75 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form I; and email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024.

76 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I. However, Türkiye stated in July 2025 that a slightly lower proportion (22%) of TURMAC staff were women. Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, pp. 5–6.

77 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, pp. 5-6.

78 Ibid.

79 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

80 See, for example, "Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) Activities and Efforts Undertaken to Ensure the Effective Exclusion of Civilians from Mined Areas", 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 18-23.

81 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

82 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025. As at 6 October 2025, the updated NMAS had not yet been made available on TURMAC's website.

83 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 30.

84 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 4.

85 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

TURMAC installed IMSMA with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in 2017.[86] Use of digital GPS allows the daily progress of each deminer to be catalogued.[87] Field reports are collected on a daily basis and transferred to the IMSMA system.[88] In April 2025, as it had a year earlier, TURMAC reported that discussions were underway with the GICHD regarding the possible use of IMSMA Core.[89] Türkiye provides a detailed account of its information management system and practices in its 2025 extension request.[90] It also notes that, following eventual completion of mine clearance, both printed and digital data "will continue to be stored in accordance with national legislation".[91] Currently, survey and clearance data reported by Türkiye are accurate and disaggregated by type of contamination—i.e. AP mines from anti-vehicle (AV) mines and UXO—as well as by method of land release.

Türkiye has submitted Article 7 transparency reports annually on time, which provide a detailed review of plans and activities. As required under the granting of its latest extension request in 2021, Türkiye submitted an updated work plan by 30 April 2023.[92] In March 2025, Türkiye submitted a timely and thorough extension request, including a detailed work plan, to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025. It also submitted additional information on the request, as the Committee on Article 5 Implementation had asked, in July 2025.[93]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

In 2020, TURMAC issued a strategic mine action plan through to the end of 2025 setting out a vision of Türkiye completing mine clearance by 2025. The plan identified five goals: to clear all emplaced AP mines in the country; to strengthen national capacity and ensure its sustainability; to reduce the number of mines held in depots for training; to provide risk education[94] and support mine victims; and to co-operate with national and international organisations on mine action.[95]

In February 2021, however, Türkiye requested an interim extension of its Article 5 deadline for three years and nine months until the end of 2025 and made it clear that it no longer expected to complete clearance by this time. The request foresaw three main projects in 2021–23: demining; NTS covering 3,834 mined areas with a view to producing baseline data from which to prepare plans for completion; and a clearance project to address 27 mined areas measuring approximately 1km$^2$ in Mardin province.[96] The NTS project to produce a comprehensive baseline of contamination was completed.[97] The Mardin Project could not proceed (see the subsection below, "The Mardin project", for further information).

By 30 April 2023, Türkiye was expected to produce an updated detailed work plan for the remaining period covered by its extension,[98] which it duly submitted, including annual targets for land release by area, size, and province.[99] From 2023 to the end of 2025, Türkiye was aiming to deploy its military demining units to release approximately 17.5km$^2$ of hazardous area.[100] In 2025, Türkiye plans for its 50 military demining teams to release address 1.2km$^2$ in the provinces of Hakkari, Hatay, Iğdır, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, Tunceli, and Van.[101] It also envisages that NTS will be conducted by TURMAC Survey Branch personnel over approximately 5km$^2$.[102]

In its 2025 extension request, Türkiye sets out four key areas of work during the proposed extension period of 2026–30, namely: Phase IV of the EPBMP, clearance of 4km$^2$ by military demining units across various provinces including border and non-border areas,[103] technical survey (TS) and NTS across 3km$^2$ in various provinces and "non-technical research activities" across 25km$^2$ in Bingöl and Mardin provinces.[104] Türkiye also sets out detailed plans for survey and clearance during 2026–30, including its "Military Demining Unit's Mine

86 Statements of Türkiye, Standing Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 22 May 2019; and on Clearance, 17MSP, Geneva, 29 November 2018; email from TURMAC, 11 July 2019; and Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form A.

87 "Türkiye Mine Action Programme: Project for Completion, Wednesday, 22 November 2023", Report, p. 3.

88 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

89 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D; and email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024.

90 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 24–26.

91 Ibid., p. 26.

92 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations on the Implementation of Article 5 by Türkiye", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

93 Both the 2025 extension request submitted in March 2025, and additional information provided in July 2025 are available on the ISU website, at: https://bit.ly/4mTiM9Z.

94 As part of its strategic mine action plan for 2020–25, Türkiye has been implementing an extensive "National Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Plan" (NEOREP). Information provided by TURMAC, 4 September 2024.

95 MoND Mine Action Centre, Strategic Plan 2020–2025, undated but 2020, pp. 7–8 and 10.

96 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Analysis of Türkiye's Article 5 deadline extension request, 19MSP, The Hague, 15–19 November 2021, p. 4.

97 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11–12.

98 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 20–22 June 2022.

99 Article 5 Implementation Work Plan, 30 April 2023, pp. 12–14.

100 The statement of Türkiye on clearance at the 21MSP, 20–24 November 2023, Geneva, p. 2, states a timeframe of 2024–25 for this, However, TURMAC provided information to Mine Action Review on 4 September 2024, correcting this to 2023–2025.

101 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

102 Ibid.

103 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

104 Ibid.

Clearance Tasks Plan"[105] for clearance of 49 areas covering 3.84km$^2$ in total (see Table 3). In requesting an extension for five years to the end of December 2030, Türkiye stated that: "During this period, Türkiye plans to continue mine clearance activities unabated and to complete its work in this area."[106] However, it is not clear in the extension request how this will be achieved, with specific plans for clearance shown only for the 3.84km$^2$ previously mentioned.

In response to a request from Mine Action Review for clarification on how Türkiye plans to complete clearance within the proposed extension period, Türkiye responded in early October 2025 and explained that: TURMAC is continuing its efforts to increase capacity, including expansion of military demining capacity during 2026–27. In addition, "studies for the use of civilian capacity" were ongoing, the results of which Türkiye will include in clearance plans. With increased capacity, Türkiye expects clearance to accelerate, "and the goal of a mine-free Türkiye is anticipated to be reached in a shorter period".[107]

The plan, set out in Türkiye's extension request, includes the priority criterion assigned to each task; the district; province; and location in relation to Türkiye's international borders (or non-border areas); the size of the areas to cleared; (m$^2$); the objective of the operation (for example, systematic clearance, or clearance to support agriculture, or tourism); and the estimated date of completion.[108] Each task represents a designated CHA.[109] See Table 3 for a summary of clearance targets for the proposed extension period.

**Table 3: Annual mine clearance plan by location for 2026–30**[110]

| Year | Syria border (m²) | Iraq border (m²) | Iran border (m²) | Non-border areas (m²) | Totals (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | 305,000 | 150,000 | 0 | 250,960 | 705,960 |
| 2027 | 293,000 | 194,000 | 0 | 192,000 | 679,000 |
| 2028 | 275,000 | 200,000 | 0 | 308,430 | 783,430 |
| 2029 | 285,000 | 315,000 | 0 | 238,000 | 838,000 |
| 2030 | 265,000 | 295,000 | 0 | 277,000 | 837,000 |
| **Totals** | **1,423,000** | **1,154,000** | **0** | **1,266,390** | **3,843,390** |

Türkiye also provides a "Technical Survey and Non-Technical Survey Plan" in the 2025 extension request, specifying the same details as the clearance plan outlines previously.[111] See Table 4 for a summary of technical survey targets and Table 5 for a summary of the NTS targets for the proposed extension period.

**Table 4: Annual technical survey plan by location (2026–30)**[112]

| Year | Syria border (m²) | Iraq border (m²) | Iran Border (m²) | Non-border areas (m²) | Totals (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | 160,000 | 240,000 | 225,000 | 33,000 | 658,000 |
| 2027 | 190,000 | 275,000 | 220,000 | 30,000 | 715,000 |
| 2028 | 170,000 | 360,000 | 55,000 | 25,000 | 610,000 |
| 2029 | 150,000 | 303,000 | 60,000 | 30,000 | 543,000 |
| 2030 | 291,000 | 162,000 | 65,000 | 35,000 | 553,000 |
| **Totals** | **961,000** | **1,340,000** | **625,000** | **153,000** | **3,079,000** |

Also within the 2026–30 work plan is NTS of 211 mined areas in Mardin province bordering Syria, and Bingöl, a non-border province, which was not completed under the NTS project that ended in 2023. The annual NTS plan for these "suspicious areas and areas to be requested [for survey]" is shown in Table 5.[113] Türkiye explains that, when any suspected mine or UXO contamination is reported to TURMAC by any authority, NTS activity not included in the annual plan is carried out in response.[114]

105 Ibid, pp. 32–33.
106 Ibid, p. 4.
107 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.
108 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 32–33.
109 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.
110 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 34.
111 Ibid., pp. 36–37.
112 Ibid., p. 37.
113 Ibid.
114 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

**Table 5: Non-technical survey plan for Mardin and Bingöl provinces (2026–30)**[115]

| Province | No. of areas | Area to be surveyed (m²) | Target completion date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mardin | 49 | 8,572,147 | December 2026 |
| Mardin | 44 | 7,697,438 | December 2027 |
| Mardin | *50 | 8,747,090 | December 2028 |
| Bingöl | *68 | 174,300 | December 2029 |
| "NTS for suspicious areas and areas to be requested" | N/R | N/R | December 2030 |
| **Totals** | **211** | **25,190,975** | |

*Non-border areas. N/R = Not reported

Based on Türkiye's 2025 extension request, including its planned timeline for NTS and TS to the end of 2030 makes it is still difficult to see how Türkiye intends to meet its obligations by the requested deadline of 31 December 2030. Indeed, Türkiye explained that it is continuing to seek donor support to help facilitate the establishment of four new "search and clearance military companies" (eight teams) by 2027. Türkiye says that "if a donor is found in this period, and following the completion of the establishment of new elements, new areas identified with TS and NTS are planned to be cleared.[116] As noted earlier, TURMAC is continuing efforts to increase military demining capacity and exploring further use of civilian capacity, and expects clearance operations to accelerate such that "the goal of a mine-free Türkiye is anticipated to be reached in a shorter period".[117] This notwithstanding, it seems likely that Türkiye will need to submit a further request to extend its deadline beyond 2030. Indeed, in information provided to Mine Action Review in October 2025, Türkiye states that it "is taking steps to increase mine clearance efforts annually. The aim is to finalize the demining activity within the specified time frame. However, if the target is not met, a further extension will be requested".[118] Without a significant change in circumstances, this further request seems likely. Apart from the reference to the need for donor support, planned land release falls a long way short of Türkiye's estimate of 220km² of mined area as at the end of 2024.[119] In the work plan Türkiye specifies that, between 2026 and 2030, only 3.84km² will be cleared.[120] The planned survey may even find new hazardous areas.[121] Furthermore, the work plan includes only limited TS and no clearance in Van province,[122] situated along Türkiye's eastern border.

Even Türkiye's limited ambition for the extension period includes assumptions that may not turn out to be reliable. These include timely allocation of national resources and international funds, and a "stable security situation" along Türkiye's borders. Potential risk factors are continued political instability and insecurity on the Syrian and Iraqi borders, terrorist threats to demining activities and personnel, delays in mine clearance by contractors, adverse weather at high altitude, the possibility of natural disasters, and challenges such as dense vegetation and volcanic rocks.[123]

In 2025, Türkiye provided updated details of its prioritisation of mine clearance activities, adding a fifth level to the first four previously provided.[124] The (now five) levels are as follows:

1. Lands with minefields along the southern and eastern borders, which prevent the establishment of new border surveillance technology and infrastructure (e.g. watchtowers, patrol roads).
2. Interior lands with minefields, posing a danger to inhabitants.
3. Lands within the mined areas to be cleared that are included in projects by other ministries for public benefit (e.g. construction of irrigation channels and other infrastructure).
4. Disputed lands along the borders and interior that are owned privately.
5. Lands within mined areas to be cleared for the purpose of generating socio-economic benefit (e.g., agriculture, livestock, and mining).[125]

Türkiye ensures co-ordination and co-operation with other ministries and institutions, in particular the Ministry of Internal Affairs, during the prioritisation, planning, and implementation of demining. It claims to have "the capacity to address all prioritization levels simultaneously in order to meet the requirements of the government and ensure the safety of its citizens". Finally, Türkiye notes that, in the event that a minefield cannot be completed in a given year,

115 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 37.

116 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 2.

117 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

118 Ibid.

119 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

120 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 34.

121 Ibid., p. 37.

122 TS is planned in only two unspecified locations in Van province, each covering 160,000m². 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 35.

123 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 40–41.

124 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D; email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 30.

125 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 30.

due to factors such as climate or changes in an assigned unit's capacity, the minefield will be assigned the same level of priority in the work plan for the subsequent year(s).[126] In response to Türkiye's extension request, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has raised a concern that casualties from mines continue to occur in provinces where no land release activities are planned. Though Türkiye provides a detailed risk education work plan, as the ICBL highlights, more information on how casualty data informs prioritisation of land release plans would be useful.[127] Türkiye responded to a request from Mine Action Review for clarification on this matter, explaining that, in an area where a mine accident has occurred, first NTS and then TS is conducted. If a need for clearance is identified, based on these findings, the area is prioritised in annual plans.[128]

## THE EASTERN BORDERS MINE CLEARANCE PROJECT (EBMCP)

Having completed the first three phases of the EBMCP, Türkiye is now seeing to implement Phase IV, which is intended to take place in Van province and aims to clear 85 mined areas, covering approximately 4km$^2$.[129] TURMAC foresees land release in Phase IV will be comparable to that of previous phases as the 85 mined areas to be addressed have records and the mines are laid in a pattern.[130] While many mined areas identified by NTS are likely to be reduced by TS, Phase IV will include full clearance of CHAs.[131] Phase IV of the project also includes the provision of risk education in 20 locations, TS over 30 SHAs, and (unspecified) capacity-building for TURMAC and military demining units.[132] The estimated cost of the proposed project over €20 million.[133] Türkiye says that TURMAC is continuing efforts to secure funding from potential donors for the proposed project. If funding is obtained, the project is expected to be conducted in 2026–28.[134] Türkiye also states in its 2025 extension request that "if an international donor is found to finance the project, a national budget contribution will be requested in return for the budget provided for TURMAC within the framework of National Budget possibilities".[135] Türkiye is disappointed at the lack of international assistance to its programme, despite it ranking among "the top 10 countries in the world" in terms of extent of AP mined area.[136]

During Phase I of the EBMCP (2016–17), 10 mined areas were cleared and 23,724 AP mines destroyed. During Phase II (2018–19), 39 mined areas were cleared and 23,277 AP mines destroyed.[137] Phase III, which was completed on time in November 2023,[138] saw release of 94 mined areas.[139] TURMAC reported that, as result of Phase III, a total area of 3.62km$^2$ had been "addressed" in Ağrı, Ardahan, Iğdır and Kars provinces (a little less than the 4.24km$^2$ predicted), and 49,336 mines destroyed (significantly less than the 80,000 thought to be present). Mine clearance was completed in Ardahan and Kars provinces, as was demining along the Armenian border in Iğdır.[140] The NTS Project under Phase III resulted in 3,451 minefields being surveyed by commercial contractors.[141]

Having begun in 2016, the EBMCP is now in its ninth year. In 2018, the UNDP Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) stated: "most partners understand that this project will potentially run for 10–12 years, although this must be determined by non-technical survey options which will verify the correct planning period."[142] Whether this 12-year time frame can be realised will largely depend on Türkiye securing the external funding needed for Phase IV.

## THE MARDIN PROJECT

The Mardin project in Mardin province encompasses 45 minefields containing 27,614 mines across 1.7km$^2$ along the border with Syria.[143] Türkiye had planned that it would be managed by TURMAC and implemented by a private contractor,[144] and in 2020, the MoND pledged an additional TRY25 million for 2022 to 2023 for mine clearance in the province,[145] seeking to clear 27 areas covering nearly 1.06km$^2$ between 2021 and 2023.[146] As explained in Türkiye's Article 7

126 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
127 "ICBL Comments on Türkiye's Article 5 Extension Request", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025.
128 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.
129 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.
130 "Türkiye Mine Action Programme: Project for Completion, Wednesday, 22 November 2023", p. 3.
131 "Türkiye Mine Action Programme: Project for Completion, Wednesday, 22 November 2023", p. 5.
132 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 31.
133 Ibid., p. 1.
134 Ibid., p. 28.
135 Ibid., p. 31.
136 Ibid.
137 "Türkiye Mine Action Programme: Project for Completion, Wednesday, 22 November 2023", p. 2; and information provided by TURMAC, 4 September 2024.
138 Presentation by TURMAC, 21MSP, Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.
139 "Türkiye Mine Action Programme: Project for Completion, Wednesday, 22 November 2023", p. 2.
140 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D; and email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024.
141 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
142 "Final Evaluation for Clearance of Landmines in the Eastern Border Regions of Turkey (Demining Project - Phase I)", UNDP Independent Evaluation Office, accessed 9 July 2023 at: https://bit.ly/3XMiZ3M, p. 24.
143 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form D.
144 Presentation by TURMAC, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 22 June 2022.
145 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form A.
146 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

report covering 2022, however, the Mardin project could not be realized "due to the activities of the terrorist organizations and the instability on the border area. It is considered that sniper and mortar shots that could be carried out by terrorist organizations from across the Syrian border may pose a risk to personnel who will carry out mine clearance in the area in question".[147] The 2025 extension request again indicated that the Mardin Project could not be conducted due to the risk of "direct and indirect fire that could be carried out by terrorist organizations (PKK/PYD/YPG) from across the Syrian border".[148] In the additional information it provided in July 2025, Türkiye said that: "Following the latest developments in Syria,[149] security risk in the region has begun to decrease" and that the NTS specified in the request was now planned. Furthermore, in addition to clearance in Mardin province in 2029 and 2030, Türkiye expects any mined areas identified as a result of NTS to be included in the clearance plans.[150]

### CLEARANCE OF NON-BORDER AREAS

Türkiye had planned to clear all 873 identified mined areas inside the country by 2021, involving release of 3.1km$^2$ and destruction of 34,410 mines. Little progress has been made in recent years, with clearance of only 0.3km$^2$ at a former military range in 2018,[151] a further 9,584m$^2$ cleared in 2021,[152] 2,727m$^2$ cleared in 2022,[153] 58,040m$^2$ cleared in 2023;[154] and 77,621m$^2$ cleared in 2024.[155] Türkiye estimated at the end of 2022 that only 2.5km$^2$ remained.[156] However, completion of NTS in 2023 meant this estimate for non-border areas increased significantly, and, as at the end of 2024, stood at 41.6km$^2$, with SHAs covering 34.2km$^2$ and CHAs covering 7.4km$^2$ (see Table 1 above).[157] The mined areas are scattered and TURMAC has previously considered it practical for clearance to be conducted by the military even though their capacity to do so has been limited.[158]

In its work plan for 2026–30, Türkiye specifies that 8.7km$^2$ in non-border areas in Bingöl and Mardin provinces will be subject to NTS in 2026–29;[159] 153,000m$^2$ in non-border areas will be subject to TS in 2028–29;[160] and 1.27km$^2$ in non-border areas will be cleared between 2026 and 2030.[161] As such, it remains unclear in the extension request by when Türkiye plans to address all the remaining 41.6km$^2$ of contamination in non-border areas.

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In its 2025 extension request, Türkiye explains that methods for release of suspected and confirmed hazardous areas in Türkiye are defined through its NMAS and standard operating procedures (SOPs), which comply with the IMAS.[162] Türkiye issued 44 NMAS (including on land release) in 2019.[163] Türkiye also has specific clearance standards for its Eastern border and Southern border.[164] Standards specific to the EBMCP were reviewed in 2019.[165] Türkiye states that the following NMAS, aligned to the latest IMAS, were published in 2024:[166] Glossary of Mine Action Terms; Accreditation and Operational Testing of Animal Detection Systems and Handlers; Animal Detection Systems – Principles, Requirements and Guidelines; and Operational Procedures for Animal Detection Systems. Türkiye adds that its NMAS are updated on a regular basis,[167] and will continue to be during its proposed extension period of 2026–30.[168] Türkiye asserts that, through these changes, it has "effectively addressed previously identified shortcomings and strengthened its national mine action framework". Türkiye also "reaffirms its commitment to keep NMAS regularly updated in line with international

147 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D; and email from TURMAC, 18 April 2023.

148 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

149 In May 2025, it was reported that he Kurdish non-state armed group, the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, Kurdistan Workers' Party) had announced its intention to lay down arms and disband in May 2025. This followed a call in February by the group's jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan, for it to disband. See, e.g., "Kurdish group PKK says it is laying down arms and disbanding", *BBC News*, 12 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4n02E6V.

150 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 2.

151 Email from TURMAC, 21 June 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2017, 2018, and 2019), Form A.

152 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form D.

153 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

154 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.

155 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

156 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

157 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.

158 Email from TURMAC, 24 June 2020.

159 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 37.

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid., p. 34.

162 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.

163 Email from Hans Risser, UNDP Istanbul Regional Hub, 3 October 2016; and Article 7 Report (covering 2015), Form F; Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form A.

164 CCW Amended Protocol II Report (covering 2023), Form B.

165 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form A; email from TURMAC, 24 June 2020.

166 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

167 Ibid.

168 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

requirements and operational needs". As at October 2025, Türkiye had also initiated the translation into Turkish of 25 technical notes and seven test and evaluation documents published by the GICHD in preparation for dissemination.[169]

Accreditation and quality management (QM) of the Turkish Land Forces (TLF) and the Gendarmerie units is carried out by TURMAC.[170] Türkiye says all data is quality checked by a contractor and then verified by UNDP before being transmitted to TURMAC.[171] According to Türkiye's Article 7 report (covering 2023), all areas cleared by Türkiye in 2023 proved to contain AP mines.[172] As at early October 2025, Mine Action Review was still clarifying with TURMAC whether there were any areas cleared in 2024 that did not contain AP mines.[173]

Türkiye provides detailed information on its eight-stage process for NTS in its 2025 extension request.[174] It also extensively outlines its methods and standards relating to QC and QA, including internal and external QA/QC activities.[175] It also describes its search protocol for lost mines, and explains that, if a mine is found in a previously cleared and completed area, TS is undertaken again and "the general condition of the land is determined and searched again with the verification methods".[176]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II report (covering 2024), which it submitted in March 2025, Türkiye notes that three companies are accredited for humanitarian demining and another for quality management of demining. Türkiye also states that "the evaluation for accreditation of four companies is ongoing".[177] No other details about these companies are provided.

In 2024, Türkiye continued to deploy its military demining units for clearance (see Table 6). Türkiye has previously stated that NTS operations are conducted by TURMAC Survey Branch and "EBMCP Phase-III NTS and demining teams".[178] Türkiye's main demining capacity is provided by the military and this has been steadily increasing in recent years. By 2020, after two years of rapid expansion, total military capacity amounted to 32 teams: 26 Land Forces demining teams with 420 personnel and 6 Gendarmerie teams with 120 personnel.[179] In 2022, a further ten Gendarmerie demining teams were added.[180] As it had planned, Türkiye increased the number of nationally operated demining teams by eight to a total of fifty in 2023 where it remained in 2024 (see Table 6). Türkiye also plans to further augment the clearance capacity of its military demining units though has given no time frame for this to occur.[181]

To accelerate land release efforts, Türkiye's defence industries developed the Mechanical Mine Clearing Equipment (*MEMATT*), a light-medium, unmanned demining machine with a tiller attachment, particularly suitable for demining on the flat terrain along the Syrian border.[182] In 2022, Türkiye's military demining units were augmented with six MEMATT-II demining machines (see Table 6).[183] As at October 2025, Türkiye had 14 such machines.[184]

Türkiye's 2021 extension request stipulates that manual clearance is followed by two levels of verification, including an extended search for missing mines and sampling checks conducted using MDDs.[185] Türkiye added 11 MDDs between 2022 and 2024. As at March 2024, it had the capacity to train 10 MDDs per year.[186]

Türkiye states that in 2024 it had: 32 operational teams affiliated with the Land Forces Command and 18 teams affiliated with the General Command of Gendarmerie along with 10 demining machines; and up to 17 MDDs (see Table 6).[187] This capacity for 2024 is largely unchanged from that in 2023, differing only in that eight demining machines were deployed across military demining units.[188] As previously noted, this increased to 14 machines by October 2025.[189]

169 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

170 CCW Amended Protocol II Report (covering 2023), Form B.

171 "Türkiye Mine Action Programme: Project for Completion, Wednesday, 22 November 2023", p. 3.

172 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.

173 In response to a request from Mine Action Review for clarification on this point, Türkiye provided information pertaining to areas cleared in 2023, but not 2024, and it was unclear if this was intended or a miscommunication. Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

174 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.

175 Ibid., pp. 26–27.

176 Ibid., p. 24.

177 CCW Amended Protocol II Report (covering 2024), Form G.

178 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.

179 Email from TURMAC, 5 September 2022.

180 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D; and email from TURMAC, 18 April 2022.

181 Article 7 Report (covering 2023); and email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024.

182 MoND Mine Action Centre, Strategic Plan 2020–2025, undated but 2020, p. 7; Article 7 Reports (covering 2019 and 2020), Form A.

183 Email from TURMAC, 18 April 2022; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

184 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

185 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20; email from Mark Frankish, UNDP, 24 May 2021.

186 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 3–4. While the figures given for the number of MDDs added at the various intervals between 2020 and 2024 amount to 16, the 2025 extension request and Türkiye's Article 7 report (covering 2024), Form D, both state that 17 MDDs are operational. Türkiye's CCW Amended Protocol II report (covering 2024), submitted on 29 March 2025, Form G, gives a lower figure of 15 operational MDDs.

187 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

188 Ibid.; CCW Amended Protocol II Report (covering 2023), Form G; email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024; and information provided by TURMAC, 4 September 2024.

189 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

**Table 6: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024**[190]

| Operator | Manual clearance teams | Total deminers | MDD teams | Mechanical assets | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gendarmerie | 18 | N/K | 17 dogs across all military units. No. of teams unknown. | 10 machines across all military units, including six MEMATT-II demining machines. | No. of deminers unknown. Deployed 18 manual clearance teams of 120 deminers in 2021.* |
| Land Forces | 32 | N/K | | | No. of deminers unknown. Deployed 26 manual clearance teams of 420 deminers in 2021.* |
| **Totals** | **50** | **N/K** | **17 MDDs** | **10** | |

*In April and September 2025, Mine Action Review requested information from TURMAC on the number of deminers deployed but, as at October 2025, had not received a response. For comparison, Mine Action Review has provided the most recent known figures from 2021.[191]

Türkiye plans to annually train and accredit an unspecified number of additional MDDs during the proposed extension period of 2026–30; continue accreditation for 50 military demining teams in 2027 and 2029; and accredit 10 machines in 2027 and 2029.[192] Türkiye states that "programming efforts are ongoing to increase military demining teams.[193]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Türkiye released 5.75km$^2$ of land in 2024, of which 5.03km$^2$ was released through NTS, 0.04km$^2$ was released through TS, and 0.68km$^2$ was cleared. A total of 179 AP mines were destroyed during clearance along with 5 AV mines and 1 item of UXO. Türkiye reported that almost 276,998m$^2$ of "increased areas due to NTS" were added in 2024.[194]

Türkiye did not report on any land release in 2024 in areas under its control in northern Cyprus or in northern Syria.

**Table 7: Summary of land release outputs in 2024 (National authority data)**[195]

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km$^2$) |
|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 0.68 |
| **Technical Survey** | 0.04 |
| **Non-Technical Survey** | 5.03 |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 179 |

## SURVEY IN 2024

Türkiye released a total of 5.07km$^2$ through survey in 2024, of which almost 5.03km$^2$ was cancelled through NTS and a little over 0.35km$^2$ reduced through TS. Most of this release, just over 5km$^2$, was through NTS along the Syrian border (see Tables 8 and 10).[196] Land release through survey in 2024 represents a slight increase on the previous year when 5.04km$^2$ was released through survey, of which 4.69km$^2$ was cancelled through NTS and 0.35km$^2$ reduced through TS. Again, most of this release, just over 4km$^2$, was through NTS along the Syrian border.[197]

It is not known which operators were responsible for land release by NTS or TS in each location in 2024. In 2023, Türkiye stated that NTS operations were conducted by TURMAC Survey Branch and "EBMCP Phase-III NTS and demining teams".[198]

Türkiye reported that 276,998m$^2$ of "increased areas due to NTS" were added to the baseline in 2024 (see Table 9).,[199] as all of which was in SHAs.[200] This is a considerable decrease on new contaminated areas identified during 2023, the last part of the major NTS project intended to establish a baseline of contamination. Türkiye reported that almost 107km$^2$ of previously unrecorded AP mined area was added to the IMSMA database in 2023[201] This was subsequently revised down to 98km$^2$ based on information reported provided to Mine Action Review.[202]

190 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
191 Email from TURMAC, 5 September 2022.
192 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 35.
193 Ibid., pp. 3–4.
194 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
197 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
198 Ibid.
199 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
200 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.
201 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024.
202 Ibid.; and information provided by TURMAC, 4 September 2024.

**Table 8: Release of mined area through NTS in 2024**[203]

| Operator* | Region | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| N/K | Syrian border | 5,004,240 |
| N/K | Non-border areas | 23,193 |
| **Total** | | **5,027,433** |

*In its latest Article 7 report for 2024, Türkiye does not specify which operators conducted NTS at specific locations.

**Table 9: SHAs identified as a result of NTS in Türkiye in 2024**[204]

| Operator* | Region | Area recorded. (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| N/K | Syrian border | 221,364 |
| N/K | Iraqi border | 48,102 |
| N/K | Non-border areas | 7,532 |
| **Total** | | **276,998** |

*In its latest Article 7 report for 2024, Türkiye does not specify which operators conducted NTS at specific locations.

**Table 10: Release of mined area through TS in 2024**[205]

| Operator* | Region | Area reduced through TS (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| N/K | Syrian border | 1,167 |
| N/K | Iraqi border | 251 |
| N/K | Iranian border | 17,223 |
| N/K | Non-border areas | 16,905 |
| **Total** | | **35,546** |

*In its latest Article 7 report for 2024, Türkiye does not specify which operators conducted TS at specific locations.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, Türkiye reported clearance of 0.68km² and destroyed 179 AP mines, along with 5 AV mines and 1 item of UXO (see Table 11).[206] This represents a decrease on the 0.92km² cleared in 2023, which resulted in the much higher total of 33,443 AP mines destroyed (as well as 12 AV mines and 10 items of UXO).[207] This, in turn, was a slight decrease on the 1.29km² cleared and 58,078 AP mines destroyed in 2022.[208] Türkiye states the decrease in the number of AP mines destroyed in 2024, compared to 2023, was due to it deploying only military (and not contracted civilian) capacity during 2024, as well as material deterioration of mines, originally laid in the 1950s, over time. However, notwithstanding the fact that phase III of the EPMBC, which included contracted civilian capacity, concluded in November 2023, and therefore did not extend into 2024, it would be helpful for Türkiye to explain more fully why clearance in 2024 destroyed so few AP mines.

**Table 11: Mine clearance in 2024**[209]

| Region | Operator | CHAs and SHAs at start of year* | CHAs and SHAs at end of year* | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Syrian border | N/K | 1,432 | 1,434 | 372,033 | 3 | 5 |
| Iraqi border | N/K | 823 | 823 | 61,636 | 0 | 0 |

203 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
204 Ibid; and email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.
205 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
206 Ibid.
207 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
208 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D; and email from TURMAC, 18 April 2023.
209 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

**Table 11 Continued**

| Region | Operator | CHAs and SHAs at start of year* | CHAs and SHAs at end of year* | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Iranian border | N/K | 563 | 562 | 169,574 | 0 | 0 |
| Non-border areas | N/K | 841 | 837 | 77,621 | 176 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **3,659** | **3,656** | **680,864** | **179** | **5** |

*Information on areas disaggregated by SHAs and CHAs, not provided. The number of hazardous areas cleared is not provided. The number remaining at the end of 2024 reflects both areas released and areas added during 2024.

In its latest Article 7 report (covering 2024), Türkiye did not specify which operators were responsible for clearance at specific locations. However, it did state that 50 military demining teams "addressed" 716,410m² of land, resulting in "184 mines found/destroyed" across eleven "areas" in the provinces of Hakkari, Hatay, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, and Van.[210] Separately, Türkiye confirmed to Mine Action Review that in 2024, only military units operated in minefields, specifically, the Land Forces Special Mine Search and Clearance Team, and the Gendarmerie Special Mine Search and Clearance Battalion Command.[211]

TURMAC did not clarify how many, if any, of the total number of AP mines destroyed in 2024 were of an improvised nature. In November 2023, Türkiye noted that Turkish Armed Forces Counter-IED (C-IED) teams had "contributed to the safety of civilians by finding/neutralizing more than 150 mines, 2000 IEDs and 30,000 munitions laid by terrorist organizations in 2023", though no details were provided on the location.[212]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR TÜRKIYE: 1 MARCH 2004

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2014

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2022

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS AND 9 MONTHS, INTERIM EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

**THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (5 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2030**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 3 years and 9 months interim extension granted by States Parties in 2021), Türkiye was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than its extended deadline of 31 December 2022. In 2022, Türkiye requested and was granted an interim extension to 31 December 2025 to complete NTS and submit another extension request to complete clearance.[213] Türkiye duly submitted an extension request based on "actual contamination" following NTS and clearance in 2024 and early 2025.[214] This third extension request was submitted in March 2025, with additional information provided, as the Committee on Article 5 Implementation had asked for, in July 2025.

In the 2025 extension request, Türkiye provides detailed information on the circumstances that impeded implementation by the deadline. These include: topographical and access challenges, harsh weather, instability in some border locations and persistent insecurity in other areas (Mardin), delays in the importation of MDDs due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the two earthquakes that affected southern Türkiye in February 2023 as a result of which military units were assigned to search and rescue activities. Also highlighted was the fact that a significant amount of EU funds were transferred to projects to mitigate the impact of the earthquakes, and that international funding for demining in Türkiye ended.[215]

210 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

211 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

212 Statement of Türkiye on Clearance, 21MSP.

213 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 19.

214 Article 5 implementation Work Plan, 30 April 2023, p. 19.

215 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 34.

The 2021 request also provided no details of plans for clearance of the 90 identified mined areas which, at the time, remained in non-border areas. Similarly, the work plan in the 2025 extension request, as previously outlined, includes only limited plans for survey and clearance of these areas during the proposed 2026–30 extension period. TURMAC said it gives higher priority to clearing border minefields and installing border management facilities such as watch towers and patrol roads[216] with the aim of providing "a more secure and technologically advanced humanitarian border management system."[217] Türkiye made only limited progress on land release in non-border areas in 2022, 2023, and 2024.[218] While Türkiye's updated work plan does specify that an area of 3.3km$^2$ will be cleared in a non-border province in 2024–25,[219] Türkiye has not yet provided further clarity on plans to accelerate clearance in non-border areas.

The implementation of Phase IV of the EBMCP, a key milestone on Türkiye's path to completion, also remains uncertain, with a request for national budget towards Phase IV and the development of a work plan for it contingent on securing some international donor funding.[220] Given this continued uncertainty over the EBMCP, it is a welcome development that Türkiye asserts that the security outlook for implementation of the Mardin Project in Mardin province bordering Syria has improved such that it finally expects to be able to undertake planned activities during the extension period.[221]

Finally, it is also unclear, based on the work plan included in the 2025 extension request and the additional information provided, whether Türkiye envisages submitting a further request to extend its Article 5 deadline beyond 2030.[222] Though, as previously noted, in information provided to Mine Action Review in October 2025, Türkiye expressed that, while it aims to complete clearance within the specified time frame and is taking steps towards this, if the target is not met, a further extension will be requested.[223] The steady expansion in operational capacity is to be welcomed. In its latest Article 7 report covering 2024, Türkiye notes that, since its first extension request, approximately 50km$^2$ of mined area has been addressed and almost 226,627 AP mines destroyed.[224] But whether Türkiye can complete clearance by the end of 2030 depends on the extent to which it can accelerate clearance significantly and undertake massive cancellation and reduction.

**Table 12: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km$^2$) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 0.68 |
| 2023 | 0.92 |
| 2022 | 1.29 |
| 2021 | 0.41 |
| 2020 | 0.14 |
| **Total** | **3.44** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Türkiye aims to establish eight new clearance teams by 2027 and states that, if previously unrecorded areas of contamination are discovered after the completion of large-scale clearance, "these areas will be addressed through existing national capacity, or through projects to be carried out if funds and resources are available".[225]

216 Email from TURMAC, 12 August 2021; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form D.

217 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form D.

218 Article 7 Reports (covering 2022, 2023 and 2024), Form D.

219 Article 5 Implementation Work Plan, 30 April 2023, p. 13.

220 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 31; and Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, pp. 2–3.

221 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 2.

222 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

223 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

224 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

225 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 3.

# UKRAINE



## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 DECEMBER 2033

Not on track to meet deadline and in serious violation of the Convention for acquisition and use of anti-personnel mines

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Massive but no reliable estimate

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 2.07 | 0.33 |
| | (Clearance of areas suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines; official IMSMA data for humanitarian clearance operators, excluding clearance by State entities such as MoD and SESU) | (Official IMSMA data for 2023, provided in 2025. Previously reported as 0.52 based only on NGO clearance data) |
| Technical Survey | 2.07 | 0.02 |
| | (Reduction of areas suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines; official IMSMA data for humanitarian clearance operators, excluding technical survey by State entities such as MoD and SESU) | (Official IMSMA data for 2023, provided in 2025. Previously reported as 0.003 based only on NGO TS data) |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| | (Official IMSMA data) | (NGO data) |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | **2023** |
| AP Mines destroyed | 14,142 | 127 |
| | by all entities, including both humanitarian and military-related demining (National authority data). Includes 457 AP mines destroyed by humanitarian clearance operators according to official IMSMA data, of which 207 were destroyed in spot tasks by non-State operators | (NGO data) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

**Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine include:**

- State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- The Armed Forces of Ukraine
- The National Police
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)

**National humanitarian operators include:**

- Humanitarian Security LLC (Mine Action Review requested data on AP mine survey and clearance in 2024 from other national operators but only Humanitarian Security responded)

**International NGOs:**

- APOPO
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

**Commercial operators:**

- Multiple

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

On 29 June 2025, Ukraine's President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, announced that he had signed a decree calling for support for a proposal from Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for Ukraine to withdraw from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). The following day, Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) shared a statement from the MFA on Ukraine's decision to withdraw from the Convention. If Ukraine formally submits a withdrawal to United Nations, Article 20 stipulates that it will not take effect until the end of any armed conflict in which the withdrawing State is engaged upon the expiry of the six-month period. Subsequently, on 21 July 2025, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, acting in his capacity as depositary, communicated the following: "In accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, Ukraine has decided, as of July 17, 2025, to suspend the operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of September 18, 1997, signed on behalf of Ukraine on February 24, 1999 in New York." The communication states that: "The above action was effected on 18 July 2025".[1]

This statement is without legal effect as it is not possible to suspend operation of the APMBC. The possibility of armed conflict involving a State Party in which it might use anti-personnel (AP) mines was specifically foreseen by the drafters of the APMBC and therefore it is not a fundamental change of circumstances that might allow suspension under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Ukraine should rescind its unlawful suspension of its implementation of the APMBC without delay. The Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025 subsequently "affirmed that the Convention does not allow the suspension of its operation and consequently its obligations. The Meeting called upon Ukraine, as a State Party, to further engage within the framework of the Convention".[2]

Extensive use of AP mines by Russian forces continued in 2024. Ukraine has also made considerable use of AP mines, making it responsible for the most serious violation of the prohibition on use by a State Party to the APMBC in the treaty's history. The United States announced two transfers of self-destructing AP mines to Ukraine in November and December 2024. Ukraine's acquisition of these AP mines is another serious violation of the APMBC.

In February 2025, the Committee on Cooperative Compliance welcomed the cooperative dialogue sustained with Ukraine and the information provided by Ukraine on its efforts to carry out investigations[3] related to criminal offences between 24 February 2022 and 31 May 2024 concerning "the use of anti-personnel mines by unidentified military personnel of individual military formations in the territory of the city of Izyum, Kharkiv region, and surrounding areas." As at June 2025, the pre-trial investigation in these criminal proceedings was ongoing.[4]

Clearance and technical survey (TS) in 2024 increased significantly, due to expanded capacity. Ukraine's national authorities also reported significant increases in survey and clearance across all types of operators, national and international, made possible by "massive use of demining machines and surface scanning unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)".[5] While disaggregated data are collected and submitted to the Information System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and were reported to Mine Action Review in 2025, when presenting information on contamination internationally, Ukraine generally states the extent of its explosive ordnance (EO) challenge without disaggregation by weapon type, as the majority of hazardous areas present a mixed EO threat. Ukraine has institutionalised, in its National Implementation Plan for 2024–26, its intention to survey all accessible areas for all types of contamination, including AP mines, by the end of 2026.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Mine Action Review recognises the extremely challenging circumstances Ukraine faces following the war of aggression launched by Russia in February 2022. Nevertheless, full compliance with the APMBC by every State Party is an international legal obligation.**

1 UN, "Ukraine: Communication, Reference: C.N.385.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5 (Depositary Notification)", 21 July 2025, available at: https://bit.ly/4lBjLeb.
2 Final report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, 5 December 2025, paragraph 50, at: https://bit.ly/493cjnY.
3 APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Final Document, 5 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4epFfIJ, para. 21.
4 Statement of Ukraine on cooperative compliance, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
5 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, Head, National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) Secretariat, Ministry of Defence (MoD), 9 May 2025.

- **Ukraine should rescind its unlawful suspension of its implementation of the APMBC without delay.**
- **Russia and Ukraine should immediately halt all use of AP mines.**
- **Ukraine should ensure its forces cease use of AP mines and prosecute past offenders in accordance with its domestic law.**
- **Ukraine should also refrain from further acquisition of any AP mines by any method or source. Importation or other means of acquisition is also a serious violation of the APMBC.**
- **If it has not already done so by the time this report goes to print, Ukraine should expedite its processes for permission to operators to use explosives in clearance and destruction operations as well as subsequent accreditation to conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).**
- **Ukraine should review its instructions to operators and processes for the issuance of cancellation certificates, which currently limit cancellation to battle area clearance (BAC) tasks with no history of evidence of AP mines (or cluster munition remnants, CMR).**
- **Ukraine should formalise a gender and diversity policy in mine action and continue its work to develop an implementation plan for this through its Gender in Mine Action Initiative group.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Ukraine lacks complete information on AP mine contamination owing to the context of the ongoing armed conflict. When presenting information on contamination internationally, Ukraine largely continues to frame its EO challenge without disaggregation by munition type, as the majority of hazardous areas present a mixed threat. It intends to survey all accessible areas by the end of 2026. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 6 | Ukraine's National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and National Mine Action Centre (MAC) have been fully operational since 2022, with the additional Centre for Humanitarian Demining (CHD) becoming fully operational in 2024. The national mine action programme continued to scale up significantly in 2024, with progress made on more unified procedures for certifying operators. Securing permission to use, transport, and store explosives as a prerequisite to accreditation for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) remains a challenge. While 44 operators had already been accredited for this as at September 2024, several international operators were still going through the process. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 3 | Although no reference was made to gender or diversity in Ukraine's most recent Article 7 reports (covering 2023 and 2022), and only limited reference in additional information was provided in its 2023 Article 5 deadline extension request, Ukraine appears to be making progress in these areas. The national mine action strategy, published in 2024, incorporates nine measures intended to ensure equality and inclusion and specifies professional involvement in mine action of women, veterans, persons with disabilities, and victims of EO as a State priority. A national working group on gender in mine action is now up and running; and an assessment on gender and diversity in mine action was conducted in 2024. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | Ukrainian National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) include a chapter on "environmental regulations", and a section on environment, occupational health, and safety. Ukraine was intending to draft a NMAS on the environment by the end of 2025. The NMAA states that environmental assessments are conducted prior to clearance. International operators report various measures they are taking to protect the environment during demining. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 6 | 5 | Ukraine uses the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action – IMSMA Core. Ukraine's reporting to Mine Action Review on 2024 contamination and land release improved, compared to previous years, with data provided disaggregated by EO type and by technical survey and clearance. As at September 2025, Ukraine had not submitted an Article 7 report covering 2024. It previously submitted one on time, covering 2023. |

**Assessment of National Programme Performance Continued**

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 4 | Ukraine has elaborated a national mine action strategy implementation plan for the period 2024–26. On 30 April 2024, Ukraine acted upon the decisions of the 21MSP and submitted a work plan for Article 5 implementation and provided an annual update in 2025. As at July 2025, a new methodology for prioritisation was being piloted. While operators reported some improvement in 2024, timely tasking and effective coordination of operators remains a challenge. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | NMAS were published in 2019 but were not fully applied in practice and were therefore updated in 2023. Several revised NMAS entered into force in 2024, including for information and quality management. New land release and mechanical land release standards entered into force in April 2025. International operators feel the existing NMAS need further work and that the instructions for cancellation, issued by the MAC, are overly restrictive. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 2 | 5 | Ukraine's third request to extend its Article 5 deadline was granted at the 21MSP and a new deadline set for 1 December 2033. The Ukrainian authorities report significant increase in technical survey and clearance in 2024 thanks to massive use of demining machines and drones. The scale of contamination and extent of areas no longer under control of the Ukrainian government have increased significantly since February 2022. However, Ukraine's use of AP mines is a serious violation of the APMBC, adding to contamination and undermining its progress in Article 5 implementation, and explaining the significant drop in scoring. |
| **Average Score** | **4.6** | **4.8** | **Overall Programme Performance: POOR** |

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Sectoral Working Group on Humanitarian Demining (SWG, under the Ministry of Economy)
- Centre of Humanitarian Demining (CHD, under the Economic and Financial Department of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers)
- National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), interministerial auxiliary collegial body, the secretariat of which sits under the Ministry of Defence (MoD))
- Mine Action Centre (MAC, under the SSTS and then the MoD, at Chernihiv)
- Kharkiv Mine Action Coordination Centre (under the Governor of Kharkiv oblast) (established during 2024)
- Social-Humanitarian Response Centre (under the Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories)
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
- Centre of Excellence for Humanitarian Demining (under the MoD) (launched in 2024)

### CERTIFICATION AND QUALITY CONTROL CENTRES

In total, 13 institutions can train and issue certificates of deminers, including:

- Interregional Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) (at Merefa**)
- Demining Center of Military Unit A2641 (at Kaminiets Podilsky)
- Military Engineering School

### STATE SERVICES ENGAGED IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE

- State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- Armed Forces of Ukraine
- National Police
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
- State Border Service
- National Guard

### STATE OPERATORS

- State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- Arkhipelag LLC
- BIG UA
- Demining Solutions
- EOD & RC
- Humanitarian Security LLC
- International Demining Group (IDG)
- Mellom Pro LLC
- Nibulon
- Patron Demining
- Safe Ground Solutions LLC
- Safe Land
- Sheriff LLC
- Transimpex Demining
- Ukrainian Deminers Association (UDA)
- Ukrainian Demining Services (UDS)
- Ukroboronservice (UOS)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS*

- APOPO
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- Global Clearance Solutions (GCS)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI) – scheduled to begin NTS in September 2025
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- SafeLane Global
- Safe Path Group

### OTHER ACTORS*

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Lithuanian Demining Coalition
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
- Tetra Tech
- Tony Blair Institute for Global Change
- Mine Action Sub-cluster (MA AoR) chaired by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- UN Resident Co-ordinator Office in Ukraine (UNRCO)
- UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
- UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
- UN World Food Programme (WFP)
- UNICEF
- UN Women
- UN Environment Programme (UNEP)
- The UN Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
- The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- Chemonics
- East Europe Foundation
- Enhancing Human Security (ITF)
- NATO
- Ukrainian Red Cross Society
- MAT Kosovo

*Information based on data available at July 2025. Due to the rapidly expanding mine action programme in Ukraine, there may be actors not included in this table. An up-to-date list of certified mine action operators is available online on Ukraine's National Mine Action Platform, Demine Ukraine, which reports 108 certified mine action operators as at 17 July 2025, with more than 50 others undergoing accreditation.[6]
**The team at Merefa relocated to Kyiv during 2024 due to the intensity of aerial attacks in the area, and remained in Kyiv at the time of writing in June 2025.[7]

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Taking into account the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the fact that both primary non-technical survey (NTS) are ongoing, no reliable estimate exists for the extent of AP mined area in Ukraine. That said, the level of contamination is expected to be massive due to the very widespread use of AP mines by Russia in the course of its assault on Ukraine and subsequent use by the Ukrainian armed forces. As at the end of 2024, areas within the control of Ukraine and scheduled for NTS, which potentially contain AP mines, anti-vehicle (AV) mines, cluster munition remnants (CMR), and other EO as a result of the presence of troops/hostilities, totalled 105,877km$^2$ and were present in nine of Ukraine's twenty-four oblasts (administrative regions)[8], as set out in Table 2. As at the end of 2024, areas within the control of Ukraine, which had undergone NTS and were suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines, totalled 76.72km$^2$ and were present in seven oblasts (see Table 1).[9] Over half of this contamination (54%) is in Kharkiv; almost one quarter (24%) in Kherson; almost one fifth (18%) is in Mykolaiv; and the remaining 5% is spread between the oblasts of Donetsk, Kyiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv – all areas which have been temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation.[10]

It is believed that not all of the 105,877km$^2$ of EO-contaminated area has yet undergone survey to establish suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) or confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) (or discredit the claimed presence of contamination). Therefore, not all of this area will contain EO, and less still will have AP mines, despite widespread AP mine use in Ukrainian territory. A combined total of 70% of all potential hazardous areas contaminated with AP mines, AV mines, CMR, and other EO are in the Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Sumy oblasts (regions).[11] It should also be noted that, where disaggregated data on hazardous areas have been collected, data are submitted to IMSMA with a list of the types of EO present and the area's designation as suspected or confirmed hazardous area. However, when presenting information on contamination internationally, Ukraine generally states the extent of its EO challenge without disaggregation by weapon type, with most hazardous areas having a mixed threat.[12]

6 See "List of Operators", Demine Ukraine at: https://bit.ly/45vLIVT.

7 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, Economic and Environmental, Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), 11 June 2025; and telephone interview with Paul Heslop, Senior Technical Advisor on Mine Action to the UN in Ukraine, UN Resident Coordinator's office (UNRCO), 16 June 2025.

8 Ukraine has twenty-four oblasts, plus the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and two cities Special Status – Kyiv and Sevastopol. It is further divided into "hromadas" (municipalities).

9 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

10 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 September 2025.

11 Email from Col. Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

12 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

The updated estimate of AP mined area, specifically, in Table 1 compares to a very partial estimate of AP mined area of 35.22km$^2$ from April 2024 and reconfirmed to Mine Action Review in September 2025.[13] Ukraine duly cautioned in its Article 7 report, covering 2023, that this estimate of contamination was far from complete given the context of the ongoing war, stating that "the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine currently lacks complete information on the coordinates of all areas where anti-personnel mines might be installed".[14] At the time of writing, Ukraine had yet to submit its Article 7 report covering 2024. Ukraine estimated in April 2024 that 16% of hazardous areas on agricultural land contained AP mines.[15]

The nature of EO contamination in Ukraine has been described as "unique" for three reasons. Firstly, there is a "scale, complexity and overlapping nature of different threats" not seen since the Second World War. Second, EO-contaminated areas are very heavily contaminated, unlike anything seen since the World Wars. Finally, many areas suspected to be contaminated—for example, because they were briefly occupied—have proven to contain little or no contamination.[16] Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), for example, highlights that less than 5% of the areas it has surveyed are either suspected or confirmed to contain contamination,[17] illustrating the critical importance of prioritising NTS efforts in Ukraine to determine the actual scope of contamination. For this reason, Ukraine recognises primary NTS and re-survey as effective use of resources, in line with its strategic goal to complete, by the end of 2026, primary NTS across all territory accessible for demining.[18]

Access by non-government operators to perform survey or clearance within 20km of the front lines of conflict and State borders was prohibited in 2023 and remained so at the time of writing.[19] The front line is approximately 1,000km long and 5km deep. Inside this area is where the vast majority of EO contamination is believed to be situated.[20] Outside this zone, some 78.08km$^2$ of previously unrecorded AP mined area was discovered and added to IMSMA during humanitarian mine action operations in 2024, according to official IMSMA data (see Table 17 in the section below, "Land Release Outputs in 2024"). The equivalent reported by humanitarian operators was nearly 54.2km$^2$ of previously unrecorded AP mined area in 2024, of which 7.3km$^2$ was SHA and 46.8km$^2$ CHA.[21] This is almost double the almost 27km$^2$ added to the national database by international operators in 2023.[22] Even in areas that are accessible, however, barriers to accurate survey still exist. Operators caution that resurvey will be needed in many areas, either due to re-contamination or owing to the displacement of people, which has left few or no witnesses to new contamination. Thus, some polygons will require refinement once more data become available.[23] Ukraine emphasises that NTS is a continuous process, which includes re-survey, and that, as the front line shifts, there will be a recurring need for primary NTS.[24]

In its most recent Article 7 report (covering 2023), Ukraine stated that 156,000km$^2$ of land, including 14,000km$^2$ of water, where hostilities have taken place or are ongoing, remained "subject to preliminary survey" and that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is checking contamination in the liberated territories.[25] As at September 2025, Ukraine stated on the Government's Demine Ukraine website that the area "affected by hostilities" and "at risk" stood at the lower total of 138,503km$^2$ and that 35,496km$^2$ could be considered "safe".[26]

**Table 1: Identified mined areas by oblast (at end 2024) (official IMSMA data)[27]**

| Oblast | Area (km²) |
|---|---|
| Donetsk | 2.36 |
| Kyiv | 1.28 |
| Mykolaiv | 14.13 |
| Sumy | 0.03 |
| Kharkiv | 40.55 |
| Kherson | 18.03 |
| Chernihiv | 0.34 |
| **Total** | **76.72** |

13 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

14 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.

15 "Restoring Livelihoods and revitalising Rural Communities through Mine Action", UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP), Presentation at side event, UN National Directors Meeting (NDM), Geneva, 29 April 2024 (hereafter, FAO and WFP Presentation, NDM, 2024).

16 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", The United Nations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and UNMAS, January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3R6uvEl

17 Email from Amela Balic, Programme Manager, NPA, 12 May 2025.

18 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 September 2025.

19 "Ukraine Mine Action Today and Tomorrow", Presentation from Roman Konovalov, Mine Action Department of the MoD, at the NDM, in Geneva, 9–11 April 2025.

20 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", OROLSI, DPO, and UNMAS, January 2025.

21 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

22 Emails from Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 12 June 2024; Tony Connell, FSD, 14 June 2024; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and Vanja Sikirica, Country Director, NPA, 5 May 2024.

23 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 3 May 2024; and Julie Bouvier, Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) Specialist, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 16 May 2024.

24 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 September 2025.

25 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.

26 Demine Ukraine, accessed 9 September 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3VclUSK.

27 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 6 and 22 September 2025.

**Table 2: Area scheduled for primary NTS which may contain explosive ordnance, including AP mines, by oblast (at end 2024) (National authority estimate)[28]**

| Oblast/District | SHAs that may contain AP mines and require NTS | Area (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Dnipropetrovsk/Kryvorizhsky | 24 | 1,255 |
| Dnipropetrovsk/Nikopolskyi | 5 | 1,472 |
| Donetsk/Kramatorskyi | 83 | 4,464 |
| Kyiv/Brovarskyi | 52 | 2,767 |
| Kyiv/Buchanskyi | 82 | 2,554 |
| Kyiv/Vyshhorodskyi | 128 | 4,314 |
| Kyiv/Fastivskyi | 68 | 1,406 |
| Zhytomyr/Korostenskyi | 13 | 3,948 |
| Mykolaiv/Bashtanskyi | 347 | 4,466 |
| Mykolaiv/Mykolayivskyi | 335 | 5,493 |
| Sumy/Konotopskyi | 7 | 5,188 |
| Sumy/Okhtyrskyi | 8 | 3,195 |
| Sumy/Romenskyi | 1 | 2,395 |
| Sumy/Sumskyi | 19 | 5,961 |
| Sumy/Shostkinskyi | 50 | 2,694 |
| Kharkiv/Bohodukhivskyi | 3 | 2,128 |
| Kharkiv/Izyumskyi | 1,030 | 5,912 |
| Kharkiv/Kupyanskyi | 467 | 2,222 |
| Kharkiv/Lozivskyi | 3 | 2,805 |
| Kharkiv/Kharkivskyi | 131 | 1,606 |
| Kharkiv/Chuhuyivskyi | 118 | 4,015 |
| Kherson/Beryslavskyi | 400 | 4,750 |
| Kherson/Khersonskyi | 62 | 2,085 |
| Chernihiv/Koryukivskyi | 4 | 4,604 |
| Chernihiv/Nizhynskyi | 20 | 7,205 |
| Chernihiv/Novhorod-Siverskyi | 2 | 4,634 |
| Chernihiv/Chernihivskyi | 137 | 10,130 |
| Chernihiv/Prylutskyi | 3 | 2,209 |
| **Totals** | **3,602** | **105,877** |

Extensive use of AP mines by Russian forces continues. In June 2024, Ukraine said it was encountering an "unprecedented density" of contamination with up to three landmines per square metre of land. Ukraine also claimed use of AP mines by Russian forces "launched by land and air combat systems to hit civilians, as well as objects used or inhabited by civilians".[29] Humanitarian organisations and media outlets stated that Russian forces had scattered mines in a haphazard and disorganised fashion across civilian areas.[30]

Many AP mined areas in Ukraine can be directly associated with Russian defensive positions. The HALO Trust (HALO) found a significant number of tripwire AP mines in 2022 and 2023 in areas from which Russian forces had retreated.[31] No humanitarian operators reported finding improvised mines during 2024. Improvised AP mines are, however, included in data provided by the NMAA (see Table 2), and the NMAA states that the regions and districts affected by improvised AP mine bombardment were: Beryslavskyi, Kakhovskhyi, and Khersonskyi in Kherson province; Sumskyi and Okhtyrskyi in Sumy; Kupyanskyi in Kharkiv; and Nikopolskyi in Dnipropetrovsk.[32] Official IMSMA data also confirms that AP mines destroyed during TS and clearance in 2024 (excluding during rapid response by State operators) included two improvised AP mines.[33] In June 2025, the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation encouraged Ukraine to report, to the extent possible, on the disaggregation of AP mines of an improvised nature from other types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[34]

In addition to contamination resulting from Russia's ongoing war of aggression, Ukraine is also contaminated by AP mines as a result of the earlier conflicts which began in 2014 with the Russian-backed, self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics. Prior to these attacks, Ukraine was affected by residual contamination of mines and other ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy fighting between German and Soviet forces in the Second World War, but also from combat in the First World War. The MoD engineering units partially cleared affected areas in the mid-1970s, suggesting that a problem may remain, but the location and extent of the legacy mine threat is unknown. Before Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, the heaviest mine and ERW contamination was believed to be inside the buffer zone, which then separated government-controlled areas from these controlled by Russian forces in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Republics.[35]

28 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

29 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

30 "Land mines create a deadly legacy for Ukraine and possibly beyond", *The Washington Post*, 12 April 2022, at: https://wapo.st/3e2X9WP.

31 In 2023, HALO identified four hand grenades attached to tripwire, which are considered AP mines under the APMBC. HALO had similarly seen grenades set to be detonated by tripwire in 2022. Emails from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and Denys Holovetskyi, Head of Operations, HALO, 29 May 2023.

32 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

33 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

34 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations,", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, p. 1.

35 Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, Programme Manager, HALO Ukraine, 5 July 2018.

Ukraine's national mine action strategy includes a target to complete "initial non-technical survey in 100 percent of the territories controlled by Ukraine, where it is possible to carry out humanitarian demining", including survey of AP mined areas, by the end of 2026.[36] As at the time of writing in September 2025, however, it was not known whether Ukraine was on track to achieve this. In June 2025, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation observed that Ukraine was still in the process of identifying the precise perimeter of mined areas and said it would welcome updated information from Ukraine on these efforts, including on the establishment of a baseline.[37]

## USE OF AP MINES BY RUSSIA

As at June 2023, Human Rights Watch had documented use of at least 13 types of AP mines since the 2022 assault on Ukraine.[38] The Landmine Monitor re-affirmed this number in November 2024 but noted that it was "not possible to systematically document, survey, and attribute the continuing use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine given available evidence and lack of access to areas where there are active hostilities".[39] A range of delivery methods for landmines has been documented: in addition to those that are manually emplaced, mines have been mechanically laid; scattered by truck-mounted projectors; and remotely delivered by rocket.[40] Several new types of landmine have been used in hostilities by Russia for the first time in the ongoing armed conflict. These include the remotely delivered POM-3 AP mine, also known as the "medallion". The mine is typically aerially launched from a rocket, falling back to earth by parachute. It is equipped with a seismic proximity sensor that picks up approaching footsteps, and is said to be able to distinguish between humans and animals, making efforts to locate and destroy it far deadlier and more complicated. The POM-3 has self-destruct features that set the mine to explode after a certain period. Ukrainian deminers are using remote equipment to destroy these mines – an expensive undertaking.[41]

HALO has described new explosive threats in Ukraine, including in Mykolaiv and Kharkiv regions for example, where more than 70% of the minefields or battle areas it assessed for clearance contained magnetic influence mines (which can be activated by the presence of metallic objects and a change in the magnetic field around the mine); or seismic mines (activated by vibrations in the earth). In this context, advanced survey techniques and the targeted deployment of mechanical clearance assets have been necessary.[42]

Russian employment of AP mines includes the use of drones to drop landmines on farms and residential areas.[43] In June 2025, Human Rights Watch reported that Russian forces were modifying commercial quadcopter drones to scatter AP mines in and around the city of Kherson, killing dozens of civilians and injuring hundreds of others. Human Rights Watch also stated that Russian military-affiliated Telegram channels showed PFM-series AP mines, also known as "petal" or "butterfly" mines, being fitted onto the drones with a mechanism to allow them to be air-dropped. It reported having a "firm evidence base" for these attacks, having analysed more than 80 photos and videos that had been shared by witnesses and on social media.[44]

Russian forces have also emplaced numerous victim-activated booby-traps as they retreated from positions they had taken, occupied, or fortified during the 2022 invasion. The booby-traps were constructed with various types of hand-grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades.[45] According to Ukraine, Russian forces have laid booby-traps in residential areas, vehicles, critical infrastructures, and even food. Ukraine has found booby-traps in dead bodies, including those of children.[46] A considerable portion of these booby-traps are AP mines as defined in the APMBC.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)'s Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine has frequently reported on the use of both AP and AV mines prior to the full-scale Russian invasion.[47] In addition, a December 2017 report from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated that: "The parties to the conflict continued the practice of placement of [improvised explosive devices] IEDs and AP mines in populated areas and near objects of civilian infrastructure."[48] In 2018, OHCHR called on all parties involved in hostilities to "cease the use of victim-activated devices".[49]

36 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p on approval of the National Mine Action Strategy for the period up to 2033 and approval of the operational action plan for its implementation in 2024–2026", section entitled "Strategic goals, objectives and expected results aimed at achieving the defined goals", at: https://bit.ly/4cKpA5j.

37 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, p. 2.

38 These are: MOB, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, MON-200, OZM-72, PFM-1/PFM1-S, PMN-2, PMN-4, POM-2/POM-2R, and POM-3.

39 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 26 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44l5dsr. This page contains a list and specifications of 11 types of AP mines used in Ukraine by Russia since February 2022.

40 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 2, 3, 8, and 10.

41 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Report, 15 June 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3PO3Yss, pp. 4, 7, and 8; "New Russian Land Mine Poses Special Risk in Ukraine", *The New York Times*, 6 April 2022, at: https://nyti.ms/3TgF9bL and Presentation of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

42 HALO, "Ukraine", undated but accessed 28 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3Cr0lbj.

43 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 26 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44l5dsr.

44 Human Rights Watch, "Russia's Drone-Dropped Landmines Threaten Human Lives and Hard-Won Humanitarian Protections", 10 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44l5dsr.

45 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 3 and 8.

46 Presentation of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023. See also, "Russians hid an anti-tank mine in a pedestrian figurine – this is a war crime" (Ukrainian), *Canal 24*, 7 August 2023, at: https://bit.ly/45rALvB.

47 See: "Daily and spot reports from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine", at: http://bit.ly/2K4IFms.

48 OHCHR, "Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 August to 15 September 2017", December 2017, p. 5.

49 OHCHR, "Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 February to 15 May 2018", June 2018, p. 29.

## USE OF AP MINES BY UKRAINIAN FORCES

Use of AP mines by Ukrainian forces during the current conflict, in violation of its international legal obligations, has also been reported. Any use of AP mines by a State Party is a serious violation of the APMBC. Human Rights Watch documented repeated use of AP mines by Ukrainian forces during the summer months of 2022 when Russia controlled the city of Izium and its environs. In August 2023, an Independent International Commission Inquiry on Ukraine stated it had seen photos of weapons found in Izium city indicating that PFM AP mines had been delivered by a 220-mm Uragan rockets with a range of up to 35Km, and that both Ukrainian and Russian armed forces were stationed within striking distance of Izium, but concluded it was likely that the PMF AP mines were used by Ukrainian armed forces.[50] Ukrainian forces fired numerous 9M27K3 mine-laying rockets carrying PFM AP blast mines into at least nine different Russian-occupied areas or near Russian military facilities in and around Izium city. Researchers verified 11 civilian casualties from these mines. The Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister, Oleksandr Polishchuk, responded to Human Rights Watch questions by saying that the Ukrainian authorities could not comment on the types of weapons used during the armed conflict "before the end of the war and the restoration of [Ukraine's] sovereignty and territorial integrity".[51]

More recently, the Landmine Monitor has reported on examples posted on social media between April and September 2024, claiming that Ukrainian combatants have constructed drone-dropped AP mines for use against Russian forces, and that Ukraine has modified several types of AV mine for individual delivery by drone. However, the Landmine Monitor cautions that it has been unable to confirm these allegations, as they do not contain enough information to attribute to any given party.[52]

In February 2023, the President of the APMBC Twentieth Meeting of States Parties issued a statement condemning the use of AP mines "anywhere, at any time, and by any actor", and requested clarification of the allegations of AP mines use by the Ukrainian government.[53] At the subsequent intersessional meetings, Ukraine said that "it did not have information which would corroborate the veracity of allegations made by some [organisation] concerning the use of anti-personnel mines by the Ukrainian Armed forces" and that it stands ready to "conduct further inquiry into the manner and keep [the Convention] updated on the outcome".[54] In June 2024, Ukraine informed the APMBC intersessional meetings that it was conducting a pre-trial investigation for criminal offenses from 24 February 2022 to 31 May 2024 concerning "the use of anti-personnel mines by unidentified military personnel of individual military formations in the territory of the city of Izyum, Kharkiv region, and surrounding areas." As at June 2024, the pre-trial investigation in these criminal proceedings was ongoing[55] and remained so as at June 2025.[56] At the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, Ukraine reiterated that alleged use of AP mines by Ukraine had been taken seriously and had been submitted to the General Prosecutor's office, with the case initiated in February 2024 and, at that time, still ongoing. Ukraine also stated that it continued to comply with international humanitarian law; would convey concerns heard by Ukraine's delegation to its government; and remained committed to the principles of the Convention.

As stated in the Final Document from the Fifth Review Conference, the Committee on Cooperative Compliance welcomed the cooperative dialogue sustained with Ukraine and the information provided by Ukraine on its efforts to carry out investigations.[57] On 18 February 2025, the Committee met with the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN in Geneva and "appreciated Ukraine's engagement with the Committee in a cooperative and transparent manner" as well as highlighting "the importance of receiving updated information from the Ukraine side on the alleged use of anti-personnel mines by the Ukrainian Armed Forces". On 26 May 2025, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN in Geneva met with the Committee again to continue the cooperative dialogue. The Committee "encouraged Ukraine to provide an update to the States Parties on matters related to these allegations during the 2025 Intersessional Meetings".[58]

In both the 18 February and 26 May 2025 meetings between the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN in Geneva and the Committee on Cooperative Compliance, the second critical matter discussed was the 20 November 2024 media reports which "surfaced with regard to the transfer of anti-personnel mines by the United States to Ukraine".[59] The United States announced two transfers of AP mines to

50 Human Rights Council, Conference room paper on the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, UN doc. A/HRC/52/CRP.4, 29 August 2023, p. 49.

51 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 2 and 15.

52 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 26 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44l5dsr.

53 APMBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), "Landmine treaty president to engage with Ukraine on allegations of use of prohibited weapon", Press release, 3 February 2023.

54 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

55 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

56 Statement of Ukraine on Cooperative Compliance, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025.

57 Fifth Review Conference Final Document, 5 February 2025, p. 47, available at: https://bit.ly/4nhRueL.

58 Committee on Cooperative Compliance, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, p. 5.

59 Ibid., p. 5.

Ukraine during 2024. In November, President Joe Biden—counter to the then US policy[60]— authorised the supply of AP mines to Ukraine. US officials did not disclose what type of mines were being provided, but one official described them as "non-persistent," meaning that the mines self-destruct or self-deactivate (i.e. lose battery charge to render them inactive) within days or weeks. The official reportedly said that Ukrainian policymakers had committed to not deploying the mines in densely populated areas. Use of the new mines, it was said, would be limited to Ukrainian territory, with an expected focus on eastern Ukraine. Prior to November 2024, the US had provided Ukraine with Claymores, a directional fragmentation munition that is set above ground and triggered by an operator, making them permissible under the APMBC if used in that manner.[61] In December 2024, a second transfer of AP mines from the US to Ukraine was announced. Prior to November 2024, the last time the United States transferred AP mines was in 1992.[62]

Following the allegations concerning the transfer of AP mines by the US to Ukraine, the President of the 21MSP and the Committee on Cooperative Compliance engaged in a cooperative dialogue with Ukraine to address and clarify the situation concerning potential transfer of AP mines. At the 18 February 2025 meeting, the Committee highlighted the importance of receiving an "explanation on potential transfer of anti-personnel mines by the United States". At the 26 May 2025 meeting, the cooperative dialogue continued and the Committee "encouraged Ukraine to provide an update to the States Parties on matters related to these allegations during the 2025 Intersessional Meetings".[63] Ukraine did so, stating: "Regarding possible transfer of munitions to Ukraine, Ukraine has no information and cannot confirm any other information regarding the transfer to Ukraine of munitions that fall under the provisions of anti-personnel mines provided in paragraph 1, Article 2 of the Ottawa convention".[64] As a matter of fact and law, the AP mines transferred by the US with self-destruction and self-deactivation features fall under Article 2(1) of APMBC and their importation by Ukraine is a serious violation of the Convention.

Unverified reports emerged in August 2024 of possible new use of landmines by Ukraine in the Kursk region of western Russia. Unverified video footage, made publicly available by an individual reporting to be a civilian filming in Kursk on 10 August 2024, appears to show several AV mines laid across a road.[65] On 2 September 2024, a Russian news agency reported, based on information from the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, that nine settlements in the Kursk region had been cleared of mines over the preceding week, with 150 munitions rendered safe. Teams were continuing survey of populated areas and infrastructure.[66] It is not known if Ukraine emplaced AP mines as part of this offensive. In June 2025, a Bulgarian online news source reported that Russian forces, operating near Russia's border with Ukraine, had encountered "3D-printed anti-personnel mines deployed by Ukrainian troops in Russia's Kursk region". However, the original source for this report was again the Russian State news agency, TASS, and the reliability of this report cannot be confirmed.[67]

On 29 June 2025, Ukraine's President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, announced that he had signed a decree, calling for support for a proposal from the MFA for Ukraine to withdraw from the APMBC.[68] The following day, the NSDC shared a statement from the MFA on Ukraine's decision to withdraw from the Convention. The statement highlights extensive use of AP mines by Russia in its armed aggression against Ukraine since 2014, and Russia's "mass use" of AP mines since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The statement declares that: "As a result, Ukraine has found itself in an unequal and unjust situation that restricts its right to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter". It goes on to say that: "Ukraine has made the difficult but necessary political decision to stop the implementation of irrelevant obligations under the Ottawa Convention. We are convinced that this step is both necessary and proportionate to the level of threats, as it concerns the survival and preservation of Ukraine as a sovereign, independent, and free state".[69] It was further reported that the NSDC had instructed Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers to take urgent steps to ensure Ukraine's withdrawal from the convention, and that the decree states that oversight for implementing the decision rests with the NSDC, which in turn gives instructions to the Cabinet. The Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) is reportedly not mentioned in the decree.[70]

It was not indicated when Ukraine planned to give notice of withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council, as required under Article 20 of the Convention. As of early September 2025, it had not done so. In any event, Article 20 states that "such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict".[71] In a video address on 29 June 2025, President Zelenskyy acknowledged the "complexities" of the withdrawal procedure when conducted during war.[72]

60 US policy, as at December 2024, was that the US would "not export or transfer" AP mines and "not assist, encourage, or induce anyone, outside of the context of the Korean Peninsula, to engage in any activity that would be prohibited by the Ottawa Convention". See International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), "ICBL Strongly Condemns Second US AP Mine Transfer to Ukraine", Press release, 4 December 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4e6hhlS.

61 "Biden approves antipersonnel mines for Ukraine, undoing his own policy", *The Washington Post*, 19 November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3ZAIzuC.

62 ICBL, "ICBL Strongly Condemns Second US AP Mine Transfer to Ukraine", 4 December 2024.

63 Committee on Cooperative Compliance, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, p. 5.

64 Statement of Ukraine on Cooperative Compliance, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025.

65 "Civilian gets shot after dodging landmines in Kursk 10.8.24", *YouTube*, accessed 14 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3M3OBg4.

66 "Nine settlements in Kursk Region cleared of explosive objects in past week", *TASS (Russian) News Agency*, 1 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4gk1YH0.

67 "Russia: Ukraine uses homemade 3D-printed anti-personnel mines", *Bulgarian Military News*, 13 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3T7JWNP.

68 "Ukraine on track to withdraw from Ottawa anti-personnel mines treaty, Zelenskiy decree shows", *Reuters*, 29 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4eCPCcr.

69 Statement of the MFA of Ukraine on the Decision to Withdraw from the Ottawa Convention, National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, 30 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3ZYiztf.

70 "Zelenskyy pulls Ukraine out of landmine treaty as war reshapes defense policy", *RBC-Ukraine*, 29 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44Hz6Ew.

71 Art. 20, APMBC.

72 "Ukraine on track to withdraw from Ottawa anti-personnel mines treaty, Zelenskiy decree shows", *Reuters*, 29 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4eCPCcr.

On 21 July 2025, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, acting in his capacity as depositary, communicated the following: "In accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, Ukraine has decided, as of July 17, 2025, to suspend the operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of September 18, 1997, signed on behalf of Ukraine on February 24, 1999 in New York."

The communication states that: "The above action was effected on 18 July 2025".[73] It is not possible for a State Party to suspend operation of the APMBC and so this statement is without legal effect. Ukraine therefore remains bound by the Convention and its continued use and stockpiling are serious violations of the Convention and of international law. The Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties affirmed that the Convention does not allow suspension of its operations.

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Ukraine is also contaminated with CMR, the extent of which is not known but is thought to be heavy, as well as with huge quantities of other ERW (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants* report on Ukraine for further information). Ukraine plans to complete NTS in all territories that can be accessed by the end of 2026.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Humanitarian demining in Ukraine is coordinated by the First Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) of Ukraine, who was also the Minister of Economy as at July 2025. The Ministry of Economy (MoE), ensures interaction of central executive bodies on humanitarian demining matters[74] and has overall responsibility for strategic planning and system coordination.[75] Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy, which covers the period 2024–33, was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers on 28 June 2024.[76]

The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) is the primary body responsible for approving mid-term and long-term national plans for mine action, alongside operative plans.[77] It is an inter-ministerial body, with 17 Ministries represented as at April 2025.[78] The NMAA secretariat has responsibility for coordinating the work of the Mine Action Centre (MAC). The MAC and the Interregional Center For Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU) share the remits of information management (IM), quality assurance (QA), monitoring, planning, and certification of the operators.[79] The NMAA also coordinates the ministries, central and local State bodies, local government, and other organisations (including mine action operators). While the MoE is the main policy-making body and coordinates the development and execution of mine action strategy, the NMAA approves and ensures State mine action policy; monitors and reports on State progress in fulfilling its obligations in mine action under international treaties; and coordinates the development and execution national mine action programme action plans.[80] While the NMAA sits at ministerial level, it is serviced by a secretariat with "some" managerial functions.[81]

The Sectoral Working Group (SWG), introduced in 2023, is an advisory body at the MoE, which "functions as a unified platform for coordinating and aligning cooperation efforts in the field of humanitarian demining between Ukrainian governmental authorities and development partners." It is co-chaired by the DPM, the UN Resident Co-ordinator (UN RC), and the Ambassador of Japan. As at May 2025 the SWG had held three meetings since its establishment; two in 2023, and one in May 2024.[82] The Working Group includes representatives from several ministries and other key national entities.[83]

The Centre of Humanitarian Demining (CHD) was established in April 2023 as a State institution under the Economic and Financial Department of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers.[84] The CHD was established with the aim of improving coordination and mobilising resources. It is now the driving force behind Ukraine's State-funded land release compensation programme and is engaged in building up Ukraine's QA capacity, as well as working in many other areas of mine action.[85]

There are nominally three national supervisory and management bodies in Ukraine: the MAC, located in

73 Ukraine: Communication, Reference: C.N.385.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5 (Depositary Notification), United Nations, 21 July 2025, available at: https://bit.ly/4lBjLeb.

74 "Soul of Soil", UN Development Programme (UNDP), accessed 19 February 2024, at: http://bit.ly/4pf4aDU.

75 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.

76 "Government approves National Mine Action Strategy and Operational Plan for its implementation for the first 3 years", Government of Ukraine, 28 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/46iT1cj; and "Cabinet adopts changes to the Humanitarian Mine Action Architecture in Ukraine", Special issue of DRC Legal Alert, Issue 98, October 2023.

77 "Ukraine: Strengthening national mine action capabilities", DRC, 9 February 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3JY8fce.

78 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.

79 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; DRC-DDG Legal Alert Special, "Mine Action Law Amendment", Issue 56, September 2020; interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE, 13 February 2020; and email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

80 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; and DRC Special Legal Alert – "NMAA Framework 2022", Issue 73, January 2022; and email from Government of Ukraine, 22 September 2025.

81 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; and email from the GICHD, 17 June 2022.

82 "The Sectoral Working Group", Demining Ukraine, 2 July 2024, accessed 22 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3zUWlhA.

83 Email from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 23 July 2024.

84 "Center for Humanitarian Demining established in Ukraine", *Interfax Ukraine*, 7 April 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3LDzj1g; and "Cabinet adopts changes to the Humanitarian Mine Action Architecture in Ukraine", Special issue of DRC Legal Alert, Issue 98, October 2023.

85 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

Chernihiv, which is under the SSTS and, in turn, under the MoD (for operational matters, including co-ordination and tasking); the inter-ministerial NMAA, serviced by a secretariat; and, at the top of the hierarchy, an inter-ministerial committee on humanitarian demining.[86] The Interregional Center For Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of the SESU, located in Merefa (hereafter, "the centre at Merefa")[87] is a QA and quality control (QC) centre, with authority to coordinate accredited SESU units.[88] A regional centre, the Kharkiv Mine Action Coordination Centre, was established in 2024 under the Governor of Kharkiv oblast.[89]

The following bodies are responsible for certification of operators and processes:[90] the centre at Merefa; the Demining Centre of Military Unit A2641, located in Kaminiets Podilsky; and the MAC in Chernihiv; and the State Certification Centre of the SESU. These bodies are also responsible for quality management (QM) tasks.[91] Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy acknowledges that the ability of these institutions to carry out QM responsibilities "does not meet the needs of today" and that quality control (QC) and external monitoring require attention as part of systems improvement. It also cites the need for a "unified procedure" for certification of operators and processes.[92]

Progress on both these matters has been being made. As previously noted, the CHD is engaged in efforts to build QA capacity. In February 2024, Ukraine's Cabinet introduced a certification procedure for mine action operators, which unifies the separate lists of required documentation and separate lead times previously required by the three above-mentioned certification bodies.[93] In November 2024, the government adopted a further resolution that provided for the launch of a digital "Diia" accreditation portal, intended to further simplify and automate certification. The portal, set up by the MoE and Ministry of Digital Transformation,[94] went live in September 2025.[95] Details of the required process for certification as a mine action operator in Ukraine are also publicly available on the Government's Demine Ukraine website.[96]

In March 2024, the Cabinet adopted Decree 284, approving the Procedure for Compensation of Costs for Humanitarian Demining of Agricultural Land, allowing land owners to reclaim from the Government 80% of the costs of demining of each plot. In August 2024 this was amended to 100% of the cost of such services.[97] The objective of this programme is to restore economic activity in EO-affected areas. Farmers apply through the State Agrarian Register (SAR). As at June 2025, 482 applications had been received; 69 contracts had been signed; and the cycle of land release had been completed under 26 contracts, covering a total area of about 25km$^2$.[98] As at September 2025, approximately 34km$^2$ had been released through the programme.[99]

A national mine action law was adopted by Ukraine's parliament in 2018,[100] although the government did not proceed with its implementation on the grounds it was inconsistent with a number of other legal acts.[101] Amended legislation was passed in December 2020. This created the national Mine Action Centre (the MAC, at Cherniv), as well as the legal basis for the creation of the CHD, established legally in 2023 and becoming operational in 2024. According to the current law, these two centres have almost identical authority. However, in practice their responsibilities are divided as follows: the MAC is responsible for IMSMA management, planning and coordination; and CHD is responsible for the demining market, State compensation programme, and new digital products for areas such as prioritisation, and information management.[102] Reporting by mine action operators and their interaction with the NMAA is managed through the MAC and the NMAA Secretariat.[103]

The MoE continued to lead on coordination of the mine action sector more broadly in 2024. Operators report being consulted and involved in key decision making by the national authorities to a certain extent, for example, through these coordination meetings as well as national mine action standards (NMAS) drafting workshops. However, some operators also note that the complex nature of Ukraine's mine action oversight and regulation framework; the variety of institutions and government and military bodies involved;

86 Email from Government of Ukraine, 22 September 2025.

87 As previously noted, staff were relocated away from Merefa to Kyiv part way through 2024, due to the intensity of aerial attacks in the area. However, to avoid confusion, the term "the centre at Merefa" has been maintained throughout this report.

88 Email from Government of Ukraine, 22 September 2025.

89 Telephone interview with Paul Heslop, UNRCO, 16 June 2025.

90 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024, No. 616-", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems", at: https://bit.ly/4cKpA5j.

91 Email from Government of Ukraine, 22 September 2025.

92 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024, No. 616-", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems", at: https://bit.ly/4cKpA5j.

93 Decree No. 123 was adopted 2 February 2024. "DRC's Legal Alert: Issue 102, 1 February–31 March 2024", pp. 2–3.

94 "The Ukrainian government has adopted a resolution that provides for the launch of the certification process for mine action operators on the Diia portal", International Demining Group, 27 November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3FocPlC.

95 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025; and "Online certification of mine action operators has been launched on the Diia portal", Demine Ukraine, 24 September 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4ntiurm.

96 "How to Become a Mine Acton Operator", Demine Ukraine, accessed 22 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4jjZFnA.

97 "DRC's Legal Alert: Issue 108, 1–30 September 2024", at: https://bit.ly/3EeHn8l, p. 8.

98 "Ukraine Mine Action Today and Tomorrow", Presentation from Roman Konokalov, Mine Action Department of the MoD, at the NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025; and email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025. Mine Action Review did not request information on how much of this area, if any, was contaminated with AP mines as this would provide only partial understanding of the CMR problem.

99 Email from Government of Ukraine, 22 September 2025.

100 OSCE, "Ukrainian parliament adopts legal framework for mine action, with OSCE advice provided", 10 December 2018, at: http://bit.ly/2QdTaqo.

101 DRC-DDG Legal Alert Special, "Mine Action Law Amendment", Issue 56, September 2020.

102 Email from Government of Ukraine, 22 September 2025.

103 The Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024, submitted to the Chair of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 30 April 2024, Annex 1.

and their complex relations to one another, mean that key decision-making processes are not always completely transparent or inclusive. Operators also acknowledge that the ongoing war and state of martial law does preclude the national authorities from including operators fully in decision-making processes.[104]

In July 2025, the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change presented its "White Paper on Updating the Institutional Architecture of Mine Action in Ukraine", commissioned by the First Deputy Prime Minister. The authors of the study note that about 30 institutions work in the field of mine action, most of which are subordinate to three key ministries: the MoD, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the MoE. The study notes that this blurs responsibility and creates additional bureaucratic and administrative barriers, and that the lack of a single window of interaction with the government of Ukraine complicates decision-making; interferes with the development of joint programmes; and can make accountability difficult. The study proposes several options for updating the system, but suggests that, under an optimised architecture, the functions of the MAC and the CHD should be included in the structure of a future Agency, while ensuring the continuity of their work and preserving their expertise.[105]

In addition to the MoE, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) also remained a key coordination mechanism[106] and continued meeting in 2024.[107] However, a formal transition is in progress from the Mine Action AoR to an MoE-led coordination structure. Presently, UNDP coordinates the MA AoR jointly with the MoE, as part of the Protection Cluster, supporting the broader UN response and providing coordination in partnership with State institutions, national and international operators, other UN agencies, and the private sector. In line with Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy (2024–33) and Operational Plan (2024–26), the Government of Ukraine, through the MoE, is leading efforts to enhance coordination and governance in the sector. UNDP will support the planned transition of the MA AoR from UNDP to full national ownership by 2030.[108] Additionally, the Senior Technical Advisor on Mine Action to the UN at the UN Resident Co-ordinator Office in Ukraine (UNRCO) convenes meetings approximately every other month of the key eight to twelve partners providing technical advice and support; there are two local Mine Action Support Group (MASG) meetings per year in advance of the global MASG meetings in Geneva and New York; and the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group meets approximately five times per year.[109]

A Mine Action Donor Coordination Workshop also took place in Kyiv in April 2024[110] and the Ukraine Mine Action Conference (UMAC) took place in Lausanne on October 2024,[111] with a further UMAC planned for autumn 2025, in Tokyo.[112] A multi-stakeholder coordination workshop took place in Geneva in April 2025 as well as a multi-stakeholder workshop in Kyiv in May 2025, to review the interim results of the national mine action strategy implementation.[113] Participants proposed multiple changes to the operational plan including expanding the programme of State compensation for demining to forests; adding new mechanisms to attract innovation; and improving the formats of mine action support for veterans, women, and victims of EO.[114]

Overall, operators have reported a positive environment for mine action and facilitation of the operators' work by the Ukrainian government. HALO, the largest international operator working in Ukraine, reports having a close working relationship with national and local authorities, but also continues to advocate for greater involvement in strategic planning.[115] Ukrainian authorities are reportedly proactive when it comes to signing memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and facilitating cooperation with partners.[116] Some operators suggest that importation legislation has proven restrictive, as many types of mine action equipment (e.g. machines, detectors) are considered "military", which involves additional constraints. Further importation rules and documentation apply to international NGOs,[117] though Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) notes that being registered as a "charitable fund" has removed these

104 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

105 "New Mine Action System Architecture: Tony Blair Institute Launches White Paper", Demine Ukraine, 4 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/48Et61K.

106 Email from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025.

107 "Mine Action in Ukraine", presentation to the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) by Paul Heslop, Senior Mine Action Adviser to the UN Resident Coordinator Ukraine, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 6.

108 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 18 July and 1 August 2025.

109 Telephone interview with Paul Heslop, UNRCO, 16 June 2025.

110 "Ukraine Identifies Strategic Mine Action Goals to Strengthen National Recovery – Two-Day Donor Workshop Ends", Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 19 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/43LfSgR.

111 "GICHD Update", Presentation to the MASG, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 3.

112 "Japan ready to host Ukraine Mine Action Conference – Economy Ministry", *Ukrinform*, 19 June 2024, at: http://bit.ly/4f2QOGi.

113 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 18 July and 1 August 2025.

114 "Progress in the implementation of the National Mine Action Strategy: a two-day workshop was held in Kyiv", Demine Ukraine, 15 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4l8LRwX.

115 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

116 Email from Dino Šujak, ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF) Ukraine, 16 May 2024.

117 Emails from Jon Cunliffe, Country Director, Ukraine, MAG, 26 April 2024; and Julie Bouvier, HI, 16 May 2024.

challenges with importing equipment, allowing it to, in effect, be treated as a national NGO.[118] However, NPA states that it has imported more than ten demining machines and hundreds of detectors and items of personal protective equipment (PPE) without any of these items being considered of "military" or even "dual" purpose. Furthermore, NPA is registered in Ukraine as a branch (not as a charitable organisation) and has never encountered any delays or other challenges with the import of equipment.[119] Some operators also note that visa restrictions can sometimes make it difficult for international staff from some countries to enter Ukraine.[120]

Conscription of male staff was highlighted as major challenge for mine action operators in 2024. Operators held several meetings on this issue with the national mine action authorities and the MoE, during 2024, which were generally supportive. As at May 2025, a procedure was in place to allow international operators to obtain up to 100% exemption from conscription for their staff,[121] including half of field staff.[122] As would be expected, the security situation in 2024 limited humanitarian demining operations at times, for example, UAV flights were grounded during active air alerts or at the order of local military authorities on occasion, and temporary stop work orders were instituted for parts of Sumy and Kherson Oblasts at different points during the year, requiring HALO, for example, to redeploy teams to other areas. HALO were able to redeploy flexibly, resulting in no loss in overall productivity.[123] Due to the active conflict, not all hromadas[124] or all parts of hromadas assigned to operators are accessible.[125]

The requirements for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) certification remained the same in 2024, with the main challenge still the approval process for transport and storage of explosives.[126] There are two separate processes involving different stakeholders. The process for acquiring permission to use, transport, and store explosives is the same whether an organisation wishes to undertake demining or another relevant activity such as quarrying, and involves the Ministries of Labour and of the Economy. EOD accreditation, on the other hand, is implemented by the mine action centres. It is reportedly the permissions process for explosives that has caused difficulties rather than the EOD accreditation process. Ukraine requires that the destruction of any ordnance identified by international operators that do not have EOD certification is carried out by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service (SSTS), or SESU.[127] In some cases, this can delay further work at a site until the hazard is cleared. Operators do report good cooperation with SESU and Ukrainian Armed Forces in the process of demolition of items found during clearance.[128]

HALO eventually gained EOD accreditation in December 2023, after a ten-month process, and FSD in August 2025, also after a 10-month process. However, as HALO and FSD highlight, even once certified challenges remain with the efficient management, storage, and transportation of explosives.[129] Additionally, the current permission and simplified accreditation are only valid under martial law. Once martial law is lifted, all EOD operators will be required to meet the full list of accreditation requirements, which HALO states previously made it almost impossible to conduct EOD.[130] As at April 2025, Danish Refugee Council (DRC) was working through the required steps to gain permission to use explosives.[131] As mentioned, FSD received certification to conduct demolitions in August 2025 and plans to use low-order techniques (for example, methods such as deflagration, used to neutralise unexploded ordnance (UXO) by burning the explosive material within the casing, rather than detonating it) as a way around the challenge of storage and transportation of explosives.[132] Humanitarian Security received EOD accreditation in April 2025.[133] Further information on the required process for obtaining permits for the acquisition, transportation, destruction, and storage of explosive materials by mine action operators can be accessed on the Government's Demine Ukraine website.[134]

Ukraine continued to collaborate with implementing partners and operators on capacity building in its national programme during 2024. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) support focused on the development of Ukraine's first national mine action strategy and implementation plan; NMAS, including land release, mechanical operations and detection systems involving animals (ADS); and Ukraine's mine action information management system.[135] As at April 2025, GICHD was planning a programme of needs assessment and organisational development support for national mine action organisations, as well as preparing a report on gender and diversity in mine action in Ukraine.[136]

118 Email from Tony Connel, FSD, 25 June 2024.

119 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 August 2025.

120 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 3 May 2024; Julie Bouvier, HI, 16 May 2024; and Tony Connel, FSD, 25 June 2024.

121 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

122 Email from Eleanor Porrit, FSD, 28 July 2025.

123 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

124 A hromada is the basic unit of administrative division in Ukraine, similar to a municipality.

125 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

126 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

127 The Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024, 30 April 2024, Annex 1.

128 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024.

129 Emails from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March and 28 July 2025.

130 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

131 Email from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.

132 FSD highlights that low-order EOD techniques can significantly reduce noise, shockwaves, and physical damage, compared to traditional high-order detonation methods, and can be a more environmentally friendly and cost-effective option for UXO disposal. Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March and 5 June 2025.

133 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 1 June 2025.

134 "Permits for Activities with Explosives", Demine Ukraine, 1 July 2024, accessed 22 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mo84cp.

135 "GICHD Update", presentation to the MASG, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 2.

136 Interview with the GICHD, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) continues to be engaged in mine action systems building, including on the environment and mine action[137] and the development of a unified EOD training curriculum, piloted in 2024 with participants from SSTS, SESU, and National Police EOD personnel.[138] UNDP's five-year mine action project in Ukraine continued to provide equipment and technical, expert, and strategic support. UNDP's project also involves innovative technologies for mine action such as satellite imagery, remote mine detection, artificial intelligence (AI), and machine learning.[139] The UN World Food Programme (WFP) continued to work with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the Government of Ukraine, and FSD during 2024 to survey small-scale agricultural land for the presence of mines and other ERW; to clear land where necessary; and support safe release for food production. As at February 2025 the project was underway in Kharkiv.[140]

The national authorities and operators also continued to receive capacity development and training from international operators in 2024, including from HALO in the areas of NTS, manual demining, and gender mainstreaming.[141] HALO, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and NPA also supported with delivery of QM training for the NMAA, coordinated by the GICHD.[142] DRC delivered EOD training to NMAA, SESU, and MAC personnel.[143]

SESU also received other capacity development support. NPA continued efforts to establish a sustainable mine detection dog (MDD) capability within SESU, training and providing six MDDs and related staff training.[144] FSD provided technical expertise and capacity development to SESU in mechanical ground preparation.[145] APOPO and MAG jointly hosted SESU and MAC delegates in Cambodia to introduce them to technical survey dogs (TSDs) ahead of APOPO's certification of TSDs in Ukraine.[146] Several international operators, including DRC and HALO, donated equipment to the MAC and SESU, including vehicles, mine detectors, EOD kits, PPE, first aid kits, and office and IT equipment.[147]

It has been suggested that there is the need for a more joined-up approach to capacity development support to the national authorities in Ukraine, and that an independent training needs analysis could be useful. International organisations and private companies in Ukraine are reportedly overlapping or duplicating support in some cases, both in terms of equipment provision and training.[148] As at March 2025, Ukraine stated that international assistance remained "of crucial need" for equipping MoD Ukraine demining teams with demining machines, vehicles for EO transportation, and International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)-compliant EOD training of all levels abroad – "due to safety in Ukraine".[149] Ukraine also highlights that capacity development support for national operators is limited.[150]

To support innovation the MoE announced the launch of the Humanitarian Demining Innovation Platform in February 2025, intended as a coordination platform for testing and improving technologies. This could also attract investment and resources from international partners and companies and facilitate innovation scaling and establishing technology production in-country.[151] Ukraine is taking other steps to lead humanitarian mine action innovation, for example, through its expanding use of AI in areas such as prioritisation, and satellite and thermal imagery.[152]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It is not possible to capture the full extent of funding for survey and clearance of AP mines (along with other EO) made available in Ukraine in 2024. A summary of information provided by international humanitarian operators for funding in 2024 and prospects for 2025 is provided in Table 3. Due to the extensive and mixed nature of the EO threat, no distinct national resources are dedicated to survey and clearance of AP mined area by the Government of Ukraine – all EO survey and clearance are funded as a whole.[153] The 2024 budget allocated by the government for all demining was UAH3 billion (approximately US$76 million).[154] In June 2025, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted that Ukraine had reported on its efforts to do their utmost to commit the resources needed to meet their Convention obligations as soon as possible and to explore all possible funding sources, including conventional and innovative sources and mechanisms of funding. The Committee said it would welcome updated information on Ukraine's efforts to develop resource mobilisation plans.[155]

137 "Support to Environmental Rehabilitation with Focus on Building National Humanitarian Mine Action Capacities of Ukraine", OSCE, accessed 15 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4dHLoze.

138 Interview with OSCE Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.

139 "Mine Action Project in Ukraine", UNDP, accessed 19 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/43KwS5V.

140 "Ukraine", World Food Programme, accessed 18 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mxy2u1.

141 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

142 Ibid.; and emails from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

143 Email from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.

144 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

145 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

146 Email from Nick Guest, APOPO, 3 March 2025.

147 Emails from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; and Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

148 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

149 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form E.

150 Email from Government of Ukraine, 22 September 2025.

151 "The Ministry of Economy launches a coordination platform for innovations in humanitarian demining", Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 17 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mtijvT.

152 Email from Government of Ukraine, 22 September 2025.

153 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

154 Presentation by Oleg Stoiev, Head, Mine Action Office, Ministry of Economy, "Ukraine: Meeting Food Security Needs Through Integrated Mine Action", Side event, NDM, Geneva, 1 May 2024.

155 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, p. 5.

As at January 2025, it was claimed that more than US$1 billion had been pledged to mine action from international donors in the preceding two years. There is some concern that the future financial burden of mine action on Ukraine could be considerable if donor support decreases.[156] Non-traditional or so-called innovative funding is also being explored extensively for Ukraine's mine action sector, for example, through a UNDP study on potential innovative finance models in 2024,[157] and through a collaboration between the GICHD, the Mine Action Finance Initiative (MAFI), and Ukraine's MoE to develop and pilot innovative finance mechanisms for Ukraine, with a view to scaling up funding mechanisms for the mine action sector.[158]

Various international operators in Ukraine were significantly impacted by the suspension of US funding in January 2025. FSD experienced a 25% reduction in survey and clearance capacity in Ukraine as the expected new contract for US funding was not signed.[159] HALO's funding in Ukraine from the US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) was suspended. As at June 2025, HALO remained optimistic that PM/WRA funding would continue.[160] NPA received a stop-work order from PM/WRA on 24 January 2025, pending a project review. This was partially lifted in February before being fully lifted on 12 March 2025. The project is scheduled to end on 30 November 2025.[161]

**Table 3: Funding for survey and clearance by international operators in Ukraine (2024–25)**[162]

| Donor | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Canada (Peace and Stabilisation Operations Programme (PSOP)) | HALO, MAG | HALO (as at March 2025), MAG |
| Czech Republic (Ministry of the Interior) | HALO | HALO (as at March 2025) |
| Denmark (Danish International Development Agency (Danida), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)) | DCA, DRC | DCA (to 2026), DRC |
| EU European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) | DCA, DRC | DCA, DRC |
| European Commission, Foreign Policy Instruments (EU-FPI) | HALO, MAG | HALO (as at March 2025), MAG |
| Festival Medical (UK charity) | MAG | MAG |
| France (Crisis & Support Centre (CDCS))[163] | HALO | HALO (as at March 2025) |
| The Freeman Foundation | MAG | MAG |
| Germany (German Federal Foreign office (GFFO)) | DCA, DRC, HALO, MAG, NPA | DCA, HALO (as at March 2025), MAG, NPA (until end June 2025) |
| Howard G. Buffett Foundation (HGBF) | DRC, FSD, HALO | DRC, FSD (to end October 2025), HALO (as at March 2025), MAG |
| The If! Foundation | MAG | MAG |
| Italy (Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS))[164] | MAG | MAG, DCA |
| Japan (Association for Aid and Relief) | HALO | HALO (as at March 2025) |
| Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) with KfW[165] | NPA (from Dec. 2024) | NPA |
| Latvia (MFA) | None | HALO |
| Luxembourg (MFA) | HALO | HALO (as at March 2025) |
| Netherlands (MFA) | DRC, HALO, MAG | DRC, HALO (as at March 2025), MAG |

156 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", OROLSI, DPO, and UNMAS, January 2025.

157 Camille Wallen, Co-Founder & Director of Symbio Impact & MAFI, "Innovative Finance in Mine Action Progress to Date & New Initiatives. Progress since 4th Review Conference", Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024, pp. 11–12.

158 "MASG Intervention: Innovative Finance for Mine Action", GICHD, 29 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4k7av1n.

159 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

160 Emails from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March and 19 June 2025.

161 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA Ukraine, 6 June 2025.

162 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April, 31 July, and 1 September 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April and 10 June 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March and 28 July 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 August 2025.

163 The Crisis and Support Centre (Centre de Crise et de Soutien) is part of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. See "France Diplomacy", Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, accessed 14 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/43f00A0.

164 L'Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo (AICS) is the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation. See www.aics.gov.it.

165 KfW is a German bank. In December 2024, NPA implemented a project with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) under NRC's donor KfW. Emails from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 August 2025.

**Table 3 Continued**

| Donor | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| The Netherlands Refugee Foundation (Stichting Vluchteling) | MAG | None |
| Norway (Norad[166]/MFA) | HALO, NPA | HALO (as at March 2025), NPA |
| Novo Nordisk Foundation[167] | DRC | DRC |
| The Sisley Foundation | MAG | MAG |
| Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)) | DRC | DRC |
| Swiss Solidarity | FSD | FSD |
| Switzerland (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation) | FSD, MAG | DRC, FSD, MAG |
| UNDP | HALO,[168] MAG, NPA | MAG, NPA |
| United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) | HALO, MAG | HALO (as at March 2025), MAG |
| Ukraine Humanitarian Fund (UHF)[169] | DRC | None |
| US PM/WRA | DRC, FSD, HALO, MAG, NPA | DRC, FSD (to end January 2025 only),[170] MAG, NPA |
| Viterra[171] | HALO | HALO (as at March 2025) |
| WFP & FAO | FSD, NPA (in-kind support from WFP) | FSD, MAG (in-kind support from WFP), NPA in-kind and financial support for MDDs from WFP) |
| Other small donors (unspecified) | FSD, HALO | FSD, HALO (as at March 2025) |

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Ukraine is taking steps to prioritise mainstreaming of gender and diversity concerns into all aspects of mine action. The National Mine Action Strategy incorporates nine measures intended to ensure equality and inclusion, including supporting veterans, mine-affected individuals, and persons with disabilities, as well as addressing gender inequality.[172] A national initiative group—the Gender Aspects in Mine Action Initiative— is up and running, and an assessment on gender and diversity in mine action was conducted in 2024. In February 2025, a multi-stakeholder workshop on gender and inclusivity took place, organised by the MoE and the GICHD. Recommendations called for tools to strengthen the capacities of different social groups and initiatives to improve political and legal frameworks.[173] As at April 2025, the MoE was working on an implementation and monitoring and evaluation plan for tracking gender and diversity in the sector,[174] while the GICHD was updating a report on gender and diversity in the sector.[175] *It has also been suggested that national-level reporting could improve gender-specific details.*[176]

One of the tasks identified in the National Mine Action Strategy implementation plan for 2024–2026 is to increase the percentage of marginalised groups who are "engaged in mine action".[177] Operator policies related to gender are reportedly given consideration before operators are accredited. The same considerations and recommendations for equality of opportunity are applied by the national authorities to groups with disabilities, and steps are taken to

166 Norad is the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, under Norway's MFA. See www.norad.no.

167 Novo Nordisk Foundation is an independent, Danish enterprise foundation. See www.novonordiskfonden.dk.

168 Although HALO's UNDP-funded land release project ended in 2024, HALO continues to cooperate with UNDP in other areas of mine action. Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

169 The Ukraine Humanitarian Fund is a country-based pooled fund led by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). See "Ukraine Humanitarian Fund", OCHA, accessed 15 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4j2JquT.

170 Ended as scheduled on 31 January 2025. As at 4 July 2025, the anticipated new contract was not signed due to freeze of US funding. Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March and 4 July 2025.

171 Viterra is a Dutch agriculture company. See www.viterra.com.

172 "Social Inclusion and Gender Equality in Mine Action: Outcomes of the Two-Day Workshop", Demine Ukraine, 21 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3YRHf6j.

173 Ibid.

174 Interview with OSCE Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025; and email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

175 Interview with the GICHD, 10 April 2025.

176 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

177 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p", section entitled "Strategic goals, objectives and expected results aimed at achieving the defined goals".

promote equal access to employment in mine action for these groups.[178] All mine action operators, as with all businesses and organisations in Ukraine, are required to employ a certain percentage of persons with disabilities.[179]

In granting Ukraine's third extension request, the 21MSP noted that the detailed work plan to follow should contain information on how Ukraine ensures consideration for gender, age, and disability, and takes the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities in its implementation efforts.[180] But no such information was provided in the work plan received in May 2024, nor the annually updated work plan for 2025, made available by the APMBC in April 2025.[181]

With regard to increasing the numbers of female operational personnel, Ukraine has stated that, as it expands mine action operational capacity in the MoD up to an estimated 5,000 personnel, it expects female specialists to form up to 30% of the units, although no time frame for this has been given.[182] The NMAA states that, due to the ongoing Russian invasion against Ukraine, information regarding the composition of the Defence and Security Forces of Ukraine, which form all of Ukraine's Government demining units, is considered to be sensitive data, which cannot be shared. Thus, Table 4 highlights the total numbers of staff (male and female) employed across government demining units and the centres involved in humanitarian demining operations (the MAC at Cherniv and the Centre at Merefa); and certified mine action operators. The numbers for women staff included in Table 4 cover only those employed by certified mine action operators.[183]

**Table 4: Gender composition of mine action supervisory bodies and government demining units (GUs) (at end 2024)[184]**

| Total staff* | Total women staff (GUs excluded) | Total managerial or supervisory staff* | Total women managerial or supervisory staff (GUs excluded) | Total operational staff* | Total women operational staff (GUs excluded) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4,395 | 179 (4%) | 879 | 20 (2%) | 3,516 | 159 (5%) |

* Includes the MAC at Chernihiv; the Centre at Merefa; the demining units of the armed forces, SESU, and SSTS; and national police EOD units.

Operators are required to provide gender and age-disaggregated beneficiary data.[185] All international survey and clearance operators implement their global gender, diversity, and inclusion policies at the country-level in Ukraine,[186] while HALO and MAG have developed country-specific gender and diversity strategies for their respective organisations in Ukraine.[187] According to some agencies, about 15% of those employed in mine action in Ukraine were women as at January 2025,[188] although Ukraine's MoD says the proportion of women engaged in mine action "exceeds 35%".[189]

A project underway with UN Women aims to bring more women into the sector in survey, clearance, and specialised positions over the following 18 months, and ultimately increase the number of women employed across all types of leadership, operational, and supporting positions in Ukrainian institutions and organisations.[190] DRC reports that the most commonly reported barriers to accessing the mine action sector identified by women, according to its 2023 perception survey, were: traditional gender stereotypes (26%); the perceived need for necessary previous military training (22%); and the need to work in remote locations (20%).[191] DRC's March 2024 report calls for recruitment processes to be strengthened so as to help overcome stereotypes about the mine action sector (particularly that military experience is required); reviewing working conditions, benefits, and pay packages; introducing shared parental/caretaker leave for both women and men; implementing capacity development plans to ensure career progression paths for women; and collecting and maintaining good, gender-disaggregated data for informed decision-making.[192]

178 Interview with Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, MoD, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

179 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025. This is a legal requirement according to Law of Ukraine No. 2682-IX of 18 October 2022 "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on the Protection of Social, Labor and Other Rights of Individuals, Including During Martial Law, and Simplifying the Registration of Jobs for Persons with Disabilities".

180 Decision of the 21MSP on Ukraine's Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 2.

181 "The Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024 (hereinafter referred to as - the Work Plan) (With annual updates to the plan until 2032)", received 17 May 2024, available at: https://bit.ly/3JzxvIO; and "Annex 1, Workplan on humanitarian demining of newly liberated areas of Ukraine in 2025 (updated on annual basis until 2032)", undated but made available on the APMBC website on 30 April 2025, available at: https://bit.ly/45lPCL5.

182 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 2.

183 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

184 Ibid.

185 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 2.

186 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 1 April 2023; Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February and 13 June 2022; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Denys Holovetskyi, HALO, 29 May 2023; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

187 Emails from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

188 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", OROLSI, DPO, and UNMAS, January 2025.

189 "Over one-third of mine action personnel in Ukraine are women", MoD of Ukraine, 21 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4dzVcfg.

190 Email from Cornelius Nolen, Women, Peace and Security programme, UN Women Ukraine, 14 October 2025.

191 "Ukraine: Gendered Perceptions and Participation in the Mine Action Sector", DRC, March 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3ST5w8p, p. 15.

192 Ibid., pp. 21–22.

Further research on women's perceptions of employment in mine action and key barriers, published by FSD and NGO Girls in the first quarter of 2025, made recommendations on: strengthening of information and awareness-raising activities to dispel fears and stereotypes; clearly communicating that newcomers to the sector receive proper training to help ensure their safety; clear emphasis of the principles of gender equality and openness to the employment of women; and transparent and decent working conditions and pay.[193]

International operators are engaged in efforts to increase female employment in survey and clearance. Building on its gender perception survey findings of 2023, DRC launched a mass media campaign in June 2025.[194] DanChurchAid (DCA) was, able, through a recruitment campaign featuring existing female staff as role models, to recruit, train, and deploy several female staff in 2024, including some as team leaders.[195] NPA was able to increase the proportion of all staff who are women by 10% between 2023 and 2024.[196] APOPO had no women in managerial or supervisory positions as of March 2025, but noted that two female dog handlers were undergoing Team Leader training from February.[197] National NGO operator, Humanitarian Security, had no female deminers at the time of writing but planned to train six by July 2025.[198] National operator, Ukrainian Deminers Association, (UDA) has 40% female staff.[199]

**Table 5: Gender composition of humanitarian mine action operators in 2024[200]***

| Operator | Total staff | Total women staff | Managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| APOPO | 33 | 17 (52%) | 3 | 0 (0%) | 21 | 12 (57%) |
| DCA | 170 | 60 (35%) | 45 | 17 (38%) | 86 | 19 (22%) |
| DRC | 330 | 96 (29%) | 21 | 5 (24%) | 309 | 84 (27%) |
| FSD | 622 | 157 (25%) | 111 | 70 (63%) | 511 | 87 (17%) |
| HALO | 1,546 | 441 (29%) | 360 | 97 (27%) | 1,308 | 322 (25%) |
| Hum. Security | 65 | 7 (11%) | 6 | 2 (33%) | 59 | 5 (8%) |
| MAG | 303 | 131 (43%) | 70 | 21 (30%) | 246 | 97 (39%) |
| NPA | 342 | 126 (37%) | 103 | 27 (26%) | 285 | 94 (33%) |
| **Totals** | **3,411** | **1,035 (30%)** | **719** | **239 (33%)** | **2,825** | **720 (25%)** |

*Includes data on all international survey and clearance operators and on national ones, where available. Mine Action Review was not able to source data on this matter from other national operators.

Initiatives to retain women, and parents, employed in survey and clearance in 2024 included the continuation of HALO's childcare stipend programme for mothers and single fathers, as well its parental leave programme. In 2024, HALO introduced additional support measures for working parents, including its "baby box" and "first grade kit" initiatives.[201] HALO, in partnership with Trimble, also launched the "Women in GIS for Demining" initiative, which trains and mentors female Geographic Information Systems (GIS) specialists from disadvantaged backgrounds. This project empowers women through technical skills development in geospatial technologies, allowing them to contribute to mine action and post-war recovery, while enhancing their long-term career prospects.[202] HALO also provides uniforms and PPE tailored for female employees.[203] In 2025, MAG planned to conduct an evaluation, exploring the impact of equitable employment practices, how these are mainstreamed throughout the programme, and if they are having an impact on retention of female staff.[204]

193 "Women's Perceptions of Employment in Humanitarian Mine Action: Key Barriers" FSD and NGO Girls, February-March 2025, pp. 6-7, at: https://bit.ly/45ayEPo.

194 Emails from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April and 10 June 2025.

195 Email from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025.

196 Emails from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024.

197 Email from Nick Guest, APOPO, 3 March 2025.

198 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

199 "Birthday of the Ukrainian Deminers Association", 15 November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/43gCpCb.

200 Emails from Nick Guest, APOPO, 3 March 2025; Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April and 11 June 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

201 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

202 Ibid.; and "She maps. She protects. Women in GIS for Safer Lands', Presentation from Luan Jaupi, Head of Information Management & ICT, HALO, at the NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025.

203 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

204 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

Efforts were also made to increase employment of war veterans in mine action. Various national and international operators, including Global Clearance Solutions (GCS), FSD, and HALO, worked alongside UNDP on a scheme, co-organised by the MoE and with the participation of other ministries, to enhance employment opportunities for military veterans.[205] In FSD, for example, the first cohort of 12 gained skills in operating drones, ground preparation machines, and detectors in 2024, and FSD planned to intensify its efforts in 2025.[206] HALO has mentorship programmes in place for war veterans.[207] NPA too encourages employment of war veterans, which comprised more than 4% of staff in 2024, rising to 5% as at July 2025.[208]

Measures were taken to increase recruitment of persons with disabilities and other underrepresented groups into mine action. In 2024, MAG surpassed the minimum legal requirement that 4% of its workforce in Ukraine should comprise persons with disabilities, increasing from one staff member to 14 by the end of the year (more than 5% of its total workforce).[209] On average, in 2024, persons with disabilities made 9% of NPA's workforce.[210] HALO conducts workplace accessibility assessments and took steps to enhance workplace accessibility in 2024. HALO also supported the MoE with a project to provide remote sensing imagery analysis training for a cohort of mine victims and employed many of the successful course participants. HALO is also collaborating with national NGOs and the State Employment Service of Ukraine to implement inclusive hiring practices, remove employment barriers, and provide tailored support to candidates from underrepresented groups. Efforts include adjusting recruitment processes, improving workplace accessibility, and offering flexible work arrangements to accommodate employees with diverse needs.[211]

FSD, HALO, and MAG also highlight their efforts to employ community-facing personnel fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian.[212] MAG provides enhanced and country-specific conflict sensitivity training for staff.[213] APOPO is tasked through MAG and therefore MAG's community liaison and tasking policies apply to APOPO in Ukraine.[214] FSD provides cultural sensitivity training to staff, particularly for engagement with displaced populations and vulnerable groups.[215] Key written communications, such as risk education materials and warning signs are commonly provided in both Ukrainian and Russian.[216]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It has been reported that there is good cooperation between the Ministries of the Economy, the Environment, and Defence, on mine action and the environment,[217] which extends to an environmental working group, with effective ministerial representation. The Department of Environment and Mine Action in the MoD coordinates all work on mine action and the environment, including research. The Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS) highlights that Ukraine's environmental legislation and mine action legislation are not yet sufficiently aligned.[218]

Ukraine has a major strategic focus on demining agricultural land and, in turn, on soil specifically. In their January 2025 report on environmental degradation from explosive weapons in southern Ukraine, CEOBS and NPA recommend post-clearance soil sampling to help enhance understanding of the dispersal of metals and energetic materials from the use of explosive weapons.[219] The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) has set up a working group to establish a protocol for soil sampling, with the FAO leading on this and related research. QA and QC teams of the MoD are implementing soil sampling on operational demining sites, and these personnel undertook environmental auditor qualifications in 2024 to prepare for this;[220] an initiative supported by OSCE.[221] Strategies suggested to mitigate the environmental impact of mine action on agricultural land in particular include: avoiding use of explosives where possible; restoring

205 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.
206 "Training veterans in humanitarian demining", FSD, 24 December 2024, at: https://bit.ly/40zT0hF; and email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.
207 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.
208 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 August 2025.
209 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.
210 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 August 2025.
211 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.
212 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.
213 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.
214 Email from Nick Guest, APOPO, 3 March 2025.
215 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.
216 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.
217 Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić and Iryna Maksymuk, OSCE, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.
218 Zoom interview with Anna McKean, Researcher, CEOBS, 28 April 2025; and email from Anna McKean, CEOBS, 15 June 2025.
219 "Assessing environmental degradation from explosive weapons in southern Ukraine", CEOBS and NPA, 16 January 2025, p. 12.
220 Zoom interview with Anna McKean, Researcher, CEOBS, 28 April 2025.
221 Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić and Iryna Maksymuk, OSCE, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.

farmland for production of non-food crops; and using cleared agricultural land to generate other non-crop sources of revenue, such as from solar panels and wind turbines.[222] It is understood that mechanical demining techniques widely applied to agricultural areas would not be suitable for clearance of EO-contaminated environmentally protected areas and forests.[223]

The first draft of a dedicated NMAS on the environment was due to be finalised by the end of 2025. Under the coordination of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the MoE, a working group has been formed to draft, pilot, and approve the future standard and identify best practices.[224] The updated IMAS 7.13 (Second Edition, 3 July 2024) has been translated into Ukrainian.[225] Ukraine's current NMAS include a chapter (11.2.9) on "Environmental regulations", and a section (12.6) on "Environment, occupational health and safety".[226] Certain other standards further cover environmental aspects of demining, though not yet fully.[227] Operators note that key gaps presently include climate change adaptation and mitigation; environmental risk assessments; environmental impact assessments; and compliance with international standards such as ISO 14001.[228]

The NMAA states that environmental assessments are conducted to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance of CMR and that environmentally friendly survey and clearance methods are applied where possible.[229] The OSCE is helping build the operational capacities of the national mine action centres to systematically conduct "environmentally safe" demining.[230]

The National Mine Action Strategy, approved in June 2024, does acknowledge the need for systemic consideration of the environment in mine action and outlines tasks related to the environment under each of the strategy's three strategic goals. These tasks include reducing pollution caused by EO; consideration of the environment during task prioritisation; and application of "environmentally friendly demining methods", especially in protected and conservation areas.[231] In June 2025, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation said it would welcome updated information from Ukraine on its efforts to ensure that climate and environmental considerations inform all relevant areas of Convention implementation to appropriately address climate and environmental risks.[232]

International operators report varying approaches to the integration of environmental considerations into mine action in Ukraine. NPA applies its Green Office tool in Ukraine and, from May 2025, also began implementing the Green Field Tool. NPA Ukraine has conducted an environmental survey among staff and was developing an action plan based on findings at the time of writing.[233] DRC has an environmental management system in place[234] and all international operators have SOPs on environmental management.[235] MAG follows the direction of the NMAA with regards to environmental measures on task sites and includes environmental considerations in the planning and delivery of survey and clearance activities.[236] MAG also conducts post-clearance environmental assessments in line with its global standards.[237] FSD and DCA report to follow a "do-no-harm" approach, for example, ensuring field activities cause minimal disruption to the environment.[238] FSD also emphasises responsible use of mechanical assets to limit soil disturbance and limits the detonation of explosive ordnance where possible.[239] APOPO has not yet implemented specific measures to protect the environment, apart from the management of waste products and animal waste, but planned to introduce further (unspecified) measures during 2025.[240]

Some international operators are also engaged in efforts to reduce emissions. In 2024, HALO continued to develop and apply its framework to calculate and reduce greenhouse gases across its demining operations and administration, using the Humanitarian Carbon Calculator Plus (HCC+) online software.[241] HALO and FSD also highlight the importance of deploying teams as close as possible to work sites reduce vehicle emissions.[242] Humanitarian Security uses solar energy in field camps.[243]

222 "Mine Action in Ukraine", presentation to the MASG by Paul Heslop, UNRCO, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 15.

223 Zoom interview with Anna McKean, CEOBS, 28 April 2025; and email from Anna McKean, CEOBS, 15 June 2025.

224 Email from Government of Ukraine, 22 September 2025.

225 Zoom interview with Anna McKean, CEOBS, 28 April 2025.

226 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022; and Imogen Churchill, HALO, 23 March 2022.

227 These include Ukraine's NMAS: 8820-2023 ("Mine action. Management processes. Basic Provisions") and parts four and five of this which address, respectively, mechanised demining (8820-4) and land release (8820-5). Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025; and "National Mine Action Standards", Communication Platform for Technical Regulation in Ukraine, accessed 20 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4m3vYZt.

228 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; and Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

229 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

230 "Support to Environmental Rehabilitation with Focus on Building National Humanitarian Mine Action Capacities of Ukraine", OSCE, accessed 14 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4dHLoze.

231 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p", section entitled "Strategic goals, objectives and expected results aimed at achieving the defined goals".

232 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, p. 5.

233 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

234 Email from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.

235 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; Nick Guest, MAG, 23 March 2023; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

236 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

237 Email from Nick Guest, MAG, 23 March 2023.

238 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; and Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

239 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

240 Email from Nick Guest, APOPO, 3 March 2025.

241 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

242 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; and Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

243 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

HALO Ukraine has formed a partnership with World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) Ukraine to restore the shelterbelts (vegetation barriers)[244] that HALO has demined in the Mykolaiv region. This project aims to have a positive impact on agriculture, help mitigate the impact of climate change, and contribute to the post-war recovery of affected communities.[245]

**Table 6: International operator environmental policies and action[246]**

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| APOPO | Yes | No | Yes |
| DCA | Yes | Yes | No |
| DRC | Yes | No | No |
| FSD | Yes | Yes | No |
| HALO | Yes | In development (June 2025)[247] | Yes |
| NPA | Yes (country-specific) | Yes (from May 2025) | Yes |
| MAG | Yes | No | No |

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Ukraine is using IMSMA Core.[248] Operators report that the system functions effectively, and all operators have been trained in its use.[249] It is said to meet information requirements for the programme, and that it has been structured to support and adapt to the specific data needs of mine action operators. Furthermore, the established connection between operators and the national database enables its use for GIS purposes, allowing operators to leverage spatial data for mapping.[250] Operators also report that the national database is up to date in so far as is possible in the context of the ongoing conflict.[251]

Survey and clearance data entered into IMSMA are validated by the MAC.[252] All accredited operators are required to regularly submit reports, including on NTS, TS, and clearance.[253] Data collection forms are regularly discussed and agreed with operators.[254] The IMSMA database receives new information daily from operators that is shared across key partners.[255] Ukraine states that access to its IMSMA Core portal is open to all certified operators "within the defined limits that do not contradict the privacy policy of sensitive data", as well as to government authorities involved in mine action, local authorities, international organisations, and the public at large.[256]

HALO developed an EOD reporting form in Survey123 in 2024, which is available for other operators to use once certified to conduct EOD operations. This has led to improved communication and co-ordination in this area between HALO and the MAC.[257] The MAC provides detailed, live information on a public website on progress in releasing EO-contaminated land, including the amount of land surveyed and cleared and the number of items destroyed (not disaggregated by weapon type), both by government units and humanitarian operators.[258]

Though large amounts of territory remain subject to primary NTS, so have not yet been excluded from being potentially contaminated, and not yet designated as SHAs or CHAs, Ukraine is collecting and recording disaggregated data in its IMSMA database in areas where it has access and where it has so far been able to conduct comprehensive NTS.[259]

As at June 2025, the Committee on Cooperative Compliance noted that, "while Ukraine has not yet submitted an Article 7 report in 2025 [covering 2024], it submitted information on implementation of Article 5".[260] As at early September 2025, the Article 7 report covering 2024 was still outstanding. Ukraine submitted an Article 7 Report covering 2023 on

244 A shelterbelt is a vegetation barrier, grown to protect crops and livestock from strong winds and to help prevent erosion, and topsoil depletion.

245 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

246 Emails from Nick Guest, APOPO, 3 March 2025; Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April and 10 June 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 6 June 2025; Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April and 11 June 2025.

247 As at June 2025, HALO was testing the NPA/CEOBS Green Field Tool, which was in the final stage of development. Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March and 19 June 2025.

248 Email from the GICHD, 26 May 2023.

249 Email from Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 May 2024.

250 Email from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.

251 Emails from Jon Cunliffe, MAG, 26 April 2024; Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024; Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 May 2024; and Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

252 Emails from the GICHD, 19 April 2023; and Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

253 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 3 May 2024; and Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 May 2024.

254 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

255 GICHD, "Ukraine faces massive explosive contamination one year into conflict", 24 February 2023.

256 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 7.

257 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

258 Ukraine National Mine Action Center, MoD and SSTS, accessed 22 May 2025, at: http://bit.ly/487neOj.

259 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

260 Committee on Cooperative Compliance, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, Annex IV.

time and acted upon on the decisions of the 21MSP by submitting an updated work plan, both in 2024, and 2025.[261] The Article 7 report covering 2023 was better than the one submitted a year earlier in that it included information on AP mined areas and land release.[262] The Committee encouraged Ukraine to report information on progress in accordance with land release methodology employed, in accordance with the IMAS and disaggregated by type of contamination, and to employ the Guide to Reporting in the drafting of its annual Article 7 report. It also called on Ukraine to update information on its remaining challenge in a manner consistent with IMAS, disaggregated by SHAs, CHAs, their relative size, and type of contamination, and to continue disaggregating AP mines of an improvised nature from other IEDs.[263] Survey and clearance data provided by the government of Ukraine to Mine Action Review for the 2024 reporting period were better than previous years. Land release for 2024 was disaggregated by EO type as was land release methodology (area reduced through technical survey was disaggregated from area cleared).

## PLANNING AND TASKING

The National Mine Action Strategy for 2024–33 focuses on three strategic goals: "land release, protection of the people, and system improvement". Ukraine plans to update the implementation plan every three years.[264] An operational plan for 2024–26 is attached to the strategy. The strategy does not make separate provision for AP mines, but rather refers throughout to "explosive ordnance".[265]

Ukraine submitted an annual work plan for 2024 to the other States Parties through the Implementation Support Unit in accordance with the decision of the 21MSP in response to its Article 5 deadline extension request, writing that it is "subject to annual updates until 2032". The plan contains a table detailing all known AP mined areas by district with precise coordinates.[266] Finally, annual land release targets for release of AP mined areas are given for the period 2024 to 2032, though these are provided only in Ukrainian and not in English.[267]

Ukraine submitted an updated annual work plan for 2025, in which it planned for 22 certified operators to undertake NTS and release through cancellation almost 205km$^2$ of AP mined area, across 1,212 hazardous areas (see Table 7). A detailed list is provided assigning each named operator with a certain number of areas and their size, as well as a detailed list of the "territorial communities" (TCs) that will be included in the NTS, and the size of each TC. Ukraine also planned for 25 certified operators to undertake clearance of 2,711 hazardous areas "to get rid of mines and explosive remnants of war" in 104 TCs, measuring 506km$^2$, across eight oblasts (see Table 8). The number of hazardous areas to be cleared in each oblast is not stated. However, a detailed list is provided assigning named operators to a specific TC, with the size of each TC stated.[268]

**Table 7: AP mined areas planned to be released through cancellation by Ukraine in 2025**[269]

| Oblast | No. of hazardous areas to be addressed | Area to be addressed (km$^2$) |
|---|---|---|
| Mykolayiv | 476 | 97.3 |
| Kharkiv | 310 | 31.8 |
| Kherson | 207 | 47.4 |
| Chernihiv | 147 | 16.3 |
| Dnipropetrovsk | 29 | 2.1 |
| Kyiv | 26 | 9.4 |
| Sumy | 17 | 0.4 |
| **Totals** | **1,212** | **204.7** |

261 Ibid., pp. 3–4.
262 Article 7 Reports (covering 2022 and 2023), Form D.
263 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, pp. 1–2.
264 Presentation by Oleg Stoiev, Head of Mine Action Office, MoE, NDM, in Geneva, 29 April 2024.
265 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p.
266 Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024, 30 April 2024, Table 3.
267 Ibid., Table 4.
268 "Annex 1, Workplan on humanitarian demining of newly liberated areas of Ukraine in 2025 (updated on annual basis until 2032)", pp. 7–9.
269 Ibid., p. 9.

**Table 8: Areas planned to be cleared containing mines and ERW by Ukraine in 2025**[270]

| Oblast | Area to be addressed (km²) |
|---|---|
| Mykolayiv | 157.6 |
| Kharkiv | 193.4 |
| Kherson | 84.7 |
| Chernihiv | 21.13 |
| Dnipropetrovsk | 2.47 |
| Kyiv | 36.7 |
| Sumy | 1.68 |
| Donetsk | 8.7 |
| **Total** | **506.38** |

Ukraine prioritises clearance of critical infrastructure facilities and population centres.[271] The National Mine Action Strategy identifies the need for better planning and tasking as part of systems improvement, citing "the formation of a system of prioritisation of tasks for mine action and the centralised distribution of relevant tasks by the authorised body" as prerequisites to effective, centralised task distribution in the country.[272] In October 2024, the Senior Technical Advisor on Mine Action to the UN in Ukraine advocated for "clear and appropriate task dossiers, linked to prioritisation & outcomes", rather than output-focused demining.[273] A pilot project to improve prioritisation, in partnership between digital technology company Palantir and the MoE, was underway in Kharkiv in April 2025.[274] In March 2025, the national authorities published the "Methodological Guidelines for Prioritizing Areas Contaminated by Explosive Ordnance for Humanitarian Demining".[275] As at July 2025, this new methodology for prioritisation was being piloted, with assessment at the hromada, oblast, and national levels[276] and by September 2025 it was rolled out in five oblasts.
Each year, Ukraine conducts a bottom-up exercise on tasking and prioritisation, gathering information from local authorities and operators, and approving the plan for the following year.[277]

Some changes to tasking procedures were made during 2024 and early 2025. A new procedure was introduced in 2024 requiring that humanitarian operators first request all tasks through the relevant oblast administration before an official task order is submitted to MAC. When the MAC and the oblast administration have differing priorities or inconsistent data availability, this has often led to significant delays. Improving coordination and data sharing between the MAC and the oblast administrations could help streamline this process.[278]

In early 2025, the MAC made changes to the task allocation process for hazardous areas requiring TS or clearance, such that operators now seek approval from the MAC, demonstrating they have capacity to begin work on a task within ten days of receiving approval. Unlike previously, requested tasks no longer need to be located in the hromadas originally designated to the operator for NTS or risk education. This allows greater flexibility for operators to apply for permission to conduct TS and clearance on high-priority hazardous areas.[279] The change could have been better communicated to all stakeholders, as initially there were delays in the issuing and renewal of task orders. By April 2025, however, the process was said to be working more effectively even though it has introduced an additional layer of bureaucracy.[280]

While there have been improvements, operators do highlight some continued challenges with tasking. For example, the annual assignment of areas for NTS can prove inefficient, as the NTS capacities of operators can change over the course of the year, leaving some operators constrained from conducting NTS where they have capacity and others unable to cover assigned areas adequately. Building more flexibility into the system of annual NTS area assignments would help ensure that operators with available resources are not constrained from conducting NTS in affected areas.[281]

Tasking for clearance sites can be lengthy and complicated, with approvals from several layers of administration required and these bodies not always aligned on priorities.[282] APOPO reports that the issuance of task dossiers can take up to 10 working days, hampering continuity of operations and operational planning.[283] HALO, at times, has encountered delays in obtaining allocation of new areas for survey from

270 Ibid., p. 7.
271 2023 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 3.
272 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems".
273 "Mine Action in Ukraine", presentation to the MASG by Paul Heslop, UNRCO, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 28.
274 Interview with the GICHD, 10 April 2025. See also "Palantir and Ministry of Economy of Ukraine Sign Demining Partnership", Palantir, 3 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/44LV5sq.
275 "Mine Action in Focus, Issue 1", Demine Ukraine, MoE, June 2025, p. 9. At the time of writing (August 2025), this document was available in Ukrainian, but it was not known if it was also available in English.
276 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.
277 Email from Government of Ukraine, 22 September 2025.
278 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.
279 Email from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025.
280 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.
281 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.
282 Ibid.
283 Email from Nick Guest, APOPO, 3 March 2025.

the MAC.[284] MAG also experienced challenges in tasking in early 2025, with other demining actors being issued task orders for clearance sites already issued to MAG. It seems that MAG was tasked for these sites within the IMSMA system, whereas others had been tasked by the MoE through the cadastral plot priority list, resulting in the overlap. The affected task sites were suspended while the issue of who has primacy to conduct clearance is resolved. This was ongoing as at April 2025.[285]

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

NMAS were finalised by the MoD in 2018.[286] At the time, the GICHD considered that these were in line with IMAS whereas other stakeholders felt they needed further refinement, for example, by tailoring the criteria for direct and indirect evidence to the new operational context[287] and clarifying responsibilities for control and enforcement of marking systems.[288] In April 2023, Ukraine issued "improved" national standards covering NTS, TS, manual demining, clearance, mechanical demining, EO destruction, and EORE.[289] Certain revised NMAS were due to come into effect on 1 June 2024[290] and IM standards and QM standards were approved in 2024.[291] New land release and mechanical land release standards entered into force on 1 April and 1 May 2025, respectively, with the former meaning that humanitarian operators are finally able to cancel land through NTS (though only under certain criteria).[292] At the time of writing, MDD standards were expected to be released in 2026.[293] A new technical committee on the "Standardisation of Mine Action Processes" was established by the national authorities in March 2025.[294] Under this Committee, as at September 2025, a primary review of the improved standards mentioned above has been conducted; a review of other standards is planned; the standard on EORE was pending approval; and work to develop the dedicated environmental standard had been launched.[295]

The changes to the NMAS in 2024 and early 2025 involved consultation with operators.[296] Though generally well received, challenges remain over how they are understood and implemented.[297] With regard to cancellation, according to the instructions issued by the MAC in August 2024, only areas with evidence of contamination from UXO, not areas with evidence of contamination from mines or CMR, may be resurveyed and cancelled.[298] Some operators suggest this is overly restrictive. HALO, for example, continues to advocate for revisions to the instructions that enable operators to cancel areas that do not require further intervention, as very few tasks are eligible for cancellation under the current system.[299] This has been highlighted as particularly problematic, given that large areas of land are suspected of being contaminated by EO (primarily as a result of having been occupied by Russian forces), but without any evidence of contamination. The Senior Technical Advisor on Mine Action to the UN in Ukraine has advocated the adoption of a risk management approach "until land is confirmed as being contaminated or no evidence of mines is accepted"[300] and also suggests greater delegation of decision-making on cancellation, e.g. to the oblast level or further down.[301] It has also been suggested that there should be greater clarity around the requirement to mark the entire perimeter of a given area during NTS, as doing so in inaccessible areas requires significant time, effort, and capacity.[302]

HALO points out that increased use of mechanical clearance techniques in Ukraine have the potential to dramatically increase the speed, efficiency, and safety of clearance, once context-specific methodologies have been refined and adapted to the terrain and threats in the country. HALO experienced some challenges with the process of accreditation of crewed mechanical assets during 2024, with delays to testing by the national authorities,[303] which require that at least one type of every asset is tested before approval

284 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

285 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

286 Emails from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 25 September 2018; and Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE, 25 September 2018; and interview, 7 February 2019.

287 Emails from the GICHD, 19 April 2023 and 19 June 2025.

288 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

289 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 7.

290 Presentation by Col. Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA, MoD, at NDM, Geneva, 29 April 2024.

291 Email from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.

292 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; interview with the GICHD, Geneva, 10 April 2025; and "Mine Action in Focus, Issue 1", Demine Ukraine, MoE, June 2025, p. 9.

293 Email from Government of Ukraine, 22 September 2025.

294 "Mine Action in Focus, Issue 1", Demine Ukraine, MoE, June 2025, p. 9. This newsletter contains a link to a document in Ukrainian regarding this committee. At the time of writing (July 2025), it was not known if the document was also available in English.

295 Email from Government of Ukraine, 22 September 2025.

296 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; and Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

297 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

298 This instruction was issued in the MAC's supplementary note No. 244, dated 21 August 2024. Email from the Government of Ukraine, 1 August 2025.

299 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

300 "Mine Action in Ukraine", presentation to the MASG by Paul Heslop, UNRCO, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 7.

301 Ibid, p. 28.

302 Email from humanitarian operator, August 2025.

303 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

and deployment.[304] The technical notes accompanying the NMAS on mechanical assets are also said to be not consistently understood or implemented across the sector.[305]

Operators also suggest the need for an amendment to the NMAS on clearance of confirmed surface-laid AP and AV mines, removing the requirement to clear to a sub-surface depth of 15cm. This requirement presents difficulties where deminers are forced to clear sub-surface metal contamination in areas where there is only surface presence of AP or AV mines.[306] A suggested alterative is that the requirement to clear areas so that they are metal free should be risk- and threat-based and designated within the task dossier.[307] Finally, it is suggested the NMAS criteria for reduction are, at times, restrictive and should be reviewed.[308]

The Government states that Ukraine's QM system is an area for further improvement, as capacity remains challenging.[309] In October 2024 a "lack of scale of capacity to meet the needs of the sector, particularly for QM, QC and tasking" in Ukraine was highlighted to the MASG, with a recommendation for further investment in QA and QM.[310] HALO reports that limited external QC capacity among the national authorities caused delays during 2024, preventing HALO from handing over completed tasks to local communities in a timely manner.[311] The MoD and SESU both have QA teams. However, respective roles and responsibilities for QA reportedly require clarification, and the national authorities were looking into this as at April 2025.[312]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

As at July 2025, Ukraine had 108 certified mine action operators, including NGOs and government units, with more than 50 others undergoing accreditation.[313] The number of mine action operators in Ukraine has grown significantly since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, increasing from 29 in 2023[314] to 45 by July 2024,[315] and then doubling to 90 by April 2025. As at June 2024, total demining capacity in Ukraine reportedly exceeded 3,000 but was changing regularly.[316]

The NMAA calculated the combined total of all government unit survey, clearance, and EOD personnel stood at 4,395 in 2024, along with 221 mechanical demining assets (see Table 9).[317] This had increased to 278 by July 2025.[318] For 2023, Ukraine reported that clearance of all types of EO by government units in Ukraine involved 384 teams comprising 1,503 personnel in total.[319] This was approximately in line with Ukraine's plan to expand from 200 demining teams of more than 1,000 personnel in December 2022, to 400 teams of 2,000 personnel in 2023[320] – nearly four times the capacity available in 2020.[321] Ukraine expected a further increase in capacity during 2025[322] and intends to set mine action operational capacity in the MoD at around 5,000 personnel. It was approaching this by the end of 2024 (see Table 9). It is not specified what level of this increased capacity will be available for the survey and clearance of AP mines. The plan for capacity growth refers throughout to "mines and explosive remnants of war".[323]

The MoD and several other ministries continue to deploy units that undertake rapid demining and EOD spot task destruction of mines and ERW. This includes the engineering units of the armed forces; SESU; national police EOD units; and the SSTS, which is responsible for demining national infrastructure.[324] The Armed Forces of Ukraine and police EOD teams are reportedly at the forefront of emergency response in disposing of ERW in newly accessible areas.[325]

304 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 17 July 2025, online.
305 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.
306 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.
307 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.
308 Emails from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March and 1 September 2025.
309 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.
310 "Mine Action in Ukraine", presentation to the MASG by Paul Heslop, UNRCO, New York, 24 October 2024, pp. 25 and 28.
311 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.
312 Interview with the GICHD, 10 April 2025.
313 These numbers were correct as at 17 July 2025. See "List of Operators", Demine Ukraine at: https://bit.ly/45vLlVT.
314 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems".
315 "List of Mine Certified Mine Action Operators", ArcGIS Web Application, accessed 23 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3y9J58e.
316 Email from Paul Heslop, (then) UNDP, 7 June 2024.
317 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.
318 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.
319 FAO and WFP Presentation, NDM, 2024.
320 US Department of State, "Demining Ukraine: A Pre-requisite for Recovery: Michael Tirre Remarks before the U.S. Helsinki Commission", 8 December 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3KFdXzJ.
321 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2020.
322 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.
323 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 2.
324 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 25 July 2025.
325 "Ukraine: Strengthening national mine action capabilities", DRC, 9 February 2024.

**Table 9: Government unit capacities* deployed for survey, clearance, and EOD of AP mines in 2024**[326]

| Type of national government unit | NTS personnel | TS and clearance personnel | Emergency EOD personnel | Total personnel | Mechanical demining assets deployed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All government demining & EOD units including in the armed forces; SESU; SSTS; and national police EOD units* | 572 | 2,149 | 1,674 | 4,395 | **221 |
| **Totals** | **572** | **2,149** | **1,674** | **4,395** | **221 |

*The NMAA states that, due to ongoing conflict, disaggregated information with regard to the composition of the separate demining entities within the Defence and Security Forces of Ukraine, is considered to be sensitive, and hence it has not been provided to Mine Action Review. **Mechanical demining assets as of 2 May 2025.

**Table 10: NGO operational NTS capacities deployed in 2024***[327]

| Operator | Teams | Total personnel* |
|---|---|---|
| DCA | 6 | 24 |
| DRC | 12 | 23 |
| FSD | 19 | 57 |
| HALO | 70 | 151 |
| Humanitarian Security | 1 | 3 |
| MAG | 12 | 24 |
| NPA | 17 | 34 |
| **Totals** | **137** | **316** |

*Information based on data available at time of writing. Full information not available on the capacity of national operators.

The SSTS reports to be the "largest formation in demining in Ukraine" and states that it conducted 54% of all demining in 2024, including 43% of all EOD and 65% of all survey, though it is not clear if this refers to demining in the area within 20km of the front lines of conflict, open only to government units, or to demining activity outside of this restricted area. As at April 2025, SSTS had four demining battalions and one underwater demining company, with 3,000 deminers trained and 250 more in training. For 2025–26, SSTS planned to establish a further underwater demining company and bring its total demining personnel to more than 5,000.[328]

Ukraine continued to build the capacity of its national demining units through international cooperation in 2024. Within the framework of NATO's international Demining Capability Coalition[329] over 1,000 humanitarian deminers of Ukraine's MoD received IMAS EOD1/EOD2 training. Humanitarian demining units of the MoD also received "demining machines, individual EOD kits, pick-up vehicles for EO transportation, mine detectors, armoured vests and visors".[330] Training of personnel in the Security and Defence Forces in 2024 covered NTS, TS, demining, mine and IED rapid clearance and spot tasks."[331]

Multiple international demining organisations operational in Ukraine include APOPO, DCA, DRC, FSD, HALO, MAG, and NPA (see Tables 10 and 11).[332] Humanity & Inclusion (HI), currently active in risk education, planned to begin NTS in September 2025.[333] Humanitarian Security is a national operator based in the Kharkiv region, where it planned to survey 90km$^2$ of hazardous area by the end of 2025. Humanitarian Security highlights that several new operators, including Falcon Demine LLC, and the Charity Fund Relief Coordinating Centre, also began conducting significant NTS in Kharkiv and the wider Kharkiv region in 2025. It also cites Ukroboronservice (UOS) and International Demining Group (IDG) as also actively conducting NTS and clearance in Ukraine. Humanitarian Security also highlights that, until early 2024, mainly international operators (along with government units) conducted survey, while the number of national humanitarian operators conducting survey was minimal.[334] While Mine Action Review made every effort to contact both international and national operators, due to the rapidly expanding nature of the mine action programme in 2024, it was not feasible to source and include information on all national operators who may have surveyed and cleared EO in 2024.

326 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

327 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

328 "Partnerships in Action: How Collaboration and Innovation Drive Impact", Presentation from Mikhailo Konopelniuk, Colonel, Demining, SSTS, at the NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025.

329 This coalition has 22 member States: Lithuania, Iceland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Moldova, Japan, and Ukraine. The MoD of Ukraine, along with Ministry of National Defense of Lithuania, initiated the Demining Capability Coalition (DMC) in February 2024. CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form E.

330 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form E.

331 Ibid., Form A.

332 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024; Michael Edwards, DCA, 3 May 2024; Dino Šujak, ITF Ukraine, 16 May 2024; Jon Cunliffe, MAG, 26 April 2024; Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 May 2024; and Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and FSD, "Ukraine", accessed 10 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4blMYPH.

333 Emails from Fenella Henderson-Howat, Technical Head of Programme, HI, Ukraine, 4 April and 30 July 2025; and Muuaz Alfayad, Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) Specialist, HI, 29 August 2025.

334 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 11 June 2025.

**Table 11: NGO operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2024***[335]

| Operator | Manual teams | Mechanical teams | MTTs | Total deminers** | Dogs and handlers | Machines*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCA | 5 | 0 | 0 | 45 | 0 | Manual teams and total deminers includes 1 x TS team of 5 deminers. |
| DRC | 0 | 0 | 20 | 180 | 0 | 0 |
| FSD | 23 | 6 | 0 | 260 | 0 | MV10 x2<br>MV4 x1<br>GCS 200 x1<br>Robocut x4<br>Rollers x3<br>Bobcat x1 |
| HALO | 75 | 25 | 0 | 430 (380 manual, 50 mechanical) | 0 | Traxx x 3<br>T800 Robocut x 30<br>S300 Robocut x 13<br>Amtrac x 2<br>Hitachi 210-LC7 remotely operated excavators x 5 |
| Humanitarian Security | 10 | N/K | 0 | 40 | 0 | 3 x MR31 demining and QC |
| MAG | 13 | Mechanical team trained and certified but not operational in 2024. | 0 | 94 | 0 | 0 |
| NPA | 31 | 15 mechanical demining personnel trained and certified in Q4 2024 but not operational. | 0 | 167 | 8 | 7 ground preparation machines. |
| **Totals** | **157** | **31** | **20** | **1,216** | **8** | **75** |

*Information based on data available at time of writing. Full information not available on the capacity of national operators. **Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers unless otherwise stated. ***Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

HALO and FSD both saw a significant increase in survey and clearance personnel deployed in 2024, compared to 2023.[336] HALO was able to double its number of NTS teams from 35 to 70, and began deploying its own dedicated EOD teams for the first time in 2024.[337] MAG was also able to increase community liaison and demining capacity due to more donor funding.[338] DCA reduced its NTS capacity from seven teams to six in 2024 but increased its TS and clearance capacity. It planned to continue this trend in 2025, while attempting to retain and retrain staff in line with its operational plan to increase focus on TS and clearance.[339] NPA had doubled the number of its manual teams[340] by the end of 2024, compared to the year before. NPA also obtained certification for mechanical assets in April 2024, with 13 deployed by the end

335 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 22 June 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April and 10 June 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

336 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; and Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

337 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

338 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

339 Email from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025.

340 NPA previously used the term "multi-task team" to refer to its teams capable of manual TS, clearance and BAC. However, from 2025, NPA is not using this term and refers instead to "manual teams".

of the year, and signed a partnership agreement with WFP. Under this agreement, WFP is providing mechanical assets and support with MDD capacity for demining on agricultural land during 2025. NPA reciprocates by sharing real-time data on cleared areas in Kherson and Mykolaiv regions, to enable targeted livelihood assistance. NPA also began training four additional MDDs in Q4 2024, which were certified in April 2025, plus a further five MDD units in the spring of 2025 (handlers and MDDs), which were expected to be certified in September 2025.[341]

MAG imported two MineWolf 240 machines in April 2024, and gained mechanical certification in November 2024, following capability testing of the machines at the National Research Centre at the request of the national authorities, which caused some delay to certification. A mechanical team was trained and certified but not operational during the year.[342] MAG anticipates EOD accreditation to be completed towards the end of 2025. The process is ongoing but has been affected by the US review of foreign assistance.[343]

Following expansion in 2024, FSD saw a 25% reduction in survey and clearance capacity in early 2025, due to the unexpected cessation of US funding. FSD expected certification and deployment of dogs for TS in June 2025.[344] HALO expected an increase in survey and clearance capacity during 2025, but not to the extent achieved in 2024.[345] NPA expected to increase manual capacity in 2025.[346] MAG expected the number of teams to remain steady in 2025, though this depended on the outcome of the US decision following the stop work order and on other funding proposals in progress as at June 2025.[347] National operator Humanitarian Security planned to add one NTS team, two mechanical teams, and one manual team during 2025. It also planned to dedicate 12 personnel to EOD spot tasks only from April 2025 while increasing mechanical assets, with 11 Ukrainian-produced machines due for delivery in Q1–Q2 2025.[348]

Some operators have enhanced or altered use of mechanical assets in Ukraine to adapt to the local context. FSD, for example, is using a mesh rather than a detector to screen soil in heavily metal-contaminated areas, prepared with the MV10 robotic demining system or the GCS200 unmanned EOD platform.[349] FSD is also using locally-produced mine rollers, which it says are enhancing safety and efficiency,[350] and HALO is working with a local manufacturer to refine a mini-flail ground preparation machine.[351]

MDD teams have been operational in Ukraine under NPA since the spring of 2024[352] and technical survey dogs (TSDs) were introduced into Ukraine in November 2024. APOPO, in partnership with MAG, deployed TSD teams working alongside MAG manual teams in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts, though adverse weather restricted operations. APOPO anticipated initial use of the dogs in suspected or confirmed hazardous agricultural areas, with remote-controlled vegetation-cutting machines considered for use in areas where there might be a tripwire threat. APOPO TSDs are trained to work in vegetation, removing the need for the ground-preparation that would be necessary when using more conventional MDDs. APOPO reports that this increases land release efficiency by allowing manual demining teams to focus their efforts on CHAs.[353] APOPO planned to add two further teams in 2025 and to survey at least 5km$^2$ using TSDs by the end of the year. However, it points out that this figure is based on minefield tasks with 50% survey coverage, whereas the MAC currently requires 100% survey coverage in BAC tasks.[354] As most hazardous areas contain a mixed threat, full coverage will likely be required.

Further development of the use of UAVs (drones) and remote-sensing capabilities continued in 2024**.** HALO trained NTS and remote-sensing personnel in UAV use and imagery analysis. It equipped teams with a mixture of small, medium, and large UAVs, including some with advanced sensors for use in different contexts. By the middle of 2024, high-resolution UAV survey was being used in planning every suitable clearance task. Automatically programmed flights over minefields are also used to rapidly collect high-resolution imagery, which is processed into a highly detailed minefield image map (orthomosaic).[355] In early 2025, FSD undertook tests of UAVs equipped with ground-penetrating radar, though these did not provide useful findings due to issues with the GPS jamming during flight.[356] NPA continued to use UAVs intensively for NTS and TS "and clearance", as well as to generate orthomosaics, which can be later used by clearance teams as the basemap.[357] NPA also introduced high-accuracy, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) devices to help field teams map mined areas and clearance polygons with centimetre accuracy.[358]

341 Emails from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 August 2025.
342 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.
343 Ibid.
344 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.
345 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.
346 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.
347 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 11 June 2025.
348 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.
349 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.
350 "Our Mine action programme in Ukraine", FSD, November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4hyEOMN, p. 8.
351 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.
352 Email from Government of Ukraine, 22 September 2025.
353 "APOPO in Ukraine", APOPO, accessed 28 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4aDj7ss.
354 Email from Nick Guest, APOPO, 12 May 2025.
355 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.
356 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March and 29 August 2025.
357 A basemap is the background map layer in GIS or mapping applications that provides geographic context for data.
358 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

Operators also continued to explore the use of AI in 2024. NPA continued two AI projects with partners, which seek to generate an alternative tool for pinpointing landmine and EO evidence points, and assist traditional manual NTS. Importing this information directly into NPA's database is intended to eliminate the risk of manual entry errors.[359] FSD is exploring using systems such as Safe Pro's *Spotlight AI* to help analyse NTS data and ensure clearance assets are deployed efficiently.[360] HALO has started to use AI analysis of satellite photos of war-affected areas to assess the potential mine threat.[361]

With the continued flow of equipment donations into Ukraine's mine action programme, one of Ukraine's challenges has been highlighted as a lack of "logistics capacity to support equipment donations and keep them operational".[362]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 12: Land release outputs in 2024 (National authority data)[363]**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 2.07 | Official IMSMA data provided on clearance of areas suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines by humanitarian operators, excluding clearance by State entities such as MoD and SESU. Not all these areas were ultimately found to contain AP mines. |
| **Technical Survey** | 2.07 | Official IMSMA data provided on reduction through TS of areas suspected or confirmed to contain AP by humanitarian operators, excluding State entities such as MoD and SESU. |
| **Non-Technical Survey** | 0 | Official IMSMA data. |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 14,142 by all entities, including both humanitarian and military-related demining (National authority data). Includes 457 AP mines destroyed by humanitarian clearance operators according to official IMSMA data, of which 207 were destroyed in spot tasks by non-State operators)* | Total AP mines destroyed: NMAA data. EOD spot tasks: official IMSMA data. |

*Data on the number of AP mines destroyed in spot tasks by government units were requested but not provided.

359 Ibid.

360 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

361 "Ukraine", HALO, accessed 28 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3Cr0lbj.

362 "Mine Action in Ukraine", presentation to the MASG by Paul Heslop, UNRCO, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 25.

363 Emails from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025; and Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

Official IMSMA data provided in September 2025 indicate that a total of almost 4.15km$^2$ of AP mined area was released in 2024 through humanitarian demining (i.e. excluding military demining), of which 2.07km$^2$ was reduced through TS (see Table 14) and 2.07km$^2$ was cleared (see Table 18). This is the mine clearance total Mine Action Review has used for 2024. While the 2.07km$^2$ was clearance of SHAs/CHAs suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines, not all these areas were ultimately found to contain AP mines during clearance.[364] No mined area was cancelled through NTS in 2024. Official IMSMA data include humanitarian demining operations, but exclude the results of military-related demining activities. A total of 457 AP mines were destroyed during humanitarian operations in 2024. At the time of writing, Ukraine had yet to submit its APMBC Article 7 transparency report covering 2024.

Land release data provided to Mine Action Review by Ukraine's NMAA pertain to release of land contaminated with various types of EO, including AP and AV mines, CMR, and other items of UXO. According to the NMAA, a total of 11.51km$^2$ of all contamination types was released through survey in Ukraine in 2024, of which 7.01km$^2$ was cancelled through NTS and 4.5km$^2$ was reduced through technical survey.[365] In addition, 17.1km$^2$ was cleared of all contamination types in Ukraine in 2024 (see Table 19).[366] The NMAA reports that 14,142 AP mines were destroyed during TS, clearance, and EOD, together with 11,119 AV mines, 25,893 submunitions and 164,248 other items of UXO.[367] This includes both humanitarian and military demining operations. However, as noted above, the areas released, as reported by the NMAA, are of all EO contamination generally. Therefore, the size of the actual AP mined area addressed, is far smaller.

International operators reported that they released a total of 1.24km$^2$ of mined area in 2024, of which 724,171m$^2$ was cleared and 513,916m$^2$ reduced through TS (none was cancelled through NTS).[368] In addition, national operator Humanitarian Security cleared 123,640m$^2$ of AP mined area and cancelled 2.39km$^2$ through NTS,[369] although no AP mined area was recorded in IMSMA as having been cancelled by any operator in 2024. Mine Action Review requested information on survey and clearance from several other national operators in 2024 but was unable to source further data. A total of 512 AP mines were found by humanitarian operators during clearance, along with 937 AV mines and 230 items of UXO. According to humanitarian operators from whom Mine Action Review was able to obtain data, a further 19 AP mines and 4 AV mines were identified in spot tasks by humanitarian operators. All mines and UXO they found were transferred for destruction by authorised national operators, except in the cases of HALO and Humanitarian Security, both of which are accredited for EOD.[370] The number of AP mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks by all operators in Ukraine in 2024, (excluding rapid response by State operators) was 207, according to official IMSMA data provided by the Government of Ukraine.[371]

## SURVEY IN 2024

At the time of writing, Ukraine had yet to submit its Article 7 report covering 2024. However, according to official IMSMA data, 2.07km$^2$ of hazardous areas with suspected or confirmed AP mine contamination was reduced through technical survey in 2024 (see Table 14). No mined area was cancelled through NTS in 2024.[372] The amount of mined area reduced through TS in 2024 was a significant increase on 2023, when was 0.02km$^2$ was reduced by HALO, based on official IMSMA data provided to Mine Action Review in 2025. No mined area was cancelled in 2023.[373]

According to the NMAA, a total of 11.51km$^2$ across 379 hazardous areas contaminated with EO, including AP and AV mines, CMR, and other items of UXO, was released through survey by all operators in 2024. Of the total, 7.01km$^2$ across 300 SHAs was cancelled through NTS and 4.5km$^2$ across 79 areas was reduced through TS (see Tables 13 and 16).[374]

By comparison, in its Article 7 report covering 2023, Ukraine reported that 362km$^2$ of land was "inspected and demined", with NTS undertaken over 1,125km$^2$, of which 547km$^2$ was "subject to demining" and 70km$^2$ was actually demined, though it is not stated how much of this was suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines. Ukraine says that this work was conducted "in cooperation with regional military administrations" and by units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the SSTS, the National Guard of Ukraine, and the National Police of Ukraine.[375] In its work Plan for 2024, Ukraine specifies that 4,275m$^2$ was reduced through TS in 2023.[376]

International operators reported release of 513,916m$^2$ through survey in 2024, all of which was reduction through TS, with 92,203m$^2$ reduced by HALO and 421,713m$^2$ reduced by NPA (see Table 15).[377] The amount of land reduced by international operators in 2024 is a very large increase on the 3,135m$^2$ reduced in 2023, all by HALO.[378]

364 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

365 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

366 Ibid.

367 Ibid. Disaggregated information regarding AP mines destroyed during TS and clearance, and those destroyed in EOD spot tasks, was requested but not provided.

368 Emails from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Zhanna Hulia, FSD, 19 March 2025, Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

369 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

370 Emails from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Zhanna Hulia, FSD, 19 March 2025, Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March and 11 June 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

371 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

372 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

373 Ibid.

374 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

375 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), "Implementation of demining measures in wartime", p. 26.

376 Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024, 30 April 2024, Annex 1, Table 1. The total figure for all land released by technical survey given in the table is "44275", but this appears to be a typographical error.

377 Emails from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

378 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

As previously noted, cancellation by NGOs is possible, but only under specific instructions from the MAC. According to official IMSMA data no AP mined areas was cancelled by any operator in 2024.[379] According to official IMSMA data for 2025, hazardous area suspected to contain AP mines had been reported by international and national NGOs to the national authorities for cancellation in 2025, but had yet to processed as cancelled in IMSMA as at time of writing; whereas a small amount of cancellation of mined area by national entities had been recorded as processed as cancelled.

No AP mined area was reported as cancelled by international operators through NTS in 2023, as no cancellation was accepted by the NMAA-MAC at that time, on the basis that the national standard for land release had not been approved.[380]

**Table 13: Cancellation through NTS all EO-contaminated area in 2024 (National authority data)***[381]

| Operators | SHAs cancelled | Area cancelled (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| All government units, and national and international demining operators. | 300 | 7.01 |
| **Totals** | **300** | **7.01** |

*Information on cancellation through NTS, disaggregated by weapon type, was requested but not provided by the NMAA. According to separate official IMSMA data provided, no hazardous areas suspected to contain AP mines were cancelled in 2024.[382]

**Table 14: Reduction of AP mined area through TS in 2024 (official IMSMA data)**[383]

| Oblast | Operator | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Chernihiv | HALO | 47,032 |
| **Sub-total** | | **47,032** |
| Kharkiv | HALO | 16,844 |
| Kharkiv | IDG | 1,262,505 |
| Kharkiv | UOS | 24,233 |
| **Sub-total** | | **1,303,582** |
| Kherson | SSTS | 42,024 |
| **Sub-total** | | **42,024** |
| Kyiv | HALO | 181,907 |
| **Sub-total** | | **181,907** |
| Mykolaiv | HALO | 3,976 |
| Mykolaiv | NPA | 109,285 |
| Mykolaiv | UDS | 384,207 |
| **Sub-total** | | **497,468** |
| **Totals** | | **2,072,013** |

**Table 15: Reduction of AP mined area through TS in 2024 (operator data)***[384]

| Operator | Oblast | District | Sub-district, locality | Areas reduced | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NPA | Mykolaiv | Shevchenkivska | Novohryhorivka | 1 | 98,113 |
| NPA | Mykolaiv | Shevchenkivska | Liubomyrivka | 1 | 323,600 |
| **Sub-total** | | | | **2** | **421,713** |
| HALO | Kharkiv | Chuhuivskyi | Chkalovska, Mykolaivska | 1 | 101 |
| HALO | Kharkiv | Chuhuivskyi | Chkalovska, Nova Hnylytsia | 1 | 2,987 |

379 National operator, Humanitarian Security, reported that it cancelled 2.39km² of AP mined area through NTS in 2024, in the sub-district of Balakliya, in Izyum, Kharkiv. Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025. However, this did not appear in IMSMA, calling into question whether this was in fact cancellation of hazardous areas suspected to be contain AP mines.

380 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA Ukraine, 5 May 2024.

381 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

382 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

383 Ibid.

384 Emails from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

**Table 15 Continued**

| Operator | Oblast | District | Sub-district, locality | Areas reduced | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HALO | Kyiv | Brovarskyi | Baryshivska, Peremoha | 1 | 19 |
| HALO | Kyiv | Brovarskyi | Velykodymerska, Zalissia | 1 | 65,387 |
| HALO | Kyiv | Buchanskyi | Makarivska, Lypivka | 1 | 12,647 |
| HALO | Kyiv | Vyshhorodskyi | Ivankivska, Orane | 1 | 11,062 |
| **Sub-total** | | | | **6** | **92,203** |
| **Totals** | | | | **8** | **513,916** |

*Information based on data available at time of writing. Full information not available on survey outputs of all national humanitarian operators.

**Table 16: Reduction of EO-contaminated area through TS in 2024 (National authority data)[385]**

| Operators | Areas reduced | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| All government units, and national and international humanitarian mine action operators | 79 | 4,499,971 |
| **Totals** | **79** | **4,499,971** |

According to official IMSMA data, some 78.08km² of previously unrecorded AP mined area was discovered and added to IMSMA during humanitarian mine action operations in 2024, of which 53% was in Kharkiv, 23% in Kherson, 19% in Mykolaiv, and the remainder in three other oblasts (see Table 17).

Equivalent data for previously unrecorded AP mined area in 2024, as reported by international operators and by national operator Humanitarian Security, totalled 54.1km².[386] This is more than double the 26.97km² they added to the database in 2023. All areas newly recorded by humanitarian operators in 2024 were entered into the national database.[387] Mine Action Review was not able to obtain comparative data on how much newly recorded AP mined area was identified by Ukraine's national operators in 2023.

**Table 17: AP mine contamination newly recorded in 2024 (official IMSMA data)[388]**

| Oblast | Operator* | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Chernihiv | FSD | 108,972 |
| Chernihiv | HALO | 226,686 |
| **Sub-total** | | **335,658** |
| Donetsk | DS | 1,567 |
| Donetsk | FSD | 187,817 |
| Donetsk | HALO | 51,769 |
| Donetsk | UDA | 2,115,293 |
| **Sub-total** | | **2,356,446** |
| Kharkiv | DRC | 864,911 |
| Kharkiv | FSD | 26,419,587 |
| Kharkiv | HALO | 6,794,190 |
| Kharkiv | HS | 185,882 |
| Kharkiv | IDG | 4,100,870 |
| Kharkiv | PSM | 1,109,540 |
| Kharkiv | UOS | 1,574,573 |
| **Sub-total** | | **41,049,553** |
| Kherson | DC-SSTS | 6,072,969 |
| Kherson | DRC | 105,185 |
| Kherson | DS | 1,308,242 |
| Kherson | HALO | 2,818,579 |
| Kherson | NPA | 7,371,028 |
| Kherson | UDA | 455,602 |
| **Sub-total** | | **18,131,605** |

385 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

386 According to information reported to Mine Action Review by clearance operators, DCA identified 8,467m² of newly record AP mine contamination in 2024; DRC identified 2,494,282m²; FSD identified 26,719,414m²; HALO identified 11,915,742m²; Humanitarian Security identified 43,876m²; and NPA identified 12,993,943m². This broadly matched the official IMSMA data provided by the government of Ukraine. Full information was not available for all national humanitarian operators on survey outputs. Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

387 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

388 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

**Table 17 Continued**

| Oblast | Operator* | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Kyiv | DRC | 72,598 |
| Kyiv | HALO | 513,773 |
| Kyiv | UAD | 285,702 |
| Kyiv | UDS | 460,462 |
| **Sub-total** | | **1,332,535** |
| Mykolaiv | DCA | 8,444 |
| Mykolaiv | DRC | 1,456,031 |
| Mykolaiv | DS | 212,708 |
| Mykolaiv | HALO | 1,364,715 |
| Mykolaiv | HDR | 2,539,033 |
| Mykolaiv | NPA | 5,876,198 |
| Mykolaiv | T0950 | 36,158 |
| Mykolaiv | UDA | 137,119 |
| Mykolaiv | UDS | 3,211,897 |
| **Sub-total** | | **14,842,303** |
| Sumy | FSD | 3,012 |
| Sumy | HALO | 27,320 |
| Sumy | NPA | 3,788 |
| **Sub-total** | | **34,120** |
| **Total** | | **78,082,220** |

*Operator names are given as per information provided by Government of Ukraine from the IMSMA database, hence acronyms only are used in all cases.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

At the time of writing, Ukraine had yet to submit its APMBC Article 7 transparency report covering 2024. According to official IMSMA data provided by the government of Ukraine in September 2025, 2.07km² of hazardous areas suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines was cleared in 2024. Not all these areas were ultimately found to contain AP mines.[389] Clearance output in 2024 was a significant increase on 2023 clearance, which was 0.33km² based on official IMSMA data provided to Mine Action Review in 2025.[390]

According to the NMAA, a total of 17.1km² of land contaminated with EO, including AP mines, CMR, and other items of UXO, was cleared by all operators in Ukraine in 2024.[391] The NMAA also reports that 14,142 AP mines, along with 11,119 AV mines, 25,893 submunitions, and 164,248 other items of UXO were destroyed during TS, clearance, and spot tasks[392] (see Table 19). According to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Ukraine also reported that SESU pyrotechnic teams destroyed a total of 16,878 AP mines,[393] though it is unclear if this is additional to the 14,142 previously mentioned.

The NMAA explains that AP mine clearance was typically conducted in combination with clearance of other types of EO, including AP mines.[394] Ukraine saw a twelve-fold increase in clearance of EO in 2024 compared to 2023, which was made possible thanks to an unprecedented increase in the number of demining teams and certified mine action operators, as well as "massive use of demining machines and surface scanning UAVs".[395] However, as noted above, the areas released, as reported by the NMAA are of all EO contamination. Therefore, the size of the actual AP mine contamination, is almost certainly far smaller.

In its Article 7 report covering 2023, Ukraine reported that 362km² of land was "inspected and demined" in 2023, neutralising in the process 153,000 items of EO.[396] In its work plan for 2024, however, Ukraine stated that only 184,797m² of AP mined area was cleared with one AP mine and 201 items of UXO destroyed. No details on which operators conducted this clearance were provided.[397]

A total of 847,811m² across 22 AP mined areas was reported by humanitarian operators in Ukraine as having been cleared in 2024 (international operators DRC, FSD, HALO, MAG, and NPA, and national operator, Humanitarian Security). A total of 512 AP mines, 937 AV mines, and 230 items of UXO were found during TS and clearance (see Table 20).[398] A further 31 AP mines and four AV mines were reported separately by NPA and Humanitarian Security as having been destroyed in spot tasks (see Table 22),[399] bringing the total number of AP mines identified by humanitarian operators for destruction to 543. Apart from items found by HALO and Humanitarian Security, which are accredited for EOD, all EO, including

389 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

390 Ibid.

391 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

392 Disaggregated information regarding submunitions destroyed in TS and clearance and those destroyed in EOD spot tasks were requested but not provided.

393 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, p. 1.

394 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

395 Ibid.

396 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), "Implementation of demining measures in wartime", p. 26.

397 Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024, 30 April 2024, Annex 1, Table 1.

398 Emails from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Zhanna Hulia, FSD, 19 March 2025, Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025: and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 August 2025.

AP mines, identified by humanitarian operators during TS, clearance, and spot tasks were transferred to authorised government operators for destruction.[400] The number of AP mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks by all operators in Ukraine in 2024, (excluding rapid response by State operators) was 207, according to official IMSMA data provided by the Government of Ukraine.[401]

The 847,811m² of AP mines areas cleared by humanitarian operators in 2024 is an increase on the 519,802m² cleared by in 2023, with more than four times as many AP mines identified for destruction in 2024 compared to the 109 in 2023.[402] FSD, HALO, and NPA all saw marked increases in clearance output due to increased capacity. NPA also introduced mechanical teams following certification in June 2024, and HALO increased its use of mechanical clearance methods in 2024, also contributing to higher clearance output.[403] DRC did not undertake any clearance of AP mined area in 2023 but did so in 2024. This was linked to a scale up of operations in Mykolaiv and Kharkiv, with hazardous areas more likely to contain mines following extended periods of occupation, than some other areas of operation.[404] HALO cleared 37 hazardous areas with suspected or confirmed AP mine threats, covering 1.02km², which proved to contain no AP mines.[405] NPA released one hazardous area of 12,623m², which proved to contain no AP mines, of which 1,332m² was fully cleared and the remainder was reduced (see Table 20).[406]

**Table 18: Clearance of AP mined area in 2024 (official IMSMA data)[407]**

| Oblast | Operator** | Area cleared (m²)* |
|---|---|---|
| Chernihiv | HALO | 366,915 |
| **Sub-total** | | **366,915** |
| Kharkiv | HALO | 112,330 |
| Kharkiv | IDG | 95,650 |
| Kharkiv | UOS | 53,657 |
| **Sub-total** | | **261,637** |
| Kherson | SSTS | 14,000 |
| Kherson | UAD | 146,156 |
| **Sub-total** | | **160,156** |
| Kyiv | HALO | 971,553 |
| **Sub-total** | | **971,553** |
| Mykolaiv | HALO | 36,947 |
| Mykolaiv | NPA | 9,732 |
| Mykolaiv | UDS | 267,378 |
| **Sub-total** | | **314,057** |
| **Total** | | **2,074,318** |

*Release by TS and clearance of mined areas. Not all these areas were ultimately found to contain AP mines. **Operator names are given as per information provided by Government of Ukraine from the IMSMA database, hence acronyms only are used in all cases.

**Table 19: Clearance of EO-contaminated area in 2024 (National authority data)[408]**

| Operators | AP mined areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed* | AV mines destroyed* | Other UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All government units, and national and international operators | 302 | 17,095,009 | 14,142 | 11,119 | 190,141 |
| **Totals** | **302** | **17,095,009** | **14,142** | **11,119** | **190,141** |

*Includes mines destroyed during spot tasks. Data separating mines destroyed during TS and clearance from those destroyed in spot tasks were requested but not provided.

**Table 20: Clearance of AP mined area in 2024 (operator data)*[409]**

| Operator | Oblast | District/ Sub-District/Locality | Area cleared (m²) | Areas cleared | AP mines destroyed*** | AV mines destroyed*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DRC | Kharkiv | Not specified | 1,108 | **0 | 2 | 0 |
| DRC | Kyiv | Not specified | 3,546 | **0 | 1 | 0 |
| DRC | Mykolaiv | Not specified | 1,475 | **0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Sub-totals** | | | **6,129** | **0 | **3** | **0** |

399 Emails from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

400 Emails from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Zhanna Hulia, FSD, 19 March 2025, Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March and 11 June 2025: Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

401 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

402 Emails from Tony Connell, FSD, 14 June 2024; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 5 May 2024.

403 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

404 Email from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.

405 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

406 Emails from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 August 2025.

407 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

408 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

409 Emails from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025; Zhanna Hulia, GIS Assistant, FSD, 19 March 2025, Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

Table 20: Continued

| Operator | Oblast | District/ Sub-District/Locality | Area cleared (m²) | Areas cleared | AP mines destroyed*** | AV mines destroyed*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FSD | Kharkiv | Iziumskyi/Donetska/ Pryshyb | 3,746 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| FSD | Kharkiv | Iziumskyi/Iziumska/ Kamianka | 13,027 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| FSD | Kharkiv | Iziumskyi/Oskilska/ Topolske | 3,588 | 3 | 123 | 0 |
| FSD | Kharkiv | Iziumskyi/Oskilska/ Dovhenke | 2,115 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| FSD | Chernihiv | Chernihivsky/ Ivanivska/Yahidne | 11,103 | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| **Sub-totals** | | | **33,579** | **10** | **127** | **0** |
| HALO | Kharkiv | Chuhuivskyi/ Chkalovska/ Mykolaivska | 16,067 | 2 | 6 | 0 |
| HALO | Kharkiv | Chuhuivskyi/ Chkalovska/Nova Hnylytsia | 2,398 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| HALO | Kyiv | Brovarskyi/ Baryshivska/ Peremoha | 1,668 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| HALO | Kyiv | Brovarskyi/ Velykodymerska/ Zalissia | 119,411 | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| HALO | Kyiv | Buchanskyi/ Dmytrivska/Myla | 251,510 | 1 | 5 | 0 |
| HALO | Kyiv | Buchanskyi/ Makarivska/Lypivka | 202,800 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| HALO | Kyiv | Vyshhorodskyi/ Ivankivska/Orane | 9,428 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| **Sub-totals** | | | **603,282** | **8** | **19** | **2** |
| Hum. Security | Kharkiv | Izyumskyi | 123,640 | 2 | 347 | 267 |
| **Sub-totals** | | | **123,640** | **2** | **347** | **267** |
| MAG | Mykolaiv | Mykolaivska, Halytsynivska, Stepova Dolyna | 723 | *0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Sub-totals** | | | **723** | **0** | **0** | **0** |
| NPA | Mykolaiv | Shevchenkivs, Novohryhorivk | 8,400 | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| NPA | Mykolaiv | Shevchenkivs, Liubomyrivka | 43,106 | 1 | 11 | 406 |
| NPA | Mykolaiv | Pervomaiska/ Maksymivka | 10,246 | 0 (7 partial) | 1 | 119 |
| NPA | Mykolaiv | Shevchenkivska/ Vavylove | 12,623 | 0 (3 partial) | 0 | 141 |
| NPA | Kherson | Vysokopilska/ Arkhanhelske | 6,083 | 0 (3 partial) | 1 | 2 |
| **Sub-totals** | | | **80,458** | **2** | **16** | **668** |
| **Totals** | | | **847,811** | **22** | **512** | **937** |

*Information based on data available at time of writing. Full information not available on the clearance outputs of all national humanitarian operators. **Tasks not yet complete as at the end of 2024. ***With the exception of items found by HALO, all items of EO, including AP mines, were transferred to authorised government operators for destruction.

**Table 21: Area cleared by international operators in 2024 in which no AP mines were found**[410]

| Operator | Area cleared ($m^2$) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| HALO | 1,021,045 | Cleared across 37 AP mined areas |
| NPA | 1,332 | One hazardous area of 12,623$m^2$ released (1,332$m^2$ cleared and remainder reduced) |
| **Total** | **1,022,377** | |

**Table 22: Mines identified by humanitarian operators during spot tasks in 2024***[411]

| Operator | Oblast | AP mines identified | AV mines identified |
|---|---|---|---|
| Humanitarian Security | Kharkiv | 12 | 0 |
| NPA | Mykolaiv | 16 | 3 |
| NPA | Kherson | 3 | 1 |
| **Totals** | | **31** | **4** |

*Information based on data available at time of writing. Full information not available on destruction of AP mines during EOD spot tasks by all national humanitarian operators.

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR UKRAINE: 1 JUNE 2006

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2016

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JUNE 2021

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (2-YEAR, 6-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 DECEMBER 2023

↓

**THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 DECEMBER 2033**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with its latest extension), Ukraine is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 December 2033. Despite Ukraine's plan to complete clearance where possible by 2033, the ongoing war of aggression by Russia and the extent of AP mined area mean it will not fulfil its Article 5 obligations by this deadline.

At the time of the announcement on 29 June 2025 by President Zelenskyy of Ukraine's intention to withdraw from the APMBC, it was not indicated when Ukraine planned to give formal notice of withdrawal to the other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council, as required under Article 20 of the Convention. Article 20 states that "such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six- month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict".[412] As at the time of writing (September 2025), no such notice of withdrawal had been given by Ukraine.

On 21 July 2025, however, the UN Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary, communicated the following: "In accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, Ukraine has decided, as of July 17, 2025, to suspend the operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of September 18, 1997, signed on behalf of Ukraine on February 24, 1999 in New York." The communication states that: "The above action was effected on 18 July 2025".[413] As noted above, this claimed suspension is invalid under the terms of the Convention and general international law. The possibility of armed conflict involving a State Party in which it might use AP mines was specifically foreseen by the drafters of the APMBC and therefore it is not a fundamental change of circumstances that might allow suspension under the law of treaties.[414] On 15 July 2025, prior to Ukraine communicating its "suspension" of the APMBC to the UNSG, the Ukraine

410 Emails from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

411 Emails from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025. NPA reports spot tasks to SESU which then conducts demolition.

412 Art. 20, APMBC.

413 Ukraine: Communication, Reference: C.N.385.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5 (Depositary Notification), United Nations, 21 July 2025, available at: https://bit.ly/4lBjLeb.

414 See Art. 62, 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: "fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, ***and which was not foreseen by the parties***" [added emphasis].

Parliament had passed a Bill[415] which the President had signed the same day and which entered into force on July 17.[416] An explanatory note to the Bill, available in Ukrainian only, and referenced in an online article written by representatives from the Legal Department of the Ukrainian MoD,[417] sought to justify Ukraine's decision to "suspend", rather than withdraw from the APMBC claiming "...the suspension of the 1997 Convention would enable unlimited use of necessary types of weapons until the moment of removal of the threat of attack or danger for the state independence of Ukraine." The explanatory note sought to further justify other changes of circumstances, including the failed Budapest Memorandum on security assurances. Nothing contained in the explanatory note changes the fact that Ukraine's attempted suspension of the APMBC is unlawful and without valid effect in international law. At least five States Parties to the APMBC—Austria,[418] Belgium,[419] Colombia, Switzerland,[420] and Norway[421]—had submitted objections to Ukraine's attempted suspension to the UN Secretary-General. In addition, France, Ireland, and New Zealand also made communications regarding Ukraine's attempted suspension.[422] However, neither the objections, nor any of the other communications, had yet been published on the UN Treaty Collection webpage.[423] The Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025 subsequently "affirmed that the Convention does not allow the suspension of its operation and consequently its obligations. The Meeting called upon Ukraine, as a State Party, to further engage within the framework of the Convention".[424]

Ukraine could not meet its earlier December 2023 deadline, and in April 2023 it submitted a request for a 10-year deadline extension for consideration by 21MSP. Ukraine had been encouraged to submit a five-year extension, instead of the full ten-year extension, to take into account recommendations by States Parties.[425] Following feedback from the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Ukraine said it did not object to reducing the requested extension to five years, which would have been through to 1 December 2028.[426] On 1 September 2023, however, Ukraine submitted additional information to the Convention maintaining its request for a 10-year extension period. It justified the requested period by the continued Russian aggression, the use of remote mining of its border territories, and the lack of knowledge as to how long hostilities would continue.[427]

At 21MSP, Ukraine's 10-year extension request was granted and a new deadline set for 1 December 2033. In the 21MSP decision on the request, the Meeting noted "the commitment of Ukraine to present to the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the States Parties in 2028 a detailed overview of the national situation including a) the progress made since the granting of its request for extension; b) the remaining challenge, and; c) the plan to address this challenge by the 1 December 2033 deadline."[428]

In 2020, Ukraine had stated that fulfilment of its first extended deadline of June 2021 was dependent upon "completion of hostilities, restoration of the constitutional order and gaining the full control over the occupied territories, including over the State border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation".[429] The 2022 full-scale invasion by Russia has resulted in huge new contamination as well as significant barriers to safe access for survey. The time needed to clear AP mines in Ukraine can only be estimated once hostilities have ended and a national contamination survey has been completed. This said, in June 2023, Ukraine's MoE stated an intention to bring 80% of all land potentially contaminated with EO back into productive use within ten years.[430]

The reported increase in clearance compared to previous years, reflects the rapid upscaling of capacity needed to address the massive contamination in Ukraine resulting from the war with Russia (see Table 23). Land release efforts have of course been hugely impeded by the Russian aggression.

Against the incredibly challenging circumstances of war, Ukraine has been able to continue to scale up operational capacity and technological innovation considerably, and further improve national ownership and programme management. Key steps taken in 2024, including the launch of the National Mine Action Strategy and implementation plan, and the adoption of several critical NMAS, including standards for land release, will help ensure Ukraine can make progress towards completion when circumstances allow. That said, large-scale cancellation of AP mine-affected areas will not be possible while the currently restrictive instructions for cancellation remains in place.

415 "Draft Law on the Suspension for Ukraine of the Operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction", 15 July 2025, available at: http://bit.ly/4nhi9ah.

416 "Law of Ukraine On the Suspension for Ukraine of the Operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction", available at: http://bit.ly/3WeTEj2.

417 I. Zavorotko and O. Plotnikov, "Tentative remarks on Ukraine's suspension of the Ottawa Convention", *Articles of War,* 8 October 2025, available at: http://bit.ly/4neZOdU.

418 Note Verbale (reference 2025-0.845.883), Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations in New York, 17 October 2025.

419 Communication reference: NYKUNO/MUL.03/MVD/NV/2025/614, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Belgium to the United Nations in New York, 17 October 2025.

420 "Switzerland submits objection to Ukraine's suspension of the Ottawa Convention", Bern, 17 October 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4qM7I1x; and Communication reference: 205-2025, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations in New York, 17 October 2025.

421 Document No. 118/2025, Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations in New York, 20 October 2025.

422 Final report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, 5 December 2025, paragraph 50, at: https://bit.ly/493cjnY.

423 United Nations Treaty Collection webpage (see treaty reference XXVI-5).

424 Final report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, 5 December 2025, paragraph 51.

425 "Reflections on the Article 5 Extensions Process", APMBC doc. APLC/MSP.12/2012/4, submitted by the President of the 11th Meeting of the States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests submitted under Article 5 of the Convention, 2012.

426 2023 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 1 September 2023, p. 1.

427 Ibid.

428 "Decision on the request submitted by Ukraine for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", November 2023, available at: https://bit.ly/4dsKgOH, para. 3.

429 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.

430 Ministry of Economy, "Our goal is to bring 80% of potentially contaminated land back into use in ten years: Yuliia Svyrydenko at the London conference", 22 June 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4dMpGu3.

Prior to the full clearance data provided by Ukraine's national authorities covering 2024 and 2023, which encompasses both national and international operators, annual clearance data have only been available from international operators (see Table 23). This makes it difficult to conclude how effectively AP mine clearance is proceeding. That said, the NMAA believes that Ukraine saw a twelve-fold increase in clearance of EO in 2024 compared to 2023, thanks to hugely increased capacity and use of demining machines and UAVs.[431]

Clearance data are not available from areas of Ukraine that were already outside of government control prior to Russia's invasion in February 2022. While Russia is not a State Party or signatory to the APMBC, it also has obligations under international human rights law to clear AP mines as soon as possible in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control, by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction.

**Table 23: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 2.07 (official IMSMA data) |
| 2023 | *0.33 (official IMSMA data provided in 2025) |
| 2022 | 0.17 (NGO data) |
| 2021 | 1.26 (NGO data) |
| 2020 | 0.83 (NGO data) |
| **Total** | **4.66** |

*Official IMSMA data for 2023, provided in 2025. Previously reported as 0.35km² in last year's Clearing the Mines report on Ukraine, based on operator data only.

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Ukraine is making provision for a sustainable national capacity to address previously unknown mined areas including regional military administrations, units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the SSTS, the National Guard, and the National Police.[432] The need for detailed planning for such residual risk is years if not decades away.

431 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

432 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024, p. 3.

# YEMEN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2028

Not on track to meet deadline

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Heavy
(no credible estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024* (km²) | Release in 2023*** (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 1.44 | 0.18 |
| Technical Survey | 0.75 | 0.29 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 37.66 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | **545 | 561 |

*Data from the internationally-recognised government (IRG / YEMAC South); and clearance and non-technical survey data from the De Facto Authorities (DFA / YEMAC North). **IRG data only. No YEMAC-DFA data was available on the number of AP mined destroyed in the 2024 calendar year. However, the DFA's Article 7 report for the year ending 31 March 2025 recorded the destruction of 143 AP mines and 158 IEDs (without specifying how many were victim-activated). ***Data from the IRG government only.

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Project Masam

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre – Internationally Recognised Government, Aden (YEMAC-IRG, also known as YEMAC South) and the Yemen Mine Action Coordination Centre – IRG (YMACC-IRG, also known as YEMAC North) maintained essential coordination, planning, tasking and information management in the face of acute shortages of funding. The Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre – De Facto Authorities, Sana'a (YEMAC-DFA) signed memorandums of understanding with Humanity & Inclusion (HI) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC), providing for international NGO engagement in Houthi-controlled areas for the first time, although only HI was operational there at time of writing. Nearly two years after the emergency mine action programme managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ended, the UN country team endorsed a roadmap for UN support to mine action in Yemen that foresees UNDP leading its support to the development of national mine action capacity.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **All parties to the armed conflicts should halt use of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).**
- **The United Nations, YEMAC-IRG, and YEMAC-DFA should engage constructively to develop a framework for mine action that can facilitate a resumption of international donor funding.**
- **YEMAC-DFA should separate its roles of regulator and operator.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Yemen is densely contaminated by explosive ordnance but remains without a credible estimate of AP mined contamination. YEMAC-IRG continued to implement a baseline survey but survey capacity is extremely limited and progress slow. YEMAC-DFA reports mined area covering nearly 1,200km$^2$ but the basis for this estimate is unclear. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Mine action is split between the Aden-based IRG and the Sana'a-based DFA. Mine action is largely dependent on international donor funding. YEMAC-IRG and its coordination centre, YMACC, work closely with international demining organisations. The DFA has concluded Memorandums of Understanding with two international NGOs but only one of them, HI, was working in the north in 2024. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | YEMAC-IRG supports inclusion of women as a priority and implementing partners employ some women, mainly for risk education, but lack of resources limits opportunities for female employment. YEMAC-DFA informed Mine Action Review that approximately 50% of its EORE personnel are women, and around 40% of administrative staff, but that there were no female deminers. It had plans to train more women in NTS in 2024, with support from HI, but no funding was available to implement them. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | Yemen has not brought into effect a national mine action standard (NMAS) for environmental management and protection in areas controlled by either the IRG or DFA. Operators face challenging environmental factors such as rising temperatures and flooding, but mostly operate according to their organisations' global standards. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | YEMAC-IRG and YMACC kept their Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database operating with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). YEMAC-DFA works with a much older IMSMA New Generation database, and the quality of information it holds is unknown. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 5 | 5 | YEMAC-IRG's 2022 Article 5 deadline extension request identified priority areas of activity, but does not set out a detailed work plan. Tasking by YMACC continued but at a slower rate due to funding constraints. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | YEMAC-IRG is revising and updating NMAS and standard operating procedures. It has reported revising 31 chapters of the NMAS since 2021, including standards relating to land release, which it claimed were compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). It was unclear whether the new standards had received government approval in 2024. YEMAC-DFA updated its standards in 2021 and they are aligned to standards applied in the south. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 4 | 4 | YEMAC-IRG continued emergency response operations implemented mainly by the Saudi-backed Project Masam but land release through survey and clearance slumped after YEMAC-IRG lost donor funding at a point when international NGOs lacked capacity to scale up operations. YEMAC-DFA reported that it cleared 1.02km$^2$ across four governorates, but almost all of it in Hudaydah governorate. |
| **Average Score** | **4.3** | **4.3** | **Overall Programme Performance: POOR** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre – Internationally Recognised Government, Aden (YEMAC-IRG, also known as YEMAC South)
- Yemen Mine Action Coordination Centre – Internationally Recognised Government, Aden (YMACC-IRG)
- Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre – De Facto Authorities, Sana'a (YEMAC-DFA, also known as YEMAC North)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- YEMAC
- Yemen Army Engineers

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Project Masam/SafeLane Global/Dynasafe

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Yemen has heavy contamination by conventional and improvised anti-personnel (AP) mines and a wide array of other explosive ordnance. The extent of mine contamination is not known after a decade of civil war between the internationally recognised government in Aden (IRG) and Ansar Allah (Houthi) forces, the de facto authorities controlling the capital, Sana'a.

The governorates most affected by explosive ordnance resulting from the last decade of conflict are reported to include Al Bayda, Al Dhale, Hajjah, Hudaydah, Marib, Saada, Shabwa, and Taiz.[1] Contamination is especially high along Yemen's west coast, where mines were placed with the aim of stalling the advance of pro-government Yemeni and Saudi coalition forces towards the strategic port of Hodeida, as well as around Marib, a focus of intense fighting in 2020 and 2021. In Hudaydah governorate alone, the UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) recorded 61 mine and explosive ordnance incidents in 2024 that killed 42 civilians and injured 52 others.[2]

A Yemen-IRG "summary" of known contamination at the end of 2024 identified almost 8km$^2$ of confirmed and suspected hazardous areas in five governorates (see Table 1) but provided only a limited snapshot of the problem, reflecting lack of access due to insecurity to many mine-affected areas and the meagre survey capacity operational in 2024 due to lack of funding.[3]

**Table 1: Contamination identified by the IRG Yemen Baseline Survey (at end 2024)[4]**

| Province/region | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total area(m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Abyan | 21 | 3,761,426 | 10 | 1,785,122 | 5,546,548 |
| Aden | 1 | 114,084 | 10 | 30,740 | 144,824 |
| Hudaydah | 9 | 109,440 | 1 | 35,723 | 145,163 |
| Lahj | 1 | 34,796 | 1 | 84,421 | 119,217 |
| Taiz | 77 | 1,881,937 | 16 | 137,313 | 2,019,250 |
| **Totals** | **109** | **5,901,683** | **38** | **2,073,319** | **7,975,002** |

CHA = confirmed hazardous areas SHA = suspected hazardous areas

**Table 2: Contaminated area in DFA-controlled governorates[5]**

| Governorate | No. of Districts | Area (km$^2$) |
|---|---|---|
| Al Baida | 8 | 211.36 |
| Al Hudaydah | 12 | 473.92 |
| Al Jawf | 3 | 211.81 |
| Amran | 1 | 10.26 |
| Marib | 2 | 3.00 |
| Saada | 7 | 83.56 |
| Sana'a | 2 | 205.63 |
| **Total** | ***35** | **1,199.54** |

*YEMAC-DFA's Article 7 report referred to 37 districts in the body of the text, but the number of districts listed in the contamination table totalled 35.

Before the 2015 outbreak of conflict, Yemen had AP mined area estimated to cover more than 200km$^2$. A Landmine Impact Survey in 2000 had recorded mines in 18 of Yemen's governorates, the result of conflicts in 1962–73 and 1970–83; the mining of the border between the North and South before they unified in 1990; a succession of conflicts after 1994; and mines laid by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The last decade of conflict has massively increased the extent and complexity of explosive ordnance contamination but shifting lines of confrontation, recontamination of some cleared areas and movement restrictions facing operators have obstructed systematic survey.

YEMAC-DFA released a parallel Article 7 report to that of the IRG, which said it had identified 527 confirmed and suspected hazardous areas (CHAs/SHAs) affecting 1,199km$^2$ in 35 districts of seven governorates (see Table 2). It suggested this represented no more than 10% of total contamination,[6] and the data looks to include all explosive ordnance (EO)

1 See, e.g., UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) website, at: http://bit.ly/3JN6JNm.
2 UNMHA, Annual Mine Action Update 2024, 15 January 2025.
3 Yemen-IRG Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
4 Ibid., Form D.
5 Email from Ali Sofrah, YEMAC-DFA, 2 September 2025; and DFA Article 7 Report (covering year ended 31 March 2025), Form D.
6 Email from Ali Sofrah, Director, YEMAC-DFA, 2 September 2025; and DFA Article 7 Report (covering year ended 31 March 2025), Form D.

contamination and not solely mined area. The report has not been included on the UN-administered Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 database. It said that non-technical survey (NTS) in the year to 31 March 2025 had identified 229km$^2$ across 159 SHAs/CHAs in 9 districts located in four governorates (Bayda, Hudaydah, Jawf, and Sana'a). Again, this likely includes all EO, and not only AP mined area. YEMAC-DFA was reported previously to have employed a landmine impact survey methodology[7] that in other countries (and earlier in Yemen) has produced hugely inflated estimates of contamination.

A UN panel of experts reported in 2021 that the Houthis had made "widespread" use of mines in villages, schools, near water sources, on beaches, and on roads, posing a constant threat to civilians and provoking displacement.[8] The UN has also reported that improvised sea mines pose a persistent threat to Red Sea shipping and coastal areas.[9] Conflict Armament Research identified several types of conventional and improvised AP mine and sea mine.[10] Project Masam has reported encountering an extensive range of IEDs, including devices activated by crush wires, passive infrared sensors, pressure plates, radio command (which means they are not mines), and tripwires, as well as an air-dropped IED with an impact fuze and vehicle-borne IEDs.[11]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Many years of conflict have left Yemen massively contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW). This includes cluster munitions used by the Saudi-led coalition in strikes on the Houthi-controlled areas. The extent of contamination is also unknown but is concentrated in seven northern governorates, particularly al-Jawf and Saada bordering Saudi Arabia. Contamination by other ERW is widespread. Yemen-IRG's 2024 Article 7 report records destruction of 7,276 anti-vehicle (AV) mines and 52,818 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).[12]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Management of mine action in Yemen is geographically divided along the lines of the conflict that erupted in March 2015 between the Houthi movement (the DFA) controlling the capital Sana'a as well as much of the north and west of the country, and the IRG, operationally based in Aden and the south. A Sana'a-based inter-ministerial National Mine Action Committee (NMAC), which was created to set national mine action policy, strategy, and priorities is no longer recognised by the IRG, which reported it had disbanded in 2019. The NMAC continues to be cited by the DFA as the institution leading mine action. It states it meets once or twice a year to discuss progress, challenges, and funding.[13]

YEMAC was established in Sana'a in January 1999 as a national mine action agency under the NMAC and functioning as both regulator and operator. It nominally maintained a national role, and in 2021, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported that, in total, YEMAC conducted clearance in 19 of Yemen's 21 governorates.[14] In practice, YEMAC had split into two operations, centred round Sana'a and Aden, respectively. YEMAC-IRG informed Mine Action Review there was no coordination between the two because YEMAC-North was under the control of Houthi militia.[15]

YEMAC South (YEMAC-IRG), headquartered in Aden, operated through three branches serving Hadramaut, Marib, and Taiz. It identified Aden, Abyan, Dhale, Hudaydah, Lahj, and Taiz as high-priority districts for mine action interventions.[16] Yemen's Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in March 2022, said that YEMAC was planning to open an office in Marib to support operations in Al-Bayda and Al-Jawf governorates, as well as the western Shabwah governorate. Operations included explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks, NTS, and risk education.[17] Those plans are thought to have been halted by the cessation of donor funding at the end of June 2023. YEMAC reported that as a result it had been forced to suspend 66 demining teams and some departments. It said it continued discussions with the UN Resident Coordinator in 2024 but "no roadmap or solutions have been reached."[18]

In April 2020, YEMAC South opened YMACC in Aden with a view to strengthening programme management in areas controlled by the IRG. The centre, which is intended to facilitate cooperation with international organisations, has responsibility for accrediting organisations and issuing task orders. It has departments for planning, information management, and quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC)[19] and had set up technical working groups focused on NTS and risk education.[20] Termination of the UNDP

7 Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, Information Management Adviser, GICHD, Geneva, 11 July 2023.
8 Letter from the Panel of Experts on Yemen to the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/2021/79, 25 January 2021, pp. 3 and 44.
9 UNDP, Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report 2022, 15 February 2023, p. 6.
10 Conflict Armament Research, "Dispatch from the field: Mines and IEDs employed by Houthi forces on Yemen's West Coast", Report, September 2018.
11 Email from Retief Horn, Project/Deputy Programme Manager, Project MASAM, 19 July 2024.
12 Yemen-IRG Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
13 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated but 2025, p 12.
14 "UNDP Annual Report on Mine Action in Yemen 2020", February 2021, p. 9.
15 Email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, Director, YEMAC, 26 December 2021.
16 Email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, 21 May 2023.
17 2022 Yemen Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26–27.
18 Statement by Yemen IRG to the APMBC 5th Review Conference, 24-29 November 2024 and to the APMBC Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 18 June 2025.
19 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2019", 20 January 2020, p. 12; and email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, 26 December 2021.
20 UNDP Annual Report on Mine Action in Yemen 2020, p. 14.

emergency project in 2023 resulted in reduced staffing and left YMACC without funding for essential utilities, including electricity or fuel for vehicles, leading to delays in its activities. YEMAC and YMACC continued to function in 2024 with the help of technical support from implementing partners (IPs) and financial support, notably from Project Masam.[21] Despite lack of funds, IPs said YMACC continued to convene regular meetings for project managers and supported operators on issues of accreditation, task orders, access, the import of equipment, and security.[22]

YEMAC North (YEMAC-DFA) functions as both the coordinator of mine action in northern governorates controlled by Houthi forces and as operator involved in all aspects of mine action including survey and clearance, risk education, victim assistance, information management, and quality management (QM). This dual role is generally seen as creating a conflict of interest.[23] To address that issue, YEMAC North and the DFA's Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (SCMCHA) agreed in principle to set up a coordination centre similar to YMACC in the IRG-controlled areas,[24] but as at June 2025 no further action had been taken to implement the proposal.

HI signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with YEMAC North in January 2024 for a range of activities, including NTS, EOD, and risk education while building YEMAC capacity building and providing support including transport, trauma kits, and personal protective equipment.[25] Danish Refugee Council (DRC) signed an MoU with the DFA in October 2024, but discussions on the activities it would be permitted to undertake were still ongoing at the time of writing, and thus, as at August 2025, it had yet to start operations. The HALO Trust, and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) also visited Sana'a in February 2023 and negotiated an MoU with YEMAC North that would provide a basis for operating in DFA-controlled areas, but no agreements have yet been concluded.[26]

The United Nations provided technical and administrative support to YEMAC through the Emergency Mine Action Project managed by UNDP from 2015 to 2023, channelling donor funding to YEMAC-IRG.[27] The programme ended in June 2023 after losing donor support and UN engagement with mine action came under the Resident Coordinator pending a review of mine action sector management structures and international support.[28] YEMAC has since received some technical and financial support to maintain essential functions from its main implementing partners.

Two UN staff deployed to Yemen in January 2024 under a six-month project funded by the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), "Strategic Coordination of Ways Forward for Humanitarian Mine Action interventions in Yemen", to make recommendations for the UN's future engagement with mine action in Yemen. Recommendations included strengthening national coordination structures, increasing international support for deployment of international NGOs in the North and the South of Yemen, and supporting reactivation of the National Mine Action Committee.

Under a roadmap endorsed by the UN country team in Yemen in May 2025, UNDP is to serve as the UN lead on mine action, acting as a strategic partner for national mine action authorities, including YMACC and both YEMAC IRG/DFA as well as co-chairing the Area of Responsibility. The roadmap states UNDP will not be involved in, or financially support, field operations but would seek to mainstream mine action into its broader national and sector development plans and programmes, such as agriculture, infrastructure, health, education, and water supply. UNICEF would lead victim assistance and risk education and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) would be available to support mine action in the field by UN agencies, national and international NGOs, and national institutions. By September 2025, UNDP was in the process of recruiting a chief technical adviser.[29]

UNMHA, which was created pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2452, opened a joint operations centre in Hodeida in October 2019 to oversee mine action in the governorate. Its mine action section includes a senior mine action adviser in Hodeida undertaking an advisory and advocacy role, supported by a mine action officer based in Aden and a staff member in Sana'a.[30] The UN Security Council on 14 July 2025 renewed UNMHA's mandate until 28 January 2026.[31]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

From October 2024, UNOPS implemented a Netherlands-funded project, "Addressing Explosive Threats for the Protection of Civilians", providing for grants to international NGOs to support YMACC. This was expected to include funding of US$160,000 over a period of eight months to support YMACC's coordination activities, including planning, tasking, monitoring/QA, completions and handovers, and information management.[32] The UN reported that Yemen received funding in 2024 from the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland. The UN Humanitarian Needs & Response Plan for 2025 identified a requirement for US$16.6 million for the Mine Action Area of Responsibility, but provided no details of donor commitments or how the funds would be used.[33]

21 Interview with Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, in Geneva, 20 June 2025.

22 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, Humanitarian Demining Programme Manager, DRC, 30 April 2025; Mara van der Kamp, Programme Manager, HALO, 6 May 2025; and Azza Sameer, Project Officer, NPA, 25 March 2025; interview with Ousama Algosaibi, Managing Director, Project Masam, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

23 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report for 2022", 15 February 2023, p. 21.

24 Ibid.

25 Email from Reshma Azmi, Country Director, HI, 17 June 2025.

26 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025; and Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025.

27 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report for 2022", 15 February 2023, p. 24.

28 Interviews with Patrick Fruchet, UN Adviser, in Geneva, 21 June 2023; and Aleksandar Mihajlov, UNDP, in Geneva, 22 June 2023.

29 Emails from Steinar Essen, Global Mine Action and Development Adviser, UNDP, 25 June and 3 September 2025.

30 Email from Leon Louw, Mine Action Adviser, UNMHA, 25 June 2024.

31 UN Security Council Resolution 2786, adopted by unanimous vote in favour on 14 July 2025, operative para. 1.

32 Interview with Charles Frisby and Habibulhaq Javed, UNOPS, in Geneva, 10 April 2025; and email from Charles Frisby, 15 April 2025.

33 UNOCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, p. 64.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

YEMAC-IRG (YEMAC South) has identified inclusion of women in mine action as a priority[34] and reaffirmed its commitment to advancing gender and diversity at the end of 2024.[35] Implementation remains challenging in the face of conservative cultural norms and restricted mobility for women, and at a time when donor funding cuts have severely curtailed mine action employment.

YEMAC South started training female staff for EOD, improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD), NTS, and risk education in 2020.[36] The 2022 Article 5 deadline extension request noted that YEMAC had employed women in NTS, risk education, information management and victim assistance. It stated that "there is no objection to including more women",[37] although YMACC was reportedly resistant to employing women in multitask teams.[38] Any plans for employing women were put on hold with the suspension of donor funding in 2023.

YEMAC DFA (YEMAC North) affirmed that women made up half of their staff working on risk education, NTS and victim assistance, including female team leaders, and around 40% of their office administrators but no further details were available. YEMAC North said it had planned to train more women to conduct NTS in 2024, with the support of HI, but the plan was suspended due to lack of funds. It added that no women conducted clearance or EOD.[39] Its strategic plan for 2025–29 omits any reference to gender.

Employment of women among international operators generally remained at a low level. DRC's NTS/risk education teams, however, are made up equally of men and women and in the last quarter of 2024 it started training a female technical field manager.[40] Of HALO's five international staff, three (60%) are women; among its 65 national staff, 12 (18%) are women, including four in field operations.[41] Half of NPA's staff were women, whether in managerial or field positions, but 27 employees seconded from YEMAC South were all men.[42] Project Masam, the biggest operator in Yemen, remains an almost entirely male organisation.[43]

In the North, HI reported a balance of employment for women and people with disabilities in the risk education team enabling delivery of safety messages to all community groups, but not in the NTS and EOD teams due to policy and because it said there were no qualified females for these activities. HI said it planned with YEMAC to consider gender diversity in upcoming training of NTS and EOD staff.[44]

**Table 3: Gender composition of operators in 2024**[45]

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DRC | 52 | 10 (19%) | 6 | 2 (33%) | 34 | 6 (18%) |
| HALO | 70 | 15 (21%) | 11 | 3 (27%) | 35 | 5 (14%) |
| HI South | 33 | 11 (33%) | 7 | 4 (57%) | 20 | 7 (35%) |
| HI North | 45 | 26 (58%) | 19 | 4 (21%) | 24 | 9 (38%) |
| NPA | 49 | 10 (20%) | 7 | 3 (43%) | 4 | 2 (50%) |
| Project Masam | 557 | 10 (2%) | 32 | 0 (0%) | 301 | 1 (<1%) |
| **Totals** | **806** | **82 (10%)** | **82** | **16 (20%)** | **418** | **30 (7%)** |

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

National mine action standards (NMAS) released by YMACC included a standard on environmental management,[46] but the emergency character of the response to mines and other explosive ordnance does not give prominence to environmental issues in planning and tasking. International operators report complying with relevant international standards, but said no environmental issues were identified or discussed with YEMAC or YMACC in 2024.[47]

34 Email from Ameen Saleh Al-Aqili, YEMAC, 26 December 2021; and 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 21.
35 Statement of Yemen to the Fifth APMBC Review Conference, Siem Reap, 24–29 November 2024.
36 Email from Ameen Saleh Al-Aqili, YEMAC, 5 May 2021; and "UNDP Annual Report 2020", p. 15.
37 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2022, p. 21.
38 Email from Marie-Josée Hamel, DRC, 30 March 2022.
39 Online interview with Ali Sofrah and Ahmed Yahya Alawi, Executive Officer, YEMAC-DFA, 13 October 2025.
40 Email from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025.
41 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025.
42 Email from Azza Sameer, NPA, 5 May 2025.
43 Email from Retief Horn, Project Masam, 16 April 2025.
44 Email from Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025.
45 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025; Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025; Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025; Azza Sameer, NPA, 5 May 2025; and Retief Horn, Project Masam, 16 April 2025.
46 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025.
47 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025; and Retief Horn, Project Masam, 16 April 2025.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Information management in the YEMAC IRG (YEMAC South) area of operations is supported by an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database installed in YMACC at the end of 2021 with support from UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[48] Since 2022 it has been populated with data on clearance, victims, and accidents as well as receiving results of the baseline survey.[49] Operator access is restricted to data relating to their own operations. They are able to request maps and other data to support operations and report that data received on tasks have proved reliable.[50] Project Masam reported its operating results to YMACC, but the data were held separately from other operators' results.[51] After closure of UNDP's programme, the GICHD continued to deploy an information management officer contracted by DRC.[52]

In 2024, YMACC upgraded IMSMA reporting forms to Version 2 with support from the GICHD, and held meetings with implementing partners to update them on the reporting requirements of the new version.[53] NPA also facilitated IMSMA workshops for YEMAC and YMACC at its offices.[54]

YEMAC DFA (YEMAC North)'s information management department has six staff working with an older IMSMA New Generation (Version 5.8) system. It said it had asked the GICHD for capacity building support and assistance in upgrading the system to IMSMA Core.[55] HI is coordinating with YEMAC North to support a system upgrade.[56] The DFA mine action strategy for 2025–29 makes no reference to information management.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Mine action in Yemen is conducted on an emergency basis in a context of continuing armed conflict, responding to immediate threats from all forms of explosive ordnance.[57] UNDP has previously observed that YEMAC needed to organise field operations to also address longer term impacts of contamination from ERW.[58] Yemen's CMR challenge, however, appears to be concentrated almost exclusively in northern governorates controlled by the DFA. In its Article 7 report, YEMAC DFA also asserted that 70-80% of contaminated areas and victims are located in the northern regions, according to the response plans and the needs of the UN and OCHA.[59]

A work plan in Yemen IRG's 2022 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in March 2022, identified general areas of activity such as emergency response, survey, and risk education, but said it would be unrealistic to set out milestones for clearance. It said it would update its plans every year or two.[60]

The DFA mine action strategic plan for 2025–29 sets out general plans for marking, survey, and clearance of explosive ordnance, including unexploded submunitions, expanding mine action teams, building capacity, and employing mine detection dogs (MDDs) and drones. The targets include marking 11.7km$^2$ and clearing 11km$^2$ of hazardous areas and "releasing a total of 1,456,941,500 square meters of SHA", but it does not set targets disaggregated by type of contamination. YEMAC-DFA put the cost of implementing the strategy at US$152.7 million.[61]

YEMAC DFA (YEMAC North) prioritised tasks on the basis of needs and demands for rapid interventions identified by YEMAC, local authorities, community committees, and community focal points. HI worked closely with YEMAC, meeting three times a week to plan field operations, workshops, and other activities. HI reported regular field visits by its Field Technical Manager and EOD Supervisor as well as by a YEMAC North QM unit.[62]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

YEMAC-IRG has been revising and updating National Mine Action Standards which were based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) when they were drawn up in 2007 but which it had acknowledged as obsolete.[63] By 2023, YEMAC-IRG

48 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report for 2022", 15 February 2023, p. 9.
49 Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 11 July 2023.
50 Emails from Christina Hendryx, DRC, 15 May 2023; and Matthew Smith, HALO, 11 July 2023.
51 Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 11 July 2023.
52 Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 27 June 2024; and email from Christina Hendryx, DRC, 17 July 2024.
53 Emails from Azza Sameer, NPA, 5 May 2025; and Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025.
54 Email from Azza Sameer, NPA, 5 May 2025.
55 Online interview with Ali Sofrah and Ahmed Yahya Alawi, YEMAC-DFA, 13 October 2025; and interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 27 June 2024.
56 Email from Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025.
57 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2022, p. 26.
58 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report for 2022", 15 February 2023, p. 23.
59 DFA Article 7 Report (covering year ended 31 March 2025), Form M.
60 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2022, p. 27.
61 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated but 2025, pp. 5, 10, and 23–24.
62 Email from Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025.

reported it had revised 31 chapters of NMAS, which were undergoing a final review and were expected to be approved and adopted before the end of 2023.[64] YEMAC-IRG reported it had finalised standards and SOPs for survey and clearance but did not clarify if they had been officially released or translated.[65]

YEMAC-DFA briefly mentions in its strategic plan for 2025–29 that it is responsible for maintaining the NMAS and implementing plans in accordance with them.[66] It said it had updated its version of national standards in 2021, ensuring they were IMAS-compliant and aligned with the national standards applied in the south by YEMAC-IRG.[67]

YMACC held regular meetings with implementing partners for planning and tasking but funding cuts severely limited YEMAC-IRG operational QM capacity. International operators reported QM took place when implementing partners funded the costs.[68] HI said YEMAC-DFA had a technical unit that conducted regular field visits to monitor its NTS and EOD operations.[69]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Until 2023, YEMAC was nominally the biggest operator, employing some 400 personnel under YEMAC-DFA in the north and 550 personnel under YEMAC-IRG in the south, but estimates of operational capacity in both areas were complicated by the reported presence of ghost deminers and by patchy reporting on the part of YEMAC team leaders.[70] YEMAC-IRG has stated that the cut in donor funding since 2023 resulted in it standing down 66 demining teams and it has only deployed teams for emergency call-outs.[71]

YEMAC-DFA reported that its total staff of 350 included 12 manual clearance teams with 234 personnel, three NTS teams/6 personnel, five TS teams/39 personnel, one mechanical team, and three MDD teams with 20 handlers and 19 dogs.[72] In June 2024, it set up two emergency teams to respond to calls from local authorities and communities to deal with the movement of mines as a result of severe flooding in Hudaydah governorate and UXO left by air strikes conducted by international forces in the context of regional conflicts.[73] YEMAC-DFA informed Mine Action Review that it conducts its operations with the support of HI and ICRC, which work in partnership with YEMAC-DFA, providing technical support and supervision to YEMAC-DFA EOD operations.[74]

In 2024, Saudi-funded Project Masam provided the most operational capacity (see Table 3) conducting emergency clearance in nine governorates. In July 2025, Project Masam began training and deploying 10 more teams with a total of 95 personnel, including 60 deminers, supported by a four-man team doing follow-up clearance and verification and a PT-300 tracked demining machine, the programme's first mechanical asset. These are to work in IRG-controlled Midi district in the north western corner of Hajjah governorate bordering Saudi Arabia, a fiercely contested area occupied by Houthi forces for two years. Project Masam said it conducted NTS and technical survey (TS) and submitted general threat assessments on all assigned tasks. It does not operate any mechanical assets and works mainly MinMod water disruptors for clearance of IEDs.[75]

Among international demining NGOs, DRC worked in the west coast governorates of Taiz and Hodeida delivering EOD support, NTS (with nine personnel), and risk education, and undertaking clearance. It completed its first clearance task through its manual team of seven deminers and also fielded a 13-strong EOD team in 2024. DRC also hosted a GICHD information management staffer to support the YEMAC IMSMA database. In October 2024, DRC signed an MoU with the DFA, but as at June 2025 discussions were continuing with authorities on what would be its operating scope and priorities.[76]

HALO's total staff of 70 included 26 clearance who conducted NTS, and EOD in Aden, Lahj and Taiz and also had mechanical assets conducting clearance in Aden and Taiz but faced significant downsizing in 2025 due to loss of funding from the but loss of funding from the US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA). NPA operated mainly in Aden (NTS and TS) and Abyan (NTS, TS, and clearance) and had a presence in Taiz delivering explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) but in 2025 had to cut back staffing and the number of rented vehicles after loss of PM/WRA funding.[77]

HI had offices in Aden and Taiz governorates with a total staff of 33 in the south including two battle area clearance (BAC) teams but also worked in three DFA-controlled governorates, Sanaa, Hodeida, and Hajjah with three NTS teams and five EOD teams as well as nine teams delivering EORE. The DFA's mine action authorities had identified Al Jawf, Al Bayda, and Al Dhalee as priorities but HI reported Yemen's severe funding constraints limited prospects for responding to those needs.[78]

63 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2019", 20 January 2020, p. 17; and 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
64 Email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, 21 May 2023.
65 Yemen IRG Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
66 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated, p. 12.
67 Online interview with Ali Sofrah and Ahmed Yahya Alawi, YEMAC-DFA, 13 October 2025.
68 Emails from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025; and Azza Sameer, NPA, 5 May 2025.
69 Email from Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025.
70 Interview with mine action stakeholders in Geneva, 23 June 2022.
71 Interview with Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC-IRG, in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and Yemen statement to the APMBC Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 18 June 2025.
72 Email from Ali Sofrah, YEMAC-DFA, 2 September 2025.
73 Online interview with Ali Sofrah and Ahmed Yahya Alawi, YEMAC-DFA, 13 October 2025.
74 Online interview with Ali Sofrah and Ahmed Yahya Alawi, Executive Officer, YEMAC-DFA, 13 October 2025.
75 Emails from Retief Horn, Project Masam, 16 April, 29 June, and 10 and 11 September 2025.
76 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April, 10 July, and 12 September 2025.
77 Emails from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025; and Azza Sameer, NPA, 5 and 7 May 2025.
78 Email from Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025.

**Table 4: International operator capacity 2024**

| Operator | Manual teams | Deminers | EOD/BAC | NTS/TS | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DRC | 1 | 7 | 13 | 9 | |
| HALO | N/R | 26 | 0 | 8 | Also trained for NTS and EORE |
| HI-North | 5 | 0 | 25 | 12 | 9 EORE teams with 45 personnel |
| HI-South | 2 | 0 | 12 | 10 | 4 EORE teams with 16 personnel |
| NPA | 2 | 8 | 0 | 8 | Also four two-person MDD teams |
| Project Masam | 32 | 264 | 0 | 0 | Multi-task, also trained for NTS, TS |
| **Totals** | **42** | **305** | **50** | **47** | |

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**[79]

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 1.44 | Includes 1.02km² in the DFA-controlled North and 0.43km² in the IRG-controlled South. |
| **Technical Survey** | 0.75 | Recorded by the IRG only. |
| **Non-Technical Survey** | 37.66 | Recorded by the DFA only. |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 545 | Mines destroyed in IRG-controlled areas only. Project Masam reported destroying 369 AP mines in clearance and spot tasks. It also reported destroying two pressure-plate IEDs. No YEMAC-DFA data was available on the number of AP mined destroyed in the 2024 calendar year. However, the DFA's Article 7 report for the year ending 31 March 2025 recorded the destruction of 143 AP mines and 158 IEDs (without specifying how many were victim-activated). |

Yemen's official land release data are inconsistent with operator results and provide an incomplete view of mine action operations, preventing a clear determination of mine action outputs. The IRG Article 7 report distinguishes between results of international demining organisations recorded as land release in YEMAC's IMSMA database and Project Masam's emergency clearance results, which are held separately.

IRG official results show a total of 1.2km² released through survey and clearance in 2024 (see Table 4). This is triple the area released in 2023 when the IRG recorded reduction of 0.3km and clearance of 0.2km² with destruction of 40 AP mines.[80] The IRG also reported destruction of 545 AP mines. It noted that Project Masam cleared 10.5km² and destroyed 246 AP mines and 3,257 AV mines but did not disaggregate the data by operator to show who destroyed the other AP mines.[81]

In the North, YEMAC-DFA reported to Mine Action Review clearing 1,018,853m² in 2024 but it did not provide details of mines destroyed.[82] In the year ending 31 March 2025, it reported clearing 1,343,052m² in Hudaydah, Al Jawf, and Sana'a governorates and destroying 143 AP mines and 158 improvised devices, without specifying if the IEDs were victim-activated devices that qualified as AP mines.[83]

79 Yemen IRG Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D; email from Ahmed Yahya Alawi, YEMAC-DFA, 21 October 2025.

80 Yemen IRG Article 7 Reports (covering 2023 and 2024), Form D.

81 Yemen IRG Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D; email from Retief Horn, Project Masam, 16 April 2025.

82 Email from Ahmed Yahya Alawi, YEMAC-DFA, 21 October 2025.

83 DFA Article 7 Report (covering year ended 31 March 2025), Forms J and K; and email from Ahmed Yahya Alawi, Executive Officer, YEMAC-DFA, 8 October 2026.

## SURVEY IN 2024

YEMAC South has identified the Yemen Baseline Survey (YBLS) as a priority but in 2025 expressed concern at its weak performance as a result of the acute financial constraints on mine action in Yemen and obstacles to accessing affected areas due to insecurity.[84] YEMAC reported that the YBLS recorded nearly 8km² of confirmed and suspected hazardous areas in 2024 (see Table 1) but the cumulative total recorded by the YBLS since it started is unclear.

The IRG Article 7 report for 2024 does not show any area cancelled although operators reported 13.3km² cancelled through NTS, mostly by NPA in Abyan (9.2km²) and Aden (2.6km²). Operators also recorded a smaller area of 0.7km² reduced through technical survey (see Table 5).[85]

**Table 6: Survey in Yemen-IRG by international operators 2024**[86]

| Operator | Area confirmed (m²) | Area cancelled (m²) | Area reduced (m²) | NTS/TS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DRC | 424,519 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| HALO | 82,975 | 1,518,257 | 387,785 | 8 |
| NPA | 3,805,002 | 11,796,282 | 307,184 | 12 |
| HI | 367,749 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| **Totals** | **4,680,245** | **13,314,539** | **694,969** | **47** |

YEMAC-DFA reported that NTS with technical support from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) identified 24 SHAs in Al Bayda governorate covering 9.27km². It also reported cancelling 37.66km² in four governorates, 96% of it in Hudaydah (see Table 7).[87] HI also reported undertaking NTS in DFA-controlled areas in 2024 and confirmed a total of 0.6km² – 0.5km² in Hudaydah and 0.1km² in Sana'a governorate.[88]

**Table 7: Yemen-DFA Cancellation through NTS in 2024**[89]

| Governorate | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|
| Hudaydah | 36,008,426 |
| Al Jawf | 1,562,821 |
| Amran | 23,000 |
| Sana'a | 67,900 |
| **Total** | **37,662,147** |

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

Land released through clearance in 2024 amounted to 425,315m² according to IRG official data, which showed that almost all (96%) was in Abyan governorate with the rest in Taiz, but it did not identify who conducted it.[90] International NGOs recorded clearance of 261,907m² – 135,286m² by HALO, 114,947m² by NPA, and 11,674m² by DRC but did not report destroying any AP mines in IRG-controlled areas of Yemen either through clearance or spot EOD operations.[91]

HI did not conduct area clearance in 2024 but said its EOD operations in IRG-controlled Mokha governorate destroyed 58 improvised mines and 64 AV mines. In DFA-controlled Hudaydah, HI said its EOD operations destroyed 5 AP mines, 72 improvised mines, and 104 AV mines.[92]

Project Masam reported clearance of 10.5 km² in 2024 but as operations conducted on an emergency basis the area cleared was not recorded as land released. Clearance in Shabwah governorate accounted for more than half the total area cleared (see Table 6) and led the number of AP mines destroyed but the project also reported encountering dense AV mines in Marib. The operation cleared slightly more area in 2024 than the previous year but said results were down because conflict prevented access to some densely mined areas. Project Masam destroyed 246 AP mines in clearance in 2024, down from 521 the previous year, but it also reported destroying 123 AP mines in spot tasks, including 113 in Taiz governorate. Project Masam also reported destroying 237 IEDs in 2024. It identified that two improvised devices were victim-activated by pressure plates and three by tripwires. Other devices included 13 activated by radio commands and a boat-borne device also remotely activated.[93]

84 Statement of Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, at Yemen side-event, UN National Directors' Meeting, Geneva, 11 April 2025.
85 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025; Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025; Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025; and Azza Sameer, NPA, 5 May 2025.
86 Ibid.
87 Email from Ahmed Yahya Alawi, YEMAC-DFA, 8 October 2026.
88 Email from Reshma Azmi, Country Director, HI, 17 June 2025.
89 Email from Ahmed Yahya Alawi, YEMAC-DFA, 8 October 2026.
90 IRG Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
91 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025; Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025; Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025; and Azza Sameer, NPA, 5 May 2025.
92 Email from Reshma Azmi, Country Director, HI, 17 June 2025.
93 Email from Retief Horn, Project Masam, 16 April 2025.

**Table 8: Project Masam clearance in 2024**[94]

| | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | Other IEDs destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aden | 144,769 | 21 | 361 | 44 |
| Al-Dhale | 86,426 | 19 | 1 | 7 |
| Hudaydah | 617,977 | 11 | 102 | 46 |
| Jawf | 299,826 | 1 | 82 | 3 |
| Lahj | 203,347 | 0 | 35 | 0 |
| Marib | 2,107,919 | 29 | 2,253 | 45 |
| Shabwah | 5,858,618 | 87 | 152 | 15 |
| Abyan | 13,100 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Taiz | 1,179,945 | 78 | 272 | 77 |
| **Spot tasks** | | **123** | **0** | **0** |
| **Totals** | **10,511,927** | **369** | **3,258** | **237** |

YEMAC-DFA said it conducted clearance in four governorates in 2024, releasing 1,018,853m², almost all of it (97%) in Hudaydah governorate (see Table 9) but it did not provide details of mines destroyed during clearance.[95] The DFA's Article 7 report, however, reported that in the year ending 31 March 2025, a total of 143 AP mines, 1,409 AV mines, 2 cluster bombs, 1 rocket, 7 missiles, 2,501 mixed UXO, and 158 IEDs were destroyed.[96] It did not specify how many of the IEDs were victim-activated.

**Table 9: Yemen-DFA clearance in 2024**[97]

| Governorate | Area cleared (m²) |
|---|---|
| Hudaydah | 991,574 |
| Al Jawf | 21,179 |
| Amran | 2,000 |
| Sana'a | 4,100 |
| **Total** | **1,018,853** |

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR YEMEN: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (6 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2015

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2020

↓

THIRD (INTERIM) EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2023

↓

**FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2028**

**ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO**

94 Ibid.

95 Email from Ahmed Yahya Alawi, YEMAC-DFA, 8 October 2026.

96 DFA Article 7 Report (covering year ended 31 March 2025), Form K.

97 Email from Ahmed Yahya Alawi, YEMAC-DFA, 8 October 2026.

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the fourth extension, for five years, granted by States Parties in 2022), Yemen is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2028. Regional conflicts, local insecurity and acute lack of funding mean that it will need at least one further extension.

The third extension request submitted by the IRG in 2020 asked for three years as an interim measure designed to buy time for a baseline survey which would provide the basis for a follow-up request informed by up-to-date evidence of contamination. By 2022, the YBLS had barely started so Yemen requested a fourth five-year extension starting in March 2023 to achieve the same objective of establishing a baseline estimate of contamination and to develop capacity to address the more complex environment resulting from extensive use of a wide range of explosive ordnance.[98]

Two years on, Yemen has barely advanced. Mine action in the IRG-controlled south continues to consist largely of emergency clearance while the scope and effectiveness of mine action in DFA-controlled areas is unknown. Yemen in particular awaits clarity on the support it will receive from donors as the UN completes its transition from the previous UNDP-managed Emergency Mine Action Programme that ended in 2023 to new arrangements outlined in the roadmap endorsed by the UN country teams in May 2025.

**Table 10: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance[99]**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | **0.4 |
| 2023 | 0.2 |
| 2022 | *2.0 |
| 2021 | *1.5 |
| 2020 | *1.0 |
| **Total** | **5.1** |

*Mine Action Review estimates. **Includes 1.02km² in the DFA-controlled North.

98 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 3–4.

99 Data include only clearance uploaded to the YEMAC-IRG IMSMA database and not emergency clearance, with the exception of 2024 data, which also includes clearance data in DFA-controlled North.

# ZIMBABWE

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025

Not on track to meet deadline
Five-year extension to 31 December 2030 requested

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 12KM$^2$

Medium
(National Authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km$^2$) | Release in 2023 (km$^2$) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 1.95 | 1.91 |
| Technical Survey | 2.44 | 0.4 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0.01 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 31,972 (with 45 destroyed in spot tasks according to operator data) | 37,360 (incl. 30 during spot tasks) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Zimbabwean Armed Forces' National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU)
- APOPO
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

All mined areas remaining in Zimbabwe are now confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). Zimbabwe continued to make steady progress in land release during 2024, but its main challenge remains securing the funding needed to complete clearance. The programme was significantly impacted by the reduction of US funding in early 2025, which led The HALO Trust (HALO) to further reduce capacity and APOPO to withdraw from the country altogether in March 2025. On 1 April 2025, Zimbabwe submitted its sixth Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request, seeking a five-year extension to the end of 2030.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Zimbabwe should ensure the next extension period is its last and fulfil Article 5 as soon as possible.**
- **Zimbabwe should continue to prioritise efforts to secure additional national and international funding for the mine action programme.**
- **Zimbabwe should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for the programme.**

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|
| **UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION** (20% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | Zimbabwe has a good understanding of remaining mine contamination, all of which is in CHAs. It believes most of the 11.99km$^2$ of mined area will need to be released by clearance. |
| **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | The mine action programme is managed effectively by the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC), with good stakeholder collaboration. There is a high degree of national ownership, with the government continuing to provide US$500,000 annually. |
| **GENDER AND DIVERSITY** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | ZIMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan although the importance of gender is acknowledged in the national mine action strategy and integrated into annual work plans. The Zimbabwean Armed Forces' National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU) has no women in operational roles but survey and community liaison teams are reportedly inclusive and gender-balanced. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION** (10% of overall score) | 7 | 7 | ZIMAC has a national standard and policy on environmental management. The use of highly destructive mechanical clearance methods is not permitted in areas with large trees. All demining operators seek to reduce the environmental impact of their operations, but vary in the degree to which they undertake environmental assessments or have environmental policies and management systems in place. |
| **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | ZIMAC continued to improve its information management in 2024, and the transition from the Information Management for Mine Action System (IMSMA) New Generation system to IMSMA Core was expected to be completed by the end of 2025. Zimbabwe submits detailed Article 7 reports annually. Regular cross-checking of data with operators continues. |
| **PLANNING AND TASKING** (10% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | In its 2025 extension request ZIMAC presented revised annual land release targets to 2030, identifying the resources, time, and funding needed to complete clearance. |
| **LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score) | 9 | 9 | Zimbabwe maintained approximately the same overall capacity across operators in 2024 compared to 2023. Use of mechanical assets alongside mine detection dogs and the roll-out of a new detector in 2024 further increased land release efficiency. Operators continue to destroy tens of thousands of anti-personnel mines annually. |
| **LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE** (20% of overall score) | 8 | 8 | Zimbabwe released 4.39km$^2$ of mined area in 2024, mostly through technical survey, up from 2.32km$^2$ in 2023. Clearance output remained stable. If Zimbabwe's request for a planned five-year extension is granted in 2025, it will still need to secure additional funding. Completion by the end of 2030 would still be a considerable achievement for one of the world's most heavily mined countries in a particularly challenging donor funding environment. |
| **Average Score** | **7.9** | **7.9** | **Overall Programme Performance: GOOD** |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ)
- Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Zimbabwean Armed Forces' National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- APOPO (programme closed in March 2025)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2024 Zimbabwe reported a total of 11.99km$^2$ of confirmed mined area[1] (see Table 1). This is substantially down on the 16.1km$^2$ a year earlier.[2] Four of Zimbabwe's ten provinces are contaminated with anti-personnel (AP) mines. With the exception of one minefield, located inland in Matabeleland North province, all the remaining mined areas are along the border with Mozambique.[3] Manicaland province no longer contains any mined areas, following completion of clearance by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in 2024.[4]

According to the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC), the baseline of contamination is complete following the completion of significant re-survey in 2016.[5] The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has stated its belief that the understanding of remaining contamination is up to date and accurate.[6] Nevertheless, ZIMAC added 223,374m$^2$ to the national database in 2024, due to an adjustment to an original CHA[7] while HALO notes that targeted survey may yet highlight additional mined areas.[8] Moreover, while all contaminated areas remaining in Zimbabwe are CHAs, in general they are widely drawn. Indeed, some 15.7km$^2$ has been released through survey between 2021 and the end of 2024, compared to 8.43km$^2$ through clearance.[9]

**Table 1: AP mined area (at end 2024)**[10]

| Province | CHAs | Sectors* | Area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Masvingo | 1 | 5 | 830,239 |
| Mashonaland East | 1 | 28 | 8,562,236 |
| Matabeleland North | 1 | 7 | 797,363 |
| Mashonaland Central | 1 | 20 | 1,809,661 |
| **Totals** | **4** | **60** | **11,999,499** |

*In Zimbabwe, as CHAs are generally relatively large and can take up to several years to complete, each CHA is split into "sectors" to enable more regular release of land.

Zimbabwe's mine contamination, the overwhelming majority of which is of AP mines, originates from the laying of minefields in the late 1970s during a decolonisation war. At the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with seven major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, and one inland minefield laid by the Rhodesian Army.[11] Initially, AP mines were laid in very dense belts (on average 2,500 mines per kilometre of frontage) to form a so-called "cordon sanitaire", with up to 5,500 mines per kilometre in some places.[12] Over time, this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response, in many sections, a second belt of "ploughshare" directional fragmentation mines protected by AP mines was laid behind the cordon sanitaire. Few areas contain anti-vehicle (AV) mines and it is thought that the number of such mines remaining is low.[13] No AV mines were destroyed during clearance or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks in 2024. In January 2025, however, an accident occurred in a previously cleared area that was most likely the result of an AV mine,[14] when a vehicle struck a landmine on the edge of a road in the Sebungwe area.[15]

1 Email from Capt. Godwish, Quality Management Officer, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024).
2 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, Operations Officer, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 6.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
4 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.
5 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
6 Email from Åsa Massleberg, Programme Manager and Senior Advisor, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 16 May 2023.
7 Emails from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and Capt. Mandaba, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025. The CHA was adjusted due to "over clearance", which refers to the situation where the area that has been cleared exceeds the initial polygon.
8 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, Programme Manager, HALO, 19 August 2024.
9 Article 7 report (covering 2021), p. 5; Article 7 report (covering 2022), p. 6; and Article 7 report (covering 2023), p. 6; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.
10 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
11 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, p. 1; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 10 October 2017.
12 "To Walk the Earth in Safety, Documenting the United States' Commitment to Conventional Weapons Destruction, Fiscal Year 2022, October 1, 2021–September 30, 2022", p. 10.
13 Email from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 19 August 2021.
14 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, Programme Manager, NPA, 11 April 2025.
15 'Three Killed, Three Injured In Landmine Blast In Binga', *Pindula*, 9 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/404Ft2b.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ) is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as the focal point and coordination centre of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated to report to NAMAAZ.[16] The Zimbabwe Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Act domesticates the APMBC and provides the framework for the elaboration of mine action policies and strategies by the NAMAAZ.[17]

Stakeholders believe that the existing structure and routines of coordination suffice. However, it has also been pointed out that a national forum was one of the objectives identified at the National Stakeholder Dialogue (NSD) in January 2023, and that such a forum could help better integrate mine action into the national development strategy.[18] It may also encourage donors who wish to support development initiatives to also support mine action initiatives.[19] These issues were discussed again at the NSD in February 2025.[20] As at April 2025, ZIMAC was still awaiting feedback on its proposal to include mine action in the national development goals.[21] In the additional information it provided on its 2025 extension request in August 2025, Zimbabwe stated that its "revised strategic plan" (for mine action) would be integrated into the 2026–30 national development plan, in order to align mine action with broader national development priorities. Zimbabwe expected the national development plan to be finalised by the end of 2025, for implementation from 2026.[22]

Operators are involved in key decision-making, with strategic, co-ordination and technical working group (TWG) meetings between operators and ZIMAC held regularly.[23] TWG meetings were not called for in 2024, but one was set to take place in September 2025,[24] with ongoing plans for operators to host these and to include field visits with a view to sharing learning and best practices.[25] Operators were fully involved in the drafting of Zimbabwe's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, including through a dedicated side session at the NSD in February 2025.[26] Communication between ZIMAC and NAMAAZ, operators, and other Zimbabwean government ministries is reported to be good, with regular bilateral meetings.[27]

Operators report an enabling environment for mine action in Zimbabwe,[28] including good administrative support from ZIMAC in liaising with government departments from ZIMAC.[29] However, operators do note that security clearance, a prerequisite for obtaining work permits for international staff, is often a lengthy process.[30] Security clearance is the responsibility of NAMAAZ, which seeks authority through the defence and national security departments. ZIMAC's role is to follow up on this process with NAMAAZ on behalf of the operators, which it has continued to do.[31] The introduction of a new process in 2024 brought some improvement, but operators still experienced delays and lacked information about applications in progress.[32] HALO notes that it presents a particular problem for those who are not a citizen of a Southern African Development Community country.[33]

APOPO reported experiencing challenges with taxes on imported demining equipment.[34] HALO has resolved this through a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the MoD, which allows it to apply to the Zimbabwe revenue authority (ZIMRA) for exemption from import fees for any capital equipment.[35] NPA has found that demining equipment can be imported without significant complications.[36]

ZIMAC continued to receive capacity development support in 2024, including in information management (IM) through workshops facilitated by NPA, and training from the GICHD in various areas including Information Management for Mine Action System (IMSMA) Core, the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and national mine action standards (NMAS).[37] HALO also provided training for 12 ZIMAC and

16 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

17 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

18 Emails from Mikael Bold, Programme Manager, APOPO, Zimbabwe, 10 June 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, Head of Donor Management and Partnerships, HALO, 21 June 2024; Peter Avenell, Country Director, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 24 May 2024; and Åsa Massleberg, GICHD, 16 May 2023.

19 Emails from Robert Burny, Country Director, APOPO, 30 April 2025; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

20 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

21 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

22 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/45FKlge, p. 11.

23 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I.

24 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 15 July 2025; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 16 July 2025.

25 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 14 July 2025.

26 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

27 Email from Gemma Welsh, Programme Manager, NPA, 19 April 2023; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.

28 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 12 May 2023; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 March 2023; and Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023.

29 Email from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024.

30 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.

31 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.

32 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

33 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

34 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

35 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

36 Email from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.

37 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

NMCU staff in use of the Minelab GPZ 7000 detectors for secondary search, enabling them to undertake missed-mine drills using these detectors. HALO handed over four GPZ 7000 detectors to ZIMAC for issue to the NMCU in May 2025, with more planned to be provided in July.[38] NPA trained ZIMAC quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) officers in the use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) for QA.[39] The NMCU trains new deminers annually, mainly to replace personnel who have worked in demining for two years or more.[40]

ZIMAC and all operators are taking steps to prepare staff for eventual demobilisation upon completion,[41] though this is now further away than anticipated. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has been training staff across a range of skills, including business, financial literacy, catering, IT, and agriculture. MAG is also continuing technical training for those who may wish to work internationally or pursue certificated skills as team leaders.[42] NPA continued to provide entrepreneurship training, extending this from office staff to operational staff in 2024, as well as supporting 142 staff to undertake vocational training courses.[43] HALO provides English literacy training in all camps through permanent teaching staff, as well as ongoing agricultural training programmes. HALO also provides training grants for staff who self-enrol on professional development or academic courses.[44] APOPO has been training its field staff in a range of skills in recent years, including agroforestry and syntropic farming, but this ended due to the unforeseen closure of APOPO's programme in March 2025, following the termination of US funding.[45]

NPA held a multi-stakeholder workshop in July 2024, on the possibility of setting up an Explosive Ordnance (EO) hotline for affected communities. As of July 2025, the roll-out of this hotline was still pending ZIMAC approval.[46] ZIMAC continues with efforts in regional cooperation and hosted the Ethiopian Mine Action Office on a learning visit in March 2025, and also joined HALO to receive a learning visit from Angola.[47]

Zimbabwe stated in 2024 that it did not expect to meet its existing Article 5 deadline of the end of 2025, citing "natural disasters", reduction of operational capacity during the COVID-19 pandemic and withdrawal of funding during the pandemic as the main causes.[48] On 1 April 2025, Zimbabwe submitted its sixth request for an extension to its Article 5 deadline, seeking a further five years to the end of 2030.[49] In its most recent Article 7 report (covering 2024), Zimbabwe reiterates that the withdrawal of APOPO from Zimbabwe in March 2025 and a 50% capacity drop for HALO compared to March 2024, made completion "extremely unattainable by any time before 2030".[50]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Government of Zimbabwe continues to fund mine action in line with previous commitments, with the national financial contribution to the implementation of its obligations in 2024 unchanged from recent years at US$500,000.[51] The government also continues to fully fund the NMCU and, in 2024, committed US$2 million to re-equip the unit,[52] with the funds released and procurement underway as at September 2025.[53] In 2024, Zimbabwe pledged that national funding will remain at its current level until completion, and could even increase if the economy strengthens.[54]

Zimbabwe's mine action programme requires an estimated US$68.3 million between 2025 and 2030,[55] with the majority of this allocated for survey and clearance.[56] Zimbabwe provided information in its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request on its funding requirements for this proposed extension period,[57] and clarified certain important points in additional information provided in August 2025. First, Zimbabwe clarified how much international donor funding has already been secured for the proposed extension period, and the shortfall still remaining, stating that, of the US$68.3 million required, US$15.52 million had been secured, leaving a gap of US$52.78 million.[58] Zimbabwe also clarified that the US$0.5m, committed annually in 2025–30 by the government, does not include equipment costs for the NMCU, as these are to be budgeted for as and when "necessary". Zimbabwe

38 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

39 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

40 Ibid.

41 'Zimbabwe's Preparations for Capacity to Address Residual Contamination and Demobilisation of Demining Personnel', Lt. Col. S. Moyo, Co-ordinator, ZIMAC, February 2025, p. 9.

42 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

43 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

44 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

45 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

46 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April and 16 July 2025.

47 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 14 July 2025.

48 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex A, p. A-1.

49 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, cover page and p. 6.

50 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

51 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 17; and emails from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 28 August 2024.

52 Article 7 report (covering 2024), Annex A, page 34; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

53 Email from Capt. Mandaba, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025.

54 Preliminary Observations, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 18-20 June 2024, p. 2.

55 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Annex A, p. 38; and 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 9.

56 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 11.

57 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, pp. 9 and 44–49.

58 Zimbabwe also provides a breakdown of funding secured and shortfall remaining for each operator, with HALO, MAG and NPA each facing a shortfall, but the NMCU not facing a shortfall. Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 8.

adds that any international support in the form of demining equipment for the NMCU "will be greatly appreciated".[59] Given this, Zimbabwe could further strengthen the request by clarifying the total funding and timeline required to fully equip the NMCU, and what international assistance, financial or in-kind in the form of equipment, is likely to be required.[60]

In the additional information provided, Zimbabwe also responded to a request for more information on its planned or proposed resource mobilisation activities during the extension period, by stating that it "proposes to conduct individualised approaches on each and every international meeting that will be held".[61] Although Zimbabwe does state that resource mobilisation will be an "ongoing effort", including hosting conferences and presenting on international platforms,[62] the request could be further strengthened by including more details on the planned resource mobilisation efforts.[63] It was hoped that the NSD in early 2025 would attract more donor support. In July, however, operators reported that, although it was a productive meeting, it had not so far led to new funding.[64] An added challenge, as MAG highlights, is that factors such as the possibility of operators being assigned to a different minefield, requiring different assets; the need to replace key equipment over the next five years or so; and inflation (an ongoing issue in Zimbabwe), can make it difficult to make exact funding projections.[65] ZIMAC has encouraged operators to seek new and innovative funding opportunities. HALO has advocated the concept of development-linked mine action projects, aimed at traditional donors who do not have funding available for mine action in Zimbabwe, but do for development interventions.[66] As previously mentioned, the integration of mine action into Zimbabwe's national development strategy could bolster this approach. MAG was also working with NPA on a possible joint operations concept note to offer to donors.[67]

The US funding freeze and subsequent review of grants in early 2025 impacted both APOPO and HALO significantly. APOPO's grant was suspended on 26 January 2025 and then terminated on 26 February, forcing APOPO to close its survey and clearance project in Zimbabwe in March 2025.[68] HALO had already experienced a reduction in US funding in August 2024, from USD$1.75m USD$1.25m. In February 2025, HALO's US funding was frozen, and then terminated in March, cutting approximately 30% of its total annual funding.[69] A summary of 2024–2025 funding of international operators is provided in Table 2.

**Table 2: Funding for survey and clearance by international operators in Zimbabwe (2024–25)**[70]

| Donor | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Embassy of Japan (EOJ) | HALO | HALO (reduced) |
| German Federal Foreign office (GFFO) | NPA | NPA (until July 2026) |
| Gould Foundation | None | HALO |
| Ireland (Irish Aid) | HALO | HALO (2025 is final year of 3-year project) |
| Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) | MAG, NPA | MAG (until end April 2025) |
| Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) | None | NPA |
| Oak Foundation | None | HALO |
| UK, Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) | MAG, HALO | MAG (reduced), HALO (extended) |

59 Ibid.

60 Mine Action Review comments on Zimbabwe's Article 5 Extension Request (delivered by NPA), Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, p. 2. It is not clear if the equipment costs for NMCU are in addition to or included in the annual clearance budget of US$500,000 per year to be provided by the Government of Zimbabwe. 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, p. 9.

61 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 10.

62 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, Annex B, p. 50.

63 Mine Action Review comments on Zimbabwe's Article 5 Extension Request (delivered by NPA), p. 2; and "ICBL Comments on Zimbabwe's Article 5 Extension Request", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025.

64 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 14 July 2025; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 16 July 2025.

65 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 20 August 2025.

66 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

67 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 14 July 2025.

68 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

69 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

70 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

Table 2 Continued

| Donor | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| US Department of Defense, Humanitarian Demining Research and Development (DoD HD R&D) | APOPO | None |
| US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) | APOPO, HALO | None |
| World Without Mines (WWM) | HALO | HALO (reduced) |

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

ZIMAC had pledged to seek assistance from international stakeholders to formulate a gender and diversity policy by the end of 2022.[71] In its latest Article 7 report covering 2024, however, Zimbabwe noted once again that its gender and diversity policy "has not yet been completed". As per its previous Article 7 reports in recent years, Zimbabwe stresses that it is bound by national policy, which upholds gender equality of opportunity and seeks to support women to take on roles which have been male-dominated. Zimbabwe asserts that no barriers exist to gender-balanced participation in mine action.[72]

Zimbabwe's National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 does refer to the importance of addressing gender and diversity considerations and existing guidelines that stakeholders should use as a reference, including the UN's Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes.[73] Zimbabwe has also included gender considerations in NMAS 07 ("Management of Demining Operations"), which calls for "special efforts" to be made "to ensure gender balance and diversity of background for Community Liaison Officers".[74]

Table 3: Gender composition of operators in 2024[75]

| Organisation | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ZIMAC | 38 | 3 (8%) | 4 | 0 (0%) | 34 | 3 (9%) |
| APOPO | 69 | 21 (30%) | 9 | 3 (33%) | 60 | 18 (30%) |
| HALO | 455 | 147 (32%) | 78 | 29 (37%) | 342 | 100 (29%) |
| MAG | 87 | 40 (46%) | 13 | 6 (46%) | 76 | 35 (46%) |
| NPA | 146 | 47 (32%) | 5 | 1 (20%) | 91 | 31 (34%) |
| **Totals** | **795** | **258 (32%)** | **109** | **39 (36%)** | **603** | **187 (31%)** |

ZIMAC had no women in its small cohort of managerial or supervisory staff in 2024, compared to one in 2023. However, it saw a marginal increase among operational staff, with women making up 9% (3 of 34) of operational positions in 2024, compared to 3% (1 of 37) in 2023.[76] No women are employed in operational roles in the NMCU because staff are recruited from the corps of military engineers, where very few women are working. NMCU deminers are drawn exclusively from soldiers and therefore tend to be male.[77] While ZIMAC can recommend the deployment of women within NMCU, as they do with all operators, the decision on which personnel to deploy lies with the Army.[78] ZIMAC notes that, thanks to community liaison efforts, all international operators employ considerable numbers of female deminers, team leaders, and supervisors.[79] This represents progress since 2020, when ZIMAC stated that the number of women employed in mine action fell short of "required" levels and noted that Zimbabwean women were somewhat reluctant to work in mine action.[80]

71 Email from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 2 June 2022.

72 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Annex A, p. 23; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex A, pp. A-1 – A-2; Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Annex A, p. A-1; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Annex A, p. A-1.

73 Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 22 February 2018; and Zimbabwe National Mine Action Strategy, 2018–2025, p. 15.

74 Email from Samuel Fricker, HALO, 20 July 2019.

75 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

76 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

77 Emails from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, 23 August 2022; and Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024.

78 Email from Capt. Mandaba, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025.

79 Email from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 2 June 2022.

80 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019 and 6 April 2020.

ZIMAC confirms that all community groups are routinely consulted in the NMCU's survey and community liaison activities, using teams that are gender-balanced and diverse. Personnel are recruited locally, to incorporate ethnic and minority groups who speak the local language.[81] ZIMAC reports that gender is considered during planning and prioritisation of minefields for clearance, such as the risks taken by women and girls to cross minefields to fetch water and by men and boys who herd cattle or plough near mined areas.[82] However, given the nature of the minefields, which are essentially one long and continuous line, operational access constraints often dictate clearance priorities as much as other factors.[83]

All international operators in Zimbabwe have either global or country-specific gender policies in place for their programme staff[84] and demonstrate continued commitment to measures that encourage and support employment of women in mine action as well as the integration of gender and diversity concerns and the needs of affected communities into their operations.

NPA has a global target of a minimum of 25% female mine action staff, with representation in operational and management roles, though NPA Zimbabwe aims to achieve a higher target of 50% female recruitment.[85] As at the end of 2024, it had some way to go, with the figure standing at 32% (see Table 3). NPA undertakes targeted recruitment campaigns to encourage more women to apply, particularly for male-dominated roles, as well as to encourage applications from members of marginalised communities.[86] Among NPA's staff, the proportion of women in managerial or supervisory positions actually fell – from 39% in 2023 to 20% in 2024.This fall was said to be due to an overall increase in the number of supervisors and team leaders.[87] In June 2025, ZIMAC accredited two female dog handlers for deployment in NPA.[88]

In MAG, the proportion of women increased significantly – from 29% to 46%.[89] This was due to an overall increase in the number of teams from three to five, meaning more openings and the promotion of female staff to some supervisory roles.[90] MAG has one all-female mine action team (MAT), which continued its work in 2024.[91] MAG also established post-maternity accommodation in the field for new mothers, to enable them to stay with their child and a helper for an additional three months after maternity leave. Staff can ask for an extended period based on individual circumstances. MAG also began distribution of menstrual products to all female staff in 2024.[92]

HALO continued its initiatives to provide material and financial support to pregnant women and breastfeeding mothers among its staff, as well as providing childcare allowances, while a female nurse rotates through HALO's operations camps.[93] HALO also continued to provide skills training for female staff to support their wider employment opportunities after HALO, and to support female staff to obtain or upgrade their driving licence.[94]

HALO and MAG note that, while they deploy gender-mixed teams and both Shona and English-speaking staff, to help facilitate access and participation by all groups in community liaison and survey activities, their areas of operation (AoOs), are mostly culturally homogenous, comprised largely of communities from the Shona ethnic group.[95]

NPA provided a one-day training course on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) to 104 staff (61 men and 43 women), having identified a need for work on this topic through its community gender assessments, conducted during the pre-task impact assessments. These showed that women and girls are at increased risk as they are forced to take longer routes to avoid mined areas, for example, when collecting water. Restrictions on land use, due to mine contamination, also impact livelihoods and increase poverty; another factor contributing to SGBV prevalence. As well as training staff, NPA is taking steps to integrate SGBV awareness into risk education.[96]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

All mine action activities in Zimbabwe are conducted in line with the Zimbabwe Environmental Agency (EMA) regulations and requirements.[97] Zimbabwe has an NMAS on environmental management (ZNMAS 10.07) and a policy on

81 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019 and 6 April 2020, and then as Major, 2 June 2022.

82 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019 and 6 April 2020.

83 Emails from Samuel Fricker, HALO, 20 July 2019; and Adam Komorowski, Regional Director West Africa and Latin America, MAG, 1 August 2019.

84 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2024; Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 April 2025; and Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

85 Email from Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.

86 Email from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.

87 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 June 2024, and 11 April and 16 July 2025.

88 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 13.

89 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024 and 11 April 2025.

90 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 14 July 2025.

91 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

92 Ibid.

93 Emails from Samuel Fricker, HALO, 30 May 2022; and Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 19 April 2023.

94 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

95 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.

96 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

97 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

environmental management, with ZNMAS 10.07 updated in 2023 and shared with operators.[98] NMAS 10.07 covers "Safety and Occupational Health and Protection of the Environment". This standard provides operational guidance on air, water, and soil pollution; reduction and disposal of waste, especially toxic and hazardous waste; obstruction of watercourses; burning of vegetation; environmental considerations at worksites and temporary accommodation facilities, as well as at fuel, oil, and lubricant storage and maintenance areas. It also covers reduction of energy consumption and carbon dioxide ($CO_2$) emissions and environmental considerations related to use of land and risk to heritage.[99] ZIMAC reported in April 2025 plans to update Zimbabwe's NMAS 10.07 it to meet the revised IMAS 07.13,[100] though no timeframe for this was specified.

In terms of good practice, the use of highly destructive mechanical clearance methods is not permitted in areas with large trees. Manual clearance only is used in such areas, with back-filling of soil undertaken soon after clearance.[101] Additionally, use of mechanical assets is limited to five hours per day, which helps reduce emissions.[102] ZIMAC also states that, where mechanical demining takes place, there is a plan for afforestation. ZIMAC's quality management (QM) department acts as the organisation's environmental focal point.[103]

**Table 4: Environmental policies and action**[104]

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| APOPO | Yes | Yes | No[105] |
| HALO | No (in development) | No | Yes |
| MAG | Yes | No | Yes |
| NPA | Yes | Yes | Yes |

All operators take measures to reduce the environmental impact of demining operations but vary in the degree to which they have environmental policies and management systems in place. MAG works in Zimbabwe according to its global environmental policy.[106] It does not have an environmental management system in place[107] but follows IMAS 07.13.[108] HALO has standard operating procedures (SOPs) on environmental management,[109] and was developing a global environmental management policy as at July 2025, which it will implement in Zimbabwe.[110] NPA has an environmental management system in place, including an environmental policy and environmental SOP, last updated in 2021.[111] Prior to closing its programme in March 2025, APOPO had an environmental policy and action plan for 2021–25, with environmental management procedures outlined in its SOP on Safety And Occupational Health.[112] NPA undertakes environmental assessments to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance and planned to roll out its Green Office and Green Field Tools fully in Zimbabwe in 2025, to support environmental assessments and management.[113]

Operators are taking a range of steps to reduce their carbon emissions. HALO field camps have been run on solar power since 2016. HALO also uses electric strimmers to clear vegetation.[114] NPA extended solar panel installation to the remaining two of its three field camps in 2024.[115] MAG continued to use solar power for field activities and is collecting data within its Zimbabwe programme for a global Carbon Accounting Project, which should offer further

98 Emails from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 2 June 2022; and Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 28 August 2024.

99 Zimbabwe National Mine Action Standards (ZNMAS) 10.07, First edition (February 2013), "Safety and Occupational Health. Protection of the Environment".

100 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

101 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023.

102 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024.

103 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025. Afforestation refers to the process of planting trees in an area which was not historically forested. Such plans for afforestation include the planting of "exotic and indigenous fruit trees such as mangoes and guavas". Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 11.

104 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

105 APOPO did not have an environmental focal point in Zimbabwe, but responsibility for this was assigned to the Country Director and Head of Support Services. Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

106 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.

107 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 March 2023.

108 Email from Roxana Bobolicu, MAG, 29 September 2022.

109 Email from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024.

110 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

111 Emails from Gemma Walsh, NPA, 2 June and 8 July 2022 and 19 April 2023.

112 Email from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 12 May 2023.

113 Email from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 16 July 2025.

114 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

115 Email from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 April 2025.

country-level advice on minimising its local environmental impact.[116] In line with its global initiative, APOPO had a carbon sequestration plan for its Zimbabwe programme, which included emissions reduction and a primary goal to plant and monitor more than 110,000 trees.[117]

HALO explains that the selection of manual versus mechanical teams to conduct clearance is the primary environmental consideration in Zimbabwe, weighing the impact of the more environmentally intrusive mechanical clearance against the operational benefits.[118] Operators minimise the cutting or larger trees and other vegetation where possible, and MAG reserves use of its mini-excavator for area contaminated with sensitive R2M2 mines.[119] NPA only cuts trees if they present an obstruction to the use of the detector to confirm a hazard in the safe lane.[120] In 2024, NPA received some training in water management and participated in refuse clean-up campaigns in local communities.[121] NPA also introduced a water borehole system at its Manicaland East camp, allowing it to store and filter water on-site, rather than bring water in.[122]

Operators are taking steps to adapt to increasingly frequent higher temperatures. APOPO systematised a proactive field work schedule in 2024, with an early start in the summer and additional breaks during hot days.[123] MAG starts operations at daylight to make use of cooler conditions but, even so, has been forced to halt operations by 9am at times due to extremely high temperatures.[124] During the planning and prioritising of clearance tasks, HALO takes into account the effect extreme weather on surrounding communities, particularly the changing distances and routes people travel to collect water. Areas that see increased movement and access are prioritised for clearance.[125]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

ZIMAC operates an IMSMA New Generation (NG) database with all data disaggregated by type of munition and method of land release.[126] Zimbabwe and operators confirm the national information database is accurate and up to date.[127] ZIMAC and operators continued to hold regular meetings in 2024 to cross-reference data to help ensure accuracy and reliability.[128] Operators confirm that data collection forms are consistent and enable efficient collection of necessary data.[129]

ZIMAC reports that migration of data to IMSMA Core is at an advanced stage, with Survey 123 installed and IMSMA forms developed. Zimbabwe's NMAS on IM were also updated in 2024 to make provision for IMSMA Core.[130] The GICHD now intends to introduce IMSMA Core in Zimbabwe towards the end of 2025.[131] NPA suggests that ZIMAC should develop IM SOPs with the support of the GICHD and operators.[132] APOPO, in cooperation with Cranfield University in the United Kingdom, field tested the Clearance Data Model (CDM) in Zimbabwe 2024, which records 66 attributes per mine, producing highly detailed datasets and reportedly improving risk assessment and management; operational understanding; and QA.[133] NPA held a joint IM workshop with all operators in 2024 and another with ZIMAC to consolidate data in March 2025.[134] HALO is supporting ZIMAC in 2025 with provision of some IT equipment and IM training.[135]

As in previous years, ZIMAC's latest Article 7 report (covering 2024) was detailed and of good quality. Zimbabwe's Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted on 1 April 2025, was also highly detailed and of generally good quality, though areas for further clarification are detailed in the section above, "Funding for AP Mine Survey and Clearance", and in the section below, "Planning and Tasking".

## PLANNING AND TASKING

An updated National Mine Action Strategy for Zimbabwe's current extension period through to the end of 2025 was launched in January 2023.[136] The strategy sets out clear objectives, baselines, indicators, and targets for four strategic mine action goals around survey and clearance; explosive ordnance risk education; victim assistance; and

116 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.
117 Email from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024.
118 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.
119 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; and Gemma Walsh, NPA, 19 April 2023.
120 Emails from Gemma Walsh, NPA, 2 June and 8 July 2022 and 19 April 2023.
121 Emails from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 April and 16 July 2025.
122 Emails from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024 and 16 July 2025.
123 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April and 28 August 2025.
124 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.
125 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.
126 Email from (then) Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
127 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and emails from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.
128 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.
129 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.
130 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.
131 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.
132 Ibid.
133 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.
134 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.
135 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.
136 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Annex A, pp, A20-A21.

advocacy and communication.[137] Zimbabwe has committed to updating the strategy to cover its proposed extension period from 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2030.[138] With the assistance of the GICHD and stakeholders, Zimbabwe states the strategy will be "finalised in 2026 and submitted to relevant ministries for approval."[139]

Zimbabwe provided a detailed work plan for 2024–25[140] and has provided one for 2026–30,[141] which includes the annual targets for land release shown in Table 5.[142] Zimbabwe says it will update this five-year work plan annually.[143] In 2023, Zimbabwe fell behind its annual land release target for the first time since 2018,[144] releasing only 2.31km$^2$ during the year instead of the 6.39km$^2$ projected.[145] In 2024, Zimbabwe again released less mined area than planned, though with a much smaller gap between projected and achieved release (4.39km$^2$ [146] instead of 5.71km$^2$).[147]

**Table 5: Revised NSP (National Strategic Plan) Projections, 2025-30 (m²)**[148]

| Minefield | Operator | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Musengezi to Mazowe River | HALO | 815,000 | 900,000 | 94,661 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mazowe River to Nyahuku | HALO | 0 | 0 | 805,339 | 900,000 | 459,495 | 0 |
| Nyahuku to Nyamapanda | NPA | 2,500,000 | 441,201 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nyamapanda to Rwenya River | MAG | 331,000 | 277,000 | 277,000 | 277,000 | 277,000 | 277,000 |
| | NPA | 0 | 198,201 | 210,000 | 210,000 | 210,000 | 210,000 |
| | HALO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 350,000 | 350,000 |
| Mwenzi River to Sango Border | NMCU | 140,000 | 140,000 | 140,000 | 140,000 | 140,000 | 130,239 |
| Lusulu | NMCU | 84,000 | 120,000 | 149,000 | 149,000 | 149,000 | 149,000 |
| **Totals** | | **3,870,000** | **2,076,402** | **1,676,000** | **1,676,000** | **1,585,495** | **1,116,239** |

In its 2025 extension request, Zimbabwe provides a detailed and costed work plan for the proposed extension period of 2026–30. The plan includes the clear land release targets already outlined; operators assigned to specific minefield sectors; and details of the operational capacity and equipment currently available.[149] In additional information provided in August 2025, Zimbabwe also gave further detail on a number of planning issues, including the following: First, it said that the operational capacity underpinning its work plan accounts for the reduction in clearance capacity resulting from decreased international funding, including from the United States.[150] Second, Zimbabwe provided additional information on the basis on which it has calculated projected clearance outputs for various minefields, notably the number of deminers, MDDs, and machines allocated per organisation and the estimated number of operational days.[151] Third, Zimbabwe clarified, for each operator, how much of the remaining mined area it expects to cancel through non-technical survey (NTS) (very minimal), reduce through TS, and release through clearance.[152] In addition to these helpful clarifications, Zimbabwe could further strengthen the request by providing a more detailed rationale and breakdown of its budget, including budget lines for key cost centres, which would help more clearly reconcile the projected funding requirements with the expected outputs.

137 Zimbabwe, National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2018-2025, Reviewed Version, pp. 18–27.

138 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

139 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.

140 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex A, p. A-1.

141 The work plan is provided as Annex A in Zimbabwe's Article 7 Report (covering 2024).

142 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

143 Ibid., Annex A, pp. 22–23; and 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, p. 6.

144 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Annex A, p. A-2.

145 Ibid., Annex A, p. A-23.

146 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

147 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 6.

148 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A and Annex A, pp. 38–39.

149 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, Annex B, pp. 44–52.

150 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 4.

151 Zimbabwe states that: "On average a deminer produces 40m$^2$ per day, MDD output 250m$^2$ per day per dog while mechanical clearance account for 400m$^2$ per one mechanical team per day. On average Zimbabwe's programme has 21 days per month constituting to 195 working days for the ten (10) operational months. One manual team consist of 9 deminers, MDD team comprises of six (6) dogs with six (6) handlers assisted by three (3) manual deminers. Mechanical team comprises of four (4) operators". Ibid

152 Zimbabwe projects the following for the remaining areas assigned to each operator: MAG: 65% cleared, 35% reduced; NPA: 11.6% cleared, 88.4% reduced; HALO: 54% cleared, 45% reduced; 1% cancelled; and NMCU: 75% cleared, 25% reduced. Zimbabwe also states: "The percentages are based on the current minefields that may change in future", likely referring to the possible re-allocation of areas of operation between operators. Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 5.

Historically, clearance was prioritised by ZIMAC according to impact, with contaminated areas closest to highly populated areas to be addressed first.[153] However, as most of the minefields are along the border with Mozambique, operations tend to proceed in a linear fashion to allow for optimal use of resources and facilitate concentrated logistical support and command and control, rather than opening tasks all over the frontage of the border.[154] ZIMAC and operators do state, however, that factors such as national priorities, community impact, and the level of incident risk also inform ongoing task prioritisation.[155] HALO also notes that its current clearance priority is those areas contaminated with R2M2 AP mines, as these cause the most accidents to animals and people in affected communities.[156]

Operators report that clearance and survey task dossiers have been issued in a timely and effective manner,[157] with all remaining tasks now allocated among them.[158] Since 2022, however, as it approached its current Article 5 deadline of the end of 2025, Zimbabwe has been taking steps to adjust plans and redistribute areas of operation so that operators who complete assigned tasks or gain additional capacity may deploy their resources elsewhere. ZIMAC re-allocated some of MAG's tasks to NPA and HALO in 2022 and 2023.[159] In April 2025, MAG handed two further minefields in Mudzi District, measuring 176,000m$^2$ and thought to be phoney, to NPA.[160] NPA has suggested it should be assigned more sectors within the Mashonaland East minefield, suitable for its MDDs (which are used only by NPA) and manual teams.[161] ZIMAC plans to allocate further tasks to the NMCU as needed, once it completes its current allocation, though the NMCU has a major shortage of detectors.[162]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

ZIMAC last reviewed the NMAS and updated some chapters in 2022,[163] and states that NMAS are reviewed every three years and in line with updates to the IMAS.[164] Operators confirm that they were consulted during this last review.[165] SOPs are also reviewed regularly and as needed to address new challenges, ensure the employment of best practice, and update them in line with IMAS and Zimbabwe's NMAS.[166] The NMAS were re-shared with operators in 2024, but no changes were made.[167]

Operators have, though, made some suggestions for improvement. While HALO, for example, believes that the NMAS are suitably adapted to the local threat and enable efficient, evidence-based survey and clearance, it does point out that no criteria are set for cancellation or reclamation of land, an omission it believes should be rectified to help aid the decision-making process for operators.[168] HALO planned to present this matter to ZIMAC during 2025 with a view to the cancellation of some areas in Mashonaland Central. HALO agrees that the issue must be carefully considered before being introduced into the NMAS.[169]

NPA adds that Zimbabwe lacks definitions of direct and indirect evidence of explosive ordnance (EO), which it believes should be rectified, in accordance with IMAS.[170] APOPO has suggested that the NMAS on quality management systems (QMS) requires updating to be brought in line with IMAS, and that the NMAS for accident investigation also requires revision.[171] It presented on these issues to ZIMAC and operators in 2024, but no further progress had been made as at June 2025. APOPO also recommends that ZIMAC consider updating the NMAS on IM and environmental management. It believes these updates, together a revision of the NMAS on QMS, would result in an updated land release system in line with current IMAS.[172]

ZIMAC conducts QA. In 2023, ZIMAC noted that, in addition to having a QA Officer attached to each operator, a stand-alone, external QC team samples completed tasks in line with Zimbabwe's inspection procedures as per the NMAS.[173]

153 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
154 Emails from Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 19 April 2023; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.
155 Emails from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; and Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024.
156 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.
157 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024; and Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024.
158 Email from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.
159 Emails from Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023 and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), p. 7.
160 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.
161 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.
162 'Demining Operational Overview', Major B. Kabvunye, 2IC 1 Engr. Sp. Regt., uploaded 18 February 2025, pp. 10–11 and 16, at: https://bit.ly/4o8cBAi.
163 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), p. 3; and emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023 and 7 June 2024.
164 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
165 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 12 May 2023; Gemma Welsh, NPA, 2 June 2022 and 19 April 2023; and Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 19 April 2023.
166 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p.3.
167 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 and 15 July 2025; and Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.
168 Emails from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 19 August 2024. The term "reclamation criteria" refers to a situation where the land has been reclaimed through activities such as construction or cultivation. If the relevant criteria are met, the area may be considered for cancellation.
169 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.
170 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.
171 Email from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 9 August 2024.
172 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.
173 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023.

APOPO notes that, since ZIMAC cannot mobilise its QA team until a certain number of sectors are cleared, their field visits for external QA are not always in line with clearance progress, sometimes leaving cleared land unused for longer than necessary.[174]

In the additional information on its extension request it provided in August 2025, Zimbabwe outlines how different land release methods are selected and applied to enhance operational efficiency. Zimbabwe explains that land release methodologies are selected based on the type of minefield being worked on. Cordon sanitaire minefields require full clearance through manual and mechanical methods, while ploughshare minefields require use of TS, full clearance, and targeted clearance, hence the current use of MDDs only by NPA in Zimbabwe, which have played a crucial role in expediting TS and facilitating prompt deployment of deminers to mine lanes.[175] NPA is working with ZIMAC towards accreditation in 2025 for clearance using MDDs, with trial sectors complete and awaiting QC by ZIMAC as at July 2025.[176] Use of MDDs in missed-mine drills was trialled in 2023, but not approved by ZIMAC, with the primary concern being to demonstrate sufficiently that dogs could detect deeply buried mines.[177]

If accreditation of MDDs for clearance is secured, NPA plans to revisit accreditation of MDDs for missed-mine drills.[178] These drills are required when gaps in the mine pattern are found, and had been an ongoing challenge to land release efficiency for Zimbabwe,[179] proving time consuming and seemingly ineffective as mines were found only rarely.[180] Use of the highly sensitive Minelab GPZ 7000 detector since 2024 has significantly improved the efficiency and effectiveness of clearance generally, as well as reducing the need for missing-mine excavations in Zimbabwe.[181] However, ZIMAC and NPA reopened the possibility of using MDDs in missed-mine drills in early 2025 as part of efforts to further increase efficiency. As at July 2025, NPA had established a new MDD training area with deeply-buried targets, intended to demonstrate MDD detection capability down to 40cm.[182]

HALO introduced the Minelab GPZ 7000 detector in Zimbabwe in 2024 and explains that, due to the detector's high sensitivity, it would be inefficient for use in primary search or clearance. As such, HALO reserves it for deeply buried mines that may have been missed during clearance. This helps more quickly determine whether the mine has been initiated or washed away, without the need for full excavation, which is far more time consuming[183] APOPO extended the use of GPZ-7000 in 2024, not only for use in missed-mine drills, but also as a tool for internal QC. This shortened the process of handing over completed sectors from a month to just a few days.[184] MAG trialled and then deployed the GPZ-7000 in 2024 but, unfortunately, as at April 2025, MAG's two GPZ-7000 detectors were being returned, due to the withdrawal of US Department of State (PM/WRA) funding and an accompanying order to return US Humanitarian Demining Research and Development (HD-RD) assets.[185]

MAG explains that the ability to use the best tools and methods for particular minefields in Zimbabwe remains a challenge at times, and may require further sharing of AoOs and collaboration with joint funding. Operators have discussed this as a group and with ZIMAC.[186]

All areas cleared in Zimbabwe in 2024 proved to contain AP mines.[187]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Land release in Zimbabwe is conducted by the Zimbabwean Armed Forces' NMCU and, as of March 2025, three international operators: HALO, MAG, and NPA. As previously noted, APOPO was forced to close its mine action programme in Zimbabwe that month due to the termination of its US funding.[188] All operators in Zimbabwe deploy combined TS and clearance teams (see Table 7).

**Table 6: Operational NTS capacities deployed in 2024**[189]

| Operator | NTS teams | Total NTS personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| APOPO | 0 | 1 | In addition, one road clearance team also capable of NTS. |
| HALO | 0 | 0 | No specific NTS teams. NTS managed by Community Outreach team (3 personnel). |

174 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

175 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex I, p. A-3.

176 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April and 16 July 2025.

177 Emails from Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023; Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023; and Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024.

178 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 16 July 2025.

179 Emails from Samuel Fricker, HALO, 20 July 2019; and Adam Komorowski, MAG, 1 August 2019.

180 Emails from Samuel Fricker, HALO, 5 August 2021; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 20 May 2020.

181 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 16 July 2025.

182 Ibid.

183 HALO explains that, for example, for a single $1m^2$ area, manual excavation in favourable soil conditions takes approximately two shifts (60 minutes of work). By contrast, using a GPZ 7000 detector, the same $1m^2$ can be completed in two minutes. Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

184 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

185 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

186 Ibid.

187 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 19 August 2024.

188 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

189 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

**Table 6 Continued**

| Operator | NTS teams | Total NTS personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| MAG | 1 | 3 | |
| NPA | 1 | 2 | Community liaison staff conduct NTS and EORE. |
| NMCU | 1 | 5 | |
| **Totals** | **3** | **11** | |

**Table 7: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2024**[190]

| Operator | Manual teams | Mechanical teams | Total deminers | Dog teams | Machines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HALO | 30 | 1 | 210 | 0 | 11 (2 x excavators for mechanical clearance, 9 x mini- excavators to support clearance on R2M2 AP mine tasks) | Decreased from 30 teams in January to 26 teams by the end of 2024. |
| NPA | 8 | 0 | 84 | 5 (5 dogs, 5 handlers) | 0 | MDDs deployed for TS only. |
| APOPO | 6 | 0 | 36 | 0 | 0 | |
| MAG | 5 | 1 | 47 | 0 | 1 (mini-excavator) | Total deminers includes two mechanical deminers. |
| NMCU | 13 | 1 | 84 | 0 | 1 (bulldozer) | Total deminers includes four mechanical deminers. |
| **Totals** | **62** | **3** | **461** | **5 dogs, 5 handlers** | **13** | |

Overall, Zimbabwe maintained a similar TS and clearance capacity in 2024 as it did in 2023 and recent years, with the combined capacity of humanitarian operators and the NMCU totalling 62 teams of 461 deminers in 2024 (see Table 7), compared to 59 teams of 455 deminers in 2023.[191] There has been a slight decrease in recent years overall though, with 59 teams of 496 deminers in 2022,[192] and 58 teams of 500 deminers in 2021.[193]

The NMCU increased from three to five NTS personnel, but maintained the same clearance and TS capacity as in 2023. It envisages equipping the NMCU with more detectors in 2025 to increase the clearance rate.[194] APOPO saw an almost 30% reduction in clearance capacity in 2024 compared to its peak of 50 deminers for much of 2023.[195] In comparison to 2023, MAG reduced its NTS capacity from two teams of five personnel to one team of three, but increased its clearance and TS capacity from four teams of 36 deminers to five teams of 45, due to increased funding. However, it expected to reduce manual clearance capacity during Q2 2025, due to expected funding decreases.[196] ZIMAC estimates that MAG would have to double its capacity to meet its land release targets set for the end of 2025 and has been reassigning some of MAG's AoO to other operators, as noted above.[197]

NPA maintained the same manual clearance capacity in 2024 as it had in 2023, but was able to add one further MDD in 2024. As of June 2025, NPA had increased its operational MDD capacity to six dogs and handlers.[198] HALO started 2024 with the same manual clearance capacity (30 teams) as in

190 Ibid.

191 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024, and email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 19 August 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex 1, pp. A-6 – A-9; and A-10 – A-11.

192 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023; Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 March 2023; and Mikael Bold, APOPO, 12 May and 8 August 2023.

193 Emails from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 2 June 2022; Peter Avenell, MAG, 17 May 2022; Gemma Walsh, NPA, 2 June 2022; and John Sorbo, APOPO, 20 June 2022.

194 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

195 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

196 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024 and 11 April 2025.

197 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex A, pp. A-8 and A-9.

198 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 June 2024; and 11 April and 16 July 2025.

2023 but had to decrease to 28 teams in July, and then to 26 in October, due to drops in funding. It expected to decrease even further to 12 teams in during 2025, due to reduced donor support.[199]

Zimbabwe first introduced mechanical assets in 2016. These have been useful in tackling deeply buried mines on hard ground as well as in areas with highly mineralised soils.[200] HALO introduced a micro excavator in 2023.[201] The machine works in conjunction with manual demining to complete excavations that would otherwise be done entirely by hand, thus increasing both deminer safety and overall efficiency.[202] In 2024, HALO led on use of the micro-excavator for excavation of sensitive R2M2 mines and MAG, having introduced the machine in 2024, followed with this practice when possible.[203] NPA had planned to introduce drones for NTS and quality management in 2024.[204] However, discussions on this possibility were still ongoing with ZIMAC as at April 2025.[205]

In late 2024 and early 2025, HALO increased its capacity for teams to use and manage hand-held standoff mine detection system (HSTAMIDS) detectors. These help distinguish clutter and pieces of metal from mines and have proved efficient for use in the high-metal content minefields. HALO also implemented a new testing system for all deminers using Minelab F3 detectors with a yellow end cap, which allows for custom sensitivity configuration. Deminers were provided with a new, extended adaptor to the standard Minelab test piece. This removed the requirement for deminers to wait each morning for team commanders to arrive with test boxes and test the detectors prior to work starting.[206]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 8: Summary of land release outputs in 2024 (national authority data)**

| Release of mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) |
|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 1.95 |
| **Technical survey** | 2.44 |
| **Non-technical survey** | 0 |
| **AP mines destroyed during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 31,672 (with 45 destroyed in spot tasks according to operator data) |

A total of 4.39km² of mined area was released in 2024, of which 1.95km² was cleared and 2.44km² was reduced through TS. No area was cancelled through NTS. A total of 31,672 AP mines were found and destroyed according to national authority data.[207] Operators report that 45 were destroyed during EOD spot tasks.[208] A total of 223,374m² was added to the national database in 2024, due to an adjustment to an original CHA by ZIMAC.[209]

## SURVEY IN 2024

According to national authority data, Zimbabwe released 2.44km² through survey in 2024, all of which was reduced through TS (see Table 9).[210] This is a significant increase on 2023, when just over 0.4km² of mined area was released through survey, of which 10,845m² was cancelled through NTS[211] and 404,311m² was reduced through TS.[212]

199 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.
200 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Annex A, p. A-2.
201 Email from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024.
202 Email from Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 19 April 2023.
203 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.
204 Email from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.
205 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.
206 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 and 15 July 2025.
207 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.
208 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April and 14 July 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.
209 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.
210 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.
211 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May and 15 August 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p.6.
212 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June and 9 August 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024; and Article 7 report (covering 2023), p. 6.

NPA saw almost a fourfold increase in reduction from 0.97km$^2$ in 2023 to 3.8km$^2$ in 2024, through increased and improved use of MDDs for TS, leading to the completion of clearance in Manicaland province during the year.[213] MAG also saw an increase in reduction from 130,507m$^2$ in 2023 to 305,003m$^2$ in 2024 due to increased capacity and increased distance between rows from the usual 25-30m up to 100m.[214]

NPA reported reducing a total of 3.8km$^2$ through TS during 2024 – higher than the 2.4km$^2$ reported for the organisation by ZIMAC (see Table 9).[215] NPA believes the discrepancy in figures may be due to a difference in the recording of clearance versus reduction, since ZIMAC initially records land released through a combination of TS and clearance as clearance, then records reduced area as only area that had no work conducted on it.[216] ZIMAC confirms that, in Zimbabwe, reduction is officially recorded upon completion of a sector,[217] and that, whereas international operators may record land released by TS as reduction, ZIMAC considers that any area where a detector has been used must, ultimately, be recorded as clearance.[218]

A total of 223,374m$^2$ was added to the national database in 2024, due to an adjustment to an original CHA by ZIMAC.[219] This is a decrease on the 166,815m$^2$ added to the database in 2023, due to expansion of a known CHA.[220]

**Table 9: Release of mined area through TS in 2024**[221]

| Area | Operator | Reported area reduced* (m²) | Operator data (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mashonaland Central (Musengezi to Mazoe) | HALO | 3,655 | 3,655 |
| Mashonaland East (Mazoe to Rwenya) | MAG | 3,888 | 3,888 |
| Mashonaland East (Nyahuku to Nyamapanda) | NPA | 173,897 | **287,997 |
| Manicaland (Rusitu to Muzite) | NPA | 225,8758 | **351,9022 |
| **Totals** | | **2,440,198** | **3,814,562** |

*Article 7 report covering 2024. **NPA data.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

Zimbabwe reports that a total of 1.95km$^2$ was released through clearance in 2024, with 31,672 AP mines destroyed during TS and clearance, as well as 19 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (see Table 10).[222] Operators reported the slightly higher number of 31,706 AP mines destroyed during TS and clearance, along with an additional 45 during EOD spot tasks[223] (see Table 11), bringing the total number of AP mines destroyed in 2024 as reported by operators to 31,751. At the time of writing in August 2025, this slight discrepancy had not been resolved, although ZIMAC's use of an Excel spreadsheet to collect all data from operators could involve human error in transcribing data.[224]

NPA reported to Mine Action Review it cleared a total of 310,270m$^2$ during 2024 – somewhat lower than the 694,139km$^2$ reported by ZIMAC as cleared by NPA (see Table 10).[225] At the time of writing, in September 2024, the discrepancy had not been explained. NPA suggests it may be due to data lag or a difference in the recording by NPA and ZIMAC of clearance versus reduction. NPA and ZIMAC continue to collaborate to resolve discrepancies and align data.[226]

Overall clearance figures remained stable for Zimbabwe compared to a year earlier, with 1.91km$^2$ cleared in 2023.[227] APOPO saw a decrease in clearance output from 250,503m$^2$ in 2023 to 164,516m$^2$ in 2024, largely due to a reduction from

213 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

214 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024 and 11 April 2025.

215 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April, 16 July, and 1 September 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

216 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 1 September 2025.

217 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

218 Email from Capt. Mandaba, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025.

219 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

220 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024.

221 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A, and emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April, 14 July, and 20 August 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April, 16 July, and 1 September 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1, 15, and 18 July 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

222 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

223 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April and 14 July 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April and 16 July 2025; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1, 15, and 18 July 2025.

224 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 16 July 2025.

225 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A, and emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April, 16 July, and 1 September 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

226 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April, 16 July, and 1 September 2025.

227 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June and 9 August 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 19 August 2024; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May and 15 August 2024; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024; and Article 7 report (covering 2023), Form D.

50 deminers down to 36.[228] MAG saw an increase in clearance from 158,195m² in 2023 to 202,134m² in 2024, due to an increase in capacity early in the year.[229]

ZIMAC reported that all areas cleared in Zimbabwe in 2024 proved to contain AP mines.[230] However, NPA reported that it released seven sectors that proved to contain no AP mines, but did contain sporadic evidence of previous mine contamination (shrapnel). These areas were addressed with TS, to confirm lack of evidence, and with minimal clearance. The total size of these seven sectors was 1,215,924m².[231]

**Table 10: AP mine clearance in 2024**[232]

| Area | Operator | Sectors* cleared | Reported area cleared** (m²) | AP mines destroyed** | UXO destroyed*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mashonaland Central (Musengezi to Mazowe)[233] | HALO | 4 | 595,394 | 24,044 | 11 |
| Mashonaland East (Mazowe to Rwenya) | MAG | 2 | 202,134 | 3,832 | 0 |
| Mashonaland East (Nyahuku to Nyamapanda) | NPA | 2 | 141,984 | 279 | 5 |
| Masvingo (Mwenezi to Sango Border Post) (Cordon Sanitaire) | APOPO | 3 | 232,546 | 2,167 | 2 |
| Masvingo (Mwenezi to Sango Border Post) (Cordon Sanitaire) | NMCU | 3 | 140,649 | 1,177 | 0 |
| Manicaland (Rusitu to Muzite) | NPA | 13 | 552,155 | 76 | 1 |
| Matabeleland North (Lusulu) | NMCU | 0 | 83,112 | 97 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **27** | **1,947,974** | **31,672** | **19** |

*In Zimbabwe, as CHAs are generally relatively large and can take up to several years to complete, each CHA is split into "sectors" to enable more regular release of land. **Data in Article 7 report covering 2024. ***Data in Article 7 report covering 2024. ZIMAC states these 19 UXO were destroyed in EOD spot tasks. However, NPA was the only operator to have reported destroying an item of UXO during EOD spot tasks in 2024 (see Table 11).

**Table 11: AP mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks in 2024 (operator data)**[234]

| Operator | Area | AP mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|
| MAG | Mashonaland East (Mudzi District) | 7 | 0 |
| NPA | Manicaland (Chipinge) | 5 | 1 |
| HALO | Mashonaland Central (Rushinga) | 18 | 0 |
| HALO | Mashonaland Central (Mount Darwin) | 15 | 0 |
| **Total** | | **45** | **1** |

228 Email from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; and Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

229 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024 and 11 April 2025.

230 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

231 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

232 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A, and emails from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 18 July 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 15 July and 20 August 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April, 16 July, and 1 September 2025; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 15 July 2025; Seb Haddock, Operations Manager, HALO, 28 August 2025; Robert Burny, APOPO, 28 August 2025; and Capt. Mandaba, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025.

233 HALO reports an additional 21,830m² cleared in Mashonaland Central (Mount Darwin), with 46 AP mines destroyed. Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 18 July 2025. This discrepancy had not yet been resolved at the time of writing. In the interim, Mine Action Review has used the national authority data in Zimbabwe's Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

234 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April and 14 July 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

## DEMINER SAFETY

Four accidents involving deminers were reported in Zimbabwe in 2024, all involving excavation of R2M2 AP mines (see Table 12). This is the same number of accidents as in 2023, all of which similarly involved R2M2 AP mines.[235]

**Table 12: Demining accidents in Zimbabwe in 2024**[236]

| Operator | Accidents | Activity | Type of AP mine | Deminers injured |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAG | 2 | Clearance | R2M2 | 2 |
| HALO | 2 | Clearance | R2M2 | 3 |
| **Totals** | **4** | | | **5** |

HALO had two accidents in 2024 and conducted detailed internal investigations. The first involved use of an authorised excavation technique of a surface R2M2 mine, resulting in one deminer being injured. The second resulted in minor injuries to two deminers when an R2M2 mine detonated during bound (territorial limit) preparation.[237]

MAG also had two accidents, in which two deminers sustained minor injuries. MAG conducted full internal investigations, supported by HQ, and shared reports with ZIMAC and operators. All have concluded that R2M2 mines should always be mechanically excavated.[238] ZIMAC confirms that all incidents and accidents are investigated in accordance with Zimbabwe's NMAS and guided by the IMAS, with findings and learning always shared across operators.[239]

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ZIMBABWE: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

↓

FIRST TO THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINES (COMBINED 5 YEARS, 10 MONTHS): 1 JANUARY 2015

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2018

↓

FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (ALMOST 8 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

**SIXTH EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (5 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2030**

**NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted in 2017), Zimbabwe is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025.[240] It will not meet this deadline and has requested a sixth extension, this time of five years, to 31 December 2030.[241] Zimbabwe cites the main challenges it has faced in meeting its current deadline as; the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and of cyclone Idai, and related withdrawal or reduction of donor funding; insufficient government resources to fully support demining operations; delayed resumption of work by MAG and APOPO at the start of the current extension period; and challenges in re-equipping the NMCU.[242]

In its latest Article 7 report (covering 2024) Zimbabwe notes that, as in previous years, the main risks that could impede progress towards completion are potentially insufficient funding; the heavy rains and risk of flooding experienced in Zimbabwe from November to March each year; and potential changes in the political or economic climate, given that national capacity is dependent on government funding. Zimbabwe does note, however, that the government has continued to prioritise demining in spite of economic challenges in recent years and that the political climate is expected remain "supportive of the initiative until the nation's landmines are removed".[243]

235 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 19 August 2024 and 1 July 2025; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024 and 11 April 2025.

236 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 and 15 July 2025.

237 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

238 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

239 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023 and 3 June 2024; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

240 Article 5 Update to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 20–22 June 2022, p. 1.

241 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, p. 6.

242 Ibid, pp. 12–13.

243 Article 7 Reports covering 2024, Annex A, p. 38; and covering 2023, Annex A, pp. A-17 to A-18.

There are many consistent strengths in Zimbabwe's mine action programme, including strong national ownership and programme management; a reliable and improving information management system; robust planning; and recent gains in land release efficiency through effective trial and deployment of new technologies. However, the extent to which Zimbabwe can secure additional funding going forward, will most likely be the deciding factor that determines whether Zimbabwe can optimise its strong mine action programme and meet its proposed new Article 5 deadline of 2030.

**Table 13: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 1.95 |
| 2023 | 1.91 |
| 2022 | 2.13 |
| 2021 | 2.44 |
| 2020 | 2.41 |
| **Total** | **10.84** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

On the matter of contamination that might be found after completion of major clearance operations, the Government of Zimbabwe will wholly fund, maintain, and equip the NMCU and military engineering units to be deployed for residual risk mitigation and management, with military engineering units EOD teams stationed in each province.[244] Zimbabwe explains that any individual who identifies a suspected hazardous item will report it to the "nearest police camp". The police will, in turn, notify the army.[245] All stakeholders were involved in a discussion on the management of the residual contamination at the NSD in 2025.[246] Zimbabwe highlights that, though it will continue clearing for several years to come, this does not prevent it from drawing up a provisional residual risk management plan."[247]

244 "Zimbabwe's Preparations for Capacity to Address Residual Contamination and Demobilisation of Demining Personnel", Lt.-Col. S. Moyo, Coordinator, ZIMAC, February 2025, pp. 5–6; and 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 39.

245 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APBMC website on 6 August 2025, p. 8.

246 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

247 "Zimbabwe's Preparations for Capacity to Address Residual Contamination and Demobilisation of Demining Personnel" Lt.-Col. S. Moyo, Coordinator, ZIMAC, February 2025, p. 4.

# NON-SIGNATORIES

# ARMENIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 4.9 KM²

Medium
(National authority partial estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 16,762 | 0 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 417 | 0 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, a total of just under 1.6km² of contaminated area in Tavush province containing anti-personnel (AP) mines was discovered and added to Armenia's database. The Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE) cleared 16,762m² of the newly recorded AP mined area – a mix of AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mine contamination – which was a partial clearance of a confirmed hazardous area (CHA). This is the first time since 2019 that Armenia has reported release of AP mined area, with priority being given previously to clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW).

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Armenia should commit never again to use AP mines and should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **In the meantime, Armenia should submit voluntary Article 7 reports annually under the APMBC.**
- **Armenia should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear AP mines on territory under its jurisdiction as soon as possible.**
- **Armenia should clarify the extent of remaining mine contamination.**
- **Armenia should expedite the adoption of national mine action legislation.**

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- CHDE (survey and clearance)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, Armenia reported that mined area containing AP and/or AV mines covered more than 11.3km$^2$ of its territory,[1] a significant increase from the 9.8km$^2$ reported for 2023.[2] Of this, a total of almost 4.9km$^2$ contained AP mines, with under 2.7km$^2$ of AP mined area only—almost all in confirmed hazardous area —and under 2.2km$^2$ in 16 CHAs also containing AV mines (see Table 1).[3]

Just under 1.6km$^2$ of previously unrecorded AP mined area in Tavush province was added to the database in 2024. The vast majority of the newly recorded contamination (five CHAs covering just under 1.5km$^2$) contained a mix of AP and AV mines, while another CHA covering less than 0.1km$^2$ contained only AP mines.[4]

During the year, 16,762m$^2$ of the newly discovered mined area in Tavush province was cleared.[5] In addition, just under 75,623m$^2$ of AV mined area was released through non-technical survey (NTS) and technical survey (TS) – two CHAs covering 8,171m$^2$ in the Tavush region, and three suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 67,452m$^2$ in the Vayots Dzor region.[6]

**Table 1: Mined area (at end 2024)[7]**

| Type of contamination | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total CHAs/SHAs | Totals (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AP mines | 46 | 2,562,707 | 4 | 132,136 | 50 | 2,694,843 |
| AV mines | 34 | 2,715,985 | 3 | 3,728,442 | 37 | 6,444,427 |
| AP and AV mines | 16 | 2,185,188 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 2,185,188 |
| **Totals** | **96** | **7,463,880** | **7** | **3,860,578** | **103** | **11,324,458** |

Three of Armenia's eleven administrative areas, all situated along the eastern border with Azerbaijan, were recorded as having AP mined areas at the end of 2024.[8]

**Table 2: AP mined area by province, excluding mixed AP and AV mined areas (at end 2024)[9]**

| Province | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total CHAs/SHAs | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Syunik | 33 | 1,669,884 | 2 | 27,013 | 35 | 1,696,897 |
| Gegharkunik | 6 | 629,186 | 2 | 105,123 | 8 | 734,309 |
| Tavush | 7 | 263,637 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 263,637 |
| **Totals** | **46** | **2,562,707** | **4** | **132,136** | **50** | **2,694,843** |

A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in Armenia in 2005, followed by partial survey of 17 sites by The HALO Trust in 2012, and again by the Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) in 2012–13. FSD identified 17 SHAs estimated to cover 26km$^2$ and 114 CHAs that covered 21km$^2$ in four districts bordering Azerbaijan. Thirteen of these areas, totalling 1.8km$^2$, contained only unexploded ordnance (UXO) and not mines.[10] In 2019, the CHDE conducted NTS in Syunik province, but military-restricted zones continued to be off limits for survey and clearance.[11]

1 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2025.
2 Emails from Vaghinak Sargsyan, Director, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
3 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2025.
4 Emails from the CHDE, 6 May and 11 July 2025.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2025.
8 Ibid.
9 Emails from the CHDE, 6 May and 11 July 2025.
10 CHDE, "FSD non-technical mine action survey", Yerevan, 2013, p. 12.
11 Emails from Margaret Lazyan, Head of Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance, CHDE, 19 April 2019 and 25 June 2020.

Armenia's border with Georgia has been cleared of mines whereas the border with Türkiye, also mined during the Soviet era, was reported as still containing AP mines in 2017.[12] While NTS in 2012–13 by FSD did not find evidence of mines outside the buffer zones in Ararat province, which borders Türkiye, certain areas have not yet been surveyed because they were controlled by Russian border troops.[13] Demining was reported to have begun on the Turkish side of the border with Armenia in July 2022.[14] In addition, in late 2022, CHDE signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the national mine action centre of Iran (IRMAC).[15] It was reported in June 2023 that demining would begin in the near future on the Iranian border.[16] No further details or updates were available at the time of writing. The implications for AP mine survey and clearance of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Armenia's borders in 2024 were not known at the time of writing.[17]

Prior to the conflict with Azerbaijan in September–November 2020, only minimal mine clearance occurred in Armenia and, as indicated above, no release of AP mined area occurred between 2019 and 2023.[18] Reported contamination in Armenia remained constant in the two years to the end of 2021,[19] but in 2022, two CHAs covering a total area of 0.27km$^2$ were identified in Syunik and added to the database.[20] Armenia stated that the two minefields resulted from military action by Azerbaijan in 2020.[21] Another three CHAs in Gegharkunik province covering a total of some 45,000m$^2$ were added to the database in 2022.[22] No new hazardous area was identified in 2023.[23]

A baseline NTS of explosive ordnance (EO) contamination began in 2022,[24] supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),[25] including of new contamination arising from the 2020 conflict. The CHDE has reported that this was completed in Ararat, Gegharkunik, Syunik, Tavush, and Vayots Dzor provinces.[26] The HALO Trust conducted NTS over three previously unrecorded AP mined areas dating back to 1998 near Pambak village in Gegharkunik province in 2022, identifying a single AP mine in each one,[27] which it reported to the CHDE.[28] The CHDE has stated that further survey is needed in areas under military control, which will only be conducted when security guarantees are in place.[29]

Mine and ERW contamination in Armenia is primarily the consequence of armed conflict with Azerbaijan in 1988–94, in which both sides used mines. The heaviest contamination exists in areas in Nagorno-Karabakh regained by Azerbaijan during the armed conflict in 2020, including a massive mined area along the 350km-long line of contact (LoC) that previously separated Armenian and Azerbaijani forces. The Second Karabakh War (also known as the Forty-Four Day War) ended in November 2020 with Azerbaijan regaining control over most of its internationally recognised territories except for a part of Nagorno-Karabakh.[30] Armenia has acknowledged laying mines since the end of 2020, contending that it has done so "exclusively within the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia for self-defence purposes only".[31] On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a 24-hour military offensive which resulted in it regaining control of the remainder of Nagorno-Karabakh.[32]

## OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Armenia reported cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other ERW in Gegharkunik, Syunik, and Tavush provinces as a result of the conflict with Azerbaijan in 2020 (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Armenia for further information).

12 Emails from Ruben Arakelyan, Director, CHDE, 19 March 2014 and 28 April 2017; and interview in Geneva, 1 April 2014.

13 CHDE, "FSD non-technical mine action survey", CHDE, Yerevan, 2013, p. 9; and emails from Varsine Miskaryan, Operations Officer, CHDE, 8 August 2016; and Ruben Arakelyan, CHDE, 28 April 2017.

14 "Mine Clearance operations begin on Turkish-Armenian border", *Arka News Agency*, 13 July 2022, at: https://bit.ly/4e5Go8g; and "Armenia not carrying out demining operations on its side of border with Turkey- defense ministry", *Arka News Agency*, 14 July 2022, at: https://bit.ly/4k6XTXq.

15 "Iran, Armenia ink MoU on humanitarian demining cooperation", *Iran Press News Agency,* 19 September 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3WyehpJ.

16 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 6 June 2023.

17 "Russia to withdraw troops from Armenia's border", *Politico*, 9 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3XO1JwX.

18 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

19 Emails from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 25 June 2020 and 26 April 2021.

20 Emails from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024; and Karine Shamiryan, Head of International Affairs, CHDE, 10 July 2024.

21 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

22 Email from Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 10 July 2024.

23 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

24 Emails from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 11 May 2022; and Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 27 May 2022.

25 Emails from Karinée Khojayan, Project Coordinator, UNDP, 15 March and 10 July 2023.

26 CHDE, "Non-Technical Survey", accessed 20 May 2024 at: https://bit.ly/3QRwXPs.

27 Emails from Fiona Kilpatrick-Cooper, Head of Region – Europe (South Caucasus), HALO, 16 March 2022; and David Crawford, Programme Manager, Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia, HALO, 14 July 2023.

28 Emails from David Crawford, HALO, 14 July 2023; and Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 10 July 2024; and Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 14.

29 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

30 T. De Waal, "Unfinished Business in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict", Carnegie Europe, 11 February 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3PFvARz.

31 International Court of Justice, *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia)*, Order, 23 February 2023, at https://bit.ly/3NwBKEG, para. 19.

32 "Azerbaijan halts Karabakh offensive after ceasefire deal with Armenian separatists", *BBC*, 21 September 2023, at: https://bbc.in/3rCVK0e.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The CHDE was established by the Armenian government in 2011 as a non-commercial State body responsible for conducting survey and clearance and identifying contaminated areas. In 2014, the CHDE was made Armenia's national mine action authority.[33] An Advisory Board oversees the CHDE at the Deputy Ministerial level, with representation from key ministries.[34] In 2013, in conformity with a government decree, the CHDE began developing national mine action legislation, but as at May 2024, the draft mine action law was still reported to be under development,[35] and no further progress has been reported since. Armenia has indicated that it has not acceded to the APMBC mainly for security reasons.[36]

Key decisions on mine action are taken centrally by the CHDE, and it is the only entity now conducting land release activities in Armenia (The HALO Trust no longer has a presence in the country, last undertaking limited demining there in 2021[37]). The National Mine Action Coordination Platform, however, which was established with the support of UNDP in 2023, serves as a key coordination mechanism supporting mine action.[38] Separate technical working groups cover land release, risk education, and victim assistance (all led by the CHDE), as well as emergency preparedness and protection (led by the Rescue Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs).[39]

In addition, under its "green label" approach, which places mine action within socio-economic development, the CHDE collaborates with similar organisations.[40] It has coordinated work with UNDP, the World Food Programme (WFP), and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), local organisations, and with local self-governing authorities, to translate the results of mine and ERW clearance into long-term socio-economic and environmental benefits, running pilot projects since 2022.[41] An advisory group, established in 2023, incorporates representatives from some of these agencies along with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). It advises the CHDE on mine action, including on use of the latest tools and technologies for the sector.[42]

The GICHD continues to support the CHDE to install the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), IMSMA Core (see further the section below, Information Management and Reporting).[43] The CHDE and the GICHD are also cooperating on innovation, with the CHDE participating in the GICHD's Mine Action Innovation Technical Group, which was initiated in 2024.[44] The GICHD and UNDP also continued to support the CHDE with a review of Armenia's national mine action standards (NMAS) in 2024.[45]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2023, the CHDE received funding from the State budget, which also made an allocation for survey and clearance activities (amounts not disclosed);[46] updates for 2024 were not reported. Under Armenia's five-year mine action strategy for 2023–27, mobilising resources from national and international donors is a priority.[47] The government aims to expand cooperation with other international, foreign, and national actors, viewing this as a key way of supporting the implementation of the strategy.[48] At the time of writing, however, no progress had been reported.

33 Emails from Ruben Arakelyan, CHDE, 8 June 2015; and Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 10 August 2020.

34 Emails from Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 13 July 2022; and Ani Zakaryan, Head of Information Management, CHDE, 21 July 2022.

35 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

36 National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, pp. 4 and 9.

37 Email from Fiona Kilpatrick-Cooper, HALO, 2 September 2022.

38 Emails from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 5 July 2024 and 17 April 2025.

39 Email from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 17 April 2025.

40 Interview with Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, Geneva, 28 April 2024; and CHDE website, "Greening Mine Action in Armenia as a component of sustainable development in the economy of the country", 21 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3REVuHX.

41 CHDE, "Greening Mine Action in Armenia as a component of sustainable development in the economy of the country", 21 May 2024.

42 V. Sargsyan, "Greening Mine Action in Armenia as a Component of Sustainable Development in the Economy of the Country", James Madison University, 21 October 2024 (last updated 17 January 2025), at: https://bit.ly/4iXMPuU.

43 Emails from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 15 March 2023; Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 25 May 2023; and Tinatin Maurer-Shengelia, Regional Focal Point, GICHD, 2 May 2025.

44 Email from Tinatin Maurer-Shengelia, GICHD, 2 May 2025.

45 Email from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP 17 April 2025.

46 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

47 CHDE, National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 10.

48 Ibid., p. 26; and CHDE, "International Cooperation", accessed 20 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3V7VVwE.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The CHDE reports that gender and diversity have been mainstreamed in Armenia's national mine action strategy, and that the needs of women and children in communities affected by EO are considered in prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance.[49] However, the strategy is not explicit about how gender and diversity are to be mainstreamed. While the CHDE does not appear to have a gender and diversity policy in place, it planned to establish an all-female demining team with training said to be underway in May 2024.[50] No further updates on progress were available. The CHDE has also confirmed that mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age.[51]

**Table 3: Gender composition of the CHDE (as reported in May 2024)[52]**

| Total staff | Women staff | Managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women in operational positions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 51 | 14 (27%) | 17 | 4 (24%) | 14 | 2 (14%) |

The CHDE reports that it offers equal employment opportunities to men and women. But as of May 2024, only 14 of 51 CHDE employees were women (27%, down from 32% in 2021), while women held 4 of 17 managerial positions and 2 of 14 operational positions.[53]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The CHDE has developed an environmental management policy and says that its NMAS on environmental management in mine action is in line with International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13, and that it conducts environmental assessments to support survey and clearance. It further claims to take measures to prevent or at least minimise environmental harm.[54] When planning and prioritising survey and clearance, the CHDE says it considers climate-related and extreme-weather risks.[55]

**Table 4: Environmental policies and action (as reported in May 2024)[56]**

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| CHDE | Yes | Yes | Not known |

The national mine action strategy lists 14 "environment protection priorities", including the "green label" approach outlined above. The first of these stipulates that: "During mine action activities, the NMAA implements environmental protection activities, ensuring the minimal impact of mine action on the environment and the intended use of these lands after clearance, land clearance (land release) "green label" rank that guarantees each person's right of both present and future generations to live in a dignified environment conducive to health and well-being".[57] The CHDE has previously reported deploying methods and tools to avoid damaging the environment where possible.[58]

49 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Email from Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 21 June 2024.
56 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
57 Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 23.
58 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 11 May 2022.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The CHDE manages the national IMSMA database[59] and has established an information management and analytical department.[60] In 2023, with UNDP and GICHD support, IMSMA Core was installed on CHDE servers, and data migration and system development continued in 2024.[61] GICHD support with information management continued into 2025.[62]

Armenia has not submitted a voluntary Article 7 report under the APMBC.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

The latest five-year national mine action strategy and operational plans were adopted by the CHDE in 2023.[63] Among its 15 strategic objectives are clearance of all mines and ERW (which suggests that Armenia could join the APMBC) and support for environmental protection.[64] Urgent demining for humanitarian purposes and improving the coordination, regulatory, and management roles of the CHDE are two other key priorities.[65]

The strategy outlines EO contamination in the four provinces of Gegharkunik, Syunik, Tavush, and Vayots Dzor,[66] but the document does not clearly or consistently disaggregate mines from other munitions. Under the strategy, the Jermuk and Kechut areas in the Vayots Dzor province (where the CHDE has not reported any AP mined area) and Davit Bek in Syunik province were deemed priorities for mine and ERW clearance in 2023–27, but the total area to be cleared (1.35km$^2$) does not disaggregate mine clearance from ERW[67] and annual targets are not provided for the different areas.

The strategy does, however, indicate that in 2023, the CHDE planned to clear 50,000m$^2$ of mined and ERW-contaminated area using State funding and, if funds allow, in each subsequent year to add another 25,000m$^2$ of clearance to the target until the end of the strategy in 2027. With EU support, UNDP was planning to support the clearance of 130,000m$^2$ of mined area in 2023,[68] but the CHDE has confirmed that UNDP funding actually ensured clearance of 155,354m$^2$ of area contaminated with CMR and other ERW.[69] The CHDE has since confirmed plans to clear at least 75,000m$^2$ of contaminated area in 2024.[70] As indicated above, it cleared 16,762m$^2$ of AP mined area, plus 75,186m$^2$ of battle area in 2024,[71] while 75,623m$^2$ of AV mined area was released through survey.[72]

Other targets listed in the strategy include expanding collaboration with national and international operators.[73] No progress with these targets in 2024 has been reported.

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

NMAS developed by the CHDE were approved by the government in 2014.[74] The CHDE says these have been reviewed to ensure consistency with IMAS,[75] and in 2022 and 2023, UNDP supported a review of the standards.[76] The overall quality of Armenia's NMAS on land release varies, with some chapters overly prescriptive and more akin to standard operating procedures (SOPs). There are sections on "All Reasonable Effort", evidence of criteria, liability, and residual risk. Some standards are taken directly from the IMAS although the text has been adapted to the local context to a certain extent.[77] The CHDE initiated a new review of the NMAS in 2023, which was ongoing as at May 2024. It intends to develop an NMAS on accreditation.[78]

59 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, CHDE, 19 March 2014.
60 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
61 Emails from Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 7 June 2024; and Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 21 June 2024.
62 Ibid.
63 Email from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 5 July 2024.
64 Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 9.
65 Ibid., p. 10.
66 Ibid., pp. 11–14.
67 Ibid., p. 21.
68 Email from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 15 March 2023.
69 Email from Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 10 July 2024.
70 Email from Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 21 June 2024.
71 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2025.
72 Emails from the CHDE, 6 May and 11 July 2025.
73 Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 21.
74 Email from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 19 April 2019.
75 Emails from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 19 April 2019 and 26 April 2021.
76 Emails from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 15 March 2023 and 5 July 2024.
77 Email from Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 25 May 2023.
78 Emails from Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 25 May and 23 June 2023; Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024; and Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 10 July 2024.

The CHDE has also been developing SOPs for several years.[79] SOPs on manual mine clearance, battle area clearance (BAC), the marking of hazardous areas, and medical support were all elaborated by 2018.[80] In 2020, the CHDE elaborated SOPs on Information Management, NTS, TS, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and quality management (QM).[81] The CHDE reviews its SOPs regularly as necessary, updating them in 2023 and again in 2024, when additions were made to QM, marking, and BAC.[82]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The CHDE was again the only demining operator in Armenia, as reported at May 2024, deploying two NTS teams with a total of twelve staff, and two clearance teams, with a total of fourteen deminers.[83] In 2024, the CHDE planned to increase its operational teams by one,[84] but it is not known whether this was achieved.

Quality assurance (QA) is conducted by dedicated officers who make regular field visits to inspect cleared land.[85] Quality control is conducted once clearance has been completed but prior to handover of the cleared area.[86]

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, 16,762m$^2$ of mixed AP and AV mined area was released through clearance in Tavush province in Armenia, a partial release of a CHA. No area containing AP mines was released through survey, though 75,623m$^2$ of AV mined area was released through survey.[87]

**Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 16,762 | Partial clearance of a mined area in Tavush. |
| **Technical survey** | 0 | |
| **Non-technical survey** | 0 | |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 417 | Includes 3 improvised mines. A further 6 AV mines and 5 items of UXO were destroyed in Tavush. |

### SURVEY IN 2024

No AP mined area was released through survey in 2024. This compares with 2023, when no AP mined area was released by any means.[88]

The CHDE did report, however, that 75,623m$^2$ of AV mined area was released through NTS and TS in 2024 (two CHAs covering 8,171m$^2$ in Tavush province and three SHAs covering 67,452m$^2$ in Vayots Dzor province).[89] A total of 1,588,442m$^2$ of mined area with AP mines was discovered and added to the database during 2024. This comprised one AP mined area of 96,086m$^2$ and five mixed mined areas extending over 1,492,341m$^2$ (of which 16,762m$^2$ of mixed mine contamination was subsequently cleared).[90]

79 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, CHDE, 8 August 2016.
80 Email from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 8 August 2018.
81 Email from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 26 April 2021.
82 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, CHDE, 8 June 2015.
86 Email from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 8 August 2018.
87 Emails from the CHDE, 6 May and 8 and 11 July 2025.
88 Emails from the CHDE, 6 May 2025; and Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
89 Emails from the CHDE, 6 May and 11 July 2025.
90 Ibid.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

The CHDE cleared 16,762m² of mixed AP and AV mined area in Tavush province in 2024 (a partial clearance of a single hazardous area), destroying in the process 417 AP mines, including three of an improvised nature, along with six AV mines, and five items of UXO.[91] In 2019–23, no AP mined area was cleared.[92]

## PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

The full extent of AP mine clearance remains unknown, with survey still needed in military-restricted areas to determine a national baseline, which CHDE has said will only be conducted when there are appropriate security guarantees in place.[93] The National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2027 has not set a target date for even partial mine clearance. BAC has been the focus since 2021 but in 2024, 16,762m² of mined area was cleared in Tavush province, part of an area (also of mixed mine contamination) covering 1,492,341m² discovered during the year,[94] and another 75,623m² of AV mined area was released through survey.[95] This is the first AP mine clearance in Armenia since 2019, when a similarly small area was cleared.

Armenia has in the past claimed that challenges in mine clearance have included the low level of contamination and the random distribution of mines and a lack of funding.[96]

**Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 0.02 |
| 2023 | 0 |
| 2022 | 0 |
| 2021 | 0 |
| 2020 | 0 |
| **Total** | **0.02** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

According to the CHDE, Armenia has included provisions for addressing previously unknown mined areas following completion in national strategies, though this is not clear from the new national mine action strategy. It is reported to have a limited but sustainable capacity to conduct survey and clearance. In addition to its own staff, the CHDE says it can also recruit additional staff from an internal roster of trained people.[97]

91 Ibid.

92 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

93 Ibid.

94 Emails from the CHDE, 6 May and 11 July 2025.

95 Email from the CHDE, 11 July 2025.

96 Emails from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 10 August 2020; and Ruben Arakelyan, CHDE, 28 April 2017.

97 Emails from Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 25 May and 24 July 2023.

# AZERBAIJAN



## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Massive, but unquantified

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 5.32 | (Mine Action Review est.) 10 |
| Technical Survey | *65 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 4,286 | 3,495 |

*ANAMA reported releasing more than 134.9km² of AP mined area through technical survey (TS) in 2024. However, TS was applied to areas previously recorded in the information management system as suspected hazardous areas for all explosive ordnance (EO), rather than areas specifically suspected to contain AP mines. ANAMA does not disaggregate AP mined area from other EO during survey and thus the actual mined area within the task polygons is far smaller than their reported total size. Mine Action Review has estimated that of the 134.9km² of area reduction claimed by ANAMA, actual reduction of AP mined area concerned 65km².

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA)
- Ministry of Defence Demining Battalion
- Ministry of Emergency Situations
- State Border Service
- Qaya Safety Solutions (partnering with SafeLane Global)
- Safe Point CJSC
- Alpha Demining
- Azerbaijan Demining Company (partnering with Piper)
- International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF)
- APOPO

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Azerbaijan adopted the Law on Humanitarian Demining Activities in February 2025, but has not yet adopted its revised national standards (ANMAR) and a new national mine action strategy. Azerbaijan continues to scale up a massive clearance effort of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). In 2024, the Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA) reported releasing more than 5.3km² of anti-personnel (AP) mined area through clearance, with the destruction of 4,286 AP mines. Mine Action Review has estimated that another 65km² was released through technical survey (TS).

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Azerbaijan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **In the meantime, Azerbaijan should submit voluntary Article 7 reports annually under the APMBC.**
- **ANAMA should conduct evidence-based survey to better define the location and extent of mined area and enhance the planning and prioritisation of clearance.**
- **ANAMA should ensure that survey, clearance, and contamination data related to AP mines are disaggregated from data relating to AV mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).**
- **Azerbaijan should adopt its revised National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) without delay and allow cancellation of areas through non-technical survey (NTS), which is not currently permitted.**

- **ANAMA should finalise and adopt its new mine action strategy (the last one expired in 2018), reflecting the significant increase in contamination now under Azerbaijan's control.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- ANAMA
- Ministry of Defence Humanitarian Demining Units
- Ministry of Emergency Situations
- State Border Service
- Four national commercial demining companies (two of which have an international commercial sub-contractor):
  - Qaya Safety Solutions partnering with SafeLane Global
  - Safe Point CJSC
  - Alpha Demining LLC
  - Azerbaijan Demining Company LLC partnering with Piper
- International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF), an Azerbaijan-based NGO

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- APOPO
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (ceased operations in Azerbaijan on 2 May 2025)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of AP mined area in Azerbaijan is unknown, but is certainly massive, especially along the approximately 254km-long, 5km-wide former Line of Contact (LOC) between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The defensive belts of berms, anti-tank ditches, and barbed wire along the LOC contain huge quantities of both AP and AV mines, and the zone has been recognised as one of the largest mined areas in the world.[1] The areas along the LOC were heavily mined over the three decades after 1990 by all parties to the conflict.[2] Further minefields and other explosive ordnance (EO), including abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), were found in areas previously occupied by Armenia in the territory of Azerbaijan and outside the former Nagorno-Karabakh (now the Karabakh Economic Region[3]). As at the end of 2024, remaining mined areas were along the former LOC or in the Karabakh Economic Region,[4] with the exception of four villages in Gazakh district returned to Azerbaijan in 2024 as a result of border delimitation.[5]

The full extent of contamination across Azerbaijan will only be better understood after completion of a countrywide survey, focusing on territory that it has regained since 2020. ANAMA has been surveying areas that came back under Azerbaijani control since November 2020, deploying a variety of methodologies including mine detection dogs (MDDs), technical survey dogs, and mine detection rats to help identify suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) as part of the baseline survey.[6]

Azerbaijan reports that, at the end of 2024, it had recorded almost 9,871km$^2$ of land contaminated with some kind of EO – almost 1,738km$^2$ of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and 8,133km$^2$ of SHA. Another 7.3km$^2$ of EO-contaminated CHA was identified in the four villages in Gazakh district returned to Azerbaijan in 2024 following border delimitation, where less than 0.7km of EO-contaminated area was cleared during the year.[7] Azerbaijan no longer classifies contamination as high, medium, and low threat as it initially did after the Second Karabakh War in 2020.[8] It says this is due to the lack of reliable contamination maps available.[9]

1 Online interview with Steiner Essen, Senior Mine Action Consultant, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Guy Rhodes, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP, 29 April 2021; and email from Guy Rhodes, UNDP, 23 June 2021.

2 Statement of Armenia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (online), 22–24 June 2021.

3 On 7 July 2021, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, signed a decree increasing the number of economic regions in Azerbaijan from 11 to 14. The capital, Baku, became its own separate economic region and two new regions were created: Karabakh (encompassing Khankendi city, as well as the regions of Aghjabadi, Aghdam, Barda, Fuzuli, Khojali, Khojavend, Shusha, and Tartar), and East Zangazur (encompassing Jabrayil, Kalbajar, Qubadli, Lachin, and Zangilan).

4 Interview with Nariman Gasimov, Deputy Head of International Relations Department, ANAMA, 25 July 2025.

5 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July and 1 September 2025.

6 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 9 September 2024 and 7 June 2025.

7 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July 2025.

8 ANAMA, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", Quarterly report, January 2023, p. 3.

9 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July 2025.

ANAMA has indicated that the 1,738km$^2$ of CHA recorded at the end of 2024 is AP and AV mined area that has been recorded along the LOC, where all contaminated area is classified as CHA.[10] ANAMA has reported that EO-contaminated area beyond the former LOC, in territory within the Karabakh Economic Region, is SHA.[11] While there is no comprehensive mapping or formal confirmation of all minefields in these districts, many have already been encountered and cleared in areas beyond the LOC after survey or clearance indicated the presence of contamination. It is expected that similar minefields exist that are not recorded and are without visible indicators.[12] The risk of finding AP mines beyond the LOC remains significant, and these areas continue to be subject to NTS and TS.[13]

There are other official indicators of mine and ERW contamination. In May 2024, the President of Azerbaijan cited initial estimates that 12% of the country was contaminated with approximately 1.5 million AP and AV mines.[14] ANAMA subsequently determined, highly improbably, that approximately 13.4% of Azerbaijan is mined.[15] Furthermore, in a letter to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in December 2024, its Ambassador provided the following data, "The minefields in Azerbaijan cover about 11,258 square kilometres of the country's total territory of 86,600 square kilometres. Approximately 14.2 per cent of this area (165,871.5 hectares of land) has been cleared, while only 3.6 per cent of all planted mines and other explosive devices have been detected and neutralized so far (that is, 54,430 mines and 104,940 other explosive devices, as of September 2024)."[16] ANAMA has claimed that minefields cover 11,667km$^2$ km$^2$ of Azeri territory.[17]

ANAMA has previously reported that areas with the highest mine contamination include a mix of AP and AV mines. Most cases involve factory produced mines but, in some cases, mines have been of an improvised nature.[18] ANAMA previously estimated that improvised mines covered 5% of total mined area,[19] but now says there is no precise information available on the scale of improvised mine contamination. ANAMA does, however, claim that such mines have mostly been encountered in residential areas, including homes, gardens, and access roads.[20]

Azerbaijan requested that Armenia immediately release information on the location of the remaining minefields following the Second Karabakh War in 2020.[21] Armenia, however, has claimed that most of the mines were emplaced by Azerbaijan in the early years of the conflict to deter Nagorno-Karabakh forces.[22] Azerbaijan disputes this claim. Following extensive international mediation, Armenia released some minefield records, providing information on 263,067 AP mines and 127,427 AV mines as well as other explosive devices. According to ANAMA, these records constitute only 5% of the regained areas and less than one third of the high-threat areas,[23] and it maintains that Armenia has yet to provide accurate mine maps.[24] In fact, it has been stated, including by officials from Armenia and the former Nagorno-Karabakh, that accurate mine maps do not exist.[25] In 2024, Armenia presented eight new maps of minefields in the Karabakh region.[26] ANAMA complains, however, that the maps are "inaccurate, unreliable, and incomplete".[27]

Mine contamination in Azerbaijan is predominantly the consequence of the 1988–94 armed conflict with Armenia, which saw landmines laid by both sides. During the 2020 armed conflict, media reported that retreating Armenian forces emplaced mines in a range of locations.[28] Under the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement, "The Trilateral Statement", which came into effect on 10 November 2020, Azerbaijan regained full control of the seven districts adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh: Aghdam, Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Kalbajar, Lachin, Qubadli, and Zangilan,[29] and most mined areas came under Azerbaijan's control. Azerbaijan's 24-hour offensive of 19 September 2023 resulted in it regaining the remainder of the territory.[30] Since the end of the 2020 conflict, ANAMA has undertaken massive clearance in the regained territories, prioritising residential areas, agricultural areas, areas of ecological importance, social infrastructure, roads, and water sources[31] (see "Planning and Tasking" below for further details).

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Statement of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, to the participants of the International Conference themed "Mitigating Environmental Impact of Landmines: Resource Mobilization for Safe and Green Future", 30 May 2024, at: http://bit.ly/3H2dAS6.

15 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 1 September 2025.

16 Letter to the UN Secretary-General from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the UN in New York, 12 December 2024.

17 Email from Nariman Gazimov, ANAMA, 1 September 2025.

18 Ibid.; and email from Ramil Azizov, Operations Manager, ANAMA, 16 August 2022.

19 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 16 August 2022.

20 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July 2025.

21 Statement of Azerbaijan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (online), 22–24 June 2021.

22 Statement of Armenia, Intersessional Meetings (online), 22–24 July 2021.

23 Ibid; "Armenia and Azerbaijan exchange detainees for mine maps", *Eurasianet*, 23 June 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3gXYWdx; and ANAMA, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", Quarterly report, January 2023, p. 4.

24 "Farid Shafiyev: Azerbaijan is among the top five countries for landmine contamination", *Azertag*, 5 April 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3GUdqMC.

25 International Crisis Group (ICG), "Post-War Prospects for Nagorno-Karabakh", 9 June 2021, at: https://bit.ly/4dclod8.

26 "Azerbaijan Urges Armenia for Accurate Minefield Maps", *Caspian News*, 27 January 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4deZVBH.

27 "Azerbaijan says Armenia presented 8 new maps on minefields in Karabakh", *Andaolu Agency (AA)*, 13 February 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3LuZF5I.

28 "Mines, Karabakh and Armenia's Crisis", *New Eastern Europe*, 16 April 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3vezeaC.

29 See, e.g., ICG, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer", Last updated 7 May 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3uiOou2.

30 ICG, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer", Last updated 16 September 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3uiOou2; and "Azerbaijan halts Karabakh offensive after ceasefire deal with Armenian separatists", BBC, 21 September 2023, at: https://bbc.in/3rCVK0e.

31 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023; and Centre for Analysis of Economic Reforms and Communication of the Republic of Azerbaijan, "State Program on the Great Return to the liberated territories of Azerbaijan", 17 November 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3DDz9D1.

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Azerbaijan is also heavily contaminated with cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other ERW, both unexploded ordnance (UXO) and AXO. The extent of contamination is not yet known (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Azerbaijan for further information).

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

ANAMA was established by Presidential Decree 854 in 1998. It initiated demining in 2000. In February 2021, again by presidential decree, ANAMA was restructured and given the status of a public legal entity as the Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan.[32] The rebranded ANAMA has the mandate to plan, coordinate, and oversee humanitarian demining by national and international operators.[33] ANAMA has a national headquarters in Baku and two regional offices in Horadiz and Goygol, and mobile base camps operating in eight regions (Aghdam, Hadrut, Jabrayil, Khankendi, Khojavend, Lachin, Qubadli, and Zangilan) in the regained territories. Goygol Regional Training Centre is the main demining training centre.[34]

In February 2025, the Law on Demining Activities was adopted, which had been in development for several years, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Law regulates mine clearance across the country. Mine clearance conducted by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces for national security and defence purposes are, though, excluded from the Law, though ANAMA has provided training for the Ministry of Defence on the scope of humanitarian demining to ensure operations are based on international standards.[35]

Prior to the 2020 conflict, ANAMA had been conducting demining operations with two contracted national operators: Dayag-Relief Azerbaijan (RA) and IEPF. In March 2020, RA's field personnel were incorporated within ANAMA while RA as an organisation continued to provide logistical support to ANAMA.[36] Since the end of the 2020 conflict, both ANAMA and clearance in Azerbaijan as a whole has been rapidly scaled up to address the significant mine and ERW contamination newly under Azerbaijan's control. An interministerial mine action working group, chaired by ANAMA, continued to meet regularly in 2024 (meeting a total of 19 times) and included the ministries of defence, interior, and emergency situations, as well as the State Border Service.[37] The working group has overall responsibility for coordination of mine action, while ANAMA coordinates mine action operators.[38]

Mine action is considered a national priority by the Government of Azerbaijan.[39] It was integrated into the Azerbaijan Socio-Economic Development Plan 2019–2023, has since been incorporated into the updated strategy, the "Social and Economic Development Strategy of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2022–2026", and is considered a key contributor to meeting the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[40] Azerbaijan has adopted national SDG 18 for mine action for safe return, settlement, recovery, prosperity and peace,[41] and has proposed a dedicated global SDG as part of the Agenda 2030 process.[42]

In November 2022, the President of Azerbaijan signed a decree approving the "First State Programme on the Great Return to the liberated territories of Azerbaijan" (the "Great Return" programme), which aims to resettle 34,500 families between 2022 and 2026 in three stages, and is contingent on clearance of EO-contaminated land (see "Planning and Tasking" below for further detail).[43] The endorsement of the "Great Return" programme came one month after the

32 "Azerbaijan establishes Mine Action Agency", *APA*, 15 January 2021, at: https://bit.ly/35MhtEu.

33 ANAMA, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", Quarterly report, January 2023, p. 7.

34 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

35 "President Ilham Aliyev approves new law on mine action activities", *Azvision.az*, 3 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3HEWV7e; "Azerbaijan's Parliament adopts draft law 'On Demining Activities' in third reading", *apa.az*, 13 December 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4kAwk9J; and "ANAMA Trains Military On Humanitarian Mine Clearance", *menafn.com*, 4 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4kYnNx3.

36 Email from Nijat Karimov, ANAMA, 28 July 2020.

37 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023 and 20 May 2024; interview with Vugar Suleymanov, Chair of the Board, ANAMA; and Samir Poladov, Deputy Chair, ANAMA, Baku, 29 March 2022; and presentation by ANAMA, International Conference on Humanitarian Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals, Baku, 31 March–1 April 2022.

38 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

39 ANAMA, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", Quarterly report, January 2023, p. 3.

40 UNDP, "Gender Organisational Assessment of ANAMA", Report, February 2023, p. 10; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

41 Presentation by Huseyn Huseynov, Head of Department for Sustainable Development and Social Policy, Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Aghdam, 24 May 2023.

42 ANAMA, Quarterly Update, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", October–December 2023, undated, p. 14.

43 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023.

President of Azerbaijan stated that Azerbaijan needed nearly 30 years and a staggering US$25 billion to "solve the issues related to demining".[44] ANAMA has been amassing international support through various fora in recent years, including organisation of several international conferences in Baku, and attending APMBC meetings to mobilise international support.[45]

ANAMA's priorities for international assistance focus on the search for funding. Other key areas identified for support include: technical surveys and feasibility studies, data management and technological innovations (including geo-spatial methodologies), developing female demining teams, upgrading mechanical demining capabilities, and conducting MDD training, demarcation, and fencing, and providing risk education.[46]

In 2024, several new donors supported demining in Azerbaijan (for details, see the subsection below, "Funding for AP Mine Survey and Clearance"), and additional capacity building support was provided to ANAMA. UNDP continued to provide strategic and technical capacity development to ANAMA and to support the creation of an enabling mine action environment. UNDP consultants provided expert guidance on land release and MDD operations for the first four months of 2025, before UNDP ceased operations in Azerbaijan on 2 May 2025. A land release consultant, building on an initial consultancy started in 2024, reviewed release methodologies and standard operating procedures (SOPs), capacity development, and institutional strengthening of mine action practices in Azerbaijan.[47] Another UNDP consultant assessed ANAMA's MDD programme and developed a capacity enhancement plan resulting in a structured capacity-building plan focused on staff training, infrastructure upgrades, veterinary care, and long-term sustainability.[48]

Following the statement of intent signed by ANAMA and UNDP in May 2024 to set up an International Centre of Excellence in Training for Mine Action,[49] a detailed feasibility study was conducted.[50] The Centre is to provide national, regional, and international training and capacity building and to promote research and innovation. A UNDP consultant supported the design and planning process.[51] A three phase plan was drawn up: preparatory phase to mid-2025, start up from mid-2025, with full operation from mid-2026.[52] As at June 2025, ANAMA was expecting a final report with detailed recommendations.[53]

A UNDP-ANAMA demining project, launched in February 2024 covering 20 villages, with €4.25 million of EU funding, concluded in March 2025.[54] The aims included enhancing local capacity, strengthening information management systems, and applying innovative solutions in demining.[55] A key achievement was the establishment of female demining teams, which have been fully integrated into a local NGO's operations.[56] Further EU support was announced on 3 May 2024, with the launch of the "Team Europe Initiative on Mine Action in Azerbaijan", with the EU and its Member States expecting to increase funding to around €13 million in 2024. Funding was to support capacity-building and institutional strengthening of ANAMA, risk education, and victim assistance. No updates on this work were available as at June 2025.[57]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has provided a range of capacity building support to Azerbaijan in recent years, and continued to provide capacity building support to the IEPF until the end of February 2025. This included team-leader training for 14 IEPF deminers, who were all accredited by ANAMA.[58] However, MAG Azerbaijan went into a phased hibernation from the end of May until the end of summer due to administrative issues relating to its registration to work in Azerbaijan.[59] The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has been providing support to ANAMA since 2022 for the installation of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core, though by 2024/25 only minimal support was deemed necessary. ANAMA and the GICHD also cooperate on innovation, with ANAMA representatives participating in GICHD's Innovation Session on AI applications for Mine Action and in the work of the Innovation Hub – Mine Action Innovation Technical Group, initiated in 2024.[60]

44 "Azerbaijan needs nearly 30 years and $25 billion to solve issues related to demining – President Ilham Aliyev", *Trend News Agency*, 13 October 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3qe8edY; and "Civilians Injured in Azerbaijan as Armenian Mine Threat Persists", *Caspian News*, 2 June 2025.

45 "Armenia completes demining of Azerbaijan-boundary village", *Trend News Agency*, 30 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3zAjXYz; and "Azerbaijan, Armenia continue joint border demining efforts", *News.Az*, 10 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3L3Ervw.

46 ANAMA, Quarterly Update, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", October–December 2023, undated, pp. 15–16; and emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025; and Statement of Azerbaijan on Universalisation, Intersessional Meetings, 20 June 2024.

47 Email from Qadeem Tariq, Mine Action Strategic Specialist, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025.

48 Ibid.

49 "ANAMA, UNDP to set up Center of Excellence for combating mine threats", *News.az*, 30 May 2024, accessed 3 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4b1tepX; and email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.

50 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

51 Emails from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 7 July 2025.

52 Presentation by ANAMA at the International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors & UN Advisers (NDM28), Geneva, 11 April 2025.

53 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

54 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 7 July 2025.

55 "Azerbaijan faces huge de-mining challenge with little help from West", *Azernews*, 20 March 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4aCxs7c.

56 Emails from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 7 July 2025.

57 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

58 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, Country Director, MAG Azerbaijan, 24 June 2025.

59 Ibid.; and email from Jessica Hyland, Regional Director – Eastern Europe, MAG, 26 June 2025.

60 Email from Tinatin Maurer-Shengelia, Regional Focal Point, GICHD, 2 May 2025.

Other ongoing partners which provided capacity building support in 2024 were the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), and the Marshall Legacy Institute. Support included the provision of training, technical assistance, and operational strengthening through partnerships with implementing organisations, including UNDP and MAG.[61] Croatia became a new capacity-building partner in 2024, providing ANAMA with eight MDDs and an associated two-month training course.[62] In addition, the Marshall Legacy Institute provided 12 MDDs to ANAMA in 2024, and expected to provide another 10 MDDs in 2025,[63] while the ITF donated two MDDs.[64] Azerbaijan has also expressed interest in collaborating on demining with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)[65] and the International Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya.[66]

Amendments to broader national regulations and compliance could improve the potential for demining NGOs to attract international funding, and could contribute to a more enabling environment for mine action. Examples of where improvements could be made include ensuring timely approvals for national NGOs to receive international funding and timely registration renewals and memoranda of understanding for international operators.

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2024, the national authorities contributed US$114.6 million to ANAMA for both running costs and capital expenditure. The Azerbaijani government has funded most of ANAMA's running costs in recent years as well as all national survey and clearance. The national contribution to running costs was expected to increase by 1.2% in 2025 to almost US$50 million.[67] In 2024, it was reported that mine action, including survey and clearance, was government-funded, except for the less than 5% that came from international donors. ANAMA continues to work towards securing new funders, welcoming potential donors and organisations interested in contributing to mine action in Azerbaijan.[68] It has held various conferences to attract interest and share good practice,[69] and held its third international conference together with UNDP, in May 2024.[70]

The EU is reported to have allocated more than €6 million to demining in Azerbaijan in recent years.[71] Other donors in 2024 included UNDP, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[72] Additional international funding was pledged at the end of 2023 for demining: $3 million from Saudi Arabia, which has already been provided, and €1.5 million from Italy via UNDP, which was pending as at July 2025.[73] New donors in 2024 included the United Arab Emirates (providing US$5 million to support demining in the Karabakh Economic Region),[74] Belgium, Croatia, and Germany.[75]

Belgium pledged €250,000 in 2024 to the Belgian NGO APOPO to continue its work with dogs and rats in Aghdam and Tartar in collaboration with ANAMA, MAG, and IEPF. In addition, APOPO continued providing MDD teams to ANAMA operators in Aghdam and Jabrayil in 2024.[76] UNHCR and UNICEF have funded risk education to support the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs).[77]

China was identified as a new donor in 2025 and was expected to provide material and technical support during the year.[78] In 2025, funding for mine clearance from foreign donors remained at about 4.8% of total demining funding. US PM/WRA donor support, however, concluded in February 2025.[79]

61 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

62 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 7 July 2025.

63 Emails from Indre Sabaliunaite, Program Director, Marshall Legacy Institute, 30 May 2024 and 19 March 2025.

64 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

65 "Azerbaijan highlights interest in OSCE cooperation on mine clearance in liberated", *trend.az*, 25 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3ZYGY1M.

66 "Azerbaijan, Kenya seek enhanced cooperation on humanitarian demining", *caliber.az*, 31 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3HRPqcU.

67 "Azerbaijan increases funding for Mine Action Agency in 2025 Budget", *Azernews*, 27 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/43FPXar; and email from Nariman Gasimov, 7 July 2025.

68 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 12; ANAMA, Quarterly Update, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", October–December 2023, undated, pp. 11 and 15; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

69 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

70 Ibid.

71 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 and 11 July 2025.

72 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

73 ANAMA, Quarterly Update, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", October–December 2023, undated, p. 12; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

74 "UAE and Azerbaijan Ink $5 Billion Deal for Nagorno-Karabakh Demining", *Devdiscourse*, 27 November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3HBzmfv.

75 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

76 Email from Mikael Bold, Program Manager, APOPO Dogs, 30 April 2025.

77 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

78 "China expresses readiness to support Azerbaijan in demining operations", *Azerbaycan24*, 20 December 2024, https://bit.ly/45g7p6F; "China ready to continue assisting Azerbaijan in enhancing its demining capacity", *apa.az*, 23 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4e0ra4h; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

79 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The Azerbaijani Code of Labour prohibits discrimination in labour relations, including between men and women. It does, however, provide for so-called "protective measures", which legally prohibit women from being hired into a wide array of jobs. Traditional norms and gender stereotyping also lead to women and men not being equally included in the different organisational levels. UNDP's assessment underlines the fact that concerns over women's reproductive health (for example, regarding pregnancy) are deeply rooted in cultural norms intended to protect women rather than exclude them. Despite being well-intentioned, these norms create barriers to women's participation in the labour force.[80]

In the mine action sector, a Gender Policy and Strategy, developed by UNDP since 2022 with FCDO funding, had been accepted by ANAMA and was being implemented as at May 2024.[81] A UNDP consultant on gender issues supported ANAMA in implementing the strategy in 2024 and developed a dashboard for monitoring.[82] According to ANAMA, gender and diversity are integrated into mine action in Azerbaijan, and ANAMA is keen to increase female demining team capacity and to employ injured people and people with disabilities.[83]

As at the end of 2024, the number of women in operational positions at ANAMA was reported as 134, all based in regional offices, comprising 8 paramedics and 126 general and technical staff (not all of whom can be considered operational staff).[84] In addition, IEPF's 150 staff include 15 women deminers and 2 women paramedics. MAG and IEPF also established two gender-balanced/mixed teams in 2024.[85] The breakdown of female staff working for other operators was not available.[86] Nevertheless, this is a considerable improvement on the situation two years earlier when no women were trained in demining in Azerbaijan,[87] while in ANAMA, historically women were concentrated in administrative roles at its Baku headquarters. Furthermore, MAG trained the first seven female demining team leaders as part of its training of 14 new team leaders in 2024; all of them were accredited.[88]

**Table 1: Gender composition of ANAMA (at end 2024)**[89]

| Total staff | Women staff | Managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2,765 | 184 (7%) | 375 | 7 (2%) | 2,590 | *134 (5%) |

*The 134 women staff include 8 paramedics and 126 general and technical staff; ANAMA did not deploy any female deminers at the end of 2024.[90]

Female demining capacity has increased in large part through the EU-UNDP funded 2023 project whereby MAG, in partnership with IEPF, supported ANAMA in deploying two fully equipped women-only multi-task teams conducting mine clearance, battle area clearance (BAC), NTS, TS, and animal detection systems, along with risk education.[91] APOPO provided support for animal detection systems, providing technical support dogs and MDRs.[92] The two gender-balanced/mixed teams were established by MAG and IEPF using 12-month PM/WRA funding in 2024[93] while APOPO developed the MDD capacity of the teams.[94] ANAMA reports that women participated for the first time in 2024 in the training for MDD handling, and it planned to deploy female MDD handlers in 2025.[95]

Azerbaijan does not have a diversity policy and implementation plan. According to ANAMA, however, survey and community liaison personnel are mostly from affected communities and there are no restrictions on the basis of ethnic group or religious affiliation. ANAMA has highlighted that risk education teams are particularly inclusive and mixed-gender.[96]

80 UNDP, "Gender Organisational Assessment of ANAMA", Report, February 2023, p. 4.
81 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023 and 20 May 2024.
82 Email from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 9 September 2024.
83 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.
84 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 7 July 2025.
85 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.
86 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025 and 8 July 2025.
87 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 11; and interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.
88 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG Azerbaijan, 24 June 2025.
89 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
90 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 8 July 2025.
91 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023; Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 16 May and 3 July 2023; online interview with Greg Crowther, Director of Programmes, MAG, 26 July 2023; UNDP, "Gender Organisational Assessment of Mine Action Agency of ANAMA", Report, February 2023, p. 11; and "I have no regrets: the Azerbaijani women trained to clear mines", *EU Neighbours East*, 18 March 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3UY0Lv8.
92 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO Dogs, 30 April 2025; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.
93 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.
94 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO Dogs, 30 April 2025; Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 16 May and 3 July 2023; online interview with Greg Crowther, Director of Programmes, MAG, 26 July 2023; and UNDP, "Gender Organisational Assessment of Mine Action Agency of ANAMA", Report, February 2023, p. 11.
95 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
96 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

ANAMA recognises the importance of environmental management in demining.[97] It has developed an environmental management policy that guides all operations in accordance with both national legislation and international best practice.[98] Climate and environmental considerations are reported to have been integrated into Azerbaijan's—as yet unadopted—national mine action strategy and operational work plans. These considerations are said to be reflected in task prioritisation, planning processes, and field-level operational procedures.[99]

By 2022, Azerbaijan had revised its ANMAR, but not formally adopted them. As at June 2025, the ANMAR were reported to have been finalised and undergoing internal governmental review prior to formal adoption.[100] The ANMAR cover all demining activities, with a dedicated chapter on environmental protection.[101] According to the draft ANMAR, the national programme seeks "to ensure that the environment is not degraded by mine action work and land is returned in a state that is similar to, or where possible better than, before mine action operations commenced, and that permits its intended use." The environmental protection chapter includes information on Azerbaijan's mine action environmental management system and requirements for the identification, assessment, and mitigation of environmental aspects. These include waste disposal, water supplies, burning and removal of vegetation, animals, open burning and demolition, environmental aspects of mechanical demining, and completion and remediation.

ANAMA has developed an (as yet unadopted) SOP incorporating guidelines from the relevant International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13.[102] During TS and clearance, demining experts are required to work with environmental specialists to assess environmental impact operations and minimise harm.[103] This includes close cooperation with the regional branches of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources to ensure compliance with national environmental standards and to address region-specific environmental sensitivities in mine action operations.[104]

**Table 2: Environmental policies and action for ANAMA**[105]

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| ANAMA | Yes | Yes | No |

The Government of Azerbaijan can also require the conduct of a formal environmental impact assessment (EIA) in relation to large or publicly significant mine action projects, or those that will take place in areas of known environmental vulnerability.[106] It routinely applies environmental considerations such as drainage water control and mitigation of environmental disruption during clearance.[107] It has taken additional steps to minimise environmental harm, establishing designated waste collection centres in all operational regions for the environmentally safe collection of ERW.[108]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Azerbaijan's revised national mine action standards provide for a single, unified, information management system, which ANAMA is implementing.[109] By January 2025, the transition to IMSMA Core had been completed, with the previous system (IMSMA Legacy) remaining accessible in parallel for reference and data verification purposes. Field staff have undergone detailed training and are now using the new platform in their daily operations. IMSMA Core is said to have significantly enhanced efficiency of data processing by introducing greater automation and improving accuracy and timeliness of reporting.[110]

97 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.
98 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
99 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
100 Ibid.
101 Email from Samir Poladov, ANAMA, 6 June 2022.
102 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.
103 Ibid.
104 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
105 Ibid.
106 ANMAR, Section IV Management Systems, Chapter 9: Environmental Protection.
107 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
108 Ibid.
109 Presentation by ANAMA, International Conference on Humanitarian Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals, Baku, 31 March–1 April 2022.
110 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

In 2024, measures were taken to further improve the quality of data in the mine action database. All data entries are subject to multi-tiered verification by both regional and headquarters personnel. With the integration of automated data processing in IMSMA Core, the system now includes built-in mapping tools and analytical features designed to detect inconsistencies or potential errors. These tools, combined with ANAMA's systematic multi-step review process, significantly reduce the risk of data inaccuracies or potential errors.[111] But despite improvements in information management, ANAMA does not yet fully disaggregate survey, clearance, and contamination data related to AP mines from other EO contamination data.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

ANAMA is guided by the following key documents, issued at cabinet level, which together influence clearance and risk education priorities: "The Great Return Program"; "Azerbaijan–2030: National Priorities for Socio-Economic Development"; and "The Socio-Economic Development Strategy of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2022–2026".[112] The "Great Return" programme aims to resettle 34,500 families by 2026.[113]

The last mine action strategy covered the period 2013–18. Its main aims were to continue mine and ERW clearance in support of government development projects and to provide safe conditions for the local population in affected regions.[114] In March 2023, UNDP indicated that it had developed a new mine action strategy, though it was reported at the time that ANAMA was working on a second strategy with the government.[115] At the time of writing, ANAMA had not yet launched a new national mine action strategy, but work was underway to develop a new strategic document, "The Mine Action Roadmap 2035". The timeline for finalisation and adoption is still to be determined.[116]

The draft strategy called for an increase in clearance capacity so as to eventually achieve annual clearance output of 650km$^2$.[117] This included all forms of EO clearance, as well as visual search of battle areas. According to ANAMA, all tasks are subject to evidence-based TS, during which a certain percentage is physically cleared. If no evidence of AP mines is found, the remaining area of the polygon is systematically searched mainly with a quick visual search supported by magnetometers.[118] ANAMA predicted that, over the long term, this level of output would not be maintained once high-priority areas had been cleared and only low threat/priority areas remained.[119] In line with its annual work plans and the draft strategy—with its focus on residential, agricultural and ecological sites, and on roads and other infrastructure—ANAMA cleared 620km$^2$ of hazardous area in 2024, exceeding its target of 605km$^2$, and was aiming to release almost 651km$^2$ in 2025, in line with the plan approved by the Cabinet of Ministers.[120] Clearance is directed by the annually approved "Plan for the Clearance of the Liberated Territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as "Other Areas Affected by War and Military Operations from Landmines, Unexploded Ordnance, Devices Containing Explosives, and Other Explosive Remnants", endorsed by the Cabinet of Ministers.[121]

ANAMA coordinates the activities of several State implementing agencies, NGOs, and commercial contractors to implement its work plans.[122] NTS of each project area/polygon is undertaken prior to any TS or clearance.[123] As part of the NTS process, ANAMA collates information through interviews with locals and with the personnel of construction companies, although generally limited data can be obtained from members of newly resettled communities. ANAMA also works in close collaboration with the military and consults minefield records; survey and clearance data; and, when available, incident data. While the results of NTS do inform decisions on clearance methodologies for each task, NTS is not typically used to prioritise the tasking of polygons for TS and clearance. Instead, polygons are mostly selected and prioritised by the Cabinet of Ministers based on rehabilitation and reconstruction plans.

According to a report by ANAMA in early 2023, in accordance with its policy of ensuring the return of IDPs, the government prioritises demining of areas of high importance such as main access roads, key infrastructure (highways, railroads, and electricity lines), agriculture, and planned residential areas.[124] Thus, highly contaminated areas are not necessarily a high priority for clearance. According to ANAMA, much of the former LOC with Armenian forces will not be cleared for years, with the exception of areas where construction of roads, railway lines, and power lines or other infrastructure are required.[125]

111 Ibid.

112 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

113 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 9 September 2024; and Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), "Landmines in Azerbaijan continue to pose a lethal threat to peace and development", 22 June 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3DCZxgD.

114 Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 2 May 2018.

115 Email from Mark Buswell, UNDP, 20 March 2023.

116 Emails from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

117 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 10.

118 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 16 August 2022 and 22 July 2024.

119 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 10; and interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.

120 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May and 24 June 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025; and presentation by ANAMA, 27th NDM, Geneva, 30 April 2024.

121 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

122 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 9.

123 Email from Nariman Gazimov, ANAMA, 1 September 2025.

124 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, pp. 3, 5, and 8.

125 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2021, all chapters of the ANMAR were fully revised in line with IMAS, and they were revised again in 2023.[126] While the revised ANMAR had been provided to all operators, they have not been formally adopted by the government.[127] UNDP considered that the ANMAR revised in 2023 were in line with IMAS, but that more work was needed for implementing NTS and to disaggregate data.[128]

All NMAS and SOPs must now align with the new legal framework, and the UNDP consultants engaged at the start of 2025 worked towards this. As at June 2025, draft ANMAR were in the process of formal adoption, undergoing internal governmental procedures.[129] In 2023, ANAMA, UNDP, and MAG began supporting the evaluation and revision of 29 mine action SOPs for the revised national standards.[130] ANAMA reported that in December 2024, it re-developed 29 of 30 SOPs reviewed in the earlier process as part of the technical adaptation process, and made some fundamental changes.[131] Updates to NMAS and SOPs are undertaken in close consultation with operators.[132]

There is no indication that ANAMA will start using NTS to cancel SHAs in the near future. ANAMA reports that while information gathered through NTS plays an important role in its understanding of contamination, cancelling areas and assessing contamination solely on the basis of NTS remains highly challenging in the Azerbaijani context. Operational experience is reported to indicate that even in areas where NTS suggests there is no contamination, AP mines and UXO are frequently discovered during subsequent clearance or other technical interventions. As a result, ANAMA does not routinely cancel areas through NTS alone but uses it to prioritise the "reduction of threat", while TS is primarily used to confirm and further define contamination.[133]

One of the challenges of conducting NTS in the regained territories is that many of the areas are unpopulated and therefore no local communities can serve as key informants on contamination.[134] According to ANAMA, all mine incidents (including those involving military personnel) are plotted in maps, which can serve as evidence points. According to the International Crisis Group, data on ordnance explosions should be a crucial component of NTS in Azerbaijan, pointing to the experience in Cambodia where survey helped shrink the area earmarked for clearance by one third.[135]

ANAMA considers planned land use in its prioritisation and tasking, and all AP mine clearance is conducted to four metres' depth in the plots where foundations will be laid for construction.[136] In its January 2023 report, ANAMA referenced an Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) technical assessment visit report, which suggested that to speed up clearance and reduce the risk to deminers, "a mix of mine-resistant heavy plant (bulldozers, backhoe loaders, and similar protected earth moving machinery)" was needed.[137] Based on the assessment, ANAMA procured more than 50 demining machines and mine-resistant heavy plant machines, including bulldozers and earth-moving equipment, to accelerate clearance.[138]

ANAMA has started fencing off hazardous areas, primarily covering areas along the former contact lines, which are considered as CHAs.[139] Previously only hazard signs were placed at the edge of each polygon and fencing was not consistently used, even when EO contamination was known to continue beyond the edge of cleared polygons.[140] However, around 70% of injuries and fatalities have occurred in areas outside the line of contact, including in cemeteries, agricultural areas, buildings, forests, and around water sources, so preventive actions are also being considered in these areas.[141]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

AP mine survey and clearance are part of ANAMA's overall training programme and ANAMA does not have personnel dedicated to AP mine operations. The number of deminers continued its upward trajectory in 2024, and ANAMA's organisational structure was scaled up in parallel. At the end of the year, Azerbaijan's total operational capacity for addressing all EO contamination consisted of 2,485 deminers (up from 2,281 in 2023), 182 MDDs (up from 151 in 2023), and 87 mine clearance machines (up from 70 in 2023[142]). See Tables 3 and 4 below for details. In 2024, ANAMA continued to use MDRs—"HeroRATs"—through its collaboration with APOPO, complementing other detection technologies.[143]

126 Interview with Vugar Suleymanov and Samir Poladov, ANAMA, Baku, 29 March 2022.

127 Email from Samir Poladov, ANAMA, 6 June 2022.

128 Email from Mark Buswell, UNDP, 20 March 2023.

129 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

130 Emails from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 16 May 2023 and 24 June 2025; and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 25 June 2024; and interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.

131 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 7 July 2025.

132 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

133 Ibid.

134 Email from Samir Poladov, ANAMA, 6 June 2022.

135 ICG, "Defusing Azerbaijan's Landmine Challenge", 31 May 2023.

136 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023; and email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 19 July 2023.

137 ANAMA, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", Quarterly report, January 2023, p. 7.

138 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 1 September 2025.

139 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

140 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.

141 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

142 In Clearing the Mines 2024, the total number of deminers in Azerbaijan was reported as 2,281, when in fact this was the total number of all survey and clearance personnel combined.

143 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

NTS capacity was increased from only one IEPF team (supported by UNDP), tasked by ANAMA to conduct NTS and generate hazardous area polygons in 2022,[144] to three IEPF teams by July 2024.[145] By the end of 2024, no personnel were listed as specifically undertaking NTS, but 314 staff across four organisations were listed as dedicated to NTS and TS activities (see Table 3). A further increase in total demining personnel was expected in 2025, in particular as operations expand into previously inaccessible or newly prioritised areas.[146]

**Table 3: Operational NTS and TS capacities deployed for all explosive ordnance (at end 2024)**[147]

| Operator | NTS teams | NTS personnel | TS teams | TS personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ANAMA | N/A | N/A | 37 | 242 | TS personnel also conduct NTS. |
| IEPF | N/A | N/A | 2 | 15 | TS personnel also conduct NTS. |
| Alpha Demining | N/A | N/A | 3 | 21 | TS personnel also conduct NTS. |
| Safe Point | N/A | N/A | 4 | 36 | TS personnel also conduct NTS. |
| **Totals** | **0** | **0** | **46** | **314** | |

ANAMA has not resumed the use of Remote Aerial Minefield Survey (RAMS) multispectral data analysis, last used in 2023, to identify suspected contaminated areas as part of establishing a baseline survey, and to collect other information on mines and ERW, such as the location of trenches and military positions.[148] However, ANAMA continues to receive proposals and to explore emerging remote sensing technologies.[149] It uses advanced equipment and technology, including high-precision mine detectors capable of identifying metal objects buried up to six metres underground.[150]

**Table 4: Operational EO clearance capacities (at end 2024)**[151]

| Operator | Operational staff | MDDs/ handlers | Machines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ANAMA | 1,458 | 126/107 | 54 | |
| Ministry of Defence | 132 | 3/6 | 19 | All personnel conduct TS, NTS, and clearance. |
| Ministry of Emergency Situations | 44 | 6/6 | 4 | All personnel conduct TS, NTS, and clearance. |
| State Border Service | 43 | 0/0 | 0 | All personnel conduct TS, NTS, and clearance. |
| Alpha Demining | 46 | 20/12 | 2 | |
| Qaya Safety Solutions | 68 | 8/6 | 3 | |
| Safe Point | 80 | 10/6 | 2 | |
| Azerbaijan Demining Company | 56 | 9/6 | 3 | All personnel conduct TS, NTS, and clearance. |
| IEPF | 83 | 0/12 | 0 | |
| **Totals** | **2,010** | **182/161** | **87** | |

ANAMA is responsible for accrediting, training and monitoring all mine action operators, including State actors involved in demining.[152] As at December 2023, two national commercial demining companies were each collaborating with an international commercial sub-contractor to assist with operational planning and help build capacity. These were Qaya Safety Solutions, partnering with SafeLane Global, and the Azerbaijan Demining Company, partnering with Piper.[153]

144 Interview with UNDP, Baku, 24 May 2023.

145 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.

146 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

147 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 8 and 9 July 2025.

148 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025; and interview with Vugar Suleymanov and Samir Poladov, ANAMA, Baku, 29 March 2022.

149 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

150 "ANAMA using cutting-edge technology to detect and clear landmines, unexploded ordnance", *caliber.az*, 29 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44lTPwD.

151 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June, 7 and 9 July, and 5 August 2025.

152 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 7.

153 ANAMA, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", Quarterly report, January 2023, p. 7; and interviews with Vugar Suleymanov and Samir Poladov, ANAMA, Baku, 29 March 2022; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

All data are reported and entered into ANAMA's IMSMA database. In 2024, ANAMA's quality management system continued to operate through a structured framework encompassing accreditation, internal and external monitoring, and quality control (QC) mechanisms.[154] ANAMA conducts monitoring and quality assurance (QA) for operators and issues hand-over certificates after QA.[155] It has an Operational Capability Assessment Division (two staff), a Monitoring Division (with three staff), and an External Quality Control Division (three staff). In addition, there is an External Quality Inspection team (79 personnel), and an External Monitoring team (nine personnel). In 2024, a total of 1,736 sites were formally accepted following successful quality inspections, and 1,069 monitoring missions were conducted across various operational tasks.[156]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

ANAMA reported that a total of more than 5.3km$^2$ of AP mined area was cleared in 2024 with the destruction of 4,236 AP mines, and that 100.9km$^2$ was reduced through TS.[157] No AP mined area was cancelled through NTS in 2024, as Azerbaijan does not use NTS for land release.[158] However, as noted above, the claimed AP mined area released through TS in 2024 corresponds to the total size of tasks (polygons) for all EO-contaminated area in ANAMA's database, which does not disaggregate AP mine contamination from other EO contamination. Therefore, the size of the actual AP mine area addressed, is far smaller. To avoid inflating AP mine release output through TS, Mine Action Review has estimated that 65km$^2$ was the actual mined area reduced through TS.

**Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**[159]

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 5.32 | |
| **Technical survey** | 65 | |
| **Non-technical survey** | 0 | |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 4,286 | (including 140 during spot tasks) |

## SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, an estimated total of 65km$^2$ of AP mined area was released through TS in 2024 in Jabrayil, Qubadli, and Zangilan in the Karabakh Economic Region.[160] While ANAMA did conduct TS in 2023, it did not disaggregate land released through TS from land released through clearance in 2023.[161] No AP mined area was cancelled through NTS in 2024 or 2023 in Azerbaijan for reasons already outlined.[162]

**Table 6: Reported release through TS of EO areas with AP mines in 2024 (national authority data)**[163]

| District | SHAs reduced | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Jabrayil | 10 | 47,089,519 |
| Qubadli | 15 | 37,843,250 |
| Zangilan | 12 | 49,989,184 |
| **Totals** | **37** | **134,921,253** |

154 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
155 Email from Samir Poladov, ANAMA, 7 July 2022.
156 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
157 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July 2025.
158 Ibid.
159 Emails from Nariman Gasimov ANAMA, 21 and 25 July and 1 September 2025.
160 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July 2025.
161 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 25 July 2024.
162 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025; and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 25 July 2024.
163 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July 2025.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

ANAMA reported clearance of more than 5.3km$^2$ in Azerbaijan in 2024 with 4,286 AP mines destroyed (see Table 7).[164] This compares with 2023, when ANAMA reported releasing, through clearance and TS, 18.1km$^2$ of mined area containing solely AP mines and a further 26.23km$^2$ of mined area that contained a mix of AP and AV mines, for a total of 44.33km$^2$ of AP mined area. As these figures were not consistent with the mine patterns and density, Mine Action Review made a conservative estimate that 10km$^2$ of mined area that actually contained AP mines was released through clearance and TS in 2023. According to ANAMA, a total of 3,495 AP mines were destroyed in 2023.[165]

**Table 7: Mine clearance in 2024**[166]

| Districts/Location | CHAs/SHAs | Area cleared (m$^2$) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aghdam* | 9 | 2,964,699 | 1,818 | 853 | 1,729 |
| Fuzuli* | 7 | 1,023,954 | 426 | 441 | 5,541 |
| Gazakh** | 8 | 216,860 | 752 | 61 | 9 |
| Jabrayil* | 3 | 60,982 | 816 | 46 | 1,273 |
| Kalbajar* (spot tasks) | 0 | 0 | 127 | 1 | 204 |
| Khojaly, Khankendi City*** | 2 | 61,136 | 75 | 3 | 5,076 |
| Khojavend* *** | 2 | 49,701 | 78 | 0 | 646 |
| Lachin* | 1 | 2,230 | 109 | 3 | 161 |
| Qubadli* (spot tasks) | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 234 |
| Shusha* | 2 | 4,271 | 8 | 0 | 1,930 |
| Terter* *** | 3 | 932,906 | 64 | 12 | 1,328 |
| Zangilan* (partial clearance) | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 486 |
| Other (spot tasks) | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 605 |
| Terter* *** | 3 | 932,906 | 64 | 12 | 1,328 |
| Zangilan* (partial clearance) | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 486 |
| Other (spot tasks) | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 605 |
| **Totals** | **37** | **5,316,759** | **4,286** | **1,421** | **19,222** |

*Previously inaccessible territory which Azerbaijan regained in 2020, plus parts of Khojavend and Terter. **Previously inaccessible territory which Azerbaijan regained in 2024. ***Previously inaccessible territory which Azerbaijan regained following the September 2023 offensive, including the remainder of Khojavend and Terter.

ANAMA reports that in total across Azerbaijan, it cleared 620.2km$^2$ of EO-contaminated area in 2024 and, in addition to the 4,286 AP mines destroyed (see Table 7 above), it destroyed 2,372 AV mines and 59,163 items of UXO.[167] ANAMA has also stated that in 2024, it cleared a total of 1,987 suspected EO- contaminated areas, and did not find AP mines in 1,950 of them (covering a total of 615.9km$^2$). However, other types of EO were found in most of them, including AV mines, UXO, and CMR.[168]

## DEMINER SAFETY

Six demining accidents were reported in 2024, all involving ANAMA demining personnel. One member of staff was killed, and 12 others were injured. In the worst incident, where one member of staff was killed, another five were injured. In another incident, three members of staff were injured while one member of staff was injured in each of the other four other incidents reported. All of the incidents are reported to have involved the PMN-E AP mine and all occurred during clearance.[169]

A special commission is established to investigate all demining accidents, and staff from ANAMA headquarters are deployed to the accident site as soon as possible to conduct on-site assessments and gather information. The findings are shared with relevant institutions and stakeholders to ensure transparency, strengthen safety protocols, and inform future operations.[170]

164 Ibid.
165 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 24 July 2024.
166 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July and 1 September 2025.
167 ANAMA presentation, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Operational challenges and priorities", NDM28, Geneva, 11 April 2025.
168 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July 2025.
169 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 24 July 2025.
170 Ibid.

## PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Following the armed conflict with Armenia in 2020, the extent of AP mined area falling under Azerbaijan's control has increased hugely, increasing again as more territory came under Azerbaijan's control following the 2023 conflict, and again in 2024 following some border delimitation. ANAMA has adapted rapidly to restructure itself and upscale operations to address the increased contamination and workload. In November 2022, Azerbaijan suggested it would need 30 years to complete mine clearance,[171] and in June 2024, ANAMA again indicated that it could take decades to clear all mines.[172]

In order to plan and address AP mine contamination effectively, ANAMA must first quantify the problem. NTS is proceeding slowly, as the main focus is on clearing land to enable the return of IDPs to the regained territories. The establishment of an accurate baseline of AP mined area is, therefore, still a long way off and there is currently no prioritisation of clearance tasks based on the type of contamination (e.g. prioritising AP mine clearance over clearance of other types of EO). In addition, ANAMA struggles to disaggregate mined areas from battle areas, in both data on the extent of contamination and data on the amount of land released. This is something that ANAMA has said that it will seek to improve as it strengthens its information management system and reporting,[173] and for 2024, it reported AP mine clearance separately. Some 600,000 IDPs were poised to return to the 2020 liberated territories under the "Great Return" programme which, ANAMA has confirmed, planned to release 2,800km$^2$ of land in three stages by the end of 2026.[174]

**Table 8: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km$^2$) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 5.32 |
| 2023 | *10.00 |
| 2022 | 3.52 |
| 2021 | *18.38 |
| 2020 | 0.10 |
| **Total** | **37.32** |

*Clearance output estimated by Mine Action Review.

Azerbaijan has yet to join the APMBC. It should do so as a matter of priority. Azerbaijan participated as an observer in the Meetings of States Parties in November 2022 and November 2023, and in the intersessional meetings in June 2023 and June 2024. In statements at Convention meetings, Azerbaijan has called on the States Parties as well as UN agencies to help it to mobilise international support for demining Azerbaijan.[175] ANAMA has said, on account of the extent of contamination, that it remains severely underfunded.[176]

Azerbaijan previously stated that it "would only accede to the Convention once all of its territories are liberated from occupation by Armenia and all IDPs and refugees return to their lands."[177] At the end of May 2024, Armenia returned four border villages to Azerbaijan following a process to demarcate the border.[178] However, there are four enclaves in Armenia that Azerbaijan wants returned to its sovereignty,[179] and it now says it cannot join the APMBC due to the "military posture of neighbouring Armenia".[180]

Azerbaijan submitted voluntary APMBC Article 7 transparency reports in 2008 and 2009, but has not submitted a report since. Accuracy of reporting of contamination, survey, and clearance data continues to be an issue in Azerbaijan. So too are the effectiveness and efficiency of land release methodology, with many areas being released that prove to have little or no mine contamination.

ANAMA continues to make impressive progress in rapidly scaling up clearance efforts, and the process is nationally led, and has drawn on international expertise, such as UNDP and MAG, for capacity development. Systems to support the huge upscaling of the mine action programme in Azerbaijan, such as elaboration of a national mine action standards (albeit yet to be formally approved), are being put in place, and in 2025, mine action legislation was enacted. Applying efficient, evidence-based survey and clearance methodology, supported by strong national standards and an effective information management and QM system, will be pivotal for the success of demining efforts in Azerbaijan. ANAMA is also seeking to increase demining capacity by adding new national demining NGOs. ANAMA believes they could play a vital role in managing a residual risk to support safe repatriation of IDPs.[181]

171 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 16 August 2022; and "Azerbaijan needs nearly 30 years and $25 billion to solve issues related to demining – President Ilham Aliyev", *Trend News Agency*, 13 October 2022.

172 "3rd Global Mine Action Conference Concludes In Baku", *MENAFN*, 1 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4bEZqiS.

173 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.

174 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 9 September 2024 and 16 October 2024.

175 Statements of Azerbaijan, Intersessional Meetings, 19–21 June 2023 and 20 June 2024; and Statement of Azerbaijan on Universalisation, 21MSP, Geneva, 23 November 2023.

176 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 16 August 2022.

177 "Azerbaijan and Ottawa Process", undated but published on 13 June 2005, at: https://bit.ly/3KLDbNV.

178 "Armenia returns four border villages to Azerbaijan", *Le Monde*, 24 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3WRdx09; and email from Nariman Gasimov, 21 July 2025.

179 The Jamestown Foundation, "Azerbaijan Calls for Return of Contested Villages", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 21, No. 59, 17 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3AcrugJ; and email from Nariman Gasimov, 21 July 2025.

180 Statement of Azerbaijan on Universalisation, 21MSP, Geneva, 23 November 2023.

181 ANAMA, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", Quarterly report, January 2023, p. 10.

# CHINA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Not reported | Not reported |
| Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |
| Non-Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed* | Not known | Not known |

*China reported destroying 563 mines in 2024 and 275 in 2023, but it is not known how many were AP mines.

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

China does not disclose comprehensive data on its anti-personnel (AP) mine contamination, nor on its survey and clearance, but it is known to maintain AP mines around military infrastructure and some of its borders. In August 2024, China warned residents along its border with North Korea of the danger that landmines may have been displaced across the Yalu River into China. China reported destroying 563 landmines in 2024, an increase from the 275 it reported clearing in 2023. It is not known whether the landmines cleared were AP or anti-vehicle (AV) mines or a mixture, nor has it been reported where the clearance took place. Clearance on the border with Myanmar has, however, been reported since 2021.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **China should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **China should clear all remaining AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- No functioning mine action programme

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- None

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of mined area in China is not known. While very significant demining has occurred since the 1990s, China has stated that it maintains some minefields for defence purposes,[1] and research by Landmine Monitor indicates that AP mines remain along most of China's borders.[2] In the 1990s, the United States reported that China had emplaced mines along its borders with India, the Russian Federation, Vietnam, North Korea, and Myanmar.[3] China's military estimated that around two million mines of a wide variety of types were emplaced on the Vietnam border alone.[4] China has reported on mine contamination and clearance along its border with Vietnam, and to some extent with Myanmar, but less information appears to be available about contamination and mine release on its borders with Russia, India, and North Korea.

In new developments in 2023 and 2024, according to the South Korean authorities and media sources, North Korea used AP mines on its side of the border with China.[5] In August 2024, a media report stated that the Chinese authorities had warned that landmines potentially buried on the North Korean side of the Yalu River along the border may have been displaced into China. This occurred, in particular, into Changbai county, Jilin province, following heavy rains at the end of July 2024.[6] Near the border with India, in August 2023, a Chinese media article claimed that India had emplaced mines in an area China claims as its own, to the north-west of Panglong Lake on the Tibetan plateau. Landmines reportedly killed two Indian labourers.[7]

China conducted four demining campaigns along its border with Vietnam between 1992 and 2018 – in Yunnan province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The first was in 1992–94; the second in 1997–99; the third in 2001–08; and the fourth in 2015–18. The Chinese military claim that the second clearance operation was the largest in world military history.[8] However, the two campaigns in 1992–94 and 1997–99 did not deal with minefields located in disputed areas of the border, where 500,000 mines covered an estimated 40km$^2$. After technical survey of mined areas, China embarked on a third clearance campaign in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Yunnan province in 2005. China stated that in 2009 it completed clearance of 5.15km$^2$ at the border.[9]

In 2009, China said that its completion of demining along the Yunnan section of its border with Vietnam represented "the completion of mine clearance of mine-affected areas within China's territory."[10] This was clarified by a statement in 2011, though, when a Foreign Ministry official reported that China maintains a small number of minefields "for national defence".[11] Two months later, at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, China said that large-scale demining had "on the whole eliminated the scourge of landmines in our territories".[12] At the Third Review Conference of the APMBC in 2014, China said it had "basically eradicated landmines on its own territory".[13]

In early November 2015, however, China initiated further demining along the border with Vietnam.[14] In its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report submitted in March 2017, China reported that between November 2015 and February 2017, the Chinese army cleared 18.4km$^2$ of minefields on the Yunnan border.[15] Media accounts indicated that mine clearance again resumed in November 2017 in the Yunnan border area and in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.[16] A total of 23km$^2$ was reported cleared between November 2015 and May 2018.[17] According to a media source, Yunnan province contained 113 minefields and accounted for more than 95% of the total mined areas on the Chinese-Vietnamese borders and mines were often laid in very hard-to-access mountainous areas.[18] In Guangxi, a total of 2,300 explosive items were reported found and destroyed across 1.5km$^2$.[19]

At the Fourth Review Conference in 2019, China said that, since the 1990s, it had carried out large-scale demining operations on the border many times. In the three years to 2019, China said it had cleared approximately 58km$^2$ of mined area on its borders with Vietnam and Myanmar and "enclosed" 25km$^2$ of minefields (permanently perimeter-marking, fencing, and closing down mined areas).[20] China was reported to have begun demining its border with Myanmar at the end of 2018 with a team of more than 300 deminers.[21] Almost three years later, in 2021, an online media source reported that the Chinese authorities had begun mine clearance along the Chinese side of the border between Yunnan province and Myanmar, near Yunnan's Nansan township and near the Menadue township. No further details were available.[22]

1 Landmine Monitor, "China", Last updated 16 December 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/43tvn6vm.
2 Ibid.
3 Landmine Monitor, "China – Impact" Last updated 1 April 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/5n6u7uww,.
4 Ibid.
5 Landmine Monitor Report 2024, pp. 8 and 21.
6 "Chinese authorities warn of possible North Korean landmine displacement due to floods, notify residents 'Do not go to the riverbank'", *Rimjin-Gang*, 13 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3ST8ZnU.
7 Landmine Monitor, "India", (last updated 22 September 2024), at: https://tinyurl.com/mryezh2e.
8 Landmine Monitor, "China – Impact", Last updated 1 April 2025.
9 Ibid.
10 Statement of China, Second APMBC Review Conference, Cartagena, 4 December 2009.
11 Email from Lai Haiyang, Attaché, Department of Arms Control & Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 September 2011.
12 Statement of China, APMBC Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 2011.
13 Statement of China, Third APMBC Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.
14 P. Scally, "Huge land mine clearance underway in Wenshan, Honghe", Blog post, Gokunming, 5 November 2015, at: https://bit.ly/2OWbdVe.
15 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2016), Form B. Unofficial translation.
16 "Land mine removal resumes on border", China Daily, 29 November 2017, at: https://bit.ly/2ZXUwtr; and "China's Guangxi completes de-mining mission along Sino-Vietnam border", *China Daily*, 26 November 2018, at: https://bit.ly/33xCdNT.
17 Landmine Monitor, "China – Impact", Last updated 1 April 2025.
18 "Soldier loses both hands and eyes from a blast while clearing mines along Vietnam border", *The Global Times*, 6 December 2018.
19 "China's Guangxi completes de-mining mission along Sino-Vietnam border", *China Daily*, 26 November 2018.
20 Statement of China, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.
21 J. Li, "Minesweeping operations along China-Myanmar border kick off", *China Military Online*, 28 December 2019, at: https://bit.ly/3f7P3qy.
22 "China Begins Landmine Removal Operation Along Border With Myanmar", *Radio Free Asia*, 13 September 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3D3lhQB.

## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no formal mine action programme in China. Any mine clearance is conducted by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a military activity.

At a regional level, China has been active in collaborating with other countries on mine action. In 2024 this included various technical cooperation and assistance activities supporting demining in other countries (Ethiopia, Somalia, Cambodia, and Laos), sending technical experts to the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC), as well as visits to Armenia and Serbia, where enhanced exchange and cooperation possibilities were explored.[23]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

It is not known whether China takes into consideration gender and diversity during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in China in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2024, China reported that it had translated the 2024 edition of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) into Chinese.[24] China has also reported carrying out technical research related to mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance and destruction, and research on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) survey technology for mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) and on a multi-parameter real-time monitoring and effect evaluation system for mine detection training.[25] In 2019, China reported conducting research on the application of virtual reality (VR) technology in humanitarian mine clearance training.[26] It claims breakthroughs in research and development, including in unmanned mine detection and laser demining (the use of directed energy weapons to destroy landmines).[27]

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

In its Amended Protocol II Article 13 reports covering 2024 and 2023, China did not report any AP mine clearance. China did, however, report in its CCW Protocol V Article 10 report (covering 2024) that Chinese public security organisations had worked closely with the military and disposed of 563 landmines (the type of landmine is not specified) in 2024. This compares with 2023, when China reported destroying 275 landmines (the type again was not specified).[28]

China stated, at meetings of States Parties to the APMBC in 2017 and 2020, that it agrees with "the vision and goals" of the Convention, especially its humanitarian underpinnings, and that it appreciates "the convention's humanitarian spirit, and recognizes its purpose and objective, and acknowledges and attaches importance to its role."[29] At the United Nations Security Council in 2021 it stated that, "China subscribes to the purposes of the Ottawa Convention and supports the ultimate goal of comprehensive landmine ban".[30] China has said that it cannot consider acceding to the treaty due to its ongoing national defence needs.[31]

23 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form E. Unofficial translation.
24 Ibid., Form C.
25 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Forms B and C.
26 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2019), Form B.
27 Statement of China, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.
28 The clearance of the 275 landmines was not reported in *Clearing the Mines 2024*.
29 Landmine Monitor, "China", Last updated 16 December 2024.
30 Statement of China, Security Council Open Debate on Mine Action, 8 April 2021.
31 Landmine Monitor, "China", Last updated 16 December 2024.

# CUBA



## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Not reported | Not reported |
| Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |
| Non-Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Not reported | Not reported |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- None

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Cuba should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Cuba should clear anti-personnel (AP) mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- No national mine action authority
- No national mine action centre

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- None

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of mine contamination in Cuba is unknown but is believed to have remained unchanged for many years. Cuban authorities maintain minefields around the United States (US) naval base at Guantanamo in the south-east of Cuba. The base, which covers an area of 117km$^2$, is encircled by several electrified fences, tens of thousands of AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines, and motion sensors, forming a heavily fortified perimeter.[1] The border is described as one of the most heavily monitored and sealed in the world.[2]

American minefields were first laid at Guantánamo in 1961 to protect the base from a possible advance by Cuba's Frontier Brigade, the infantry and armoured forces of Cuban leader Fidel Castro, who had taken power two years earlier. The United States has occupied the base under a lease signed in 1903, which successive Cuban governments regard as a violation of national sovereignty.[3]

Cuba, in turn, laid its own minefields on the other side of Guantanamo's barbed-wire fences 22 years later, in 1983, following the US invasion of Grenada. According to official accounts, the mines were intended to deter a possible US incursion through that area.[4] In a 1997 document submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Cuba stated that its "military policy is to use mines solely as a defence against the external threat or use of aggression, particularly on the part of one country which is well-known for having maintained a hostile policy towards Cuba for more than three decades and which has vast arsenals of all types of weapons, including nuclear weapons."[5]

On 16 May 1996, US President Bill Clinton announced a new AP mine policy requiring the removal of all non-self-destructing AP mines by the end of 1999, except those used for training or along the Korean Demilitarized Zone.[6] The US Department of Defense reported that mines on the US side of Guantanamo base were removed in accordance with this Presidential Order. By 1999, US Marines had removed some 50,000 AP and AV mines, replacing them with motion and sound sensors.[7] Quality assurance was reportedly completed in 2000.[8] Clearance was facilitated by the fact that the mines had been emplaced in 1961 according to maps and a strict cluster design, and had been regularly maintained. Between 1962 and 1990, 13 Marines were reportedly killed while maintaining them.[9]

In 2007, Cuba stated it carries out "a strict policy with regard to guaranteeing a responsible use of AP mines with an exclusively defensive character and for national security".[10] An earlier Foreign Ministry statement affirmed that existing minefields are "marked, fenced and guarded" in accordance with Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II.[11] By contrast, the US Navy reported in 1999 that Cuba's minefields were laid haphazardly in 1983 without precise mapping, making future clearance particularly challenging.[12]

Media sources report that Cuba's minefields also serve to restrict the movement of Cubans seeking to reach the foreign military installation and subsequently depart for the United States. Rare accounts exist of victims injured while trying to cross. Among the areas facing the greatest risks are those bordering the towns of Boquerón and Caimanera, where animals or people can accidentally trigger mines.[13] According to a book published in 2008, mines laid around the naval base detonate "at least once a month",[14] but it has not been possible to independently confirm this claim. In February 2018, a fire broke out in the 17-mile strip of land separating the Guantánamo base from Cuban territory which reportedly detonated 1,000 mines and burned 1,700 acres over the course of three days before being extinguished.[15]

1 "People of Guantanamo live under the danger of anti-personnel mines", *Martí Notícias*, 4 December 2014, at: https://bit.ly/3x4vCZD; "Barbed wire and anti-personnel mines", *Martí Notícias*, 26 January 2012, at: http://bit.ly/464JExj.

2 "Cuba/United States – Guantánamo: a U.S. base of geostrategic importance in the heart of the 'American Mediterranean'", French National Centre for Space Studies (CNES), images taken on 12 October 2019 by the Sentinel-2B satellite, at: http://bit.ly/4mGY25F.

3 "Guantánamo 'minesweepers' perform a delicate task: Deadly devices disabled one by one", *Miami Herald*, 6 March 2018 (original published on 18 March 1999), at: http://bit.ly/46gAAGH; and "Guantanamo base now free of land mines but US official fear waves of defectors", *Miami Herald*, 6 March 2018, at: http://bit.ly/45JPlll.

4 Ibid.

5 "Cuba's observations on the question of anti-personnel landmines" issued as an official document of the General Assembly under agenda item 71", 14 November 1997, at: http://bit.ly/4g3plof.

6 Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-48, White House, 26 June 1996, at: http://bit.ly/45JYPwT; and "US Announces AP Mine Policy", US Department of State archives, 16 May 1996, at: http://bit.ly/3UV1w8E.

7 "Marines unload deactivated land mines for destruction at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba", US Department of Defence archives, at: https://bit.ly/3x3BBOf; and "Anti-tank mines are stacked for destruction at Guantanamo Bay", US Department of Defense archives, at: http://bit.ly/3VfqqA5; and http://bit.ly/4n3OrFW.

8 "Detritus of Conflict: The U.S. Approach to the Humanitarian Problem Posed by Landmines and other Hazardous Remnants of War", US Department of State archives, 18 April 2003, at: http://bit.ly/4mLdRbI.

9 "Guantánamo 'minesweepers' perform a delicate task: Deadly devices disabled one by one", *Miami Herald*.

10 Statement by Rebeca Hernández Toledano, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Cuba to the UN, "Item 29: Assistance in mine action", UN General Assembly, Fourth Committee, New York, 6 November 2007.

11 Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2000.

12 "Guantánamo 'minesweepers' perform a delicate task: Deadly devices disabled one by one", *Miami Herald*.

13 "Informe situa a Cuba como productor de mines AP", *Martí Notícias*, 4 December 2014, at: http://bit.ly/47W1e93; and "People of Guantanamo live under the danger of AP mines", *Martí Notícias*, 4 December 2014, at: https://bit.ly/3x4vCZD.

14 "The Cuban mines detonate at least once a month, sometimes starting fires that sweep across the fence line. [Staff Sergeant Kaveh Wooley of the US Marines]... described a fire that started the previous summer and turned into a giant cook-off, with about 30 mines exploding...." D. P. Erikson, *Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution*, Bloomsbury, United States, October 2008, pp. 196–97.

15 "U.S. and Cuban forces unite to fight a common foe: wildfire at Guantanamo", *USA Today*, 1 March 2018, at: http://bit.ly/2KytDH9.

Cuba is the only Latin American State that has not adhered to the APMBC and which has never committed to clearing its minefields. It has not acceded to Amended Protocol II, which regulates the use of AP mines, though it is party to the 1980 CCW Protocol II. Consistent with its previous voting, Cuba abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 79/34 on 2 December 2024, which called for universal adherence to and effective implementation of the APMBC. The resolution was adopted by the positive votes of 173 States, with only Russia voting against and 15 other States abstaining. The Landmine Monitor lists Cuba among 12 potential producers of AP mines in the world,[16] noting that while it is not known to be actively producing them, it has yet to commit to never doing so in the future.[17]

## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no mine action programme in Cuba.

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARD COMPLETION

Cuba has not conducted clearance in its minefields around the US naval base at Guantánamo since it emplaced them in 1983.

16 A total of 12 States—all not party to the APMBC—are listed as possible producers: Armenia, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. Of these, only India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, and South Korea appear to be actively producing AP mines.

17 Landmine Monitor, "Cuba", accessed 29 August 2025, at: http://bit.ly/46fLWL3.

# EGYPT

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, but medium

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Unknown | Unknown |
| Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |
| Non-Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Unknown | Unknown |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Corps of Military Engineers

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

While the extent of anti-personnel (AP) mined area in Egypt is thought to be considerable, precise details about contamination as well as on progress in survey and clearance are not known. Much of the information that is available is out of date and likely inaccurate. No details were identified about AP mine survey and clearance in 2024, and no reports of accidents involving mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been identified since the middle of 2024.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Egypt should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **In the meantime, Egypt should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Egypt should not use AP mines under any circumstances.**
- **Egypt should report publicly and accurately on land release, disaggregating clearance from release through survey.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- National Committee for the Supervision of Mine Clearance and the Development of the North West Coast*
- Executive Secretariat for the Demining and Development of the North West Coast (ESDD)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Corps of Military Engineers

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- None

*No recent reports mentioning the Committee were identified, which may indicate that it is no longer functioning and that its responsibilities have been transferred to another body, such as the ESDD.

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of AP mine contamination in Egypt remains unknown and past estimates have been wholly unreliable. There are mines in the Western Desert dating back to the Second World War, as well as in the Sinai Peninsula and Eastern Desert – a legacy of wars with Israel between 1956 and 1973.

In August 2016, reports indicated that Islamic State had been harvesting explosives from Second World War mines still uncleared in Egypt. Ambassador Fathy el-Shazly, former head of Egypt's Mine Clearance Secretariat, noted at least ten reports from the military about terrorists using old mines.[1] This was reiterated in June 2017 at a United Nations (UN) Security Council briefing by Egypt's permanent representative to the UN.[2] In January 2018, it was reported that Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), a group aligned with Islamic State since 2014, had been using old mines and caches of explosives left in Sinai to produce improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Egypt faced five major terrorist attacks using such devices in 2017.[3] This underscored the urgency for Egypt to intensify mine clearance.

Landmine Monitor has also reported intermittent and more recent use of improvised AP mines by non-State armed groups (NSAGs), including Islamic State militants in the Sinai, between 2020 and 2022. These include pressure-plate IEDs found by the Egyptian Army in houses and arms caches in early 2022.[4] Tarabin tribesmen have reportedly been killed by mines laid by a group associated with Islamic State in May 2020 and March 2022.[5] A photograph shared on social media in April 2022 reportedly depicts IEDs left by Islamic State militants in the Sinai region, which were cleared by Egyptian soldiers.[6]

Furthermore, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) database and the Fenix Insight database both contain details of numerous incidents involving IEDs in 2022. These include mines laid by Islamic State targeting the Egyptian military and what are likely to be incidents involving the Union of Sinai Tribes and/or the Union of Sinai Mujahideen.[7] A few reports of possible landmine and IED explosions in North Sinai continued in 2023 and 2024,[8] with the Landmine Monitor identifying a total of three casualties from improvised mines in 2023,[9] but appeared to completely drop off in the second half of 2024.

Previously, there was evidence that the Egyptian army had also used mines in Sinai. In May 2015, the military told an Egyptian newspaper that it had begun placing landmines around military outposts in Sinai, which resulted in the reported deaths of two militants.[10] There is, however, no indication that Egypt's armed forces have used AP mines in recent years.[11]

Most of the Western Desert contamination occurred around the location of Second World War battles that took place between the Qattara depression and Alamein on the Mediterranean coast. Other affected areas are around the city of Marsa Matrouh and at Sallum near the Libyan border.[12] In 2016, during a ceremony to mark the opening of a new prosthetic limb centre, the United Kingdom's Ambassador to Egypt announced that all the maps of minefields laid by British and Allied forces during World War II had been handed over.[13] According to the head of the military engineering department, though, the British minefield maps were "sketch maps" and most of the mines were buried randomly.[14] Major General Mahrous Kilani, Head of the General Secretariat for Mine Clearance, reported that while the mine maps are an indication of possible mined areas many mines have been found in areas unmarked on the maps.[15]

Reports of AP contamination and release since 2010 include the Executive Secretariat for the Demining and Development of the North West Coast (ESDD) reporting to donors in 2010 that the army had destroyed 2.9 million "mines" while clearing 38km$^2$ in five areas, leaving "more than 16 million mines" covering an estimated area of 248km$^2$.[16] In 2013, the army handed over to the Ministries of Housing and of Planning and International Cooperation an area of some 105km$^2$ in the Western Desert, which it had reportedly cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Details of clearance were not reported. Minister of Housing Tarek Wafiq was quoted as saying that, with the completion of the project, one-fifth of the Western Desert had been cleared.[17]

1 P. Schwartzstein, "ISIS Is Digging Up Nazi Landmines From World War 2 As Explosives", *Newsweek*, 10 August 2016.
2 UN Security Council meeting, UN doc. SC/12866, 13 June 2017, at: http://bit.ly/2YSmjPl.
3 "How Egyptian security dealt with IEDs threat?", *Egypt Today*, 1 January 2018, at: http://bit.ly/2HbRwCe.
4 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt", accessed 1 September 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3Vtepa4.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2022-31/12/2022, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Egypt," accessed 20 August 2023, at: www.acleddata.com; and Fenix Insight database, at: https://fenix-insight.online/.
8 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2023-31/12/2023, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Egypt," accessed 22 July 2024, at: www.acleddata.com; and "Landmine explosion kills two children in Egypt's North Sinai", *The New Arab*, 2 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3yaoBwa.
9 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt – Impact", Last updated 23 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3JINKn6.
10 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt Mine Ban Policy", 15 October 2020.
11 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt", accessed 1 September 2025.
12 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt – Impact", Last updated 23 April 2025.
13 A. Nayder, "Helping Landmine Victims in Marsa Matrouh – and Preventing More", Because, 3 November 2016, at: http://bit.ly/2Hbsl2V.
14 UK Parliament website, "Egypt and Libya: Land Mines", written question – 122961, 16 January 2018, at: http://bit.ly/2Z4gJsB.
15 "MG: We cleared 130,000 acres of mines in El Alamein and there was no single incident", *Times of Egypt*, 26 February 2018, Unofficial translation at: http://bit.ly/33EQrMO.
16 "Egypt Mine Action Project Northwest Coast: Phase I Accomplishments", Presentation by Amb. Fathy El Shazly, Director, Executive Secretariat, Cairo, August 2010.
17 N. al Behairy, "20% of the Sahara in West Egypt cleared of landmines", *Daily News*, 20 March 2013.

A joint project between the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and Egypt entitled "Support the North West Coast Development Plan and Mine Action Programme: Mine Action" was initially conducted in two phases from 2007 to 2014 and from 2015 to 2017.[18] The EU provided €4.7 million and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is also reported to have provided funding for the second phase.[19] Between 2014 and 2018, 1,674km$^2$ of the 1,950km$^2$ total released in the two phases, was reportedly released, far exceeding the target of 902km$^2$.[20] In August 2017, it was reported that negotiations had begun on a third phase of the project to allocate $5 million to clear the rest of the northern coast and the Sinai peninsula.[21] As at July 2020, an area of 2,182km$^2$ is said to have been released from the reported 5,100km$^2$ of mined area since the beginning of the project in 2009.[22]

In 2014, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had reported that, in terms of the number of items of explosive ordnance (EO), Egypt was one of the most heavily contaminated countries in the world. According to NATO, AP mines and explosive remnants of war can be found at depths of more than 1.5 metres, and are in areas contaminated with fragments of metal.[23]

Available data on contamination and clearance are, however, generally unreliable. The Egyptian government claimed in 2009, for instance, that 17 million mines remain in the Western Desert and another 5.5 million are in Sinai and the Eastern Desert.[24] In an April 2009 assessment, though, the UN Mine Action Team cautioned that data needed careful analysis to avoid reporting areas that had already been cleared and thereby misrepresenting the problem.[25] More than a decade later, the Egyptian authorities were still citing similarly high contamination figures. In a statement to the UN General Assembly in 2021, Egypt claimed, incorrectly, that it was contaminated with 22 million AP mines. The figure had not changed despite the European Union (EU)-funded clearance and land release by the Egyptian authorities of around one fifth of the suspected area of contamination.[26]

## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Egypt has not acceded to the APMBC. It reiterated its reservations regarding the Convention at the UN General Assembly in November 2023 arguing, among other factors, that it lacks balance between humanitarian concerns and possible legitimate military uses. It also criticised the APMBC for not assigning responsibility for clearance to those who laid mines.[27]

Egypt's mine action programme has been developing extremely slowly since 2007 and includes only the basic structures and institutions to regulate, coordinate, and implement mine action activities. As at 2015, the programme consisted of a three-tier structure that comprised the National Committee for the Supervision of Mine Clearance and the Development of the North West Coast; the ESDD; and the Army Corps of Military Engineers, which has overall responsibility for demining operations in Egypt.[28] It is unclear whether the National Committee continues to function. Landmine Monitor has reported that coordination of mine action continues to be limited.[29]

In 2017, Egypt's Minister of International Cooperation alongside a representative of the Ministry of Defence announced the establishment of the National Centre for Landmine Action and Sustainable Development (which was reported to have replaced the ESDD).[30] The centre set out to release 600km$^2$ of mined area in the North West Cost.[31] However, no references to this body have since been identified, and the ESDD continued to be referenced after 2017. The third phase of the EU-funded UNDP project with Egypt (referred to above), is reported to have supported the expansion of the organisational structure of the ESDD, which was mandated with coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the development plan and humanitarian mine action activities in the North West Coast.[32] The EU-Egypt Innovation Fund is also reported to have funded research into the digital mapping of minefields.[33]

18 UNDP, "Support to the North West Coast Development and Mine Action Plan", undated.

19 "UNDP, USAID provide EGP 13.8m for WWII landmines clearance programme", *Daily News Egypt*, 30 May 2015, at: https://bit.ly/4naWa59.

20 UNDP, "MoIC, EU and UNDP Egypt Joint Statement: International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action", 4 April 2023, at: https://tinyurl.com/47p5he5c; and UNDP, "EU-UNDP Partnership: From Mines to Milestones", 9 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/41ycp3W.

21 "Egypt to invest $17.5M in Anti-Mines Action Project", APA News, 11 August 2017, at: http://bit.ly/2z1ChYn.

22 Executive Secretariat website, accessed 5 July 2020.

23 NATO/OTAN, "Egyptian desert: new technologies for landmine detection", 3 April 2014 (last updated 17 September 2014), at: https://bit.ly/4fgUsMf.

24 State Information Services, "Landmines in Egypt", 20 July 2009; M. Abdel Salam, "First phase of demining in Egypt complete", *Bikyamasr* (blog), 18 April 2010.

25 UN Mine Action Team, "Egypt Mine Action Inter-agency Assessment", 14–18 April 2009, p. 11.

26 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt", accessed 23 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4fcKawO.

27 UN, "First Committee Approves New Resolution on Lethal Autonomous Weapons, as Speaker Warns 'An Algorithm Must Not Be in Full Control of Decisions Involving Killing'", Press release, UN doc. GA/DIS/3731, 1 November 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4dbYUu5; see also "Landmines in Egypt", State Information Service, 18 January 2022, at: https://tinyurl.com/ynv9x5cf; and Landmine Monitor, "Egypt", accessed 1 September 2025.

28 UNDP Project Document, January 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3ghRon1, p. 6.

29 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt – Impact", Last updated 23 April 2025.

30 Egypt continues to suffer from WWII landmines", *Mada*, 4 April 2017, at: https://tinyurl.com/538ft7pd.

31 "Establishment of National Center for Mines Action and Sustainable Development completed: Nasr", *Daily News Egypt*, 23 January 2017, at: http://bit.ly/3dqbcmu.

32 The Executive Secretariat for the Demining and Development of the North West Coast website, accessed 5 July 2020, at: http://bit.ly/3ivjTwl (link no longer working).

33 MineProbe, "EU-Egypt Innovation Fund – Grant Scheme 1 – EuropeAid/132-715/M/ACT/EG", undated, accessed on 23 July 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/mvw78jak.

Trained deminers from the Corps of Military Engineers conduct manual and mechanical demining. In 2020, the ESDD was said to have procured 461 mine detectors, 355 demining suits and protective helmets, a Casspir armoured vehicle with the "Mine Lab" detecting device, and five Amtrak vehicles.[34] NATO has provided training to the Egyptian armed forces on IEDs, alongside its wider efforts to support Egypt in mine and UXO detection.[35] Funding was also used for capacity building, establishing a quality management unit, and supporting the creation of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.[36]

In 2019, Egypt's Minister of Investment and International Cooperation signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) on mine clearance and development of Egypt's North West coast. The MoU provides a cooperation framework to enhance capacity building for the Egyptian mine action programme but according to the GICHD in early 2022, there had been no activity since the signing of the MoU.[37] In March 2022, the ESDD did participate in an Arab Regional Cooperation Programme (ARCP) IMSMA Core Workshop organised by the GICHD in Beirut,[38] and the same year, the GICHD listed Egypt as one of the countries where it had supported the regional exchange and dissemination of good practice.[39]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

It is not known whether Egypt takes into consideration gender and diversity during any planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines. In its annual report for 2022, however, the GICHD reported that the ESDD had adopted approaches developed, promoted or shared by the GICHD to reduce the risks from EO in a "gender and diversity sensitive and responsive manner".[40]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Egypt in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Egypt has not reported in detail on its release of mined areas in recent years and no target date has been set for the completion of mine clearance. In August 2022, a spokesperson for the Egyptian Armed Forces said that the army had destroyed "more than 25 million mines, explosive objects and ammunition over the past years", including in areas around El Alamein, and the Hamman canal, although no detailed information was provided on the timeframe, number of mines or amount of area cleared.[41]

34 Executive Secretariat website, accessed 5 July 2020.

35 NATO/OTAN, "NATO trains Egyptian experts in improvised explosive devices investigation", Last updated 4 December 2017, at: https://bit.ly/3SfQIRh.

36 Executive Secretariat website, accessed 5 July 2020.

37 "Egypt, Switzerland sign agreement on demining North West Coast", State Information Service, 14 November 2019, available at: http://bit.ly/2CcF0mj; and email from Boris Ohanyan, Junior Programme Officer, GICHD, 22 March 2022.

38 Email from Boris Ohanyan, GICHD, 22 March 2022.

39 GICHD, "Annual Report 2022", at: https://bit.ly/3I2yK2S, p. 13.

40 Ibid.

41 "Egyptian army has cleared 25 million WWII landmines, explosives from Western Desert: Spox", *Ahram Online*, 31 August 2022, at: https://bit.ly/47R1gfQ; and "Egypt removes 25 million mines planted during World War II", *Daily News Egypt*, 1 September 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3Pd4MKp.

# GEORGIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

# CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

**2.8KM²**

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0 | 0 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 0 | 0 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- None

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

No survey or clearance of anti-personnel (AP) mines by national or international operators took place in Georgia during 2024, and the last reported release of any AP mined area was in 2022. No international operators are deployed in Georgia, either in Tbilisi Administered Territory (TAT) or in Abkhazia, an autonomous republic outside the effective control of the Georgian government, since The HALO Trust withdrew from the country in 2023. It is uncertain if and how international mine action may resume in Georgia, following the passing of a legislative package by Georgia's Parliament in April 2025, which restricts the activities of international donor-funded organisations.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Georgia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Georgia should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Georgia should pursue bilateral political dialogue with Azerbaijan as well as multilateral dialogue with all stakeholders to enable clearance of the Red Bridge border minefield.**
- **Georgia should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and engage with donors to secure the resources needed to complete clearance.**

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- State Military Scientific Technical Centre (DELTA)
- Humanitarian Demining Control Division (HDCD)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Engineering Battalion of the Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- Georgian State Security Service (SSS) EOD team

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None. The HALO Trust ceased operations in 2023.

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The full extent of mine contamination in Georgia is not known due to access restrictions and lack of survey. Georgia has at least 2.8km$^2$ of contamination across four regions and seven mined areas in the TAT (see Table 1).[1] This estimate dates back to 2022 and remained unchanged, according to Georgia's national authorities, as at the end of 2024.[2] In its most recent Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Georgia again confirmed that mined areas remained near the village Barisakho, close to the border with Dagestan in Russia; near the village of Kadoeti, which is close to South Ossetia and the administrative border line (ABL) of the Tskhinvali region; near the village of Khojali, close to the ABL with Abkhazia; and along Georgia's borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan.[3] The size of these mined areas has not been made public.

**Table 1: AP mined area in TAT (at end 2024)[4]**

| Region | District/ Municipality | Village | Type of mine contamination | Mined areas | Area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kvemo Kartli | Marneuli | Kirach-Muganlo | Mixed AP/AV | 1 | 2,738,730 |
| Mtskheta-Mtianeti | Dusheti | Kadoeti | Mixed AP/AV | 1 | *29,828 |
| Mtskheta-Mtianeti | Dusheti | Barisakho | AP only | 2 | 28,058 |
| Shida Kartli | Khashuri | Osiauri | AP only | 1 | N/K |
| Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti | Mestia | Khojali | AP only | 2 | **26,000 |
| **Totals** | | | | **7** | **2,822,616** |

N/K = not known
*This comprises 16,825m$^2$ of confirmed hazardous area and 13,003m$^2$ of suspected hazardous area (SHA) identified by HALO during non-technical survey in 2022.
**Identified as an SHA by HALO in 2022.

The only location of a mined area in Table 1 not mentioned in this most recent CCW Protocol V Article 10 report is one of an unknown size near the village of Osiauri, a military base in the interior of the country.[5] Contamination in Georgia comprises AP mines only in five areas, with mixed AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines in two areas.[6] There may be other contamination. Since 2011, Georgia is believed to have been conducting a General Mine Action Assessment (GMAA) which may amend the baseline.[7] In its latest Protocol V Article 10 report, however, Georgia again said that additional technical and financial support is needed to conduct the GMAA.[8]

In the mined areas at Barisakho and Osiauri, the extent of contamination is unknown. HALO was unable to secure the necessary permission and funding to be able to complete non-technical survey (NTS) at these areas. It says both technical survey (TS) and NTS are required to accurately determine their size.[9] Having ceased operations in Georgia at the end of the first quarter of 2023 and leaving the country, HALO has no longer pursued efforts to secure access.[10]

1 Tbilisi Administered Territory does not include Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are outside Georgia's effective control.
2 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
3 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
4 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Division, DELTA, 31 May 2022; Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025; Michael Montañ, Partnerships Manager, HALO, 26 July 2022; and Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023. Data on mined areas at the villages of Kadoeti and Khojali were provided by HALO in April 2023. All other information in the Table was provided by Georgia's national authority in May 2022, and stated to be accurate as at the end of 2021. It was confirmed by Georgia's national authority in July 2025 to be unchanged as at the end of 2024.
5 Emails from Michael Montañ, HALO, 30 April 2021 and 17 May 2022.
6 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May 2022; Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023; and Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 15 July 2025.
7 Email from Michael Montañ, HALO, 17 May 2022.
8 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form E.
9 Email from Michael Montañ, HALO, 17 May 2022.
10 Email from Tom Griffiths, Head of Region, HALO, 25 April 2024.

The Red Bridge minefield is an unfenced 7km-long minefield covering 2.2km$^2$ consisting of densely packed lines of AP and AV mines at the "Red Bridge" border crossings with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Laid in 1991 by Azerbaijan during the 1988 Nagorno-Karabakh war, it is the largest minefield in the Caucasus and the last major minefield not in the vicinity of a functioning military establishment. The Red Bridge minefield affects more than 4,000 people. As at May 2022, there had been 88 incidents: 22 involving people and the other 66 involving livestock.[11] It is not known if any incidents have occurred since then. In Barisakho, there are two mined areas close to a police station on the Russian border, which were laid to prevent entry from Ingushetia during the Second Chechen War. In Osiauri, at a military base in the interior of the country, next to the main east-west road through Georgia, mines were laid around the perimeter of an ammunition storage area to defend the position in an event of an invasion.[12]

HALO conducted NTS at Kadoeti and Khojali in 2022. Evidence of AV mines was found at Kadoeti, where 16,825m$^2$ of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and 13,003m$^2$ of SHA was identified. At Khojali, two sections of SHA covering an area of 26,000m$^2$ of were identified.[13] There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia as a result of the 1990–92 Georgian-Ossetian war and the 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia. HALO was not granted access for clearance in South Ossetia, which is under Russian control. HALO is not aware of any remaining areas of contamination in Abkhazia.[14]

HALO believes that, besides the areas already identified, any additional AP mine contamination in Georgia is so sparse and spread over such large areas that further survey of locations where access is permitted would not be productive.[15]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Georgia remains contaminated by other unexploded ordnance (UXO), likely in South Ossetia and also in former firing ranges across Georgia. The Georgian authorities also suggests that explosive remnants of war (ERW) contaminate the Shida Kartli region, bordering Russia, and "other populated places of Georgia, which were bombed".[16]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Georgia's national mine action authority is the Humanitarian Demining Control Division (HDCD), which sits under the State Military Scientific Technical Centre, known as DELTA, within the Ministry of Defence (MoD).[17] As well as implementing and coordinating mine action, DELTA HDCD is responsible for munition demilitarisation and clearance of ERW remaining from the 2008 conflict with Russia. It conducts quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC), and facilitates the development and implementation of Georgian National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[18] The HDCD is also responsible for collecting and processing data for the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.[19] It directly undertakes some NTS and TS.[20] The HDCD continues to participate in various courses organised by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), including on mine action management and IMSMA in 2024. Nevertheless, the HDCD faces challenges in its work owing to a lack of equipment and says it still requires expert assistance in almost all areas of mine action.[21]

HALO reported that, during the time of its operations in Georgia, the authorities were enabling of mine action wherever access was granted. HALO had a memorandum of understanding with the HDCD, which allowed HALO to work in Georgia.[22] It is, however, uncertain whether, and if so, how international mine action may resume in Georgia following the passing of a legislative package by Georgia's Parliament in April 2025, which restricts the activities of international donor organisations. Among other measures, the legislation bans foreign grants from being issued without prior approval from the Georgian government or an authorised representative. The bill was unanimously approved by lawmakers of the ruling Georgian Dream party, which is regarded as increasingly anti-Western,[23] though it is not yet known to what extent the government may restrict international mine action operators from re-entering Georgia if funding becomes available.

11 Emails from Michael Montafi, HALO, 8 May 2020 and 17 May 2022.

12 Emails from Michael Montafi, HALO, 30 April 2021 and 17 May 2022.

13 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.

14 Email from Fiona Kilpatrick, Head of Region, Europe (South Caucasus), HALO, 12 June 2023. Georgia notes that "no external QA/QC [quality assurance/quality control] was conducted by the DELTA" on areas released by HALO in Abkhazia, (because it is outside the effective control of Georgia). CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

15 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.

16 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form A.

17 Decree 897 issued by the Minister of Defence, 30 December 2010; and CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

18 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

19 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015; Michael Montafi, HALO, 17 May 2022; and Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 1 July 2024; and CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form A.

20 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 2 September 2022.

21 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form E.

22 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.

23 "Georgia Passes Controversial Law Targeting Foreign-Funded NGOs, Drawing EU, US Condemnation", *Georgia Today*, 17 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4elpMK3; and "Georgia's parliament passes law restricting foreign grants to local groups", *Reuters*, 16 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/46dvD1N.

While permission to start clearance at two of the six minefields (at Khojali and Kadoeti) was granted to HALO in 2019, permissions for the other four were not granted and HALO did not expect permissions for clearance at Barisakho or Osiauri to be forthcoming due to the perceived tactical value of these minefields to the Georgian military.[24] Permission to access the Red Bridge area had also been denied since July 2015 when, a month after the granting of access to HALO and their initiation of NTS, the Azerbaijani military demanded that TS be halted.[25] In 2019, Georgia reported further discussions with Azerbaijan regarding the clearance of Red Bridge minefield.[26] As at March 2023, however, as HALO was winding down operations in Georgia, it had still not been granted permission to restart clearance.[27] HALO closed its programme in Georgia that year.[28] While there has been no humanitarian demining in Georgia since HALO's departure, the HDCD hopes this can resume at some point in the future.[29]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Georgian government funds the running costs of the HDCD and the Engineering Battalion, which conducts some survey and battle area clearance (BAC).[30]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Georgia is reported to have a gender and diversity policy in place for its mine action programme[31] and to facilitate equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams. Proportionately, however, the number of women in national mine action organisations has remained very low, with only one of the HDCD's seven positions—the Geographic Information System (GIS)/IMSMA specialist—filled by a woman in 2022,[32] and one in seven positions was filled by a woman in 2024.[33] DELTA reported that in 2021, only 1% of military personnel within the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Company of Combat Engineer Battalion were women.[34] No information has since been provided on the gender balance of within this Battalion. An update was requested in 2025, but DELTA stated it was beyond their scope of competency to provide it.[35]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

In 2022, DELTA reported that Georgia's draft NMAS contained a standard on environmental management and policy.[36] DELTA has also stated that all national and international demining operators are expected to abide by State laws relating to environmental protection when planning and conducting demining operations.[37] Finally DELTA states that, to minimise environmental impact, explosive materials are processed only at designated waste sites.[38]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The HDCD uses the IMSMA database and confirms that data are disaggregated by type of contamination and method of land release.[39] According to HALO, when it was operational in Georgia, the data are accurate, with data archives going back to 2009 and regularly updated, based on HALO's reports and on work by the Engineering Battalion.[40] It is not known if data are disaggregated by type of contamination and method of land release.

24 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO, 26 July 2022.
25 Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO, 18 October 2016; Irakli Chitanava, HALO, 2 May 2017; and Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.
26 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019.
27 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.
28 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 April 2024.
29 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 9 August 2024.
30 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
31 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 April 2021.
32 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 April 2021 and 31 May 2022.
33 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
34 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 April 2021 and 31 May 2022.
35 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 15 July 2025.
36 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May 2022.
37 Ibid.
38 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
39 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form B; and email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
40 Emails from Michael Montafi, HALO, 8 May 2020 and 17 May 2022.

In 2024, Georgia restated that various government agencies, in particular the Defence Forces and the EOD team of the Georgian State Security Service, report contamination discovered through their established networks and in response to information from local residents. DELTA compiles and regularly updates digital and printed maps of contaminated and cleared areas through the "national IMSMA database and GIS programme". Exchange of data between relevant ministries, national agencies, and external organisations was reported to be ongoing in 2024.[41] That said, Georgia has said that further support is needed to train staff in IMSMA.[42]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

In 2019, Georgia reported having a national mine action strategy in place whose goals and targets focused on clearing mined areas unless they are deemed to have military utility as well as areas with ERW.[43] Georgia last reported to Mine Action Review that it had a mine action plan in place for 2022.[44] Mine Action Review requested an update on the status of Georgia's national mine action strategy in 2025, but DELTA HDCD explained that this matter is beyond their scope of competency.[45] Georgia did not plan to undertake any clearance of mined areas in 2025.[46]

Since 2009, Georgia has had no national level prioritisation system for clearance. In 2022, Georgia said that clearance is sometimes conducted at the request of ministries, organisations, or commercial companies to facilitate safe infrastructure development.[47]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Georgia states that development of National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) and NMAS continued in 2024, in line with IMAS.[48] In 2025, as in previous years, Georgia reported that a draft set of NMAS was still in need of final revision and expert and peer review.[49] In 2023, prior to its withdrawal, HALO stated that it had not been given access to the draft NMAS or asked to provide input.[50] The IMAS have been translated into Georgian.[51]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

HALO, the only international operator present in Georgia in recent years, withdrew from Georgia in 2023.[52] HALO also responded to call-outs in conflict-affected areas across Abkhazia until funding expired in 2023.[53] In 2024, the EOD company of the Eastern Command of the Defence Forces of Georgia was clearing UXO on the former military training ground of Gonio. Clearance has been ongoing since 2016. The EOD Company of the Engineering Battalion continued to dispose of ammunition in the Vaziani firing range area. No national capacity was deployed for survey or clearance of AP mines.[54]

41 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Reports (covering 2024), Form B.
42 Ibid., Form E.
43 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019.
44 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May 2022.
45 Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 15 July 2025.
46 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
47 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May and 26 July 2022.
48 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
49 Emails from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 1 and 10 July 2024 and 14 July 2025.
50 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.
51 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
52 Emails from Fiona Kilpatrick-Cooper, HALO, 12 April 2024.
53 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.
54 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD DELTA, 25 March 2025; and CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

No area contaminated with AP mines was released through survey or clearance in Georgia in 2024. Georgia did not add any AP mined area to the national database during the year.[55]

## SURVEY IN 2024

No AP mined area was released through survey in Georgia in 2024.[56] The last time this occurred was in 2022, when 32,456m$^2$ was reported to have been reduced through TS by the HDCD at the Dedoplistskaro base in Kakheti region.[57]

Georgia did not add any hazardous areas to the national database in 2024.[58] The last report of any new recording of AP mined area was during 2022, when HALO identified 26,000m$^2$ of SHA at Khojali as well as 13,003m$^2$ of SHA and 16,825m$^2$ of CHA at Kadoeti.[59] These areas were not added to the national database as HALO did not have access to the database in 2022.[60]

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

No AP mined area was released through clearance in Georgia in 2024.[61] As a result of "demining operations" at the Gonio former military base, however, 17,400m$^2$ were cleared with one anti-vehicle mine, a TM-62 blast mine, was found, among other items of UXO.[62] The last reported clearance of AP mined area in Georgia took place during 2022, when a total of 0.28km$^2$ of clearance was conducted.[63] Almost all (0.24km$^2$) took place at Primorsky, the site of an explosion at an ammunition storage area in 2017. As such, the mines had not been emplaced but rather scattered around the area by the explosion.[64]

## PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

No target date has been set for completion of AP mine clearance in Georgia. DELTA reiterated in 2021 that, "given all the impediments, it is difficult to name specific timelines".[65] Again, in July 2025, DELTA stated that Georgia is "striving to have its territories free of mines" but without a set deadline.[66] The Red Bridge minefield is Georgia's largest mined area, clearance of which has previously been identified as one of its key strategic mine action priorities.[67] Georgia previously reported plans to start clearing the Red Bridge minefield in 2015, but after discussions between Georgian and Azerbaijani representatives only survey was permitted.[68] In 2022, HALO reported that, while there had been indications from the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that progress had been made on general demarcation disputes between Georgia and Azerbaijan, there was still no clear evidence of progress towards Red Bridge clearance.

In September 2024, it was reported that a spokesperson for the Azerbaijani MFA had stated that two thirds of the border with Georgia had been agreed upon,[69] though there was no mention of the Red Bridge area. The Landmine Free South Caucasus Campaign, which had provided a forum for regional discussion of border minefield clearance, was paused indefinitely in March 2024. As at May 2025, it was consulting with local and international partners about a possible relaunch.[70]

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

DELTA states that Georgia's national strategy provides for action to address previously unknown mined areas that are found after completion.[71] The MoD Engineering Battalion has been trained to carry out EOD, demining, and BAC by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace programme.[72] Georgia has expressed concern—echoed by HALO—that this capacity to tackle residual contamination is limited.[73]

55 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
56 Ibid.
57 Emails from Jemal Kopaleishvili, DELTA, 18 May and 16 June 2023.
58 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
59 Emails from Jemal Kopaleishvili, DELTA, 18 May 2023; and Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.
60 Emails from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 and 19 April 2023.
61 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
62 CCW Amended Protocol II Report (covering 2024), Form B.
63 Emails from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023; and Jemal Kopaleishvili, DELTA, 18 May and 16 June 2023.
64 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.
65 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May 2022.
66 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
67 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.
68 Interview with George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 June 2015.
69 The article also states that since 1996 "a relevant commission between the two countries has been working on delimitation". "MFA: Azerbaijan, Georgia agreed 2/3 of state border", *Report News Agency*, 17 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3ZXsejU.
70 "Opinion: Landmine free South Caucasus – the job is far from finished", *commonspace.eu*, 9 May 2025, at: http://bit.ly/44tjbdd.
71 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May 2022.
72 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 April 2021; and Michael Montafi, HALO, 30 April 2021.
73 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May 2022.

# INDIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Unknown | Unknown |
| Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |
| Non-Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Unknown | Unknown |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- None

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Little information is available on anti-personnel (AP) mine contamination, survey, and clearance in India, and there is no civilian mine action programme. India appears to be using AP mines on the line of control (LoC) with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir. Non-State armed groups (NSAGs) are reported to use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that meet the definition of an AP mine in various Indian states, such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkand, Manipur, and Telangana. No details were available on survey or clearance of AP mines.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **India should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **India should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **India should report publicly on the extent and location of AP mines and prepare a plan for their clearance and destruction.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- Director-General of Military Operations

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army Corps of Engineers
- Indian Police Service

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- None

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mine contamination in India is not known. India used mines in three wars with Pakistan in 1947, 1965, and 1971, and in its war with China in 1962.[1] Large-scale mine-laying was conducted by government forces on and near the LoC separating India and Pakistan during the 1971 war and the 2001–02 stand-off between the two states. Both AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines were laid on cultivated land and pasture, as well as around infrastructure and a number of villages.

In 2002, media resources reported that India was laying mines along virtually the entire length of its 2,897km border with Pakistan. One army commander said the mined area extended roughly two kilometres deep.[2] The Landmine Monitor asserts that this was India's last significant use of AP mines when, between December 2001 and July 2002, the Indian army emplaced an estimated two million mines along the northern and western borders with Pakistan, in Operation Parakram.[3] It appears that some areas were subsequently cleared. In June 2016, India's NDTV news network, for example, reported that the Indian army was demining areas of the LoC in Rajouri district, Kashmir, in order to return land to communities for agricultural use as it vacated fields near the border that were reportedly taken over and mined during the Kargil Conflict in 1999 and Operation Parakram in 2001.[4]

Indian officials have in the past stated that "there is no minefield or mined area in any part of India's interiors", but acknowledged that "minefields are laid, if required, along the border areas as part of military operations".[5] India has said it would only completely stop using mines when alternative technologies can perform their defensive role, though it has reported having ended production of "non-detectable" AP mines in accordance with the Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).[6] In January 2021, a former Director-General of India's Defence Intelligence Agency was quoted as saying that India only emplaces mines when there is "a threat from an enemy state or possibility of an imminent war",[7] while a 2023 media source reported that the Indian army continues to use AP mines as part of its counter-infiltration strategy, to seal possible infiltration routes into Jammu and Kashmir across the LoC.[8]

Reports of landmine contamination, detonations, and casualties persist. In May 2024, several landmines, reported to be part of the "anti-infiltration" system, were reported to have exploded during a forest fire along the LoC in Poonch district,[9] and in August 2024, a soldier and two porters were reported injured in another mine blast along the LoC in the in Mandi area of Poonch district in Jammu and Kashmir.[10] Multiple reports of landmine explosions in Poonch continued throughout the remainder of 2024, and into 2025, with explosions often triggered by forest fires.[11] There were also reports of landmine explosions in other districts bordering the LoC.[12]

Explosions along the LoC continued to result in casualties, the majority of those reported in 2024 and the first seven months of 2025, involved Indian military personnel. Civilian and "terrorist" casualties were also reported, including a porter injured in Poonch in November 2025,[13] five "Pakistani terrorists" killed in a landmine blast in Poonch in February 2025,[14] and two women injured in a blast in Kupwara in August 2024, though the cause of the blast was not known.[15]

Furthermore, it was reported in August 2020, that conflict over disputed territory in Kashmir between India and China resulted in at least one death and one injury due to mines laid in the past along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).[16] In addition, a Chinese media article claimed in August 2023 that India had emplaced mines in an area that China claims as its own, to the north-west of Panglong Lake on the Tibetan plateau. Two Indian labourers working on a new road in the area were reportedly killed in a landmine explosion on 16 August 2023.[17]

1 Human Rights Watch, Recent Landmine Use by India and Pakistan, Backgrounder, May 2002, p. 3, at: http://bit.ly/3srXtQz.

2 "India's Minefields Mean Bitter Harvest for Farmers", *The New York Times*, 4 January 2002, at: http://nyti.ms/3mTiBhp.

3 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 22 September 2024, accessed 19 August 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/mryezh2e.

4 "Farmers Hope to Return to Fields as Army Clears Landmines on Line of Control", *NDTV*, 27 June 2016, at: http://bit.ly/2Z1AJIl.

5 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 22 September 2024.

6 "'A Ghost that haunts': Living with landmines in Kashmir", *Al Jazeera*, 27 January 2021, at: https://tinyurl.com/t3xcsns7.

7 Ibid.

8 "Army soldier injured in landmine explosion in Jammu and Kashmir's Rajouri district", *The Indian Express*, 15 October 2023, at: https://tinyurl.com/49w7w72j.

9 "Forest fire triggers landmine explosions along LoC in J&K's Poonch", *Deccan Herald*, 19 May 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/mr4czspa.

10 "Soldier, Two Porters Injured In Mine Blast Along LoC In Poonch", *Kashmir Observer*, 14 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3Mb4q4L.

11 See, e.g.: "Forest Fire Along LoC Triggers Landmine Blasts In J&K's Poonch", *ETV Bharat*, 21 November 2024 at: https://bit.ly/41cCB3U; "Indian soldier injured in Poonch landmine blast" *Kashmir Media Service*, 21 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3HEFCDo; "Forest fire triggers landmine blasts along LoC; no one hurt", *The Print*, 26 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4171nT1; "IIOJK: Forest fire triggers landmine blasts in Poonch", *Kashmir Media Service*, 1 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3V3Pn0W; "Forest fire triggers landmine explosions in Poonch", *Kashmir Reader*, 10 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/41KZ5ZZ; "Army soldier injured in landmine blast along LoC in J-K's Poonch", *The Indian Express*, 20 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mMKQMg; "Soldier injured in landmine blast near J&K's Poonch", *Deccan Herald*, 17 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4fGDmYM; and "Forest fire trigger landmine blasts along LoC in Poonch", *The Indian Express*, 23 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/45Trrnb.

12 See for example, "Two soldiers injured in landmine blast near LoC in Kupwara", *Hindustan Times*, 4 October 2024, at https://bit.ly/47w2jEo; "Soldiers Injured In Landmine Blast In Jammu And Kashmir's Rajouri" *NDTV*, 14 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mKyeoO; "J&K: Two soldiers including captain killed in landmine explosion in Akhnoor sector", *Hans India*, 11 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/45TzHUh; and, "Forest fire triggers landmine blasts along LoC in J-K's Rajour", *Press Trust of India*, 11 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/41L06kL.

13 "Porter Injured in Landmine Explosion at LoC", *Devdiscourse*, 29 November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/46XvErb.

14 "5 Pakistani terrorists killed in landmine blast during infiltration bid at LoC in Poonch", *Sambad English Bureau*, 7 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/46WfTAJ.

15 "2 women injured in Kupwara blast", *Kashmir Reader*, 7 August 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/5zurub94.

16 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 22 September 2024.

17 Ibid.

India is one of only a handful of countries still believed to be actively producing mines, which it does exclusively through the State-owned Munitions India Ltd.[18] In 2019, according to an online media report, the Indian Army was planning to procure one million AP mines over a five-year period to be used along the LoC.[19] In August 2020, India said it planned to increase domestic production and end AP mine imports.[20] In 2021, the Indian Army's Corps of Engineers received delivery of the first of 700,000 domestically manufactured Nipun AP mines and were also carrying out trials on new AV mines which it planned to deploy along the LoC.[21]

India asserts that the Indian Armed Forces have never used landmines in internal armed conflicts in its northern and north-eastern states.[22] The security forces have, however, reported extensive use of mines and IEDs by Maoist fighters in the north-eastern states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand causing civilian and military casualties. Landmine Monitor has reported several incidents involving the use of pressure-plate AP mines by either the Communist Party of India-Maoist or its People's Liberation Guerrilla Army.[23]

Media reports support these findings, with mine explosions, including "pressure-activated" IEDs, recorded as causing civilian and security force casualties in 2024 and 2025, and killing wildlife.[24] There are also reports that landmines have been found in various other states, including Telangana in 2024 and 2025, and in Kerala in 2024, where their use has been attributed to Maoist groups.[25] A surge in landmine blasts in Manipur state bordering Myanmar has been reported since 2024,[26] including claims that mines have been emplaced by militants from Myanmar.[27] In July 2024, a landmine was found by a shepherd in Jaisalmer in Rajasthan, reportedly dating from Operation Parakram in 2001.[28]

International databases also indicate the use of AP mines,[29] including IEDs that may meet the definition of an AP mine, in the states outlined above.[30] The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) database also indicates the possibility that remote explosives, landmines, or IEDs have been used by NSAGs in several other Indian states.[31]

## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

India has no civilian mine action programme. The Director-General of Military Operations decides on mine clearance after receiving assessment reports from the command headquarters of the respective districts where clearance is needed. The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for clearing mines placed by NSAGs. According to media reports, the Army's bomb disposal squad is responsible for destroying mines near the LoC that have drifted due to seasonal rainfall and been reported during Army patrols.[32]

Available details about demining undertaken by the Indian military are scant. In its Article 13 report under CCW Amended Protocol II, covering 2024, India registered no entry for mine clearance.[33] It did, however, report various bilateral exercises in 2024 including "demining, CIED [Counter Improvised Explosive Devices] & UXO [unexploded ordnance] disposal ... undertaken in India with Troops from other Nations".[34] It is unclear to what extent the exercises included AP mine clearance.

In its most recent Amended Protocol II report, India also lists exchange programmes it has undertaken "on CIED, Demining and Combat Engineering aspects" at the College of Military Engineering in Pune, Maharashtra state. These included five Russian army personnel who participated in a field Engineering and demining programme between 13 March to 14 March 2024; three UK army personnel who participated in a programme on "Counter Improvised Explosive Devices" between 4 and 6 March 2024; and two French army personnel who participated in a "Counter Improvised Explosive Devices and Field Engineering" programme from 12 to 13 June 2024.[35]

18 Ibid.

19 "Army wants 1 million mines from private sector", *The Economic Times*, 3 October 2019, at: https://bit.ly/3L22UiQ.

20 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 22 September 2024.

21 "Nipun anti-personnel mines: Army gets weapons boost for Pakistan, China borders", *Hindustan Times*, 21 December 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3P6SnaJ.

22 Human Rights Watch, "Recent Landmine Use by India and Pakistan", Backgrounder, May 2002, p. 3.

23 Landmine Monitor Report 2024, pp. 23-24, at: https://tinyurl.com/8j2uvatt.

24 "10 Year-Old Boy Killed in Naxal Land Mine Explosion", *Ommcom News*, 28 July 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/y6n43j6v; "Five cops injured as IED planted by Naxalites explodes in Chhattisgarh", *The New Indian Express*, 29 September 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/43pbmctj; "Chhattisgarh Cop Dies, Two Officers Injured In Landmine Blast In Sukma", *NDTV*, 9 June 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/ykmpkatv; "Maoists regret death of villager in landmine explosion", 6 June 2024, *Telangana Today*, at: https://tinyurl.com/unky4cwe; and "Maoist landmine claims life of young elephant in Jharkhand's Chaibasa", *Social News XYZ*, 6 July 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/55x9useh.

25 "Woman pilgrim injured in Mulugu land mine blast", *The Times of India*, 14 June 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/bdetdstw; "Tribal injured in Maoist landmine blast in forest", *The Times of India*, 7 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3UT6l2l; "Three Greyhounds commandos killed in landmine blast in Telangana", *Social News XYZ*, 8 May 2025, https://bit.ly/4fD9Jrq; and "Landmine and other explosives found buried in Thalappuzha in Wayanad", *Kaumudi Online*, 24 June 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/mus97m66.

26 "Living under the shadow of Land mines", *Daily Excelsior*, 30 March 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/yf7r58ra.

27 "Landmines kill, maim many on Indo-Myanmar border", *The Sangai Express*, 2 August 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/ymzjas6c; and "India-Myanmar border saw surge in landmine blasts, MLA tells House", *The Times of India*, 3 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3XbzsQk.

28 "Landmine recovered in Jaisalmer", *The Times of India*, 29 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3MjVTw9.

29 Fenix Insight database, at: https://fenix-insight.online/.

30 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2024-31/12/2024, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, India", accessed on 19 August 2024 at: www.acleddata.com.

31 Ibid.

32 "Six land mines destroyed along LoC in Balakote", *Northlines*, 5 May 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3qQG6hj; and "Rusted landmine found in J-K's Poonch; destroyed", *The Print*, 31 July 2023, at: https://bit.ly/44jlhrC.

33 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form B.

34 Ibid., Form E.

35 Ibid.

Innovation in demining technology has been reported in India. The Digital University Kerala has developed an "advanced mine detection solution" to detect buried explosives with minimal human involvement using machine learning, radar and drone technologies. The technology can be used in rugged and forested areas, and has been provided to the Indian Army for further testing and validation. According to a media report, the technology could reduce reliance on manual demining and could expedite clearance efforts.[36] In November 2024, The India International Forum on Mine Action and Safety, an independent think tank and an initiative of Horizon Safer World, hosted a symposium on "Mine Action: Pathways to a Safer World" to advance global discussions on demining and post-conflict rehabilitation.[37]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

It is not known whether India takes into consideration gender and diversity during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in India in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

India has not provided information on land release in its recent Article 13 reports under Amended Protocol II of the CCW, as it has done previously. It provided no survey or clearance information in its reports covering 2024, 2023, or 2021, and did not submit a report covering 2022. In Form B of the report covering 2024, India left the section on mine clearance programmes blank, whereas in the report covering 2023, it stated: "No update since 2006" in this section.[38]

Although little information is publicly available on AP mine clearance in India, various media reports have attested to recent landmine clearance. These include a report in January 2025, that security personnel were undertaking a demining exercise in Bijapur district in Chhattisgarh after eight soldiers and a civilian driver were killed in an IED attack, reportedly orchestrated by "Maoists". The demining exercise was said to focus on removing landmines that put the military and civilians at risk.[39] Another report in 2025 indicated that the former Chief Minister of Manipur had established a committee made up of Assam rifle personnel, Manipur police and intelligence, and tasked them with identifying, removing and defusing" landmines on the Indo-Myanmar border, where a surge in landmine blasts had been reported.[40]

Other reports of landmine clearance in recent years include the Lieutenant Governor of Ladakh tendering for clearance of UXO and mines in January 2024 following the deaths of at least five people from explosive ordnance in 2023.[41] The military cleared 175 landmines in three villages in Ladakh, bordering the LAC between India and China in October 2023,[42] and in February of that year, the army is reported to have destroyed a mine in a controlled explosion near the LoC in Poonch district, in Jammu and Kashmir.[43] The army is also reported to have cleared mines attributed to Maoist rebels in Kathagudem district in Telangana state in 2022 following livestock injuries.[44]

Since 2004, India has given similar statements regarding its position on the APMBC. In November 2023, it reiterated its position to the United Nations General Assembly, indicating that it, "supports the vision of a world free of anti-personnel landmines and is committed to their eventual elimination", indicating little change in its position over two decades.[45] During the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties of the APMBC, India affirmed its commitment to the "eventual elimination" of AP mines. However, India also noted that the achievement of this objective hinges on the "availability of militarily effective technologies that can perform cost effectively the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines."[46]

No target date has been set for the completion of mine clearance in India. In a statement delivered at the Fourth APMBC Review Conference in November 2019, India said: "Mines that are used for defensive military operations are laid within fenced perimeters and marked, in accordance with the requirements specified in AP [Amended Protocol] II. Post operations, these mines are cleared by trained troops".[47]

36 "DUK develops mine-detection technology", *The New Indian Express*, 8 November 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/yr5zdf9b.
37 "IIFOMAS symposium on mine action highlights global commitment to safer world", *The New Indian*, 16 November 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/4865x6xm.
38 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024 and 2023), Form B.
39 "Chhattisgarh: Security personnel undertake demining exercise after nine killed in IED blast", *Ani*, 7 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3Jj8Vfm.
40 "Living under the shadow of Land mines", *Daily Excelsior*, 30 March 2025.
41 "LG Mishra orders tendering for clearing Kurbathang of unexploded ordnance", *The Earth News*, 23 January 2024", https://tinyurl.com/2jmhe2tt.
42 "In Ladakh, Army removes landmines from 3 border villages", *The Statesman*, 12 October 2023 at: https://tinyurl.com/2n5wm9zb.
43 "Army destroys landmine found near LoC in J-K's Poonch", *The Indian Express*, 23 February 2024, https://tinyurl.com/yjhraekd.
44 Landmine Monitor Report 2023, at: https://tinyurl.com/2838baj8, p. 18.
45 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 22 September 2024.
46 Statement of India, Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, Geneva, 21 November 2022.
47 Statement of India, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 26 November 2019.

# IRAN



## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Not reported

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Not reported | Not reported |
| Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |
| Non-Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Not reported | Not reported |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Not reported

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Available data on contamination and release of anti-personnel (AP) mined areas in Iran continue to be extremely limited. Although Iran is contaminated by AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines, mainly as a result of the 1980–88 war with Iraq, there are several reports and allegations of use of AP mines by Iran as part of border security systems in the last few years. Evidence suggests that limited clearance of AP mined area took place in 2024.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Iran should immediately halt all use of AP mines and accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Iran should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Iran should report publicly on the extent and location of mined areas and prepare a plan for their clearance and destruction.**

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- Iran Mine Action Center (IRMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- IRMAC
- Iranian Army
- Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
- Commercial operators

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Iran is contaminated by AP and AV mines, mainly as a result of the 1980–88 war with Iraq, but there are also reports and allegations of use of AP mines by Iran as part of border security systems in recent years. The extent of the remaining mined areas is unknown. Mined areas are concentrated in five western provinces bordering Iraq.

According to the Iran Mine Action Center (IRMAC), the initial estimation of undefined "contamination" in Iran was 42,000km$^2$ (Ilam province, 17,000km$^2$; Kermanshah province, 7,000km$^2$; Khuzestan province, 15,000km$^2$; Kurdistan province, 1,500km$^2$; and West Azerbaijan, 1,500km$^2$); which by February 2020 had reportedly been reduced by "90%".[1]

There are also said to be additional mined areas around military bases.[2] Some of the remaining contamination is said to be in hard-to-reach areas, including "impassable mountainous areas" or in marshes.[3] Türkiye has also recorded AP mined area in the province of Ağrı, which borders Iran to the east. In its APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2025, Türkiye notes that, regarding 94 minefields that it had planned to address in Ağrı, after the construction of a border wall, "the mined areas located in Ağrı were not included in [the] total number" as they "remained on the Iranian side, and the operation of this field was not completed".[4]

A further complication in understanding the extent of mined area in Iran pertains to reports of continuing casualties in areas that were supposed to have been cleared, calling into question whether mine clearance has been conducted to international standards. For example, in 2012, Kermanshah province was declared "free from landmines" but several people were killed or injured by landmines only a few days after the announcement, which led the government to consider re-clearing the area.[5] As recently as March 2024, it was reported that a mine in Kermanshah had detonated while a farmer was grazing cattle, resulting in one fatality.[6] A June 2024 online article noted that "evidence and testimonies from citizens in the western provinces and border regions" do not "align" with frequent claims by government media that more than 90 per cent of mined areas have been cleared. The article claims that Iranian citizens "often encounter landmines not just in former military zones but also in their everyday environments like pastures, forests, and villages", declaring that "kolbars[7] in the western provinces are frequently injured or killed by landmine explosions". It suggested that of the 230km border between Iraq and Kurdistan province in Iran, 136km remained mined.[8]

At least one recent explosive ordnance (EO) incident injuring border force personnel has been documented. In May 2025 a soldier serving in Iran's border guard was seriously injured in a "landmine explosion" in the Piranshahr border area. The article stated that Iran's state-run Mehr News Agency had confirmed the incident.[9]

New use of AP mines by Iran in recent years has been documented. In a November 2024 article, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) includes Iran in a list of countries having used AP mines between the middle of 2023 and October 2024.[10] Another June 2024 article claims that Iran's security strategies for the borders and western provinces have been re-laying landmines, stating that "local witnesses have reported seeing IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] forces planting landmines at borders such as those near Baneh and Piranshahr",[11] which is in West Azerbaijan province. No dates are given for when this new use may have occurred.

1 IRMAC PowerPoint presentation, available at: http://bit.ly/38ALojt; and presentation by Mr. Pourbagher, Deputy Director of IRMAC, National Directors Meeting, Geneva, 12 February 2020.

2 "Landmines Still a Major Menace in Iran", *Atlantic Council*, 25 August 2016, at: https://bit.ly/3dVTKp2.

3 "The ominous legacy of war still takes victims", *Iranian Labour News Authority*, 22 May 2020, at: https://bit.ly/3S1UfBk.

4 2025 Türkiye Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

5 F. Aman, "Landmines Still a Major Menace in Iran", Blog post, *Atlantic Council*, 25 August 2016, at: https://bit.ly/3dVTKp2.

6 "Decades-Old Landmine Kills One in Iran", *Iranwire*, 28 March 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3M2LpkQ.

7 Kolbars are workers who, legally or illegally, carry goods on their back across the borders of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Türkiye.

8 "Government Claims Contradicted as Landmine Danger Persists in Western Iran", *Iranwire*, 24 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3yGKljx.

9 "Piranshahr: Iranian soldier severely injured by landmine explosion", Report, Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights, 2 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44gHppM.

10 HI, "Landmines: 22% more victims in one year", 20 November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/464zxKd.

11 "Government Claims Contradicted as Landmine Danger Persists in Western Iran", *Iranwire*, 24 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3yGKljx.

As well as incidents along Iran's western border areas, outlined above, there have been reports of EO incidents along Iran's eastern borders, as a result of people entering new minefields, particularly in the Saravan district of Sistan and Baluchestan province, along Iran's borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan. No information is available on exactly when these minefields were laid. Landmine Monitor lists multiple reports by media outlets and others in late 2023 and early 2024, which allege new mine victims and/or new use of AP mines by the IRGC in those two provinces.[12] No estimate of AP mined area in this eastern border province or in any province outside of Iran's western border provinces is available.

The Iranian government reportedly asserts that it uses landmines as "defence tools" to guard its borders and deter movement of drug traffickers.[13] New mines are said to have been laid "in limited quantities and in specific areas of the borders".[14] It is not possible to state with certainty which organisations or units of Iran's defence and security forces have laid AP mines in recent years, as responsibility for border control in Iran passes periodically from one force or unit to another in any given location (for example, from the IRGC to the army or police). It is said that, when responsibility from one party is handed over to another, if the minefields have already been laid by the current unit, it will hand over its maps to the next unit.[15] The extent to which an accurate and comprehensive database of new minefields in Iran is maintained is also not known. Customary international humanitarian law (IHL), however, requires that minefields should be recorded wherever possible.[16]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Iran is also believed to have cluster munition remnants (CMR) remaining on its territory (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Iran for further information).

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

IRMAC was established as the national mine action centre in 2005, taking the place of a Mine Action Committee within the Ministry of Defence. In 2014, IRMAC reported that it was responsible for planning, data, managing survey, procurement, and the accreditation of demining operators. It was also tasked with setting standards, providing training for clearance operators, concluding contracts with demining operators, and ensuring quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of their operations. IRMAC also coordinates mine action operations with the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, the Management and Planning Organisation of Iran, and other relevant ministries and organisations, and handles international relations.[17]

Several IRMAC staff are believed to be serving or former military personnel, including its director, while others are civilians employed by the Ministry of Defence. At the time of writing, Mine Action Review had not been able to establish if this detailed description of IRMAC's role and responsibilities remains up to date.

As part of an ongoing mine action programme in Iran, which also includes victim assistance and mine risk education, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has undertaken technical training of mine action actors in co-operation with IRMAC, though no dates for this have been given. In 2020, the ICRC reported signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for a mine action partnership with IRMAC, which included support to Iran for safe procedures of humanitarian demining.[18]

Iran has engaged in activities to promote regional and international co-operation for mine action in recent years. In 2019, Iran opened its first international demining training centre in Tehran, with the aim of offering courses to other countries in the region struggling with mine contamination.[19] In 2022, an MoU for mutual co-operation in mine action was signed between the national mine action centres of Iran and Armenia.[20] In June 2023, it was reported that demining would begin in the near future on the Armenian side of the border with Iran.[21]

Iran's Minister of Defence stated in April 2023 that "Iran has acquired the knowledge to produce demining equipment and is ready to use its resources to sweep land mines." He added that Iran "is also ready to help other countries and relevant international organisations."[22] In May 2025, Mine Action Review made renewed inquiries to IRMAC about its mine action programme and AP mined area, and mine survey and clearance in Iran. IRMAC declined to provide information on these issues.

12 Landmine Monitor, "Iran", accessed 19 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44jBnWp.

13 "On the Borders That Divide Kurdistan, Landmines Devastate Communities", Gordyaen Benyamin Jermayi Kurdish Peace Institute, 4 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4lbn0Jl.

14 Ali Asghar Faridi, "Landmines: Silent Killers Lurking in the Earth's Core", *Our Law Magazine*, undated but accessed 19 June 2025, at; https://bit.ly/3T0qoe7.

15 Ibid.

16 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary IHL Rule 82: "Recording of the Placement of Landmines", at: https://bit.ly/4eaDCPh.

17 IRMAC PowerPoint Presentation, Tehran, 9 February 2014; and IRMAC, "Presentation of IRMAC".

18 F. Arabpour (Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC delegation in Tehran), "ICRC Mine Action activities in the I.R. of Iran", Presentation to the 23rd International Meeting of National Mine Action Program Directors and United Nations (UN) Advisors, Geneva, 11–14 February 2020, at: https://bit.ly/43EjVZD.

19 "1st International Humanitarian Demining Training Center opens in Tehran", *Mehr News Agency*, 12 November 2019, available at: http://bit.ly/2C7wRzG.

20 "Iran, Armenia ink MoU on humanitarian demining cooperation", *Iran Press News Agency*, 19 September 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3WyehpJ.

21 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 6 June 2023.

22 "Defense Minister: Iran ready to help other countries for demining", *Iran Press News Agency*, 4 April 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3SOIwYz.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The extent to which gender and diversity are mainstreamed into mine action in Iran is not known.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known whether Iran has a national mine action standard on environmental management and/or a policy on environmental management. It has been reported, however, that Iran's Ministry for the Environment does regulate environmental practices in mine action to some extent.[23]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

It is not known to what extent IRMAC is able to disaggregate AP mine contamination and clearance from that relating to other explosive ordnance. It was reported in 2023 that IRMAC's database is accurate and that operators provide regular activity reports to IRMAC on both humanitarian and commercial mine action projects.[24]

In 2020, IRMAC reported having a geographic information system (GIS), web-based, integrated information management system, which integrates information on quality, safety, and the environment.[25] In 2022, IRMAC launched an application for smartphones, which is reported to contain all data from historical and current clearance operations and intended to provide mine action organisations with a comprehensive view of contaminated and cleared areas identified by IRMAC. The application is also said to contain information about explosive incidents and is updated on a regular, even daily, basis. The application is available to operators and interested parties upon request.[26]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known whether Iran has a national mine action strategy or an annual work plan for the survey and clearance of AP mines or agreed and specified criteria for the prioritisation of tasks.

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2023, Mine Action Review was informed that Iran has national mine action standards in place,[27] though these are said to not strictly follow the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[28] No information was available on quality management (QM) procedures for clearance in Iran, although it was reported in 2023 that a subsidiary of IRMAC performs QA and QC of commercial demining.[29] IRMAC undertakes two main types of clearance activity: shallow and deep.[30] After Kermanshah province was declared "free from landmines" in 2012 (but several people were killed and injured by landmines only a few days later), an Iranian Member of Parliament commented that the clearance had not respected the minimum depth set in national standards.[31]

23 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 26 April 2023.

24 Email from Reza Amaninasab, Director, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 23 March 2023.

25 IRMAC PowerPoint presentation, available at: http://bit.ly/38ALojt; and presentation by Mr Pourbagher, IRMAC, 23rd International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisers, Geneva, 11–14 February 2020.

26 Emails from Reza Amaninasab, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 23 March 2023; and Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 26 April and 6 May 2023.

27 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 6 June 2023.

28 Information provided on condition of anonymity by two separate sources in 2023 and 2025.

29 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 26 April 2023.

30 IRMAC PowerPoint presentation, 2020, p. 5.

31 "Landmines Still a Major Menace in Iran", Blog post, Atlantic Council, 25 August 2016.

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

At the time of writing, no up-to-date, detailed information was available on Iran's survey and clearance capacity. In March 2024, the Deputy of Iran's Armed Forces spoke of the army Engineering Units' ongoing efforts to "clear millions of mines and bullets from contaminated border areas", with a "significant number of personnel" dedicated to this.[32]

IRMAC combines the roles of regulator and operator and, in 2019, was reported to have demining teams and support staff deployed in five affected provinces. In Kurdistan province, IRMAC was conducting verification, mainly through mechanical clearance. IRMAC also responds to calls from the local community reporting landmines or items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). In 2019, demining capacity in Kurdistan province was believed to stand at only around 12 personnel, a reduction on earlier capacity. Available demining assets, such as mechanical assets, vary from province to province.[33]

Commercial mine and ERW clearance in Iran is conducted to ensure that land is free from explosive ordnance before it is used for economic purposes or developed. It is separate to demining of areas known or suspected to contain explosive ordnance in order to make the land safe for civilian use, which comes under the remit of IRMAC. In a number of countries, commercial demining is applied to areas whether or not there is firm evidence of a threat from explosive ordnance.

In 2023, it was reported that the Petroleum Engineering and Development Company (PEDEC), the development arm of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), contracts and monitors commercial operators conducting clearance of Iran's oil and gas producing areas, which are concentrated in the west and south-west of the country, close to the border with Iraq.[34] International operators are not believed to have been active in Iran since 2008.

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

It is not known how much mined area was released in 2024, nor if any previously unrecorded areas of contamination were added to Iran's national database.

### SURVEY IN 2024

It is not known how much mined area was released in 2024.

### CLEARANCE IN 2024

It is not known how much mined area was cleared in 2024.

### PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

It is not possible to know when or even if Iran will become free of AP mines. In 2020, IRMAC listed the challenges it faces in clearance in Iran as follows – a high density of contamination; flooding in contaminated areas, which hinders access; displacement of munitions by flooding; displacement of mines to lower soil (up to six metres below the surface); the transformation [degradation] of mines, and vegetation.[35]

32 "Over five million landmines cleared from contaminated border areas: commander", *Tehran Times*, 3 March 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4aHFag2.

33 Information provided by Reza Amaninasab, Ambassadors for Development without Borders, September 2019.

34 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 6 June 2023.

35 IRMAC PowerPoint presentation, 2020; and presentation by Mr Pourbagher, IRMAC, UN-National Directors Meeting, Geneva, 12 February 2020.

# ISRAEL

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

**215KM²**

Heavy
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 2.28 | 0.27 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | *2.19 | 0.65 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Not reported | (approx.) 17,480 |

*Conducted by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the result of five years of survey.

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- IMAG
- 4M
- Minefree
- AMAN
- QUADRO Projects & Technologies LTD
- IEOD
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Israel reported almost 215km² of anti-personnel (AP) mined area as at the end of 2024, and said that 4.47km² of AP mined area had been released during the year. The Israeli Mine Action Authority (INMAA) oversaw clearance of 2.28km² while the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) Engineering Corps cancelled a further 2.19km² of hazardous area containing AP mines, the result of 5 years' survey efforts. This is a huge increase in the release of AP mine contamination from the previous year, when INMAA reported release of 924,000m² of AP mined area.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Israel should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Israel should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Israel should refrain from laying AP mines.**

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- Israeli Mine Action Authority (INMAA)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- Israel Defence Forces (IDF)
- IMAG
- 4M
- Minefree
- AMAN
- QUADRO Projects & Technologies LTD
- IEOD
- GA-MAN (Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC))
- 4CI SECURITY LTD (QA/QC)
- OpMS-Open Minded Solutions Ltd (QA/QC)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

### OTHER ACTORS

- None

*INMAA indicated in 2024 that only two of five active companies (IMAG and 4M) had won contracts to undertake mine clearance in the past two years, but did not name the other three active companies.[1]

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

INMAA reported comprehensive data on AP mined area and land release for a second consecutive year in 2024, declaring a total of more than 271.32km² of combined AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mined area across Israel (see Table 1), compared to the equivalent 271.84km² the previous year. Of the total mined area, 214.76km² contained AP mines, with 106.44km² across 2,900 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 108.32km² across 383 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) (see Table 2).[2] This compared to the equivalent figure for total mined area containing AP mines of 215.66km² the previous year. The difference in AP mine contamination between end of 2023 and end of 2024 does not, however, reconcile with the amount of land released in 2024.

**Table 1: AP and AV mined area (at end 2024)[3]**

| Type of contamination | CHAs | Area (km²) | SHAs | Area (km²) | Total SHA and CHAs | Total Area (km²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AP mines only | 2,898 | 107.25 | 0 | 0 | 2,898 | 107.25 |
| AV mines only | 1,713 | 55.28 | 0 | 0 | 1,713 | 55.28 |
| AP and AV mines | 16 | 0.47 | 383 | 108.32 | 399 | 108.79 |
| **Totals** | **4,627** | **163.00** | **383** | **108.32** | **5,010** | **271.32** |

**Table 2: AP mined area by region (at end 2024)[4]**

| Region | CHAs | Area (km²) | SHAs | Area (km²) | Total SHA and CHAs | Total Area (km²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central region | 809 | 4.49 | 45 | 10.83 | 854 | 15.32 |
| Northern region | 2,034 | 101.90 | 281 | 9.13 | 2,315 | 111.03 |
| Southern region | 57 | 0.05 | 57 | 88.36 | 114 | 88.41 |
| **Totals** | **2,900** | **106.44** | **383** | **108.32** | **3,283** | **214.76** |

1 Email from Shahar Back, Director, INMAA, 15 July 2024.

2 INMAA questionnaire 2025.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. There is a small discrepancy between the sum of the area containing AP mines and mixed AP and AV mines from Table 1 (216.04km²) and the total size of SHAs and CHAs containing AP mines in Table 2 (214.75km²).

No previously unrecorded AP mined area was added to INMAA's contamination database in 2024.[5]

In its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 report covering 2023, Israel repeated that the IDF had again made "significant progress" in re-surveying mined areas and in examining the possibility of area cancellation, following the completion of a fully detailed non-technical survey (NTS),[6] as it had stated in previous reports. It did not specifically reference such activities in its CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report covering 2024. It did, however, indicate that the IDF continued its annual programme to reduce the number of mined areas, and stated that INMAA continued clearance and land release operations intended for civil use.[7]

The head of INMAA told media in 2020 that of the estimated total of 200km$^2$ of mined area in Israel, half was essential to Israel's national security while the remaining 100km$^2$ was to be cleared in order of priority. An Israeli Ministry of Defence map shows mines planted in a series of hotspots along the eastern border. The minefields start from the north-eastern borders with Syria in the Golan Heights, with high concentration around the sea of Galilee (also known as the Tiberias Lake). Mined areas stretch southwards along the Jordan Valley (east) all the way to the southern region of Eilat bordering Egypt.[8] It is not clear whether the Ministry of Defence map includes the minefields considered essential to Israel's security or only the ones that are to be cleared.

Israel's mine problem dates back to the Second World War. Subsequently, Israel laid significant numbers of mines along its borders, around military camps and training areas, and near civilian infrastructure. In August 2011, Israel's military reported planting new mines to reinforce minefields and other defences along its de facto border with Syria in the Golan Heights.[9] The extent of mines laid by Syrian forces remains largely unknown although certain areas have been fenced off by the IDF. According to a 2017 online media report, however, fencing is not always properly maintained with warning signs, and civilians occasionally cross into minefields looking for edible plants.[10]

In addition, Israel controls AP mined areas in the West Bank (see the *Clearing the Mines* report on Palestine for further details).

Following the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, media reports claimed that the IDF had used mines to seal the border with Gaza, which was breached in the attack.[11] The unverified reports did not specify whether AP and/or AV mines were thought to have been used or if the mines extended into the Gaza Strip, and INMAA has categorically denied that Israel used mines to seal the border or that it had emplaced landmines in Gaza since October 2023.[12] No further reports alleging the emplacement of mines at the border with Gaza since October 2023 have been identified. In a statement to the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC in November 2023, Israel acknowledged that some of its borders were "protected" by landmines and indicated that it continued to view AP mines as "an essential defensive tool".[13]

Media sources also reported, at the end of 2023 and beginning of 2024, that some security experts had proposed that landmines could prevent any future invasion of Israel,[14] and that Israel was preparing to create a buffer zone, encroaching on territory in Gaza, using landmines.[15] No further reports, though, have been identified which indicate that any such plans existed or were taken forward.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

A March 2011 law on minefield clearance established the INMAA to undertake a "comprehensive programme of mine clearing projects inside Israel".[16] The law's aim was "to create a normative infrastructure for the clearance of minefields that are not essential to national security, and to declare them as free from landmines with the highest degree of safety to civilians, in accordance with the international obligations of the State of Israel, and within the shortest period of time possible."[17] A National Minefield Clearance Fund was established in 2011 pursuant to the provisions of the Act, to receive, manage, and allocate donations.[18]

5 Ibid.

6 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2023), Form B.

7 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form B.

8 "Below the surface: Israel's mine map is exposed", *N12*, 19 September 2020, at: https://bit.ly/3xfQ9KV.

9 "Israel army plants new mines along Syria border", *Associated Press*, 13 August 2011.

10 "New Golan mine-clearing project to begin this summer", *Jerusalem Post*, 16 March 2017, at: http://bit.ly/2MyEKBc.

11 "IDF says Gaza border finally sealed, bodies of 1,500 terrorists found inside Israel", *The Times of Israel*, 10 October 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3XYrT08; "Israeli forces plant mines after securing Gaza border as fighting continues to intensify", *SBS*, 10 October 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4cT7aPq; and "Hamas and Israel at war: what we know on day 4", *The Guardian*, 10 October 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4cVKIL3.

12 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 23 July 2024.

13 Statement of Israel on Universalisation, APMBC Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 23 November 2023.

14 "Landmines proposed as solution for Israel's border protection", *Globes*, 12 December 2023, at https://bit.ly/4bKzzpT.

15 "Hamas blasts Israel's plan to create buffer zone in Gaza as a 'crime'", *Al Jazeera*, 25 January 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3W4Ga8Z.

16 Minefield Clearance Law 5771-2011 of March 2011, unofficial translation at: http://bit.ly/2GDOQgJ; Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2010), Form A. Form A refers to details provided in Form D, but the information in Form D has been deleted.

17 Minefield Clearance Law 5771-2011.

18 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form D; and email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 23 July 2024.

In 2019, the director of INMAA reported that a new local law had given INMAA responsibility for clearing former military bases and for addressing abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and AV mines. Prior to this, the INMAA had only had responsibility for addressing AP mines and mixed mined areas.[19] Under the Minefield and Unexploded Ordnance Clearance Bill (Amendment 2), adopted by the Knesset in 2023, INMAA's responsibilities were extended to AV mined areas and UXO-contaminated areas. In addition, INMAA can now collect fees from developers for minefield clearance; a similar provision allowing INMAA to charge for UXO clearance was made permanent.[20]

INMAA was established within the Ministry of Defence, with staff responsible for planning mine action.[21] INMAA was charged with clearing and releasing land intended for civilian use.[22] It assumed responsibility for the following:

- establishment of a national policy for mine clearance; liaison with operators to conduct demining
- oversight of clearance and contacting relevant military commanders to open military zones
- coordination with the IDF and government authorities
- managing the deployment of private contractors for clearance; earmarking of government budgets for such activities
- public relations so as to increase awareness of existing minefields; and
- preparation of annual and long-term demining plans.[23]

The national authority seeks to build its capacity and expertise through collaboration with research institutions and universities, particularly in the field of explosive ordnance (EO) and object detection technologies.[24]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

INMAA said that it is dedicating substantial resources and employing all available means to ensure clearance of AP mines. In 2024, the Government of Israel allocated a budget of NIS37 million (approx. US$11 million) to the INMAA, which includes funding for survey and clearance of mined areas.[25]

This is a significant increase on INMAA's general budget in 2023 provided by the government, which was NIS27 million (approx. US$7.5 million). In addition, HALO continued to receive international donor funding for AP mine clearance in the West Bank in 2024.[26]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

INMAA operates in accordance with the instructions of the Civil Service Commissioner on the issue of gender and diversity.[27] While none of INMAA's five operational positions were occupied by a woman in 2024, three of nine supervisor/managerial positions were held by women (see Table 3).[28] INMAA states that it actively promotes gender inclusion and diversity by integrating women into both clearance operations and site management roles and that there is a standing policy supporting the full integration of women in mine clearance and management roles across all planning frameworks.[29] INMAA does not have a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan tailored to mine action, but points to the Israel Open Government National Action Plan and the Advancing Equal Pay For Women and Men in the Workplace Employer's Manual as providing relevant policy and guidance. Mine action data, however, are not disaggregated by gender or age.[30]

Under its contracts with operating companies, INMAA reports that, in theory, there is equal access to employment for women and men through tenders that are published by the State Commission. However, because of the way Israeli military service functions, more qualified men than women are able to compete in the process. In 2024, INMAA was to publish new qualification requirements for clearance operators, which would allow employees to be trained and approved by the operators or at professional schools in compliance with the INMAA national standards;[31] no subsequent updates were available.

19 Interview with Marcel Aviv, Director, INMAA, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.
20 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
21 Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018.
22 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Form B.
23 IDF website, "Israel National Mine Action Authority", accessed 17 August 2022 at: https://bit.ly/3AmMLAT; and Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
24 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
25 Ibid.
26 Email from Ronen Shimoni, Programme Manager, HALO, 3 June 2025.
27 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
28 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.

**Table 3: Gender composition of INMAA (at end 2024)[32]**

| Total staff | Women staff | Managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16 | 5 (31%) | 9 | 3 (33%) | 5 | 0 (0%) |

INMAA has highlighted that its national standards include a chapter on "national distinction", which indicates how minefields are prioritised for release. The first criterion is the safety of the community (i.e. humanitarian) while the second relates to the needs of the community (i.e. development).[33] INMAA has confirmed that it has considered the needs of minority groups in its planning of demining – for example, some mined areas were prioritised for release in the Golan Heights where Druze live.[34] Israel has said that risk education material is produced in both Hebrew and Arabic and that warning signs around minefields are also in English.[35]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Israel has an environmental management policy, which is published and enforced by the Ministry of the Environment. INMAA standards include Chapter 06.50: "Environmental Protection and Protecting Nature Values and Landscape". This is not currently aligned with International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 (Second Edition, 2024) on environmental management in mine action. INMAA, however, is in the process of reviewing and updating all relevant National Mine Action Standards (NMAS – see the subsection below, "Standards and Land Release Efficiency").[36]

Environmental assessments are conducted to support the planning and conduct of demining.[37] INMAA has highlighted that it works closely with the Israel Nature and Parks Authority to ensure minimal environmental impact and that the companies involved in clearance are required to follow detailed instructions and comply with all relevant regulations.[38]

**Table 4: Environmental policies and action[39]**

| Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance | Environmental focal point |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | Yes | Not disclosed |

INMAA also reports that climate-related factors are considered in planning, noting that during the winter, special attention is given to minefields close to farms, residential areas, and hikers routes, where flooding might carry mines into such areas.[40] INMAA has highlighted how it has collaborated with a company specialising in civil infrastructure and environmental engineering to develop a hydrology model to predict mine drift.[41]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Since the establishment of INMAA, Israel has made continuous efforts to collect and manage data through a dedicated geographic information system (GIS) and mine action information management system. INMAA reports that these systems support effective monitoring, learning, and the extraction of lessons learned across all activities.[42]

INMAA's organisational database is partially accessible to the public. (i.e. mined areas and suspected mined areas).[43] Its "minefield information bank" is open for public queries concerning demining plans and programmes, and indicates measures taken to enhance public awareness of safety and security to minimise mine-related risks.[44] INMAA seeks to improve the accuracy of data in the mine action database by holding periodic meetings with IDF officials.[45]

32 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
33 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
34 Ibid.
35 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
36 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
37 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
38 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
39 Ibid.
40 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
41 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
42 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
43 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Forms A and B.
44 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
45 Ibid.

According to Israel, in 2024, the IDF's Engineering Corps continued to promote improved minefield global positioning system (GPS) recording and GIS capacity to build an "accurate archive of manually-emplaced minefields".[46] The IDF is said to provide information to local authorities and the general population on land rights and use, responding to requests for updated information on minefields "as appropriate".[47] The IDF maintains a set of detailed regulations and instructions for recording minefields and mined areas.[48] The IDF has also continued its programme to preserve the history of the minefields, including in digital records, while the Israeli Mapping Centre (IMC) produces commercially available maps, with minefields said to be clearly marked. The locations of minefields are also said to be available on the official map site of the Government of Israel.[49]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

INMAA is "tasked with forming a national demining plan, which will be consistent with Israel's international obligations and based on IDF's demining procedures and instructions, as compatible as possible with International Mine Action Standards".[50] INMAA defines clearance policies, sets the national priorities, creates a work plan for mine clearance, and implements these in coordination with the relevant governmental ministries, the IDF, and local authorities.[51]

INMAA approves annual and multi-year mine clearance plans which are executed by "civilian local operators".[52] INMAA's website indicated part of it plan since 2020 was to conduct mechanical and manual clearance of nearly 0.17km$^2$ across three minefields in the Golan Heights, and of 0.19km$^2$ in Naama Bell in the Jordan valley.[53] INMAA confirmed in 2024 that clearance at Naama Bell had been completed,[54] and has since confirmed that clearance at Mitzpe Gadot, in the Golan Heights was completed in 2023.[55]

INMAA has a national demining plan for 2023–25 for the release of AP and AV mined areas, and has been developing a plan for 2026–30. Key elements of the current plan include the clearance of mined areas to support civilian safety and use, facilitate safe access for trekkers and travellers, enable economic expansion and demographic growth, and allow the development of critical infrastructure such as electricity, water, and energy systems — with particular focus on border regions.[56] No changes were made to Israel's national mine action strategy or demining plan during 2024 or to date in 2025, and the multi-year work plan for the survey and clearance of AP mined areas in 2026–30 has yet to be completed.[57]

As noted above, clearance tasks are assigned according to a classification formula laid down by INMAA, largely based on the risk level and development potential of the affected areas.[58] Israeli's "National Specification" includes a chapter on the "National plan for clearing minefields and UXO fields" detailing the way INMAA determines its plans, and the principles for developing annual and multi-year plans.[59] INMAA assesses AP mined areas and prioritises clearance based on risks as set out in an evaluation table. The primary risk considered is that to the civilian population, while others include environmental risks, landmine type, the quality of the demarcation of the minefield, risk of mine drift, and land designation.[60]

The IDF Engineering Corps follows its own annual programme of reducing the number of mined areas, while monitoring and maintaining protection of minefields and suspected areas.[61] As mentioned, the IDF gives special attention in winter to flooding might cause mines to move. In 2024, Israel reported that the IDF conducted thousands of inspections of the fencing and marking of minefields, and that it had installed additional signs in the north of the country.[62]

In circumstances where an unknown mined area is discovered, the IDF declares the area a minefield and as a "closed military area", and fences it off. INMAA assesses the risks the mined area poses and decides whether to prioritise release of the newly discovered mined area. Furthermore, INMAA has allocated a dedicated budget to fund occasional tasks that arise.[63]

46 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
47 Ibid., Forms A and B.
48 Ibid., Form A.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., Form D.
51 Ibid., Form B.
52 Ibid.
53 INMAA website, accessed on 6 July 2021.
54 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 23 July 2024.
55 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Emails from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 23 July 2017; and Shahar Back, INMAA, 23 July 2024.
59 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
60 Ibid; and National Plan for the removal of mines and minefields (Hebrew), Instruction 01.20, updated 05/23, at: https://bit.ly/3SdfGRr.
61 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form B.
62 Ibid., Forms A, B, and C.
63 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

INMAA's NMAS, which concern rules and regulations on the law, insurance, clearance methods and quality management, appear in the Israeli National Mine Action Standards, which are updated "on occasion" on INMAA's website.[64] As indicated, INMAA states that these are based on IMAS.[65] INMAA is in the process of reviewing and updating its NMAS based on the latest IMAS, and INMAA's operational experience and knowledge, and aimed to complete the process by the end of 2025. Key updates made so far are in line with: IMAS 08.10: Non-Technical Survey; IMAS 06.10: Management of Training in Mine Action; IMAS 09.30.01/2022: EOD1 competences; and IMAS 05.10: Information Management for Mine Action. INMAA IMAS 06.10 was developed in coordination with clearance operators.[66]

INMAA has also updated standard operating procedures (SOPs) including: 01.50: Qualification of personnel for Mine Action; SOP 02.50: GIS information management for Mine Action; and SOP Task guidelines for INMAA's Project Manager.[67] INMAA approves the SOPs of its contracted operators every three years, or whenever an operator seeks to use a new clearance device or method. All updates are conducted in accordance with IMAS.[68]

The IDF is said to conduct mine clearance according to its own mine action plans "that are executed by their military methods and techniques".[69] In 2023, the CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report made specific mention of IDF regulations and orders concerning marking, fencing, and monitoring, as well as demining and disposing of mines, booby-traps, and other devices, but there was no specific mention of these in the Article 13 report covering 2024.[70] IDF's instructions and SOPs, however, are still reported to be regularly reviewed.[71]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Commercial companies are contracted to conduct clearance as well as quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC). In recent years, INMAA has listed seven approved mine clearance companies and three QA/QC companies in its CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report.[72] In 2024, however, INMAA informed Mine Action Review that only two of five active companies (IMAG and 4M) had won demining contracts in the past two years. It did not reveal which other companies were active.[73]

No operational staff were dedicated to survey in 2024, unlike in 2023, when a total of 110 personnel from IMAG and 4M were reported as undertaking survey.[74] INMAA did, though, report an increase in the number of deminers in 2024, to five teams with a total of 60 deminers, from three teams with a total of 40 deminers 2023.[75] The number of mechanical assets also increased by one, to a total of five machines.[76]

**Table 5: Mine clearance capacities deployed in 2024**[77]

| Operator* | Manual clearance teams | Total deminers | No. of mechanical assets/machines |
|---|---|---|---|
| IMAG | 2 | 30 | 2 |
| 4M | 3 | 30 | 3 |
| **Totals** | **5** | **60** | **5** |

*In addition, HALO deployed one team of between 10 and 12 deminers in the West Bank in 2023 and 2024.[78]

64 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form B.
65 Ibid., Form D.
66 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
67 Ibid.
68 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
69 Email from Eran Yuvan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2014; and Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2023), Form B.
70 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
71 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
72 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 reports (covering 2024, 2023, and 2022), Form G.
73 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
74 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2023 and 3 June 2025; and online interview, 5 August 2024.

HALO works under the auspices of both INMAA and the Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the West Bank (see the *Clearing the Mines* report on Palestine for further information). Every mine clearance project in Israel has an INMAA supervisor, a QA/QC contractor, and a clearance operator.

Israel uses several types of machines in its mine clearance operations for ground preparation, survey, and clearance. They are said to include, as and where appropriate, screening and crushing systems, bucket loaders, excavators, sifters, and flails/tillers. Israel has reported that all mine clearance machines are tested and approved by INMAA during the initial preparation period of an operation, and that it has a system of quality management and results based management for its mechanical operations.[79] A pilot project in 2017 using mine detection dogs (MDDs)[80] concluded that dogs would not be a valuable tool.[81] After further research into animal detection and behaviour, INMAA planned to conduct further trials,[82] but it subsequently reported that the pilot was stopped.[83]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

INMAA reported that in 2024, almost 2.28km$^2$ of AP mined area was released through clearance in Israel (but the number of AP mines discovered and destroyed during clearance was not specified), and that a further 2.19km$^2$ was released through cancellation—the result of five years of survey.[84]

**Table 6: Summary of land release output in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km$^2$) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 2.28 | |
| **Technical survey** | 0 | |
| **Non-technical survey** | 2.19 | Conducted by the IDF Combat Engineering Corps and the result of five years of survey. |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | Not reported | |

In addition, HALO cleared 29,710m$^2$ of CHA and destroyed 1,455 AP mines in the Jordan Valley in 2024, working with the support of INMAA and PMAC (see the *Clearing the Mines* report on Palestine for further details).[85]

## SURVEY IN 2024

INMAA contractors did not release any land through survey in 2024. However, the INMAA reported that IDF – Combat Engineering Corps, released 2,190,000m$^2$ of AP mined area in the Central region through NTS in 2024, which was the result of five years' work.[86] This is a significant increase on 2023, when INMAA oversaw cancellation of 650,000m$^2$ of SHA in Naama Bell in the Central district. As in 2023, in 2024 no land was reported to have been reduced through technical survey (TS).[87]

The INMAA said that no additional areas of previously unrecorded AP mine contamination were added to Israel's information management database in 2024.[88]

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

INMAA reported that a total of 2,276,666m$^2$ of land was cleared of AP mines in Israel in 2024, with by far the largest area cleared in the Central Region (see Table 7). It did not, however, specify how many AP mines were destroyed or whether this includes any clearance data relating to the IDF.[89] This is a huge increase on the area cleared in 2023, when the INMAA reported that 274,000m$^2$ of AP mined area was cleared and "approximately" 17,480 AP mines were destroyed.[90]

79 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
80 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2023), Form C.
81 Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018.
82 Interview with Marcel Aviv, INMAA, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.
83 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 4 May 2024.
84 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
85 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
86 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
87 Ibid., and email from Shahar Back and email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
88 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
89 Ibid.
90 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.

**Table 7: Mine clearance in 2024**[91]

| Region | Operator | SHAs/CHAs | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northern | INMAA | 9 | 40,848 | Not reported |
| Central | INMAA | 1 | 2,191,000 | Not reported |
| Southern | INMAA | 4 | 44,818 | Not reported |
| **Totals** | | **14** | **2,276,666** | **Not reported** |

Media reports indicate that clearance in 2024 included operations on the Syrian border where in October 2024 the IDF is said to have cleared AP mines and erected new barriers at the border between the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and a demilitarised strip bordering Syria.[92] In addition, INMAA's website lists a number of AP minefields undergoing clearance, but it is not clear whether operations have been concluded. The AP minefields listed on the INMAA website undergoing recent clearance are the Amakim A + Supplements site (407,000m²) in the Northern district, where clearance company "Eitan Lidor" began mechanical clearance on 6 January 2024, and the Camp Peak and Susita site (32,000m²) in the Northern district, where IMAG began manual and mechanical clearance on 1 April 2022. The other sites listed give clearance operations start dates in 2020 or earlier.[93]

As mentioned, in 2024, HALO cleared 29,710m² of CHA and destroyed 1,455 AP mines in the Jordan Valley, at the Sokot AP minefield.[94] This is a significant increase on clearance in 2023, when HALO cleared 5,975m² of confirmed mixed AP and AV mined area in the West Bank, destroying 32 AP mines and 26 AV mines during clearance. HALO also cleared an additional estimated 15,945m² of AV mined area in the Jordan Valley in 2023.[95] (Please see the *Clearing the Mines report* on Palestine for more information).

## PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

It is likely to take many decades just to clear AP mined areas in Israel in areas deemed not essential to Israel's security. The Director of INMAA acknowledged the extent of the challenge in January 2023, informing the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee that, "There are 150,000 dunams [150km²] of minefields in Israel, and the army has already given up on [*sic*] 100,000 [100km²]. With our existing resources, it will take us at least 100 years to clear all these areas. With such budgets, companies from abroad won't come, and additional Israeli companies will not be opened".[96]

A December 2023 media report described Israel's main demining efforts as undertaken at a "sluggish pace", with a meagre annual budget and clearance companies' costs indicated as contributary factors. The same article goes on to claim that annually Israel clears between 0.3km² to 0.6km² of hazardous area, far less than the 100km² target set by INMAA, and indicates a 64% decline in the clearance rate between 2019 and 2022 due to increased costs.[97]

In 2024, just two of the five active clearance companies were contracted by INMAA to undertake clearance. INMAA has said this does not affect progress as the two companies have the capacity to work on multiple sites.[98] In a positive development, 2024 saw more than an eightfold increase in AP mined area cleared, with a further 2.19km² cancelled through NTS – a more than threefold increase on the previous year. Despite the huge increase in the AP contaminated area released, and increased government funding to INMAA in 2024, completing clearance remains a long-term project.

91 INMAA questionnaire 2025.

92 See, e.g., "Israel's demining near Golan signals wider front against Hezbollah, sources say", *Reuters*, 15 October 2024, at: http://bit.ly/4mmHwY5.

93 INMAA website, accessed 30 July 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4lPahwB.

94 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

95 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June and 5 August 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.

96 "Approved in final readings: Temporary provision regulating clearance of unexploded ordnance at the expense of developer interested in developing land—to become permanent provision", *Knesset News*, 14 February 2023.

97 "Landmines proposed as solution for Israel's border protection", *Globes*, 12 December 2023.

98 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 23 July 2024.

# KYRGYZSTAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Unknown | Unknown |
| Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |
| Non-Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Unknown | Unknown |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Unknown

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Kyrgyzstan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Kyrgyzstan should clear anti-personnel (AP) mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Kyrgyzstan should detail whether it has fully addressed mine contamination in areas under its jurisdiction or control and, if not, report on the extent and location of remaining mined areas and clearance operations.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY*

#### MANAGEMENT

- Kyrgyzstan has no functioning mine action programme

#### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- The Ministry of Defence (MoD) undertakes clearance of explosive ordnance

#### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

#### OTHER ACTORS

- None

*This is based on information from earlier years. It is not known if the information remains accurate.

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Kyrgyzstan is suspected to be contaminated by mines, though the precise location and extent of any mined areas is not known. Added to this, the borders between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, drawn in Soviet times, have been problematic since their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.[1] In turn this has, at times, impeded progress to survey and clear mined areas.

According to the Minister of Defence, contamination in the southern Batken province bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the result of mine use by Uzbekistan's military between 1999 and 2000, was cleared by Uzbek forces in 2005.[2] It was reported, however, that rainfall and landslides had caused some mines to shift.[3] In 2005, media reports cited Kyrgyz officials in Batken province as saying Kyrgyz border guards had checked previously mined areas of the border around the settlements of Ak-Turpak, Chonkara, and Otukchu, which had been cleared by Uzbek deminers, and confirmed that they were free of contamination.[4] In 2003, Kyrgyz authorities claimed that Uzbek forces had also laid mines around the Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and Shakhimardan located within Kyrgyzstan. Press reports have suggested that Uzbek troops partially cleared territory around the Sokh enclave in 2004–05 and that they completely cleared mines around the Shakhimardan enclave in 2004.[5]

Kyrgyzstan has admitted using AP mines in 1999 and 2000 to prevent infiltration across its borders, but has claimed that all the mines were subsequently removed and destroyed.[6] In June 2011, a government official confirmed: "We do not have any minefields on the territory of Kyrgyzstan."[7] An online news source reported that demining of areas along the Kyrgyzstan side of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, in the Batken region and the Chon-Alai district of the Osh region, began on 20 September 2022. This was according to the Border Service of the State Committee for National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic (also known as GKNB). Work was to be carried out to clear these areas of unexploded ordnance (UXO), mines, ammunition, and other explosive devices and was to be undertaken in co-ordinated between the authorities of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.[8] Mine Action Review has not been able to source any further information on demining in these areas since the reports in September 2022.

In recent years, Kyrgyzstan has been demarcating its borders with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. On 13 March 2025, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed an agreement on demarcating their shared border, a process that had been underway since 2022.[9] Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have also signed a series of agreements to demarcate their border over the last decade, first in 2017, with an agreement to demarcate some 85% of the countries' nearly 1,300km-long border,[10] then in 2021, when a land swap agreement led to disputes,[11] and subsequently in 2022, with an agreement covering disputed sections of the border, particularly around the Andijan[12] reservoir.[13] In April 2024, it was reported that the border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had been fully resolved through another land swap agreement. This saw Barak, a 208-hectare portion of Kyrgyz territory entirely surrounded by Uzbekistan, absorbed by Uzbekistan, with Kyrgyzstan receiving an equivalent parcel of Uzbekistan's Andijan province in exchange. In November 2024, a new village was opened in Kyrgyzstan's southern Osh region, for Kyrgyz citizens resettled from Barak.[14]

On 31 March 2025, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan gathered to discuss cooperation, an unprecedented event following decades of strained relations.[15] A trilateral agreement, dubbed the Khujand Declaration, was signed, demarcating the tri-state border and establishing a formal declaration of friendship.[16] It is not yet clear if this move towards cooperation will increase the opportunity to demine any of the mine-affected border areas remaining.

1 "Central Asian Presidents Meet, Seeking to Defuse Decades of Tensions in the Ferghana Valley", Foreign Policy Research Institute, 16 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4m0CK2R.

2 Fax from Abibilla Kudaiberdiev, Minister of Defence, 4 April 2011.

3 See, e.g., Y. Yegorov, "Uzbekistan agrees to remove minefields along its border with Kyrgyzstan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 1, No. 41 (29 June 2004).

4 "Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan: Landmine threat along Uzbek border removed", *IRIN*, 31 October 2005, available at: https://bit.ly/3sezaey.

5 S. Zhimagulov and O. Borisova, "Kyrgyzstan Tries to Defend Itself from Uzbek Mines", *Navigator* (Kazakhstan), 14 March 2003; and "Borders are becoming clear", Blog post, at: http://bit.ly/2z0s7qU.

6 Statement of Kyrgyzstan, Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention), Geneva, 8 May 2006; and Letter 011-14/809 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2010.

7 Letter from Amb. G. Isakova, Permanent Mission of Kyrgyzstan to the United Nations (UN) in Geneva, 29 June 2011.

8 "Demining work began on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border", *Azerbaycan 24*, 20 September 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3DrPbA3; and "Invasion of Kyrgyzstan: Mines, unexploded shells to be neutralized in Chon-Alai", *24.KG*, 20 September 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3WG3R7S.

9 "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan discussed border demarcation – a protocol signed", *Central Asian Light*, 6 May 2024; and "Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sign deal to end long-running border dispute", *Reuters*, 13 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4lWftij.

10 "Tug-Of-War: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Look To Finally Settle Decades-Old Border Dispute", *Radio Free Europe*, 14 December 2017, at: http://bit.ly/2yXsrXt.

11 "Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan sign deal to end border disputes", *Euroasianet*, 26 March 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3vD5QKA; "'No Issues Remain?' Not So Fast. Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border Disputes Don't Appear To Be Decided", *Radio Free Europe*, 2 April 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3zrFrEK; and "Kyrgyzstan reports deaths after Uzbek border troops open fire", *Aljazeera*, 6 May 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3zuh4pT.

12 Andijan is also referred to as Andijon in the Uzbek language. "Andijan", *Central Asia Guide*, accessed 6 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4dy2VJn.

13 The Andijan or Andijon reservoir is also known the Kempir-Abad reservoir. "Resolution of Uzbek border disputes heralds increasingly united Central Asia", *Central Asia News*, 12 January 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3rOIp4z.

14 "Farewell Barak: Uzbekistan Absorbs Kyrgyz Exclave As Part Of Historic Border Deal", *Radio Free Europe*, *Rado Liberty*, 23 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3LTIVFm; and "Kyrgyzstan Opens New Village for People Resettled from Barak Exclave", *The Times of Central Asia*, 14 November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/45zhs6n.

15 "Central Asian Presidents Meet, Seeking to Defuse Decades of Tensions in the Ferghana Valley", Foreign Policy Research Institute, 16 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4m0CK2R.

16 "Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan sign deal on junction point of state borders", AA, 31 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4leX5jA; and "Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan's Leaders Signed a Historical Agreement in Khujand", *SpecialEurasia*, 31 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4fw0v07.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Kyrgyzstan has no functioning mine action programme. In 2021, it was reported that clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW) is carried out by the Ministry of Defence (MoD).[17] The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), of which Kyrgyzstan is a member, reported in June 2022 that a joint unit for humanitarian demining would be created in the CIS.[18] No timeline for this was given. Mine Action Review has not been able to source any further updates on this.

In 2017, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan conducted joint exercises to train army engineer demining teams at the Otar Military Base in Kazakhstan.[19]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It is not known whether the Government of Kyrgyzstan contributes national resources to support demining in the country.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The extent to which gender and diversity are mainstreamed into mine action in Kyrgyzstan is not known.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Kyrgyzstan in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Mine Action Review has been unable to source any information on any efforts in Kyrgyzstan to implement or maintain a national mine action database.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known whether Kyrgyzstan has a national mine action strategy in place. Nor is it known if Kyrgyzstan has annual work plans for the survey and clearance of AP mines or criteria for the prioritisation of clearance tasks.

17 "Border guards of Kyrgyzstan begin clearance on the border with Tajikistan", *EurAsia Daily*, 4 May 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3dbirOT.

18 "Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that a joint unit of humanitarian demining will be created in the CIS", Commonwealth of Independent States, 27 June 2022, at; https://bit.ly/3b1ulgn.

19 "Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan conducting joint exercises of engineering-rescue teams at Otar military base", *KazTAG - Kazakh Telegraph Agency*, 22 August 2017, at: https://bit.ly/4fubhEg; and "In photos: Kazakhstani, Kyrgyz military sappers hone skills together", *Caravanserai*, 6 September 2017, at: https://bit.ly/4lZUTxF.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

It is not known whether Kyrgyzstan has national mine action standards in place.

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

International NGO Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) stated in its 2024 annual report that it plans to adopt a regional approach in Central Asia, expanding its existing demining operations in Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan (and Uzbekistan), although no time frame for this to occur was given.[20]

Mine Action Review has been unable to source any recent information on Kyrgyzstan's national operational capacity for AP mine survey and clearance. In 2024, however, personnel from Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian countries attended a training in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) at the Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre managed by the Ministry of Defence of Tajikistan.[21]

In 2022, the United States (US) reported that its Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and its precursor, the Quick Reaction Demining Force, had deployed to Kyrgyzstan since 2001 to support efforts to tackle risk from unsecured, deteriorating weapons and ammunition stockpiles.[22] It was not stated if the US QRF had been involved in any disposal or clearance of AP mines.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ITF Enhancing Human Security, and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) have a presence in Kyrgyzstan to support the long-term management of ammunition, working with the MoD.[23] In July 2023, the ITF handed over renovated facilities for safe and secure munitions management in Balykchy in the north-east of the country to the Kyrgyz authorities.[24]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

It is not known if any survey or clearance of AP mines took place in 2024. As noted above, demining along the Kyrgyzstan side of the border with Tajikistan, in the Batken region and the Chon-Alai district of the Osh region, began on 20 September 2022. Mine Action Review has not been able to source any further information since this was reported.

20 "FSD Activity report 2024", accessed 31 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mffNbR, p. 21.

21 "The first-ever Tajik-led explosive ordnance disposal course kicks off at OSCE-supported Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre", Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 16 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/454bPgo.

22 The QRF is a team of civilian explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technical experts that serve as the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the US Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' (PM/WRA's) first responders to conventional weapons disposal-related emergencies around the world, including ERW that pose significant threats to civilians. "To Walk the Earth in Safety, Documenting the United States' Commitment to Conventional Weapons Destruction, Fiscal Year 2022, October 1, 2021-September 30, 2022", pp. 25, 46, and 50.

23 GICHD, "Kyrgyzstan", accessed 8 August 2024 at https://bit.ly/45D8Pou; and ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF), Annual Report 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3K3frUG, pp. 78–80.

24 "Enhancing Human Security and Infrastructure in the Kyrgyz Republic", ITF, 1 August 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4fm2pjY.

# LAO PDR



## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 86,863 (NGO data) | 26,773 (NGO data) |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 162 (NGO data) | 68 (National Authority data not disaggregated by mine type but believed to be almost all AP mines) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, two teams from The HALO Trust continued mine clearance in Savannakhet province. However, the government's priority continues to be on addressing cluster munition remnants (CMR) and the only other mines found and destroyed by humanitarian operators in 2024 were during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks or occasionally during CMR survey or clearance. In 2024, the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) was supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to develop its capacity for quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of mine clearance, and by June 2025 the NRA reported it could accredit and oversee such operations.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Lao PDR should clear anti-personnel (AP) mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Lao PDR should commission or undertake and publish a detailed assessment of mined areas.**
- **The NRA should ensure that its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database can easily disaggregate AP mines from anti-vehicle (AV) mines and that a mechanism exists whereby humanitarian clearance operators can report mined area in IMSMA.**
- **In light of clearance operators continuing to discover AP mines during CMR survey and clearance, the NRA should consider convening a sector-wide meeting to discuss national standards, accreditation, and procedures for addressing mine contamination.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- National Regulatory Authority (NRA) Board
- National Regulatory Authority (NRA) Office

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- UXO Lao
- Humanitarian teams of the Lao People's Army (Unit 58)
- Commercial operators

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Commercial operators

### OTHER ACTORS

- ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- Tetra Tech

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

While by far the greatest contamination in Lao PDR is from explosive remnants of war (ERW), in particular CMR,[1] Lao PDR is also contaminated by both AP and AV mines. The extent of the contamination is not, however, known. During the Indochina conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s, all sides in the war laid AP mines, particularly around military installations and patrol bases. Mined areas also exist in some border regions as a legacy of disputes or tensions with or within neighbouring countries.[2]

A 1997 survey by Humanity & Inclusion (HI) found mines in all 15 provinces it surveyed, contaminating a total of 214 villages.[3] AP mines it discovered included United States (US)-manufactured M7, M16, and M14 mines; Vietnamese MBV-78A1 mines; and Soviet POMZ mines.[4] In 2023, HI also found M2A1 bounding fragmentation mines.[5] In total during its operations in Houaphanh province, and prior to relocating to Phongsaly province, HI identified 54 mined areas in 22 villages in Houamuang district.[6]

Across Lao PDR as a whole, the NRA has reported that "gravel mines" (US air-dropped AP mines) had all degraded, but remaining mine types included M14 blast mines, M16 bounding fragmentation mines, M18 claymore mines, and M15 and M19 blast AV mines, as well as Soviet or Chinese PMN blast AP mines, POMZ fragmentation mines, and TM41, TM46, and TM57 AV mines.[7] HI has found increasing evidence that few of the M16 mines are still functioning. Most were exposed to fire, or the expelling charge is missing, or the tripwire was no longer present.[8] HALO's assessment of more than 100 M16 mines located since 2019 in Savannakhet province supports this finding. However, two landmine accidents in 2024 indicate that M14 and PMN mines are likely to still be functional.[9] In 2023, HALO found and destroyed a DH-10 fragmentation mine during battle area clearance (BAC) in Phin village, Phin district, Savannakhet province.[10]

The remote location of many mined areas means that mine impact is negligible. The NRA, however, had formerly observed that "with a steady expansion of land use 'mined areas' will become areas for growing concern."[11] Demographic pressures regarding land could lead to people accessing remote places that could be mined. HI believes that action on locating and recording mined areas needs to occur before the older generations that know about the presence of landmines disappear.[12] In 2024, there were two incidents involving landmines in Savannakhet province. One involved children playing with a PMN mine they had found in an uncleared part of an ongoing HALO clearance task. Another involved a woman stepping on an M14 AP mine while cutting vegetation behind her house. HALO opened a new task at the site of the second accident and has since cleared a further 24 mines from the area.[13]

1 See Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Lao PDR for further information.
2 NRA website, "UXO types: Mines", accessed 9 March 2020 (page no longer online).
3 HI, "Living with UXO, National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact of UXO in Lao PDR", Report, Vientiane/Brussels, 1997, p. 7.
4 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, Humanitarian Mine Action Coordinator, HI, 27 August 2019, and 25 March and 29 June 2020.
5 Email from Yvon Le Chevanton, Technical Survey/Clearance Operations Manager, HI, 10 August 2023.
6 Email from Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 8 May 2024.
7 NRA website, "UXO types: Mines", 9 March 2020 (page no longer online).
8 Email from Alexandra Letcher, HI, 6 April 2023.
9 Email from William Hunter, Programme Manager, HALO, 23 September 2025.
10 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 30 May 2024.
11 NRA website, "UXO types: Mines", 9 March 2020 (page no longer online).
12 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 25 March 2020.
13 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 5 September 2025.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active since 2006, has an inter-ministerial board composed of representatives from government ministries. Since September 2023, the NRA has been chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), having previously been chaired by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (MoLSW).[14] The move to bring the NRA under MoFA was part of measures taken by the Lao government in 2023 to strengthen coordination systems among various agencies including government and operators.[15] In June 2024, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, who chairs the NRA, led a special session of the UXO Sector Working Group, demonstrating the high-level commitment of the Lao government to clearance.[16]

A 2018 decree, "On the Organisation and Operations of the National Regulatory Authority for UXO in Lao PDR" defines the position, role, duties, rights, organisational structure, and working principles and methods of the NRA.[17] A further national decree on UXO management was endorsed by the government in 2022.[18] The NRA acts as the coordinator for national and international clearance operators and serves as the national focal point for the sector. This includes overall management and consideration of policy, planning, projects, accreditation, quality management (QM), and coordination of the implementation of the national strategy nationwide, as well as NRA planning and coordination functions at provincial and district levels.[19]

UNDP provides programmatic and technical support to the NRA focusing on areas such as QM, policy, and support with national standards and treaty compliance. UNDP also supports UXO Lao as well as the Lao People's Army demining teams (Unit 58) with funding and capacity building support.[20] Further capacity development in information management (IM), QM, operations support and EOD training is provided, primarily to UXO Lao, and to a lesser extent the NRA, through a US-funded contractor, Tetra Tech.[21] Japan, through the Japan International Cooperation System (JICS), is also supporting survey and clearance as well the administration of training in EOD to UXO Lao.[22]

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and the NRA, funded by the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), are jointly implementing the IM Capacity Development Project in 14 provinces (see section below, "Information Management").[23] Mines Advisory Group (MAG), in collaboration with the NRA and the provincial Department of Foreign Affairs (DoFA), and with UK government support, implemented a capacity-building project to strengthen national mine action management. Activities focused on IM, planning, and prioritisation. Quarterly coordination meetings facilitated continued exchange between MAG, UXO Lao, DoFA, and DoLSW, covering operational capacity, donor funding, and use of Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) technology.[24]

### COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

Moving the NRA's line ministry from the MoLSW to MoFA has already borne fruit. In 2024, HI, NPA, HALO, and MAG all reported strong cooperation and coordination with the NRA at both national and sub-national levels. In 2022, Lao PDR established a Country Coalition under the existing "UXO Sector Working Group" (SWG), chaired by the Minister or Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and co-chaired by UNDP and rotating donor countries. Meeting twice a year, the SWG aims to improve the efficiency, transparency, and funding of mine action in Lao PDR.[25] The SWG consists of five Technical Working Groups (TWGs) covering survey and clearance, victim assistance, risk education, information management, and policy coordination and funding strategy.[26] None specifically addresses mine clearance.

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Lao PDR government makes in-kind contributions to mine action including the salaries of the NRA staff (at provincial and district level) and the clearance teams of Army Unit 58, administrative support, and infrastructure in collaboration with funding from KOICA and coordination by UNDP.[27] Salaries of NRA personnel in Vientiane are paid by international donors, with funding channelled through UNDP.[28] In addition, the government provides in-kind contributions such as for UXO Lao facilities,

14 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form J.

15 Ibid.

16 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 24 July 2024.

17 Government Decree No. 67, dated 12 February 2018; 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 17; and Statement of Lao PDR on National Implementation Efforts, CCM Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018.

18 Government Decree No. 210, dated 29 July 2022. Presentation by Chomyaeng Phengthongsawat, NRA, minutes of the UXO Sector Working Group meeting, 16 September 2022.

19 2019 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, pp. 14, 15, and 18.

20 Emails from Rupert Leighton, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP, 14 August 2023; and Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

21 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025; and "US Renews Partnership with Lao PDR to Build Capacity in UXO Sector", US Embassy in Lao PDR, 31 January 2020, at: http://bit.ly/2LzmG8J.

22 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

23 Email from Per Håkon Breivik, Country Director, NPA, 23 May 2025.

24 Email from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025.

25 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form J; and email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

26 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form D.

27 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 13; CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form I; and email from Chanmy Keodara, NRA, 13 July 2024.

28 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 24 July 2024.

and through tax exemptions for equipment for humanitarian operators.[29] Clearance operators are, however, required to pay visa fees for expatriates and the previous tax exemption for international experts was removed from all MoUs after 2018.[30] In addition, changes to the law mean that international NGO staff have paid income tax since 2021.[31]

HALO is the only operator that has dedicated mine clearance teams. In 2024 and 2025, HALO's donors were the US PM/WRA, the UK government, and Ireland.[32]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

For details regarding gender and diversity in Lao PDR's survey and clearance programme, please see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Lao PDR.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Lao PDR has an NMAS on environmental management (Chapter 21), but this needs to be revised, to review both its compatibility with the second edition of International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 on Environmental Management in Mine Action and with national environmental norms. As at June 2025, the NMAS was being revised as part of a review of all NMAS that was due to be complete by the end of the year.[33] The Safe Path Forward III strategy says that climate change is a challenge to addressing UXO and reiterates that mine action activities have to comply with national standards and environmental protection laws.[34]

For more details on measures being taken by HALO, HI, MAG, NPA, and UXO Lao, to take the environment into consideration during the planning and tasking process for survey and clearance of explosive ordnance in Lao PDR, see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Lao PDR.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

There are currently no mechanisms in place in Lao PDR's national information management and reporting systems to enable humanitarian clearance operators to report mined area.[35] And as yet, no distinction is made in the NRA's reporting between AP mines and AV mines. The NRA records all mines as landmines. In the national IMSMA database, an item is first registered as a landmine (rather than as an AP mine or AV mine), and then the model type/number is recorded, from which it is then possible to extrapolate whether the mine is AV or AP.[36]

Lao PDR stated at the Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC in November 2019, that it was preparing a voluntary Article 7 report.[37] At the 2023 APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Lao PDR reported that the Department of International Organizations would coordinate submission of an Article 7 report by 2024.[38] At the 2025 Intersessional Meetings, Lao PDR said it would submit a voluntary Article 7 report before the Meeting of States Parties in December 2025.[39] As at September 2025, a voluntary report had yet to be submitted. The only voluntary Article 7 report submitted previously by Lao PDR was in 2011.

For details regarding Information Management and Reporting in Lao PDR's survey and clearance programme more broadly, please see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Lao PDR.

29 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 13; CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form I; and email from Chanmy Keodara, NRA, 13 July 2024.

30 Emails from Katherine Harrison, NPA, 9 September 2020; Cameron Imber, Programme Manager, HALO, 11 June 2021; Julien Kempeneers, HI, 16 June 2021; and Rebecca Letven, MAG, 19 June 2021.

31 Emails from Cameron Imber, HALO, 11 June 2021; and Katherine Harrison, NPA, 19 June 2021.

32 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.

33 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

34 Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", pp. 12 and 17.

35 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 13 August 2024.

36 Email from Rupert Leighton, UNDP, 14 August 2023.

37 Statement of Lao PDR, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019.

38 Statement of Lao PDR, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

39 Statement of Lao PDR, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

The National Strategy for the UXO Sector (2021–30), "Safe Path Forward III", was developed under the leadership of the NRA and adopted in January 2023.[40] The target, by 2030, is to have identified 2,500km$^2$ of CHA and cleared 1,000km$^2$ of land for agricultural and development purposes.[41] The Safe Path Forward III strategy and the Ninth National Socio-Economic Development Plan 2021–2025, set intentionally aspirational targets for survey and clearance (which have not been met), and which were revised in 2025.[42] At the time of writing, the NRA was conducting a mid-term evaluation of the Safe Path Forward III strategy to assess its effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact, relevance, and coherence within the current context and national planning for the next five years.[43] While Safe Path Forward III refers to landmines, it does not set out any specific strategy or targets for the survey or clearance of mined areas.

For details regarding Planning and Tasking in Lao PDR's survey and clearance programme more broadly, please see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Lao PDR.

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Lao PDR's National Standards separate UXO clearance from mine clearance, with manually emplaced mines excluded except for the "disposal of 'one-off' mines located during EOD roving tasks."[44] According to Lao PDR's National Standard on Mine Clearance Operations (Chapter 12), systematic mine clearance is not commonly conducted. "However, it is known that mined areas exist in Lao PDR and at some stage in the future these areas will have to be cleared."[45] If mines are found during UXO work, operations must stop, the case assessed by the clearance supervisor, and reported to the NRA.[46] According to the National Standards, mine clearance is considered more dangerous than UXO clearance and must only be undertaken by accredited organisations with specialised training, equipment, and procedures.[47]

The NRA contracted a specialist to undertake a review of the national standards in 2024, with support from UNDP and input from operators and stakeholders. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted a one-week training course on national standards.[48] At the time of writing, the approval of the English version of the standards was expected in August 2025. The standards were then to be translated into Lao for final approval and shared with operators later in the year.[49]

With respect to landmines, the national standards are in need of being brought up to date in accordance with the latest IMAS. In June 2025, the NRA reported ongoing technical discussions on revising the national standard on landmines and on training for mine survey and clearance.[50]

HALO and HI have both proposed amendments to the national standards on mine survey and clearance to NRA.[51] While the current standards do allow for mine clearance and set parameters for safe distances and other relevant issues, there is a need to strengthen national institutional knowledge on mine clearance, including in relation to QA and training.[52] Furthermore, and as previously mentioned, no mechanisms are currently in place in Lao PDR's national information management and reporting systems to enable humanitarian clearance operators to report mined area.[53] Nor is there a mechanism in place for cancellation of mined area through non-technical survey (NTS) or the reduction of mined area through technical survey (TS). However, a process to review and remedy this was said to be in progress as at the time of writing.[54]

With Canadian funding, UNDP began a project in January 2024 to train the NRA's QM department in QA/QC of mine clearance.[55] In June 2025, the NRA reported having the capacity to accredit and conduct QA/QC of mine clearance operations. The government, with donor support, aims to strengthen national operators, including Unit 58 and UXO Lao, to build mine clearance capacity.[56]

40 Statement of Lao PDR on National Implementation Measures, Second CCM Review Conference (Part 1, virtual meeting), 25–27 November 2020; email from Chomyaeng Phengthongsawat, NRA, 21 June 2021; and Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", p. 2; Statement of Lao PDR on victim assistance, CCM Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 August–2 September 2022; and Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", p. 2.

41 Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", p. 14.

42 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 4 August 2025.

43 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 29 July 2025.

44 Lao PDR National UXO/Mine Action Standards (NS), "Chapter 0: Introduction and Glossary", accessed on NRA website on 29 July 2021, p. xi.

45 Lao PDR NS, "Chapter 12: Mine Clearance Operations", accessed on NRA website on 29 July 2021, p. 5.

46 Lao PDR NS, "Chapter 7: UXO Clearance Operations", p. 13.

47 Lao PDR NS, "Chapter 12: Mine Clearance Operations", accessed on NRA website on 29 July 2021, p. 5.

48 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 29 July 2025.

49 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

50 Ibid.

51 Emails from Cameron Imber, HALO Laos, 31 March 2022; and Julien Kempeneers, HI, 30 March 2022.

52 Email from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 26 March 2021.

53 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 13 August 2024.

54 Email from Rupert Leighton, UNDP, 26 August 2024.

55 Ibid.

56 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

NGO clearance operators in Lao are not formally accredited for mine clearance, and permission for EOD is given on a case-by-case basis when mines are found.[57] HALO drafted a mine clearance standard operating procedure (SOP) and submitted it for approval to the NRA in 2021.[58] As at May 2024, HALO had yet to receive any feedback on the SOP, although it had tacit approval from the NRA to start mine clearance with two teams in 2024.[59]

HI stressed the need to strengthen reporting on landmines, noting that areas should be classified as suspected mined areas until survey confirms otherwise.[60] It observed that determining whether mines form part of a larger minefield is difficult, particularly without trained or equipped personnel, and that mines may have been moved, washed away, or left behind, leading to misreporting.[61] HI recommended gathering additional evidence, such as the location of wartime military sites and whether mines discovered by communities had been moved.[62]

During NTS and risk education, HI interviews older residents about wartime activity; and collects information on mine incidents, inaccessible areas, and accidents involving people or animals. It found cases where villagers had collected or moved mines.[63] HI suggested that specific markings should be displayed where the mine was found/an accident happened.[64]

In response to mines found during Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS), HI developed a "clearance while surveying" (CWS) approach to safely release cluster munition-contaminated areas where random mines are reported but there is no evidence of systematic mine-laying or the presence of minefields. CWS involves full clearance from the evidence point.[65] While CMRS remains valuable for planning, HI argues CWS is faster and requires less paperwork, particularly where full clearance of the CHA is required.[66] In remote, high-risk areas such as Houaphanh, where mines and anti-handling fuzes (M83 submunitions) have been found, and focuses on the highest priority areas over village-wide CMRS, citing safety and efficiency as the reasons.[67] In early 2024, HI developed a mine clearance SOP, and received positive feedback from UNDP's QA/QC specialist.[68] However, the Lao government has continued to prioritise and focus efforts on implementing its clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), aligned with its national socio-economic development plans.[69]

With respect to spot tasks, HI only destroys mines that are clearly identifiable and safely accessible. If mines are found during CMR survey and clearance operations, work stops and HI's operations manager conducts a risk assessment. Non-emplaced mines in agricultural land are destroyed, while emplaced mines in undeveloped areas lead to suspension, data collection, and reporting to the NRA.[70] Mines in Houaphanh province were laid more than 60 years ago, the extent to which they could still detonate is unknown. An ageing analysis of ordnance could help clarify the threat.[71]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Land release operations in Lao PDR are conducted by a range of implementing partners, which includes humanitarian operators such as national operator UXO Lao; international NGOs, HALO, HI, MAG, and NPA; commercial clearance operators; and humanitarian teams of the Lao People's Army (Unit 58).

Survey and clearance by the humanitarian operators focus almost exclusively on addressing contamination from CMR and other ERW. HALO does, however, have two teams with 34 operational staff (including team leaders) conducting clearance in mined areas and in addition, HALO's EOD team and one of its survey teams retain the capacity to conduct landmine-specific NTS.[72]

For further details on CMR survey and clearance capacity of humanitarian operators, see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Lao PDR.

57 Emails from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 30 March 2022; and William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.
58 Emails from Cameron Imber, HALO, 14 March 2021; and William Hunter, HALO, 30 May 2024.
59 Emails from William Hunter, HALO, 30 May 2024 and 22 June 2025.
60 Email from Alexandra Letcher, HI, 6 April 2023.
61 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 27 August 2019 and 30 March 2022.
62 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, on behalf of Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 25 March 2020; and Minla Nanthavong, HI, 2 August 2021.
63 Email from Julien Kempeneers, on behalf of Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 25 March 2020.
64 Email from Alexandra Letcher, HI, 6 April 2023.
65 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 25 March 2020; and Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 13 July 2024.
66 Email from Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 8 May 2024.
67 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 30 March 2022; and Alexandra Letcher, HI, 6 April 2023.
68 Email from Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 8 May 2024.
69 Statement of Lao PDR, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.
70 Email from Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 8 May 2024.
71 Email from Rupert Leighton, UNDP, 26 August 2024.
72 Emails from William Hunter, HALO, 30 May 2024 and 5 September 2025.

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 1: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 86,863 | Operator data |
| **Technical survey** | 0 | Operator data |
| **Non-technical survey** | 0 | Operator data |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 162 | Operator data |

## SURVEY IN 2024

No area was cancelled through survey in 2023 or 2024. In 2024, HALO conducted survey of a minefield in Dongsavan village, following a reported landmine accident. This resulted in confirmation of one CHA totalling approximately 10,000m$^2$, which may be expanded. Desk assessment of wartime records and aerial photography suggest the original minefield may have been roughly 80,000m$^2$, although much of it has since been developed for housing and agriculture. HALO also identified a further suspected mined area in Tampong Village, Xonnbuly district, Savannakhet province, with confirmation ongoing in 2025.[73] In 2023, HALO conducted survey of a former US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)/Royalist airstrip in Houei Mun village, Thapangthong district of Savannakhet, in October and November 2023. The survey resulted in confirmation of one CHA totalling 43,000m$^2$ and containing M18A1 directional fragmentation mines and tripwire flares. The survey was conducted by a HALO NTS team trained to address the threat from mines.[74]

None among HI, MAG, NPA, and UXO Lao surveyed any mined area in 2024 or 2023.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, HALO conducted clearance of 86,863m$^2$, of which 82,521m$^2$ was in the Phalanxai district of Savannakhet, the remaining clearance was conducted in Dongsavan village, Sepon district. A total of 130 AP mines were destroyed (including M16 bounding fragmentation mines and PMN and M14 blast mines). In addition, HALO found and destroyed six AP mines during EOD call-outs and survey.[75] In 2023, HALO cleared 26,773m$^2$ in manual clearance of three mined areas in Phalanxai district of Savannakhet, destroying 34 AP mines.[76]

HALO reported that the significant increase in clearance rates in 2024 was due to confirmation that large parts of the Kalong Nua minefield in Phalanxai district contained only M16 mines, with no plastic or minimum-metal AP blast mines. This allowed teams to use less sensitive detector settings, reducing interference from metal clutter. By contrast, clearance in Dongsavan, Sepon district, progressed very slowly, as the area lay on a main artery of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and was heavily bombed, requiring sensitive settings to detect M14 mines amid millions of fragments of bomb debris.[77]

With the exception of HALO, none of the other humanitarian demining organisations (HI, MAG, NPA, and UXO Lao) conducted any clearance of mined area in 2024 or 2023. However, NPA, UXO Lao and MAG discovered a small number of AP mines during CMR survey, clearance, or EOD spot tasks in 2024 (see Table 2). According to operator data, a total of 162 AP mines and 2 AV mines were discovered and destroyed in 2024. This excludes mines found and discovered by the Lao People's Army (Unit 58).

According to the NRA, however, 57 mines were found and destroyed in 2024, of which 10 were found during CMR clearance and 47 during spot tasks.[78] In Lao PDR's CCM Article 7 report, 58 mines were cleared in 2024, with no disaggregation made between AP and AV mines.[79] Lao PDR reported the same number in its CCW Protocol V Article 10 transparency report.[80] The discrepancy between HALO's and the NRA's figures stems from reporting procedures as items found during clearance are only reported to the NRA once a task is completed. Mines from HALO's ongoing tasks are therefore not yet included. HALO has raised this issue with the NRA, and as of 2025 steps are being taken to update the figures.[81]

73 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 23 September 2025.
74 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 13 August 2024.
75 Emails from William Hunter, HALO, 22 June and 5 and 23 September 2025.
76 Emails from William Hunter, HALO, 30 May and 13 August 2024.
77 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 23 September 2025.
78 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.
79 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
80 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
81 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 23 September 2025.

**Table 2: Mines discovered in 2024 (based on humanitarian operator data)**[82]

| Operator | AP mines | AV mines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| HALO | 136 | 1 | **Clearance:** 69 M16 bounding fragmentation mines, 43 PMN blast mines and 18 M14 blast mines.<br>**Survey:** 2 M16 mines.<br>**EOD spot tasks:** 2 M16 mines, 2 M18 Claymore mines, 1 M15 AV mine. |
| MAG | 4 | 0 | **EOD spot tasks:** 4 AP mines |
| NPA | 5 | 1 | **Risk education:** 1 M16 mine<br>**EOD spot tasks:** 1 69 Chinese mine, 2 M16 mines<br>**CMR clearance:** 1 Minh/Vietnamese mine |
| UXO Lao | *17 | *0 | **Survey:** 5 mines<br>**CMR clearance:** 2 mines<br>**EOD spot tasks:** 10 mines |
| **Totals** | **162** | **2** | |

*UXO Lao does not disaggregate AP from AV mines.

## PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Lao PDR is not yet a State Party to the APMBC. Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear landmines as soon as possible.

Lao PDR has not set a deadline for completion of AP mine clearance. The full extent of contamination remains unknown, though AP and AV mines are present alongside widespread ERW, in particular CMR. Mine clearance is not a national priority, and progress is limited: HALO is the only operator with dedicated mine clearance teams, while other organisations encounter mines only during CMR survey, clearance, or EOD tasks.

Institutional capacity is gradually improving. With Canadian funding, UNDP supported the NRA to develop a QA/QC capacity for mine clearance, and by the middle of 2025, the NRA reported being able to accredit and oversee such operations. However, systematic survey of mined areas has yet to be undertaken, and no timeframe for addressing mine contamination has been established.

82 Emails from Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, Chief of Programme Office and Public Information (PO-PI) Unit, UXO Lao, 27 May 2025; Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025; Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025; and William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.

# LEBANON

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 15.79KM²

Medium
(National authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0.20 | 0.29 |
| Technical Survey | 0.23 | 0.18 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0.08 | 0.32 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 435 (incl. 370 in spot tasks) | 10,669 (incl. 46 in spot tasks) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Engineering Regiment
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Clearance and non-technical survey (NTS) outputs decreased in 2024 in Lebanon, and the number of anti-personnel (AP) mines destroyed dropped sharply, with most destroyed in spot tasks rather than during clearance. This was due to suspension of all mine clearance operations along the Blue Line, and a redeployment of some teams to Mount Lebanon where technical survey (TS) predominated. With priorities shifting towards NTS and clearance of areas newly contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW) to support the return of displaced people, and a reduction in funding for mine action, release of AP mined area is unlikely to increase in 2025.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Lebanon should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Lebanon should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Wherever possible, evidence-based NTS and TS should be used to define mined areas more accurately prior to initiating clearance. This is particularly important in non-pattern mined area, such as those in Mount Lebanon.**

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA)
- Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC)
- Regional Mine Action Centres (RMAC-N and RMAC-RB)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Engineering Regiment

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) (now under UNIFIL and called UNMAS UNIFIL or UNIFIL Mine Action Unit)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, Lebanon had nearly 15.8km$^2$ of mined area, including along the Blue Line, across 715 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 120 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) (see Table 1).[1] This is a reduction from the nearly 16.2km$^2$ of mined area at the end of 2023.[2]

**Table 1: Mined area by province (at end 2024)**[3]

| Province | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total number | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Al Beqaa | 13 | 4,404,810 | 8 | 56,905 | 21 | 4,461,715 |
| Al Janoub and Al Nabatiyeh (south Lebanon) | 678 | 6,092,044 | 1 | 451,269 | 679 | 6,543,313 |
| Jabal Loubnan (Mount Lebanon) | 24 | 2,161,824 | 111 | 2,618,384 | 135 | 4,780,208 |
| **Totals** | **715** | **12,658,678** | **120** | **3,126,558** | **835** | **15,785,236** |

Lebanon's mine problem is largely a legacy of 15 years of earlier civil conflict and the Israeli invasions of south Lebanon in 1978 and in 1982 and the subsequent occupation that ended in May 2000. Most of the mined areas are in the south of the country, in conventional minefields laid according to a pattern and with the location of the mines identified on minefield maps. The minefields in Mount Lebanon in the middle of the country are typically "militia" laid with scattered mines and for which minefield records and maps do not exist. Multiple actors emplaced these mines during the civil war.[4]

There had also been a small amount of new mine contamination in "Jroud Arsal" on the north-east border with Syria, resulting from spill-over of the Syrian conflict onto Lebanese territory in 2014–17.[5] The Lebanese territory in question was fully regained by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in August 2017 and assigned to the Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) for survey and clearance. Following completion of land release, LMAC reported the area as free from explosive ordnance as at June 2023.[6]

The LAF continue to play a major role in the north of the country as the number of rapid-response missions remains high. In recent years, LMAC has had to address the problem of mines migrating from the north Syrian border through floods and riverbeds to areas in Wadi Khaled and Wadi Nahle in the north.[7] Mine migration can happen anywhere along the border river and LMAC only knows about the migrated mines through reporting of detonations. LMAC surveyed the location of incidents and submitted a report to LAF headquarters recommending that, where possible, berms are built in these locations to prevent future migration. The LAF Engineering Regiment searches and clears large fade-out areas and erects fences and marking signs where possible, with risk education delivered to local populations.[8]

1 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, Information Officer and Risk Education and Media Section Head, LMAC, 8 May 2025.
2 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 16 May 2024.
3 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.
4 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.
5 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019; David Willey, Country Director, MAG, 7 March 2019; and Emile Ollivier, Grants Coordinator, NPA, 19 March 2019.
6 Email from Lt.-Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 7 September 2023.
7 LMAC, "Annual Report 2019", pp. 7 and 25.
8 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 March 2021.

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Lebanon is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). For details on CMR contamination, see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Lebanon.

Lebanon is contaminated with new CMR as a result of Israeli airstrikes on weapons and munitions storage depots belonging to non-State armed groups during the conflict that began on 8 October 2023. These storage depots contained unused cluster munitions, along with other explosive ordnance, and led to submunitions being ejected into the surrounding area. To date, there is no evidence of use of cluster munitions by Israel, Hezbollah, or other armed groups during this conflict.[9] In October 2023, Amnesty International reported that the Israeli army had used white phosphorus artillery shells during an attack on the southern border town of Dhayra, a populated civilian area.[10]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Lebanon's mine action programme is under the control of the military. The Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA), which has overall responsibility for Lebanon's mine action programme, is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence and is chaired by the Minister of Defence. In 2007, a national mine action policy outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the programme, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate the programme on behalf of the LMAA.[11]

LMAC, part of the LAF, is based in Beirut. Since 2009, the Regional Mine Action Centre-Nabatiyeh (RMAC-N), which is a part of LMAC, has overseen operations in south Lebanon, under LMAC supervision.[12] At the end of 2018, the RMAC-Ras Baalbek (RMAC-RB) regional centre was established in north-east Lebanon to oversee mine action operations, but it closed in 2023 after the area was declared free of mines.[13]

LMAC has a capacity that, in general, functions well, but as the staff are army officers, typically many senior managers, including in RMAC, are rotated every two years or so, which hampers continuity in the management of the three mine action centres.[14] The current director of LMAC started in April 2025.[15] A new standard operating procedure (SOP) for LMAC was approved in 2020 which specifies the roles and responsibilities of each section and their duty to cooperate with one another. This should help preserve institutional memory, assist new LMAC staff, and reduce the impact of staff rotations.[16]

There is good coordination and collaboration between LMAC/RMAC and clearance operators, with consultation before key decisions are taken.[17] International operators reported that an enabling environment exists for mine action in Lebanon, with LMAC facilitating the processing of visas for international staff and assisting with the importation of equipment, including exemption of customs fees for equipment.[18] DanChurchAid (DCA) reported that during and after the conflict, visa procedures were more closely scrutinised, with on-arrival visas no longer granted and working visas typically taking several weeks to be approved. In addition, residency cards were cancelled and multiple-entry visas issued in their place for international personnel.[19]

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) personnel provide institutional support to LMAC, particularly in strategic planning, project management, resource mobilisation with a focus on sustainability, coordination, and reporting. In 2024, three UNDP personnel were supporting LMAC with administration and information management.[20] The International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security provided institutional support to LMAC in 2024, helping to strengthen the LMAC's administrative, logistic, and technical capacity. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) supports Lebanon through technical training, compliance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), operational planning, gender and diversity, and enhancement of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).[21]

9 "Mapping Israel-Lebanon cross-border attacks", *Al Jazeera*, 15 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3VlYtWy.

10 Amnesty International, "Lebanon: Evidence of Israel's unlawful use of white phosphorus in southern Lebanon as cross-border hostilities escalate", Report, 31 October 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3VBUxT4.

11 LMAC, "Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013", August 2014, pp. 4–5.

12 LMAC, "Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020", September 2011, p. 4.

13 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 21 August 2019; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.

14 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, signed June 2020, p. 4.

15 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.

16 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 28.

17 Emails from Sylvain Lefort, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 24 March 2021; Hala Amhaz, NPA, 15 March 2021; Mahmoud Rahhal, POD, 8 March 2019; and David Ligneau, Mine Action Programme Manager, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 21 April 2020.

18 Emails from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025; and Southern Craib, Programme Manager, NPA, 8 April 2025.

19 Email from Mohamed Chour, Head of Mine Action Lebanon, DCA, 24 April 2025.

20 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

21 Ibid.

In 2024, particularly during preparations for the post-ceasefire emergency response, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) provided extensive support to LMAC. This included developing SOPs and training on the handling of white phosphorus, and producing technical notes and training materials on rubble removal and debris management. MAG also co-led the Debris Task Force, contributed to the updated rubble removal prioritisation matrix, and developed resources for handling air-dropped bombs. MAG supported the Regional School of Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon (RSHDL) in delivering two courses in battle area clearance (BAC).[22]

DCA's NTS teams are supporting LMAC by delivering NTS training and assisting with IMSMA Core implementation.[23] NPA identified several issues with LMAC's transition to IMSMA Core in 2023 and has continued working closely with LMAC's Information Management department to resolve them.[24]

A "Humanitarian Mine Action Forum" was established in Lebanon in close partnership between LMAC and Norway. The forum aims to meet twice a year, with UNDP designated as the secretariat for the Forum.[25] In 2021, the Netherlands took over from Norway as Forum co-chair.[26] In 2024, the Forum met once.[27] A technical working group (TWG) where LMAC and the RMACs meet with clearance operators was established in 2018, meeting every two to three weeks in 2024 in response to the security situation.[28] Since the start of the conflict in 2023, representatives from the LAF Engineering Regiment, UNDP, and the Social Stability Working Group have also attended the meetings.[29] In 2024, discussions focused on adjusting LMAC's operational plan due to the conflict, including increased emphasis on risk education, NTS, rubble clearance, use of mechanical assets, and new SOPs.[30] Operators said the TWG offered a useful platform for discussion of operational challenges.[31]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Lebanese government contributed approximately US$7.5 million in 2024 towards the mine action programme (for both mine- and CMR-related work). This was used to the running of LMAC (facilities and staff); two LAF Engineering Regiment BAC teams, and three Engineering Regiment teams to cover rapid response across Lebanon; risk education; victim assistance; training; and advocacy.[32] This is the same amount as 2023.[33] Before the economic crisis, the Lebanese government had planned to allocate around $30 million for clearance. However, due to ongoing political and financial instability, no government funding for this purpose was allocated in either 2023 or 2024.[34]

In 2024, AP mine survey and clearance in Lebanon were funded by the United States Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), the French Crisis and Support Centre (CDCS, until August), the Japanese Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects (GGP, from September), the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DMFA). In 2025, funding came from PM/WRA, the GGP (until July), the GFFO (until March), and the NMFA.[35]

In 2024, DCA's AP mine survey and clearance in Lebanon were funded by the PM/WRA. For 2025, funding from PM/WRA continued; was briefly suspended; and then support resumed in February, alongside new funding from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA).[36] HI received funding for its AP mine survey and clearance in 2024 from the Embassy of Japan through the GGP and the CDCS. GGP support continued until August 2025, with CDCS funding continuing.[37] MAG was supported in 2024 for its AP mine survey and clearance by PM/WRA, the GFFO, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CDCS, and Fibertek, a US-based technology company. In 2025, MAG was funded by PM/WRA, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF, a new donor for clearance), Fibertek, Canada, and the Netherlands.[38]

22 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
23 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
24 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
25 LMAC, "Annual Report 2018", p. 23.
26 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.
27 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
28 Ibid.
29 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.
30 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
31 Ibid.; and emails from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025; and Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
32 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
33 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
34 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I.
35 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.
36 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 6 May 2025.
37 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.
38 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 30 April and 25 September 2025.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The gender and diversity-related policy applied at LMAC is that of the LAF military rules. LMAC reports that all staff are familiar with the rules, including provisions on gender equality, inclusion, and safeguarding.[39] Committed to mainstreaming gender and diversity across mine action in Lebanon, LMAC has implemented inclusive policies, with data disaggregation in risk education and victim assistance, appointed a gender focal point, implemented a gender work plan, and organised and participated in courses at the RSHDL.[40]

In 2024, MAG in partnership with LMAC launched the Gender and Inclusive Forum, an initiative that brings together international and local NGOs, UNDP, and LMAC to advance gender equity across the sector. MAG and LMAC also co-hosted the Gender in Mine Action Forum at the RSHDL, which led to the reestablishment of the Gender, Diversity and Inclusion (GDI) Steering Committee and encouraged partner organisations to designate gender focal points.[41]

Lebanon's National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 includes considerations on gender and diversity.[42] Of the five objectives in the strategy, the fifth states that: "The specific needs and perspective of women, girls, men and boys from all groups of society are considered, in order to deliver an inclusive HMA [mine action] response". LMAC also acknowledges in the strategy that mine action "is a male-dominated environment and we have therefore a particular responsibility to empower women and ensure that we have a gender sensitive approach to our work".[43]

The GICHD's 2021 assessment of gender and diversity in Lebanon's mine action programme found that LMAC had implemented many of its recommendations.[44] In 2023, LMAC and the GICHD co-hosted a three-day course to strengthen gender and diversity integration among mine action stakeholders.[45] LMAC also reviewed its national mine action standards (NMAS) in 2023 to align with IMAS and integrate gender and diversity considerations.[46]

**Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2024**[47]

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCA* | 68 | 13 (19%) | 18 | 5 (28%) | 50 | 8 (16%) |
| LMAC | 149 | 15 (10%) | 20 | 2 (10%) | 46 | 2 (4%) |
| MAG** | 202 | 31 (15%) | 49 | 6 (12%) | 170 | 25 (15%) |
| NPA | 77 | 15 (19%) | 12 | 3 (25%) | 56 | 11 (20%) |
| HI | 32 | 7 (22%) | 9 | 2 (22%) | 23 | 5 (22%) |
| **Totals** | **528** | **81 (15%)** | **108** | **18 (17%)** | **345** | **51 (15%)** |

*DCA – Mine action staff only (excluding programme staff). **MAG – 198 national staff and 4 international staff.

The number of staff at LMAC is determined by the LAF headquarters, so LMAC has limited control over the number of women, but it consistently requests that the percentage of women be increased.[48] The proportion of women at LMAC is more than double the 5% average of the Lebanese armed forces but LMAC is seeking to improve this ratio further.[49] The number of women in operational positions has decreased from seven in 2023 to two in 2024.

MAG, NPA, DCA, and HI all report having policies on gender.[50]

MAG Lebanon advanced gender equality and inclusion in 2024 through international and national initiatives. It contributed to the "Getting Ready for Siem Reap" meeting, highlighted progress on gender policies, and integrated gender-responsive practices in recruitment and training. Women participated in technical roles, including explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and team leader training, and MAG advocated successfully for the inclusion of women in Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) courses for LAF staff. A new training facility with separate accommodation for women is also under construction. Internally, MAG re-established its Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion (EDI) Committee and delivered training on gender mainstreaming and action planning.[51]

39 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020.

40 LMAC, "Annual Report 2018", p. 5; and email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019.

41 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.

42 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March and 22 July 2020.

43 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, p. 8.

44 Email from the GICHD, 6 April 2023.

45 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.

46 Ibid.

47 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025; Zeina Al Salhani, Ops Manager, HI, 10 October 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025; and Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.

48 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–25)", p. 19.

49 LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 37.

50 Emails from Emile Ollivier, NPA, 19 March 2019; David Willey, MAG, 7 March 2019; Zeina Al Salhani, HI, 10 October 2025; and Mohamed Chour, DCA, 30 April 2024.

51 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.

In 2024, DCA launched a new Gender Action Guide; established a Gender Hub on the Fabo platform, a digital platform where member NGOs share knowledge and resources; and updated its online gender training.[52] HI added women to its mine clearance teams and providing specialised training on gender and diversity to all its staff.[53]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

LMAC does not currently have an environmental management policy, although it would like to develop one in the future and it recognises its responsibility to ensure that demining is conducted responsibly and efficiently while minimising the impact on the environment. Lebanon's NMAS on Safety and Occupational Health – Protection of the Environment (10.70) is said to align with IMAS 07.13, although it has not yet been updated to reflect the revised international standard.

LMAC and its implementing partners are required to coordinate with local authorities and landowners before operations start. All NTS reports and clearance plans include information on the climatic and weather characteristics of the region; their impact on the clearance operation; and the measures to be taken. After clearance has been completed at a worksite, operators must remove and appropriately dispose of all rubbish and large fragments of munitions, filling in any holes in the ground to stabilise the surface so that natural regeneration can take place.[54] Additionally, when planning and prioritising survey and clearance tasks, Lebanon considers climate-related and extreme weather risks.[55]

**Table 3: Environmental policies and action[56]**

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| DCA | Yes | Yes | No |
| HI | No | Yes | No |
| MAG | No | Yes | No (not yet assigned yet) |
| NPA | Yes | No | Yes |

In 2024 and 2025, mine action operators introduced several new measures to reduce environmental harm and greenhouse gas emissions. Solar panels were installed at selected demining offices and camps to reduce reliance on diesel generators, with MAG's Beirut office becoming fully solar powered. Solar power was also used for the first time during HI's Body Worn Camera project to charge equipment in the field.[57] MAG Lebanon began a baseline carbon footprint assessment to inform the development of a work plan and country-level environmental policy.[58] DCA enhanced vehicle maintenance routines and improved travel planning to cut fuel use and emissions, while increased use of digital tools, such as mobile apps and cloud-based systems, has reduced paper consumption.[59]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Since 2021, LMAC has been using IMSMA Core.[60] Key improvements in the new system include more accurate drawing of surveyed polygons using tools based on GPS and imagery base maps; reducing instances of double counting of polygons; and recording the depth at which ordnance was discovered, its condition, and whether it is safe to move.[61]

In 2024, new emergency response forms were introduced to better reflect operational needs and capture the full range of survey activities. These updates aim to maintain accurate and comprehensive data collection.[62]

52 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
53 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.
54 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022 and 5 May 2023.
55 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
56 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025; and Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
57 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.
58 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
59 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
60 LMAC, "Annual Report 2022", p. 31.
61 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 May 2023.
62 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

Some database information, particularly regarding scattered/militia minefields from the civil war, may be inaccurate due to outdated NTS. According to HI, it is, however, challenging to confirm what contamination was cleared by the LAF in the north and whether clearance documents were transferred to LMAC.[63] LMAC emphasises the importance of NTS for these scattered minefields.[64]

In the Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 and the accompanying implementation plan, LMAC pledges to voluntarily submit Article 7 reports under the APMBC.[65] As at September 2025, however, none had yet been submitted.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

LMAC has a National Mine Action Strategy for 2020–25 with a strategic implementation plan,[66] developed with support from the UNDP project funded by the European Union (EU).[67]

In 2023, LMAC conducted a mid-term review of the strategy and implementation plan with a final external review conducted at the beginning of 2024.[68] A new strategy covering 2026–30 will be developed. The plan will define clear objectives, required resources, and implementation methods to ensure "an effective and responsive" mine action programme.[69]

LMAC's prioritisation system is based on three strategic categories: safety, economy, and treaty compliance. Each contains subcategories which consider operational considerations and impact.[70] The prioritisation of actions and allocation of resources is automated in IMSMA Core.[71] LMAC reported in May 2025 that the national prioritisation criteria were being reviewed to focus on survey and clearance of residential areas to facilitate the safe return of displaced persons.[72]

Prior to 2016, demining along the border with Israel had been said to depend on "political developments",[73] but the Lebanese government subsequently took the decision to initiate larger-scale, planned clearance on the Blue Line.[74] Clearance by humanitarian demining operators, which began in November 2016,[75] was suspended on 8 October 2023 with UNIFIL announcing that it would resume operations on the Blue Line in September 2025.[76]

Lebanon had a work plan in place for AP mine survey and clearance in 2024. Implementation was, however, severely impacted by the ongoing economic crisis and security situation in the south, which led to a temporary suspension of operations in the last quarter of 2023 and continuing into 2024. For 2025, no comprehensive work plan had been elaborated, as NTS is still pending in several areas and security conditions remain uncertain. Instead, Lebanon is relying on short-term operational planning, guided by team availability, access, and donor support.[77] Operators report that clearance and survey task dossiers are issued in a timely and effective manner.[78]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Lebanon developed its first NMAS in 2010 and since then there have been regular revisions to ensure IMAS compliance, integrate lessons learned and case studies, and strengthen gender and diversity considerations.[79] The NMAS were updated in 2023 to permit mechanical flailing as a primary clearance asset, provided it is followed by a secondary search and clearance process. This approach has been implemented in SHAs in Mount Lebanon. The NMAS update also allows for the deployment of mine detection dogs (MDDs) as an initial clearance asset in TS operations and low-density minefields. In Mount Lebanon, however, the terrain is more suited for using MDDs for quality control (QC) rather than TS.[80]

63 Emails from David Ligneau, HI, 21 April 2020; and Aurélien Thienpont, HI, 9 August 2023.
64 LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–2025)", p. 16.
65 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, June 2020, p. 4; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–2025)", p. 5.
66 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 22 July 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–25)", p. 3.
67 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2019", p. 7.
68 Email from Lt. Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 2 July 2024.
69 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 10 June 2025, p.5.
70 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 35.
71 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 May 2023; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2022", p. 32.
72 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
73 Presentation by Maj. Bou Maroun, RMAC, Nabatiyeh, 4 May 2012; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Leon Louw, Programme Manager, UN Mine Action Support Team (UNMAST), 7 May 2014.
74 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.
75 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.
76 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 16 May 2024; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 30 April and 25 September 2025; and Mohamed Chour, DCA, 6 May 2025.
77 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.
78 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 6 May 2025; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 30 April 2025.
79 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
80 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 7 October 2024.

Drones were first used in 2018 by MAG for NTS on Lebanon's north-east border, contaminated during the Syrian conflict spillover from 2014 to 2017. In 2021, HI brought in an unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) expert to assess feasibility, confirming Lebanon's suitability for deployment. From 2022 to the middle of 2023, HI and LMAC trialled drones in Mount Lebanon, surveying more than 50 polygons to test their value in improving situational awareness, identifying ground signs, and exploring advanced sensors for detecting buried explosives, while also training drone pilots and NTS team leaders.[81] In 2024, HI delivered eight UAVs (aerial drones) with accessories and provided related training.[82]

In 2023–24, HI piloted and implemented Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs) in demining operations across Lebanon. The introduction of BWCs enhanced monitoring and oversight by enabling real-time or retrospective review of field activities and improving quality assurance (QA) and compliance with SOPs. They also supported training and knowledge transfer by providing footage for post-operational debriefings and training materials. Transparency and accountability were strengthened through verifiable records of daily operations. Finally, BWCs contributed to greater operational efficiency and safety by helping identify procedural deviations and allowing for immediate corrective action.[83]

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, manual mine clearance was conducted by international operators DCA, HI, and MAG along with the Engineering Regiment of the LAF. There was a decrease in mine clearance capacity in Lebanon in 2024 compared to the previous year.[84] UNIFIL and international operators who conduct clearance on the Blue Line suspended operations on 8 October 2023. UNIFIL resumed operations in July 2025.[85]

The LAF Engineering Regiment has two BAC teams. A further three Engineering Regiment companies conduct rapid response call-outs. In addition, each deployed combat brigade has its own combat engineering company which can also conduct rapid-response call-outs. The LAF has seven MDD teams for TS as a secondary asset supporting clearance. Through the Engineering Regiment, it provides mechanical assistance to clearance operators that lack this capacity.[86]

In Lebanon, machines are primarily used as secondary assets to support clearance teams (e.g. for ground preparation, rubble removal, or fade-out); in areas where manual clearance is difficult; and for TS and low-threat hazardous areas (LTHAs); and as an initial tool in SHAs in Mount Lebanon followed by manual clearance based on a task-by-task risk assessment.[87] Often, however, the terrain is not suitable for machines. Unfortunately, the economic crisis in Lebanon has resulted in huge budget cuts in all government institutions and therefore the LAF teams are not able to conduct the same level of activities as before, including with respect to some mechanical assets. Clearance operators who are supported by mechanical assets from the LAF are providing fuel, maintenance, and spare parts for the machines.[88] In addition, new mechanical assets have been introduced by MAG.[89]

**Table 4: Operational NTS capacities deployed in 2024**[90]

| Operator | NTS teams | Total NTS personnel | TS teams | Total TS personnel |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LMAC | 3 | 6 | N/K | N/K |
| MAG | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| DCA | 2 | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| HI | 1 | 2 | 2 | 26 |
| **Totals** | **8** | **16** | **6** | **26** |

N/K = Not Known

81 Emails from Aurélien Thienpont, HI, 13 April and 9 August 2023.
82 Email from Aurélien Thienpont, HI, 30 May 2024.
83 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.
84 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.
85 Email from Aaron Buckly, UNMAS headquarters, 13 October 2025.
86 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022 and 5 May 2023.
87 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022; and Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 7 October 2024.
88 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.
89 Ibid.
90 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.

**Table 5: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024**[91]

| Operator | Manual teams | Total clearance personnel | Dogs and handlers | Machines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ER | 2 | 12 | 4 | 4 | |
| MAG | 4 | 40 | 0 | 0 | Deminers also conduct TS. |
| DCA | 1 | 8 | 0 | 1 | |
| HI | 2 | 17 | 0 | 0 | |
| **Totals** | **9** | **77** | **4** | **5** | |

In 2024, the suspension of operations along the Blue Line and limited access to other areas of South Lebanon and western Beqaa lead to a decrease in the number of AP mine survey or clearance personnel deployed by DCA, while NPA and UNIFIL did not deploy any teams for mine clearance.[92] MAG redeployed its clearance teams to safer regions within the Chouf district of Mount Lebanon which increased the number of personnel deployed on AP mine survey and clearance, while HI maintained its previous capacity without change.[93]

In 2025, LMAC expects operational needs to drive an increase in NTS teams, although funding constraints are likely to reduce the number of TS and clearance teams.[94] DCA expects a rise in NTS activities to re-survey disturbed minefields along the Blue Line and re-assess destroyed warehouses in the South.[95] MAG, however, foresees a decrease in mine clearance capacity due to reduced funding and the prioritisation of emergency response in southern Lebanon.[96] NPA did not expect to deploy any mine clearance teams, while HI does not expect major changes but has trained two staff in NTS.[97]

In March 2025, UNIFIL and the LAF renewed their memorandum of understanding (MoU) on demining in south Lebanon, extending cooperation until 31 December 2026. The MoU formalises UNIFIL's support to LMAC in mine clearance and EOD, aimed at protecting civilians and UNIFIL personnel and ensuring operational mobility. Under the agreement, LMAC will identify priority hazardous areas, with joint reconnaissance conducted by UNIFIL, LMAC, and the Mine Action Unit at UNIFIL (previously called the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)), which also oversees quality assurance. In 2025, UNIFIL had six demining teams and six EOD teams and six explosive ordnance risk education teams. Of these, four manual clearance teams totalling 60 personnel are deployed in direct support of the LMAC's operations, with the remaining teams engaged in other operational tasks.[98] This marks the third renewal since the first MoU was signed in 2020.[99]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 6: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 196,172 | National authority data |
| **Technical survey** | 225,372 | National authority data |
| **Non-technical survey** | 80,443 | National authority data |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 435 | Including 370 during spot tasks |

91 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025; and Zeina Al Salhani, HI, 10 October 2025.
92 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 6 May 2025; and Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
93 Emails from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 30 April 2025.
94 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.
95 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 6 May 2025.
96 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 30 April 2025.
97 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
98 Email from Aaron Buckly, UNMAS headquarters, 13 October 2025.
99 UNIFIL, New understanding cements continued UNIFIL support in demining in south Lebanon, 25 March 2025, at: http://bit.ly/45T97Lh.

## SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, LMAC reported that a total of 305,815m² was released through survey, of which 80,443m² of mined area was cancelled through NTS and 225,372m² reduced through TS (see Tables 7 and 8).[100] Data reported by LMAC for 2024 differed from the amount reported by operators directly. This is a decrease from the 507,331m² released through survey in 2023, of which 324,223m² of mined area was cancelled through NTS and 183,108m² reduced through TS.[101]

In 2024, 114,055m² of AP mined area was added to the database, of which 68,021m² was previously unrecorded and the other 46,034m² was perimeter adjustments for existing AP mined areas.[102] In addition, as at the end of 2023, LMAC reported a total of 2,734,741m² of "Dangerous Areas",[103] some of which may contain booby-traps and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These areas relate predominantly to rapid response or EOD spot tasks and are often the result of incidents having been reported to LMAC by the local community. Further investigation and/or survey is required in order to confirm the existence, type, and extent of any contamination.[104]

**Table 7: Release of mined area through NTS in 2024 (national authority data)[105]**

| Province | Operator | Areas cancelled | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mount Lebanon | HI | 4 | 3,933 |
| | DCA | 0 | 600 |
| | MAG | 2 | 5,374 |
| | NPA | 0 | 1,307 |
| South of Lebanon | NPA | 5 | 13,900 |
| | MAG | 0 | 9 |
| Bekaa | DCA | 5 | 55,320 |
| **Totals** | | ***16** | **80,443** |

*A total of 16 SHAs were fully cancelled, while the remaining areas were partially released.

**Table 8: Release of mined area through TS in 2024 (national authority data)[106]**

| Province | Operator | Areas reduced | Area reduced (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mount Lebanon | LAF ER | 1 | 6,360 |
| | DCA | 1 | 11,460 |
| | MAG | 17 | 181,966 |
| | HI | 1 | 25,586 |
| **Total** | | **20** | **225,372** |

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

A total of 196,172m² of mined area was cleared in Lebanon in 2024, with 65 AP mines and 1 AV mine found and destroyed (see Table 9).[107] Data reported by LMAC for 2024 differed from the amount reported by operators directly. This is a decrease from the 293,963m² of mined area cleared in 2023 (270,513m² by NGOs and UNIFIL, and 23,450m² by the LAF), with a huge drop in the 10,623 AP mines destroyed (10,262 by demining NGOs and UNIFIL and 361 by the LAF), along with 783 AV mines.[108] In addition, 370 AP mines and 282 AV mines were destroyed during EOD spot tasks in 2024.[109]

From December 2024 to June 2025, UNIFIL cleared 1,651m² around United Nations positions; provided technical assistance, assessments, and clearance for 192 explosive remnants of war incidents and 326 roadblocks; and carried out battle area clearance along the outer perimeter of 43 positions. Teams also conducted reconnaissance and verification on four access lanes to the Blue Line and continued planning and prioritisation, which enabled clearance of the lanes and refurbishment of Blue Line markers to begin in the first quarter of 2026.[110]

100 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.

101 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 16 May 2024.

102 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.

103 Ibid.

104 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, Director, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, Head of Operations, LMAC, Beirut, 18 April 2016.

105 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025. In 2024, operators reported 22 areas totalling 74,476m² cancelled through NTS. In Mount Lebanon, HI cancelled four areas totalling 3,388m², MAG cancelled eight areas covering 5,374m², and NPA reported 653m² as cancelled though not linked to specific areas. This figure refers to changes in the total area of seven minefield tasks in El-Metn, where none was cancelled but some were reduced and others increased. In the south, NPA cancelled four areas covering a total of 9,732m² and MAG cancelled one area of 9m². In Bekaa, DCA cancelled five areas totalling 55,320m².

106 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025. In 2024, operators reported a total of 29 areas reduced through TS, totalling 245,037m². In Mount Lebanon, DCA reduced three areas totalling 29,916m², MAG reduced 19 areas covering 190,509m², and HI reduced seven areas measuring 24,612m².

107 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.

108 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 16 May 2024.

109 Ibid.

110 Email from Aaron Buckly, UNMAS headquarters, 13 October 2025.

LMAC has its own category for IED tasks and they are not registered as mine clearance, but victim-activated IEDs discovered are included in the total of AP mines destroyed. None of the AP mines destroyed in 2024 was of an improvised nature.[111]

**Table 9: Mine clearance in 2024 (national authority data)[112]**

| Province | Operator | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mount Lebanon | LAF ER | 59,204 | 47 | 0 |
| | MAG | 117,011 | 10 | 1 |
| | DCA | 3,718 | 8 | 0 |
| | HI | 16,239 | 0 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **196,172** | **65** | **1** |

**Table 10: Area cleared in 2024 in which no AP mines were found (operator data)[113]**

| Operator | Area cleared (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| DCA | 143 | DCA suspended one high-altitude task due to winter conditions and, in coordination with LMAC, relocated the team to a lower-altitude site. |
| HI | 15,239 | HI found and destroyed 7 items of UXO. |
| MAG | 75,851 | MAG found and destroyed 6,631 items of UXO. |
| **Total** | **91,233** | |

Almost half of all mined area cleared in 2024 did not contain AP (or AV) mines. According to LMAC, no AP mines were found in 327,880m² of the 421,544m² released through TS and clearance in 2024.[114]

From 2023 to 2024, there was an overall decrease in land release output as teams were redeployed from the South to Mount Lebanon and shifted focus from clearance to TS. There was also a reduction in the amount of NTS.[115] DCA's operations were significantly affected by the security situation which caused prolonged suspensions, in addition to weather-related disruptions.[116] MAG also faced interruptions due to team stand-downs for security reasons and a relocation of activities away from the Blue Line, where clearance had been more productive thanks to favourable terrain and heavy mechanical support. In 2024, operations were limited to Mount Lebanon, where productivity is lower, though additional teams helped narrow the gap compared to 2023.[117] NPA ceased minefield clearance entirely after October 2023, with work along the Blue Line suspended indefinitely; its operational focus has remained on cluster munition clearance.[118]

## PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

At the Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC in 2019, Lebanon made a statement as an observer affirming its aspiration to become a State Party to the APMBC. The Minister of Defence, as head of the LMAA, confirmed he had no objections to accession, and LMAC pledged to act in the spirit of the Convention.[119] Lebanon continues to promote accession and participates in APMBC meetings as an observer.[120]

Clearance of mined areas was originally expected to be completed by the end of 2020, in accordance with the 2011–20 national strategy, but actual mine clearance capacity was far lower and progress against the strategy fell well behind schedule. Lebanon's National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 sets out annual targets through to 2026. In 2020, LMAC expected Lebanon to be free from known mined areas in ten years, with the application of efficient land release methodology and subject to securing the necessary funding.[121] However, this looks to be very ambitious,

111 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.

112 Ibid. In 2024, operators reported a total of 37 areas cleared in Mount Lebanon, totalling 194,797m² with 18 AP mines and 1 AV mine found and destroyed. MAG cleared 25 areas totalling 117,011m² and destroyed 10 AP mines and 1 AV mine. DCA cleared five areas measuring 10,162m² and destroyed 8 AP mines. HI cleared 15,239m² but did not report any mines destroyed.

113 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 6 May 2025; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 30 April 2025.

114 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.

115 Ibid.

116 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 6 May 2025.

117 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 30 April 2025.

118 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.

119 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, signed June 2020, p. 4; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–2025)", p. 5.

120 LMAC, "Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025", pp. 1 and 4.

121 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March and 22 July 2020 and 15 March 2021; LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 31; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–2025)", p. 9.

considering the extent of the remaining mined area (15.8km$^2$) and annual mine clearance rates of considerably less than 0.5km$^2$ per year, with a total of less than 1.5km$^2$ of mined area cleared in the last five years (see Table 11).

Furthermore, Lebanon has ambitious clearance targets set under the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), to which Lebanon is a State Party. It is therefore likely that the focus of clearance efforts will be on CMR, especially given funding constraints.

Lebanon is unable to confirm a completion date for AP mine clearance, following the suspension of operations in the south from October 2023 to November 2024. Lebanon will provide a revised estimate once ongoing NTS has been completed and operational capacity and resources have been reassessed. The recent conflict has impacted AP mine survey and clearance, and with most mine contamination located along the Blue Line it is highly likely that markings have been damaged or removed and that NTS is required before clearance plans can be updated. These activities are also dependent on a stable security environment, which remains uncertain. At the same time, steadily declining funding for mine action is reducing operational capacity, while national priorities have shifted towards enabling the return of displaced people, redirecting resources to areas newly contaminated with ERW rather than previously prioritised known minefields.[122]

**Table 11: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km$^2$) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 0.20 |
| 2023 | 0.29 |
| 2022 | 0.22 |
| 2021 | 0.25 |
| 2020 | 0.35 |
| **Total** | **1.31** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

According to LMAC, the strategic implementation plan, which will support the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, will address an exit strategy and long-term risk management.[123] LMAC presented a draft exit strategy with respect to addressing residual risk after CCM Article 4 fulfilment to all stakeholders including donors at a Mine Action Forum meeting in 2022.[124] But details have yet to be provided on an exit strategy and long-term risk management strategy for residual AP mine clearance.

122 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.

123 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020.

124 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.

# LIBYA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

No credible estimate, but believed to be light

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0 | 0 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 0 | 0 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Libya made no progress in survey or clearance of anti-personnel (AP) mined areas in 2024, as efforts continued to focus on battle area clearance (BAC). The extent of AP mined area remains unknown. Operators faced major operational challenges, including a seven-month suspension imposed by the Libyan National Army (LNA) on three organisations in Benghazi and Sirte, during which their vehicles and equipment were seized. Although the suspension was lifted in May 2024 and the equipment returned, operators also faced funding challenges, with donors redirecting support away from Libya.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Libya should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Libya should conduct a baseline survey to identify the extent of AP mined area and begin systematic clearance based primarily on humanitarian priorities.**
- **Libya should finalise and adopt a national mine action strategy that includes targets for AP mine survey and clearance.**
- **National authorities and relevant security actors should facilitate survey and clearance by accredited operators across all areas of the country. This includes resolving visa delays, import restrictions, and arbitrary suspensions that hinder operations.**

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- The Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Free Fields Foundation (3F)
- The Safe Trust (Al-Thiqa al-Amena), accredited and supported by DCA
- Libya Peace Organisation (accredited, and supported by DRC)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

There is no accurate figure for the extent of mined area in Libya with reported figures for contamination confused and sometimes contradictory. Earlier estimates of significant contamination have not been repeated in recent years. Most of Libya's contamination is concentrated around Tripoli, particularly in its southern parts. Significant contamination also exists in Sirt, Tawergha (north), Derna, and Benghazi (north east).

On 10 September 2023, a devastating storm—Cyclone Daniel—hit the north-east of Libya, destroying two aging dams and giving way to severe flooding that affected Benghazi, Derna, and other populated areas. DanChurchAid (DCA) said the floods have greatly increased the risk of exposure to mines and other explosive ordnance (EO) as floodwaters have shifted ordnance to previously cleared areas. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) told the media that EO and other unused ammunition still stored in the area, particularly in the old town of Derna, have been displaced.[1]

Mined areas, mainly in the east and predominantly anti-vehicle mines, are a result of legacy contamination from the Second World War, subsequent armed conflict with Egypt in 1977 (mapped, fenced, and marked pattern minefields) and the armed conflict with Chad in 1978–87. This also resulted in mines being laid on Libya's borders with these two neighbours. Mine contamination is also the result of the Libya uprising of 2011 and subsequent armed conflicts. The border with Tunisia is also believed to be affected.[2]

As a result of the offensive on Tripoli launched by the Libyan National Army (LNA) in January 2020, and subsequent withdrawal in June 2020, an unknown number of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were left behind, many of which fall within the scope of the APMBC.[3] In addition, Human Rights Watch reported that between April 2019 and June 2020, LNA and affiliated forces, including the Wagner Group, a Russian government-linked private military security contractor, placed "enormous" quantities of munitions, including AP mines, in Tripoli's southern districts. Some devices were hidden inside homes and other structures, in some cases inside furniture, and which were often activated by tripwire.[4]

Multiple types of AP mines were used or left behind as part of abandoned stockpiles across the country at the start of the conflict in 2011.[5] DCA, which has been operating in Libya since 2010, confirmed the presence of AP fragmentation and bounding mines and mines fitted with anti-lift devices in Tripoli, along with legacy IEDs in Benghazi and Sirte. According to DCA, the extent of mined area has remained the same since the fighting around Tripoli in 2020. According to HALO, mines across Tripoli included a mix of previously unseen items, and possible distribution and mine-laying (including anti-vehicle mines) from Gaddafi-era stockpiles. There have been reports of mines causing fatalities in the west of Sirte, but non-technical survey (NTS) of mined area has not been conducted.[6]

In 2024, operators confirmed a total of 12,986,977m$^2$ of previously unrecorded hazardous area contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW). Of this, DCA identified 4,703,029m$^2$ of land contaminated with mixed, large-surface-area hazards.[7] DRC reported 8,211,861m$^2$ of ERW contamination, including a variety of projectiles, guided missiles, rockets, mortars, and fuses, as well as UXO such as howitzer shells, Grad missile shells, and mortars.[8] In addition, HALO identified 72,087m$^2$ containing missiles, aircraft bombs, and other items.[9] This did not include any AP mines.

1 DanChurchAid (DCA), Devastation in Libya after storm Daniel, 14 September 2023, DCA website accessed on 9 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/44yd3hW; and "After Libya flood, unexploded weapons pose new risk", *Al Jazeera*, 21 September 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3QD58dM.

2 Interview with Col. Turjoman, Director, LibMAC, in Geneva, 7 February 2019; and "Libya: The Toxic and Explosive Legacy of Modern Conflict", Presentation by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), UN National Directors Meeting, Geneva, 12 February 2020.

3 ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2020", p. 78; and UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Agreement for a complete and permanent ceasefire in Libya, Geneva, 23 October 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3Bunnej.

4 Human Rights Watch, "Libya: Russia's Wagner Group Set Landmines Near Tripoli", 31 May 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3xRfzQy.

5 Landmine Monitor, "Libya", accessed 27 June 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3y0blpF.

6 Emails from Zita Andrassy, Programme Officer Libya, HALO, 27 February 2022; and Graeme Ogilvie, Country Director, DCA, 1 April 2022.

7 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.

8 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, EORE-NTS Program Manager, DRC, 4 June 2025.

9 Email from Julia Eckelmann, Programme Manager/Country Director, HALO, 23 May 2025.

The focus of demining operations in Libya seems to be increasingly shifting towards BAC to address ERW threats near populated areas and critical infrastructure. There are, however, occasional reports of mine incidents. HALO reported that in January 2024, a man in Tripoli was injured by what was claimed to be an AP mine, although HALO could not confirm this.[10] In May, a local media outlet reported that a mine detonated in a camp near Tripoli airport, injuring three children who had been using it as a football.[11] However, the Arabic term for "landmine" is often used broadly to describe any explosive item, which can make such reports difficult to verify.

LibMAC documented 202 EO incidents in Libya in 2020–24 resulting in 406 victims (148 deaths and 258 injured), with 375 male and 31 female victims.[12]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

After the overthrow of Libyan dictator General Muammar Al Gaddafi in 2011, the country's massive weapon arsenal was left unguarded and munitions were seized by various armed groups.[13] The same year, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces bombarded ammunition storage sites, destroying 13 of the 37 located across the country, and resulting in large-scale contamination of mixed types of explosive ordnance. Many of the kicked-out munitions remain buried.[14] Dozens of abandoned ammunition storage depots in western and southern Libya have never been cleared. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) estimates that 100,000 tonnes of ammunition remain under the rubble in these areas.[15]

Libya is also contaminated by large quantities of AXO, UXO, and cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Libya for further information).

## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no national mine action legislation in Libya. Mine action exists in a fragmented and occasionally violent political context. Following years of armed conflict, a new UN-backed "unity" government, the Government of National Unity (GNU), was formally installed in Tripoli in early 2016. It has faced armed opposition from the LNA and a host of militia forces. The warring parties reached a ceasefire agreement to halt hostilities in October 2020, which culminated in the election of an interim government with a roadmap leading to national elections in December 2021. Since then, Libya's progress towards elections has stalled with national elections still not held and recent outbreaks of violence in Tripoli between the GNU and the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), a security institution affiliated with the Presidential Council.[16]

LibMAC was mandated by the Minister of Defence to coordinate mine action in 2011.[17] Operating under the UN-backed GNA, LibMAC has its headquarters in Tripoli, with sub-offices in Misrata and Benghazi.[18] ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF), which started its capacity-building project in Libya in January 2014, pays the salary of 27 LibMAC employees and covers other overhead costs.[19] Danish Refugee Council (DRC) is providing capacity development support to LibMAC through training in NTS and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), as well as by supporting the standardisation of risk education.[20] The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) provides capacity development support to LibMAC on information management, national mine action standards, strategic planning, gender and diversity, and risk education.[21]

In August 2023, the LNA ordered the suspension of three national and international mine action organisations operating in Benghazi and Sirte—DanChurchAid (DCA), DRC, and Free Fields Foundation (3F)—and seized vehicles and demining equipment, leading DRC and other organisations to halt all operations and close their office.[22] The suspension lasted for seven months, with operators receiving the return of their equipment only in May 2024.[23]

In 2025, ten international NGOs operating in the country were subjected to scrutiny by the Libyan Internal Security Agency (ISA), which led to suspension of DRC's activities nationwide. DRC reported that the investigation initiated by the ISA lacked transparency regarding its scope and justification and significantly affected their mine action operations.[24]

10 Email from Josh Ridley, Country Director, HALO, 16 May 2024.

11 "A landmine explosion in the airport area in the Capital Tripoli", *Al-Hadath Al-Libi [The Libyan Event]*, 24 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/46n1tr4.

12 Presentation of LibMAC, 27th NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2024.

13 "After Libya flood, unexploded weapons pose new risk", *Al Jazeera*, 21 September 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3QD58dM.

14 Presentation of LibMAC, NDM27, Geneva, 9–11 April 2024.

15 UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Mine action critical to Libya's recovery, Analysis, 5 April 2022, at: https://bit.ly/4dun5op.

16 "UN launches new bid to revive Libya's elections", *Africanews*, 16 December 2024, at: http://bit.ly/4k3SYpZ; and "Libyans in Benghazi relay frustrations about the political and security situation to UNSMIL, propose solutions", UNSMIL, 8 June 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3TDtNzG; and "Escalating conflict in Tripoli exposes the realities of false stability – and international neglect in Libya", Blog post, Chatham House, 16 May 2025, at: http://bit.ly/45TQxDd.

17 LibMAC website, accessed 9 May 2024, at: http://bit.ly/2JqVr0S.

18 Presentation of LibMAC, 27th NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2024.

19 ITF, "Annual Report 2024", p. 113.

20 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.

21 Email from Christelle Mestre, Advisor, Strategic Planning, GICHD, 17 July 2025.

22 Emails from Wajdi AlKhatib, DRC, 19 April 2024; and Tess Bresnan, UNMAS, 7 June 2024.

23 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.

24 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which is integrated into the UN Support Mission In Libya (UNSMIL), has maintained a presence in the country since October 2020. As the UNSMIL Mine Action Section, the UNMAS programme in Libya is mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 2755 (2024) to secure and manage stockpiles; conduct survey and clearance of ERW, for EOD, and to provide risk education at the request of Libyan institutions, along with supporting capacity development for mine action of Libyan institutions. UNMAS conducted an operations and quality assurance (QA) training for LibMAC officers from all regional offices.[25]

UNMAS and LibMAC chair quarterly in-person Implementing Partner (IP) meetings, attended by key mine action stakeholders.[26] Since February 2025, these meetings have been held in Tripoli, which enables wider stakeholder participation.[27] DCA highlights the quarterly meetings as an effective platform for keeping operators informed and for presenting challenges and progress to donors. They also commend LibMAC's strong coordination of tasking.[28]

HALO maintains regular contact with LibMAC's Chief of Operations and staff in Misrata but has noted that coordination would be strengthened by formal operational meetings involving all operators.[29] In August 2025, during a meeting with operators, LibMAC indicated its intention to resume regular operational coordination meetings.[30] DCA reports ongoing, constructive dialogue with LibMAC on both current and planned operations, noting that cooperation is strong with input from operators on operational priorities.[31] HALO also recommends that coordination mechanisms be expanded to include representatives from the east of Libya. Their inclusion would help ensure challenges are elevated to the appropriate authorities in Benghazi and that task prioritisation reflects operational needs across all geographic areas.[32] DRC also highlighted difficulties in coordination of mine action activities in the East.[33]

In its Article 7 report under the APMBC, Türkiye said it provided training on mine clearance, counter IED, and EOD in 2024 to Libyan Armed Forces personnel.[34]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

HALO was funded for survey and clearance in 2024 by the United States (US) Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA). In 2025, US funding was temporarily paused for one month (in January–February) due to the Foreign Assistance Review, and future support remains uncertain. Italy was co-chairing the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) in 2025, while most European Union (EU) donors, except the Netherlands, have redirected funding elsewhere.[35] DCA received funding from the EU and PM/WRA in 2024, but EU support ceased in August 2024 when funds were reallocated to Gaza.[36] In 2025, DCA was being funded by PM/WRA and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MinBuZa). DRC was funded by the Netherlands for survey and clearance in 2024. In March 2025, Dutch funding ended, but Denmark (DANIDA) provided new funding for April to June.[37] In 2024, UNMAS was funded by the UNSMIL Regular Budget and bilateral donors, including Italy and Spain.[38]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

LibMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy for mine action in place. LibMAC disaggregates mine action data by sex and age.[39]

**Table 1: Gender composition of operators in 2024**[40]

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCA | 23 | 8 (35%) | 7 | 3 (43%) | 14 | 0 (0%) |
| DRC | 22 | 4 (18%) | 3 | 0 (0%) | 16 | 3 (19%) |
| HALO | 28 | 2 (7%) | 8 | 1 (13%) | 20 | 0 (0%) |
| **Totals** | **73** | **14 (19%)** | **18** | **4 (22%)** | **50** | **3 (6%)** |

25 UNMAS website, Libya, last updated January 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3G7yRJE.
26 Emails from Sharmeela Aminath, UNMAS, 16 March 2023; Samir Becirovic, UNMAS, 10 June 2022, and Tess Bresnan, UNMAS, 3 May 2024.
27 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
28 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.
29 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
30 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 2 October 2025.
31 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.
32 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
33 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.
34 Türkiye APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I.
35 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
36 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.
37 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.
38 UNMAS website, Libya, last updated January 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3G7yRJE.
39 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.
40 Emails from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.

In 2024, DCA continued to build the capacity of its all-female EOD and risk education teams until the project concluded in August. This initiative was set to resume in July 2025 under new funding, which will also facilitate an increase in the number of women in operational roles to 16.[41] In 2023, DRC delivered Gender and Diversity training to LibMAC and local partners. In 2024, DRC followed up on the participation mechanism proposed during the workshop to support ongoing engagement and implementation.[42]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Libya does not have a national mine action standard (NMAS) or a policy on environmental management.[43]

**Table 2: Environmental policies and action[44]**

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| DCA | No – SOP | Yes | Yes |
| DRC | No – SOP | No | No |
| HALO | Yes | No | No |

In 2024 and early 2025, DCA introduced several environmentally conscious practices, including replacing plastic and synthetic fibre sandbags with sustainable hemp alternatives and continuing the use of thermite lances to limit explosive use and prevent soil contamination. It also transitioned its field offices to solar energy. Additionally, DCA teams have been clearing land in support of the government's agro-ecology project, contributing directly to Libya's one million tree-planting carbon sequestration initiative and supporting broader climate change mitigation.[45] In 2023, HALO developed its rubble recycling capabilities and secured funding for a pilot project aimed at reducing emissions, landfill use, and resource extraction by repurposing rubble for construction. However, implementation of the pilot project in Sirte in 2024 was disrupted due to redevelopment activities by the Libyan Reconstruction Fund in the target areas.[46]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

LibMAC receives technical support in information management from the GICHD and UNMAS. In 2023, LibMAC successfully upgraded its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database from the New Generation (NG) version to IMSMA Core.[47] While the database contains extensive information, it is largely focused on major cities.

Further NTS is needed in the north, and anecdotal reports suggest additional contamination in the south. In some cases, hazard polygons exceed 10km$^2$, and the time elapsed since initial survey indicates a need for re-surveying.[48] To address this, DRC is re-surveying both confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) to determine which should remain in the system and which can be cancelled. Some earlier surveys also appear to have been poorly conducted or lack sufficient detail.[49]

Operators report adequate access to the database.[50] However, HALO notes a lack of access to quality management reports from LibMAC's external monitoring visits. Additionally, victim data is only accessible to the submitting organisation, with LibMAC citing confidentiality concerns.[51] DRC reported ongoing discussions between its Information Management team and LibMAC to improve data accuracy to include a more detailed ERW categories database.[52]

Field data collection via Survey123 has enabled faster data submission and improved issue visibility.[53] LibMAC has introduced measures to strengthen data reliability, including

41 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.
42 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.
43 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022; Alessandro Di Giusto, DRC, 7 March 2022; and Zita Andrassy, HALO, 27 February 2022.
44 Emails from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
45 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.
46 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
47 Email from Tess Bresnan, UNMAS, 3 May 2024.
48 Email from Josh Ridley, HALO, 16 May 2024.
49 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.
50 Emails from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
51 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
52 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.
53 Email from Josh Ridley, HALO, 16 May 2024.

mandatory geotagging and submission through Survey123's photo capture function. Despite these steps, HALO reports limited evidence of field validation of operator reports on newly identified hazardous areas, items found or destroyed, and other key metrics. Increased visibility of QA visits and reporting would improve data quality.[54]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

There is no national mine action strategy for Libya.[55] In 2024, LibMAC announced plans to develop a strategy with support from the GICHD and UNMAS.[56] The GICHD conducted a general assessment of Libya's mine action programme in the second half of 2024 and subsequently assisted LibMAC with strategic planning. A strategy stakeholder workshop was held in October 2024, followed by a consultation workshop in February 2025. Both were co-organised by LibMAC and the GICHD and included participation from operators. These workshops produced a strategic theory of change for Libya. In July 2025, the GICHD reported that LibMAC will lead the drafting of the strategy, based on the agreed theory of change, and the GICHD was awaiting further updates on next steps.[57]

ERW-contaminated areas in Libya are prioritised for clearance based on criteria set by LibMAC, in coordination with national authorities and in alignment with Ministry of Defence and donor priorities and agreements. LibMAC is responsible for issuing task orders and operators report that LibMAC reviews implementation plans and issues task orders in a timely and effective manner.[58] The prioritisation of tasking considers humanitarian impact, requests from local authorities and affected communities, socio-economic land use, and security and access conditions.[59] In 2024, following the intervention of the Libyan Reconstruction Fund/National Development Agency in redevelopment of hazardous areas in Sirte, LibMAC advised HALO to focus on ammunition storage areas as priority for clearance, as HALO has a unique mechanical clearance capability and there is high need for this in multiple locations across Libya.[60]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

National mine action standards (LibMAS), available in Arabic and English, have been elaborated with the support of the GICHD and UNMAS, and were approved by the GNA in 2017. The LibMAS are available on the LibMAC website.[61] According to international clearance operators, the LibMAS are sufficient and aligned to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[62] But the national standards have not been updated since being approved in 2017. The GICHD and LibMAC conducted a workshop in June 2025 on NMAS development and review with the inclusion of operators and LibMAC have committed to updating several LibMAS over the next year with support from the GICHD.[63]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Mine action operations have been conducted by government entities, in particular LibMAC as a leader in mine action response, but also the National Safety Authority (NSA), which is mandated to conduct EOD in civilian areas.[64] These institutions liaise with LibMAC but are not tasked or accredited by them, nor do they provide clearance reports to the Centre.[65] Three national operators are currently active in Libya: 3F, The Safe Trust (Al-Thiqa Al-Amena), and Libya Peace Organisation.[66] Libya Peace Organisation, which partners with DRC, is accredited by LibMAC to conduct NTS, EOD, and risk education.[67]

In 2024, LibMAC opened 117 tasks, mostly for quick response and NTS activities in southern parts of Tripoli after the LNA withdrawal, as well as in Tawargha, Sirte, and Benghazi. In addition, LibMAC personnel conducted 226 QA/QC missions and 23 accreditation procedures for international and local NGOs for NTS, risk education, and EOD tasks. During 2024, LibMAC recorded 112 completed tasks.[68]

54 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
55 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.
56 Presentation of LibMAC, 27th NDM meeting, Geneva, 9–11 April 2024.
57 Email from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 1 July 2025.
58 Emails from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
59 Emails from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; and Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.
60 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
61 LibMAC website, accessed 20 May 2022 at: https://bit.ly/3ldhvx2. Report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL, UN doc. S/2018/140, 12 February 2018, p. 12; and UNMAS, "Programmes: Libya", accessed 14 May 2022 at: http://bit.ly/31tU1tB.
62 Emails from Catherine Smith, HI, 12 March 2019; Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 14 April 2020, and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.
63 Emails from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, Libya, 23 May and 2 October 2025; and Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 17 July 2025.
64 Interview with Brig. Turjoman, LibMAC, in Geneva, 10 January 2017; and email from Tess Bresnan, UNMAS, 3 May 2024.
65 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.
66 Presentation of LibMAC to the 27th NDM meeting, Geneva, 9–11 April 2024; and email from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 17 July 2025.
67 3F website, accessed 20 May 2024 at: https://bit.ly/4bnui8h; and email from Wajdi Alkhatib, DRC, 10 June 2024.
68 ITF, "Annual Report 2024", p. 113.

**Table 3: Operational survey capacities deployed in 2024**[69]

| Operator | NTS teams | Total NTS personnel | TS teams |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3F[70] | 2 | 6 | 0 |
| DRC | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| HALO | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| Libya Peace Organisation[71] | 2 | 6 | 0 |
| **Totals** | **6** | **18** | **0** |

**Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024**[72]

| Operator | Manual/mechanical clearance teams | Total deminers | Mechanical assets/machines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCA | 5 | 46 | 0 | All clearance personnel function as multitask teams conducting NTS, TS, BAC, and EOD as required |
| HALO | 2 | 9 | 3 | Two mechanical clearance teams |
| **Totals** | **7** | **55** | **3** | |

Now in its fourteenth year of working in Libya, DCA has offices in Benghazi, Misrata, Sirte, and Tripoli, and is accredited to conduct clearance and EOD tasks.[73] DCA's capacity decreased in 2024 due to a drop in funding. In 2025, capacity was increasing by four teams totalling 48 personnel, including re-establishing the "all-female" EOD and NTS team, plus one "all-female" risk education team.[74]

DRC has been working in Libya since 2011 and has had three offices: in 2013–21 in Sabha (southern region); in 2018–23 in Benghazi (eastern region); and since 2011 in Tripoli. DRC Tripoli office has a capacity of one EOD team, one NTS team, two risk education teams, and a capacity-building project with the partner Libya Peace Organisation. DRC intended to establish a new NTS team to operate in Tripoli in 2024.[75]

HALO has been present in Libya since 2018 and has offices in Misrata and Sirte, as well as liaison presence in Benghazi. HALO's main operations focused on mechanical clearance in Sirte in the Jeeza Navy area and at a Misrata ammunition storage area where it found CMR in 2022. In March 2024, HALO recruited an additional mechanical clearance team, and cross-trained an EOD team in NTS. HALO's mechanical clearance teams continued work in Sirte until the Libyan Reconstruction Fund began redevelopment of the areas. In August 2024, teams shifted focus to a priority ammunition storage area in Misrata. One team returned to Sirte in December to respond to EOD call-outs and began conducting re-survey in March 2025. In 2024, HALO also procured mechanical ancillaries, such as a hydraulic grapple, which improved the efficiency of rubble removal and mechanical clearance in 2025.[76]

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

None of the international operators found AP mines in Libya in 2023. Survey or clearance carried out by national operators were not reported to Mine Action Review.

## SURVEY IN 2024

None of the international operators reported any survey of AP mined area in Libya in 2024 or 2023.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

None of the international operators conducted clearance of AP mined area in 2024 or 2023 and no AP mines were found and destroyed in Libya in 2024 or 2023.

69 Emails from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021; Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.

70 This information was last updated in April 2021.

71 Ibid.

72 Emails from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.

73 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 22 July 2025.

74 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.

75 Emails from Wajdi AlKhatib, DRC, 19 April and 10 June 2024.

76 Emails from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, Libya, 23 May and 2 October 2025.

## PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Libya is not yet a State Party to the APMBC. Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear landmines as soon as possible.

No progress was made in 2024 to determine the extent and location of AP mined area, and no systematic survey or clearance took place. A comprehensive nationwide baseline survey is urgently required.

Although progress towards a national mine action strategy is promising, the political and security context remains a key challenge for implementation. Strengthening the capacity of LibMAC remains a priority, particularly its ability to coordinate mine action by all stakeholders and in all geographic areas.

# MOROCCO

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Massive (no credible figure)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | No credible figure | Unknown |
| Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |
| Non-Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 40 | Unknown |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Royal Moroccan Army (RMA)

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Morocco should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Morocco should clear anti-personnel (AP) mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Morocco should establish a timeline for completing clearance of all mined areas on territory under its jurisdiction or control.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- No national mine action authority
- No national mine action centre

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Royal Moroccan Army (RMA)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) Mine Action

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The exact extent of contamination from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Morocco, including the area under its control in Western Sahara on the west side of the Berm,[1] is not known. In the past, Morocco declared, highly improbably, that a total of 120,000km² of area was contaminated,[2] although the extent of the threat is undoubtedly massive. According to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), of the 2,700km-long Berm, both sides are significantly contaminated with landmines and ERW along 1,465km.[3]

Morocco's contamination is mostly a result of the conflict of 1975–91 between the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) and Polisario Front forces over Western Sahara. Morocco acknowledges that it had laid mine belts during the construction of the Berm, with the mines being laid before the APMBC entered into force, and states that mined areas are surveyed and mapped. Morocco has pledged to clear the mines it laid as soon as the conflict over Western Sahara is "definitely settled".[4]

Morocco reported in its voluntary APMBC Article 7 transparency report covering calendar year 2022 that the following provinces were mine affected: Akka, Aousserd, Assa-Zag, Boujdour, Dakhla, Laayoune, Smara, Tantan, and Tata.[5] In its voluntary Article 7 report covering 2018, Morocco had reported that 10 localities within these provinces contained mines: Bir Anzarane, Douiek, Gerret Auchfaght, Gor Lbard, Gor Zalagat, Hagounia, Idiriya, Imlili, Itgui, and Tarf Mhkinza. It claimed that these were contaminated through "haphazard" mine-laying across the south of Morocco by the Polisario Front in 1975–91.[6] In its Article 7 reports covering 2020 and 2021, Morocco also reported suspected mined areas in its far eastern corner bordering Algeria in the El-Melias corridor in Figuig province.[7] It is not clear when these mines were emplaced or by whom, but media reports indicate they were laid in the 1990s as a result of border tensions between the two neighbouring States.[8]

Since 1975, Morocco has registered 2,771 mine and ERW victims, of whom 826 were killed. In 2022 alone, three persons were killed and eight injured as a result of mine and ERW-related accidents.[9]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Morocco does not have a national mine action authority or a mine action centre. The RMA carries out demining, which, it has reported, is conducted in collaboration with MINURSO.[10]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Morocco is not believed to have a gender policy in place for its demining operations.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known what, if any, environmental policies and practices Morocco adheres to, but it has reported that "normal safety and environmental protection standards have been followed" in clearing mines and ERW.[11]

1 The Berm refers to the defensive wall built by Morocco in 1982–87 to secure the north-western corner of Western Sahara. It is constituted of earthen walls some 2,700 kilometres long and three metres in height. Morocco controls the area located on the west side of the Berm.

2 Statement of Morocco, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 25 May 2009.

3 MINURSO website, Mine Action, accessed 28 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3BmYLnM.

4 Statement of Morocco, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

5 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

6 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form D. Idiriya is spelled "Jdiriya" in the 2018 report. From 2015, the area of Glibat Jadiane, which had been listed as contaminated in earlier years, was no longer included on the list of mined areas.

7 Voluntary Article 7 Reports (covering 2020 and 2021), Form D.

8 "Fguig, mine disposal leads to rumours of conflict on the eastern borders", *Chouf TV* (Arabic), 20 February 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3rIWGvO.

9 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form G.

10 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form D.

11 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

It is not known which information management system is used in Morocco for recording mine action data.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known how Morocco plans and prioritises its demining operations.

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

Morocco appears to use only manual demining, which is not efficient given the size and type of terrain being released.

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Morocco has not adopted national mine action legislation or standards, but has reported that "normal safety and environmental protection standards have been respected" in the clearance of mines and ERW[12] and that demining by the RMA conforms to international rules and techniques.[13]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

All mine clearance in Morocco is conducted by the RMA. In 2022, Morocco indicated that 13 demining units had been deployed every year from 2007 to March 2023, and that 1,258 limited interventions had been undertaken from 2014 through to end-March 2023.[14] By "limited interventions" it is understood that Morocco refers to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks.

In 2010, Morocco declared it had employed 10,000 deminers, despite having only 400 detectors available at the time.[15] This raised serious questions both about the procedures being used and the accuracy and credibility of clearance figures being reported. Morocco reported that demining takes place in the framework of a vast annual programme that aims to release suspected areas of contamination.[16]

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Morocco initiated major demining efforts in 2007, following an increase in the number of deaths and injuries. In April 2016, Morocco reported it planned to clear mines from along the Berm.[17] But it has not reported in detail on its release of mined areas in recent years, nor given any indication of implementing land release methodology. The figures it does provide are not credible with respect to physical clearance and should be taken as an indication of land released or declared as clear of contamination rather than land actually released through clearance.

In its voluntary Article 7 report covering 2024, Morocco reported "clearance" of a total area of 158.48km$^2$ with the destruction of 40 AP mines, 63 anti-vehicle (AV) mines, and 142 items of ERW.[18] Morocco did not submit an Article 7 report covering 2023 but in 2022 reported it had "cleared" 95.24km$^2$ with the destruction of 34 AP mines, 23 AV mines, and 174 items of ERW.[19] Neither claim for the extent of physical clearance is credible. An eight-year review of Morocco's reporting on its clearance outputs reveals big fluctuations in the number of AP mines destroyed per year, from more than 1,000 AP mines destroyed in 2021 to a low of 22 AP mines in 2020.

12 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

13 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Form B.

14 Statement of Morocco, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, June 2022; and Kingdom of Morocco, Information Leaflet, Strong Commitment for Population's Safety – All Against Antipersonnel Mines and Remnants of War (covering 1975 to 2023), undated.

15 Statement of Morocco, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 23 June 2010.

16 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Form B.

17 "Morocco to Deploy Highly Qualified Team to Remove Sahara Landmines", *Sahara Question*, 25 March 2016, at: http://bit.ly/2Llu9d4.

18 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

19 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

In his October 2024 report to the UN Security Council on the situation in Western Sahara, the UN Secretary-General indicated that the RMA had reported release of 189km$^2$ of land west of the Berm from 1 September 2023 to 31 July 2024, with the destruction of 35 AP mines, 15 AV mines, and 549 items of ERW.[20] This compares with 165km$^2$ of land west of the Berm reported by the RMA as released between 1 September 2022 and 31 August 2023, with the destruction of 7 AP mines, 44 AV mines, and 384 items of ERW.[21] No further details were provided. MINURSO continues to strengthen coordination and cooperation with the RMA.[22]

Morocco has stated on numerous occasions its determination to comply voluntarily with the provisions of the APMBC, including completion of stockpile destruction of AP mines and demining. It has submitted annual voluntary Article 7 reports over the past decade, with the exception of the report covering 2023, and attends APMBC meetings as an observer. It has not, however, indicated when it might complete mine clearance. In a statement at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2023, Morocco repeated its commitment to the Convention.[23] It earlier indicated that accession to the APMBC is a "strategic objective", which has been "momentarily delayed" pending "the resolution of the regional dispute over the Moroccan Sahara".[24]

**Table 1: Eight-year summary of reported AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area released (km²) | AP mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 158 | 40 |
| 2023 | N/R | N/R |
| 2022 | 95 | 34 |
| 2021 | 217 | 1,289 |
| 2020 | 171 | 22 |
| 2019 | 301 | 23 |
| 2018 | 313 | 232 |
| 2017 | 232 | 69 |
| **Totals** | **1,487** | **1,709** |

N/R: Not reported

20 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para. 49.

21 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2023/729, 3 October 2023, para. 53.

22 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2024/707, para. 42.

23 Statement of Morocco, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 22 June 2023.

24 Statement of Morocco, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 23 June 2010.

# MYANMAR

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown but heavy

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Unknown | Unknown |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Unknown | Unknown |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Unknown

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

All parties to Myanmar's civil war are reported to be using anti-personnel (AP) mines, some conventional and many of an improvised nature. The Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) is reported to have emplaced a dense defensive mine belt around Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine state. After a threefold increase in 2023, the United Nations (UN) recorded a further rise in explosive ordnance casualties in 2024.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Myanmar's armed forces and non-State armed groups should halt all use of AP mines, including mines of an improvised nature.**
- **Myanmar should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Relevant authorities in Myanmar should permit humanitarian mine action organisations to undertake surveys to identify and mark mined areas using conventional marking systems, particularly in areas expected to receive internally displaced persons (IDPs).**
- **Mine action NGOs and their implementing partners should develop standards for implementing community-based assessments and non-technical survey (NTS).**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- Department of Rehabilitation (DoR)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Tatmadaw (Army)
- Unspecified ethnic armed entities/non-State armed groups
- Unspecified NGOs

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

### OTHER ACTORS

- UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Myanmar is heavily mine-affected as a result of conflicts between the Tatmadaw (Myanmar army) and numerous non-State armed groups (NSAGs) affiliated with ethnic minorities. The conflicts started after the nation's independence in 1948. AP mines, including those of an improvised nature, as well as other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continue to be laid by both government forces and NSAGs.[1] Mine use has reportedly accelerated since the military's February 2021 coup and the escalating conflict it has ignited across the country.[2]

The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar reported in September 2019 that parties to the conflict, including the Tatmadaw, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Restoration Council of Shan state (RCSS, formerly referred to as the Shan State Army South (SSA-S), and the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP, formerly referred to as the Shan State Army North (SSA-N)), all continued to emplace landmines and IEDs.[3] Intensifying conflict since then has seen mines and improvised mines widely used by other ethnic armed organisations and Popular Defence Forces. The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) recorded a total of 1,082 civilian casualties from explosive ordnance in 2024, up from 1,052 the previous year. Actual casualties are believed to be higher.[4]

There is no accurate estimate of the extent of mine contamination. Before the coup, available data showed that nine of Myanmar's fourteen states and regions were contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).[5] The UN believes that Myanmar has the highest number of mine/ERW casualties in the world.[6] UNICEF reported mine incidents in Naypyidaw in June 2024.[7]

Mine contamination was previously concentrated in the states bordering Bangladesh, China, and Thailand. UNICEF monitoring of mine and ERW incidents found that most casualties in 2024 occurred in the eastern Shan state (24% of all casualties); the central Sagaing region (which before the coup was largely peaceful), and the western state of Rakhine. Other states and regions experiencing mine/ERW casualties in 2024 included Ayeyarwady, Bago, Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Mandalay, Mon, Naypyidaw, Tanintharyi, and Yangon.[8] Among recent developments, the Tatmadaw was reported in 2025 to have emplaced a massive defensive mine belt around Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine state, and an area of strategic Chinese Belt & Road Initiative investment that is heavily contested by the Arakan Army.[9]

A 7.7 magnitude earthquake on 28 March 2025 centred near Sagaing, close to Myanmar's second city of Mandalay, added further complexity to understanding and dealing with explosive ordnance contamination causing displacement of mines, destroying or moving signs and markers indicating the presence of explosive items and posing risks to first responders and recovery programmes of explosive items buried in rubble.[10]

1 Amnesty International, "Myanmar: Military's use of banned landmines in Kayah state amounts to war crimes", 20 July 2022; and "Myanmar: In reverse: Deteriorating Human Rights Situation, Report, January–February 2021, p. 8.

2 "As Myanmar's army faces setbacks, it is stepping up attacks on civilians, a UN expert warns", *Associated Press*, 20 March 2024; UNICEF, "Three-fold increase in civilian casualties caused by landmines and unexploded ordnance in Myanmar's expanding conflict", 4 April 2024; Karen Human Rights Group, "Danger beneath our feet; Briefing Paper", 22 December 2023; see also Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Myanmar Emergency Update: Key displacement figures", 6 March 2023; and R. Ayisi, "Children pay a heavy price as more landmines are laid", UNICEF, 4 April 2023.

3 "Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar", UN doc. A/HRC/42/CRP.5, 16 September 2019, pp. 155–58.

4 UNICEF, Humanitarian Situation Report No. 1, 2025.

5 Landmine Monitor, Myanmar/Burma, Mine Ban Policy, Last updated 12 November 2019, at: https://bit.ly/2TrvOm.

6 Statement of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, to the UN Human Rights Council, 19 March 2025; see also UNICEF, "Six things to watch in Myanmar in 2025," 5 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4189pv1.

7 UNICEF, Myanmar Landmine/ERW Incident Information 2024 (Q2).

8 UNICEF, Myanmar Landmine and Explosive Ordnance Incident Information (2024).

9 Interview with international humanitarian organisation, 15 May 2025.

10 Email from Aleksandra Minkiewicz, Country Director, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 16 July 2025.

## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Myanmar does not have a structured mine action programme. Tentative steps over several years towards setting up a national mine action authority (NMAA) ended with the military coup in 2021. The State Administration Council established by the Tatmadaw to lead the government has not set up a mechanism for managing or coordinating mine action and focused on military campaigns marked by intensifying air strikes and sharply increased explosive ordnance contamination.[11]

The operating context for humanitarian demining organisations—as for humanitarian and civil society organisations in general—has become increasingly challenging. Myanmar informed the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC in November 2020 that it had set up a Mine Action Working Group in May 2020 as "the first step towards formulating a National Strategy and Plan of Action for mine clearance".[12] A Department of Rehabilitation created in 2018 gradually took over responsibility for overseeing mine action and took steps towards setting up a NMAA but momentum was lost with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and government elections in November 2020.[13] No concrete results emerged by the time the Tatmadaw took over the government in February 2021. Since then, operators have followed a policy of non-engagement with the Department of Rehabilitation.[14]

A national Mine Risk Working Group (MRWG) first set up in 2012 has not formally convened since February 2021. A Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) which was set up in 2022 under the Global Protection Cluster comprising UN agencies, international organisations, and NGOs meets monthly, providing a platform for coordinating and sharing information between demining organisations on security, access, and programme content. It is supported by five subnational AoRs – for the north-west, the north-east, the south-west, the south-east, and Rakhine state.[15]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Myanmar does not have a centralised mine action information management database. Data collection and information management were included as one of six main priorities of the 2018–19 MRWG strategic plan.[16] It was hoped that a national database would be set up once a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established,[17] but that process stalled after the February 2021 coup.

The MA AoR set up by the UN ranked improving information management—and specifically creating a comprehensive mine victim information system—as a top objective. UNICEF continues to collect victim data from open sources which it releases quarterly, but the number of victims is believed to significantly exceed that recorded in available data.[18]

In 2021, DanChurchAid (DCA) had a project with a component related to information management which sought to build capacity of partners to gather, input, manage, and analyse data, and included plans to introduce and train them in the use of Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core. The project was delayed as a result of the coup.[19]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

In the absence of an NMAA, Myanmar has not formulated national or state-level plans for mine action. Humanitarian demining organisations are not permitted to conduct survey or clearance, restricting operations to supporting community-level assessments designed to identify the location of explosive ordnance and delivery of risk education.[20]

The MA AoR strategic plan for 2025–26 set out general objectives, including expanding risk education, enhancing the coverage and effectiveness of mine action, and ensuring access for victims to health care and support. It calls for increasing the number of local mine action organisations and providing them with training. It also called for systematic surveys to map explosive contamination and an information

11 "Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights", UN doc. A/HRC/57/56, 4 September 2024, pp. 4–5; Myanmar Protection Cluster Strategy 2024–2025, Global Protection Cluster, undated, pp. 2–3; and N. Gillen, "Myanmar: at least 43 killed and 50 injured by junta air strike in Rakhine", Action on Armed Violence, 10 January 2025.

12 Statement of Myanmar, 18th Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, Geneva 16–20 November 2020.

13 Email from Hilde Jørgensen, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 27 May 2021.

14 Email from Matthew Walsh, Head of Humanitarian Response and Mine Action, DanChurchAid (DCA), 22 April 2021.

15 Interview with an international humanitarian organisation, 15 May 2025; MA AoR Strategy 2025–26, Global Protection Cluster, undated.

16 Email from Matthew Walsh, DCA, 22 April 2021.

17 Emails from Bekim Shala, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 13 April 2020; Fabrice Vandeputte, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 8 May 2020; Kyaw Lin Htut, NPA, 3 April 2020; and Liam Harvey, DRC, 22 May 2020; and Matthew Walsh, DCA, 22 April 2021.

18 Email from Kim Warren, MA AoR, 11 August 2022; and Zoom interview, 12 August 2022.

19 Email from Matthew Walsh, DCA, 22 April 2021.

20 Online interviews with operators, 15 May and 15 July 2025.

management department to be established with a centralised database accessible to all mine action stakeholders.[21] Among the challenges addressed by AoR participants is ensuring the consistency and quality of risk education messaging.[22]

Operators are not tasked by any central authority but liaise with local actors and communities in their operating areas to identify tasks.[23] Priorities are shaped by factors including the location of armed clashes and population displacements as well as results of community survey.[24]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Historically, Myanmar has not developed national standards and therefore operators have followed the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and their own standard operating procedures (SOPs). Operators are not permitted to conduct technical survey, clearance, or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), so the focus of the mine action sector is on developing standards for permitted activities.

Prior to the February 2021 military coup, tentative steps to develop national standards saw the drafting of a first national standard on marking, which was approved by the government in January 2020. An NTS Working Group also worked on a standard for NTS in 2020, led by the Mine Action Advisor from the New Zealand Embassy,[25] but the group had not finalised and approved the standard by the February 2021 coup that suspended discussions on national standards.

The civilian-led government in office in 2018 agreed that physical marking (with warning signs) and fencing should be included as part of NTS.[26] Circumstances prevailing after the coup, including intensifying conflict, the Junta's crackdown on civil society and humanitarian programmes, and increased use of mines by parties to the conflict, halted the development of humanitarian mine action.

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Until 2023, five international demining organisations—DCA, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), The HALO Trust (HALO), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)—had offices in Yangon and some provincial locations. Deteriorating conditions, ranging from widening conflict, administrative obstacles and denial of movement authorisations, most organisations now work remotely supporting local partners remotely.

In 2024, two demining organisations (HALO and MAG) were represented in Myanmar. Other organisations remotely supported partners in the country. HALO supported delivery of risk education in parts of the north, in western Rakhine state, and in the east, including from April in Mon State. MAG had 20 national staff and 36 volunteers supporting risk education and planned to expand, partly in response to the greater needs created by Myanmar's March 2025 earthquake.[27]

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Myanmar has no programme of systematic survey or clearance. Even before the February 2021 military coup, demining operators were not permitted by either the government or ethnic minority authorities to conduct technical survey, clearance, or EOD spot tasks. Since 2021, international operators have largely limited their activities to community-based assessments of contamination and risk education.[28]

21 MA AoR Strategy 2025–26, Global Protection Cluster, undated, pp. 6–9.
22 Online interviews with operators, 15 May 2025 and 15 July 2025.
23 Email from Julie Utting, HALO, 10 May 2022.
24 Email from Sofia Raineri, MAG, 8 August 2022.
25 Email from Liam Harvey, DRC, 21 April 2021.
26 Emails from Liam Harvey, DRC, 21 April 2021; and Matthew Walsh, DCA, 22 April 2021.
27 Aleksandra Minkiewicz, MAG, 16 July 2025.
28 Email from Camille Marie-Regnault, MAG, 15 May 2023.

# NORTH KOREA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, but very heavy

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Not reported | Not reported |
| Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |
| Non-Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Not reported | Not reported |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Korean People's Army engineers

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2023 and 2024, there were reports that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) had emplaced mines on its border with China, and in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates North Korea from the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Little is known more broadly about contamination, and no survey or clearance of anti-personnel (AP) mines has been reported in North Korea in recent years.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **North Korea should cease all use of AP mines.**
- **North Korea should resume mine clearance in the DMZ as soon as possible and permit independent verification of clearance.**
- **North Korea should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **North Korea should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- No functioning mine action programme

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Korean People's Army engineers

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- None

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of North Korea's mine problem is not known. In 1998, North Korea admitted laying mines in the DMZ, a 1,000km$^2$ strip of land between the north and south of the peninsula believed to be one of the most densely contaminated areas in the world. Estimates have put the number of mines spread across the border with South Korea—an area 248km-long and 4km-deep—at 2 million. Mined areas are reported to be marked and fenced but mines are also believed to have shifted as a result of flooding and landslides.[1] Moreover, it has been claimed that both North Korea and South Korea have poorly managed their mine-laying and that they do not know exactly how many they emplaced nor exactly where they are.[2]

In September 2018, at the third inter-Korean summit, which took place amid a period of improving relationships between the North and the South, North and South Korea agreed to begin removing landmines from the Joint Security Area (JSA) at Panmunjom in the DMZ. North and South Korea completed clearance of the JSA, a month later. In November, South Korea reported that North Korea had removed more than 600 AP mines from the area under the Comprehensive Military Agreement signed in September 2018.[3] Additional clearance was conducted in late 2018 around Arrowhead Hill (also known as Hill 281) in Cheolwon, Gangwon province, under a pilot, joint project to recover human remains.[4] Both North Korea and South Korea conducted mine clearance in the area, with South Korea reportedly clearing 158 mines (not disaggregated by type) and 2,410 items of unexploded ordnance around Arrowhead Hill in 2020.[5]

In April 2022, South Korea resumed demining operations in the Baekmagoji area of the DMZ in Cheolwon, Gangwon province, which had been part of an earlier peace building initiative in 2018.[6] Operations were temporarily suspended on 1 April 2022 following threat of hostile action from North Korea in the border area, but resumed on 11 April 2022.[7] In November 2022, during a statement to the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, South Korea reported it was "continuing with its mine clearing efforts, where possible, in a systemic and phased manner" and in line with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), but it did not state where these activities were taking place.[8]

In late 2023, however, it was reported that the North Korean army had re-mined an unpaved road near Arrowhead Hill, roughly 50 miles north-east of Seoul.[9] Further reports that North Korea was emplacing mines in the DMZ followed in late 2023 and early 2024.[10] Early in 2024, South Korea noticed that North Korea was laying both AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines in the DMZ, including at either end of the unofficial border.[11] This included mining a land route on the Gyeongui road in the west that connects the cities of Paju in the South and Kaesong in the North.[12] One report indicated that, in early December 2023, mine emplacement had started around the Gyeongui Line railroad and nearby guard posts, where North Korea had previously cleared mines in 2002.[13] North Korea is also reported to have laid mines on the Donghae road along the east coast.[14] Mining of the three roads (including at Arrowhead Hill) effectively cut off all land connections connecting the two States.[15] The cross-border sites were once targeted for modern train lines to improve economic integration between the two countries before the collapse of the 2018 agreement.[16]

1 Statement of North Korea, United Nations (UN) General Assembly, New York, 4 December 1998, UN doc. A/53/pv79, pp. 8–9; Choe Sang-Hun, "Koreas start clearing landmines at DMZ in effort to ease tensions", *The New York Times*, 1 October 2018.

2 "North Korean landmines could float into South Korea, South warn" *Associated Press*, 17 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4dwBwYj.

3 Email from Eum Soohong, member, Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL), 14 August 2024; and Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "North Korea", Last updated 16 November 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3LUyZvi.

4 Song Young-moo and No Kwang Chol, "Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain", National Committee on North Korea, 19 September 2018, Annex 2, p. 7, at: http://bit.ly/2XXbuXd; and "Korean leaders sign agreement for North Korea to take further steps to denuclearize", *ABC News*, 20 September 2018, at: http://abc7.ws/2XZM0bq.

5 Untitled article [translated from Korean], *Maeil Business Newspaper*, 29 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3WEgyA4; and B. Jung "Unearthed 143 remains of this year's Arrowhead Bill", *Yonhap News Agency*, 19 November 2020.

6 Emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 5 January and 14 August 2024.

7 Emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 3 and 11 April 2022 and 14 August 2024.

8 Statement of the Republic of Korea, APMBC Twentieth Meeting of States Parties (20MSP), 24 November 2022.

9 "Map Shows Where North Korea Has Placed Land Mines in Demilitarized Zone", *Newsweek*, 30 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3LLpui2.

10 "Concentration of road blocking and fortification in the north… Joint Chiefs of Staff discloses surveillance and reconnaissance data on North Korea" (unofficial translation), K-Force, 10 October 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/4e9uynp3.

11 "Map Shows Where North Korea Has Placed Land Mines in Demilitarized Zone", *Newsweek*, 30 April 2024.

12 Ibid.

13 "North Korea redeploys landmine near Gyeongui Line", The Dong-A Ilbo, 5 January 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3WVk4Y4.

14 "North Korea redeploys landmine near Gyeongui Line", The Dong-A Ilbo, 5 January 2024.

15 Untitled article (translated from Korean), Maeil Business Newspaper, 29 April 2024.

16 "Map Shows Where North Korea Has Placed Land Mines in Demilitarized Zone", *Newsweek*, 30 April 2024.

In addition to laying mines along three roads in the DMZ, in mountains and fields,[17] and along inter-Korean railroads, including using AP mines in some areas,[18] it has been reported that tens of thousands of additional explosive devices have been used by North Korea to reinforce the border.[19] Mine explosions are reported to have caused multiple casualties among North Korean troops laying explosives along the heavily armed border.[20] In July 2024, it was reported that North Korean had sent more military personnel to the DMZ to speed up mine emplacement and other efforts to fortify the border.[21]

Although reports of North Korea emplacing new AP mines in the DMZ tailed off from July 2024, at least one report has claimed that North Korean troops began emplacing landmines in the DMZ again in late 2024, "Since late 2024, Pyongyang has intensified its efforts to strengthen border defenses, including laying additional landmines and erecting anti-tank barriers".[22] Other media sources suggested that North Korea might again be, at least sporadically, laying mines in the DMZ in 2025.[23] In March, the South Korean military reported many casualties among the North Korean military in a mine explosion after it resumed work in the "front area" of the DMZ.[24]

South Korea has highlighted the risk that AP mines, emplaced by the North could float into South Korea during heavy rains, and that North Korea might intentionally float mines to South Korea.[25] There was particular concern about a small plastic mine, shaped as a leaf, containing 40 grams of explosive which had already been found in South Korea, according to its armed forces. Another AP mine used by North Korea is a locally manufactured version of a Soviet box mine, with a wooden body. In the past, such box mines have been swept by water into South Korea and found on beaches and riverbanks.[26]

There have also been reports of North Korea emplacing AP mines on its northern border with China since 2020, when North Korean soldiers are reported to have laid BBM-82 fragmentation mines along parts of the 880km-long border with China to deter and prevent people from illegally leaving the country or entry by people who might bring in the COVID-19 virus. Troops reportedly sustained injuries from mine detonations as they emplaced mines in two provinces bordering China.[27] According to a media source, North Korea had, since August 2023, again been emplacing landmines along the border with China to discourage potential defectors. This had resulted in casualties among citizens trying to cross into China from North Hamgyong Province.[28]

In August 2024, the Chinese authorities are reported to have warned local residents on the Chinese side of the border that landmines potentially buried on the North Korean side of the Yalu River along the North Korean-Chinese border may have been displaced into China following heavy rains at the end of July 2024.[29]

## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

North Korea has no functioning mine action programme.

In September 2018, the North Korean and South Korean Ministers of Defence signed a military agreement, the Panmunjom declaration, which mandated North Korea, South Korea, and the United Nations Command (UNC) to "remove all mines in the Joint Security Area (of the DMZ) in Panmunjom within 20 days, beginning on October 1, 2018".[30] Diplomacy intended to improve relations between North and South Korea in 2019 did not lead to any additional action.

17 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), "International Campaign to Ban Landmines concerned at reported landmine use by North Korea", 20 May 2024 (updated 24 July 2024), at: https://bit.ly/4fnqDtL.

18 "Editorial: Resuming loudspeaker broadcasts demands preparedness for any N. Korean provocation", *The Chosun Daily*, 10 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3WMeg2V.

19 "North Korean landmines could float into South Korea, South warn", *Associated Press,* 17 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4dwBwYj.

20 "Ibid.; and "Land mine blasts inflicted casualties on North Korean troops in DMZ in recent months, South says", *CNN*, 18 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3YBTLaK.

21 "N. Korea speeds up landmine and fortification work on inter-Korean border", *Daily NK*, 1 July 2024.

22 "Exclusive look at the DMZ drama shaking the Korean Peninsula", *Bulgarianmilitary.com*, 9 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mCvdXV.

23 "North Korea notifies UN Command to resume work on barbed wire fence and barriers to cut off South Korea (unofficial translation), Dong-A Ilbo, 30 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4gco4eV; and "There is no answer to the repatriation of residents… North Korea notifies UNC to 'resume frontline work' after 8 months" (unofficial translation), JoongAng Ilbo, 30 June 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/yc86p3tm.

24 "North Korea dispatched additional troops to Russia earlier this year… DMZ ship mine explosion kills many people", (unofficial translation), *K-Force*, 27 March 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/yh26mdj9.

25 "North Korean landmines could float into South Korea, South warn", *Associated Press*, 17 July 2024.

26 ICBL, "International Campaign to Ban Landmines concerned at reported landmine use by North Korea".

27 S. Kin, "Soldiers injured as North Korea deploys landmines at Sino-Korean border to stop escapees", *Radio Free Asia*, 22 October 2020; "N. Korea lays landmines in border areas to fend off coronavirus: NIS", *Yonhap*, 3 November 2020; and Lee Chae Un, "Storm Corps trooper killed in landmine explosion on border with China", *Daily NK*, 10 November 2020.

28 "N. Koreans maimed or killed by landmines during defection attempts", *Daily NK*, 7 November 2023, at: https://bit.ly/46DQpG7.

29 "Chinese authorities warn of possible North Korean landmine displacement due to floods, notify residents 'Do not go to the riverbank'", *Rimjin-Gang*, 13 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3ST8ZnU.

30 "Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain", 19 September 2018, Annex 2, p. 7; and "Korean leaders sign agreement for North Korea to take further steps to denuclearize", *ABC News*, 20 September 2018.

In January 2019, a North Korea delegation went to Cambodia to study mine clearance techniques.[31] Following a request from North Korea to the UNC, the Korean People's Army engineers also received training on use of US detectors using ground-penetrating radar for tackling box mines.[32] US army engineers trained South Korean army engineers who in turn provided the training to the Korean People's Army.[33]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

It is highly unlikely that North Korea takes into consideration gender and diversity during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in North Korea, even when it occurs.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in North Korea even when it occurs.

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

In October 2016, North Korea, in explaining its position at the UN General Assembly, stated that it "shares the humanitarian concerns associated with the use of AP mines, but due to the unique security environment of the Korean peninsula, especially regarding the United States' insistence on the use of landmines there, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not in a position to give up the use of landmines". It stated that the use of AP mines was "strictly for self-defence purposes".[34] It has not taken any steps to accede to the APMBC, and has not participated in efforts to ban AP mines.[35]

No mine clearance or land release is thought to have occurred in either 2023 or 2024. Reviving tensions between North Korea and the United States in 2019 have precluded any progress in demining and may continue to do so in the future. As the relationship between North Korea and South Korea deteriorated, the mine situation regressed further in 2023 and 2024, with North Korean troops emplacing new AP and AV mines in the DMZ, re-contaminating areas that had previously been cleared.

31 Landmine Monitor, "North Korea" (last updated 16 November 2021), at: https://bit.ly/3LUyZvi.

32 Presentation by Col. J. P. Lloyd, Command Engineer, UNC, Side event, National Directors' Meeting, Geneva, 11 February 2020.

33 Emails from Col. J. P. Lloyd, UNC, and Maj. M. S. Born, UNC, 14 April 2020.

34 Landmine Monitor, "North Korea", Last updated 16 November 2021.

35 Landmine Monitor, "North Korea", Last updated 22 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/45cB1l6.

# PAKISTAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Unknown | Unknown |
| Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |
| Non-Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Unknown | Unknown |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- None

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Little information is available on anti-personnel (AP) mine contamination, survey, and clearance in Pakistan, where there is no civilian mine action programme. Pakistan has stated that landmines are essential for defence purposes given its vast land borders, though it claims to have cleared AP mines laid on the border with India in 2001–02, and there is little evidence that it has used them in recent years. Pakistan claims that it does not use mines to maintain internal order or for counter-terrorism purposes. However, reports of AP mine explosions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan persist, and though non-State armed groups (NSAGs) are likely to bear responsibility, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at least, it is possible that some are legacy AP mines involving the Pakistan security forces.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Pakistan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **In the meantime, Pakistan should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law to protect life.**
- **Pakistan should report publicly on the extent and location of AP mined areas and prepare a plan for their clearance.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- No national mine action authority or centre

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Pakistani military engineering units
- Frontier Constabulary
- Police bomb disposal squad

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- None

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mine contamination in Pakistan is not known. Pakistan remains affected by mines and other explosive ordnance (EO) resulting from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–89) and three wars with India: in 1947, 1965, and 1971. Pakistan has also laid AP mines in front of its positions in Pakistan-administered Kashmir,[1] where it maintains permanent minefields along certain sections of the Line of Control (LoC) that divides Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir.[2] There are reports of Indian-produced anti-vehicle (AV) mines at least having moved from the LoC into Pakistan during flooding.[3] More recent contamination results from the continuing conflicts in areas bordering Afghanistan, including the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018.[4]

Pakistan asserts that AP mines are integral to its defence,[5] particularly given its extensive land borders,[6] and is one of a small number of nations that still manufactures AP mines.[7] In 2016, Pakistan stated that it would not adhere to the APMBC due to the security situation on its border with India where it had previously emplaced mines, and said it would do so again if necessary.[8] The last confirmed large-scale use of AP mines by Pakistan was between December 2001 and the middle of 2002, during escalating tensions with India.[9] In 2017 and 2018, Pakistan claimed that mines laid during those tensions were all cleared and that no mines had been laid since.[10] In its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report covering 2022, Pakistan reiterated past statements that the country "at present faces no problem of uncleared mines since no mines have been laid by [the] Pakistan Army after escalation of 2001–2002 on Pakistan's Eastern Border".[11]

Media reports in 2012–13, following an increase in Pakistan army operations along the Afghan border, indicated new casualties from use of mines by Pakistani forces for "security purposes", although it was unclear whether this was from recent or historic use. Landmine Monitor has received no reports of the Pakistan Army emplacing any landmines in recent years.[12] In January 2025, however, one Indian publication claimed that Pakistan had been laying AP mines along some sections of the LoC that divides Pakistan- and Indian-administered Kashmir as part of a move to enhance its defence capabilities.[13] In April 2025, an explosion along the LoC is said to have killed a soldier, although the cause of the explosion was not known.[14]

Reports of casualties from landmine explosions, including AP mines, among security personnel and civilians also continue in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan, though media articles regularly fail to attribute responsibility.[15] Politicians and defence analysts have denied claims that the authorities are responsible for emplacing any mines in the tribal areas (in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), and Pakistan has stated that its "security forces do not use mines for the maintenance of internal order and law enforcement or in counter terrorism operations".[16]

In April 2019, however, the Pakistan Red Crescent Society stated that mines emplaced by security personnel and militants over the years posed a threat to communities across different areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Dawra, Gandaw, and Landi Kallay in Sipah, and in Sheen Kamar near Mastak).[17] Local activists contend that tribal areas have not been cleared of mines (whether emplaced by the security forces or NSAGs), and a media source in 2023 indicated that

1 Human Rights Watch, "Recent Landmine Use by India and Pakistan", Backgrounder, May 2002, at: https:/bit.ly/3srXtQz, p. 4.
2 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/26ptt9d8.
3 Ibid.
4 "Extending Constitutional Rights to Pakistan's Tribal Areas", United States Institute for Peace, 6 April 2021, at: https://tinyurl.com/263w6685.
5 Statement of Pakistan on Universalisation, APMBC Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP), Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.
6 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024.
10 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2018), Form B; and Statement of Pakistan, Sixteenth Meeting of the States Parties to the APMBC, 18–21 December 2017.
11 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2022), Form B.
12 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024.
13 "Anti-personnel mines, mock firings, reigniting local militancy: Pakistan's new LoC strategy against India exposed", *The Week*, 11 January 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/32yusuru.
14 "Soldier martyred in accidental explosion in AJK", *Dawn*, 3 April 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/5n9x8zpa.
15 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024.
16 Statement of Pakistan on Universalisation, APMBC Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP), Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.
17 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024.

the authorities had acknowledged that, at least in North and South Waziristan (in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) where a heavier concentration of AP mines is reported, more time was needed to complete clearance.[18] Some residents in tribal areas have indicated that if they complain about the danger of mines, they risk being detained.[19]

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and neighbouring Balochistan province, reports of landmine use among NSAGs date from as early as the 2000s.[20] Incidents affecting security personnel and civilians in the two provinces, including from AP mines, continued to be reported in 2024 and into 2025.[21] Although it is not always clear how recently landmines have been used, the fact that accidents have occurred as recently as 2024 in areas frequented by locals, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at least, suggests that some use was recent.[22] In 2020, it was reported that the Baloch Liberation Army had imported factory-made AP mines, probably from Iran,[23] and the authorities have regularly reported seizing AP mines from NSAGs, with reports of seizures in Balochistan in 2023.[24] NSAGs in Pakistan are also reported to have used AV mines.[25]

According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), between January 2024 and August 2025, Te'reek-i-Taliban was involved in the vast majority of the remote explosive, improvised explosive device (IED), and mine detonations it reported in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochi separatist movements were involved in most such explosions reported in Balochistan. More than 200 reports were listed in each province, although only a few will have involved munitions that meet the definition of an AP mine.[26] Responsibility for the incidents listed is not attributed.[27]

## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Pakistan has no formal civilian mine action programme. Pakistani military engineering units have been responsible for mine clearance in conflict zones, while the Frontier Constabulary has conducted clearance in contaminated areas of Balochistan, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and other conflict zones. According to a media report some clearance is also undertaken by the police's bomb disposal squad.[28]

Pakistan's CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report covering 2021, was submitted under cover of a letter dated 17 December 2024,[29] and no report was submitted in 2024 covering 2023. As at August 2025, Pakistan had not submitted an Amended Protocol II report. Pakistan did, as mentioned above, submit an Amended Protocol II Report in 2023 (covering 2022).

In its Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report covering 2019 (repeated in the corresponding report covering 2022; no report was submitted in 2021), Pakistan said it had established a National Counter IED Forum with representatives from the Armed Forces, civil defence organisations, law enforcement agencies, and the police to develop a coordinated response to the IED threat and that the capacity of these organisations was being built.[30] Pakistan says it has acquired considerable expertise in demining.[31] Furthermore, mine education forms part of the syllabus at different military schools and training centres, and periodic programmes for the education of civilians, especially children, are held in areas close to the border with India.[32]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

It is not known whether Pakistan takes into consideration gender and diversity during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines.

18 "Landmines Continue To Terrorize Civilians In The Merged Areas And Beyond", *The Friday Times*, 20 July 2023, at: https://tinyurl.com/2yn74cnh.

19 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024.

20 "The New Humanitarian, "Landmine toll increasing in Restive Balochistan", 14 September 2006, at: https://tinyurl.com/5yue8989; "Pakistan: Menacing Landmines In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – Analysis", *Euroasiareview*, 5 July 2021, at: https://tinyurl.com/2w4pcyds.

21 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024); ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2024-21/08/2025, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Pakistan," accessed: 21 August 2025 at: www.acleddata.com; see also "4 Pakistani security personnel killed in landmine blast in Balochistan", *AA*, 26 April 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/4tec8frp; "Foreign Diplomats Safe After Convoy Hits Land Mine In Pakistan; 1 Officer Killed", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 22 September 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/2vae47ns; "Father And Daughter Injured In Landmine Blast In Lower Kurram, Armed Attack On Mangak Village", *MENAFN*, 15 February 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/2xc2se82; and "Land mine blast kills 4 people in northwestern Pakistan", *AP*, 25 June 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/y6nhanpb.

22 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2024-21/08/2025, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Pakistan", accessed: 21 August 2025 at: www.acleddata.com.

27 See: https://acleddata.com/faq/can-it-be-assumed-actor-1-aggressor.

28 "Landmines recovered from Bajaur college", *DAWN*, 22 January 2020, at: http://bit.ly/2Qy2LfY.

29 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021).

30 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Reports (covering 2019 and 2022), Form B.

31 Statement of Pakistan on Universalisation, 21MSP, Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.

32 Ibid.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Pakistan in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

In its statement at the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC in November 2023, Pakistan reiterated its claim that, "The use of landmines is exclusively by the military for defence purposes".[33] Pakistan has said, as mentioned, that it does not use mines to maintain order, for law enforcement, or in counterterrorism operations.[34] Pakistan has also advocated for the total elimination of AP mines through the development of non-lethal and cost-effective alternative technologies.[35]

Pakistan reported on mine clearance in its most recent Amended Protocol II report (covering 2022), indicating that the army had destroyed 582 mines (526 AP P2, 47 AP P4, 7 AP P4 Prac, and 2 AP Sharpenal).[36] In 2023, a Pakistani army spokesperson reported that 65% of the AP mines in the districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa affected by terrorism had been cleared of AP mines.[37] A media source the same year indicated that the military had undertaken extensive demining operations, clearing the vast majority of explosive ordnance in five of the seven tribal districts (Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, Khyber, and Kurram). The report acknowledged though, as indicated above, that more time was needed to clear the remaining two districts of North and South Waziristan, where there was a greater concentration of AP mines.[38]

There have, however, been repeated calls from local communities to step up demining to avoid further mine blasts.[39] Pakistan has stated that: "Marking, fencing and monitoring of mined areas are common ways through which effective exclusion is accomplished by the Pakistan army.[40]

Given Pakistan's stance that AP mines are integral to its security, no target date has been set for the completion of mine clearance.

33 Ibid.; and Statement of Pakistan, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019.

34 Statement of Pakistan on Universalisation, 21MSP, Geneva, 20–24 November 2023; and Statement of Pakistan, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019.

35 Statement of Pakistan on Universalisation, 21MSP, Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.

36 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

37 "Pakistan Army Clears 65% of Landmines in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: ISPR", *Tribal News Network*, 25 April 2023, at: https://tinyurl.com/356wzvbt.

38 "Landmines Continue To Terrorize Civilians In The Merged Areas And Beyond", *The Friday Times*, 20 July 2023.

39 "Uncleared landmines, ordnance threaten lives, limbs along Pakistan-Afghan border", 19 April 2024, *Voice of America*, at: https://tinyurl.com/mmfwfvk6.

40 Statement of Pakistan, APMBC Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2018.

# RUSSIA



## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Unknown | Unknown |
| Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |
| Non-Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Unknown | Unknown |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces
- Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) EMERCOM specialised demining units

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Extensive use of anti-personnel (AP) mines by Russian forces in Ukraine continued in 2024. Unverified reports emerged of use of landmines by Ukraine in the Kursk region of western Russia following Ukraine's incursion that began on 6 August 2024. There were also reports of Russian forces clearing AP mines from border areas in the Kursk region in March 2025. It was reported in July 2024 that Russian State operators were clearing explosive ordnance (EO) in Ukrainian territory under Russian occupation, namely in the Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions, with mine clearance taking place in Donetsk. Available data on survey and clearance, disaggregated by explosive threat type, continue to be limited.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Russia should cease any use of AP mines, including in Ukraine and accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Russia should clear AP mines in all areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT*

- No national mine action authority or civilian mine action programme
- International Mine Action Centre of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (IMAC), formerly known as the International Demining Action Centre. IMAC is a training base that co-ordinates Russia's mine action activities internationally. It is not a mine action centre as the term is generally understood in humanitarian mine action.

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces
- EMERCOM specialised demining units of the Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Disaster Relief (also known as the Ministry of Emergency Situations, MES)
- Military Engineers of the Airborne Forces
- Federal Ministry of Defence Engineers
- Demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

### OTHER ACTORS

- None

*IMAC, the Military Units of the Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, EMERCOM Pyrotechnic Units and EMERCOM Demining are referred to in publicly available sources dated during 2024 and 2025. Other information is based on information from earlier years and it is not known if it remains accurate.

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

There is no accurate estimate of the extent of mine contamination but Russia remains contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of the Second World War, the two Chechen wars (1994–96 and 1999–2009), armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, and most recently the international armed conflict with Ukraine.

In August 2024, news reports suggested new use of landmines by Ukraine following its incursion into the Kursk region of western Russia.[1] Unverified video footage, made publicly available by an individual reporting to be a civilian filming in Kursk on 10 August 2024, appeared to show several anti-vehicle (AV) mines laid across a road.[2] On 2 September 2024, a Russian news agency reported, based on information from the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) that nine settlements in the Kursk region had been cleared of mines over the preceding week, with 150 munitions rendered safe. Teams were continuing survey of populated areas and infrastructure.[3]

In March 2025 various media sources reported that Russian forces had begun to clear AP mines from border areas of the Kursk region.[4] The Russian news agency, TASS, claimed that this included discovery of Lepestok ("butterfly") AP mines.[5] In June 2025, a Bulgarian online news source reported that Russian forces operating near Russia's border with Ukraine had encountered "3D-printed" AP mines that had been deployed by Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region.[6] The original source for this report was again TASS and its reliability could not be confirmed at the time of writing. In July 2025, Ukrainian news agencies claimed, based on information from Ukraine's military intelligence service, Defense Intelligence (HUR), that Russia had requested that an engineering unit from the armed forces of Lao PDR conduct demining in the Kursk region.[7]

AP mines and AV mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya (1994–96 and 1999–2009). Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem. In January 2017, a commander in the Russian Armed Forces reportedly told press agency Interfax that more than 100km$^2$ of land remained to be cleared in Chechnya, and a further 20km$^2$ in neighbouring Ingushetia.[8] According to the online media report, areas cleared to date had nearly all been in lowland Chechnya and remaining mined area is in more mountainous terrain, complicating demining efforts.[9]

In 2021, Russia's Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated that Russia had planned to clear approximately 160km$^2$ of agricultural and forest land, but that over the course of nine years, military personnel had exceeded this, surveying approximately 240km$^2$ and discovering and destroying more than 41,000 explosive items (mines, shells, grenades, and other ammunition), as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It is not clear how much of this 240km$^2$ represents AP mined area.[10]

In 2020, the MES reported that each year, its specialised EMERCOM demining units clears about 40,000 items of ordnance remaining from the Second World War in Russia. The bulk of the items found are said to be unexploded bombs, artillery shells, grenades, and landmines.[11]

1 "What to Know About Ukraine's Cross-Border Assault Into Russia", *The New York Times*, 14 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3X1J6EX; and "Ukraine claims to control 1,000 sq km of Russian territory", *BBC News*, 12 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3SS4iL5.

2 "Civilian gets shot after dodging landmines in Kursk 10.8.24", YouTube, accessed 14 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3M3OBg4.

3 "Nine settlements in Kursk Region cleared of explosive objects in past week", *TASS Russian News Agency*, 1 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4gk1YH0.

4 "Russian forces start demining border areas of Kursk Region", *TASS*, 15 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4lQCLpw; and "Russia begins demining border areas of Kursk region", *The Statesman*, 16 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3Un6cnb.

5 "Russian forces start demining border areas of Kursk Region", *TASS*, 15 March 2025.

6 "Russia: Ukraine uses homemade 3D-printed anti-personnel mines", *Bulgarian Military News*, 13 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3T7JWNP.

7 "Russia to deploy Laotian troops for demining in Kursk region, Ukrainian intel reports", *RBC-Ukraine*, 5 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4568ZY9; and "Russia to Deploy Laos Engineering Troops for Demining in Kursk Region", *Mezha*, 5 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/469LluX.

8 "Landmine threat in Chechnya still prevalent", *OC Media*, 23 January 2017, at: https://bit.ly/33HxfOT.

9 Ibid.

10 "Sappers of the Southern Military District completed demining work on the territory of Chechnya", Ministry of Defence (MoD) of the Russian Federation, at: https://bit.ly/3QdfQEO.

11 "About 40 thousand explosive objects from the time of the Great Patriotic War are annually destroyed by the pyrotechnic units of the Ministry of Emergencies of Russia", *EMERCOM media news*, 8 May 2020, at: https://bit.ly/3wsuLlr.

## USE OF MINES IN UKRAINE SINCE 2014

At the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in May 2019, Ukraine accused Russia of having used AP mines in its territory since 2014. According to Ukraine, these mines have been emplaced by Russia-backed illegal armed groups in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and it said that Russia has also put mines on the administrative border between Crimea and the rest of Ukraine.[12] The mines allegedly used by separatist groups include PMN-1, PMN-2, PMN-4, POM-2R, OZM-72, MES type mines, and MON-50 mines with tripwire.[13]

In the most recent conflict in Ukraine, which began with Russia's invasion in February 2022, Russia has made very widespread use of both AP and AV mines.[14] This extensive use of AP mines by Russian forces continued in 2024 and into 2025, including in areas with civilians. In June 2024, Ukraine stated that it is encountering an "unprecedented density" of contamination, with up to three landmines being laid in a single square metre of land. Ukraine also reports ongoing use of AP mines by Russian forces, "launched by land and air combat systems to hit civilians, as well as objects used or inhabited by civilians".[15] Humanitarian organisations and media outlets indicate that Russian forces have scattered mines in a haphazard and disorganized fashion across civilian areas.[16]

As at June 2023, Human Rights Watch had documented use of at least 13 types of AP mines since the 2022 assault on Ukraine. The Landmine Monitor re-affirmed this number in November 2024 but noted that it was "not possible to systematically document, survey, and attribute the continuing use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine given available evidence and lack of access to areas where there are active hostilities".[17] A range of delivery methods for landmines has been documented: in addition to those that are manually emplaced, mines have been mechanically laid; scattered by truck-mounted projectors; and remotely delivered by rocket.[18]

Several new types of landmine have been used in hostilities for the first time in the ongoing armed conflict. These include the remotely delivered POM-3 AP mine, also known as the "medallion". The mine is typically aerially launched from a rocket, falling back to earth by parachute. It is equipped with a seismic proximity sensor that picks up approaching footsteps, and is said to be able to distinguish between humans and animals, making efforts to locate and destroy it far deadlier and more complicated. The POM-3 has self-destruct features that set the mine to explode after a certain period. Ukrainian deminers are using remote equipment to destroy these mines – an expensive undertaking.[19]

HALO has described the existence of new explosive threats in Ukraine, including in Mykolaiv and Kharkiv regions, where more than 70% of the minefields or battle areas it assessed for clearance contained magnetic influence mines (which can be activated by the presence of metallic objects and a change in the magnetic field around the mine); or seismic mines (activated by vibrations in the earth). In this context, advanced survey techniques and the targeted deployment of mechanical clearance assets have been necessary.[20]

Russian employment of AP mines includes the use of drones to drop landmines on farms and residential areas.[21] In June 2025, Human Rights Watch reported that Russian forces were modifying commercial quadcopter drones to scatter AP mines in and around the city of Kherson, killing dozens of civilians and injuring hundreds of others. Human Rights Watch also stated that Russian military-affiliated Telegram channels showed PFM-series AP mines, also, also known as "petal" or "butterfly" mines, being fitted onto the drones with a mechanism to allow them to be air-dropped. It reported having a "firm evidence base" for these attacks, having analysed more than 80 photos and videos that had been shared by witnesses and on social media.[22]

Russian forces have also emplaced numerous victim-activated booby-traps as they retreated from positions they had taken, occupied, or fortified during the 2022 invasion. The booby-traps were constructed with various types of hand grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades.[23] According to Ukraine, Russian forces have laid booby-traps in residential areas, vehicles, critical infrastructures, and even food. Ukraine added that it found booby-traps in dead bodies, including those of children.[24] A considerable portion of the booby-traps are considered AP mines under the APMBC.

12 Statement of Ukraine, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 22 May 2019.

13 Government of Ukraine, "Measures to ensure compliance", Geneva, 9 June 2017; Statement of Ukraine on Article 5, APMBC Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016; and Preliminary observations of the committee on cooperative compliance, "Ukraine", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8–9 June 2017.

14 "Russians booby-trap 'safe corridor' in Ukraine with landmines: report", *New York Post*, 7 March 2022, at; https://bit.ly/3wkW2rT; "Ukraine: Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Landmines", Human Rights Watch, 29 March 2022, at; https://bit.ly/3CiVpTg; "Russia using banned 'jumping' landmines in Ukraine", *The Telegraph*, 30 March 2022, at; https://bit.ly/3dNKp6t; "Russia 'using banned landmines' in north-eastern Ukraine", *The Times*, 30 March 2022, at; https://bit.ly/3R1mvCO; "Russia urged to stop using land mines in its war in Ukraine", *ABC News*, 5 April 2022, at; https://abcn.ws/3K9VNW3; "Russia likely using Soviet-era landmines in Ukraine, say U.K. officials", *The Washington Times*, 8 August 2022, at; https://bit.ly/3AdfsA4.

15 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

16 "Land mines create a deadly legacy for Ukraine and possibly beyond", *The Washington Post*, 12 April 2022, at: https://wapo.st/3e2X9WP.

17 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 26 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44l5dsr. This page contains a list and specifications of 11 types of AP mines used in Ukraine by Russia since February 2022.

18 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 2, 3, 8, and 10.

19 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Report, 15 June 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3PO3Yss, pp. 4, 7, and 8; "New Russian Land Mine Poses Special Risk in Ukraine", *The New York Times*, 6 April 2022, at: https://nyti.ms/3TgF9bL; and Presentation of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023, slide 4.

20 HALO, "Ukraine", undated but accessed 28 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3Cr0lbj.

21 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 26 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44l5dsr.

22 Human Rights Watch, "Russia's Drone-Dropped Landmines Threaten Human Lives and Hard-Won Humanitarian Protections", 10 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44l5dsr.

23 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 3 and 8.

24 Presentation of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023, slide 5. See also, "Russians hid an anti-tank mine in a pedestrian figurine - this is a war crime" (Ukrainian), *Canal 24*, 7 August 2023, at: https://bit.ly/45rALvB.

The full nature and extent of contamination caused by use of AP and AV mines by Russia in Ukraine since February 2022 will remain unclear until an effective cessation of hostilities and a comprehensive survey has been completed (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Ukraine for further information). While Russia is not a State Party or signatory to the APMBC it has obligations under international human rights law to clear AP mines as soon as possible in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no formal civilian mine action programme in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by units of the Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,[25] military engineers of the Airborne Forces,[26] Federal Ministry of Defence engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the MES through its specialised demining units, referred to as EMERCOM Demining.

Russia's armed forces established an International Demining Action Centre in 2014. The Centre serves as a base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine action centre as the term is generally understood in humanitarian mine action.[27] Since 2021, Russia has referred instead to its International Mine Action Centre (IMAC).[28] In July 2024, the Russian MoD reported that IMAC specialists organise clearance, quality assure and quality control demining, and support the subsequent transfer of cleared areas to the heads of municipal administrations.[29]

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), of which Russia is a member, has reported that in 2022, following a meeting of the Council of Defence Ministers of the CIS members, Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, had pledged to create a joint unit for humanitarian demining in the CIS.[30] No timeline for this was given and Mine Action Review has not been able to identify any further information on this.

Russia reports regularly on its efforts to deploy troops internationally to clear landmines and train foreign military personnel in related activities. In 2024, IMAC trained 49 foreign specialists and undertook demining in Lao PDR,[31] as it has done since 2021.[32]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It has been reported that IMAC receives a contribution from Russia's federal budget, though the amount is unknown.[33]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Gender and diversity issues are not thought to be mainstreamed into mine action in Russia.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Russia reports that it has "developed environmentally safe technologies for the disposal of the most dangerous types of scatterable mines, such as PFM mines, through the method of cementation".[34] EMERCOM Demining claims to "strictly comply with environmental protection measures".[35] It is not known how else, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Russia in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

25 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2022), Form A.

26 "Military engineers of the Airborne Forces neutralized more than 15 thousand explosive objects in 2021", MoD of the Russian Federation, at: https://bit.ly/3SfbDCt.

27 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, 31 March 2015, Form B; and meeting with Andrey Grebenshchikov, First Secretary, Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 9 April 2015.

28 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Form E.

29 "Military engineers checked the readiness of the humanitarian demining unit to perform tasks on the territory of the DPR", MoD of the Russian Federation, 27 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3yE6L4T.

30 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), "Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that a joint unit of humanitarian demining will be created in the CIS", 27 June 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3b1ulgn.

31 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form E; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Forms B, F, and H.

32 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

33 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

34 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

35 EMERCOM Demining, accessed 16 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44VN7O9.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Russia records information on the use of EO at the headquarters of military units, with annual reports submitted to the Office of the Chief of Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.[36]

Russia submits Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol II Article 13 reports and CCW Protocol V Article 10 reports annually. In March 2025, Russia submitted both a Protocol V Article 10 report and a Protocol II Article 13 report covering 2024.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known whether Russia has a national mine action strategy in place. It is also not known whether Russia has annual work plans for AP mine survey and clearance or criteria for the prioritisation of clearance tasks.

In its most recent Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Russia states that further work to clear EO "from areas within the military districts" was planned for 2025, specifically in places where military parades and ceremonial marches were to take place, though locations were not specified. Tasks were to be planned in accordance with the assignments of " the President and Government of the Russian Federation; legal acts of Russia's Ministry of Defence; and the orders of military district commanders".[37]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

It is not known whether Russia has national mine action standards (NMAS) in place for land release. In 2024, as previously, Russia reported that procedures for ERW disposal are regulated by the "Manual for clearing terrain from explosive objects for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation".[38]

In its most recent Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Russia outlined improvements planned for 2025 to ensure effective use of personnel and resources and prevent cases of death and injury among personnel, namely: eliminating survey and clearance undertaken without use of personal protective equipment (PPE); training during the winter; elimination of use of conscripted personnel in demining; and improved planning of tasks.[39]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Reporting on clearance of land affected by explosive ordnance in 2024, Russia referred, as previously, to the involvement of the demining units and the Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation[40] as well as the EMERCOM demining units.[41] "EMERCOM Demining" has its own website under this name.[42] According to the website, EMERCOM Demining has capabilities in non-technical survey (NTS); technical survey (TS); manual, mechanical, and underwater demining; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); battle area clearance (BAC); and training of demining specialists.[43]

For 2021, Russia reported that 1,608 military personnel were involved in explosive ordnance clearance, including 292 officers, 38 survey teams, 464 automobile technician units, and 27 engineering technician units.[44] Mine Action Review has not been able to source more recent information on Russia's military survey and clearance capacity. One Russian news article claimed in January 2025 that over 150 deminers had been trained since 2023, and "several thousand" more would need to be trained to "demine all the territories liberated over the course of the special military operation."[45] It is not clear if this "liberated" territory refers to mine-affected areas of the Russian Federation that have been occupied by Ukrainian forces, or mine-affected Ukrainian sovereign territory under Russia's control, or both.

36 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form B.

37 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form I.

38 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Reports covering 2022, Form C; and covering 2024, Form C.

39 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form I.

40 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form E; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form B.

41 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and EMERCOM, "Alexander Kurenkov summed up the work of the Russian Emergencies Ministry in the main areas of activity", 19 July 2023.

42 EMERCOM Demining, accessed 16 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/454eruC.

43 EMERCOM Demining, "Activities", accessed 16 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/45eoMDp.

44 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Form B.

45 "Special military operation" is a term frequently used in Russian sources to refer to the Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in 2022.

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Russia reported that, in 2024, a little over 3,189 hectares (31.89km$^2$) of territory were "cleared of mines" in the Russian Federation, with 179,655 explosive objects detected and destroyed.[46] It is not specified how many mines were cleared, nor of what type (AP or AV). Clearance operations by EMERCOM pyrotechnic units in 2024 took place in the Chechen Republic; Kaliningrad region; and in Baltic Sea waters.[47] As previously noted, in March 2025 various media sources reported that Russian forces had begun to clear AP mines from border areas of the Kursk region.[48] This total reported for 2024 is substantially lower than the 82,408 hectares (824.1km$^2$) reported as cleared of mines in the Russian Federation in 2023.[49] Again, it was not specified how many mines were cleared, nor of what type (AP or AV). In any case, the extent of clearance reported for 2023 is not credible.

In July 2024, a report by Russia's MoD said that IMAC and the combined detachment of Engineering Troops had "checked the readiness" of the demining detachment of one of the humanitarian demining companies of the armed forces to work in the "liberated territories in the rear areas of the SVO".[50] The same report states that "specialised organizations" were involved in clearing EO in the Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as "ensuring the safety of the local population and carrying out agricultural work".[51]

The article claims that, to date in 2024, demining had taken place across 350 hectares (3.5km$^2$) of territory, with more than 6,000 items of EO found, and that, as at July 2024, nine "specialized organizations" comprising more than 250 personnel were involved in humanitarian demining "on the territory of the DPR",[52] under contractual obligations with the Russian MoD. Finally, the MoD article claims that, since 2022, "more than 1,000 hectares of territory have been demined by specialized organizations, and over 19,000 explosive objects have been found". It is not specified if AP mines have been cleared.[53]

It was also reported in July 2024 that EMERCOM personnel had "examined more than 620 hectares of open terrain in the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and detonated about 15,000 landmines", though no time frame is given, nor is it specified how many were AP mines. Footage released by EMERCOM shows deminers detecting EO and clearing the area using an MV-4 machine. The article states that, in the city of Mariupol in particular, some 2,500 explosive devices were found and destroyed. Mine clearance in the area was reported to be ongoing.[54]

### PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Russia has not provided information on whether it has a plan in place for dealing with any residual contamination following completion of clearance of known mined areas.

46 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

47 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

48 "Russian forces start demining border areas of Kursk Region", *TASS*, 15 March 2025; and "Russia begins demining border areas of Kursk region", *The Statesman*, 16 March 2025.

49 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2023), Form B.

50 "SVO", also referred to as "special military operation" and abbreviated as SMO, is used to by the Russian government and pro-Russian sources to denote Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

51 "Military engineers checked the readiness of the humanitarian demining unit to perform tasks on the territory of the DPR", MoD of the Russian Federation, 27 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3yE6L4T.

52 "DPR", sometimes also referred to as "DNR", denotes "The Donetsk People's Republic", created by Russian-backed paramilitary forces in 2014 and claimed to have been annexed by Russia in 2022. It comprises the occupied parts of eastern Ukraine's Donetsk region. The territory of the DPR is sovereign Ukrainian territory.

53 "Military engineers checked the readiness of the humanitarian demining unit to perform tasks on the territory of the DPR", MoD, 27 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3yE6L4T.

54 "About 15,000 explosive devices have been found and destroyed – EMERCOM sappers demining DPR territory", 7 July 2024, *Viory*, at: https://bit.ly/3ytWFnl.

# SOUTH KOREA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

**128KM²**

Massive
(national estimate at October 2021)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Not reported | Not reported |
| Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |
| Non-Technical Survey | Not reported | Not reported |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 167 | 767 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Republic of Korea Army Engineers

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Following the enactment of the "Mine Response Activities Including Mine Clearance Bill" in February 2024, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) set up an "ad-hoc" national mine action centre in March. The Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) led the development of Korean national mine action standards (KMAS), completing an initial draft in February 2025. A Mine Response Activities Committee, which was to assume responsibilities similar to a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), was planned to have been established in February 2025, although at June 2025, it had still not been set up. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) has continued sporadically to emplace anti-personnel (AP) mines in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates North and South Korea, with the risk that heavy rains could result in mines floating into South Korean territory.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Republic of Korea (South Korea) should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **South Korea should establish a national mine action authority as soon as possible to assume responsibility for planning and implementing mine clearance.**
- **South Korea should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- Ministry of National Defence

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army engineers

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Command (UNC)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The DMZ and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, in 1978, and in 1988. Restricted Protection Zones (including Military Protection Zones, established for national security purposes, often surrounding military installations), and rear areas (away from the DMZ) are also mined.

In September 2021, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to the National Assembly that South Korea had 1,308 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) affecting 128km$^2$ (see Table 1).[1] More recent contamination data were not available at the time of writing.

**Table 1: CHAs in South Korea (at September 2021)**[2]

| | Controlled Protection Zones | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | DMZ | CCZ | Restricted Protection Zones | Rear Area | Totals |
| No. of sites | 786 | 433 | 22 | 67 | **1,308** |
| Area (m$^2$) | 10,030,000 | 114,780,000 | 2,470,000 | 880,000 | **128,160,000** |
| No. of mines | 380,000 | 389,000 | 50,000 | *9,000 | **828,000** |

*Following clearance between 1998 and 2007, the Ministry of National Defence reported in 2019 that 3,000 of the 53,000 AP mines it emplaced between 1960 and 1980 had not yet been found and destroyed.[3]

Contamination data reported in 2021 were largely unchanged from those disclosed in previous years. A report presented to a side event at the 2019 APMBC intersessional meetings had similarly referred to 1,308 mined areas containing an estimated 828,000 mines.[4] Information from the Army's Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2018 indicated that 380,000 of the mines were emplaced in 786 sites within the DMZ.[5] These mined areas in the DMZ comprise 771 mapped minefields and 15 undocumented mined areas covering a total of 10.03km$^2$. Other estimates have put the number of mines spread across the border, which is 248km-long and 4km-deep, at 2 million. Experts assert that both North Korea and South Korea have poorly managed their mine-laying and do not know exactly how many they planted or where they are.[6] The Landmine Monitor claims that more than one million mines have been laid in the DMZ along the border with North Korea.[7]

CCZ contamination comprises 257 minefields and 176 undocumented mined areas covering a total of 114.79km$^2$.[8] The Ministry of National Defence reported that it had emplaced some 53,000 M14 AP mines around 37 rear air defence bases between 1960 and 1980. In operations between 1998 and 2007, it cleared around 50,000 of the mines. Floods, landslides, and changes in topography are also believed to have caused mines to move, with some 3,000 mines believed to remain.[9]

1 Press release from the Office of the Rep. Seol-Hoon, 21 October 2021 (unofficial translation), provided via email from Eum Soohong, member, Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL), 16 August 2024.

2 Ibid.; and Yoo Hyun-min, "828,000 landmines buried nationwide…59,000 even south of the Civilian Control Line", *Yonhap News Agency*, 9 October 2020.

3 Ministry of National Defence press release, 16 October 2019.

4 PowerPoint presentation by Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Han Cheol Ki, Side event, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 24 May 2019.

5 South Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS), cited in "Mine Action in the Korean Peninsula", unpublished paper by Eum Soohong, member, KCBL, September 2019.

6 "North Korean landmines could float into South Korea, South warns" *Associated Press*, 17 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4dwBwYj.

7 Landmine Monitor Report 2023, p. 51.

8 United Nations Command (UNC) South Korea PowerPoint presentation in Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) side event, UN National Directors' Meeting, Geneva, 11 February 2020.

9 Ministry of National Defence press release, 16 October 2019.

In November 2022, South Korea reported to the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC that South Korea had not "installed any anti-personnel mines in several years".[10] Three years earlier, South Korea told the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) that it had not laid any minefields since 2000.[11] In June 2023, however, the Ministry of National Defence stated that South Korea "did not plant any new *non-self-destructive* anti-personnel landmines in new areas during the calendar year 2022".[12] Similarly, in May 2024, the Ministry of National Defence stated that: "The Republic of Korea did not plant any new non-self-destructive anti-personnel landmines in new areas during the calendar year 2023."[13] These statements lay the door open to the possibility that self-destructing AP mines might be used in the future.

The South Korean authorities and media sources reported that beginning in late 2023 and into the first half of 2024, North Korea had started to emplace mines in the DMZ, including in areas it had previously cleared.[14] This included reports that North Korean soldiers had laid AP mines on three roads in the DMZ, in mountains and fields,[15] and along inter-Korean railroads.[16] The mines are understood to be a mix of AP mines and anti-vehicle (AV) mines.[17] South Korea has ruled out mining roads in the South in response to the North's actions.[18]

On 17 July 2024, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff highlighted the risk that AP mines emplaced by the North could float into South Korea during heavy rains, and that North Korea might intentionally float mines to South Korea.[19] There was particular concern about a small plastic mine, shaped like a leaf and containing 40 grams of explosive, which had already been found in South Korea according to its military. Another AP mine used by North Korea is a locally manufactured version of a Soviet box mine, with a wooden body. In the past, such box mines have been swept by water into South Korea and found on beaches and riverbanks.[20]

Although reports of North Korea emplacing AP mines in the DMZ tailed off after July 2024, one source claimed that North Korean troops had begun emplacing mines in the DMZ again towards the end of the year: "Since late 2024, Pyongyang has intensified its efforts to strengthen border defenses, including laying additional landmines and erecting anti-tank barriers".[21] In 2025, media again reported that North Korea was laying mines in the DMZ.[22] In June, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a further warning about the risk of AP mines floating from the North into South Korea.[23]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The southern half of the DMZ is controlled by South Korea, but under the Armistice Agreement, the area between the Demarcation Line and the Southern Line Limit is under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Command (UNC) and any mine clearance is conducted with its approval. Demining in the CCZ between the Southern Line Limit and the Civilian Control Line and the rest of South Korea is overseen by the Ministry of National Defence and is conducted exclusively by South Korean army engineers.

The Law on Mine Response Activities Including Mine Clearance was enacted in February 2024. Pursuant to the law, the Ministry of National Defence is to develop a "basic" mine action plan every five years and establish a Mine Response Activity Committee to oversee mine action activities. The law permits qualified organisations to conduct survey and clearance.[24] The law was to take effect a year after promulgation—in February 2025—with preparation to operationalise the law due to take place during 2024.[25] As part of the preparations, in August 2024, the Ministry of National Defence contracted KCBL to develop South Korea's national mine action standards, requesting that it complete a draft by the end of the year, although this actually occurred in February 2025 (see the section below, "Standards and Land Release Efficiency" for further details).[26]

10 Statement of North Korea, APMBC Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21–25 November 2022.

11 Landmine Monitor, "South Korea", accessed 6 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4ckUAHT.

12 Ibid.

13 Landmine Monitor, "South Korea", Last updated 22 September 2024.

14 "North Korea redeploys landmine near Gyeongui Line", *The Dong-A Ilbo*, 5 January 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3WVk4Y4.

15 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), "International Campaign to Ban Landmines concerned at reported landmine use by North Korea", 20 May 2024 (updated 24 July 2024), at: https://bit.ly/4fnqDtL.

16 "Editorial: Resuming loudspeaker broadcasts demands preparedness for any N. Korean provocation", *The Chosun Daily*, 10 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3WMeg2V; and "Concentration of road blocking and fortification in the north… Joint Chiefs of Staff discloses surveillance and reconnaissance data on North Korea" (unofficial translation), *K-Force*, 10 October 2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/4e9uynp3.

17 ICBL, "International Campaign to Ban Landmines concerned at reported landmine use by North Korea".

18 "Map Shows Where North Korea Has Placed Land Mines in Demilitarized Zone", *Newsweek*, 30 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3LLpui2.

19 "North Korean landmines could float into South Korea, South warns", *Associated Press*, 17 July 2024.

20 ICBL, "International Campaign to Ban Landmines concerned at reported landmine use by North Korea".

21 "Exclusive look at the DMZ drama shaking the Korean Peninsula", *Bulgarianmilitary.com*, 9 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mCvdXV.

22 "North Korea notifies UN Command of resumption of work on 'severance with South Korea' barrier-iron fence" (unofficial translation), *Dong-A Ilbo*, 27 March 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/3bf7dpr; and "There is no answer to the repatriation of residents… North Korea notifies UNC to 'resume frontline work' after 8 months" (unofficial translation), *JoongAng Ilbo*, 30 June 2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/yc86p3tm.

23 "Military warns of North Korean land mines washing into South", *Korea JoongAng Daily*, 23 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4lkbs6a; and "Military urges caution against N. Korean land mines possibly being brought to South by heavy downpours", *The Korea Times*, 22 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3HnvLSm.

24 Statement of the Republic of Korea on Universalization, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 18–20 June 2024.

25 Emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 26 January and 14 August 2024.

26 Emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 14 August 2024 and 2 April 2025.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has made reference to an "ad-hoc national mine action center" that was set up in at the Military Installation Bureau of the Republic of Korea in March 2024.[27] In June 2025, South Korea indicated that the Mine Response Activities Committee which was due to be set up in February 2025,[28] was still to be established, stating that Ministry of National Defence will "establish a Mine Response Activity Committee to deliberate on matters related to mine action activities."[29] The South Korean army remains the only organisation conducting mine clearance in South Korea.[30]

UNDP has shared its approach to building the capacities of a national mine action authority with the Korean authorities. Additionally, UNDP has consulted with the Ministry of National Defence on legislating the Presidential (Enforcement) Decree and the Ministry of National Defence Regulation, which are attached to the mine action law of February 2024.[31]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The level of funding for AP mine clearance in South Korean in recent years is not known. A Joint Chiefs of Staff memo to the National Assembly reported an increase in the budget for mine clearance from KRW180 million (approximately US$161,000) in 2018 to KRW330 million back in 2019, and KRW8.2 billion (US$7.3 million) in 2020.[32]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The Law on Mine Response Activities Including Mine Clearance does not specifically mention gender and diversity. The Korean legal system, however, enshrines fundamental rights to groups falling under this heading, which should be reflected at the implementation level. The draft KMAS stipulates that gender and diversity should be addressed in the Korean context. With risk education, for example, the KMAS explicitly states that access must be guaranteed to people from abroad, disabled people, and people with little education, living in mine-contaminated areas.[33]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The draft KMAS were developed with reference to the latest IMAS on environmental management in mine action (IMAS 07.13, second edition), and the revised standards on environmental considerations were incorporated.[34] No further information on how environmental considerations are incorporated into current demining practice in South Korea were available.

27 Email from Goosoon Kwon, Chief Technical Advisor for Mine Action, UNDP, 5 April 2025.

28 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 14 August 2024.

29 Statement of the Republic of Korea on Universalization, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 16–20 June 2025.

30 Interview with Cho Jai Kook, Coordinator, KCBL, and Eum Soohong, KCBL, in Geneva, 13 February 2020; and emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 26 January 2024 and 23 August 2025.

31 Email from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 5 April 2025.

32 Memorandum from the Engineering Department of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Assembly (unofficial translation by Eum Soohong, KCBL), October 2020.

33 Emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 23 August 2025.

34 Ibid.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Little information is available about South Korea's information management and reporting system for mine clearance. South Korea has stated that the military collects and analyses all available data,[35] and at the APMBC Intersessional meetings in 2024 and 2025, South Korea indicated how many AP mines it had destroyed in the previous year.[36] However, information on its information management system is not available, and South Korea does not make public comprehensive, up-to-date contamination, survey and release data for AP mined area and for the number of AP mines it destroys.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

In June 2025, South Korea confirmed that it would "devise a basic mine action plan over five years".[37] There is no available information about any progress in this regard.

In 2019, the Ministry of National Defence announced that it had embarked on a three-year programme to complete survey and clearance of rear areas by October 2021. The proposal called for demining capacity to be increased from 6 teams with 200 personnel to 31 teams with 1,200 personnel. It also called for investment in upgrading detectors to detect plastic mines and in mechanical assets.[38] The extent to which the Army has progressed in implementing the plan remains unclear, but data provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on mine contamination in September 2021 appear to have remained constant since at least 2019 (see Table 1 above and explanatory text). In the past, South Korea has reported using a risk management approach to residual contamination.[39]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

As noted above, the Ministry of National Defence commissioned KCBL to develop national mine action standards. Work began in August 2024 in collaboration with national and international demining experts, seeking to align the standards as closely as possible with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) while ensuring compatibility with domestic law and the specific circumstances in South Korea. In February 2025, KCBL submitted the draft KMAS which comprising 22 chapters and 6 related technical documents.[40] As at February 2025, the draft documents were undergoing a review by the Ministry of Government Legislation to ensure consistency with existing legal frameworks.[41]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

It is not known how many South Korean military personnel engage in AP mine clearance. South Korea has highlighted how the army has developed demining expertise since 1990; that it launched a specialist unit in 2019; and that it can work simultaneously on up to 16 sites.[42] In 2021, the Army Engineering School initiated a demining training programme in which 249 officers participated;[43] and in 2022, 317 army officers attended the demining programme at the School.[44]

In addition to running expert demining courses at its Engineering School, South Korea has sent team leaders on training courses run by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Colombia's International Demining Centre (CIDES), and the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Center Centre (ARMAC) in Cambodia.[45]

South Korea has said that it uses the latest demining equipment, highlighting the various mechanical assets it deploys, which include the Armoured Excavator, Vibrator Skeleton Bucket, and the Spider Excavator, and its use of remote-control systems. It is developing technology at its Future Innovation Centre, has adopted artificial intelligence detection technology, and uses robots to confirm data. It also uses laser technology to destroy surface mines, and mine and explosive ordnance detection robots that detect, mark, and clear mines.[46]

35 Presentation by the South Korean Ministry of National Defence and UNDP at the 27th International Meeting of Mine Action Directors & UN Advisors (NDM27), 29 April 2024.

36 Ibid., and Statement of the Republic of Korea on Universalization, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 16–20 June 2025.

37 Ibid.

38 Ministry of National Defence press release, 16 October 2019.

39 Presentation by South Korean Ministry of National Defence and UNDP, NDM27, 29 April 2024.

40 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 2 April 2025.

41 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 23 August 2025.

42 Presentation by South Korean Ministry of National Defence and UNDP, NDM27, 29 April 2024.

43 Statement of South Korea, APMBC Twentieth Meeting of States Parties (20MSP), 24 November 2022.

44 Statement of South Korea on Universalization, APMBC Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP), 20–24 November 2023.

45 Presentation by South Korean Ministry of National Defence and UNDP, NDM27, 29 April 2024.

46 Ibid.

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

South Korea maintains it is unable to accede to the APMBC: "In light of the unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea is yet to accede to the APMBC while it aligns itself with the objectives and purposes of the Convention and remains concerned about the humanitarian impacts of the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines".[47]

Comprehensive data for AP mine clearance for South Korea are not available. South Korea reported to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2025 that it "has been on a steady path of anti-personnel mine clearance where possible".[48] It reported clearing 167 AP mines in 2024, a substantial decrease on the 767 AP mines it reported clearing in 2023, when it said it had adhered to "core IMAS principles".[49] It did not provide data about the area(s) cleared or the location for either year.

South Korea has also disclosed partial information on AP mine clearance for earlier years. At the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties in November 2023, South Korea reported that in 2022, 822 AP mines were cleared from an area of approximately 377,000m$^2$, but again, did not state where the clearance took place.[50] In November 2022, in its statement to the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, South Korea reported it was "continuing with its mine clearing efforts, where possible, in a systemic and phased manner" and in line with IMAS, but did not provide information on the area cleared or number of mines found and destroyed.[51] According to online media, 120,000m$^2$ of minefields in rear air-defence sites south of the CCZ were cleared between April 2020 and July 2023 with 180 mines found and destroyed.[52] In October 2019, the Ministry of National Defence had declared its intent to clear all mines from the rear area although the task remained unfinished in 2023.[53]

South Korea has conducted some demining operations with a view to exhuming military casualties. From April to November 2022, South Korea resumed operations to exhume remains of Korean War casualties, with a total of 45 bodies found, and conducted demining in the Baekmagoji area of the DMZ. Operations had been suspended following threat of hostile actions from North Korea in the border area.[54] South Korea reported clearing 158 mines (not disaggregated by type) and 2,410 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the course of operations to exhume remains of Korean War casualties around Arrowhead Hill in the DMZ in 2020. North Korea, however, did not conduct clearance in the DMZ as provided for in the September 2018 Panmunjom Declaration.[55]

In 2023, the Ministry of National Defence was planning to conduct exhumation operations in the Baekmagoji area from April to November and further demining around seven rear air-defence sites south of the CCZ.[56] The Agency for KIA Recovery & Identification under the Ministry of National Defence (MAKRI) is responsible for these operations. MAKRI is also collaborating with the US Department of Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency to recover the remains of American soldiers from the DMZ.[57] No information on progress with these operations was available.

47 Statement of South Korea on Universalization, 21MSP, 20–24 November 2023.

48 Statement of South Korea on Universalization, Intersessional Meetings, 16–20 June 2025.

49 Ibid; and Statement of South Korea on Universalization, Intersessional Meetings, 18–20 June 2024.

50 Statement of South Korea on Universalization, 21MSP, 20–24 November 2023.

51 Statement of South Korea, 20MSP, 24 November 2022.

52 "Civilian, Government, and Military Collaborate for Public Verification… 'Beyond Normal' National Safety", Ministry of National Defence, 10 August 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3Phqc9i.

53 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 26 August 2023.

54 Emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 3 and 11 April 2022 and 26 August 2023; and "We will not forget the noble sacrifices of our national heroes", Ministry of National Defence, 30 November 2022 at: https://bit.ly/3szd2LQ.

55 Jung Bitna, "Unearthed 143 remains of this year's Arrowhead Bill", Yonhap News Agency, 19 November 2020.

56 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 4 September 2023.

57 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 26 August 2023.

# SYRIA

(An Arabic language copy of this report is available on the Syria page of the Mine Action Review website)

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, but at least 20km²
in the north-east and other areas

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 3.61 | 3.10 |
| Technical Survey | 0.61 | 1.90 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0.02 | 2.74 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 84 (incl. 28 in spot tasks) | 69 (incl. 15 in spot tasks) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

**In areas formerly controlled by the Assad regime:**

- Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society (SARC)
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Safety Solutions

**Operating in the north-west:**

- Syria Civil Defence (SCD) (also called the White Helmets)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

**Operating in the north-east:**

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- ReachOut
- Roj Mine Control Organization (RMCO)
- SafeLand Organisation

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 has enabled a shift to a countrywide approach to mine action coordination, with operators reporting improved access and cooperation. Clearance output increased in 2024 while survey output fell, but operators have been expanding survey and clearance capacity in 2025 to reach previously inaccessible areas. However, major challenges remain, including a surge in casualties, persistent funding shortfalls, the absence of a national contamination baseline, only nascent managerial capacity in the transitional government, and ongoing security risks.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Syria should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Syria should urgently establish a baseline of anti-personnel (AP) mined area to enable effective prioritisation and planning, with particular focus on agricultural land due to its importance for food security and economic recovery, and the high number of victims.**

- **Syria should continue strengthening the structure and capacities of its national mine action programme in close collaboration with the Syria Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) and partners, as well as with other stakeholders promoting application of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) for establishment of a mine action programme (IMAS 02.10).**
- **Syria should continue to strengthen coordination mechanisms and information management by promoting consistent, timely data sharing among all mine action operators and integrating the Northeast Syria Mine Action Centre (NESMAC) into a unified national system.**
- **Syria should develop national mine action standards (NMAS) in consultation with operators and ensure their application across all survey and clearance activities.**
- **Syria should systematically assess and address informal clearance practices by untrained civilians, which pose severe risks to life.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- Ministry for Emergency and Disaster Management

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Syria Civil Defence (SCD) (also called the White Helmets) (concluded operations in August 2025 and are now embedded in the Ministry for Emergency and Disaster Management)
- Roj Mine Control Organization (RMCO)
- SafeLand Organisation
- ReachOut

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Enhancing Human Security (ITF)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society (SARC)
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Syria is heavily contaminated by mines, including of an improvised nature, which were used extensively by parties to the country's 13-year-old armed conflicts. It also has mined areas left by a succession of Arab-Israeli wars since 1948. The Syrian government laid mines along borders with Türkiye and Lebanon in 2012, with Turkish authorities claiming that up to 715,000 mines had been planted along its border with Syria.[1] Syrian government forces also placed mines with a view to slowing the advance of opposition fighters as well as, along with Hezbollah forces, in besieged areas such as Madaya and al-Zabadani (Rural Damascus).[2]

Non-State armed groups (NSAGs) also laid mines, including around besieged towns such as Kafarayya and al-Fouaa in 2015–18.[3] In Raqqa, where 80% of the city has been destroyed, rubble was mixed with booby-traps left by the parties to the armed conflict.[4] Retreating Islamic State forces emplaced huge numbers of AP mines of an improvised nature and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The full extent of AP mine contamination is unknown. No comprehensive countrywide survey of contamination has yet been conducted. Prior to the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, such a survey was not feasible. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is now leading efforts to coordinate with selected mine action implementing partners to prioritise a baseline non-technical survey (NTS) of explosive ordnance (EO) contamination across accessible areas in north-west and central Syria more fully.[5]

1 Human Rights Watch, "Syria: Army planting banned landmines", 13 March 2012, at: http://bit.ly/2Ybz9rK; "Thousands of landmines planted along Turkish-Syrian border", *Middle East Monitor*, 21 November 2013, at: https://bit.ly/2Mt7efE.

2 Physicians for Human Rights and the Syrian American Medical Society, "Madaya: Portrait of a Syrian town under siege", July 2016, at: https://bit.ly/3MKrpE7, p. 6; Syria Direct, "Walking in the darkness: Hunger drives the most desperate to risk Madaya land mines", 18 April 2016, at: https://bit.ly/3ZsrmV0; and Syrian Association for Citizens Dignity, "The displacement of Madaya and Zabadani, the complex crime and prospect of return (translation from original Arabic), 5 May 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3XKV0na.

3 Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), "On the International Day for Mines Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action: Landmines Continue to Plague Large Areas of Syria and Threaten the Lives of Millions", Report, 4 April 2023, at: https://bit.ly/43Vp2UQ, pp. 3 and 17; and "Inside Foua: A Shi'a town in the eye of the Syrian storm", *Middle East Eye*, 19 August 2018.

4 Humanity & Inclusion (HI), "Syria: it will take at least two generations to rebuild", 25 February 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3fPFoaF.

5 Emails from Adesh Singh, Technical Advisor, DanChurchAid (DCA), 6 June 2025; and Joseph McCartan, Chief Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

Estimates indicate that more than 65% of all Syrians—15.4 million of the 23.6 million population—are at risk from explosive ordnance, with extensive impact on communities, farmland, and infrastructure.[6] Contamination is particularly high in Deir ez-Zor in the north east where roughly a quarter of all accidents since December have taken place. Contributing factors include former frontlines being dismantled and redistributed as arable land, restricted humanitarian access on both sides of the Euphrates river, and limited access to essential services, forcing people to travel long distances.[7] The 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated that the highest percentages of explosive contamination were in Quneitra, As-Sweida, Rural Damascus, Aleppo, Idleb, Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, and Dar'a governorates and Damascus governorate neighbourhoods.[8] The Syria Civil Defence (SCD), also known as the White Helmets, published a map of hazardous areas of northern Syria, showing the highest intensity of EO contamination in the sub-districts of Saraqeb (Idlib governorate) and Al-Atareb (Aleppo governorate), followed by Jisr Al-shighur, Nabul (Idlib), Al-Bab, and Tadaf (Aleppo) uncovered between 26 November 2024 and 1 March 2025.[9]

Since December 2024, Syria has witnessed a surge in casualties from explosive ordnance. More than 1,000 victims, a third of them children, were reported in December 2024 to May 2025. The 414 people killed and 592 injured compares to the 912 casualties reported for the whole of 2024.[10] The highest numbers of casualties were reported in Deir ez-Zor, Idlib, and Aleppo governorates.[11] In June 2025, the Minister for Emergency and Disaster Management noted that the ministry records victims of mines and other EO on daily basis.[12] The recent rise in casualties in Syria is linked to multiple factors. Abandoned military vehicles and weapons stockpiles have increased civilian exposure, while military strikes on ammunition storage areas have scattered ordnance more widely. Since December, many internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to areas with contamination, often unaware of the risks. Economic hardship has also pushed people to collect scrap metal, which includes EO. Without a fully functioning mine action programme, civilians are increasingly trying to clear or dismantle explosives themselves, often at great personal risk.[13]

Data on the types of destroyed mines provided by operators confirm that many AP mines used in Syria are of an improvised nature. For example, all AP mines found and destroyed by Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and DanChurchAid (DCA) in 2023 were of an improvised nature.[14] Many of the mines have acquired local names from the way they were crafted (e.g., the ruler, the rosary, or the stone). Other organisations or media outlets documented use of Russian-made PMN-2 and POMZ AP mines.[15] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) jointly assessed the needs of 573 communities in Aleppo, Al-Hassakeh, Daraa, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Homs, Idlib, Quneitra, and Sweida governorates. According to the assessment, 530 (92%) communities reported the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW). Of the assessed communities, 57% reported the presence of AP mines, 46% reported cluster munition remnants (CMR), and 25% other EO.[16]

In 2024, DCA conducted NTS in multiple areas of Raqqa governorate, including the Hurriyeh, Nahda, and Tass Heyah neighbourhoods of Raqqa, as well as Abu Jadi and Um-Saharij villages. Direct evidence of EO contamination, including improvised anti-personnel mines, was identified. A total of 61,131m$^2$ was recorded as contaminated and added to the information management database. Most of the areas were located in urban residential settings and were cleared by DCA's mine action teams.[17]

MAG has been conducting surveys across several governorates in the north-east of Syria since 2016. Between January and December 2024, MAG conducted 111 Contamination Baseline Assessments, identifying 76 hazardous areas (suspected and confirmed). It was found that improvised AP mines and CMR are both present and significantly hinder daily activities, including farming, livestock grazing, movement between communities, and access to humanitarian assistance. At the beginning of 2025, conventional AP mined area was also identified in newly liberated areas in the south of Raqqa. In total, 449,190m$^2$ of previously unrecorded AP mined area was added to the national database in 2024.[18]

Humanity & Inclusion (HI) conducted a total of 37 Community Impact Surveys (CIS) across 37 communities in north-east Syria, with contamination posing a significant risk in 31 communities (83% of locations accessed). In north-west Syria, CIS reports were made of 27 communities, with

6 UNMAS, Syria, data as of June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4lFMXkn.

7 Mine Action Area of Responsibility (AoR) Syria, Situation Update No. 3, covering 1–30 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4eBpEWT.

8 Syria 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview, February 2024, OCHA, at: https://bit.ly/4erk3St.

9 The White Helmets website (in Arabic), accessed on 4 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4fks3Wl.

10 Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report No. 6, as of 27 May 2025, OCHA, at: https://bit.ly/3TmDkey; and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "International Mine Awareness Day: Addressing the threat of explosive ordnance in Syria", News release, 3 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3IdKMGy.

11 Email from Aida Burnett-Cargill, Co-coordinator, Syria Mine Action AoR, 5 September 2025.

12 "The Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management to Al-Ikhbariah: The Ministry's mission is to plan and prepare before disasters strike", *Al-Ikhbariah* (in Arabic), 20 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/46FjmDz.

13 ICRC, "International Mine Awareness Day: Addressing the threat of explosive ordnance in Syria", 3 April 2025.

14 Emails from Adesh Singh, Acting HMA OM, DCA, 16 May 2024; and Riaan Boshoff, MAG, 21 May 2024.

15 SNHR, "On the International Day for Mines Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action: Landmines Continue to Plague Large Areas of Syria and Threaten the Lives of Millions", Report, p. 6; See also The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, "Syria's Landmines: Silent Killing", Report, April 2021, pp. 11–15.

16 ICRC and SARC, Mine Risk Needs Assessment and Education, PowerPoint presentation to the 24th NDM, 25 May 2021, slides 7–8, at: https://bit.ly/3zxkRRk.

17 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

18 Email from Najat El Hamri, Regional Director, MAG, 3 June 2025.

contamination found to pose a significant risk in 22 communities (81% of locations accessed).[19] In the same year, HALO conducted NTS of three minefields in north-west Syria and added 22,262m$^2$ of previously unrecorded AP mined area to its database.[20] Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) discovered previously unrecorded AP mined area in areas then controlled by the then Assad regime in 2024. However, NPA were not permitted by the authorities in power at the time to record the areas, as they were located around military and security installations.[21]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Syria also has significant contamination from CMR and other ERW (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Syria for further information).

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is not yet a fully functioning national mine action authority or national mine action centre in Syria although both are in the process of being established. In March 2025, the Syrian transitional government appointed Raed al-Saleh, former head of the White Helmets, as Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management with responsibility for coordinating mine action in the country. UNMAS will provide capacity development support to the ministry to establish a national mine action authority and national mine action centre.[22]

On 20 June 2025, the Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management stated that the Ministry intends to establish a national mine action centre "soon", in collaboration with national and international partners. He added that the Ministry also plans on establishing a national emergency response system[23] and designate zones that are safe for return, construction, and agriculture, within three years.[24]

In north-east Syria, mine action is coordinated by the Northeast Syria Mine Action Centre (NESMAC), which was established by local authorities in 2021. Until July 2024, iMMAP was embedded within NESMAC to provide capacity-building support, particularly in information management. When iMMAP withdrew due to the loss of funding, MAG assumed a more active role in supporting NESMAC.[25] In 2024, MAG continued to strengthen NESMAC's capacity, particularly in information management (IM), delivering four training courses in IM, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 2, quality management, and gender equity, diversity, and inclusion (GEDI), for 11 NESMAC staff. MAG's IM unit also supported NESMAC in collecting and analysing data from mine action actors to develop an ongoing portal-dashboard project.[26] DCA provided limited in-kind support to sustain NESMAC's operations in 2024, providing equipment such as solar panels, batteries, and electronics to improve office capabilities.[27] In November 2024, HI trained 16 NESMAC staff (7 women and 9 men) in disability, gender, and age (DGA) issues as part of its victim assistance activities.[28] HI also reported, however, that coordination with NESMAC remains a challenge.

Since iMMAP ended its capacity support in July 2024, NESMAC has faced significant operational constraints, limiting its ability to provide consistent technical oversight, coordination, tasking, and information management. Limited institutional capacity and lack of formal recognition also hinder robust quality assurance (QA) and standardised procedures. As a result, mine action actors in north-east Syria must rely on external coordination and technical support, highlighting the need for continued capacity-building and resources to strengthen NESMAC's role. Meanwhile, no formal relationship exists between NESMAC and UNMAS, which cites "political sensitivities" and unclear dynamics between Damascus and Hassakeh as barriers. NESMAC remains a de facto coordination body for mine action in north-east Syria but is not officially recognised by international frameworks or the UN system.[29]

Prior to the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024, mine action coordination in Syria was divided into three separate regions: government-controlled areas, the north-west, and the north-east, with coordination mechanisms operating separately in each and with no effective integration between them. This was the case even though the "Whole of Syria" coordination mechanism was based in Amman and had been tasked to bring the response together. Since the fall of the regime, a country-wide approach has become the central framework for mine action coordination.[30]

19 Email from Lejla Susic, AVR Specialist, HI, 2 June 2025.

20 Email from Simon Jackson, Programme Manager, HALO, 4 June 2025.

21 Email from Chris Tierney, Country Director, NPA, 24 June 2025.

22 UNMAS, UNMAS Syria and the Syrian Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management Discuss Future Cooperation on Mine Action, 15 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44AAfwz; and email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

23 "The Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management to Al-Ikhbariah: The Ministry's mission is to plan and prepare before disasters strike", (Arabic), *Al-Ikhbariah*, (Arabic), 20 June 2025; and "The Minister of Emergency

24 "The Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management launches a plan for safe zones and a mine action centre", (Arabic), *Ultra Syria*, 21 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mlali6.

25 Email from Aida Burnett-Cargill, Syria Mine Action AoR, 6 October 2025.

26 Email from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025.

27 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

28 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.

29 Ibid.

30 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

The Syria Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR), part of the Syria Protection Cluster, with UNMAS as the cluster lead agency and with a co-coordinator hosted by HI. That said, as at June 2025, UNMAS was facing delays in staff recruitment and did not yet have an MA AoR Coordinator or full-time IM officer in place.[31] The Syria MA AoR unifies all previously existing coordination structures and hosts technical working groups (TWGs) in: explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), victim assistance, IM, survey and clearance, and advocacy. The Syria MA AoR coordinates the activities of more than 38 partners nationwide implementing a range of mine action programmes.[32] MA AoR partners must be engaged in at least two pillars of mine action, one of which must include survey and clearance to be core members of the AoR. Other partners directly coordinate with relevant technical working groups.[33] AoR coordination meetings are held twice monthly, beginning on 6 February 2025, while TWGs meet monthly, except for the Advocacy TWG which meets twice a month.[34] Since July 2025, the NESMAC and national mine action centre have been participating in AoR meetings.[35] According to operators, cooperation and information sharing among national and international mine action actors has seen a significant improvement.[36]

Operators have generally reported a more enabling environment for their work since December 2024, but numerous challenges remain. HI reported facing significant constraints from new requirements as of January 2025 for international NGOs to operate under the umbrella of Syria Trust for Development (STD) or SARC, limiting independence and impartiality, and a provision that calls for international NGOs to hand over all assets to the government prior to closing operations.[37] NPA reported that access permission processes are lengthy, taking up to six weeks, although these now cover larger areas at the governorate level for three-month, extendable periods, and visitor visas are easier and cheaper to obtain than before.[38] In north-east Syria, DCA and MAG operate in a relatively enabling environment with good international staff access via the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) border, cooperative local authorities, and streamlined MoU processes. Both operators reported facing delays and restrictions on importing mine action equipment, though, with a ban in place on the importation of explosives and equipment such as detectors, GPS, and Push to Talk radios.[39] In north-west Syria, HALO reported improved international staff access via Jordan since December 2024 and strong relations with local authorities enabling wide operational freedom, but persistent challenges in importing large equipment, leading to reliance on local procurement.[40]

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The mine action sector remained underfunded throughout 2024, with only 13% of the required US$51 million received.[41] In 2024, DCA's survey and clearance operations were funded by the European Union-Foreign Policy Instruments (EU-FPI) until June, with internal gap funding covering the remainder of the year. DCA secured United Kingdom (UK) Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) for survey and clearance operations in 2025.[42] HALO's survey and clearance in 2024 and 2025 were funded by France, Ireland, and Norway, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Syria Cross-border Humanitarian Fund (SCHF). In addition, the Gould Foundation provided funding for a single project in 2024, and new donors Germany and Canada began funding in 2025. Ireland, Norway, and France were, though, ending their support by December 2025.[43]

MAG's survey and clearance operations were funded by US Department of State Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) and Norway NMFA-Norad in 2024, with the Netherlands joining in 2025. US funding faced a temporary suspension until a waiver was issued to continue operations although, as at June 2025, no official outcome has been received.[44] HI's 2024 survey and clearance donors were the US Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), OCHA SCHF, and the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO). In 2025, BHA stopped funding while the rest of the donors have remained.[45]

UNMAS's 2024 donors included UN OCHA Syria Humanitarian Fund (SHF), Belgium, Estonia, Finland, and the Republic of Korea, which joined as a new donor. For 2025, donors included OCHA SHF, Belgium, UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), UN-Habitat, Italy, and Finland, with Canada in the pipeline.[46] NPA was funded in 2024 by the Norwegian MFA, Japan, and SHF. This continued into 2025 with Norwegian funding responsibility moving to Norad and plans for OCHA to also support.[47]

31 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
32 Mine Action AoR, Situation Update No. 3 (covering April 2025).
33 Online meeting with Aida Burnett-Cargill, Syria Mine Action AoR, 7 August 2025.
34 Emails from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025; and online meeting with Aida Burnett-Cargill, Syria Mine Action AoR, 7 August 2025.
35 Email from Aida Burnett-Cargill, Syria Mine Action AoR, 6 October 2025.
36 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.
37 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
38 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.
39 Emails from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; and Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
40 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025.
41 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
42 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
43 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025.
44 Email from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025.
45 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
46 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
47 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

There is no national gender and diversity policy for the mine action programme. However, several operators have their own frameworks in place.[48] DCA has both a global and a country-specific gender and diversity policy with an implementation plan. MAG and NPA each have institutional gender and diversity policies and implementation plans.[49] UNMAS has an institutional gender and diversity strategy.[50] SCD has a gender strategy and a diversity strategy, along with policies to prevent discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, or sex.[51]

HI has reported working to integrate gender and diversity considerations into its humanitarian and development programs in Syria, in alignment with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Equality Strategy for Syria 2024–26,[52] which aims to advance gender justice and women's empowerment by increasing their participation in decision-making, improving access to resources and services, and engaging men as allies.[53]

**Table 1: Gender composition of operators in 2024**[54]

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNMAS | 12 | 6 (50%) | 4 | 2 (50%) | 2 | 1 (50%) |
| NPA | 70 | 31 (44%) | 27 | 10 (37%) | 54 | 23 (43%) |
| HALO | 58 | 19 (33%) | 14 | 5 (36%) | 48 | 14 (29%) |
| MAG | 222 | 43 (19%) | 39 | 7 (18%) | 153 | 34 (22%) |
| DCA | 35 | 7 (20%) | 4 | 1 (25%) | 31 | 6 (19%) |
| HI | 254 | 73 (29%) | 29 | 7 (24%) | 6 | 4 (67%) |
| SCD* | 3,246 | 419 (13%) | 630 | 88 (14%) | 2,616 | 331 (13%) |
| **Totals** | **3,897** | **598 (15%)** | **747** | **120 (16%)** | **2,910** | **413 (14%)** |

*Data are from 2023.

In 2024, all HALO Syria staff received safeguarding training on gender and power dynamics, with improved reporting mechanisms to help all staff, especially women and vulnerable groups, feel safe speaking up about abuses.[55] MAG's senior management held workshops and awareness sessions to strengthen staff and NESMAC understanding of gender, diversity, and practical integration in fieldwork.[56] HI deployed an Inclusion Technical Specialist based in Amman to support projects across Syria, ensuring interventions are responsive to disability, gender, and age through inclusive case management and technical assistance for local service providers in health, education, livelihoods, and protection. The specialist also advances HI's "BeHinclusive" action plan, highlighting its commitment to inclusive humanitarian action.[57]

In 2025, NPA delivered training to 20 students, half of whom were women, and over the past year has promoted more women than men to team leader positions based on performance. Four NPA staff were trained in Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) data collection, with plans to conduct regular or ad-hoc surveys in operational areas, sharing results with the PSEA coordinator at the OCHA Protection Sector.[58]

48 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 16 May 2024.

49 Emails from MAG, 24 May 2021; and Chris Tierney, NPA, 17 June 2024.

50 Email from Francesca Chiaudani, UNMAS, 31 March 2022.

51 Emails from Michael Edwards, SCD, 5 March and 15 June 2022.

52 UNDP, Gender Equality Strategy 2024 – 2026, at: http://bit.ly/44pJL5D.

53 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.

54 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June and 29 July 2025; Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025; and Sami Mohammad, SCD, 24 May 2024.

55 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025.

56 Email from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025.

57 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.

58 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

UNMAS's partnerships with implementing partners follow guidelines that include environmental requirements. UNMAS applies the International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 10.70 on environmental management, and the "do no harm" principle. It also considers the environmental impacts of assessing and removing explosive ordnance, such as the necessary removal of vegetation for operations.[59]

**Table 2: Environmental policies, assessments and focal points[60]**

| Operator | Environmental policy in place for country programme | Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| NPA | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| HALO | No - SOP | No | No |
| DCA | No - SOP | Yes | No |
| HI | No – SOP | Yes | Yes |
| MAG | No – SOP | Yes | Yes |
| SCD | No – in development | No | N/R |

N/R = Not Reported

In 2024, two female staff from NPA were trained on the Green Field Tool and have translated the accompanying Survey123 form for use in Syria. Training sessions on the tool with programme staff were held in July and August 2025, with implementation of the tool on all projects scheduled thereafter. NPA also signed an MoU with a national NGO, the Athar Organization, to recycle NPA's empty 10-litre plastic water bottles with Athar.[61] DCA began using an environmental assessment tool in its clearance operations in 2024 and planned to adopt the Green Field Tool via Survey123 in 2025.[62] HI assessed MUNIREM technology in 2024, a chemical neutralisation agent for EOD, as a more environmentally friendly option for disposal but found it impractical in Syria due to the need for specialised equipment and high water consumption. Instead, HI adopted Dragon Fire, a thermite-based system, which leaves minimal residue, reduces the logistical burden in the field, and meets IMAS and environmental protection principles.[63]

Operators report considering climate and extreme weather risks during operational planning.[64] In 2024, DCA delivered risk education sessions in the informal settlement camps of Hweijet Zehra and Al-Khalil, targeting communities displaced by flooding. DCA also accounts for risks such as vegetation fires during dry periods, heat-related health hazards in summer, and reduced accessibility during the rainy season when planning and prioritising survey and clearance.[65]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

In 2025, UNMAS assumed responsibility for coordinating information management across all of Syria. This includes managing existing and incoming data related to survey and clearance.[66] Until the fall of the Assad regime, IM remained fragmented between the north-west, the north-east, and government-controlled areas, with no data sharing between them. The Information Management Working group led by UNMAS and co-led by NPA have taken on the task of consolidating all data from mine action partners into a centralised Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, to which, as at June 2025, most international operators had submitted data on NTS and EO incidents.[67] To streamline data flow and ensure timely, standardised reporting, UNMAS has asked each operator to formally designate a dedicated user who will be granted access to submit data directly to the IMSMA server via structured forms or automated scripts (depending on their technical capacity).[68]

The IM TWG meets regularly, both monthly and on an ad-hoc basis, with participation from personnel representing the majority of international mine action implementing partners. Co-chaired by UNMAS and NPA, the TWG seeks to ensure that information is collected, stored, and analysed in a uniform and coordinated manner.[69]

59 Email from Hassana Mardam Bey, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.

60 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025; and Sami Mohammad, SCD, 24 May 2024.

61 Emails from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June and 19 September 2025.

62 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

63 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.

64 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; and Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.

65 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

66 Ibid.

67 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

68 Ibid.

69 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Syria does not have a national mine action strategy in place. Operators use their own prioritisation frameworks for clearance.

NPA reported that before December 2024, prioritisation was mainly determined by access permissions and since then, NPA has established its own prioritisation system with priority agricultural areas to support the return of IDPs, strengthen food security, and enable livelihoods activities.[70] DCA prioritises clearance based on humanitarian impact and urgency of need, focusing first on areas where civilians live amid known or suspected contamination, followed by areas likely to see the return of IDPs, while also considering access to critical infrastructure, livelihoods, and services.[71] As at June 2025, HALO was finalising its clearance prioritisation matrix in coordination with UNMAS and local authorities, using indicators such as type of threat, proximity to residential areas, number of accidents, direct beneficiaries, intended land use, and frequency of EOD call-outs.[72] MAG prioritises clearance based on threats to local populations and land needed for agriculture.[73] HI's prioritisation framework aligns with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) principle of "All Reasonable Effort", and considers humanitarian impact, community engagement, and technical assessments. It collaborates closely with local communities to identify priority areas, such as agricultural lands, schools, and healthcare facilities, in an inclusive manner.[74]

UNMAS uses a structured, needs-driven approach aligned with IMAS, national priorities, and humanitarian principles, coordinating closely with implementing partners. Its criteria include humanitarian impact, severity and type of contamination, support for humanitarian and development access, requests from authorities or communities, and operational feasibility and security. UNMAS also employs evidence-based tools like IMSMA to inform and guide prioritisation decisions.[75]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

There are no formal national mine action standards (NMAS) in Syria. As a result, most of the operators work to their own standard operating procedures (SOPs). HALO has highlighted that the absence of national standards and the lack of requirements for all actors, including local volunteer and military organisations, to follow them results in partially cleared areas that must be treated as uncleared, wasting time and resources.[76] DCA has also stressed the urgent need to assess and address widespread informal clearance by untrained civilians, which poses a severe risk to life.[77]

HALO updated its NTS SOP in 2024 to address the anticipated scale of contamination following increased access after the Assad regime's collapse. Aligned with IMAS 08.10, the revised SOP includes a more detailed survey form and expanded data analysis procedures to improve clearance planning and reporting. HALO also slightly amended its mechanical clearance SOP to maintain safety as it expands its mechanical fleet.[78] DCA began reviewing its manual and mechanical clearance SOPs in 2025 to align with evolving operational contexts, updated technical standards, and best practices, with planned improvements in safety protocols, task planning, equipment use, and environmental integration.[79] HI updated its risk education and NTS SOPs in April/May 2025, introducing more concise steps to improve operational clarity, IMAS compliance, and field-level efficiency and consistency.[80] NPA revised its SOPs on NTS, environmental considerations, and quality in line with updated IMAS and to better reflect procedures adapted to the specific context in Syria.[81]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, SARC, the ICRC, NPA, and UNMAS implementing partner, Safety Solutions, were conducting survey and clearance in Assad-regime controlled areas; SCD and HALO were operating in the north-west; and DCA, HI, ITF, MAG, and Roj Mine Control Organization (RMCO), were operating in the north-east. Prior to the fall of the Assad regime, in areas under the government's control, most survey and clearance had been conducted by Russian and Syrian military engineers and civil defence organisations.[82] In 2024, the Syrian army conducted clearance in regime-controlled areas, on a limited scale, which included clearance of CMR and other ordnance.[83]

70 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.
71 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
72 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025.
73 Email from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025.
74 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
75 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
76 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025.
77 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
78 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025.
79 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
80 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
81 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.
82 "Russian military boosts qualified Syrian sappers to demine war-ravaged country", *Tass*, 9 January 2018.
83 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 17 June 2024.

**Table 3: NTS and TS capacities deployed in 2024**[84]

| Operator | NTS teams | Total NTS personnel | TS teams | Total TS personnel | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RMCO | 10 | 20 | 0 | 0 | Until the end of January 2024. |
| DCA | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | |
| HALO | 2 | 9 | 0 | 0 | |
| MAG | 10 | 27 | N/A | N/A | NTS and community liaison teams. Clearance teams conduct TS. |
| HI | 28 | 72 | 0 | 0 | 11 teams totalling 25 personnel were operational until end of January 2024 and 8 teams totalling 19 personnel until end of August 2024. |
| Safety Solutions | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | |
| NPA | 4 | 12 | N/A | N/A | Clearance teams conduct TS. |
| SCD* | 6 | 30 | 0 | 0 | |
| **Totals** | **64** | **182** | **0** | **0** | |

*Data are from 2023. N/A = Not applicable

**Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024**[85]

| Operator | Clearance teams | Total deminers* | Mechanical assets/machines | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Safety Solutions | 1 | 4 | 0 | |
| NPA | 4 | 30 | 0 | |
| HALO | 2 | 10 | 2 | Two five-strong mechanical clearance teams deployed on AP mined area. |
| SCD* | 6 | 54 | 0 | |
| MAG | 9 | 83 | 10 | |
| DCA | 4 | 27 | 11 | |
| HI | 6 | 56 | 0 | 3 teams totalling 30 personnel were operational until the end of August 2024 |
| **Totals** | **32** | **264** | **23** | |

*Data are from 2023.

UNMAS signed an MoU with the Syrian government in 2018. The following year, UNMAS reported the government had agreed to the involvement of international demining organisations which would be registered by the government and coordinated by UNMAS.[86] In 2024, prior to the fall of the Assad regime, four organisations were accredited for mine action in government-controlled areas: DRC, NPA, Safety Solutions, and SHIELD.[87] UNMAS reported no change in capacity from 2023 to 2024 and but expected an increase in capacity during 2025. The planned increase includes deployment of additional NTS teams and Multi-Task Teams (MTTs) which will conduct TS and clearance and provide risk education.[88]

NPA has been operational in Syria since 2022.[89] NPA reported no change in capacity from 2023 to 2024. A planned training course for searchers was postponed from December 2024 to January 2025. The newly trained searchers will allow staff to be reassigned to form dedicated risk education teams. NPA also plans to increase its capacity in 2025, contingent on funding, and was beginning operations in Homs governorate in July 2025.[90]

84 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025; Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025; and Sami Mohammad, SCD, 24 May 2024.

85 Ibid.

86 Statement by Agnes Marcaillou, Director, UNMAS, to the UN Security Council, 24 October 2019.

87 Email from Hassana Mardam Bey, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.

88 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

89 Email from Claus Nielsen, Programme Manager, NPA, 12 April 2023.

90 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.

The ICRC works in partnership with SARC and has trained and supported SARC risk education and NTS teams with SARC teams conducting NTS in Aleppo, Damascus, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Homs, and Lattakia governorates. ICRC has its own clearance teams, and in 2024 it also initiated spot-task EOD operations.[91]

HALO has operated in Syria since 2016. In 2024, given the scale of the programme and the prevailing security situation, HALO cleared a single AP mined area in Idlib governorate. There was no significant change in HALO's survey and clearance capacity in 2024 compared to 2023. As at June 2025, HALO had increased the number of NTS teams from one to three and mechanical clearance teams from two to six. It planned to add a further five NTS teams during the year. In addition, the number of EOD teams has grown from two to five, with a further seven expected to be deployed by the end of 2025. HALO was restarting operations in Daraa and beginning operations in Deir ez-Zor in July 2025. Subject to funding, it also plans to expand into Rural Damascus and Latakia.[92]

SCD has been operational in Syria since 2013. In June 2025, SCD announced it will become fully integrated into the Syria government with its emergency response capacity transferred to the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management.[93] In 2024, SCD was operational in 33 sub-districts of Idlib, Aleppo, and Hama governorates providing NTS and single-item disposal via remote-controlled open burning.[94] The SCD intended to increase its survey and clearance capacity from six to eleven teams in 2025.[95]

DCA has been operational in north-east Syria since 2015. In 2024, it prioritised survey and clearance operations across multiple locations in Raqqa governorate. In early 2024, it conducted survey and clearance on three public infrastructure sites. Following clearance, the sites were rehabilitated by DCA's Shelter team and handed over to local authorities and communities for use. After a reduction in clearance teams from 2023 to 2024 following the conclusion of a major grant, an increase in the number of NTS and clearance personnel was expected in 2025. This planned scale-up supports DCA's strategy to expand mine action operations into new areas, including Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, and Rural Damascus.

Under the Syria Mine Action and Livelihood Outcome-Based Pilot Project funded by the FCDO, a "Nexus" approach will be implemented in 2025. This will integrate mine action, shelter rehabilitation, and livelihood components in targeted areas. In the countryside, clearance will enable safe access to agricultural land. The livelihood component will include agro-ecology training, distribution of agricultural inputs and irrigation kits, and the construction of greenhouses, designed to promote food security and enhance resilience among rural communities affected by EO. In urban settings, contaminated public infrastructure, particularly schools, will be cleared of ordnance, with rubble safely removed and managed. Following clearance, the shelter team will rehabilitate the schools, while the livelihood team will provide on-the-job apprenticeship training to community members (of mixed gender) in masonry, carpentry, plumbing, painting, and electrical work. In preparation for this expansion, DCA has initiated the registration process with the Syrian MoFA and has established an office in Damascus. As of June 2025, DCA was working to set up a mine action base and recruit survey and clearance personnel, with an initial focus on clearance in Rural Damascus and the surrounding areas.[96]

A local organisation, RMCO, established in 2016, was conducting clearance in the north-east but sustained heavy casualties among its deminers attempting to clear improvised devices.[97] In 2023, RMCO partnered with DCA for NTS in hard-to-reach areas and this project concluded at the end of January 2024.[98]

HI has been present in Syria since 2012. In 2024, it conducted survey, clearance, and EOD in Raqqa, including clearance of the riverbed of the Euphrates, which enabled the reopening of the Al-Rashid bridge, improving connectivity between Raqqa and the surrounding regions. HI increased its survey and clearance capacity by 12 personnel in 2024. Plans to expand the programme further in 2025 depended on securing adequate funding. In 2025, HI began clearance at three schools in Deir ez-Zor. In north-west Syria, HI is delivering EORE in Idlib and Aleppo governorates and training its staff and those from SCD in NTS.[99]

MAG has been operational in north-east Syria since 2016. In 2024, MAG conducted survey and clearance in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Kisreh, Al Ajil, Hasakah-Markada, Shadaddi, Tal Tamr, and Elwet Eldisheisha. There was no change in operational capacity compared to 2023. In 2025, newly liberated areas with heavy contamination, including locations in southern Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor governorate, and western Syria, will require an expansion in its operations. MAG has secured new grants to support activities in these areas and expected to receive additional funding. As a result, the number of personnel was expected to increase across the country.[100]

ITF has operated in north-east Syria since 2020. From January 2023 to January 2024, ITF deployed 10 NTS teams as part of a consortium with 3iSolution, DCA, and HI to conduct survey of all accessible explosive ordnance-contaminated areas in north-east Syria. From August 2023 to October 2024, under the "Clear then Grow Phase III" project supported by the French and Slovenian Ministries of Foreign and European Affairs, ITF surveyed and cleared former agricultural land and infrastructure contaminated with explosive ordnance in IS-liberated areas, also providing risk education. ITF also provided capacity-building support to its local partner, Reachout, conducting training on IMAS, international donor expectations and project management; developed SOPs and organisational policies; and provided guidance on best practices, including financial management.[101]

91 ICRC, "ICRC in Syria, A Year in Review: 2024", at: https://bit.ly/401D9Jl, p. 8.

92 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025.

93 SCD, Statement on the Integration of the Syria Civil Defence (The White Helmets) into the Syrian Government, 2 June 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3J8fSQd.

94 Email from Sami Mohammad, SCD, 24 May 2024.

95 The White Helmets website (Arabic), accessed on 4 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4fks3Wl.

96 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

97 S. Kajjo, "Landmine removal crucial in post-IS Syria", *Voice of America*, 3 April 2019; and interview with operators, Erbil, Iraq, May 2019.

98 Emails from Kevin Straker, DCA, 15 March and 28 June 2023; and Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

99 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.

100 Email from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025.

101 ITF, 2024 Annual Report, at: https://bit.ly/4m0FJbd, pp. 105–10.

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

**Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 3,606,311 | Operator data |
| **Technical survey** | 613,873 | Operator data |
| **Non-technical survey** | 24,929 | Operator data |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | **Comments** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 84 (including 28 in spot tasks) | Operator data |

## SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, DCA cancelled seven areas through NTS in Raqqa totalling 24,929m².[102] This is a decrease from the 2.47km² across 27 areas cancelled through NTS by DCA in Raqqa in 2023.[103] No area was cancelled through NTS by MAG, HALO, NPA or HI in 2024 or 2023.

In 2024, a total of 613,873m² of AP mined area across 32 areas was reduced through technical survey (TS) in Hassakeh and Raqqa by MAG and HI (see Table 6). This is a decrease from the 1.9km² across 20 hazardous areas reduced through TS by MAG in 2023.[104] DCA, HALO and NPA did not reduce any AP mined area through TS in 2023 or 2024.

**Table 6: Technical survey of AP mined area in 2024**[105]

| Governorate | Operator | Areas reduced | Area reduced through TS (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hassakeh | MAG | 17 | 407,632 |
| Raqqa | MAG | 8 | 60,000 |
| Raqqa | HI | 7 | 146,241 |
| **Totals** | | **32** | **613,873** |

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, a total of more than 3.6km² was cleared across 68 areas in Idleb, Hassakeh, Raqqa and Raqqa with the destruction of 56 AP mines (see Table 7).[106] This is an increase from the 3.1km² of reported mine clearance in 2023 with the destruction of 54 AP mines.[107]

In addition, a total of 28 AP mines and 24 anti-vehicle (AV) mines were destroyed during spot tasks by DCA, HALO, MAG and UNMAS/Safety Solutions.[108] Of the 19 AP mines found and destroyed by DCA in 2024, 18 were of an improvised nature.[109] Of the 12 mines destroyed by UNMAS/Safety Solutions, 3 were improvised.[110] All 47 AP mines destroyed by MAG were improvised.[111]

**Table 7: Mine clearance in 2024**[112]

| Governate | Operator | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed | AV mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Idleb | HALO | 1 | 62,265 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| Hassakeh | MAG | 48 | 2,376,448 | 45 | 2 | 61 |
| Raqqa | MAG | 8 | 1,038,877 | 1 | 3 | 1,745 |
| Raqqa | DCA | 6 | 12,201 | 10 | 0 | 345 |
| Raqqa | HI | 5 | 116,520 | 0 | 0 | 95 |
| **Totals** | | **68** | **3,606,311** | **56** | **5** | **2,258** |

102 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
103 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 16 May 2024.
104 Email from Riaan Boshoff, MAG, 21 May 2024.
105 Emails from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025 and Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
106 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; and Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
107 Emails from Riaan Boshoff, MAG, 21 May 2024; Damian O'Brien, HALO, 27 May 2024; and Adesh Singh, DCA, 16 May 2024.
108 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
109 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
110 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
111 Email from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025.
112 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; and Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.

## PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Syria is not yet a State Party to the APMBC, nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear AP mines from its territory as soon as possible. NPA reported conducting quarterly advocacy meetings with the national mine action committee of the former Assad regime to encourage Syria to join both the APMBC and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). NPA has continued this advocacy with the interim government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Finance. These efforts have been framed as a means to reintegrate Syria into the international community, enable funding from other States Parties, and demonstrate that the interim government prioritises the well-being of the Syrian people. On 22 June 2025, during a meeting on the national disaster plan, the Minister for Emergency Services and Disaster Management announced that the government is considering acceding to the APMBC, with a decision expected in the coming months.[113]

In 2024, until the fall of the Assad regime in December, survey and clearance in Syria remained divided across three main regions as described above. Overall land release output fell from 2023 to 2024 due to the lack of survey, although clearance output increased. An overall rise in survey and clearance capacity was expected in 2025, with operators planning to deploy additional teams. However, this expected increase will not be sufficient to meet expanding demand in newly accessible areas following the change of regime unless funding significantly increases, with a dramatic rise in the number of incidents from EO especially on agricultural and grazing land. Population movements into newly accessible areas combined with high-risk civilian behaviours, such as informal clearance for cash, further compound the challenge.

Funding remains a critical constraint with HALO reporting a lack of long-term, sustainable funding and the absence of multi-year contracts, while NPA notes that mine action continues to receive low funding priority despite the manifest humanitarian need. In 2025, UNMAS was prioritising a baseline survey of accessible areas across Syria to improve understanding of contamination, including from AP mines, which will support the development of a nationwide prioritisation process. However, coordination challenges remain with HALO reporting the absence of shared data from other mine action and non-mine action actors while HI highlights the lack of formal recognition and limited capacity of NESMAC with no direct relationship with UNMAS due to political sensitivities. HALO has also raised concerns about the absence of enforced national standards, leading to inconsistent clearance quality and the need to re-clear partially cleared areas.

The interim government of Syria is still building its institutional capacity and does not yet have a formally mandated national mine action authority or mine action centre to manage mine action. UNMAS is providing capacity support to the Minister for Emergency Services and Disaster Management. Nevertheless, NPA reports significant regulatory and administrative challenges, including centralised and understaffed registration and licensing processes in Damascus; frequently changing visa policies; sanctions that restrict direct or indirect support to the interim government; and retrospective customs reviews of previously imported goods.

The security situation in Syria remains fractured and volatile with Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) maintaining control over the north-east; foreign militaries, notably Turkish troops still holding parts of the north-west; regular Israeli strikes on Syrian military positions; and sporadic attacks from Islamic State.[114] In 2024, NPA reported the loss of equipment, including a large-loop detector on loan to the national mine action committee that was stolen during the looting of its building; a 20-foot shipping container used as a temporary ammunition store stolen from Yarmouk; and team uniforms stolen while awaiting clearance at the Lebanese border with Syria.[115] In 2025, three SCD volunteers were killed by a remotely detonated device during EOD operations in eastern Hama. Initial observations raise serious concerns that the team may have been deliberately targeted by individuals monitoring the site.[116]

113 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.

114 Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker, Conflict in Syria, accessed 5 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3Gv2Knk.

115 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.

116 SCD, Statement by the Syria Civil Defence (White Helmets) on the killing of three volunteers from the UXO removal team in Hama Countryside, 22 May 2025, at: http://bit.ly/407TBI6.

# UZBEKISTAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Release in 2023 (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | Unknown | Unknown |
| Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |
| Non-Technical Survey | Unknown | Unknown |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | Unknown | Unknown |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Not known

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Uzbekistan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Uzbekistan should clear anti-personnel (AP) mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Uzbekistan should detail the extent of its mine contamination and clearance operations.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT*

- Uzbekistan has no functioning mine action programme.

NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- Army Engineers

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- None

*This is based on information from earlier years. It is not known if the information remains accurate.

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Uzbek forces have laid mines along Uzbekistan's international borders at various times, including on its border with Afghanistan in 1998, with Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and with Tajikistan in 2000.[1] Added to this, the borders between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, drawn in Soviet times, have been problematic since independence of these countries from the Soviet Union in 1991.[2] In turn, this has, at times, impeded progress to survey and clear mined areas.

While Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled most of their 1,283km-long border dispute following the collapse of the Soviet Union, certain areas were not delineated and therefore the exact location of mined areas is not known.[3] In 2010, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), Ban Ki-moon, criticised as "unacceptable" Uzbekistan's emplacing of mines along parts of its border that had not been delineated.[4] Over a decade later, in 2021, Tajikistan reported that parts of its border with Uzbekistan, not yet demarcated, still needed to be surveyed for contamination.[5]

Soviet troops also laid mines on the Uzbek-Afghan border. Uzbekistan had reportedly cleared 95% of the minefields along the Tajik border by the end of 2007 in demining operations conducted by its army engineers in cooperation with Tajik border troops.[6] The clearance, however, has not been verified by independent organisations, and, as at 2018, civilian casualties were still being reported on the Uzbek-Tajik border.[7]

In 2005, media reports cited Kyrgyz officials in Batken province (on the Kyrgyz side of the border with Uzbekistan) as saying that Kyrgyz border guards had checked previously mined areas of the border around the settlements of Ak-Turpak, Chonkara, and Otukchu, which had been cleared by Uzbek deminers, and confirmed that they were free of contamination.[8] Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have signed a series of agreements to demarcate their borders over the last decade – in 2017, with an agreement to demarcate some 85% of the countries' nearly 1,300km-long border,[9] then in 2021, when a land swap agreement led to disputes,[10] and in 2022, with a further agreement covering disputed sections of the border, particularly around the Andijan[11] reservoir.[12]

In April 2024, it was reported that the border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had been fully resolved through another land swap agreement. This saw Barak, a 208-hectare portion of Kyrgyz territory entirely surrounded by Uzbekistan, absorbed by Uzbekistan, with Kyrgyzstan receiving an equivalent parcel of Uzbekistan's Andijan province in exchange. In November 2024, a new village was opened in Kyrgyzstan's southern Osh region, for Kyrgyz citizens resettled from the Barak exclave.[13]

In 2018, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan agreed to set up a joint commission to investigate mined areas along the Uzbek-Tajik border.[14] According to online media, during the first State visit of the President of Uzbekistan to Tajikistan in March 2018, the leaders of the two States agreed that their common border would be cleared of landmines by the end of 2019.[15] Online media sources reported that by October 2018 demining along the border had started,[16] and that the Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) and the Tajik Ministry of Defence (MoD) "got acquainted" with mine maps before starting clearance. The size of the mined areas was not publicly shared, but unofficial reports indicated it was 9.5km$^2$.[17] Mine clearance was said to have been carried out exclusively by Uzbekistan and assistance from Tajikistan was refused, as the clearance was occurring exclusively on Uzbek territory.[18] Clearance along its border with Tajikistan by Uzbekistan was reportedly completed by January 2020,[19] following which the Uzbek and Tajik authorities progressed from delimiting their border to demarcating it.[20]

1 "Uzbekistan", Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, last update 24 October 2011, at: https://bit.ly/3GYFEG5.

2 "Central Asian Presidents Meet, Seeking to Defuse Decades of Tensions in the Ferghana Valley", Foreign Policy Research Institute, 16 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4m0CK2R.

3 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC), 25 April 2018.

4 "Ban calls Uzbekistan land mines 'unacceptable'", *The Hindu*, 6 April 2010, at: http://bit.ly/2Z3WYgN.

5 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 22 April and 12 August 2021; Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form D; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

6 Email from Jonmahmad Rajabov, Director, Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC), 16 February 2009; Tajikistan Article 7 Report, "General situation", 3 February 2008, p. 3; and "Uzbekistan started demining on Tajik border", *Spy.kz*, 23 October 2007.

7 "Demining the Tajik-Uzbek Border: What have we learned from the Tajik experience?", The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, November 2018, at: https://bit.ly/3q7lixw.

8 "Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan: Landmine threat along Uzbek border removed", *IRIN*, 31 October 2005, available at: https://bit.ly/3sezaey.

9 "Tug-Of-War: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Look To Finally Settle Decades-Old Border Dispute", *Radio Free Europe*, 14 December 2017, at: http://bit.ly/2yXsrXt.

10 "Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan sign deal to end border disputes", *Euroasianet*, 26 March 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3vD5QKA; "'No Issues Remain?' Not So Fast. Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border Disputes Don't Appear To Be Decided", *Radio Free Europe*, 2 April 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3zrFrEK; and "Kyrgyzstan reports deaths after Uzbek border troops open fire", *Aljazeera*, 6 May 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3zuh4pT.

11 Andijan is also referred to as Andijon in Uzbek. "Andijan", *Central Asia Guide,* accessed 6 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4dy2VJn.

12 The Andijan reservoir is also known the Kempir-Abad reservoir. "Resolution of Uzbek border disputes heralds increasingly united Central Asia", *Central Asia News*, 12 January 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3r0Ip4z.

13 "Farewell Barak: Uzbekistan Absorbs Kyrgyz Exclave As Part Of Historic Border Deal", *Radio Free Europe, Rado Liberty*, 23 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3LTIVFm; and "Kyrgyzstan Opens New Village for People Resettled from Barak Exclave", *The Times of Central Asia*, 14 November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/45zhs6n.

14 Tajikistan's 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

15 "Uzbekistan reportedly completes demining work on Tajik border", *The Diplomat*, 10 January 2020; and "Uzbekistan completes demining of its border with Tajikistan", *Asia Plus*, 3 January 2020 at: https://bit.ly/3Bpu0Pd.

16 "Putting an end to 20 years of death along the Tajik-Uzbek Border", *RFERL,* 13 October 2018; and "Report: Tajik-Uzbek Border Cleared of Mines", *RFERL*, 6 January 2020.

17 "Demining of Tajik-Uzbek border began", *Regnum*, 9 October 2018, at: https://bit.ly/3vx2WXP; "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan start demining their common border", *Sputnik Tajikistan*, 9 October 2018, at: https://bit.ly/3gAJm8I; and "Dushanbe and Tashkent begin demining Tajik-Uzbek border", *Radio Ozodi*, 8 October 2018, at: https://bit.ly/3xAPzHv.

18 "Uzbekistan reportedly completes demining work on Tajik border", *The Diplomat*, 10 January 2020.

19 "Uzbekistan reportedly completes demining work on Tajik border", *The Diplomat*, 10 January 2020; "Uzbekistan, Tajikistan to finalise border demarcation", *Azernews*, 7 January 2020; and "Uzbekistan completes demining of border with Tajikistan, say officials", *Central Asia News*, 4 February 2020.

20 "Uzbekistan reportedly completes demining work on Tajik border", *The Diplomat*, 10 January 2020; and "Uzbekistan, Tajikistan to finalise border demarcation", *Azernews*, 7 January 2020.

Tajikistan has yet to provide a public update in these matters. Following the establishment of the joint commission to investigate mined areas along the Uzbek-Tajik border, Tajikistan reiterated, in its updated work plan submitted to the APBMC Meeting of States Parties in November 2023, that it will "continue to provide updates on the development of cooperation with regard to land release along the Tajik-Uzbek border in Article 7 reports and to the Meetings of the States Parties".[21] In June 2024, the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted that it would welcome further updates from Tajikistan on this matter.[22]

Since the first state visit of the president of Uzbekistan to Tajikistan in March 2018, during which an initial agreement was signed on demarcation of the separate regions of their common border,[23] the two nations have continued to work to resolve the border issue. Online sources from 2021 indicated that a "joint Tajik-Uzbek commission for delimitation and demarcation of the mutual border" was active and that working groups met several times in 2021.[24] Delineation talks and meetings of the Demarcation Commission working groups continued throughout 2023[25] and 2024, with a protocol signed in May 2024.[26] On 31 March 2025, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan gathered to discuss cooperation, an unprecedented event following decades of strained relations.[27] A trilateral agreement, dubbed the Khujand Declaration, was signed, demarcating the tri-state border and establishing a formal declaration of friendship.[28] It is not yet clear if this move towards cooperation will increase the opportunity to demine any mine-affected border areas remaining.

Uzbekistan has not reported plans to clear mines laid on its 150km border with Afghanistan.

It is not known whether contamination data is disaggregated by weapon type in Uzbekistan's national database, or if contamination is classified into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no functioning mine action programme in Uzbekistan.

In March 2021, Russia and Uzbekistan were reportedly considering bilateral cooperation in mine action clearance and training of Uzbek military personnel at the Russian Mine Action Centre.[29] The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), of which Uzbekistan is a member, reported in June 2022 that a joint unit of humanitarian demining would be created in the CIS.[30] No timeline for this was given. Mine Action Review has not been able to source any further updates on these matters.

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It is not known whether the Government of Uzbekistan contributes national resources to support demining in the country.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The extent to which gender and diversity are mainstreamed into mine action in Uzbekistan is not known.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Uzbekistan in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

21 Tajikistan Mine Action Programme General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, p. 14.

22 "Preliminary Observations on the Implementation of Article 5 by Tajikistan", Intersessional Meetings, 18–20 June 2024, p. 3.

23 "Uzbekistan reportedly completes demining work on Tajik border", *The Diplomat*, 10 January 2020; and "Uzbekistan completes demining of its border with Tajikistan", Asia Plus, 3 January 2020 at: https://bit.ly/3Bpu0Pd.

24 Tajik-Uzbek border delimitation and demarcation commission meets in Uzbekistan", *Asia Plus*, 30 November 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3zDDNzJ; and "Uzbekistan and Tajikistan discuss demarcation of state border", *KUN.UZ News*, 22 May 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3iSbky7.

25 "Demining Mountains: Tajikistan's Struggle Against Landmine Contamination", *NCT CBNW*, 7 February 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4d5WdKY.

26 "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan discussed border demarcation – a protocol signed", *Central Asian Light*, 6 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3LKBbpc; and "Uzbek-Tajik demarcation commission held a meeting in Dushanbe", *KUN.UZ*, 4 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3LMkSbx.

27 "Central Asian Presidents Meet, Seeking to Defuse Decades of Tensions in the Ferghana Valley", Foreign Policy Research Institute, 16 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4m0CK2R.

28 "Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan sign deal on junction point of state borders", *AA*, 31 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4leX5jA; and "Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan's Leaders Signed a Historical Agreement in Khujand", *SpecialEurasia*, 31 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4fw0v07.

29 "Uzbekistan, Russia looking at joint training of bomb disposal specialists", *Tass* (Russian News Agency), 30 March 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3gDKjfn; and "Military delegation of the Republic of Uzbekistan visits the International Mine Action Centre of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation", Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 30 March 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3WPGCtg.

30 "Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that a joint unit of humanitarian demining will be created in the CIS", Commonwealth of Independent States, 27 June 2022, at; https://bit.ly/3b1ulgn.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Mine Action Review has been unable to source any information on any efforts in Uzbekistan to implement or maintain a national mine action database.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known whether Uzbekistan has a national mine action strategy in place. Nor is it known if Uzbekistan has annual work plans for the survey and clearance of AP mines or criteria for the prioritisation of clearance tasks.

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

It is not known whether Uzbekistan has national mine action standards in place.

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

International NGO Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) stated in its 2024 annual report that it plans to adopt a regional approach in Central Asia, expanding its existing demining operations in Tajikistan into Uzbekistan (and Kyrgyzstan), although no time frame for this to occur was given.[31]

Mine Action Review has been unable to source any recent information on Uzbekistan's national operational capacity for AP mine survey and clearance. However, personnel from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries continue to attend training in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) at the Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre run of the Ministry of Defence of Tajikistan, most recently in September 2024.[32]

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

There are no detailed reports of survey or clearance output in 2024. As noted, according to online media sources in January 2020, mine clearance on the Uzbek side of the border with Tajikistan was completed.[33]

31 "FSD Activity report 2024", accessed 31 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mffNbR, p. 21.

32 "The first-ever Tajik-led explosive ordnance disposal course kicks off at OSCE-supported Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre", Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 16 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/454bPgo; and "OSCE supports regional explosive ordnance disposal course for specialists from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Serbia", OSCE, 27 October 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3WQQdQA.

33 "Uzbekistan reportedly completes demining work on Tajik border", *The Diplomat*, 10 January 2020.

# VIETNAM



## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, thought to be medium

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0 | 0 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 6 (during spot tasks) | 6 (during spot tasks) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- None

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The Korea-Vietnam Peace Village Project started the second phase of its mine action programme in May 2024 with Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) teams working in three central provinces under the US$25 million initiative. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted an assessment to prepare for the upgrade of VNMAC's national database from Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation to IMSMA Core.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Vietnam should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as soon as possible.**
- **Vietnam should publish a detailed assessment of areas known or suspected to contain anti-personnel (AP) mines.**
- **Vietnam should report annually on survey, clearance, or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) interventions targeting AP mines.**

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- Ministry of Defence
- Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC)
- Provincial mine action centres and authorities (e.g. the Quang Tri Mine Action Centre (QTMAC) and Quang Binh Database and Coordination Unit (DBCU))

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- VNMAC

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (Golden West)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The full extent of mined area in Vietnam is unknown. The 2018 Landmine Impact Survey reported areas with AP mines in 26 of 63 cities and provinces but gave no further details.[1] According to VNMAC, the total area still contaminated with bombs, mines, and explosive ordnance in Vietnam was 56,000km$^2$, which accounts for approximately 17% of Vietnam's land surface. Contamination is mainly concentrated in central provinces including Quang Tri, Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, Nghe An, and Quang Ngai.[2] Mined area, however, makes up only a small proportion of the total explosive ordnance contamination, with cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) the vast majority of items.

Most mines were left by conflicts in the 1970s with neighbouring Cambodia and China, and affect areas close to its borders with those nations.[3] Clearance had been reported by Vietnam along its northern border with China in the 1990s and since 2004, but mined areas further inland are believed to persist.[4] It was reported in 2013 by Vietnam's Military Engineering Command that clearance had been completed in areas bordering Cambodia.[5] Many ports and river deltas were extensively mined during the armed conflict with the United States and were not completely cleared when it ended. A number of sea mines have been found on the coast. Some mines have also been found around former US military installations.[6]

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

VNMAC was established in 2014 by Prime Ministerial decree to strengthen the direction of mine action and provide a focal point for mine action operations.[7] A Decree on the Management and Implementation of Mine Action Activities (Decree No. 18), which entered into effect in 2019 confirmed the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as the lead authority for the national mine action programme, in coordination with other relevant ministries and sectors.[8] VNMAC is mandated, under the direction of the Prime Minister and management of the MoD, to "monitor, coordinate, and implement mine action tasks".[9] The MoD's Circular 195, which came into effect in 2020,[10] provides detailed guidance on the implementation of the Decree.

Decree 18 is currently the highest-level legal document governing mine action activities in Vietnam and applicable to all domestic and foreign organisations operating in mine action in the country.[11] It established the legal basis for revising and updating national regulations the QCVNs (National Technical Regulations), which are mandatory for all operators, and National Mine Action Standards (TCVNs), as well as for regulating information management. In February 2022, the Prime Minister ordered the preparation of an Ordinance for mine action in Vietnam, to be issued by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly. The ordinance, which is reportedly in preparation, will effectively replace Decree 18.[12]

1 VNMAC, "Report on Explosive Remnants of War Contamination in Vietnam, Based on the Explosive Remnants of War Contamination Survey and Mapping –Phase 1", provided by Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) 19 April 2018, p. 38.

2 Decree on Implementation and Management of Mine Action, No. 18/2019/ND-CP, 1 February 2019.

3 Decree on the Management and Implementation of Mine Action Activities, Hanoi, April 2018.

4 Emails from Jan Erik Støa, Country Director, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 6 April 2020; and from Tim Horner, Senior Technical Advisor, on behalf of Mr Phuc, VNMAC, 6 April 2021.

5 Email from Sarah Goring, Country Director, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 5 April 2023.

6 Ibid.

7 Prime Ministerial Decree No. 738 of 2013 on management and implementation of mine action, Hanoi.

8 Decree on Implementation and Management of Mine Action, No. 18/2019/ND-CP.

9 Decree on the Management and Implementation of Mine Action Activities, April 2018.

10 Emails from Jan Erik Støa, NPA, 6 April 2020; and Tim Horner on behalf of Mr Phuc, VNMAC, 6 April 2021.

11 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 5 April 2023.

12 Ibid.

VNMAC is nationally funded but the National Mine Action Programme (Programme 504) is funded by both the State and international donors.[13] According to VNMAC, government support for mine action has included the following:

- establishing coordinating agencies and associations to support all levels of mine action;
- completing a legal framework, mechanism, and policies for demining;[14]
- facilitating capacity development of demining organisations in management, administration, survey, and clearance;
- setting up a national quality management (QM) system for survey and clearance in accordance with international standards; and
- developing an information management system.[15]

Vietnam's regional mine action centres coordinate operations at the regional level with support from operators. Quang Binh province's database and coordination unit (DBCU) tasks operators applying a prioritisation system introduced in 2022 and holds regular coordination meetings with operators.[16] Quang Tri Mine Action Centre (QTMAC), which is technically supported by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) through a US-funded capacity development project, and with additional support from Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN), is implementing a five-year action plan covering 2021–25. Under the plan, the QTMAC sets task priorities and conducts quality assurance (QA) for operators in the province.[17]

VNMAC participates in a Mine Action Working Group (MAWG), previously co-chaired by MAG and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which provides a platform for discussion and joint planning. It met four times in 2024, discussing sector concerns, including the planned mine action ordinance. The chairmanship rotates every two years, and in December 2023, PTVN replaced MAG. MAWG sub-task forces also met in 2024, including those dealing with risk education, the environment, victim assistance, and gender, diversity, and inclusion (GDI).[18] In 2024, Vietnam's MoD agreed with the United States to re-establish a Mine Action Partnership Group as a platform for engaging with stakeholders, including donors, operators, and the UN.[19]

VNMAC is collaborating with the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and UNDP in the Korea-Vietnam Peace Village Project, which combines mine action with a programme for sustainable rural development in central Vietnam. The US$29 million first phase in 2018–22 involved ERW survey and clearance in Binh Dinh and Quang Binh provinces. The $25 million second phase, which started in May 2024 and was due to run until 2026, focuses on survey and clearance of explosive ordnance in Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and Thua Thien Hue provinces, working on priorities set by provincial authorities with an emphasis on maximising post-clearance land use.[20]

Vietnam also receives capacity development support from MAG, NPA, PTVN, the GICHD, and the Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (Golden West), as well as UNDP.[21] As mentioned, NPA supports capacity development of the Quang Binh and Huang Tri provincial authorities, funded by the United States, and in 2024, NPA also provided capacity development support to Hue Database Unit with funding from Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA).[22] MAG concluded a new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with VNMAC in October 2024, providing for cooperation, including technical training, in 10 key areas, including non-technical survey (NTS) and technical survey (TS), explosive ordnance clearance, and data management.[23] NPA supported VNMAC with a Senior Technical Adviser and information management adviser as well as EOD training and legal and professional advice in preparation of the new mine action ordinance.[24]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The Constitution of Vietnam prohibits gender discrimination, and it is State policy to guarantee equal gender rights and opportunities. In mine action, women participate more in victim assistance and risk education, however, while national survey/clearance and information management are still male-dominated and managed by the Vietnam Army.[25] A MAWG sub-task force on gender was established in 2022 and renamed the GDI task force in December 2023 to emphasise the focus on inclusivity.[26] In 2024, VNMAC put forward a female candidate for EOD training for the first time.

The number of women employed by demining NGOs increased by about 10% in 2024 compared to the previous year in line with the increase in total staff (see Table 1). The percentage of women employed by NPA in managerial

13 Email from Tim Horner, on behalf of Mr Phuc, VNMAC, 6 April 2021.

14 The MoD cooperates with other ministries to develop Circulars guiding QCVNs, TCVNs, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) on QM, survey, and clearance, and related issues.

15 Email from Tim Horner, on behalf of Mr Phuc, VNMAC, 6 April 2021.

16 Emails from Helene Kuperman, MAG, 10 April and 23 June 2020, and 31 March 2021; Jan Erik Støa, NPA, 24 June 2020; and Pham Hoàng Hà, Country Director, PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN), 11 May 2021.

17 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025; NPA Vietnam management, 5 May and 17 July 2025; and Pham Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 3 May 2023.

18 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025; and Pham Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025.

19 Emails from Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025.

20 Email from Goosoon Kwon, Chief Technical Adviser for Mine Action, UNDP, 21 May 2025.

21 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 30 April 2024; Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 May 2024; and Pham Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 27 May 2024.

22 Emails from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May and 17 July 2025.

23 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025.

24 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.

25 Email from the GICHD, 5 May 2023.

26 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 5 April and 19 May 2023 and 17 May 2024.

or field positions dipped from the previous year, but it began integrating gender and diversity training into staff training and undertook a number of projects, including implementing a German-funded gender and diversity project that included GDI and leadership training for women in Quang Binh, Hue, and Quang.[27]

**Table 1: Gender composition of NGO operators in 2024[28]**

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAG | 755 | 228 (30%) | 80 | 15 (19%) | 706 | 207 (29%) |
| NPA | 395 | 127 (32%) | 14 | 8 (57%) | 318 | 91 (29%) |
| PTVN | 314 | 79 (25%) | 16 | 6 (38%) | 270 | 60 (22%) |
| **Totals** | **1,464** | **434 (30%)** | **110** | **29 (26%)** | **1,294** | **358 (28%)** |

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

VNMAC engaged actively in the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) Review Board discussions on a revised IMAS on the environment and reportedly plans to issue a TCVN on the issue, though this had not occurred as at the end of 2024.[29] Demining operators applied their own standards. MAG hired a Vietnamese environmental consultant, Keep Vietnam Clean, to assess the impact of its operations and waste management practices.[30] NPA applied the global organisation's Green Field and Green Office tools, and provided training to field staff and operational management.[31] PTVN applied a General Code of Conduct on environmental management for its staff, partners, and the communities it supported along with measures to minimise and manage waste by office and field staff, promoting use of environmentally-friendly materials and integrating environmental protection messaging in its risk education sessions. It also plants trees to strengthen communities' resilience to the environmental impacts of mine action and climate change, including the dangers of soil erosion and landslides.[32]

**Table 2: Environmental policies and action[33]**

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|---|---|---|---|
| MAG | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| NPA | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| PTVN | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Mine action in Vietnam contends with a number of environmental challenges in its diverse habitats ranging from tropical forest to coastal wetlands. PTVN reported losing more working days in 2024 to heavy rain and flooding which also displaces items of explosive ordnance, making their detection and removal more challenging. Additionally, erosion and sediment transport caused by intense rainfall can bury or expose explosive ordnance, necessitating frequent re-surveying and clearance of affected areas. Severe flooding following intense rainfall in Thua Thien Hue province in October 2023 prevented NPA deploying survey teams for several weeks and landslides necessitated relocating its clearance team from A Luoi, the province's most heavily contaminated district.[34]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

VNMAC has made improving information management a top priority.[35] VNMAC completed consolidation of five IMSMA databases into a central national database using IMSMA New Generation at the end of 2022, and was preparing in 2024 to upgrade the database from IMSMA NG to Core. The GICHD conducted an assessment in March 2024 to prepare for the

27 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.
28 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025; NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025; and Pham Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025.
29 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 30 April 2024.
30 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 May 2024.
31 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.
32 Email from Pham Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025.
33 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 July 2025.
34 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 30 April 2024.
35 Interview with Mr Hop, VNMAC, in Geneva, 22 June 2023.

transition with VNMAC planning with a view to completing the process by the end of 2025.[36] Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien Hue provinces continue to operate their own mine action databases, which collect and analyse data from operators and task operators. The operators report activities to these databases that in turn report to VNMAC's central Information Management Unit.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Programme 504, approved by the Prime Minister in April 2010, set out a National Mine Action Plan for 2010–25. It provides a broad policy framework for responding to explosive ordnance and covers mines, CMR, and other ERW. It aimed to "mobilise domestic and international resources in making efforts to minimise and finally create impact-free environment for social economic development." The programme called for clearance of 8,000km$^2$ of ERW between 2016 and 2025,[37] and planned to complete an impact survey to map contamination nationwide, develop national standards, and establish a database management centre.[38]

Vietnam prepared a five-year plan for the 2021–25 final phase of the National Mine Action plan, without input from NGOs or other members of the MAWG. The plan was eventually adopted in June 2023 for the last two years through to 2025.[39] It calls for improved organisational structures, enhanced legislation and national standards, international cooperation for funding and resources, research and development, the establishment a national mine data system, promotion of awareness of ERW risk, and victim assistance.[40]

VNMAC has been preparing a 10-year plan covering 2026–35 and a draft was reportedly under review by the MoD and other government agencies, but it has not consulted demining organisations or shared information on priorities. It is also understood to be developing a new national mine action programme for 2026–45, with a vision for mine action through to 2065.[41]

Vietnam does not have a national prioritisation system for CMR clearance.[42] Quang Binh Database and Coordination Unit (DBCU) has operated a reporting and tasking system in the province since 2021, and applies a province-wide prioritisation system.[43] The DCBU also submitted a Quang Binh Provincial Mine Action Programme 2024–2035 to the Provincial People's Committee for official approval in the first quarter of 2024, setting specific objectives and timelines to minimise the impact of CMR and ERW and with the longer term ambition of becoming impact-free by 2045.[44] The QTMAC tasks operators and sets annual work plans approved by provincial authorities in consultation with operators.[45] Thua Thien Hue provincial authorities similarly task NGO operators in accordance with the provincial socio-economic development plan.[46]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Vietnam has two types of national standards: QCVNs, which are mandatory for all operators, and TCVNs, which are only guidelines for organisations that do not receive Vietnamese funding.[47]

Vietnam has drafted 15 TCVNs, which have been the subject of a lengthy review, and which had not been released by the start of 2025. The review is now reportedly complete and the TCVNs were being translated with a view to their release before the end of 2025.[48] The TCVNs are: (1) General regulations, (2) Appraisal and certification of MA organisations' capacity, (3) Monitoring & Evaluation, (4) Contamination inspection, (5) Survey, (6) Safety assurance, (7) Survey and clearance, (8) Disposal of landmines/bombs, (9) Medical insurance, (10) Inspection over incidents, (11) Collecting, processing, and providing mine action information, (12) Quality management, (13) Risk management, (14) Risk education, and (15) Victim assistance. A further TCVN on environmental protection in mine action is also expected to be developed.[49]

36 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.
37 Prime Minister, "Decision on Approval of the National Mine Action Plan Period 2010–2025", Hanoi, 21 April 2010.
38 STA Capacity Development Project (NPA), "Vietnamese legal framework in mine action", January 2023.
39 Emails from Tim Horner on behalf of Mr Phuc, VNMAC, 6 April 2021; Valentina Stivanello, MAG, 29 April and 20 June 2022; and Kimberley McCosker, NPA, 22 June 2022.
40 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 May 2024.
41 Emails from mine action stakeholders, April 2025.
42 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 5 April 2023; and Do Quy Linh, NPA, 16 June 2023.
43 Emails from Kimberley McCosker, NPA, 21 April 2022; and Pham Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 3 May 2023.
44 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 May 2024.
45 Emails from Jan Erik Støa, NPA, 6 April 2020; Simon Rea, MAG, 24 April 2019; Helene Kuperman, MAG, 31 March 2021; and Pham Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 3 May 2023.
46 Email from Jan Erik Støa, NPA, 6 April 2020.
47 Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 6 May 2019.
48 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.
49 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 5 April 2023; Do Quy Linh, NPA, 16 June 2023; and Pham Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 3 May 2023.

QCVNs were promulgated by the MoD in a Circular (No. 59) in 2022 after extensive review over the course of several years by four working groups. The process was co-chaired by VNMAC, and included consultation with operators and international organisations, including the GICHD.[50] The QCVNs include general provisions, technical regulations, regulations on safety and on management, and the responsibilities of organisations and individuals.[51]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Most clearance in Vietnam is conducted by the Army Engineering Corps and 43 military-owned commercial companies. Vietnamese officials have previously reported that it had 250 mine clearance and battle area clearance (BAC) teams nationally,[52] but the current strength and deployment of military-related demining is unknown. International operators mainly work in the central provinces of Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien Hue provinces, and most recently also in the Central Highlands province of Kon Tum.

Internationally-funded operators deployed 114 teams and 1,474 at the end of 2024.[53] NGO operators are not currently operating in the areas close to Vietnam's borders where many of the mined areas are located. Survey and clearance by the international operators currently address contamination from CMR and other ERW, not AP mines. For further details on survey and clearance capacity of humanitarian operators, see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Vietnam.

**Table 3: International NGO clearance capacity (at end 2024)[54]**

| Operator | Area | Teams | Personnel |
|---|---|---|---|
| MAG | Quang Binh, Quang Tri | 44 | 484 |
| NPA | Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue | 18 | 194 |
| PTVN | Quang Binh, Quang Tri | 18 | 184 |
| KPVP | Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, Thua Thien Hue | 34 | 612 |
| **Totals** | | **114** | **1,474** |

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 4: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 0 | |
| **Technical survey** | 0 | |
| **Non-technical survey** | 0 | |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | **Comments** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 6 | Any destruction of mines by the army and army-related companies is unknown |

International NGOs conduct survey and clearance focused on a wide array of explosive ordnance, including cluster munition remnants, air-dropped bombs, and artillery shells but they rarely encounter AP mines. NPA destroyed three AP mines in EOD operations in Hue City.[55] PTVN's EOD operations in Quang Binh and Quang Tri destroyed a further three AP mines.[56]

50 Emails from Kimberley McCosker, NPA, 8 April 2021 and 21 April 2022; Valentina Stivanello, MAG, 29 April 2022; GICHD, 24 April 2022; and Tim Horner on behalf of Mr Phuc, VNMAC, 6 April 2021.

51 STA Capacity Development Project (NPA), "Vietnamese legal framework in mine action", January 2023.

52 Interview with Sr. Col. Nguyen Thanh Ban, Engineering Command, Hanoi, 18 June 2013.

53 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025; NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025; Pham Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025 and Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 21 May 2025.

54 Ibid.

55 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.

56 Email from Pham Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025.

# OTHER AREAS

# KOSOVO

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

Not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

**1.12KM²**

Light
(National estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0.05 | 0.03 |
| Technical Survey | 0.06 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 8 | 10 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, Kosovo launched its new Mine Action Strategy for 2025–30, which targets the completion of all landmine and cluster munition remnants (CMR) clearance by 2030. Clearance output was higher in 2024 than the previous year, although 70% of the area cleared found no mines. The HALO Trust is the only operator conducting mine clearance in Kosovo and, at the time of writing, the programme was facing closure due to a lack of funding.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **While formal accession to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) is not currently possible for Kosovo, as it is not yet recognised as a State by the depository, Kosovo should submit a letter to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General stating that it intends to fully comply, on a voluntary basis, with the APMBC and submit voluntary Article 7 reports annually.**
- **The Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) should seek to complete clearance of anti-personnel (AP) mines as soon as possible. With the newly developed mine action strategy, and if some funding can be sustained, KMAC should ensure the implementation of realistic annual targets and adhere to the established timeline for completion.**
- **A specific resource mobilisation strategy should be developed as a matter of urgency.**

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Kosovo Security Force (KSF)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2024, KMAC reported that 21 AP mined areas remained covering more than 0.89km$^2$ (see Table 1). In addition, three areas are contaminated with both AP mines and CMR totalling 225,000m$^2$, bringing the total mined area to close to 1.12km$^2$ (see Table 2).[1] This is an increase from 28 mined areas covering almost 1km$^2$ reported for end 2023.[2] The baseline of mine contamination at the end of 2024 cannot be reconciled with the baseline reported by KMAC at the end of 2023.

**Table 1: AP mined area by district (at end 2024) (KMAC data)[3]**

| District | CHAs | Area (m²) | SHAs | Area (m²) | Total areas | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| South | 0 | 0 | 4 | 60,971 | 4 | 60,971 |
| East | 1 | 9,516 | 4 | 68,832 | 5 | 78,348 |
| West | 5 | 352,663 | 7 | 398,717 | 12 | 751,380 |
| **Totals** | **6** | **362,179** | **15** | **528,520** | **21** | **890,699** |

CHA = Confirmed hazardous area SHA = Suspected hazardous area

**Table 2: Mined area by contamination type (at end 2024) (KMAC data)[4]**

| Type of contamination | Total areas | Total area (m²) |
|---|---|---|
| AP mines | 21 | 890,699 |
| Mixed AP mines and CMR | 3 | 225,000 |
| **Totals** | **24** | **1,115,699** |

The last detailed survey of contamination in Kosovo was in 2013, during which HALO and KMAC systematically conducted community surveys across most of the districts in Kosovo, with the exception of four municipalities in the north, confirming a total of 130 hazardous areas: 79 mined areas covering an estimated 2.76km$^2$ and 51 cluster munition strikes covering an estimated 7.63km$^2$.[5] The northern municipalities have since been surveyed and KMAC has confirmed that no mined areas remain.[6]

HALO conducted non-technical survey (NTS) in 2021–22 with a view to creating confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), as this was not done during the 2013 survey (prior to the recent survey there was no classification of CHAs and SHAs in Kosovo). HALO says the project significantly contributed to ensuring Kosovo's current baseline was as accurate as possible given available resources.[7] No previously unrecorded AP mined areas were discovered in 2024.[8]

Kosovo is contaminated by mines, CMR, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of the conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the late 1990s, and between Yugoslavia and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member States in 1999.[9]

Both AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines were used during the conflict – in fixed-pattern minefields as well as more randomly in "nuisance" minefields.[10] The UN claimed in 2002 that "the problems associated with landmines, cluster munitions and other items of unexploded ordnance [UXO] in Kosovo have been virtually eliminated",[11] but further investigation revealed considerably more contamination than thought.[12]

1 Email from Ahmet Sallova, Head, KMAC, 5 May 2025.
2 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 17 May 2024.
3 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 5 May 2025.
4 Ibid.
5 HALO, "Action on cluster munitions in Kosovo", Side event, First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), Dubrovnik, 10 September 2015.
6 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 23 August 2022.
7 Email from Michael Montañ, Programme Manager, HALO, 18 April 2023.
8 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 5 May 2025.
9 See UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), "UNMIK OKPCC EOD Management Section Annual Report 2005", Pristina, 18 January 2006, p. 2; and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), *Explosive Remnants of War, Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo*, Rev'd Edn, Geneva, June 2001, at: https://bit.ly/331PWfQ, pp. 6 and 15.
10 ICRC, *Explosive Remnants of War, Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo,* June 2001, p. 15.
11 "UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report – 2001", Mine Action Coordination Cell, Pristina, undated but 2002, p. 1.
12 HALO, "Failing the Kosovars: The Hidden Impact and Threat from ERW", Report, 15 December 2006, p. 1.

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

In addition to contamination from mines, Kosovo is contaminated with CMR (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Kosovo for further information) as well as other ERW. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) and KSF explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams regularly dispose of ERW in response to information from the public or demining organisations.[13]

## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Kosovo's mine action programme is fully nationally owned, with a strong, long-standing commitment from the government, and benefits from a dedicated team of permanent national staff.[14] KMAC is responsible for managing survey and clearance of mines and ERW throughout Kosovo. KMAC prepares an annual work plan in cooperation with international demining NGOs and coordinates their operations along with the national demining teams of the KSF. It also coordinates survey, quality assurance (QA), risk education, public information, and victim assistance.[15] KMAC's role and responsibilities as head of the national mine action programme under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence were established and institutionalised by Kosovo's 2012 Law on Humanitarian Demining which was amended in 2022.[16]

NGO operators in Kosovo have consistently reported a constructive working relationship with KMAC and say there is an enabling environment for mine action, with clear administrative processes in place for obtaining visas and annual accreditation.[17]

### FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2024, Kosovo's government provided €1.1 million in financial support to KMAC and the KSF for mine and CMR clearance, a similar amount to previous years.[18] In 2024 and 2025, HALO was funded by the EU for mine clearance. This funding was coming to an end in December 2025, and no new funding had been secured as at May 2025.[19]

It has been estimated that €3.5 million will be required on an annual basis to meet Kosovo's mine action strategy's objectives, totalling €21 million between 2025 and 2030. At the time of writing, the programme had limited, confirmed international funding beyond the summer of 2025. To address this gap, the mine action programme will actively seek to mobilise funds.[20]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Kosovo's mine action strategy for 2025–30 prioritises gender and diversity mainstreaming as a guiding principle. The strategy directs that mine action activities be sensitive to gender and inclusive of ethnic and disability considerations, declaring that gender and diversity considerations should be integrated into all phases of planning, implementation and follow-up.[21] Both KMAC and KSF have gender policies in place. KMAC reported that the KSF's gender policy aims to facilitate the consultation of all groups affected by mines and ERW, including women and children. KMAC hired a Gender and Safeguarding focal point who began working in 2023.[22]

**Table 3: Gender composition of operators in 2024**[23]

| Operator | Total staff | Women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KMAC | 5 | 1 (20%) | 1 | 0 (0%) | 3 | 0 (0%) |
| KSF | 112 | 27 (24%) | 14 | 2 (14%) | 60 | 9 (15%) |
| HALO* | 155 | 42 (27%) | 28 | 6 21%) | 134 | 36 (27%) |
| **Totals** | **272** | **70 (26%)** | **43** | **8 (19%)** | **197** | **45 (23%)** |

*Data correct as at December 2024.

13 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 1 August 2012.
14 "Mine Action Strategy 2019–2024 in Republic of Kosovo", 4 April 2019, pp. 5–6.
15 ICRC, *Explosive Remnants of War, Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo*, June 2001, p. 15.
16 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 16 June and 3 July 2017; Ministry of Defence, "Mine Action Strategy 2019–2024 in Republic of Kosovo", 4 April 2019, p. 3; and Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 4.
17 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 30 March 2023; and Michael Montañ, HALO, 18 April 2023.
18 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
19 Email from Fred Wellesley, Programme Manager, HALO, 15 April 2025.
20 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 16.
21 Ibid., p. 18.
22 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
23 Ibid.; and emails from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025; and Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.

The mine action strategy recognises the lack of economic opportunities in Kosovo, with women and youth particularly impacted by limited employment prospects. This leads many to seek work abroad, posing both a challenge and an opportunity for the mine action sector. It poses a threat of losing valuable talent and human capital, yet it also provides an opportunity to recruit new talent within Kosovo. By hiring both women and men from diverse ethnic groups and offering competitive salary packages and benefits, HALO actively promote gender equality and economic empowerment within local communities. This approach aligns with the principles outlined in its Gender and Diversity Policy.[24]

HALO's gender policy, developed with the Kosovo Women's Network, aims to improve recruitment and retention of women by addressing barriers such as childcare responsibilities.[25] In 2024, HALO continued its provision of childcare stipends and explicitly mentioned them in job announcements to attract female applicants and support retention. Health insurance was also extended to all staff. In 2024, nine women received childcare stipends; two baby boxes were issued; and 92 school-supply packages were distributed to employees' children during the spring and winter terms.[26]

HALO continues to ensure that as many household members as possible are consulted during pre- and post-clearance surveys and that women, children, and ethnic minorities are included in community liaison (CL) activities. There is always a female CL Officer supporting the NTS teams, and senior management staff who are fluent in relevant languages are deployed for CL.[27]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Kosovo has a national mine action standard on the environment although it has not yet been updated in line with the revised IMAS 07.13 (second edition, 3 July 2024).[28] KMAC reported that environmental assessments are integrated into the planning and delivery of survey and clearance.[29] It prioritises clearance based on risk reduction, development, environmental protection, and poverty reduction, with contaminated land whose clearance would reduce emissions by enabling better land management or support climate adaptation given the highest priority.[30] The Law on Climate Change, adopted in December 2023, seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and Infrastructure.[31]

Demining takes place from April to November, but increasingly frequent and unpredictable weather due to climate change is affecting operations. NPA Kosovo has an environmental policy in place, conducts environmental assessments to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance, and, since 2023, has an environmental focal point for the programme.[32] In March 2024, HALO's Kosovo programme introduced a standard operating procedure (SOP) on environmental management for operations, aligned with HALO's global environmental management SOP. This SOP aims to ensure minimal environmental impact and mitigates potential negative effects of survey and clearance operations.[33]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

KMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation version for its national mine action database. Data are disaggregated between mines, CMR, and other ERW.[34] Operators were positive in their assessments of the quality and accessibility of data contained in the database and of KMAC's information management systems in general. KMAC is collaborating with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to install IMSMA Core, which was expected to be operational by late 2024 but at the time of writing was still in development.[35]

HALO reported that all data collection forms are consistent and enable collection of the necessary data and added that the database is checked in comparison to HALO's quarterly reports; once every task is completed or when KMAC agrees and signs off on a re-survey or survey conducted by an NTS team, the data is fed into IMSMA.[36] The land release data reported to Mine Action Review by clearance operators and the KMAC were more or less aligned. This is an improvement compared to previous years' reports, which typically contained greater discrepancies.

KMAC reported to Mine Action Review in 2023 that voluntary submission of Article 7 reports was again under consideration by the authorities.[37]

24 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 5.
25 Email from Olivia Meader, HALO, 22 May 2020.
26 Email from Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.
27 Email from Megan Dwyer, HALO, 11 May 2022.
28 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 24 April 2023.
29 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 14 May 2024.
30 GICHD, "Mine Action and the Resilience of Communities to Climate Change", Report, December 2023, p. 40.
31 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 5.
32 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025.
33 Email from Michael Montañ, HALO, 7 May 2024.
34 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 30 April 2019.
35 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
36 Email from Megan Dwyer, HALO, 11 May 2022.
37 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 8 June 2023.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Kosovo's Mine Action Strategy for 2025–30, developed by KMAC in consultation with operators and with the support of the GICHD, declares that the risk of explosive ordnance contamination will be considered tolerable once all high and medium-priority tasks have been completed by 2030, and provided that there are no incidents for five years thereafter. The general expectation is that any remaining contamination after 2030 would be considered as residual.[38] Achievement of Strategic Objective 1 on land release is to be assessed by reference to four outputs:

- Greater clarity on the remaining contamination in Northern municipalities will be established;
- Mine action organisations will continue clearance operations to fulfil task completion, prioritising high and medium-priority tasks and concluding with low-priority tasks. However, the strategy also states that the risk of EO contamination is considered tolerable once all high- and medium-priority tasks are completed which is the objective that HALO is working towards;[39]
- In light of current efficiency challenges and anticipated obstacles posed by difficult terrain such as dense vegetation and steep slopes, KMAC will reassess clearance requirements to enhance efficiency and effectiveness; and
- Recognising that 2030 marks the conclusion of the international mine action organisations' presence in Kosovo, the mine action programme will implement staff transition plans.[40]

A target of 45,000m$^2$ of annual mine clearance has been set, along with zero high and medium priority tasks remaining by 2030 and as few low priority tasks remaining as possible. It is planned that of the 38 municipalities currently contaminated with landmines and CMR, 35 will be declared free from risks of landmines or CMR by 2030.[41]

KMAC elaborates an annual work plan for survey and clearance of landmines. In 2024, due to an increase in funding from the EU, HALO expanded their clearance capacities for mined areas, allowing KMAC to incorporate additional regions into their annual work plan.[42]

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2024, the national mine action standard (NMAS) for land release in Kosovo was updated in accordance with IMAS and in consultation with clearance operators although the changes were related to CMR clearance rather than mines.[43]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, Kosovo's national mine action programme's capacity consisted of two international operators—HALO and NPA—and a national operator: the KSF. NPA did not conduct survey or clearance of AP mined area in 2024, tackling only CMR.[44] The KSF did not conduct any survey or clearance in 2024 but provided a round-the-clock EOD emergency response. KFOR, a NATO-led international peacekeeping force, supports NPA with BAC in northern Kosovo.[45] The demining season is from the end of March to the end of November due to weather conditions.[46]

**Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024**[47]

| Operator | Manual clearance teams | Total clearance personnel |
|---|---|---|
| HALO | 5 | *24 |

*Average across the year with 27 personnel in March–April; 22 in May to July; 23 in August-September; and 25 in October–December.

HALO's operational personnel are cross-trained for mine clearance and BAC and can move readily between the two.[48] There was an increase in the number of clearance personnel deployed by HALO in 2024 compared to the previous year due to increased funding. In 2025, however, two major funding contracts were due to expire. Unless new funding is secured, the programme may close by the end of the year.[49]

38 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 8.
39 Email from Fred Wellesley, HALO, 5 September 2025.
40 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 10.
41 Ibid., p. 11.
42 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 17 May 2024.
43 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025; and Fred Wellesley, HALO, 5 September 2025.
44 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 25 April 2024.
45 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 3 September 2024.
46 "Mine Action Strategy 2019–2024 in Republic of Kosovo", 4 April 2019, p. 3.
47 Email from Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.
48 Email from Megan Dwyer, HALO, 11 May 2022.
49 Email from Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (m²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 47,065 | HALO data |
| **Technical survey** | 56,822 | HALO/KMAC data |
| **Non-technical survey** | 0 | HALO/KMAC data |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | **Comments** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 8 | HALO data |

## SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, a total of 56,822m$^2$ of area was reduced through technical survey, no area was cancelled through non-technical survey.[50] This is an increase from 2023 when no mined area was released through survey.[51]

**Table 6: Release through technical survey in 2024**[52]

| District | Operator | No. of areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gjakovë | HALO | 2 | 20,586 |
| Prizren | HALO | 2 | 36,236 |
| **Totals** | | **4** | **56,822** |

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, a total of 47,065m$^2$ was released through clearance with eight AP mines found and destroyed (see Table 5). This is an increase from the 29,309m$^2$ cleared in 2023,[53] but seven tasks totalling 30,371m$^2$ were cleared without finding any mines.[54]

**Table 7: Mine clearance in 2024**[55]

| District | Operator | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m²) | AP mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ferizaj | HALO | 1 | 14,074 | 8 |
| Gjakovë | HALO | 5 | 15,010 | 0 |
| Prizren | HALO | 2 | 18,521 | 0 |
| **Totals** | | **8** | **47,605** | **8** |

50 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 5 May 2025; and Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.
51 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 17 May 2024.
52 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 5 May 2025; and Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.
53 Email from Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.

## PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Kosovo cannot formally adhere to the APMBC as it is not recognised as a State by the depositary of the Convention (the UN Secretary-General) and therefore does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 5. Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear AP mines as soon as possible.

In its Mine Action Strategy 2025–30, Kosovo has set a completion deadline for 2030. Operators expect that Kosovo will be able to meet this deadline as long as donor funding can be secured to maintain capacity.[56] According to KMAC, securing sufficient donor support to clear the remaining mine and CMR contamination in Kosovo will be one of the primary challenges in 2026 and beyond.[57] This effort is seen as a crucial contributor to enhancing human security, economic development, and stability in Kosovo and the broader Western Balkans region.[58]

**Table 8: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

| Year | Area cleared (km²) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 0.05 |
| 2023 | 0.03 |
| 2022 | 0.02 |
| 2021 | 0.10 |
| 2020 | 0.14 |
| **Total** | **0.34** |

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The second strategic objective of Kosovo's Mine Action Strategy 2025–30 focuses on enhancing national capacities and includes a strategic outcome on the management of residual contamination. As clearance operations conclude in 2030, Kosovo will shift from proactive clearance efforts to the reactive management of residual threats by KMAC with support from KSF units. Recognising the unique requirements of risk management, KMAC will seek to ensure that both KMAC and KSF are equipped, staffed, and resourced to address residual contamination effectively.[59] A comprehensive residual contamination strategy is planned for development and submission to the Government of Kosovo by 2029.[60]

56 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025.
57 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
58 Email from Michael Montañ, HALO, 7 May 2024.
59 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, pp. 8 and 12.
60 Ibid., p. 13.

# WESTERN SAHARA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2025

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

Not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

**50KM²**

Heavy
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Release in 2023 (km²) |
|---|---|---|
| Clearance | 0.19 | 0.08 |
| Technical Survey | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Technical Survey | 2.88 | 0 |

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| AP Mines destroyed | 22 | 1 |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- SafeLane Global

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

There was a substantial increase in land release output from 2023 to 2024, with a doubling of clearance and, for the first time since 2018, release of mined areas through non-technical survey (NTS). The Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) developed a new mine action strategy for 2024–28, although this is currently only available as a short summary document in Arabic and will require review in 2026. It does not include a completion date for mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) clearance.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic should reaffirm its written commitment to implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), including clearance of all anti-personnel (AP) mines east of the Berm, consonant with its international human rights obligations. The commitment should include annual submission of a voluntary Article 7 report.**
- **Greater support should be provided to SMACO to enable it to continue to coordinate mine action east of the Berm, and to ensure that capacity development efforts are not wasted.**
- **Mine action in Western Sahara must not become forgotten or overlooked by the international community. Support must still be given to address the remaining mine, cluster munition, and other explosive ordnance contamination.**

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) [Territory of Western Sahara, east of the Berm]
- Royal Moroccan Army [Territory of Western Sahara, west of the Berm]

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Royal Moroccan Army (RMA)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- SafeLane Global

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Western Sahara

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The exact extent of mine contamination across Western Sahara is not known, although the areas along the Berm[1] contain some of the densest mine contamination in the world. According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the primary mine threat in Western Sahara east of the Berm—excluding the Berm itself, restricted areas, and the buffer strip—is from anti-vehicle (AV) mines rather than AP mines; cluster munition remnants (CMR) are also a major hazard.[2] No areas suspected or confirmed to contain solely AP mines remain to the east of the Berm.

At the end of 2024, land in Western Sahara to the east of the Berm contained a total of 24 areas confirmed or suspected to contain mixed mines, covering a total of nearly 210km$^2$ (see Table 1).[3] This is a decrease from the previous year when contamination totalled nearly 213km$^2$ across 24 areas,[4] reflecting land release during 2024.

Both the north and south of Western Sahara are known or suspected to contain AP mines, as set out in Table 2.[5]

**Table 1: Mined area east of the Berm (at end 2024)[6]**

| Type of contamination | CHAs | Area (km²) | SHAs | Area (km²) | Total CHAs and SHAs | Total area (km²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AP/AV mines | 14 | 84.08 | 10 | 125.91 | 24 | 209.99 |
| **Totals** | **14** | **84.08** | **10** | **125.91** | **24** | **209.99** |

CHA = Confirmed hazardous area SHA = Suspected hazardous area

**Table 2: Mined area containing AP mines by province east of the Berm (at end 2024)[7]**

| Province | CHAs | Area (km²) | SHAs | Area (km²) | Total CHAs and SHAs | Total area (km²) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North Region | 4 | 0.24 | 3 | 4.11 | 7 | 4.35 |
| South Region | 10 | 83.84 | 7 | 121.80 | 17 | 205.64 |
| **Totals** | **14** | **84.08** | **10** | **125.91** | **24** | **209.99** |

In September 2018, UNMAS reported that, following NTS, east of the Berm, 10 of the then 27 mined areas remained, covering an estimated total of almost 120km$^2$. These areas, which are located within the 5km-wide buffer strip, are not accessible for clearance.[8] Clearance of the buffer strip of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) is not foreseen in the MINURSO Military Agreements No. 2 (with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro, the Polisario Front) and No. 3 (with the Royal Moroccan Army, RMA). This, according to the United Nations (UN), considerably limits the ability of military observers in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to conduct patrols and verify developments.[9] No survey or clearance of the buffer strip was conducted during 2024.[10]

1 A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm was built during the conflict, of which 1,465km divides the territory between Morocco on the west and the Polisario Front on the east. The Berm is 12 times the length of the erstwhile Berlin Wall and second in length today only to the Great Wall of China.

2 Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March 2018.

3 Email from Elhadji Kebe, Chief, Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

4 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 16 May 2024.

5 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

6 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 16 May 2024.

7 Ibid.

8 Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 14 September 2018. The buffer strip is an area 5km wide east of the Berm. MINURSO, "Ceasefire Monitoring Overview", undated but accessed 1 June 2016, at: http://bit.ly/2Yxg1nv.

9 "Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara", UN doc. S/2017/307, 10 April 2017, p. 8; and email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 6 August 2020.

10 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

The contamination is a result of fighting in previous decades between the RMA and the Polisario Front forces. Most mine contamination identified during ongoing and historical clearance was from AV mines though some areas previously thought to contain only AV mines were found to also contain AP mines following NTS in the Agwanit Area of Responsibility.[11] In 2023, MINURSO identified a probable additional threat of AP mines in the Territory. MINURSO has continued to advocate for the parties to the conflict to share detailed information on where renewed fighting had taken place and the types of munitions used so that it could update the mine action database.[12]

The RMA controls territory to the west of the Berm where it has been conducting large-scale demining. According to UNMAS, the RMA cooperates with the MINURSO mine action component and submits regular monthly reports of its activities in the territory, west of the Berm, helping to build a clearer understanding of the mine and ERW threat across Western Sahara.[13]

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Western Sahara also has a significant problem from CMR and other ERW (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Western Sahara for further information).

## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

UNMAS Western Sahara, formerly the MINURSO Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC), facilitates MINURSO's monitoring of the ceasefire and ensures the safe passage of UN personnel. On 31 October 2024, under UN Security Council Resolution 2756, MINURSO's mandate was extended for an additional 12 months to 31 October 2025.

UNMAS Western Sahara serves as the UN focal point for mine action activities within the MINURSO area of operations.

Its contracted teams work only in areas east of the Berm. The RMA conducts its own demining in areas west of the Berm. In 2013–14, the Polisario Front, with UN support, established SMACO, which is responsible for coordinating mine action in Western Sahara east of the Berm, excluding the buffer strip.[14]

In 2024, SMACO received funding from Spain to cover its running costs and UNMAS received funding from MINURSO for its clearance.[15]

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

UNMAS has reported that gender policies are implemented in accordance with UNMAS, the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and MINURSO guidelines, as well as with direction from the Polisario Front.[16] UNMAS has a gender strategy as part of its overall country strategy with a work plan and system to monitor its implementation.[17] UNMAS also reported that gender has been mainstreamed into Western Sahara's national mine action work plans and the SMACO 2019–23 mine action strategy.[18] During survey, efforts are made to consider the needs of men, women, girls, and boys to ensure more effective and efficient operations, despite challenges presented by survey among Bedouin.[19]

UNMAS claims equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams east of the Berm, including for managerial and supervisory positions. In 2024, one woman was employed by SMACO and eleven (14% of the total) by SafeLane Global (UNMAS's contractor), including eight in operational roles (also 14%) (see Table 3).[20] This is unchanged from 2023.[21]

11 Emails from Leon Louw, Programme Manager, UNMAS, 30 March 2021; Edwin Faigmane, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 18 June 2020; Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 31 July 2019; Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March 2018; and Virginie Auger, UNMAS, 29 March 2017.

12 Report of the Secretary-General, Situation concerning Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2023/729, 3 October 2023, para. 52.

13 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

14 Response to questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 24 February 2014, and email, 25 February 2014; and email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 6 August 2020.

15 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

16 Emails from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March and 5 May 2018.

17 Emails from Leon Louw, UNMAS, 30 March 2021; and Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

18 Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 18 June 2020.

19 Emails from El Hadji Mamadou Kebe, NPA, 4 May 2019 and 14 March 2018.

20 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

21 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 16 May 2024.

**Table 3: Gender composition of SMACO and SafeLane Global in 2024**[22]

| Entity | Total staff | Total women staff | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SMACO | 5 | 1 (20%) | 2 | 0 (0%) | 0 | 0 |
| SafeLane Global | 77 | 11 (14%) | 17 | 2 (12%) | 57 | 8 (14%) |
| **Totals** | **82** | **12 (15%)** | **19** | **2 (11%)** | **57** | **8 (14%)** |

Through SMACO, UNMAS also supports the Sahrawi Mine Action Women's Team (SMAWT), an all-female organisation working on risk education in Rabouni and the five Sahrawi refugee camps. All national deminers, both male and female, are ethnic Sahrawi.[23]

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

There is no national standard on environmental management in mine action, but SMACO have a policy on environmental management that requires all implementation plans to consider environmental impacts.[24] UNMAS Western Sahara also does not have an environmental management policy but reported that environmental impact is considered as part of the tasking process and the implementation plan to minimise potential harm from demining.[25] This includes waste disposal procedures for rubbish and grey and black water disposal; how and where to set up camps; and how to dismantle camps without leaving an operational footprint.[26]

Risks from extreme weather such as high temperatures and sandstorms are factored into the planning and prioritisation of survey and clearance tasks. Operations are halted during sandstorms; during periods of extreme heat, teams start earlier and work shorter hours.[27]

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for Western Sahara, east of the Berm, was upgraded to IMSMA Core in 2022.[28] All data have been successfully migrated to the new database. Review and verification of the data, which began at the end of 2023, was ongoing at the time of writing.[29] In addition, a process is now in place to validate any newly submitted information from the implementing partner.[30]

## PLANNING AND TASKING

SMACO 2019–23 mine action strategy for Western Sahara east of the Berm, included objectives toward a Western Sahara free of mine and ERW impact, including effective accident data collection, sustainable funding by 2020, and adequate staffing.[31] These goals were not achieved.

SMACO has developed a new mine action strategy for 2024–28 and UNMAS is supporting SMACO in reviewing and updating the strategy in line with the political and regional developments.[32] As at September 2025, SMACO reported to UNMAS that only a summarised version of the strategy (in Arabic) is available and noted that the plan will require review in 2026.[33] The UNMAS mine action work plan for 2024 supports MINURSO's mandate.[34]

UNMAS and SMACO identify priorities for clearance of both minefields and cluster munition strikes east of the Berm in conjunction with MINURSO. Priorities are identified based on humanitarian needs for the safety and freedom of movement of local populations, while UNMAS Western Sahara facilitates the ceasefire and ensuring the safe passage of UN personnel.[35]

22 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
23 Email from Leon Louw, UNMAS, 30 March 2021; and SMAWT newsletter, March 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3yN542U.
24 Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 18 June 2020.
25 Emails from Leon Louw, UNMAS, 4 February 2022; and Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 21 March 2022.
26 Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 24 May 2022.
27 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 16 May 2024.
28 Emails from Leon Louw, UNMAS, 4 February 2022; and Nadine Husseine, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.
29 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
30 Ibid.
31 SMACO, "Strategic Plan 2019–2023", at: http://bit.ly/38jaGm²; and email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 31 July 2019.
32 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
33 Email from Dimitri Lermytte, Associate Program Officer, UNMAS, 15 September 2025.
34 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
35 Emails from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March and 5 May 2018; and Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 6 August 2020.

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Local mine action standards were developed and finalised in 2016 by UNMAS, together with SMACO, and in coordination with mine action partners. UNMAS reported in 2019 that translation of the standards into Arabic had been completed and shared with SMACO.[36] UNMAS said that the standards are reviewed annually but that no updates were made in 2024.[37] An external quality management system was in place from 2018 and implemented by UNMAS and SMACO to the east of the Berm.[38]

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

SafeLane Global was the sole implementing operator for UNMAS Western Sahara in 2024.[39]

**Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024**[40]

| Operator | Manual teams | Total deminers | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| SafeLane Global (for UNMAS Western Sahara) | 2 | 24 | No change from 2023* |
| **Totals** | **2** | **24** | |

*Two teams have been deployed since 23 May 2023 when demining operations resumed.

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

**Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2024**

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km²) | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **Clearance** | 0.19 | UNMAS data |
| **Technical survey** | 0 | UNMAS data |
| **Non-technical survey** | 2.88 | UNMAS data |
| **Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks** | **2024** | **Comments** |
| **AP mines destroyed** | 22 | UNMAS data |

### SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, 2.88km$^2$ across three AP mined area was cancelled through NTS (see Table 5), an increase from 2023 when no area was cancelled through NTS. No area was reduced through TS in 2024 or 2023.[41]

**Table 6: Release of AP mined area through NTS in 2024**[42]

| Region | Operator | Areas cancelled | Area cancelled (m²) |
|---|---|---|---|
| North | SafeLane Global | *2 | 149,493 |
| South | SafeLane Global | *1 | 2,732,080 |
| **Totals** | | **3** | **2,881,573** |

*Partially cancelled.

36 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 29 April 2019; and Dandan Xu, UNMAS, 28 June 2019.
37 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
38 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 29 April 2019; and Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 28 July 2020.
39 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
40 Ibid.
41 Emails from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025 and 16 May 2024.
42 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 16 May 2024.

In addition, two previously unrecorded mined areas totalling 112,998m$^2$ which have a mix of AP and AV mines were added to the database. These were legacy minefields from the 1985–91 conflict.[43]

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, 0.19km$^2$ of mined area was cleared, with the destruction of 22 AP mines, 4 AV mines, and 15 items of UXO.[44] This is an increase from 2023 when 0.08km$^2$ was cleared with one AP mine, two AV mines, and one item of UXO found and destroyed.[45]

**Table 7: Clearance of AP/AV mined areas in 2024**[46]

| Region | Operator | Areas cleared | Area cleared (m$^2$) | AP mines destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| North | SafeLane Global | *4 | 188,218 | 22 |
| **Total** | | **4** | **188,218** | **22** |

*Two areas were partially cancelled by NTS; clearance is ongoing in one area.

Between 1 September 2023 and 31 July 2024, the RMA reported release of more than 189km$^2$ of land west of the berm with the destruction of 35 AP mines, 15 AV mines, and 549 items of ERW.[47]

## PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is not a State Party to the APMBC and cannot adhere to it as it is not recognised as a State by the depositary – the UN Secretary-General. In June 2014, however, the SADR submitted a voluntary Article 7 transparency report to the UN "as a sign of the support of the Sahrawi State for the goals of the Treaty".[48]

There was a substantial increase in land release output from 2023 to 2024, as the resumption of clearance by UNMAS teams in the Mijek area in January 2024 marked the restart of full demining operations east of the berm for the first time since September 2019. At that time, operations were suspended at the request of the Polisario Front.[49]

In SMACO's mine action strategy 2019–23, the vision was for Western Sahara to be free of the impact of mines and ERW by 2023.[50] This target was not met. A new strategic plan 2024–28 plan has been developed, but UNMAS has stated that due to the current political and security situation, it is challenging to estimate a completion date for clearing mines and other explosive ordnance in Western Sahara.[51]

Additional challenges include maintaining consistent support for funding, capacity-building, and access to new clearance technologies, all of which are vital to improving clearance efficiency. Alongside demining, UNMAS Western Sahara, as part of the MINURSO mission, provides 24/7 emergency response to EO-related incidents, as well as logistical support in response to mission requests.[52]

43 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
44 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
45 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 16 May 2024.
46 Ibid.
47 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para. 49.
48 "SADR initiative welcomed by Maputo Conference on Mine Ban", *Sahara Press Service*, 2 July 2014, at: https://bit.ly/4mdALHU.
49 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para. 49.
50 SMACO "Strategic Plan 2019–2023", at: http://bit.ly/38jaGm$^2$.
51 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
52 Ibid.

# ANNEX

# ANNEX 1: ARTICLE 5 OF THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION

## ARTICLE 5: DESTRUCTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES IN MINED AREAS

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
   - **a)** The duration of the proposed extension;
   - **b)** A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
     - **(i)** The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programmes;
     - **(ii)** The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
     - **(iii)** Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
   - **c)** The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
   - **d)** Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| **AIM** | Abandoned Improvised Mines (Afghanistan) |
| **AP** | Anti-personnel |
| **APMBC** | 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention |
| **AV** | Anti-vehicle |
| **AXO** | Abandoned explosive ordnance |
| **BAC** | Battle area clearance |
| **BiH** | Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| **CCM** | 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions |
| **CCW** | Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons |
| **CHA** | Confirmed hazardous area |
| **CMR** | Cluster munition remnants |
| **DCA** | DanChurchAid |
| **EDD** | Explosive detection dog (team) |
| **DDG** | Danish Demining Group |
| **EO** | Explosive ordnance |
| **EOD** | Explosive ordnance disposal |
| **EORE** | Explosive ordnance risk education |
| **ERW** | Explosive remnants of war |
| **EU** | European Union |
| **FSD** | Fondation suisse de déminage |
| **GICHD** | Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining |
| **GIS** | Geographic information system |
| **HI** | Humanity and Inclusion |
| **ICRC** | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| **IED** | Improvised explosive device |
| **IMAS** | International Mine Action Standards |
| **IMSMA** | Information Management System for Mine Action |
| **IP** | Implementing partner |
| **ITF** | International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security |
| **LIS** | Landmine Impact Survey |
| **MAG** | Mines Advisory Group |
| **MDD** | Mine detection dog (team) |
| **MoU** | Memorandum of Understanding |
| **MRE** | Mine risk education |
| **MTT** | Multi-task team |
| **NATO** | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| **NGO** | Non-governmental organisation |
| **NMAS** | National Mine Action Standards |
| **NPA** | Norwegian People's Aid |
| **NSAG** | Non-State armed group |
| **NTS** | Non-technical survey |
| **OAP** | Oslo Action Plan |
| **OAS** | Organization of American States |
| **OSCE** | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| **PPE** | Personal protective equipment |
| **QA** | Quality assurance |
| **QC** | Quality control |
| **QM** | Quality management |
| **SHA** | Suspected hazardous area |
| **SOP** | Standing (or standard) operating procedure |
| **SRAAP** | Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan |
| **TS** | Technical survey |
| **TWG** | Technical working group |
| **UN** | United Nations |
| **UNDP** | United Nations Development Programme |
| **UNICEF** | United Nations Children's Fund |
| **UNMAS** | United Nations Mine Action Service |
| **UXO** | Unexploded ordnance |
| **VA** | Victim assistance |
| **VTF** | Voluntary Trust Fund (United Nations) |

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